
Clio's Psyche

Understanding the "Why" of Culture, Current Events, History, and Society

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Lawrence J. Friedman: Psychohistorian

Paul H. Elovitz
Clio's Psyche

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Hitler as the Bad Boy of the European Family of Nations

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For some historians, David R. Beisel will have attempted the impossible by endeavoring to illustrate that Europeans cooperated to bring about World War II. For historians there is no question that Hitler was the principal actor in the emerging confrontation of the 1920s and 1930s, but Beisel, in *The Suicidal Embrace: Hitler, the Allies, and the Origins of the Second World War* (Nyack, NY: Circumstantial Productions Publishing, 2003; 399 pp.; ISBN 1891592157, hardback; ISBN 1891592149, paperback, \$18.00), builds the case for Hitler's being unconsciously assisted by European diplomats, politicians, journalists, and ordi-

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America as an Imperial Power? Psychological Implications Special Issue

War, Imperialism, and "American Character": The Rhetoric of Manliness and Shame, Past and Present

Nancy C. Unger
Santa Clara University

My local newspaper invites readers to submit one-sentence political editorials. A recent submission accepted for publication reads simply, "Yeeee ha! is not a foreign policy."

Much has been made of the "cowboy approach" to world affairs by George W. Bush. He had only been in office a few months when the German weekly magazine *Der Spiegel* featured a caricature of Bush wearing a cowboy hat, treading on the globe with his cowboy boots, both guns blazing (an image reprinted by the Asian press as well). But domestically, Bush's cowboy image has been more celebrated than lampooned, especially in recent months. Several of the "Re-elect Bush" campaign items new on the market highlight Bush's cowboy image specifically. Moreover, the "toughness" of Bush's rhetoric and action when it comes to Iraq has been favorably contrasted with the shameful "softness," "weakness," and even "cowardice" of those both at home and abroad who oppose his measures.

The powerful rhetoric of equating both war

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and the spread of American ideals with manliness and national self-respect, while equating peace, non-military intervention, and isolationism with weakness and cowardice, is hardly new. Such appeals strike deep chords in the American psyche, perpetuating the glorification of a particular perception of the "American character" that is as old as American imperialism itself.

In her new biography of another American cowboy, *Theodore Roosevelt: A Strenuous Life*, Kathleen Dalton examines the "muscular Christianity" and "righteous ruthlessness" impressed upon Roosevelt in his youth. Dalton notes in particular the Southern definitions of manliness imparted by Roosevelt's mother, who encouraged her son to dream of military crusades. Of far greater influence was Roosevelt's father, who demanded that his son cast off his childhood asthma through sheer force of will, aided by body building and boxing, for "weaklings were especially susceptible to the

"moral typhoid" that Roosevelt, Sr., feared was sweeping the nation. Not surprisingly, as an adult Theodore Roosevelt justified war with Spain by warning that an American refusal to fight would mark the end of the nation's greatness and the beginning of its impotence and decay: "Are we still in the prime of our lusty youth, still at the beginning of our glorious manhood, to sit down among the outworn people, to take our place with the weak and the craven? A thousand times 'no.'" So convinced was he in the character-building qualities of war that Roosevelt even proclaimed publicly, "No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumph of war," and he confided privately in a friend, "I should welcome almost any war, for I think this country needs one."

Woodrow Wilson's determination to avoid war in Europe at almost any cost was a far cry from Roosevelt's enormously popular Rough Rider *persona*. As pressures mounted, Wilson tried to

deflect the inevitable charges that it was a lack of manliness that motivated his refusal to call for war: "There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force." In his retort to Wilson, Roosevelt again stressed the imperative of superiority in international affairs, and presented peace as potentially shameful if purchased at the cost of manliness: "It is well to remember there are things worse than war, and concluded peace is worth having only when it is the hand-maiden of international righteousness and national self-respect."

More than a hundred years later, George W. Bush offers a similarly imperialistic vision of America's foreign policy, grounded less in Rooseveltian notions of *noblesse oblige*, and more in 20th-century traditions of military supremacy, national pride, and Christian fundamentalism. Prior to his presidency, Bush, who experienced a self-proclaimed religious awakening at age forty, was

commonly perceived as less intelligent and accomplished than his father. In his public speeches and press conferences as president, Bush plays to his very different set of strengths. Regarding his efforts to carry out the international agenda begun, but left incomplete by his father, the younger Bush eschews complex arguments and explanations in favor of "cowboy" rhetoric laced with spiritual terms and phrases: emotional assertions of America's determination to preserve its proud traditions of freedom, power, and victory.

Such reassurances of American greatness -- past, present, and future -- hold tremendous appeal for a nation whose confidence in its omnipotence and righteousness has been shaken in recent decades, first by an inglorious defeat in Vietnam, then compounded by frustration over ongoing Middle Eastern resistance to American intervention and leadership, and more recently by the pain, outrage, and shock of September 11. The current military defeat of Iraq, as well as the ongoing efforts to reshape that country (and others) into a more American image, are being welcomed by many as proof that the United States still sits tallest in the global saddle -- still virile, still righteous, still manly, and still in charge.

The reasons Americans and their leaders come to support or oppose both war and imperialism are, of course, enormously complex, and yet beliefs concerning the "American character" play an undeniable role. From the taunts of "Cowboy" George W. Bush to Iraqi dissidents to "bring it on," to the popular characterization of the French as "cheese-eating surrender monkeys," the tradition of linking war and imperialism to perceptions of an idealized "American character" of strength and manliness, continues to wield great influence.

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Our Thanks to Clio's Associate Editor

Bob Lentz, after 10 years of devoted, volunteer service, is retiring from his position as Founding Associate Editor of **Clio's Psyche**. See page 119.

The Personification of Evil: The Language of the New American Empire

Jeffrey A. Engel
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Americans fight tyrants, not foreign peoples, and they fight to free others from despots who delegitimize their rule by oppressing their own people. This is the rhetoric of the new American empire, Wolfowitzian in spirit, Wilsonian in tone, whose language serves as a psychological salve to American concerns over misuse of their awesome power. By claiming to fight only tyrants -- and by naming them as well -- American leaders justify and sell the muscular foreign policy that marks this new brand of American global leadership by proclaiming a universal link among peoples that touches an emotional human chord. "The United States respects the people of Afghanistan," President George W. Bush declared in 2001, "but we condemn the Taliban." After all, "we have no quarrel with the people of Afghanistan." Eighteen months later only the names had changed. "We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people," Bush stressed. "They are the daily victims of Saddam Hussein's oppression."

Bush is merely playing to form. American leaders almost always describe their enemies as unrepresentative tyrants while claiming affiliation with their oppressed peoples, because framing America's military endeavors as fights for liberation helps maintain domestic consensus behind foreign wars. They have employed such language since the 1770s. Without it, the costs of empire would be unbearable. With this language, however, victory can be won only with the tyrant's elimination. It is at once psychological crutch and political straitjacket.

Americans have a long tradition of "personifying" foreign threats. "We have no quarrel with the people of Iraq," President Bush declared hours before the first American air strikes. "Our only object is to oppose the invasion ordered by Saddam Hussein." This, of course, was the first President Bush, in 1990. President Clinton employed the same language. "I cannot emphasize too strongly that the United States and our European allies have no quarrel with the Serbian people," he said. America's enemy was Slobodan Milosevic. It was, in fact, Woodrow Wilson who first used this phrase "have no quarrel with," that was subse-

quently employed by each of his wartime successors, when he told Congress: "We have no quarrel with the German people ... and no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war."

Wilson formed the key phrase, but Thomas Jefferson began this American trend. In 1774, he wrote in a pamphlet entitled *A Summary View of the Rights of British America* that King George III was a tyrant leader of an unrepresentative regime. Jefferson was not, of course, the first to make this charge. He was, however, the first American essayist to frame the budding war for independence not as a battle for English liberties against English cousins, or as a crusade against the King's "evil ministers," but rather as a fight against King George alone. As the "chief officer of the people," he was ultimately responsible for their fate. His failures justified revolt, Jefferson wrote in true Lockean fashion. More to the point, George III alone was to blame for colonial suffering as well.

Jefferson's rhetoric offered more than mere semantics; it instead removed the psychological burden of fratricide from Revolutionary soldiers. Bullets fired in the name of liberty were aimed at King George, even if they found their mark in the chests of his subjects or hired mercenaries. This was a new idea. The sovereign had long embodied the state -- *L'etat c'est moi* -- but never before had an author made the sovereign explicitly embody the state's apparatus and arms. The *Declaration of Independence* Jefferson authored two years later employed this logic as well. Though addressed to the world, it was primarily a domestic tool useful for rallying public support. The Continental Congress ordered it read aloud throughout the colonies and to the Continental Army. Original copies even included oratorical prompts, designed for maximum emotional effect.

Their efforts clearly paid off. Burnt effigies of George III took on a new poignancy after July 1776. Once symbols of opposition to royal oppression, they now represented the root cause of the war. Most dramatically, American soldiers found new justification for a war against their brethren. One patriot wrote after hearing the Declaration: "I could hardly own the King and fight against him at the same time; but now these matters are cleared up. Heart and hand shall move together." Framing the enemy as a single tyrant made easier the violence deemed necessary to achieve change. King George's failures made him deposable; his evil

tyranny made the war psychologically bearable.

Seven generations later, Woodrow Wilson used personification in his own potentially fratricidal war. He confronted an unprecedented international crisis with Germany at a time when one in five Americans claimed German descent, and he faced as well fears that such Americans might prove more loyal to their blood than to their adopted nation, especially if called upon to kill their former compatriots, cousins, and brothers. Personification proved his answer. Unable to rally support for killing "krauts" at a time when whole swaths of the country spoke German, he instead framed the war as a crusade for German liberation. America fought "for their [Germans'] emancipation from fear" and from "autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of the people." One people would free another in this righteous fight. "God help her, she can do no other."

Wilson's rhetoric worked as well as Jefferson's. German-Americans volunteered for military service at a faster clip than other citizens. Who would not want to return to the fatherland as liberator? Of course, many joined lest they be branded a traitor, and much has been made of the war hysteria that saw the German language banned from schools and sauerkraut replaced by "liberty cabbage." Equally as important to the war effort at home, and proof of personification's widespread effect, were efforts to "de-Kaiser" the country. Industrial workers in German-speaking Pennsylvania, for example, removed all visible signs of authority from their workplace as an assault against "Prussian tyranny." Miners in that state vowed to "remove the Kaiser," so that "Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy shall be forever banished from the earth." Americans spilled German blood to win the war and built the weapons that made victory possible, but guilt for German suffering was borne by the Kaiser alone.

America fought its subsequent wars, rhetorically at least, for the same reason. Responsibility for World War II and the Cold War fell on Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Ho (among others). Each inspired international conflict, just as each oppressed his own people. "I speak to you as a friend," John Kennedy told the "captive people of Cuba," in their struggle against those illegitimate "puppets and agents of an international conspiracy" in power in Havana. America fought only for their liberation. Ultimately, by the Cold War's last decades, a sophisticated philosophy of republican peace theory

helped justify the idea known to Thucydides and Montesquieu, and explained most famously by Immanuel Kant, that despots caused wars while democracies strove for peace. Presidents Bush (I and II) and Clinton made promotion of democracy -- read: eradication of tyrants -- explicit foreign policy goals. What they promoted as policy their predecessors already knew was good politics.

The exception of World War II to this tradition of personification helps focus the utility of this rhetoric for the maintenance of America's empire in the 21st century. Whereas FDR urged Americans to keep the world from being "dominated by *Hitler* and *Mussolini*," he simultaneously argued "we are now in the midst of a war against *Japan*." One was a fight against tyranny. The other was a race war. His chief commanders understood the difference. Dwight Eisenhower spoke of liberation for Europe; Admiral Bull Halsey termed his job: to "kill japs, kill japs, kill more japs." This distinction infused popular propaganda as well. Calls for rationing reminded drivers: "When you ride alone, you ride with Hitler." Depictions of the Japanese threat, conversely, never displayed Emperor Hirohito. They used instead a simian caricature of the Japanese, contributing to the dehumanization of the Japanese people that led more than 13 percent of Americans in 1944 to support wholesale Japanese extermination at war's end. With only one percent of Americans of Japanese descent in 1941, compared to more than 30 percent of German or Italian extraction, personification was not deemed necessary as justification for the Pacific war. Without personification, it became a war of genocide.

World War II was the last time American leaders failed to personalize their international foes, just as it was America's last openly racial war. Subsequent American soldiers assuaged their anguish at the horrors of conflict by dehumanizing their enemies, calling them "gooks" when to recognize their humanity would make their deaths too painful. Soldiers used this trick, but political leaders did not. The Cold War was a battle for ideology, not race. One could not publicly advocate killing Koreans or Vietnamese when America fought to save one-half their country and liberate the other. Moreover, changes in American society, the civil rights movement and lingering memories of the European Holocaust in particular, made racialized language impossible to support domestically or internationally. Changes in immigration patterns helped diversify the American population

as well, making it impossible for Washington to wage any war in which the enemy country did not sustain a sizeable expatriate population within America's borders. Thereafter, America's wars were waged to an even greater extent against evil men. To have done otherwise would have been to admit the flaws of American society too blatantly, or to have waged war against those who, with better luck, might themselves have become Americans.

Americans see the world when they look in the mirror, and thus any fight directed at a foreign people threatens the burdens of fratricide, or worse yet, suicide. They fight instead to free the world one foreign people at a time. The list is seemingly endless: Iraq, Kosovo, Panama, Somalia, perhaps soon North Korea, and so on. Each fought above all else to end foreign suffering. Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program received the most headlines, but check the record: every major American leader when speaking of the Iraq War (before, during, and after the conflict) highlighted that Hussein gassed his own people, that he had torture chambers, that mass graves were his most enduring legacy. His people needed rescuing, and America was obliged to consider their needs even as it worked to preserve its own security. For political effect, salvation and security go hand-in-hand. Thus as much food as munitions were dropped by American planes during the first weeks of the Afghan campaign, while the White House established a fund for American children to contribute their allowance to their Afghani counterparts. To charges that American bombs might inadvertently harm Afghan civilians, Bush offered both salve and reminder: "This is something the children of America can do for the children of Afghanistan, even as we oppose the brutal Taliban regime." Opposition to oppression universally links peoples, but childhood's bonds of innocence in particular know no national boundaries.

Personification has its drawbacks, however. What works domestically also constrains strategic options. Making despots the putative cause of war makes their elimination the sole mark of victory. Americans want their wars to end as cleanly as 1945 in Germany, with the tyrant dead. So far, the post-Cold War wars have not met that standard. Milosevic survives. So too, as of this writing, do Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, "evildoer" and "tyrant" respectively. Victory cannot be claimed -- and the electoral fruits of victory collected -- so long as the bogeymen of presiden-

tial rhetoric lives. Less easily perceptible, overuse of personified rhetoric additionally seems to warp political expectations. American leaders truly expected to be greeted in Baghdad as liberators. Remove Hussein, their logic ran, and the crisis ends. Remove him with an impromptu surgical strike as the war's first blow, as the White House tried, and the people would rise up in appreciation. The Bush Administration is presently learning the consequences of policies based upon optimistic projections framed by a solitary ideological worldview.

Ultimately, personification has not only become modern America's sole means of justifying war, it has also become the unavoidable reason for war. Jefferson, Wilson, Roosevelt and others framed their wars as fights against tyranny only after they had decided on conflict. Current American leaders, by overusing this rhetoric, make war their only option. Bush could not justify leaving Hussein in power once he identified him as this generation's Hitler. To have failed to remove such an enemy would be to admit the failure of his policies and of America's historic mission. Functionally, then, the decision to go to war was made the first moment Bush linked the two tyrants in the same sentence. For those who need a specific date, try October 5, 2002, when Bush declared: "We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people." Historically, there has been no going back from such language. Future wars for empire may be justified, and begun, just as simply.

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Honor and American Diplomacy in Peace and War

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American foreign policy makers are too often ignorant about the culture, history, language, and religious life of the regions they are assigned to cover. An important consideration is the failure to recognize the significance of the twin concepts of *honor* and *shame*, that most ancient yet almost everlasting ethical system, which affects personal

and community identities. Even so renowned a scholar as Bernard Lewis, in all his studies of the Middle East, overlooks the honor theme. A recent review of his *The Crisis of Islam* observes that Lewis clearly describes the backward-looking character of Muslim life, governance, and economy that tragically inhibits modernization. Nonetheless, the Arabist expert "fails to go beyond this 'what' to address the 'why,' and it is the 'why' that we most need to understand now" (Kenneth M. Pollock, "Faith and Terrorism in the Muslim World," *New York Times Book Review*, April 6, 2003, p. 11).

Columnist Thomas L. Friedman comes closer to understanding Iraqi mentality than most journalists. He points out how the thoughtless decision to disband the Iraqi army left thousands of veterans "bewildered and confused." Humiliated by coalition occupation, they and others have "wounded pride to restore" -- by shooting U.S. soldiers and exploding roadside bombs under U.S. vehicles (Friedman, "The Humiliation Factor," *The New York Times*, November 9, 2003, nytimes.com/2003/11/09/opinion/09FRIE.html). Even Friedman arrives at the insight late after months of occupation, whereas a swifter recognition in the press and Pentagon would have saved lives and eased the burdens of reconstruction.

The honor code encompasses a set of values and sanctions that function most especially in tribal communities but also in many parts of the world, including the U.S. Psychohistorians should consider the violent tendencies inherent in the honor code, which is a set of warrior principles predating Islam and Christianity. In international relations, we must keep a skeptical eye on the traditions -- *ours* as well as *others'* -- that honor constructs. The term is very much alive in two respects. First, United States foreign policy functions under the rules of honor and dread of humiliation like those of other nations with ambitions for aggressive power. If we had failed to answer the events of September 11 with bombs and troops, who would not have felt the shame and squirmed when others called us "womanlike" and "cowards"? Americans generally believe that a challenge to our power must be retaliated with greater might. Second, since Roman legions marched across Europe and Asia Minor, no armed services, ours included, has mustered without the discipline, sense of hierarchy for prompt obedience, and indoctrination of comradeship and unit loyalty -- all things that the primarily male code

cultivates. Even today in this secular world, the sacred elements of honor animate young men and women in the armed forces to deeds of determination and valor. When carried to extremes, however, the emotions that the trumpet of honor marshals can be tragically wrongheaded. When called into play, honor can inspire millions toward some unifying end, and, often enough, for better or worse, in war.

To deal with so complex a theme as honor and shame, we must consider the various aspects: the search for justice, the causes of warfare, and the effects of defeat. With regard to justice, the honor ethic thrives when firm enforcement of justifiable laws does not exist. Civic institutions function below their potential or minimally. A chronic sense of mistrust prevails throughout society for the lack of predictable authority. The honor code privileges family over individual, reigning as a form of community law over civil jurisprudence, gift obligation over taxation or tribute. Honor relies heavily upon the need for reputation as a bulwark against a hostile world. The code demands conformity over all alien ideas and represses deviations from the established order of things.

In post-Saddam Iraq, Baathist loyalists murder those cooperating with the Americans as a means to avenge their loss of power. Often these crimes are carried out against entire families. Retribution becomes a prime duty of every victimized family. How can an alien and secular state such as the U.S. alter that perception and make Iraqis see the advantages of an impartial rule of law; the value of self-expression over tribal, clan, and familial loyalty and conformity; and the necessity of mediating agencies besides guns, land mines, torture chambers for soccer players, and hate-disseminating mosques? The inability to place honor below other human needs is a stumbling block hard to overcome.

Gaining wisdom from hard-won experience, Lt. Col. Hector Mirabile, battalion commander in the Florida National Guard at Ramadi, Iraq, has learned how to work the honor system when dealing with the surrounding network of powerful sheiks. Doling out patronage favors, eating companionably with his hosts, and veiling threats of retribution with appropriate packets of cash, Mirabile has secured peace and safety for his troops. Now, at chieftain gatherings, he is offered a tiny but overflowing cup of tea. "If it's just barely full, it's a sign of disrespect," he observes. That was how the glasses for the American mili-

tary looked before the lessons of honorable protocol were properly mastered (Yaroslav Trofimov, "To Find Peace in Sunni Triangle, Talk to the Sheiks," *Wall Street Journal*, November 5, 2003, pp. A1 and A16).

The second point of honor as the causation of warfare is a factor not generally understood. Wars are triggered neither exclusively by threats to territorial security nor desire for territorial expansion, nor economic gains or some other concrete, materialistic advantage. Instead, often uppermost is the need to prove a point of honor not only to the enemy and to the world-at-large but also to the nation in its own zealousness and need to reinforce self-esteem. Donald Kagan, the Yale historian, notes, "modern politicians and students of politics" view anything except palpable or material motives for war merely "irrational. But the notion that the only thing rational or real in the conduct of nations is the search for economic benefits or physical security is itself a prejudice of our time." Kagan continues, "Honor as prestige has played a critical role" in national rivalries. But equally compelling, he contends, is the dread of dishonor, while assaults on their status prompts outpourings of passion and hatred, not calculation ("Donald Kagan on National Honor," www.cs.utexas.edu/users/vl/notes/kagan.html).

For example, the secession of the American Deep South in 1860 and 1861 had its origin in the ethic of honor. Slaveholding Fire-Eaters, as the radicals were called, were outraged, humiliated, and driven into paroxysms of rage when Yankees, whether mildly antislavery or abolitionist, criticized slavery and sought to eliminate it. They heard slaveholding denounced from pulpit and political platform as a violation of Christian principle, as an unchecked license for promiscuity in the slave quarters, and as a justification for black retaliation in incendiary revolt or flight from their God-chosen place under benevolent masters. Such dishonor upon what Southerners called their "way of life" and "domestic institutions" demeaned Southern whites in the eyes of the world. But it did so in their self-evaluation as well. The honor ethic places the individual in subordination to his or her community. An insult left un-repudiated stains the moral character and reputation of the victim. Those Southerners who thought the alarms about Lincoln and Black Republicanism were exaggerated and required no severing of the Union were denounced as pusillanimous cowards, more interested in money-making than loftier duties to

preserve Southern honor.

A second example is the cause of World War I. When Gavrilo Princip shot Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo in July 1914, he was avenging the Austrian prince's profane presence in a Slavic city on a day celebrating the sacred principles of Serbian Nationalism. In turn, the assassination represented an unforgivable affront to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Obsessed with the notion of honor, Kaiser Wilhelm induced his royal neighbor to issue a demeaning ultimatum whereby Serbia could only escape war with expressions of abject contriteness. Yet, as the Kaiser's chief of staff, Helmuth von Moltke, feared, a war would be suicidal, and not just for Germany alone. Neither the Austrian Chief of Staff General Franz Conrad nor von Moltke had faith in their nation's prospects for victory. As often happens, war is not "a rational pursuit of political goals," as political scientist Avner Offer notes, "but a gesture of defiance, taken, like the duel, against the odds" (Offer, "Going to War in 1914: A Matter of Honor?", *Politics and Society* 23 (June 1995), pp. 213-241, esp. 221-222). Nations as large families will seek to obliterate embarrassment and retrieve lost reputation.

Pursuing the relationship of honor and American military motives, the example of Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam further illustrates the point. Unaware of centuries of mistrust between China and the Vietnamese, the Johnson administration assumed that the little Southeast Asian country was merely a puppet of international Communism. To throttle that ideological menace in far distant rice paddies would prevent the collapse, it was thought, of the rest of Asia into the arms of the Soviets and Mao. A secular understanding would refer to our "credibility" for living up to international commitments to our friends and allies. But Lyndon Johnson's vindication of his own and his nation's honor was involved as well. This Texas president's public pronouncements were thoroughly drenched in the rhetoric of honor, in the terminology of his native state. As representative of that frontier spirit, Johnson put the matter succinctly: "If America's commitment is dishonored in South Vietnam, it is dishonored in forty other alliances or more ... *we do what we must*" regardless of consequences. By his perspective, honor had its own logic. Practical considerations and prudence drew out no imperative to cast it aside. "We love peace. We hate war. But our course," Johnson announced in 1965, "is charted always by the compass of honor" (in Ronnie Dugger, *The Politician: The Life and Times*

of Lyndon Johnson, 1982, pp. 146&147). It was the pathway to death and defeat. Yet any other option apparently would have betrayed America's "word of honor." In his memoir, Henry Kissinger explains why Americans had to persist in the Vietnam War. "No serious policymaker could allow himself to succumb to the fashionable debunking of 'prestige,' or 'honor' or 'credibility'" (in Barry O'Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War*, 1999, p. 85). These terms mattered in war and in the seeking of peace without losing face.

Jimmy Carter proved exceptional in choosing peace and patience over war and honor over the Iranian Revolutionary raiding of the American Embassy and seizing of hostages in 1979. Many Americans felt the U.S. had cause to issue an ultimatum: free the hostages or expect the bombing of Iran's military installations and out-and-out war. Most other Southern-born or Southern-influenced presidents have chosen military encounters, large or small, from Jefferson's conflict against the Barbary Pirates to Johnson's against North Vietnam to the one undertaken in Iraq by another Texan. But what were the real reasons for these wars? Was it something in the natures of the presidents? Recall President Bush's remark about Saddam Hussein's being the "guy who tried to kill my dad." Now, to imply that Bush began a war simply in honor's name to avenge a conspiracy against his father in the fashion of Michael Corleone or the "Sopranos," might seem too reductionist. But an ex-White House aide argues that this explanation would at least be preferable to the idea that seizing Iraqi oil was the administration's prime objective: "That's not why Americans fight wars," he said. "Usually it's about honor or pride" (Dick Polman, "Suspicious Abound that Bush Wants to Avenge his Father and Seize Oil Reserves," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 20, 2002, in <Philly.com>). President Bush's outlook on life, like Lyndon Johnson's, really does seem to lie deep in the heart of Texas.

Honorable vengeance in the name of the Bush family brings us to the third aspect: the effects of defeat, or moral disesteem. We can pose once more as analogy our own civil conflict, 1861-1865. In "The Fruits of Preventive War," Civil War historian James M. McPherson, thoughtfully reflects on the "preemptive" strategy of Jefferson Davis to save the allegedly threatened institution of slavery and white domination. The seceded states began the war, trusting that the other slave states would answer the trumpet of honor and need to

defend their Deep South kinspeople from a common foe. As McPherson notes, they entered the affray convinced that with a few cannon balls, well aimed, "those blue-bellied Yankees" would soon scatter in cowardly retreat. But "the preventive" war, as he concludes, led not only to devastation and ruin but to disgrace, sullen anger, and futile claims to a moral superiority that could scarcely be substantiated (McPherson, "Preventive War," *Perspectives* 41, May 2003, pp. 5-6).

Like the American South in 1860 and in the years thereafter, Islamic countries today are immersed in the rubrics of both honor and hatred. Agrarian-minded, slaveholding Southern whites customarily railed against Yankee imperialism and economic greed, godless feminism, hypocrisy of mind and spirit, and evil habits of every sort. In their defeat, they developed the legend of the "Lost Cause," a memorialization of the glorious dead that fed Southern resentments of black freedom and Yankee domination for years to come. Lynching in the name of preserving white women's honor not only terrorized black communities but also fed the continuing sense of shame that Lee's surrender at Appomattox signified -- honor and the satisfactions of revenge above all other considerations.

Like the antebellum Southerners in the United States appealing to their Christian God, traditions of honor, and disdain for unchivalric commercialism, Muslim fundamentalists take similar pride in their piety, purity of principle, and militancy. Despite their technological and military inferiority, they dream that Allah and suicidal valor can restore a military parity or lead to victory -- without adopting Western ways to do so. Joyful are the Iraqi mothers who send their sons "off to the realms of honor, the realms of martyrdom," advised a leader of Hamas just days before the war began ("The Enemies of Iraq Crave Life, While Muslims Crave Martyrdom," *Middle East Research Institute* No. 457, March 9, 2003). But, in this encounter with the West, what could be more morally degrading than the quick American seizure of Baghdad? Evidence of western superiority in technology, education, and ways of conducting modern business deepens anxiety, fear, and ignominy. Last April, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz boasted that "the magnitude of the crimes of that regime and those images of people pulling down a statue and celebrating the arrival of American troops is having a shaming effect throughout the region" (Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Shaming Effect on Arab World,"

Washington Times, April 29, 2003, <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030429-91488338.htm>). That may be so, but American attempts to exploit that shame are proving costly. Memories of Saddam's regime inspire little nostalgia, but the more marginalized the Iraqis feel the less welcome will be their liberators.

Finally, victory over a weak and vulnerable enemy, no matter how evil, provides the winners with yet another opportunity to refashion the world as we Americans would have it. *Pax Americana* carries with it a very fervent missionary zealotry. Woodrow Wilson with his ideas of making the world safe for democracy in World War I had shown the way to Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam -- but not with much success in either case. On his recent visit to England, Bush reiterated his Wilsonian approach to foreign affairs. Even before the war, the American President announced the revived Wilsonian doctrine of forcing the world to accept American-style democracy. "A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interests in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq" ("President Discusses the Future of Iraq," www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html). But, if, to save their sense of honor, the Iraqis choose a different and perhaps undesirable path, what then?

In the West, we identify democracy with liberty. Yet it took even this country from its 17th-century founding to the Emancipation Proclamation and far beyond to achieve that difficult and still imperfect combination. These are matters that cannot be answered as glibly as our leaders propose. Cultures of honor create tremendous volatility with all its complex transactions and sensitivities. Arrogance, naivety, and aloofness in dealing with those abroad and at home who perceive only the cold steel of armies might well prove America's undoing. Americans must come to an understanding of honor and shame, that the world is not a rational place. Not to do so opens us to enormous risks.

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University, Ogden, Utah, April 13, 2003. Professor Wyatt-Brown may be contacted at <bwyatb@ufl.edu>. □

The Return to Imperialism: Restoring American Manhood

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The past 50 years have seen a sharp decline in traditional forms of imperialism along with the steady growth of neo-imperialism through the cultural, economic, and technological dominance of the "West" over the "rest." However, the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq under the Bush Pre-emption Doctrine has many hallmarks of 19th-century empire-building, albeit cloaked in the rhetoric of human rights and global security rather than in the discourse of civilization and enlightenment. What has prompted this apparent national regression to a might-makes-right, winner-takes-all imperialist mentality?

The answer lies not only in pragmatic issues too numerous to discuss here (such as national and international security concerns, control of oil reserves, and the alignment of transnational political and corporate elites) but also in the national psyche. Specifically the imperialist turn in American foreign policy must also be understood in relation to gendered conceptions of national identity and perceived threats to American manhood. I have argued elsewhere that constructions of American national identity remain overwhelmingly masculine and that this gendered national imaginary reflects the material realities of a patriarchal social system. If such an understanding of American national identity is correct, then the attacks of September 11, 2001, not only violated American security and sovereignty, but also symbolically emasculated the nation. Thus, U.S. actions following September 11 can be understood, at least in part, as attempts to restore American manhood.

Consider for a moment not only the material effects of the September 11 attacks but also their symbolic salience to gendered national self-conceptions. First, the World Trade Center, phallic monument to the glory of American economic dominance, is felled ignominiously. Next, the Pentagon, bastion of American heterosexual masculinity, is brutally penetrated by a hostile force. Then,

in the skies over Pennsylvania, a group of American men lose the battle for control of their hijacked aircraft. Significantly, as these events unfold, the U.S. president and vice president, symbolic patriarchs of the national family, are driven into hiding, seemingly rendered impotent by the assault. Thus, the nation suffered not only a devastating loss of life and property on September 11, but a blow to the images of masculine agency that underpin discourses of American national identity.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, media attention focused on the national climate of grief, fear, and outrage. Within days, however, reports of state intelligence and security failures suggested an underlying sense of national humiliation. A ready cure for this national loss of face was found in military action. At the most basic level, the military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq can be seen as pragmatic attempts to eliminate forces hostile to the U.S. At another level, however, such state-sanctioned violence can be understood as an exercise in reclaiming masculinity.

After all, war itself has both pragmatic and symbolic dimensions. At the practical level, war typically centers on the control of land, wealth, populations, or political processes. At the symbolic level, however, war can be understood as the ritual assertion of dominance and resistance and, in many ways, the assertion of masculinity. In countless cultures through the ages, ritual bloodshed -- whether through warfare, the hunt, sport, circumcision, or other bloodletting activity -- has been the definitive marker of manhood. Some scholars have suggested that at a primal level this male bloodletting mimics menstruation, the unambiguous marker of mature womanhood, and thus serves to neutralize male fear of the feminine. According to this logic, the ritualized bloodshed of post-September 11 military campaigns can be understood as a way for an emasculated nation to reassert its fundamental masculinity and suppress traits perceived as dangerously "feminine": pacifism, nurturance, and vulnerability.

Still, the question remains: Why this particular form of blood-letting? Why the return to old-school imperialism, combining military subjugation with the arbitrary economic and political restructuring of established nation states? Again, there are both pragmatic and symbolic considerations. In practical terms, two developments in particular since the 1980s have solidified U.S. dominance worldwide: the break-up of the Soviet bloc and unprecedented advances in communications

technologies. The collapse of the Communist East effectively left the U.S. without a unified oppositional force, while at the same time, improvements in computer and telecommunications technologies made multinational production and distribution more efficient and more profitable, thus increasing the reach and influence of U.S.-based conglomerates. Arguably, imperialism is only possible where there are vast inequalities between nations, and in the last two decades the advantage of the U.S. over the rest of the world has increased substantially. In short, the U.S. may be returning to imperialism because there is little to stop it from doing so.

However, it is crucial to remember that imperialism is not just about pragmatic goals such as acquiring territory, resources, subjects, or markets; many of these goals could be accomplished without resorting to military action. Imperialism is also about the control of meaning, the ability of a nation to shore up its power and influence by symbolically placing itself at the top of a hierarchical global order. Nineteenth century imperialism allowed European powers to assert the "natural" superiority of whites over peoples defined as non-white, of Christians over non-Christians, of men over women. The apparent return to the *modus operandi* of traditional imperialism serves the U.S. in much the same way. Imperialism allows the U.S. to assert its world dominance through both material and symbolic means, while restoring the masculinized American national identity undermined by the events of September 11, 2001.

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Now Is the Autumn of Our Discontent

John V. Knapp
Northern Illinois University

Oh, East is East and West is West, and
maybe the twain shall meet,
When earth and sky stand presently at God's
great judgment seat;
But here on land some take a stand and vow
they'll eat alive,
Those infidel bands from foreign strands till
none such shall survive.

Refrain:

Cheney, Wolfowitz, Perle, Rumsfeld, and
Bush.

Imperial hubris, rational mush.

You're lying, you're lying; how e'er much
you want to,

Invasion is risky; this isn't Lepanto [the Battle
of Lepanto in 1571].

Oh, they had cause, tis often said, but
unsatisfied with their price

The bloody deeds, as flights rent steel, came
once, then, oh God, twice.

And some oft say to those who pray new
warnings will suffice,

Take heed the pest exterminator's vow: "real
power" only, kills lice.

Cheney, Wolfowitz, Perle, Rumsfeld, and
Bush.

Imperial hubris, rational mush.

You're lying, you're lying; how e'er much
you want to,

Revenge, it is risky; this isn't Lepanto.

But democracy can't grow nor freedom
breathe by mere exported ukase,

And fools that try will often cheat and lie to
make their doggy case.

So yesterday we "won," the battle's done,
and reactionaries

Only are left to fight; mere lucid fanatics in
the deserts of night.

Cheney, Wolfowitz, Perle, Rumsfeld, and
Bush.

Imperial hubris, rational mush.

You're lying, you're lying; how e'er much
you want to,

Occupation's risky; this wasn't Lepanto.

And the monster is down, evil offspring
deceased; free folks

Can breathe; and self-rule increased. Or so it
looks!

We are an occupying army, as all there do
know;

It's only in DC where enforced blinkers still
grow.

Cheney, Wolfowitz, Perle, Rumsfeld, and
Bush.

Imperial hubris, rational mush.

You're lying, you're lying; how e'er much
you want to,

Self-governing's risky; this wasn't Lepanto.

So what was it worth, this venture

Neo-CONish?

And why does Ms. Rice look so astonished?
Where is Powell's common sense, his army
hard head?

As the Congress, too, rolled over, or just
jumped into bed.

Cheney, Wolfowitz, Perle, Rumsfeld, and
Bush.

Imperial hubris, rational mush.

You're lying, you're lying; how e'er much
you want to,

Though war drums keep thumping, this was
no Lepanto.

Oh, East is East and West is West, and
happens the twain did meet,

Where earth and sky stood presently at God's
great judgment seat;

Though here on land some took a stand and
tried hard to insist

That we stop those bands of Neo-CON
hands whose aftermath persists!

Cheney, Wolfowitz, Perle, Rumsfeld, and
Bush.

Imperial hubris, rational mush.

You're lying, you're lying; how e'er much
you want to,

The election is coming; your neuroses we're
on to.

John V. Knapp, PhD, is Professor of English at Northern Illinois University. His publications include Reading the Family Dance: Family Systems Therapy and Literary Study (2003), Striking at the Joints: Contemporary Psychology and Literary Criticism (1996), and essays on teaching Orwell's Animal Farm in College Literature (1996) and on "Talking the Walk in Cognitive Stylistics" in Style (2003). Prof. Knapp may be reached at <tb0jvk1@corn.cso.niu.edu>. □

Psychological Imperialism: The Dark Side of a Redemptive Story

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In his eight-stage model of the human life-cycle, Erik Erikson identified generativity as the psychosocial centerpiece of the middle-adult years. According to Erikson, the mature man or woman in

midlife channels life's energies into caring for the next generation, aiming to leave a positive legacy of the self for the future. Yet as Erikson illustrated in his famous case study of Mahatma Gandhi, some midlife adults are substantially more generative than are others. Over the past 15 years, my students and I have used well-validated self-report and behavioral measures to assess individual differences in adults' generativity. We have identified adults scoring relatively high and low on our generativity measures and then interviewed many of them with an aim toward analyzing their life stories. Our research is guided by contemporary narrative theories in psychology asserting that modern adults provide their lives with some measure of coherence and purpose by constructing and internalizing self-defining life stories, or what we now call narrative identities. How do highly generative American adults narrate their lives?

Although every life story is unique, we have observed that certain themes appear significantly more often in the narrative identities of highly generative American adults compared to their less generative counterparts. Highly generative American adults tend to construct their lives as heroic morality tales wherein a gifted protagonist suffers through many hardships on the way to redemption. In these mythic reconstructions of the past, the protagonist learns early in life that while many people are disadvantaged and in pain, he or she is blessed with some kind of special advantage. Knowing deep down that "I am blessed but others suffer," the protagonist commits the self in adolescence to a clear and strong set of values, often rooted in a religious tradition, and aims to make the world a better place for others while promoting the strivings of the self. The protagonist encounters many setbacks, ranging from addiction to abuse to poverty, but bad things usually turn good and life moves forward and upward. The generative authors of these progressive narratives of the self employ many different kinds of redemptive discourses in telling their life stories. They may use language and metaphors describing atonement, emancipation, recovery, enlightenment, self-actualization, or upward social mobility -- all highly privileged ways of talking about selfhood in contemporary American life.

The life stories of highly generative adults -- these most productive and caring American men and women in their midlife years -- are windows into the midlife self and into American society and culture. The redemptive tone of these life-

narrative accounts recalls some of the most cherished life texts in the American heritage -- from Puritan spiritual autobiographies to the 19th-century slave narratives to the wide range of contemporary forms, both exalted and profane, that celebrate the American self's inner goodness and its striving to expand and to overcome. The protagonist's early conviction that he or she is blessed with a special advantage is the psychological counterpart of American exceptionalism and manifest destiny; the commitment to make the world a better place while promoting the self reflects ideals and dilemmas in American cultural life that have been recognized since the time of de Tocqueville. For the most part, this kind of redemptive life narrative provides psychological sustenance and support for a productive and caring engagement of the world. Empirical research shows conclusively that highly generative American adults are indeed engaged in a range of life pursuits -- from effective parenting to volunteer work in the community -- that do make a positive impact on the world around them.

At the same time, the redemptive life stories constructed by highly generative American adults hint at a darker side of American character. While many highly generative American adults are sincerely committed to promoting the well-being of future generations, the narrative identities they construct to make sense of their own lives and to sustain their generative involvements in the world may suggest images and themes that resonate well with, and may even reinforce, imperialistic thinking. Like the Puritan settlers and the 19th-century champions of American manifest destiny, highly generative American adults tend to see themselves as the chosen people. They have been blessed with a special gift, a gift they hope to use to benefit themselves and the world. They have committed themselves to a set of values that they know to be true. But the world may not welcome their usually well-meaning efforts, may not appreciate their noble oblige, and may not share the same values.

The redemptive life narratives told by highly generative American adults sometimes suggest arrogance and a sense of moral superiority that others find off-putting. Since the 19th century, cultural observers have taken Americans to task for their arrogant exceptionalism and their deeply held belief that they are the chosen people. American exceptionalism sometimes takes the form of a blithe and naive isolationism, as Americans go their merry way without paying much attention to

what the rest of the world is doing. But American exceptionalism can also take the form of psychological, cultural, and political imperialism, especially when it is buttressed by power: I am blessed with the truth; I will share the truth with you; I will liberate you to see the truth the way I see it; You will follow my path, which is the right path; You will follow my path even if you do not want to.

Even though highly generative American adults are no more aggressive than other people, the narrative identities they construct suggest images and themes that may condone imperialistic aggression in the name of redemption. If I am the gifted exception, the one who is blessed and chosen, I may need to break the rules sometimes and to violate the autonomy of others in order to promote the good agenda to which I am committed. Life is a mission, even a crusade. I am here to do God's work, or at least good work. If I encounter resistance, I may need to fight for what is right. I know what is right. My fight, therefore, will always be the good fight. As James Monroe argues in *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History* (2003), Americans have been subject to moral fervor since the days of the Puritans, reinforcing the twin urges of reforming "them" as we redeem ourselves. Such moralizing divides the world into the forces of good (think: freedom, democracy, Judeo-Christian values, American capitalism) and the axis of evil.

In certain features of current American foreign policy, the discourses of redemption and imperialism blend together. A man whose own life story follows closely the redemptive narrative of the highly generative American adult, George W. Bush appears committed to the idea that American values are the right and universal values, that America is the most gifted and blessed of all nations, the one chosen to fight the forces of evil (think: terrorism, Saddam, those who threaten us with weapons of mass destruction) even if it must fight the good fight alone. In a similar power politics-oriented vein, the influential analyst Robert Kagan has argued that Americans, unlike the Europeans, are perfectly positioned today to exert imperial power for the good of the world. After two bloody wars, the weakened European nations have come to value cooperation and conciliation in world affairs, Kagan suggests. By contrast, Americans generally are more comfortable going it alone, both because of our unsurpassed military might and because of a history of independent action.

Of course, American imperialism today is a

complex phenomenon motivated by a wide range of forces and interests. While some Americans see the war in Iraq, for example, as an effort to establish a democratic beachhead in the Middle East, others justify the venture as part of a more general war on terrorism, a long-term strategy to obtain cheap oil, or any of a number of other reasons. Americans are increasingly split on the Iraq war, however, and many recoil at what they see as a dangerous imperialistic turn. Still, while many Americans may disagree with the administration's policies, many still find stirring the story of America that the Bush administration implies. It is a redemptive narrative of the national self -- blessed from its inception with a special truth and goodness, committed to fulfilling its manifest destiny, strong and free and dedicated to making the world a better (American) place for generations to come, even if the world does not think it wants to go there.

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The Apocalyptic and American Empire

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The apocalyptic occupies a nether world in the self. It describes the collective end of things, the destruction of the human experiment, the death of death itself. Such things are hard to imagine, and in frustration we often turn to metaphors as varied as personal traumas, natural disasters, and political events such as war to carry the weight of ultimate meaning. Such substitutes don't always work. But there is also no question that in a psychological sense the apocalyptic is ontological. As humans, we not only die but also have foreknowledge of our end. That awareness may well be what most decisively distinguishes us from the higher primates. It may be crucial in the making of culture. In the apocalyptic, in other words, ultimate dread contends with human creativity.

Apocalyptic thinking is at least as old as culture. It can manifest within a time frame as millennialism. Its first producers were probably priests and mystics who spoke with special knowledge of God's purpose in the world. Artists, however, who create on the margins, have given powerful voice to apocalyptic yearnings in their songs and paintings and stories. Psychotics as well, prized before modern times for their special insight, see a larger picture, an image of ultimate death and their place in it. As a culture, we may well lose more than we gain by numbing that vision with antipsychotics and other drugs.

The mystic, the artist, and the psychotic, however, have all been marginalized in the last eight thousand or so years. They have talked, or sung, or painted images of destruction wrought by an angry God. It could not be otherwise. It took a huge act of imagination to summon the idea of the end of everything. Hiroshima changed that sequence dramatically. The apocalyptic is now in our hands. We don't need God. Such awesome power is ours. The apocalyptic still works most noisily among the traditionally religious. But its real future lies not with Christian fundamentalists like Jerry Falwell, or with Jewish fanatical apocalypticists in the West Bank, but with Osama bin Laden, a man who is intent on making the end happen -- destroying the world to save it -- as on his specifically religious notions of redemption.

Osama bin Laden makes sense. He speaks for centuries of Arab humiliation and skillfully blends his monumental disdain for Americans desecrating Saudi soil with his appropriation of the cause of Palestinians. He is the president of "terrorist university," not in direct control of actions from Afghanistan to Indonesia, but a charismatic leader who provides a sense of purpose and mission. He inspires others to act, which is why his continued survival is so threatening to world peace.

But if we are to understand the contemporary world we also need to look within. What is this imperial mission all about? It is surely about oil, but the apocalyptic casts its shadow. As a child I was something of an Episcopalian prodigy, confirmed at eight and on track to be a priest or bishop. I also carried the cross on Sunday mornings and lustily sang "Onward Christian Soldiers." I would like to think I have gone beyond such beginnings. I am not sure about George W. Bush. While he is responding to all kinds of pressure in making two wars in two years, what may be the

most powerful lobby in America is without a staff. It lays in the 70 to 80 million Americans who are bedrock Republicans who would die to preserve Israel because that is where Jesus returns.

Ponder that. Jesus returns. Read your Book of Revelation. Jesus can only come back after vast destruction, violence, and the "second death," involving rivers running red with blood so deep it reaches to the bridles of horses (in an antiquated image). This "end time," end of the world, is no small thing. Its images inspire George W. Bush, a blue-blooded scion of an American dynasty, who also has a West Texan sense of apocalyptic dread at the edges of political life.

I can only end in hope. I think Americans are finally waking up to the extent to which we have been hoodwinked by Bush and his administration. The turning point of the awakening of the American people to the reality of the current government may well have been his September 7, 2003, televised speech requesting an additional 87 billion dollars for post-war Iraq governance. My good friend, Robert Jay Lifton, has just published *The Superpower Syndrome: America's Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World*, a book that I helped him with and that I would urge all readers to consult. I fear we lack a politically viable alternative to Bush, but I also think the scales have fallen from our eyes. We know of apocalyptic violence. We were its victims on September 11. But we cannot let ourselves become in turn its perpetrators. There is much at stake.

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Noam Chomsky and the Political Psychology of Anti-Imperialism

Ted Goertzel
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To understand the psychological roots of American foreign policy, we must include the opponents as well as the supporters of the current administration. There is no more prominent opponent of American foreign policy than Noam Chomsky. Chomsky's reputation as a scholar is based on his pathbreaking work in linguistics. He is perhaps even better known, especially in Third World countries, as a tireless crusader against American "imperialism."

Chomsky travels the world giving speeches to audiences of angry radicals, often on college campuses. He uses his intellectual brilliance and massive reservoir of factual knowledge to intimidate anyone who challenges him in debate. Yet he is quiet and unassuming in his personal manner, seldom raising his voice. He appears to be a dispassionate intellectual, following the truth wherever it leads him. Yet the content of his remarks reveals a passionate ideologue.

Research on the psychology of radical activists helps us to understand this mismatch between Chomsky's ideas and his personal style. In the 1970s, Stanley Rothman and Robert Lichter administered Thematic Apperception Tests to a large sample of "new left" radicals (*Roots of Radicalism*, 1982). The authors found that activists were characterized by weakened self-esteem, injured narcissism, and paranoid tendencies. They were preoccupied with power and attracted to radical ideologies that offered clear and unambiguous answers to their questions. All of these traits can be found in the work of Chomsky and other anti-imperialist intellectuals.

Leftist activists are prone to believe that their own thinking is rational and objective, while that of their opponents is distorted and biased. This is clearly true of Chomsky. He writes long historical and analytical tomes, full of facts of figures. He speaks softly and maintains a veneer of scholarly objectivity. Yet no one can miss the bitter anger just beneath the surface. As Larissa MacFarquhar observes in her brilliant essay on Chomsky, he

chooses to believe that his debates

consist only of facts and arguments, and that audiences evaluate these with the detachment of a computer. In his political work, he even makes the silly claim that he is presenting only facts -- that he subscribes to no general theories of any sort. His theories, of course, are in his tone -- in the sarcasm that implies "this is only to be expected, given the way things are" ("The Devil's Accountant," *The New Yorker*, March 31, 2003, available on LexisNexis Academic Search Premier).

One of the most common critiques of leftist intellectuals, especially Karl Marx and his followers, is that they claim to be objective, scientific observers, although their work oozes anger. They also studiously avoid offering alternatives to the policies they are criticizing, expending all their energy on attacking the enemies they blame for all the world's problems. As Chomsky's wife observed, "An early question in every Q&A is, 'You've told us everything that's wrong but not what we can do about it,' and they're right. He hasn't. So he gives what to me is a fake answer, 'You've got to organize'" (MacFarquhar, "Devil's Accountant").

The unwillingness to offer alternative policy ideas suggests an unwillingness to run the risk that their ideas would not seem persuasive to others or even fail, thus subjecting themselves to criticism. It is difficult for anti-capitalists, such as Chomsky, to offer an alternative after the fall of the Soviet Union and the abandonment of socialist economics in China and many other countries. It has also been difficult to offer an alternative in the war against terrorism because Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden are such unsympathetic figures. Psychologically, it is easier to blame America for not finding a solution than it is to put one's self on the line.

Politically, there are two different elements in the American anti-war movement: the socialists and the pacifists. The pacifists oppose war and violence in general, the socialists oppose it only when used by the ruling classes. These belief systems are not really compatible, but they work well together in practice because they have much in common psychologically. They share the same target of externalization, American business and political leaders. They both deny their own aggressive impulses and blame their political enemies for the problems of the world. As the British psychoanalyst R.E. Money-Kryle observes, "Those who

cling to a vision of a world without strife, or even competition, deny at least some part of the predatory aggression that threatens to disturb their relations with their fellows" (*Psychoanalysis and Politics*, 1973, p. 92).

In her biography of Quaker economist Kenneth Boulding, Cynthia Kerman quotes him as saying, "I am consumed by the moral disease of anger" and "If I wasn't so violent I wouldn't have to be a Quaker" (*Creative Tension*, 1974, p. 130). Later in his life, however, Boulding denied that his pacifism had anything to do with his personal psychology, attributing it entirely to logical reasoning and religious faith. This is not any more persuasive in his case than it is in Chomsky's.

It is just as easy to find psychological roots for the anger that many pacifists and anti-imperialists feel as it is for the beliefs of people who support American government policies. Pro and anti-imperialist activists are opposite sides of the same coin. Both seek a worldview which gives meaning to their lives and puts them on the side of good against evil. Both project their unwanted feelings onto their enemies. Both are very concerned with expressing their values and asserting the correctness of their views.

A more rational and realistic perspective might be that of the "owl" instead of the "hawk" or the "dove." The owl's goal is to seek out a policy that will work instead of one that expresses his or her values. This is difficult because it is hard to know what will work, or even to evaluate policies once they have been implemented. Thus, when asked whether the war with Iraq was justified, the Dalai Lama responded, "It's too early to tell." Neither the hawks nor the doves are comfortable with the ambiguity of the real world. By casting politics in a moralistic framework that reflects their personal needs, they make it more difficult for us to deal with some very difficult real world problems.

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A Pax Upon You: Preludes and Perils of American Imperialism

Lincoln P. Paine
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The United States' invasion of Iraq has given rise to a long overdue debate about whether the Republic has become an empire and, if so, of what kind. Those who view the United States as an imperial power usually point to the Roman or British empires as relevant or even appropriate models, but their comparisons raise a number of objections. In the first place, however we choose to reinterpret Roman or British forms of imperial governance and law in hindsight, the ethical and ideological foundations of their empires are antithetical to the privileges, responsibilities, and freedoms embodied in the United States Constitution. There are echoes of Roman and British rule in the United States today, but they are -- or should be -- as faint as cosmic echoes of the big bang. A second objection is that while neo-imperialists rummage through history for precedents that might look good in the light of 21st-century sensibilities, today's architects of an imperial United States simultaneously flatter themselves with the novelty of their ideas. It takes a fatal arrogance to imagine that the Bush administration invented the preemptive use of brute force in defense of national interests, the so-called "Bush Doctrine." Mix this with the questionable belief that Western democracy is the natural state of mankind and you have all the makings of a *Pax Americana*.

Empire-building has always comprised two elements, an economic end and an ideological rationale. The latter is subject to variation, but there is always a vein of continuity. The Bush administration's claim that we had to change the regime in Iraq because of its stock of non-traditional weapons resonates because of our recent experience with terrorism. Likewise, overthrowing a tyranny to make way for a democratic government is consistent with our nation's self-image as the arsenal of democracy. Both these rationales have something to do with reality, but in ignoring real world complexities, they leave us with false options. The failure to recognize the dual nature of imperial enterprise -- the one ideological, the other material -- makes it impossible to see our nation's actions for what they are, or to address the profound perils of a *Pax Americana*.

Grand though this Latin phrase sounds, it should strike fear in the hearts and minds of Americans, our allies, and the objects of our covetous gaze. Whatever imperial apologists or historical shorthand may say to the contrary, the peace of the *Pax Romana* and the *Pax Britannica* were fictions. Peace was enforced by pacification, all but endless warfare in the interest of winning strategic advantage for material gain. A *Pax Americana* can be no different, and it can only undermine the institutions and high ideals upon which our republic was founded.

The longing to emulate either the Roman or British empire is based on a selective reading of their accomplishments and tactics. It will foster a clearer understanding of American ambition to examine other imperial models as well. The first to consider is surely that of Athens, in whose imperfect and short-lived democracy we like to see our political origins. On closer examination, there is much to be said against it: slaveholding, women without political rights, and a compulsion to worship the state gods, among other things, including its brevity. Athens' golden age lasted only half a century after her victory over the Persian Empire in 479 BCE. In this period the Athenians sowed the seeds of their own destruction by transforming a naval alliance created for collective defense against the Persians into a grasping empire. Athens' demise resulted not from alien invasion, but because of her erstwhile allies' hostile reaction to her imperial reach, which culminated in the devastating 27-year-long Peloponnesian War.

The resulting weakness led to the rise of the kingdom of Macedonia, whose people contemporary Greeks regarded as barbarians. In a decade of military campaigns, a young Alexander the Great trailed a thin veneer of Greek culture across a large swath of the Near East as far as the Indus River, but he died on the march, well before he could take steps to organize his rule. His conquests were divided among three of his generals, who embarked on a great arms race to vie for control of the Eastern Mediterranean and its contiguous lands.

At the same time, in the central Mediterranean, Rome was also embarked on an imperial career. We tend to view the accomplishments of the Roman Empire through rose-colored glasses that highlight its military successes, cultural attainments, and the logistical sophistication that spread goods, people, and ideas -- *Romanitas* and later Christianity -- across vast territories. It does not

discount these achievements to acknowledge that they had a tremendous human cost. Slavery was extensive, wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few, and the people's baser appetites were sated with liberal doses of *panem et circenses* -- bread and circuses. Most glaring, the price of imperial administration was exorbitant, especially the maintenance of a large, highly trained professional army by whose arms the empire was enlarged and protected.

Rome's transition from republic to empire occurred under Augustus, who assumed for himself an unprecedented degree of political power. But in its territorial expansion, Rome had been an empire in the modern sense for hundreds of years. In the first century BCE, Rome already controlled most of Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and parts of Spain, North Africa, and the Balkans. By the death of Augustus in 14 CE, these gains had been consolidated: Gaul, Britain, and Egypt (with its invaluable granaries), and vast tracts of Asia Minor and the coastal Near East had been annexed. For several centuries thereafter, the empire was preoccupied variously with the expansion and/or security of its long, heavily fortified borders. In Roman Britain, Hadrian's Wall stretched from the North Sea to the Irish Sea to protect Romano-British settlements against invasion from Scotland, while a line of forts in the west guarded against incursions from Wales. The empire's continental border was defined more or less by the Rhine and Danube Rivers, natural boundaries of considerable size that the Romans nonetheless had to reinforce with more than a hundred forts. A further measure of security was achieved by establishing colonies peopled by retired legionnaires as a sort of veterans' benefit for people whose allegiance was presumably assured.

It is a testament to the inherent instability of the empire that by the 300s, the *Pax Romana* was being maintained by more than thirty legions. Ultimately, the armies and associated bureaucracy upon which the state relied for its existence proved both unaffordable and unreliable. The level of unrest in the empire varied by place and time, but they included local uprisings (slave revolts and the Jewish revolts of the 60s and 130s CE, for instance), as well as probes by Germanic tribes along the Rhine/Danube line, which culminated in the "barbarian" invasions of the fourth century. There was also chronic instability in the East, where security depended largely on the weakness of the Parthian Empire and the willingness of buffer states to submit to Rome.

In addition to their intended role as guardians of the frontier, the armies played a decisive role in domestic politics. In the first century of the *Pax Romana*, when the lands ringing the Mediterranean were at their most serene, being emperor was at its most dangerous. A large part of the army's pay derived from booty acquired on campaign, which more or less dictated that it be kept gainfully employed if the soldiery were to be kept in check. Inattention to this fact, combined with other political pressures, often proved fatal. Of the first 12 emperors, five were murdered and two killed themselves in disgrace.

In the United States, there is a comparable problem, not with the patriotic military (hence the cavalier downgrading of veterans' benefits), but with its self-serving civilian arm -- the industries of the military-industrial complex. Their revenues depend on the consumption of an enormous array of weapons, goods, and services, and these industries go to great lengths to make sure their products are in demand. The degree to which military contractors have perverted American politics and foreign policy can be seen in these companies' strategic establishment of factories and offices in virtually every single Congressional district in the United States, a fact that enables them to exert an incalculable influence on government from the local to the federal level. Against such an entrenched interest, the Son of God would have to campaign on a platform of *Pax Christiana* rather than of *Pax Christi*.

In its 19th-century phase, America's conquest of the lands south and west of the original 13 states towards the Gulf Coast, the Great Lakes, and the Pacific seems reminiscent of the expansion of the Roman Republic, although there was greater technological parity between Rome and her neighbors than between American settlers and Native Americans. The American experience more accurately reflects that of the Russian Empire in its eastward expansion into Siberia and North America from the 16th to the 19th centuries. With exemplary bad timing, the Russians sold Fort Ross, in California, to John Sutter seven years before the gold rush began at Sutter's Mill in 1849, and then sold Alaska to the United States three decades before the Klondike gold rush. Despite these losses, Russian expansion was spectacular. Even after the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Russia remains the largest country in the world. The nation that began with 13 states on the eastern seaboard of North America is the third.

An apt parallel for America's more recent imperial exertions can be found in those of 15th- and 16th-century Portugal: evangelical, commercial, essentially non-territorial, militarily advanced and often ruthless in the pursuit of its aims. Two forces drove Portuguese expansion. As latter-day crusaders, the Portuguese believed it was their mission to fight Muslims and convert heathens. As merchants, they sought access to the spice trade and to monopolize it at the expense of Indian Ocean merchants (many of whom were Muslim) and in the Mediterranean, where their chief rivals were fellow Christians. In much the same way, the United States seeks to convert to democracy nations and regions where we have a quantifiable economic interest. The war against Saddam Hussein came about not because the people of Iraq suffered under the government, or because the regime's weaponry posed a clear and present danger to the United States, but because the government controlled vast stocks of oil.

The man credited with kick-starting Portugal's overseas adventures was Prince Henry, whom a 19th-century British historian dubbed "the Navigator." A strong advocate of the Church militant, Henry cajoled his brother to embark on a crusade against the Moors. After casting about for a likely target, in 1415 Henry took part in the capture of the Moroccan port of Ceuta, a place of little economic or strategic significance to Portugal. The victory proved a white elephant, for the territory was costly to maintain but impossible to surrender without losing face. A subsequent attack on the more powerful port of Tangier failed, and Henry eventually turned to more commercial pursuits that took his caravels into the archipelagoes of the western Atlantic, especially Madeira, and south along the Guinea coast of West Africa, a source of gold, slaves, and cheap pepper.

The aims and rationale of this European 600 years ago anticipated the strained arguments of the Bush administration. Although crusading was properly an altruistic activity undertaken for spiritual rather than material gain, Henry was unquestionably a merchant prince who had no problem mixing commercial opportunity with the work of the Church militant. Similarly, President Bush's version of militant democracy serves as an ideological banner around which business interests rally in search of market share. In his denial of the obvious economic rationale for U.S. adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq -- but not in Saudi Arabia, which has too much oil, nor in North Korea, which

has none -- he protests too much. Afghanistan gives access to the gas fields of Central Asia and Iraq has the world's second largest reserves of oil.

Rather than admit what the whole world knows, the Bush administration insists that the American invasion of Iraq is not about oil. With some qualification, this is correct: It is not about oil -- alone. Any number of opportunists are hiding in the wings, from the administration's friends and associates at corporations such as Halliburton -- whose former chairman is Vice President Dick Cheney, and whose board of directors includes President George H.W. Bush's Secretary of State, George Schultz -- and Bechtel -- whose board of directors includes George H.W. Bush's other Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger. Other luminaries who stand to gain enormously include American businessman and hawk Richard Perle, and Saudi arms dealer and businessman Adnan Khashoggi, trusted veteran of the Iran-Contra scandal. There are myriad ways to cash in on rebuilding and rearming Iraq, if you know the right people and have the right access.

An especially striking parallel between Prince Henry and President Bush is their staunch adherence to outmoded legal concepts to justify their actions. Prince Henry promoted the notion that fighting Muslims was just war as sanctioned by the Church. His insistence on this point disregarded a growing body of ecclesiastical and lay legal writing that maintained that neither popes nor princes had the authority to wage war against non-Christian states simply because they were not Christian. With similar ideological fervor, President Bush has argued the need to export democracy to the people of Iraq, even if it means disregarding international law and opinion, or even, as it may transpire, the wishes of the Iraqi people.

At the end of the 15th century, the Crusader ethos was still alive and well in Portugal, and when Vasco da Gama reached the Indian port of Calicut in 1498, one of his first acts was to drive a wedge between the Hindu rulers and the city's community of Muslim merchants. So eager were they to find co-religionists with whom they could make common cause against the Muslims that the Portuguese determined that the local Hindus belonged to a previously unknown sect of Christians. This tendency to see things not as they are but as we want them to be is a salient characteristic of Bush's foreign policy, in which all issues are divided into black and white and democracy is treated like a marketable commodity. The Presi-

dent's announcement that if you are not with us, you are against us, has a corollary of uncertain value: if you are with us -- in this case, against Hussein -- you must also be like us, that is, democratic.

This error is not unique to Bush. It was tragically made in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion; when we armed the fundamentalist factions who went on to form the Taliban government and Al Qaeda. We are poised to make the same mistake in Iraq, where the anti-Hussein lineup comprises virtually every shade of the political spectrum from Kurdish Communists, to Sunni clerics, to democrats-in-exile whose political credentials and legitimacy are thin. This is not to suggest that no Iraqis believe in democracy, but opposition to Baath Party rule takes many forms, and it is not clear that a secular majority has much chance of winning a clear mandate to form a democratic government, especially if the winner is perceived as an American puppet. Any government that truly represents the fractured will of the Iraqi people will have to make concessions and embrace ideologies that are anathema to the militant democracy espoused by Bush's own "Republican Guard."

Once in the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese might have adapted themselves to the laissez-faire patterns of an ancient network of trade that passed goods from East Africa and China. Instead, they seized strategic ports; built and garrisoned fortresses; demanded protection money from Muslim, Hindu, and other merchants; and attempted to monopolize the Indian Ocean spice trade. In so doing, the crown relied upon soldiers who died by the hundreds of disease or in battle, and on viceroys and governors who usually exploited their offices for personal gain. The American empire already emulates this approach with military bases strung like a necklace around the world. The jewels in the western Indian Ocean region include Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, and Diego Garcia (whose entire population was forcibly removed between 1965 and 1973). Together these help shape the patterns of world trade -- especially the oil trade -- in America's interest. Those nations dependent on Middle Eastern oil and Central Asian natural gas must tread lightly for fear of antagonizing the United States.

The last empire to consider in this brief comparative survey is that of Great Britain, one of several successors to the Portuguese and by most measures the most successful. At its height, its territories were the most extensive in the world,

including Canada, Australia, India, vast tracts of Africa and Asia, and smaller holdings in the Americas, Antarctica, and Europe -- Ireland and Gibraltar. The underlying factors for English expansion in the 16th century were essentially practical -- a desire to compete for spices and to provide an outlet for their domestic trade, which the Spanish had curtailed. But like the Portuguese before them, the English were animated by a militant ideology, one originally founded on a virulent hostility to Catholicism in general and to Spain and Portugal (by then part of the Spanish empire) in particular.

This ideological foundation quickly took on a life of its own. In the early 1600s, English propagandists decided that in their failure to develop the abundant resources available to them in the European manner, Native Americans had effectively ceded their right to the land. North America was considered "virgin" territory "that hath yet her maidenhead" and which was, therefore, "attractive for Christian suitors." The attraction was not, however, absolute, and much of the raw labor for the colonies had to be provided by indentured servants, criminals, and religious dissidents from the British Isles, and African slaves. The latter were a staple of the English Atlantic trade for centuries, and when the slave trade was finally abolished in the 19th century, British traffickers in human cargoes simply shifted to the coolie trade -- the shipment of Indian and Chinese laborers in conditions that abolitionist Frederick Douglass, himself a former slave, described as "almost as heart-rending as any that attended the African slave trade."

Despite their differences, abolitionists and slavers alike believed that the world was filled with inferior races. They parted company on the issue of what to do about them. The former argued they could be civilized, the latter that they were good for little more than brute labor. One can sense the tension between these two lines of thought in Rudyard Kipling's turn-of-the-century ballad in which he urged people to "take up the White Man's burden ... to serve your captives' need." By 1899, the British had their empire well in hand (their meddling in the Middle East would have to wait until after World War I) and Kipling was addressing himself to the people of the United States, who had just taken up "the White Man's burden -- The savage wars of peace" in the Philippines, newly won in the Spanish-American War.

If religion and ideology account for the zeal with which the British undertook their expan-

sion, their success must be attributed to their relative commercial sophistication and their essentially pragmatic approach to business. The chartered companies that initiated foreign trade and colonization were run by merchants who were quick to adapt to changed circumstances. Investors in the East India Company fully intended to profit from the spice trade, but when the Dutch established a monopoly in the East Indies and shut them out, the Company withdrew to India. At first, they were all but ignored by the Mughal court, but they persevered, especially in Calcutta. As the Mughal Empire declined (as all empires must), by the end of the 18th century the Company had all but annexed Bengal through the deft use of trade, diplomacy, and arms. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, it exercised either direct or indirect control over most of the lands that now comprise India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. The British government's involvement in India grew gradually from the mid-17th century, but it was only in 1858 that the government assumed formal control of India.

A crucial reason for the British success in India was the lack of homogeneity in the subcontinent. The East India Company exploited divisions of race, religion, and caste to gain commercial and territorial concessions. Another was the British reliance on trafficking in low-value, high-volume goods within the framework of traditional intra-Asian trade, especially in Indian cotton, lead, silver, and pepper, and Chinese silk, porcelain, and lacquer ware. Profits from these trades were significant, but, as important, such commerce did not justify the imposition of a monopoly and the huge expenses required for its maintenance; such costs ate deeply into the profits of the Portuguese and Dutch spice trades.

The East India Company's trade remained profitable and balanced until the 1720s, when demand for tea in Britain grew sharply, a development with profound consequences for Britain, China, and indeed much of the world. Starting in the 1720s, tea comprised more than half of the Company's exports from China, and a century later it accounted for all of them. The government's keen interest derived from the duty it imposed on tea, which by the 1820s accounted for 10 percent of government revenues. As China was self-sufficient for virtually all its needs and traders had almost nothing they wanted in exchange for tea, Europeans were forced to pay in silver. The British need for silver to pay for the Napoleonic Wars and for the pacification and administration of India

at the end of the 1700s forced the Company to search for an alternative to bullion, which they found in the form of opium. So successful was the East India Company's cultivation of China's appetite for opium that it stopped carrying silver to China in 1805, and two years later it was actually importing silver from China. (American merchants also shipped Turkish opium to China, to the chagrin of the British and the consternation of the Chinese.)

The only problem with this trade was that it was completely illegal in China, where the first laws proscribing opium had been enacted in 1729. The effects of opium use were widespread and had both moral and economic effects that the Chinese could ill-afford. Trade in daily goods declined as addicts devoted more and more of their income to the drug. Bullion outflows from China had a direct impact on the treasury, which collected taxes in silver. In response to these growing problems, in 1839 the emperor's imperial commissioner at Canton seized and burned about 140 tons of opium. In response, the British government dispatched a force of 16 ships and 4,000 soldiers to demand satisfaction. The British victory over the antiquated Chinese forces in what became known as the First Opium War was swift and total. By the Treaty of Nanking, the British secured millions in restitution and forced the Chinese to open additional ports to foreign trade. China lost two more drug wars, and Britain ultimately secured the legalization of the opium trade, which towards the end of the century brought in £10 million a year.

The opening of the treaty ports had a number of unintended consequences, two of which are of particular relevance to the United States. Having observed the overwhelming superiority of British arms against the Chinese, Japan responded promptly to U.S. demands to open its ports to foreigners after several centuries of relative isolation. Thereafter, Japan industrialized rapidly, working especially closely with Britain to develop its naval and merchant fleets. In 1895, Japan overwhelmed the modernized Chinese fleet in the Sino-Japanese War. Ten years later, it destroyed a powerful Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima to find itself the dominant naval power in the Pacific. Forty years later, the Japanese met their match at the hands of the United States, whose crushing but slow victory in World War II helped pave the way for American hegemony in the Pacific -- half a century after taking up the White Man's burden there -- and dragged it deep into East Asian regional politics.

The Opium Wars may have illustrated China's technological and cultural decline under the Qing dynasty, but the unequal treaties forced by the British undermined any prospect that China would soon achieve its former stature on the world stage. In fact, the drug-induced malaise fueled by the British certainly contributed to the collapse of the Celestial Kingdom in the 20th century and to the turbulent decades of civil war and oppressive communist rule that followed. A century-and-a-half after Britain's shocking and awesome victory, China has begun to find its way in the world once again, while Britain's empire is virtually extinct, a victim of overreach and to a lesser extent its unintended clarity in preaching the virtues of individual rights to the very people it sought to oppress on four continents.

None of these imperial models is an exact fit for the United States at the start of the 21st century. But even a glance at their salient features offers a grim reminder that, stripped of revisionist hyperbole, empires yield a ghastly human toll. No one can fault the bravery, luck, and sheer force of will characteristic of imperial pioneers of any age. Against these we must weigh their hideous legacy of brutal intimidation, human bondage, and appalling exploitation.

What fruit will the current round of American imperialism in Iraq bear? A few American businesses will reap huge windfalls from rebuilding the country's infrastructure. As of this writing, the Bush administration has installed a military authority to run the country while it scrambles to install a puppet regime whose interests align with its own. This will give the United States control of Iraq's oil production and revenues, and an unprecedented voice in OPEC. Such superficial achievements benefit only a small and shrill minority of powerful interests, however. For the majority of Americans, this and similar imperial ventures will provide no more than an outlet for demonstrations of jingo patriotism and flag-waving xenophobia.

As for the loftier premises deployed to justify our imperial ambition, it takes a chilling indifference to history to believe that people anywhere will swarm to democratic ideals as articulated by an invading army, or that the people of the Middle East, who in their day have shucked off many versions of Western imperialism -- Greek and Roman, Portuguese, British and Russian -- have any inclination to be subject to a *Pax Americana*. Three things are certain: Their reluctance will come at a high price. The burden of sustaining the empire

will be spread more evenly than the benefits of creating it. And for Americans, the most immediate and gravest risk is to neither people nor property, but to that great preserver of them both, the Constitution.

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The Looting of the Past in Iraq

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A museum of the quality of the National Museum of Iraq is, speaking psychohistorically, a sacred space. It is a place where myths and history become visible in concrete form. It provides a necessary point of orientation by containing the accumulated evidence from which the reinterpretations that are necessary in every stage of life can proceed. Its pillaging in the days after American forces entered Baghdad is an archetypal act of vandalism, of violation. It is a denial of the search for meaning.

One object destroyed in the orgy of looting of the Museum was the Great Harp of Ur, an exquisite instrument fashioned by a Sumerian artist 4500 years ago. It had been an offering buried with a king of that city, one of the first cities on earth. Its sound box was surmounted by a gold-covered bull's head 30 centimeters high. On the front panel were symmetrical inlaid figures, including a bull-man holding two leopards by the feet, and two ibexes rearing up to eat the foliage of a tree. Such an object arouses my desire for anamnesis, for a restoration of lost memory to the collective experience of humankind. What melodies were played on it? What songs accompanied its music? What stories told about its pictures?

Part of the Museum's trove of art works disappeared during looting that began on April 10, 2003, and continued for several days, possibly

smuggled out of the country by professional thieves and into clandestine collections of high-bidding gloaters. Many of them are too famous to be advertised by dealers without alerting Interpol; I have seen the Harp of Ur in dozens of books on art history. But the harp was not stolen. Whoever grabbed it from the case ripped off the gold covering and threw the rest of it on the floor amid broken glass. Works of art too large to be carried were smashed. These were acts of a mob. What were their motives? Cupidity and anger that they could not take everything? *Schadenfreude* over the elite who would feel their loss?

I never saw the harp itself, and now never will. But by itself it could not answer my questions about humankind's past. For that, the clay tablets bearing cuneiform writing, many unread, that lay in exhibits and vaults would be necessary. Many were grabbed in handfuls. Tracing cuneiform tablets is arduous, and they are easily sold on antiquities markets. Museum records were deliberately damaged and scattered. All the major libraries of Baghdad were looted and/or burned. Donny George, a director of the Iraqi Board of Antiquities, called it "the crime of the century."

Baghdad is not the only place where archaeological knowledge has been lost. Looting persists in hundreds of sites in Iraq, including Nineveh and Babylon. According to the *National Geographic*, "poverty-stricken villagers and organized bandits are ransacking ancient mounds across the country, feeding the foreign appetite for antiquities." "Before the war, we had 1,600 guards protecting various sites," said Hanna Khaliq, general director of excavations. "Now we have nothing, no cars, no people. The sites are not safe. The looting will continue." Ur is secure from Iraqi looters inside an American base, although it suffered collateral war damage and vandalism from soldiers.

Damage to humankind's cultural heritage was feared before the war. Sites were looted during and after the 1991 Gulf War, and a repeat seemed likely. In January 2003, Museum director Dr. Nawalla Al-Mutawalli said, "I'm frightened of the war. But I'm really frightened about the looting and the damage that might occur." Western experts voiced similar concerns. Organizations such as the American Institute of Archaeology and the University of Chicago's Oriental Institute warned the Defense and State Departments in the months before the war, providing lists of sites that needed protection. McGuire Gibson, an archaeological

authority, met with Defense officials on January 24, 2003, and reported that the military had 150 sites on a "do not target" list. Gibson also said that he was assured that the National Museum, the single most important archaeological location in the country, would "be heavily safeguarded and not be targeted." General Richard Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, later said that the Department of Defense received advance warnings about archeological sites around Baghdad and that they were passed to the Central Command. A March 26 Pentagon memo to the coalition command uncovered by the *Washington Times* listed 16 sites in Baghdad to receive protection. Second on the list was the National Museum.

Coalition forces tried to avoid bombing noted archaeological sites. But the Museum was not protected from looting. There are conflicting reports on what U.S. troops near the Museum did while it occurred. It seems that troops were present, and that a hole in the façade of the Museum was caused by fire aimed at a sniper. But no order was given to guard the Museum then, nor for days afterward. It was "a matter of priorities," said Myers. American troops had other places to safeguard, including the Oil Ministry. If the military had enough troops to secure the Oil Ministry, they surely could have spared a few to ward off looters at the Museum.

When news media announced the looting, U.S. government voices tried to discount the losses. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, "Looting is an unfortunate thing. Human beings are not perfect. No one likes it. No one allows it. To the extent it happens in a war zone, it's difficult to stop.... I would suspect that over time we will find that a number of the things were, in fact, hidden prior to the conflict." Some collections had been hidden, including gold objects placed in a flooded vault under the Bank of Iraq. Other objects, perhaps a majority of the Museum's holdings, were concealed, and some famous pieces were later returned. Some citizens had gone into the Museum during the looting and grabbed whatever they could with the intention of returning it when it became safe to do so. Other objects were confiscated at Iraq's borders from thieves, although many more were undoubtedly smuggled.

I rejoice at every object saved or recovered. But it angers me that the U.S. did not try to protect the Museum's assembled evidence of the origin of human civilization. Why is that important to me? I am an ancient historian, and that information is

valuable to my work, but that point is minor. More central to me by far is that the knowledge that might have come from that unique trove could have helped me increase my understanding of what it means to be human. I seek from ancient material realizations of the same kind about the human experience that I sought from psychological analysis on a personal level: understanding of my history that can help me know what I am today.

The wisdom that comes from ancient artifacts and writings is primarily on the collective, not the individual level, which emphasizes the fact that it is of value not just to me, but to my students, my nation, and humankind. Eleftherios Pavlides, architecture professor at Roger Williams University said, "The pillaging of the National Museum in Baghdad was not just a loss for Iraqi history. It was also a devastation of world culture akin to the destruction of the library in Alexandria, Egypt, and will be lamented for ages." I expected something like that to be evident to every intelligent person, but it was not.

A spin campaign tried to convince the public that the losses were negligible, and were exaggerated for political reasons. But thousands of objects are still missing. Museum Director Dr. Al-Mutawalli, at a conference in Vienna in June 2003, provided an estimate of 10,000. Even if less than some earlier estimates, it is still a catastrophe. Imagine losses of that magnitude from the Louvre in Paris or the National Gallery in Washington. The fact remains that losses could have been reduced or prevented if the safeguarding of the Museum had been given higher priority by U.S. military leaders.

The destruction of an enemy's cultural treasures was historically part of the agenda of barbarian invasions, not of imperialism. Imperial powers usually carried them home in triumph, or, in a more "civilized" way, bought them. Rome paraded Jerusalem's temple ornaments and carved their images on a triumphal arch. One can consult the catalogs of the British Museum, the Louvre, or Istanbul's Topkapi Palace to see what conquerors do with treasures of the conquered: they display them ostentatiously. But the real conqueror today, to which the U.S. government subscribes, is the world market economy. Perhaps Americans unconsciously feel it is appropriate that the looters who got away with Iraqi treasures have placed them on the market (even if surreptitiously), where their value can be established by the laws of supply and demand.

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Reflections on the Psychohistory and Economics of American Imperialism

Paul H. Elovitz

Psychohistory Forum and Ramapo College

For several reasons, imperialism is a difficult phenomenon to speak and write about psychohistorically. First and foremost, it is hard because most thoughtful people have very strong feelings about and, normally, against it. These negative views result in either outrage against it, hardly a good state for psychological analysis, or denial of imperialism by many people. Let us trace some of the history of this denial. Certainly since the defeat of the naked imperialism of Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese in WWII, imperialism has overwhelmingly been seen as incompatible with democracy. Thus, American democrats such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt, while determined to save Britain from the Nazis, also sought to thwart Churchill's overt imperialist, Great Power expansionist ambitions. Some in the world looked to the U.S. as an anti-imperialist power. So, in 1945, the Vietnamese insurgent Ho Chi Minh vainly sought U.S. help against the French reoccupation of his country.

American post-WWII imperialism has been complicated by the issue of denial because most Americans do not want to see themselves as imperialists anymore than as warlike. Just as the pacifistic Thomas Woodrow Wilson talked himself and America into entering WWI on the basis of it being "a war to end all wars," so Americans incline to see our imperialism as steps in the liberation of peoples from the evils of European imperialism. Most Americans incline to see imperialism as the action of others. However, my *American Heritage Dictionary* defines imperialism not as the action of others, but as "the policy of extending a nation's authority by territorial acquisition or by the estab-

lishment of political and economic hegemony over other nations" (1976, p. 660).

The psychology of the imperialists is akin to that of the parent over the toddler: the imperial power knows what is right and good for the politically, economically, and socially imperialized peoples. American imperial impulses and actions are often used or rejected by others according to their own needs and fantasies. Thus, France was eager to be liberated from the Nazis by American and English troops in 1944. In the 21st century, a number of Persian Gulf state rulers have opted to have American bases on their territory because the presence U.S. forces serves as a protection against foreign or domestic dangers. The rulers of Saudi Arabia ignored Osama bin Laden's 1990 offer of saving his homeland from the Iraqi dictator who had just invaded Kuwait, choosing to rely on American military might rather than that of 5,000 or so *muja-hideen* that the Saudi hero of Afghanistan could raise. Most Iraqis probably wanted to see the tyrant Saddam Hussein driven out of power earlier this year, but now many of the same people want our troops out of Iraq immediately. Iraqis may be as ambivalent about the current U.S. occupation of Iraq as are a growing number of Americans, though for different reasons.

One psychohistorical approach to this and other subjects is as a participant-observer. In this vein of introspection and self-revelation, I usually find myself frustrated when people say America is an imperial power, just as I find myself frustrated when people say America is *not* an imperial power. I am like many other Americans in being ambivalent about using the term *imperialist* in relation to the U.S. My main reason is that it is so emotion-laden that real exchange often stops rather than opens up when the term is used in public or even private discussion. I was reluctant to have this special issue on the psychology of imperialism. I feared that we might receive mostly screeds against imperialism, which fortunately has not been the case. I also insisted upon the question mark after "America as an Imperial Power" because I did not want to discourage those who were totally convinced America is not an imperial power. Furthermore, I have a revulsion as a democrat, with a small "d," to the very idea of dominating other people. In my opinion, imperialistic behavior inclines to endanger the civil liberties and democracy of both the imperialized and those in the imperial country.

It is easy to declare that the U.S. is not im-

perialist by definition. Many Americans think, "we liberated parts of Western Europe and East Asia in the 1940s without annexing Germany and Japan, therefore we can not be an imperialist power!" To the contrary, from the America-as-imperialist perspective, establishing "economic hegemony over other nations" (*American Heritage Dictionary*) is sufficient proof of our imperialism. However, *hegemony* is a vague enough term for this point to be quite arguable. Clearly, the U.S. throws around its weight much less when dealing with countries we know better and respect, such as England and Germany, and more in dealing with weaker countries we know less about, such as Nicaragua under President Reagan and Iraq under the Bushes. The power of other nations to potentially hurt us also makes a difference. Powerful nuclear powers are treated with special care. It is no accident that when Bush first looked into Vladimir Putin's eyes, he had a sense of his "soul," and felt the former KGB agent was a trustworthy and straightforward person, rather than feeling and expressing these thoughts upon looking into the eyes of the president of a minor European country with virtually no power to influence American policy.

Returning to the question of psychological approaches to imperialism, when undergraduate students are unsure as to how to make a paper psychohistorical, I tell them it is usually easiest to do this by making it specific and psychobiographical, rather than keeping it general. I just read an interesting paper by a student discussing the imperialistic policies of Theodore Roosevelt and George W. Bush. Roosevelt's imperialism was related to his overcoming his weakness as an asthmatic child and Bush's to his struggle to measure up to a high achieving father he lived in the shadow of for most of his life. Had my student more time to work on his paper, I would have told him to think and write more about the unconscious motivations and mechanisms of defense of each of them.

For example, despite his dyslexia and malapropisms, George W. Bush is an intelligent man who was educated at the finest prep schools and then Yale and Harvard. However, though he was a history major at Yale, he concentrated more on the activities of his DKE fraternity and the Skull and Bones Society than on the world around him (Bill Minutaglio, *First Son: George W. Bush and the Bush Family Dynasty*, 2000). His leadership as a cheerleader at Andover was excellent preparation for politics. A lack of curiosity had made it easy for neo-conservatives to influence his policies in

ways that are not very good for the country. Like his father, he considers oil to be extremely important and is able to convince others that it makes sense to invest American lives and wealth in the oil-rich Middle East. His personal reasons for the war, which he was empowered to start because of the trauma of 9/11, relate to wanting to punish a man he though had tried to have his father assassinated in Kuwait in 1993, to measure up to the first President Bush as a war leader, and to exceed his father's accomplishments by actually getting rid of Saddam Hussein.

Imperialism is such an emotion-laden term that there are many misconceptions about it. Through the years I have always had a substantial number of students and colleagues who have argued that imperialism is primarily caused by economic motivations, yet I have never been presented with convincing evidence that imperialism and the wars that it generates are normally financially profitable. Imperialism does not pay, although like all human endeavors, there are some people who make money from it. If one adds up the cost of imperial adventures, including the cost of the lost lives (using insurance charts) and payments to orphans and widows, it is seldom possible to justify imperialism economically. One might make an economic case for poverty-stricken Mongols coming off the Steppes of Central Asia into the rich cities of China or for the Bedouins coming out of the deserts of Arabia into the cities and granaries of North Africa and the Near East, but these are more the exception than the rule. American society as a whole has not benefited from imperial expansion in areas not contiguous to the U.S. Yes, individuals and industries may benefit, in the same way as when anyone dies coffin makers, florists, gravediggers, and newspapers make some money on the misfortune of the dead. So also, certain arms makers, the Halliburton Company, and various other special interests are benefiting from the current war in Iraq. The average American taxpayer and those who are coming home in body bags are certainly the losers. Over the long run Iraqis *may* even benefit from having Saddam Hussein out of power, but that is another issue! Personally, I opposed the 2003 Gulf War for a variety of reasons, including its being a distraction from the War on Terrorism. My sentiments lie much more with the long term interests of the average American than with the special interests who benefit from war and preparations for it. Above and beyond all else, I dislike seeing people dying.

It is certainly true that there are special interests who benefit from imperialism, provided they are able to keep the imperialism from causing large scale wars, which end up taking their wealth and lives, along with those of their countrymen. Economically, however, in a world of relatively unrestricted trade, why go through the expense of war and occupation of a country to get its goods when you can buy them on the open market? This was also true in the period of "New Imperialism" from 1870 to 1900, which was one of the reasons why the imperial victors after WWII generally relinquished their colonies without a fight, when there were few of the "mother" country's nationals living in them, as was generally the case.

In conclusion, strong emotions and numerous myths about imperialism make it a difficult subject to examine psychohistorically. Nevertheless, Jeffrey Engel, Ted Goertzel, Jackie Hogan, J. Donald Hughes, John Knapp, Dan McAdams, Lincoln Paine, Charles Strozier, Nancy Unger, and Bertram Wyatt-Brown have made some progress in this process through their varied articles. Though much more work is yet to be done, I hope the reader finds these contributions to be of value. Furthermore, as a citizen of the sole superpower in today's world, I also hope that my country will quickly learn and accept the limits of its power without it costing too many of our lives or those of the citizens of other countries.

Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, took his doctoral degree in modern English and European history before training as a psychoanalyst for 10 years to improve his psychohistorical work and practicing for over a quarter century. He has over a hundred publications with many of them being in the areas of the psychobiography of American presidents/presidential candidates; psychohistorical methodology; interviews of psychohistorians; the dreams of historical figures; teaching about violence, war, and the Holocaust; and the history of psychohistory on which he is currently writing a book. He is Editor of this publication, and founder and director of the Psychohistory Forum as well as a past president of the International Psychohistorical Association. Before becoming a founding faculty member at Ramapo College near New York City, he taught at Temple, Rutgers, and

Fairleigh Dickinson universities. Professor Elovitz may be reached at <pelovitz@aol.com>. □

Lawrence J. Friedman: Psychohistorian

(Continued from front page)

ber of Robert Jay Lifton's Wellfleet psychohistory group. He has received many honors and awards, most recently an Independent Sector book award for his volume on philanthropy, cited below. He was a Post-doctoral Fellow in the Menninger Foundation Interdisciplinary Studies Program, 1981; held a Fulbright Distinguished Chair to Germany in American Studies in 2001-2002; was designated "Writer of the Year" for 2003 by the International Biographical Center at Cambridge, United Kingdom; and is a participant in the 2003-2004 Organization of American Historians (OAH) Distinguished Lectureship Program.

Doctor Friedman is the author of *Menninger: The Family and the Clinic* (1990); *Identity's Architect: A Biography of Erik Erikson* (1999), which received a Library Journal "Best Books of 1999" award; *Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History* (with Mark McGarvie) (2003); and a forthcoming biography of Erich Fromm and a short volume with Alan Petigny on *The Demise of Psychoanalytic Psychology in America*, as well as numerous articles, presentations, and book reviews.

Professor Friedman may be reached at <ljfriedm@Indiana.edu>. Paul Elovitz conducted the interview by phone in October, using questions he prepared together with Bob Lentz.

Paul H. Elovitz (PHE): Please tell us about your background.

Lawrence J. Friedman (LJF): Baseball has always been important to me. I have corresponded with Yogi Berra since I was eight years old, he is so psychologically attuned that I think of him as a type of psychohistorian. I rooted for the Cleveland Indians, and at age 18 I tried out for them as a pitcher and made it to the Toledo Mud Hens minor league team, but my folks insisted I go to college. An important part of my identity is as a Yankee hater. I just won a bet with you of a pitcher of beer since the Marlins beat the Yankees and won the World Series.

PHE: Well, now all of our readers will know about my baseball disappointment. Tell us

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about your *family* background.

LJF: My parents were Jewish. My father was from Poland. He was a Communist Party union organizer who was in the family gravestone business. Later he went into the insurance business where he did rather well. My mother was a bacteriologist in academia who, due to difficult circumstances in the Great Depression, was never able to finish her doctoral degree. My parents identified with the working class but were actually middle-class, despite my father's never really making a living as an organizer. It was mainly my mother's earning power that supported the family. My mother is now 91 years old and reads 14 books a week. She still favors my younger sister (and only sibling), who is a doctor. My father died in 1978 when I was 38. That loss prompted me to go into therapy, which became analysis -- lasting from 1978 to 1981 with breaks -- and with my analyst becoming a Jungian along the way. My books became better as time went on.

PHE: Some Forum researchers have been struggling with the issue of identification with a particular parent and achievement.

LJF: Of course we identify with our parents. I identify with both my mother and father. My mother preferred my sister to me. When I won a book prize and showed my mother, she looked at me and said, "Your sister won one 20 years ago. What took you so long?" My sister behaved. I was the rebel. There was love for me; they just preferred me to behave.

PHE: But you identified with their rebelliousness.

LJF: Yes. Communists in the McCarthy era were rebellious. I was asked to join the Party, but I told them that I didn't need to go to church, to join -- I was a sympathizer. The Party did a lot of stupid things. Gus Hall was nuts at the end. He was anti-Gorbachev. Hall stayed in our house for the night when he got out of prison in the mid 1950s. (All the Communists in California came to our house.) The next morning my folks asked me, "What did you think of Gus?" I said, "He's a dumb shit," and my dad replied, "You get the fuck out of here and go to school. We don't need to hear anymore of that." My mother turned to him and said, "I think he's right." It turned out that Hall was so dogmatic and narrow that he destroyed the CPUSA.

PHE: In your experience and life, are high achievers more identified with their fathers?

LJF: I don't know because I don't understand women. Freud didn't either. I don't know what women want. I used to identify with my father, who died in 1978. I identify with my mother; she's smart as hell. She's not just smart, she's street smart.

PHE: How do you define *psychohistory*?

LJF: It's the integration of the inner psyche with the outer social circumstances with time and place relevant to both.

PHE: What brought you to psychohistory?

LJF: Reading Erik Erikson. I went to law school at UCLA, but it occurred to me that in any law office 95 percent of the time is devoted to money-making and that was not my interest. Then my mentor in history was Donald B. Meyer, whose first book, *The Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919-1941* (1960), was psychohistory. I started out with him, doing a paper on the Southern Rape Complex, which became my first book, *The White Savage: Racial Fantasies in the Postbellum South* (1970).

PHE: What books were important to your development?

LJF: My academic career was turned around by one guy who cared, who saved me from being a drop-out. I had flunked several grades and stayed back two years. A junior high school teacher, a black man named Robert Williams, had me read Richard Wright's *Native Son* (1940). This is the most important book I have in my library. It has tremendous power in economics and psychology, in explaining racism.

I've been assigning Ralph Ellison's *The Invisible Man* (1952) for over 30 years -- it's very psychological, and it's historical. The character "Supercargo" is obviously a superego representation and "all roads lead to Golden Day," which is a bar where black prisoners riot against their prison guards and enjoy momentary freedom. In New York, I would go over to Ellison's apartment for tea. He had my students, even undergraduates, coming over, providing that they read closely. Learning how to read closely, and bringing life into the text and the text into my own life, is important in doing psychohistorical work. Really good literature and poetry is all psychohistory.

PHE: Who else was important to your development?

LJF: My dad was the most important mentor. He would take a book like *The White Savage*,

read really slowly, and then take a paragraph and tell me, "This paragraph doesn't make any sense; it contradicts the previous paragraph." Then I would read it and say, "No, it doesn't. I don't see that." He would tell me, "That's because you don't know how to read carefully."

There was another man who helped me in how to read. Robert Nisbit, Dean of the University of California, Riverside, where I received my BA, taught the way we can't teach anymore. I didn't share his politics, but I had a course with him my sophomore year. He had us read Tocqueville and Rousseau. He would have us prepare a paragraph as homework, and then read it aloud in front of the class, summarize it, and critique it. When it was my turn, I "prepared" the paragraph on my way up to the front of the class and started to read it there. After two minutes, Nisbit said, "Okay, Mr. Friedman, that's enough. Meet me in my office on Sunday. If you ever do this again, I'm the dean and I'll flunk you out." Basically, he did what we can't do to students anymore: he said that he was the dean and if I kept screwing around, he would flunk me out of school. I shaped up.

PHE: Again, you've been a rebel when it came to authority.

LJF: Always, always. It's Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*. There is a case called *Lessin, Friedman, et al. vs. Regents of the State of California*. The University of California had a ban on Communist speakers. We had a forum in 1960 or 1961 at UC Riverside called Dissent: Far Left and Far Right. The right-wing John Birchers were allowed to speak but the Communists weren't. With my dad being communist and my mother ACLU-connected, we filed suit, my roommate and I. We were about to win in the California Supreme Court nine to zero, and Dean Nisbit was about to propose a settlement, but I said, "No." My father, who was our representation, pulled me aside and kicked me. I said I would let it drop only if Nisbit would publicly apologize. He did, saying the ban was the most barbaric thing he'd ever known in higher public education, and thanked me for suing the school.

PHE: The designation as a rebel seems to give you a lot of zest.

LJF: Yes, I would say so. From one of my books, *Gregarious Saints: Self and Community in American Abolitionism, 1830-1870* (1982), I really do identify with Garrisonian abolitionists, or radical abolitionists, who believed in God -- although I

don't -- and felt slavery was a metaphor for the degradation of blacks. I think the government of man is slavery but the government of God is democratic socialism. I'm a Garrisonian abolitionist, so was Erich Fromm.

PHE: Of which of your works are you most proud?

LJF: There're different kinds of books. I think the best scholarship is *Gregarious Saints*. In the field of abolition and slavery, that's still the book to go to. The book -- the experience -- that I will never repeat is *Identity's Architect*. Every review was favorable, though each was different. I knew how Erikson felt and thought even before I looked at the evidence. I examined the evidence to back it up and it always agreed. For example, I knew that Erikson would publicly abhor but privately sign the California loyalty oath, even before I found the evidence. It's something when you are so attuned to your subject. I wish I could get that sense again with Erich Fromm. What do you make of it?

PHE: You're not yet at the right stage of research to be so empathetically attuned to your new subject. That special ability of a biographer to anticipate his subject's thoughts and actions is based on the level of identification. You don't have it now, but that does not mean you will not have it in the future.

LJF: I liked him, but I also didn't like him. I thought he was a coward in failing to openly oppose the University of Californian loyalty oath in the McCarthy period and later failing to publicly oppose the war in Vietnam.

PHE: Though I know Erikson left Europe before the Holocaust was a direct threat, my thought is that you grew up in easier times and places, perhaps that explains what you see as cowardice.

LJF: I disagree. I think Erikson always had a privileged life. Joan always made things right. He could never take care of himself and he always had people to take care of things for him. That was his career. Maybe he had the capacity for others to take care of him. Joan used to tell me that she had one extra kid -- Erik.

PHE: That seemed pretty clear from your book. You [a Freudian slip, interviewer meant to say, "He" (Erikson)] seem to enjoy it, being taken care of.

LJF: I would love to be taken care of; I've

wanted that all my life; I haven't found it yet. I'm envious of Erik.

PHE: Well, we'll see if that happens if you live to be as old as Erik, who lived to be 91, and your 91-year-old mother.

LJF: I should live so long. I've never found a woman to take care of me like that.

PHE: It was a different time, too.

LJF: Yes, when women took care of men. Joan was so talented. The part of the book I enjoyed most was the epilogue, about going to her funeral.

PHE: You felt a lot of identification with her.

LJF: Yes, as Erik declined mentally, Joan became the key source. You know what their son Kai and I do every year? We go to his house in Contuit on Cape Cod two hours outside of Boston. Each of us alternates in bringing a bottle of great scotch, Chivas Regal, and we run into the ocean. It's the only time in the year I drink scotch. He constantly loses football bets to me.

PHE: Sue Erikson Bloland told me Kai is not very psychological.

LJF: That's off base. Sue is very sensitive but is wrong on this aspect of her brother. She depends on Kai for scholarly advice, as Erik did. In *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance* (1960), Kai claims that New England Puritans identified themselves by contrasting themselves favorably with deviants (Quakers, Indians, etc.). This involved negative identification. The process helped them only temporarily. Within two generations the Puritans lost their sense of mission and the inner meanings within their lives. In his second book, *Everything in Its Path* (1985), Kai Erikson argues that a trauma, like a flood that kills everyone, does permanent damage psychologically. It would be good if Sue were as psychologically sensitive as Kai.

PHE: At times Sue seems to have an axe to grind against her father.

LJF: Yes. The latest news I heard from Kai was that Erik Erikson was in bed with Frida Fromm Reichman when she was married to Fromm. Erich Fromm was impotent. Frida then divorced him. Kai didn't tell me this when I was doing the book, because he knew I would include it.

PHE: Was this characteristic of Erikson --

that he wasn't faithful?

LJF: No, it wasn't at all characteristic. Erikson never did anything at all like this before. He was afraid of what Joan would do.

PHE: When you turn the woman you marry into your mom, it gets more tempting to go elsewhere sexually.

LJF: That's true. Maybe Kai has other stories that I haven't heard.

PHE: What is Erikson's legacy?

LJF: It's a pretty big legacy. There is going to be a PBS documentary that millions will see. That's a very concrete legacy of Erik Erikson. The intersection of the inner psyche and the outer culture are inseparable -- that's what he calls the "psychosocial," and it seems to me that it's all over the place. Erikson won conceptually over his more orthodox psychoanalytic and even his behaviorist detractors.

PHE: A reviewer (Cushing Strout) of *Identity's Architect* has written about you, "Friedman joined the early 'psychohistory' movement but became disenchanted when too many participants 'failed dismally in their historical judgments and their aesthetic sensibilities.'"

LJF: I objected to some of Lloyd deMause's material early on. Twenty-five years ago he invited me to a meeting of the Institute for Psychohistory in New York City and I was doing what became my *Gregarious Saints* chapter on Garrisonian abolitionists. He wanted it modeled after what he was doing, but I said that I wanted to concentrate on the evidence and felt that the evidence did not validate his model. He was leading from theory, not the historical evidence. Cushing Strout was concerned that we shouldn't lead from theory and become reductionist. Rather, we should be reading and digging into the archives, backing our work with good evidence, as any historian should.

PHE: What is the status of the field of psychohistory and what is its future?

LJF: I think we psychohistorians have won. We don't always know it, and the other folks don't read us. When they're writing books and doing things they call the "New Cultural History," it isn't new at all. It's what we created, you and I, what we call "psychohistory." They're not as good as we were or are because they don't read. They don't read Erikson, they don't read Freud, and they don't read Jung. They don't read anything. They just screw around, saying that they are writing

about something like the identity issues of the American Revolution. But they don't know what they're doing.

PHE: My argument is that they take the psychohistorical message and kill the messenger, although usually not doing a very good job of understanding and presenting the message.

LJF: I doubt they even read the message. They're too busy going to committee meetings and redoing the curriculum with lots of increasingly arcane requirements. Who in the world would want to be a history graduate student if graduate school involves this disheartening rite of passage and not much of a job market ahead when you are finished? It's not fun to study history anymore.

I think we ought to ignore the new cultural history people. We better fight postmodernism. How would you like it if you went for surgery and the doctor said, while you're on the operating table under his knife, "My *perception* is that your heart is here?" We cannot repeal the Enlightenment. Freud was against postmodernism in his day.

I don't think we should be afraid to be called "psychohistorians." I used to think that we needed to change the name, but I don't think so anymore. We ought to say what we are and continue the kinds of dialogue that we do. I think we have new blood, but the problem is bad graduate programs. The historians, especially the "cultural historians," want to make the graduate programs as miserable as they had it. They call it "rigor," but it's just misery.

PHE: It's a fraternity and they want new members to suffer as they suffered.

LJF: Yes, and to become as blasé and uncreative as they are.

PHE: What is the importance of childhood to psychohistory?

LJF: It's absolutely central. We have to stop apologizing for focusing on childhood and stop trying to defend ourselves. We've won the battle already.

PHE: For almost 15 years, from 1985 until its demise in 1999, you were Associate Editor of *The Psychohistory Review*. Please tell us about your involvement with that journal. What is its legacy?

LJF: I was always active in the *Review* and Chuck labeled me "Associate Editor" from 1985-1999. Its end occurred when Larry Shiner retired and he and Chuck were unable to find a successor

editor, with university support, with whom they felt comfortable. As we were folding, we could have cut a deal with Andrea Sabbadini and Robert Hinshelwood from London who were working on starting *Psychoanalysis and History*. But Larry and Chuck weren't interested, they felt it was better to go under, and they were doing the work at the time. I think they wanted to say that that era was over, and I think it was the wrong call. We could have had an Anglo-American journal but since I didn't do the work I wasn't entitled to be part of the decision.

PHE: What are you working on now?

LJF: Three books. The most important one is *The Art of Giving: Erich Fromm and the Intellectual Emigration from the Holocaust*. It is not a pure biography. It is about the Fromm generation, including Albert Einstein and even Hannah Arendt. They corresponded with each other. Fromm wrote to all of them. They psychologically understood the Holocaust and tried to understand their entire lives.

PHE: Do you consider yourself Jewish?

LJF: I consider myself a rabbi. You know what a rabbi does? He cuts a deal between the id and the superego. He's a broker -- none of this rigid moralism stuff. He solves real problems today and worries about God tomorrow. Rabbis work it out so people can live with each other. Ariel Sharon, the Israeli prime minister, learned a lot from the Nazis, but not enough about early Israeli history. He's not a rabbi.

PHE: I certainly have not noticed any sign of an observing ego, in your sense a "rabbi," in Sharon.

LJF: Sharon is horrible. I'm going to Israel in June -- and not just for fun. I'm trying to find out if Sharon and the people around him read and studied Nazi military plans. I want to look in the archives at Hebrew University.

PHE: He's been in the public eye for so long and he's unobservant of himself, so you may find out. My guess is that the answer to Sharon's aggressive personality and political approach lies in his early life: in his father's (and therefore his) being so disliked in their Israeli Jewish village and his reflexively responding with sadistic aggression, of wanting to beat his critics twice as hard as they beat him.

LJF: He did tell Bush that the way to respond to critics is to quash them and bomb the hell

out of them.

PHE: Well, Sharon's aggressive responses make sense to Bush. Our president isn't willing to stand up to Sharon regarding not building the fence on the West Bank. Not mainly because he's afraid of offending Southern Baptists and Jews, certainly Jews don't count for much of the vote, but because he identifies with the reflexive use of force.

LJF: The whole Christian Right identifies with Israel and the Jews as the Chosen People. I wish they knew a little Jewish history.

PHE: It's very interesting. There has been and is a lot of anti-Semitism among fundamentalist Christians, but at the same time we're the "chosen people." Look what we are chosen for!

LJF: The Holocaust.

PHE: Why write on Erich Fromm next after Erikson? What is his intellectual legacy and how do you compare Fromm with Erikson?

LJF: Fromm and Erikson's theme is the same, "social character" in Fromm and the "psychosocial" in Erikson. Fromm is dead 24 years, but he's a best seller in Poland, he's a best-seller in Catholic and former Soviet countries. The people there are reading *To Have or To Be* (1976), that you have to be to have a voice and find yourself. You cannot just have the U.S.-style emphasis on acquiring more and more, you have to find yourself. That's why he sells millions of copies today, that's his legacy. Fromm is still in every Borders and Barnes and Noble bookstore even though the academics don't bother to read him.

I'm working on two other books that are shorter than my Fromm volume. One is *The End (or Demise) of Psychoanalytic Psychiatry in America*. Alan Petigny, a historian at the University of Florida, is my co-author. It will be focused on the demise of the Menninger Foundation and similar private psychoanalytic hospitals. The other book is called *Why We Hate: Psychological and Historical Perspectives*. It will be a dialogue with classic literature.

PHE: Tell us about your work in philanthropic studies.

LJF: I'm going to San Francisco in a few days. *Charity, Philanthropy and Civility in American History*, which I edited with Mark McGarvie, won a book prize from the Independent Sector. They gather together all the non-profit organizations in the country. This is going to be fun. I'm staying at the Westin Saint Francis in San Fran-

cisco. I requested Mother Theresa's bed. It was that or Queen Elizabeth II's bed. I thought it better for Mother Theresa's bed to preserve my chastity. The book replaces Robert Bremner's *American Philanthropy* (1960), which was old consensus material from the 1950s. We got together people in various fields to put it together. The cover of the book originally had a picture of John D. Rockefeller giving a child a dime. The original title that Cambridge Press did not want was *Small Change: A History of American Philanthropy*. That's my view of philanthropy. It's part of the destruction of the welfare state that's going on. I don't know why the hell the Independent Sector gave it a prize, because we argued that there is no such thing as an "independent sector." It's all about corporate money, whether it's government or private.

PHE: In 1970 you published *The White Savage: Racial Fantasies in the Postbellum South*. What are your views on American race relations as we enter the 21st century?

LJF: I just got back from a civil rights march in southwest Georgia. We followed W.E.B. duBois' trail in 1903 from *Souls of Black Folk*. I would say that the conditions are pretty much the same as they were in 1903. The prisons in Baker County, Georgia, are blocks of cement, which are former power plants. You can stay in jail or work on the chain gang. I would call that slavery. One good thing I saw in Georgia was black cops, they didn't arrest you or beat you up. This past fall a white sheriff in Baker County Georgia apparently ordered them to arrest us but they didn't. The black women run the churches very well and are very considerate. But I think the civil rights cause is still on shaky ground. Even in 2003 we still have to go south and raise hell all the time, because if we didn't go, it would get even worse.

PHE: In 1990 you published *Menninger: The Family and the Clinic*. How did you become interested in the Menningers?

LJF: I was there on a sabbatical in the Interdisciplinary Study Program in 1981. Jack Fitzpatrick, who worked there, had arranged for me to go. I was introduced to Carl Menninger, who said, "Did you see *The Brothers Karamazov* by Tolstoi?" I said, "Yes, I've read every book on your shelf, Dr. Carl." He then asked me if there were any books in his library that I had not read, and I picked out several, and he gave me a few books and said, "Read them tonight." That began it all. Then I would bring him books to read. One day he threw some keys on the table. I said, "What are

these?" His response was, "Keys to the archives, you're going to write the clinic's history." "The hell I am," I declared. It ended up that the Menninger family allowed me to write the book I wanted without agreement restrictions or even seeing chapters in advance. So I wrote the volume.

PHE: Did they help support your work financially?

LJF: They tried to, quite deliberately, but I didn't take any money because I knew quickly, as did Carl Menninger, that the book's theme was that a dysfunctional family became a dysfunctional clinic that rarely helped either patients or staff. You had to leave the clinic to gain emotional stability and confidence.

PHE: Although many psychohistorians live on the east and west coasts, some people associate you with the Midwest -- born in Cleveland, played ball in Toledo, taught for decades in Ohio and now Indiana, affiliated with Illinois (*The Review*) and Kansas (Menninger). How has your Midwest setting affected your life and work?

LJF: Damned if I know! I go to Boston, San Francisco, London, or Japan at every opportunity. I am no fan of the heartland.

PHE: In 2001-2002 you taught at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. What are your impressions of Germany today?

LJF: Germany is a lot healthier than America. It's a real change from the 1930s, when America was the hope and Germany was the horror. I was at a seminar last summer with German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. He reminded me a lot of Thomas Jefferson. He reads; he's open; he's flexible. He admits that he doesn't know a lot of answers. Fischer is the most popular politician in Germany, more popular than the chancellor.

I have a problem, though, with the prosecution of neo-Nazis. I taught *Mein Kampf*, and when I heard it was banned in Germany, I taught it anyway. I think the approach is that in banning books, you make a big to-do about them. I think the best approach is to ignore them because the more attention they get, the more popular they become.

PHE: For a while after World War II, I think they needed to ban it.

LJF: They needed to ban it then but not in recent years. It's a crazy paradox because Berlin does more in a sophisticated way on the Nazi Holocaust than the rest of the world and yet they have the book banned.

PHE: Tell us about your plagiarism problems with Erica Good, *The New York Times* reporter on human behavior.

LJF: In writing, when you take something from someone, you cite your source. We all do that, even Einstein did it. She didn't do it earlier this year in an article on the Menninger Clinic. There is something wrong in stating my theme and also using much of my evidence, but giving the reader the impression that these were her thoughts and her evidence. My lawyers tell me it's legal plagiarism and a major copyright violation. Whether it is scholarship or ethics, plagiarism is wrong.

PHE: Are you going to sue her?

LJF: I don't know yet. The article she wrote earlier this week on her father's suicide makes it harder to sue her without looking bad. The *Times* should definitely fire her.

PHE: How has your training as a lawyer had any impact upon your work as a professor and scholar?

LJF: The only way I find it possible to effectively deal with middle-level management is to sue them or to let them know you are going to sue them, because they would have to hire outside law firms, which is expensive. That's where we are in higher education. There's no point in talking collegiality, it's either relying on your union for protection or suing them.

PHE: How do you explain the growth and psychology of fundamentalism?

LJF: I don't know why it is that a lot of religious evangelicals and semi-fundamentalists were against slavery and for women's rights and peace in the 19th century. I don't know what went wrong in the 20th and 21st centuries that the situation has reversed. That may be a way to answer your question. You can give the quick answer of the desire for certitude in terrible times, but I prefer to try to understand what brought about the change from the 19th to the 20th century, where these people really became hateful of others.

PHE: It's a good question. But maybe there was a lot of hatefulness in the 19th century and they had a good outlet to direct it at.

LJF: It could be good to hate slavery, you're right. But my people, the Garrisonians, were very loving. You know what my daughter said? She said "Dad, I don't want you to be embarrassed by this, but how can you be gregarious and a saint at the same time? You can't be both,

Dad." I replied, "I think both are true of them." She said "Dad, you're going to get bombed on this book!"

PHE: What happened?

LJF: The book was accepted without trouble, but she still thinks she's right.

PHE: Strong opinions seem to run in your family.

LJF: Definitely.

PHE: What do you make of Islamic fundamentalists?

LJF: If I was a Palestinian kid today and I was 16 and my folks were shot at, and I couldn't go to school or get a job, and I couldn't get anything to eat, and someone told me that I would have a great life in the next life, I might go with a grenade into an Israeli disco. It's so horrible what's going on, but I think we can understand it. We know how to change it. We've got to give those kids hope -- what we gave the kids in Germany and Japan, some hope. Then maybe we wouldn't have so many crazy fundamentalists. They might even know that they're part Jewish themselves.

PHE: What are your thoughts on the psychology of violence in our world?

LJF: I'm doing a university seminar on religion and violence. We just had our first forum on the IRA a few weeks ago. It was a great forum; we had a hard-nosed sociologist with numbers and a folklorist with stories. They both concluded that the IRA knew what they were doing; they just killed folks that were tied to the Brits because they wanted the Brits out of Ireland. The Protestant militia shot civilians. It's not really about religion there, but about power and money and who rules Ireland. Religion is a smokescreen. If both sides could agree to get the British out and the British would get out, then maybe there would be peace there.

PHE: How can psychologically oriented scholars have more influence in academia and on society in general?

LJF: We need to rediscover the public intellectual tradition and write for broader audiences. We should get out there in the real world and fight real problems, and attend fewer department meetings. We should never aspire to be deans and chairs. That experience [as Coordinator of Graduate Studies in History, 1989-1993] nearly did me in.

PHE: The Frankfurt School had a lot of

impact

LJF: Fromm was in there. His study around 1929/1930 on the appeal of fascism to German workers was the beginning of what became the authoritarian personality study.

PHE: Please list the five people who you think have made the greatest contribution to psychohistory in order of their contribution.

LJF: Yogi Berra....

PHE: *Seriously!*

LJF: Oh, if you insist: Erik Erikson; Sigmund Freud; Marx of 1844; Ralph Ellison; Erich Fromm; and Carol Gilligan, author of the brilliant recent book, *The Birth of Pleasure* (2002), and Erik Erikson's teacher's assistant, who left him. I would also include Hannah Arendt, despite her being critical of her psychological friends.

PHE: Do any future plans come to mind?

LJF: I am going to Boston -- Cambridge -- on a sabbatical next year and may choose to retire there. I have done all my books there, with some side trips to New York City.

PHE: Thank you for the interview.

See profile of interviewer Paul H. Elovitz on page 101. □

Hitler as the Bad Boy of the European Family of Nations

(Continued from front page)

nary people. In a very real sense, *der Führer* carried out their hidden dreams and frustrations.

Professor Beisel's analysis is based upon a review of the roles of all the major European players who brought about the Second World War. The author starts out by dealing with the central issue at hand: that feelings and fantasies weave through and influence diplomacy. Right from the outset, he describes how European and non-European policy makers in the 1930s were deeply affected by their feelings.

The book displays an impressive knowledge of the sources and uses some remarkable David Lowe cartoons to good effect since they do so much to illustrate the dysfunctional family dynamics that Beisel describes and analyzes. It also contains an excellent set of footnotes and an extensive bibliography.

The author addresses the stress that many

Europeans felt during and after World War I. This tension resonates with my own experience in Europe. I noticed the same sort of strain on the local level when I wrote about the village in Northern Italy where I grew up. The battles of WWI killed about 10 per cent of the farmers and more than that of the male farm hands, and the memory of the collapse and aftermath of the Austro-Hungarian Empire lingered in the village as a whole and in households and individuals. Just as Beisel describes for the broader European population in similar situations, the ordinary people in my region, who were all Germanic, felt betrayed for being "given" to Italy in 1919. Their feeling was matched by reality: they had actually been "let down" by politicians, like Wilson, who spoke of freedoms and national self-determination but then assigned them to a strange and former enemy country. The villagers had lived as Tyrolian Austrians since the 1230s, and after the World War I settlements were supposed to be loyal Italians! They were angry and vented their anger on the innocent young Italian teachers who came to teach them their new language.

Beisel continues with the fantasies that Europeans experienced about their body politic and how it could be healed or be in crisis, either as a whole or in its parts. Each of the states was seen as if it was a body part. Within the larger context, Europeans saw their states as organisms; especially Hitler spoke of the German state as such. Some contemporaries spoke of being threatened by various infiltrations, vermin and cancer being popular metaphors. In a similar vein, some saw member states as being born, absorbed, dismembered, and torn asunder. Thus, Czechoslovakia was seen as the new kid in the European family, that is, a state that was created at Versailles, only to be dismembered as Hitler was given permission, if not unconscious encouragement, by the Allies to do so.

In a different context, even though Hitler spoke of Germany being male, *das Vaterland*, he also spoke of it as if it were female, the land *der Mutter*, emphasizing its maternalness. Fatherland may appear as male on one level. That is, the land of father, but the article that moderates it is the neuter *das*, not the masculine *der*. It is a neutral entity and, thus, could be assigned to either gender. *Land*, which also means *earth* as in English, is thus perceived as neutral, being male or female, as fertile and lifegiving. Attacking the fatherland was thus not just about attacking a male but also a female entity. Contemporaries could thus speak of

the incorporation of Austria into Germany in 1938 as the "rape of Austria," an obviously improper act against this land. Interestingly, Beisel did not make much of the *Anschluss*, the more genteel phrase for this rape. It, too, is an image filled with fantasies. Historians have often seen this *Anschluss* as two rail cars being coupled, but the word derives from *anschiessen*, that is, *to follow*, as in a line of soldiers or shoppers, or *to associate oneself*. The word is closely related to *einschiessen*, as in *to enclose* or *to embrace*.

Professor Beisel follows this general explanation of the European family system with a very astute and careful discussion of each of the family members: Great Britain, Germany, France, Belgium, and Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union. The analyses of Britain and Germany are most satisfying; the discussions of the other European powers are equally intriguing but sometimes lack the same depth. Beisel's treatment of England and Germany are gratifying because he could read the primary sources available from and about many of the key players, many of who had spoken and written about most of their thoughts and actions. In addition, subsequent authors have investigated almost every major English and German personality and every conceivable aspect of decisions and their background of the pre-war era. The same is not as true of the other leading European figures and their thoughts and decision-making processes. We are not as well served with information on them, perhaps because of a lack of interest on the part of the English-speaking and reading public in leaders other than those who already seem familiar. Thus, understanding Stalin, for example, appears to be quite easy on one level but on another we have all too little knowledge about the context of his upbringing in the Caucasus, the traumas of his monastery and Siberian prison experiences, and his later innermost thoughts. Stalin was not adept with the pen, thus leaving us little with which to work, and some of the key recent work on him continues to elude Westerners. Similar points can be made about Benes and other Central European leaders. Consequently, it is difficult to find the detailed evidence relevant to Beisel's three underlying "needs" of the decision-makers of the 1930s.

The author's three underlying themes in decision-making and their outcomes are: "the needs to be humiliated, to vicariously experience their own aggression, and to create a clear conscience" (p. 45). He excels not only at integrating

childrearing patterns but also later life experiences and circumstances that led men to their adult needs. The last of these is definitely the one easiest to explain to historians in general. Yes, the leaders of the 1930s consciously did everything to avoid war. But Beisel looks at the reasons that persuaded leaders of the time to work at peace, for example, by allowing the German absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and simultaneously to play into Hitler's hands by allowing him, even encouraging him, to be the bad boy in the family. It is worth noting that many of the leaders embraced the beginning of the horror of the war with some relief as their worst fear was realized.

The *Suicidal Embrace* is a treat for historians and general readers who are open to understanding the psychological influences in the decision-making of the 1930s that led to the horror of World War II. Policy makers of our era would also benefit from reading it since doing so might help to prevent future horrors.

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My Experiences Editing a Volume on Psychoanalysis and History

**James William Anderson
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As an undergraduate at Princeton, I took one psychology course. We were issued a rat at the beginning of the year and spent two semesters putting it through its paces. The drab, mechanistic version of psychology taught in this course had no relevance to the complicated, inner life of individuals as I glimpsed it in history and literature courses and in my own life. Then one memorable day, I began reading Erik Erikson's *Gandhi's Truth*, and I saw there was a wholly different kind of psychology that honed in on and illuminated just what most interested me.

Erikson took a psychoanalytic perspective in studying history, and I wanted to learn about this approach. I came across a volume that had just

been published in paperback, *Psychoanalysis and History* (1963), edited by Bruce Mazlish. The book gave me an overview of the field that ever since has been at the center of my intellectual life. In the volume Mazlish highlighted William L. Langer's 1957 address as president of the American Historical Association in which he declared that "The Next Assignment" for historians was to make use of psychoanalysis.

When I had the opportunity to co-edit a volume of the *Annual of Psychoanalysis* on this same topic, psychoanalysis and history, I thought about Mazlish. I wrote him, mentioned the importance his book had had for me, and asked whether he would like to submit a paper in which he talked about his experiences as a leading figure in this field. He wrote back, saying he had started writing his essay and was already finding it exciting to think back over his decades of involvement in psychoanalysis and history.

In his completed essay, Mazlish not only looked at the past, but, with Langer's talk in mind, he also considered what he saw as the "next assignment" for psychoanalysis and history, that is, developing a "psychoanalytic sociology" that would be as effective in looking at groups as psychoanalysis is in looking at individuals. My co-editor and I decided to place the essay, which both summarizes the field and takes a forward look, as the final essay of the volume. (Though I use "I" throughout this essay, because I am concentrating on my own experiences and because I took the lead in working on this volume, I would like to note that, as Associate Editor, I worked closely with the Editor, Jerome A. Winer, who uses a hands-on approach and was involved in all major decisions.)

While my plan of writing Mazlish went well, not everything I tried was a success. My original idea was to produce a volume that would be something of a handbook. I divided the field into several areas and started asking leading people in the field to write papers on these areas. I soon learned that most of those I asked wanted to look at what interested them, rather than at what I wanted. The exception was that two people were willing to take up my suggestions, and the result is that the volume includes two valuable essays that would not have been written otherwise. One is on Freud as a psychohistorian by Alan C. Elms and the other is a wonderful overview of psychoanalytic work on American presidents by the Editor of this journal, Paul H. Elovitz.

After I saw that the volume could not be a

handbook, my main goal became to convince many of the outstanding scholars in the field to contribute papers. I thought of the famous story about a person who wanted Sartre, Picasso, and Gide to come to a dinner party he was giving. He told each of them that the other two would be there, and, of course, they all accepted his invitation. I used a similar strategy. Once several distinguished authors, such as Norman Itzkowitz, Vamik Volkan, Geoffrey Cocks, George Moraitis, Thomas A. Kohut, Elizabeth Wirth Marvick, and William McKinley Runyan agreed to participate in the volume, I could write to other people and say, in effect, wouldn't you like to be a part of a volume that includes these other authors? I received far more "yes's" than "no's."

I had some adventures in pursuing the leading scholars. I wrote Sudhir Kakar, pointing out that he had done work in the area of psychoanalysis and history, and asked whether he would like to contribute to the volume. "My work is more in the area of religion at the moment," he noted, "and the only paper I have, prepared for a conference on religion and eroticism at NYU, is 'Seduction and the Saint.'" I told him that this topic interested me and that I would like to read the paper. My hidden agenda was that I thought there was a chance the paper would fall within the subject matter of the volume. My hopes were realized when I read it and saw that it was a subtle and penetrating psychoanalytic study of two historical religious figures. It would fit perfectly in the volume, particularly because we were planning to have a section on psychoanalytic perspectives in religious history. I asked him whether he would submit the paper to the *Annual*, and to my delight he agreed.

Although we solicited people to submit papers, the papers were all subject to review. This process did create one scare, and it had to do with Kakar's paper. Kakar is so important a scholar that not only is he a winner of the Goethe Medal from the government of Germany, but Oxford University Press has published a volume of selections from his work. The first reader to submit a report failed to see the value of Kakar's superb paper and recommended that we turn it down. I remember thinking, "How could this happen?" But fortunately there were four more readers who all said the paper would be one of the jewels of the volume, thus outvoting the first, unappreciative reader.

One of the authors I most wanted to have in the volume was W.W. Meissner. The author of

13 books, he is one of the giants of psychoanalytic scholarship, and I knew he was interested in psychoanalytic history because he had written a fine psychobiographical study of Ignatius of Loyola (*Ignatius of Loyola: The Psychology of a Saint*, 1994). I sent him one of my most carefully crafted letters, evoking the people who had already agreed to contribute to the volume and expressing my sincere admiration for his work.

Meissner wrote back that he would like to contribute and mentioned two possibilities. His preference would be for us to accept a paper he had already written, a review of psychoanalytic perspectives on mysticism. Or, he might write a paper on the psychohistorical study of religious figures. It was obvious to me that the latter topic would suit the volume perfectly and would fit into the same section as the Kakar paper. But he wanted to send us the paper on mysticism. Although an important piece of work, the paper did not fit our volume. There was nothing in it that was substantially psychohistorical.

I regretfully wrote back explaining that the paper was not in accord with the theme of the volume and said we would love to have him write the other paper. He replied, "I'll see what I can do." He added, "My list of commitments is getting longer than I like," and said he did not know whether he would be able to write the paper. As the weeks went by, I e-mailed him, gently asking whether he had decided to work on the paper. He did not reply. I was convinced that he had been offended by our turning down the paper on mysticism, and I was resigned to having a volume without a contribution from Meissner. Then one day I checked my e-mail and found a message from Meissner. It was not what I had been hoping for, a note saying he was working on the paper; instead, he had attached the completed paper, meticulously done.

As the deadline for submitting papers was getting close, I attended the annual convention of the American Psychological Association. I heard Seymour Epstein give a talk; he took what I saw as an exciting, new psychoanalytic approach in discussing "Unconscious Roots of Hitler's Anti-Semitism." The first chance I had, I wrote him, asking whether he would submit the paper to the *Annual*. He said "Yes," and I realized how lucky I had been to have gone to his talk.

The final volume is not a handbook. It does not systematically cover the key areas of psychohistory. Yet, it turns out that the volume does pro-

vide a well-balanced view of the present and future of psychohistory. All the essays are the original work of outstanding scholars. The essays ended up fitting into different sections that span nicely across the field.

The opening section has four papers that, each in a striking way, make the case for the value of psychobiography. As an example, many people would agree that a psychological approach could help explain why novelists would write about certain kinds of conflicts that might resonate with their own experience. But a non-representational painter like Wassily Kandinsky would seem to be an unlikely figure for psychobiography, and yet Gerald N. Izenberg shows how invaluable this approach is even in the case of Kandinsky.

The second section, surviving my original plan for a handbook, includes Elms' paper on Freud as a psychohistorian and my own paper on how the work of three post-Freudian psychoanalysts -- Winnicott, Kohut, and Kernberg -- can be used in psychobiography.

Then there are papers looking at the author's journey, such as Charles Strozier's reflections on what it was like for him to write his heralded biography of Heinz Kohut.

The section on the study of American presidents begins with Elovitz's overview and includes three original contributions to this area. For example, Betty Glad thought of a novel approach for getting at psychological issues by exploring the question of what it means for a president to be considered "tough."

In the section on psychoanalysis and religious history, we wanted to have, along with the essays by Meissner and Kakar, something that would show the relevance of psychoanalytic history to current concerns. I contacted Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin, who has published several papers in this journal, and she wrote an essay that took a psychohistorical approach to Osama bin Laden.

The final section focuses on the use of psychoanalysis with larger groupings of people, such as cohorts, or followers of a particular leader, and nations, as opposed to the usual focus on the individual life. For example, Rudolph Binion gives his theory, developed over a lifetime of psychohistorical scholarship, of how societies, much like individuals, relive and re-experience trauma.

I would like to think that the final volume is a worthy successor to the book edited by Mazlish. If someone had just become interested in

psychohistory and looked at the *Annual*, I think it would show the person what the field is like, how exciting it is, what it has accomplished, and some of the directions in which it is heading. Best of all, it offers something that a handbook does not. It showcases the new, creative work of many of the best writers and thinkers in the field.

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A Major Psychoanalytic Recognition of Psychohistory

Todd Schultz
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Review of Jerome A. Winer, MD, and James William Anderson, PhD, editors, Psychoanalysis and History (The Annual of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 31). Hillsdale, New Jersey: Analytic Press, 2003. ISBN 0881633992, ISSN 00925055, 288 pp., \$49.95. Available through www.analyticpress.com or 1-800-926-6579.

Edited volumes like *Psychoanalysis and History* can sometimes feel haphazard, with individual chapters by different authors desultorily thrown together. This book, however, for the most part succeeds on two criteria: the intrinsic fascination we feel about each chapter's subject and the distinct level of quality of each individual chapter.

A panoply of interesting people are assessed psychohistorically, including Freud, Hitler, American presidents, Kohut, Kubrick, and bin Laden. These colorful, enigmatic, and paradigmatic figures, scientists and politicians and artists alike, are written about by some of the best psychobiographers and psychohistorians in the field, including Binion, Kakar, Marvick, Mazlish, Meissner, and Strozier. With the few exceptions noted below, each chapter delivers significant insights and represents a valuable contribution to the field.

Alan Elms is wise and convincing as he

focuses on Freud and, among other things, Freud's persistent rejection of pathography (the reduction of personality to "mental disorder"). At a time when intense, virtually worthless disease-sniffing seems almost standard in biographical and psychobiographical research (for example, was Clinton narcissistic, van Gogh bipolar, Marilyn Monroe borderline?), any effort to combat such tendencies provides welcome relief. Giving a person a label -- say, "sociopath" -- explains nothing; the name is mere shorthand for a list of behaviors, not a reason for the behaviors. This tendency reminds me of an exchange I witnessed once on an inpatient psychiatric unit. The mother asked, "Doctor, why is my son hearing voices?" The doctor replied, "Well, he is a schizophrenic." The mother then asked, "How do you know he's a schizophrenic?" The doctor answered, "We know because he hears voices."

Jim Anderson's illustration of the usefulness of object-relations models in psychohistory is also laudable. He summarizes essentials of theory with aplomb, and then applies Kohut, Kernberg, and Winnicott's theories to a trio of historical subjects. Object-relations models, each a little different from the other, focus on infinitely subtle psychological mechanisms, like splitting, projection, projective-identification, and symbiosis.

The chapters by Elms and Anderson appear in Section II of the book, subtitled "Freud and Beyond." Some of the chapters in Section One, "The Case for Psychobiography," are unfortunately disappointing. Norman Itzkowitz and Vamik Volkan in Chapter One work hardest at making a case for Itzkowitz and Volkan as they assemble self-congratulatory anecdotes trumpeting the superiority of their work over that by biographers tackling the same figures, for example, Nixon. I also found Geoffrey Cocks' chapter on Stanley Kubrick below par. The linking of parts of *The Shining* to Holocaust obsessions never achieves cogency. I'm always suspicious of attempts to formulate significant psychological meaning out of number connotation. It reminds me of embarrassingly contrived Jungian efforts to find "4"s and "6"s hidden in Jackson Pollock's pre-drip painting canvases like *Guardians of the Secret* and *Moon Woman Cuts the Circle*. But then Seymour Epstein's chapter on Hitler turns the tide, however. It is quantitative in part, which makes it all the more rare. It also effectively shows how Hitler's attitude towards Jews derived from displaced hostility, aimed originally at his mother's Jewish doctor, who, at Hitler's infantile urging, treated her breast cancer with idio-

form.

Other especially enjoyable chapters include William McKinley Runyan's self-reflective stroll through his personological past -- contacts with Henry Murray and Gordon Allport -- plus an interesting application of some of Stephen Jay Gould's ideas to psychohistory; Paul Elovitz's valuable review of psychoanalytic scholarship on American presidents; Nancy Kobrin's analysis of Osama bin Laden; and Bruce Mazlish's musings on the past and future of psychohistory.

If the book in the end asks more questions than it answers, that is fine -- and inevitable anyway. For example, What are the advantages of psychoanalytic psychohistory? Well, first one must note that there aren't too many other kinds. Further, if cognitive psychologists are correct, and roughly 90 percent of our lives is lived unconsciously, then, by setting its sights on the subterranean, psychoanalysis exposes motives too often left obscured by rational-actor models of behavior which always seem absurdly naïve to begin with.

What is the difference between psychobiography and psychohistory? This volume of the *Annual* chiefly includes examples of the former. Where psychobiography ends and psychohistory begins, therefore, remains murky. Psychohistorians can examine group psychological processes, of course -- an area psychobiographers usually avoid. It might have been worthwhile to include a few more examples of such methods in the volume.

Mazlish asks, "Has psychohistory fulfilled its initial promise?" His answer, surprisingly, is "No." Historians after all have fallen under the spell of the "tyranny of the social." But even more importantly, Mazlish notes, the field lacks cumulative power -- nothing ever adds up, no one follows up important work in ways that start an ongoing scholarly "conversation." What is needed, Mazlish declares, is systematic and sustained effort along such lines, as well as a commitment to explore the relation between universal psychological truths (such as, say, projection) and their expression in particular contexts,

I think he's right. I've always felt an idea for an edited volume might run something like this: choose a subject (say, documentary photographer Diane Arbus), identify 10 key questions about her, and then ask a dozen or so of the field's leading minds to venture replies. Force a sort of dialogue on them. Mark agreements, resolve disagreements, and see what revelations result. Build the "adding

up" into the process. Or, as Mazlish also recommends, identify one core "universal" -- such as the emotion of shame. Then once again ask a set of psychohistorians to particularize it in specific settings. Explore its shadings and permutations.

It is time for the field to start showing progress -- clear, tangible progress. *Psychoanalysis and History* does that. Most of the papers are solid and persuasive. I found myself mainly feeling quite convinced. Let's build on it, then, in the new "next assignment."

William Todd Schultz, PhD, is Associate Professor of Psychology at Pacific University in Oregon. He has published numerous articles and book chapters in the area of psychobiography, on subjects ranging from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Jack Kerouac. He is presently editing the Handbook of Psychobiography for Oxford University Press. Professor Schultz may be reached at <schultzt@pacificu.edu>. □

De Ecclesia Hysterica?: Response to Guido

**Richard Booth
Black Hawk College**

While reading Joseph Guido's article, "Hysteria and the Sexual Abuse Crisis in the Catholic Church" (*Clio's Psyche*, Vol. 9 No. 4, March 2003, pp. 168-170), I wondered how he would persuasively interconnect the psychodynamics of hysteria with the institutional church as explanatory of the sexual abuse of thousands of children over numerous decades.

Guido's rapid movement from Freud to Peter Gay to Judith Herman made his foundational argument uncertain. Was he actually saying that perpetrator priests, the pathological representatives of an hysterical church, had been sexually abused (early Freud), or that abusive priests were experiencing PTSD, rendering them amnesic regarding abuses they had perpetrated? Was he confusing victim with perpetrator dynamics? Is there evidence that priests were traumatized by their abusive behaviors? Was Guido arguing that mere exposure to trauma determines symptomatology, without consideration of premorbid, adaptive, and resilience factors? If he was, would not everyone exposed to "trauma X" all be symptomatic, and equally so (environmental determinism)? If this was his argument, I was convinced that a review of

the disposition-situation data was in order.

Institutions may certainly be dysfunctional and sometimes diagnosable. (See, for example, my "Dysfunction in Higher Education," *Clio's Psyche*, Vol. 7 No. 4, March 2001, pp. 208-210.) However, Guido and I diverge when he suggests that the Church, *as an institution represented by its bishops*, is hysterical, and that this hysteria adequately explains the way it dealt and deals with those it has victimized.

Having belonged to the Catholic sacerdotal system for some years, I know something about its inner workings. It is very much like other human institutions in its manner of dealing with secrets and deniability. I was not surprised that ecclesiastics lied, withheld information, and tried to settle abuse cases inexpensively, regardless of the damage done to children. One difference is that the Church might argue "no accountability" to civil authority. History is clear about mutually beneficial and pragmatic dealings between *sacerdotium* (priesthood) and *imperium* (kingship) through time, some of which were destructive to the laity. Bishops sometimes lived like kings and were unaccountable to lower clerics or laypersons.

The powerful are loathe to lose their power, for example, Cardinal Law, among others. What better way to exert power than to imprison people's minds, threaten them, and keep them blind? Two methods used historically by the Church (as moral arbiter) to accomplish this have been the "movie guide" which once, if not also currently, carried the weight of serious sin when forbidden films were viewed, and the *nihil obstat quominus imprimatur*, which allowed people to read certain writings only following censorship on the part of the Church. I believe ecclesiastics, having held such power for so long, including the power to threaten hell, feel entitled to protect what they perceive as their turf. But, I maintain that power and control tactics are not "hysterical," since they require systematic thinking, planning, task completion, and methods of enforcement, none of which behaviors are typical of hysterics.

Now, after much persuasion, records and files are being released, secrets are emerging, and some changes are being made. Law, for instance, who, according to Massachusetts Attorney General Reilly, knew of the pedophilic problem in 1984 prior to arriving in Boston, has been replaced by Archbishop O'Malley. This monk, who will surely be maligned by clerics whose interests lie in ecclesiastical externalia, has relocated to the south side

of Boston to live in a regular rectory, amidst his people, rather than residing in the mansion occupied by Law and O'Malley's other predecessors while the sexual abuse went on and on.

I agree that Catholic ecclesiastics formulate a prototype, but I reject Guido's argument that the perpetrators, in general, are "merely" pathological and the bishops hysterical. Guido says, "...It is worth considering whether the current crisis in the Catholic Church is not merely an expression of the individual psychopathology of abusers and presumed prevarication of bishops, but is a variant of hysteria" (p. 169). I wonder what "merely" means in this context and whether "psychopathology" implies lesser responsibility. Since the evidence clearly shows the bishops lied, Guido's "presumed" episcopal prevarication is actually not presumed at all. Law knew. Others knew. There were no surprises and no hysterical reactions. Moreover, the "mere" psychopathology of pedophilia is not "mere" in any way and, to suggest that it is, trivializes victims' suffering and manifests a fundamental ecclesiastical character flaw relative to empathy and charity.

If nothing else demonstrates the Church's systematic lack of empathy toward victims and families, these factors do: in at least one diocese, the statute of limitations is being invoked to prevent giving compensation; in Chicago, victims received some compensation, while in Joliet (a different diocese only an hour away), victims received nothing; and under Law's regime, a significantly lower amount of restitution was offered to victims than the \$55 million offered by O'Malley during the infancy of his episcopacy. This tells an interesting tale of the Church's resistance, narcissism, inequitable treatment, and sense of superiority over its people.

I have known hysterical clerics, but they are no more numerous than hysterics in other comparable groups. Christianity's history itself shows how manipulative, punitive, extravagant, and powerful some bishops and popes have been, virtually since the bishop became the hub of the ecclesiastical wheel in the Western world. The systematic, deliberate acquisition and maintenance of power, the writing of canon law, the multitudinous rules, the well-planned compromises with royalty, the continued accumulation of wealth, the organization of armies, and the controlling of minds and lives for so many centuries required disciplined planning, centralization of power, and, perhaps, prag-

matic collusion. These are not the traits of hysterics. Hysterics simply do not think things through this thoroughly; their ideas are vague; and they virtually fail to notice details. The Church is not hysterical.

Moreover, when one ponders deliberate transfers of abusive priests to other parishes, protected files documenting abusive clerics' histories, and information available to bishops over many years, it becomes clear that dissociation is not causal here. Fear of exposure? Certainly. Guilt? Possibly. But, we have no evidence that speech, sight, and hearing were impaired, or that "volitional movement [was] inhibited," as Guido argues (p. 169). The available evidence suggests otherwise.

Hysterics are whimsical, given to infantilism, easily persuaded, cognitively superficial, and impulsive. I suggest an alternative explanation: *the serious examination of the Church's crisis in terms of pathological entitlement and malignant, expansive narcissism*. It may also be helpful to re-examine self-object issues that may have played a role in episcopal prevarication. Is it possible that some bishops were so narcissistically invested in careerism, pomp, and protecting "Mother Church" that they carefully played checkers with abusive priests and unsuspecting laity, while simultaneously documenting their files with abuse complaints?

In view of the analysis above, I cannot accept that a group of bishops, archbishops, and cardinals would *whimsically* exempt themselves (or even whimsically *appear* to exempt themselves) from the guidelines of *The Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People, Revised Edition* (2003). The bishops' document appears to be "business as usual," transferring negative sanctions primarily to priests and deacons rather than sharing the onus in equitable ways (see *Charter*, Article Five). I perceive this to be a deliberately written document, carefully and politically sculpted by frightened, narcissistic men, which, without the mounting disrespect, public outcries, and pressures from every side, would never have been penned.

I believe there is a helpful lesson at the core of the crisis, namely, that psychospirituality and religion are not synonymous and that powerful narcissists probably exist in all large organizations. Those who love the Church, its rituals, and God, may be disillusioned by clerics for a time, but the truth will out. Ultimately, the most vital dimension

of psychospirituality is the relationship one has with Ultimate Reality, however one understands it.

Richard Booth, PhD, is Professor of Psychology at Black Hawk College, Moline, Illinois, and a Licensed Psychotherapist with Diplomat Status. He also holds the position of Adjunct Professor of Behavioral and Social Sciences at University of Maryland University College. Dr. Booth is the author of numerous professional journal articles and may be reached at <boothr@bhc.edu>. □

Report on the November 22 Psychohistory Forum Autobiography/Biography Research Group Meeting

Paul H. Elovitz

Psychohistory Forum and Ramapo College

Discussion focused on Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Interesting Times: A Twentieth-Century Life*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2003. ISBN 0-375-42234-X, i-xv, 448 pp., \$30.

The eight members of the Autobiography/Biography Research/Discussion Group had a lively meeting at the home of Lee and Connee Shneidman as they returned to the subject directly related to their origins as the Research Group on Communism: The Dream that Failed. The group wondered how the brilliant Eric Hobsbawm (1917-) could remain a communist after the Molotov/Ribbentrop Pact (1939), suppression of the Hungarian Revolution (1956), and military destruction of the Czech Spring (1968), and into the final years of Soviet Communism. For over 60 years, despite its repeated failures, Hobsbawm remained faithful to the creed of his youth.

The three historians in the discussion group did not share intellectual Tony Judt's assessment of Hobsbawm as "the best-known historian in the world" (Judt, "The Last Romantic," *The New York Review of Books*, November 20, 2003, p. 43). Indeed, we all noted that we had inclined to start, rather than finish, this English historian's best-known works on the 19th century, such as *Primitive Rebels*, *The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848*, or *Industry and Empire*. *Interesting Times*, however, appeared to have been read from start to finish by all involved. Like Christopher Hill, E.P. Thompson, and Raymond Williams, his fellow members

of the British Communist Historians' Group, he has an impressive mastery of the English language. The first hundred pages of this volume are wonderfully written and as self-revealing as a non-introspective man can be. He provides the information from which our group formed its own analysis. First, I will discuss his life and then some of our speculations about his motivations.

There is a Chinese proverb that says it is cursed to be born during interesting times, which one can readily agree with when looking at some of the difficulties of Hobsbawm's early life. He was born in Alexandria, Egypt, to an English father and an Austrian mother, though his first memories of are of Vienna where he lived until the age of 14. There was never enough money in his childhood and his father died suddenly one freezing February day when his son was 11. His mother, who he still thinks of when he makes an important accomplishment, was stricken with a lung disease and died before his 14th birthday. He and his younger sister, with whom he never appeared to be close, were shipped off to relatives in Berlin, where he soon became enamored of communism in the dying days of German democracy. Eric had the thrill of fighting the Nazis on the streets. As Hitler took over Germany, he was shipped to relatives in England where he became a scholarship student. The young man's Cambridge University college supervisor told Tony Judt that "'Hobsbawm was the cleverest undergraduate he had ever taught,'" but added, "'Of course, you couldn't say I taught him -- he was unteachable. Eric already knew everything'" (Judt, "Last Romantic," p. 43).

The Forum Research Group felt that the intensity of Hobsbawm's early loss and his frequent moving left Eric desensitized and, in a sense, untouchable. He established his kinship with the family of the "Communist Brotherhood of Man" and was very much in the Marxist tradition of the intellectual who found his cause among the workers. He felt at home all around the world, because there he would find Communist Party members, sympathizers, or those influenced by communist, anti-imperialist ideology. To me, it seemed that the Party had become his family. He was a dutiful son of the Party. Thus, he declares, "We did what it ordered us to do ... whatever it would have ordered, we would have obeyed ... if the Party had ordered you to abandon your lover or spouse, you did it" (p. 135). When he discovered, after 1956 and 1968, that his "family" was far from perfect, he remained steadfast in his loyalty to it, keeping

his doubts to himself. After all, a good son would be remiss in abandoning the family that has given him life and nurtured him. Thus, we have the paradox of the brilliant rebel who is also a dutiful son. I came away from the book feeling that Hobsbawm would remain the forever-talented student, but one who was both unteachable and untouchable. He would live very much in the world he created in his childhood.

In retrospect, Hobsbawm is willing to admit "that failure was built into this [communist] enterprise from the start" (p. 127). However, in a romantic vein, he still wonders if humanity could "live without the ideals of freedom and justice" which throughout virtually his entire life was embodied by the Communist Party (p. 151). He wrote with great zest about communists out of power and somewhat less of those in power. Hobsbawm felt he has a home in the left-wing movement around the world, considering Paris to be his second home and teaching half the year in New York. He writes enthusiastically of his travels in Italy, Latin America, and elsewhere.

Hobsbawm appears to me to be a classical example of the intellectual who identified with the downtrodden of the world, despite having had little contact with them, and always being a part of the intellectual elite. He clearly came from middle-class origins, even if his parents and his mother's sister's who looked after him never seemed to have had enough money. His contact with the workers of the world was slight and mostly in his boring years in the army on the World War II home front. To Hobsbawm, as with his comrades, the Communist Party represented the workers, so what was the need to have more direct contact? The nature of such identification is something which needs to be investigated carefully in every case. Like so many other communists, Hobsbawm was and is very much a part of the British intellectual elite.

Hobsbawm's Jewishness is an issue that appears repeatedly throughout the volume, though he recalls no "personal anti-Semitism," even when living in Vienna in a period where distain for Jews was intense (p. 22). His index has over 30 references to Jews, many of which are multi-volume works. Many of the people he writes about were not only Jews, but were identified specifically as Jews. He makes various references to his own Jewishness, as when he writes of his "ancestral Jewish experience of moving from place to place among strangers" (p. 310). He provides a valuable discussion of the two Jewish historians, Mounia

Postan and Lewis Namier, who did much to revolution views of history.

Though Hobsbawm is neither very introspective nor psychologically attuned, the raw materials for psychological analysis are present. *Interesting Times* is well worth reading. The other members of the group might not mostly agree with

Letters to the Editor

this judgment, but I noticed that all had read the book closely and were eager to discuss it and offer many valuable insights.

See profile of author *Paul H. Elovitz* on page 101. □

Brink-Elovitz September 11 Exchange on Historians' Response to the *Emotional Life of Nations* Symposium in *Clio's Psyche*, September 2003

To the Editor:

Though Lloyd deMause is no special hero of mine, I do believe I grasp his central point about childhood trauma in history and its far-reaching implications. (I gave up on heroes a long while ago but admit that Harry Guntrip may have been one.) I admire Lloyd's tenacity and his intellectual discipline and brilliance as writer and speaker. I have more questions and theoretical points of difference with Lloyd's book than I want to say just now, but didn't want to go beyond "certain caveats" (p. 34) as I knew that the contributions would supply more than enough. But I was surprised and shocked by the range of exception-taking, especially by historians who failed to engage with the main issue of child abuse. I didn't come away with much sense that historians enjoy working with ideas ... that touch on the painful aspects of childhood experiences, including our own. Only Leon Rappoport and myself saw how extraordinary *The Emotional Life of Nations* really is and were willing to say so -- but we aren't historians. I am still slightly in shock over the symposium and want to think about it some more.

Andrew Brink
Greensville, Ontario

The Editor Responds:

As a historian, I use many different ideas, especially Lloyd's on the history of childhood. Indeed, this semester all 135 of my students in four

classes (two Western Civilizations, one Psychohistory, and one Childhood and Youth in History) have read and have been separately quizzed on deMause's "Evolution of Childhood." I accept and use his central point on childrearing, as do Dave Beisel, Joe Dowling, Peter Petschauer, and other historians. Peter was inspired by "The Evolution of Childhood" and uses Lloyd's materials appreciatively, but wishes Lloyd would be more open to other research and developments, as do I. Historians use different ideas, including Lloyd's, and I do not appreciate Lloyd's unflattering depictions of us and our work (I do not see why the work of historians should drive him to tears! (*ELN*, p. 108) However, we historians are interested in careful documentation as well as varied ideas.

Regarding your [unpublished] query about a symposium on Lloyd's next book, **Clio's Psyche** paid Lloyd a great compliment, at your behest, by making his book the basis of a symposium. We had never done this before. It will be up to our Editorial Board as to whether we will do it again for his next book or anyone else's book.

Paul H. Elovitz
Franklin Lakes, NJ

Response to Lloyd deMause

To The Editor:

One sometimes wonders whether a reply to a critic is worth it, especially when most readers will have read the book in question, *The Emotional Life of Nations* (*ELN*), and can decide for themselves. But in the case of a factual assertion that is simply wrong, I must reply.

Regarding my quite sympathetic review of his work (**Clio's Psyche**, September 2003, pp. 36-37), Lloyd deMause says that "When Alford attacks me for saying the Oliners' study found rescuers' parents 'invariably' used reason rather than violence in correcting their children, he is misquoting what I said. I nowhere used the word 'invariably' in connection with the Oliners' study" (**Clio**, p. 53).

DeMause is correct that he does not use the term "invariably" in the passage (*ELN*, pp. 202-203) he quotes in his reply. He does, however, use the term when citing the Oliners' work on p. 110 of *ELN*, where he says that "rescuers' parents were found to have invariably" used reason rather than violence in correcting their children. The footnote to this claim, number 68, p. 110 of *ELN*, cites

Oliner and Oliner, *The Altruistic Personality*. Perhaps deMause missed this reference because it does not appear in the index under "Oliners."

DeMause says that my supposed misquotation "gives a glimpse of how furious my work has made him [Alford]" (**Clio**, p. 54). I leave it to the reader to imagine what deMause's false assertion that I misquoted him says about deMause. Perhaps it has something to do with his inability to distinguish reasonably sympathetic criticism from an attack.

Fred Alford
Columbia, Maryland

Bulletin Board

The next **Psychohistory Forum WORK-IN-PROGRESS SATURDAY SEMINAR** will be on **December 6, 2003**. The topic is "**The History, Present State, and 'Next Assignment' of Psychohistory,**" and the presenters are, with their affiliations and the fields they are discussing: **Ralph Colp, MD** (Columbia) - Psychiatry; **Paul Elovitz, PhD** (Ramapo) - Psychohistory; **Henry Lawton, MLS** (Film Group; IPA) - Film Studies and Bibliography; **Jerry Piven, PhD** (New School) - Psychology; **Robert Quackenbush, MSW** (Private Practice) - Social Work; and **Jacques Szaluta, PhD** (Merchant Marine Academy) - History. Subsequent Winter/Spring seminars will include **David Beisel** (SUNY-Rockland), "**Incomplete Mourning and the Origins of WW II: Chamberlain as Exemplar,**" on **March 6, 2004**. **CONFERENCES:** The **International Psychohistorical Association's** 27th annual conference will be at New York University on **June 2-4, 2004**. For information on attending or presenting, contact Henry Lawton at <HWLIPA@aol.com>. The **International Society for Political Psychology** (ISPP) will have its 27th Annual Scientific Conference in Lund, Sweden on **July 15 - 18, 2004**. The theme will be "**The Political Psychology of Hegemony and Resistance,**" and papers may be submitted through the end of 2003 to Catarina Kinnvall at <Catarina.Kinnvall@svet.lu.se>. **NOTES ON PSYCHOHISTORIANS:** **Larry Friedman** has been named "**Writer of the Year**" for 2003 by the International Biographical Center in Cambridge, UK, and has received an **Independent Sector Book Award** for his *Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History*. **Peter Loewenberg** of UCLA has been teaching at Hong Kong University in the Department of Psychiatry. **How-**

ard Stein has just published *Beneath the Crust of Culture: Psychoanalytic Anthropology and the Cultural Unconscious in American Life* (Contemporary Psychoanalytic Studies I) (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2003, ISBN 9042008180, \$40). At his own request, Ramapo College has changed the professional title of **Paul H. Elovitz** to “Associate Professor of History, Psychohistory, and Interdisciplinary Studies.” He is eager to learn if others have (or have had) “psychohistory” in their academic title. The ISPP is pleased to announce the establishment of the **Alexander L. George Book Award** for the best political psychology book in the previous year, to be given at the 2004 ISPP Annual Scientific meet-

ing. Professor Robert Shapiro is award committee chair and may be reached at <rys3@columbia.edu.>. **OUR THANKS:** To our members and subscribers for the support that makes **Clio's Psyche** possible. To Benefactors Herbert Barry, Ralph Colp, and Mary Lambert; Patrons David Beisel, Andrew Brink, David Lotto, and H. John Rogers; Supporting Members Rudolph Binion, Peter Loewenberg, Jacqueline Paulson, and Peter Petschauer; and Members Mike Britton, Paul Elovitz, George Gouaux, Glen Jeansonne, Kenneth Rasmussen, and Charles Strozier. Our thanks for thought-provoking materials to Fred Alford, William Anderson, Richard Booth, Andrew Brink, Jef-

Our Thanks to Associate Editor, Bob Lentz

Paul H. Elovitz

Bob Lentz, after 10 years of devoted, volunteer service, is retiring from his position as Founding Associate Editor of **Clio's Psyche**. Bob has demonstrated excellence as a psychohistorical editor despite having a limited background in psychohistory when he assumed the editorship.

Some of the special issues and features which he conceived of and was lead editor on include: The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories; Psychobiography; The Psychology of Religious Experience; and America as an Imperial Power?: Psychological Insights.

After we editors formed a strong working alliance, he shared in the development of all the major ideas and in the direction of our quarterly journal. Bob Lentz has been a wonderful person to collaborate with: his judgment has always been sound, his work ethic is exemplary, and he has a good eye for detail as well as a special ability to cut lengthy articles without losing their essence. He demonstrates great patience in working with authors. Upon completion of editing he always has complete responsibility for the production and mailing. Bob leaves his mark on each issue of **Clio** at every stage of its development.

The efforts of the Associate Editor went well beyond the ordinary. When an anonymous donor in 1995 donated a computer to the Psychohistory Forum so that we could e-mail back and forth, and produce **Clio's Psyche** more effectively, Bob came down from Canada for a greater part of a week to set it up and train me in its use. Bob has always been our technical expert.

Our Associate Editor shied from publicity and credit, and, like the Editor, has never been paid for his services. He always refused to write for **Clio**, pouring his energies into the editorial process. Bob lives in Calgary, Alberta, with a view of the Canadian Rocky Mountains, with his wife Anna and their children Erika and Adam. We wish him every success in whatever new endeavor he pursues.

Anyone wishing to fulfill any of the duties Bob performed should contact me. These duties included:

- sending out the calls for papers and responding to initial inquiries
- screening the submissions and making editorial suggestions
- editing, copyediting, and proofreading
- doing the layout in Microsoft *Publisher*
- printing and mailing

frey A. Engel, Lawrence J. Friedman, Ted Goertzel, Jackie Hogan, J. Donald Hughes, John V. Knapp, Dan P. McAdams, Lincoln P. Paine, Peter W. Petschauer, Todd Schultz, Charles B. Strozier, Nancy C. Unger, and Bertram Wyatt-Brown. □

Call for Papers

Psychology of the Arab-Israeli Conflict & Terrorism in the Middle East

Special Theme Issue

December 2002

Some possible approaches include:


- The Nature and Causes of Terrorism: Comparative Middle Eastern Examples
- Applying Psychodynamic Concepts to the Israeli-Palestinian Struggle
- Factual, Historical Survey of Israeli-Palestinian Relations
- Finding Chosen Traumas and Chosen Glories in Israeli and Palestinian Histories
- Identification and Ethnic Rituals in Large Groups
- Comparative Suffering and Victimization: Violence in the Name of Suffering
- Getting Beneath & Beyond Recrimination
- The Relationship Between Childrearing Practices and Political Behavior
- Women in Palestinian Society and the *Intifada*
- Unconscious Sado-masochistic Elements
- Mutual Self-destructive Behavior of Israelis and Palestinians
- Psychobiographical Studies of Arafat, Barak, Sharon, and Other Leaders
- The Changing Identity of Arab Israelis
- Leader-Follower Dynamics
- Fundamentalist Jews and Muslims
- Internecine Clashes -- Violence Against One's Own
- Cycles of Violence and Exhaustion, War and Peace, Conflict and Resolution
- Journeys to Peace: Crossing the Psychological Borders to Conflict Resolutions
- Implications of the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute for the U.S. War on Terrorism
- Changing Views of Israel and the Palestinians in Europe and America
- Anti-Zionism as Anti-Semitism? Case Studies
- Book Reviews, for example, of Sharon's *Warrior*

500-1500 words, due October 1

Contact Paul Elovitz, Editor
<pelovitz@aol.com>

Announcement & Call for Volunteers

Robert Quackenbush, PhD, counselor, teacher, and author/illustrator of numerous books for children, has accepted the invitation of the Branton-Peale Institute and Counseling Center, in Manhattan, to direct the **Liberty Avenue Program**. The program's purpose is to help young people to discover ways of coping and resolving emotional conflicts with the events of 9/11 through art, writing, music, and dance. Every Saturday, professionals in the arts will teach and help; also at hand will be a psychiatrist as well as therapists. In addition, training programs for adults who work with young people will be offered. Professionals in the arts and clinicians are invited to participate. Contact Robert Quackenbush, PhD, P.O. Box 20651, New York, NY 10021-0072, <Rqstudios@aol.com>.



The Best of Clio's Psyche - 1994-2002

This 153-page collection of many of the best and most popular articles from 1994 to the June 2002 issue is now available for only \$30 a copy. Contact Paul H. Elovitz. See page 63.

Back Issues Wanted

The Makers of Psychohistory Research and Publication Project of the Psychohistory Forum is searching for copies of the *Newsletter of the Group for the Use of Psychology in History (GUPH)* and some early issues of *The Psychohistory Review*. Please contact Paul H. Elovitz at (201) 891-7486 or <pelovitz@aol.com>.

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting Saturday, September 21, 2002

Paul H. Elovitz

**"Psychoanalytic Approaches to the
American Presidency"**

In Memoriam: Melvin Kalfus (1931-2002)

**Paul H. Elovitz
Ramapo College and the
Psychohistory Forum**

Mel Kalfus, psychobiographer, psychohistorian, professor of history, institution builder, business executive, and Jewish intellectual, died on February 24, 2002, a week short of his 71st birthday, of congestive heart failure after a lifetime of struggling to maintain his health. He left behind a legacy of scholarship (published and unpublished) and courage.

Courage in the face of illness and death was a most outstanding characteristic of this talented scholar. Shortly after his birth in a Manhattan hospital he contracted whooping

(Continued on page 49)

Letter to the Editor

Praise for Clio's Psyche

"I like to think the [*Psychohistory*] *Review* has been reincarnated in **Clio's Psyche!**" Charles Strozier as quoted in "A Conversation with Charles B. Strozier on Heinz Kohut," (**Clio's Psyche**, Vol. 8 No. 2, September 2001, p. 90).

"Paul -- It's up to you now -- good luck with **Clio**. Larry" was a hand written note on the May 1, 1999, letter from Larry Shiner, Editor of *The Psychohistory Review*, advising that the *Review* was ceasing publication. (Published with permission)

**November 8, 2002, Psychohistory Forum
Meeting on "Violence and War"**

**CFP: Arab-Israeli Terrorism - Dec. 2002
See page 124.**

Comments on the March Special Issue on Terrorism and "Home"

[Editor's Note: We do not normally keep track of comments on Clio's Psyche by readers. However, after the first half dozen e-mail or in-person remarks on our March issue, we kept a record of the next 10 which are listed below.]

- "The recent issue of **Clio's Psyche** was indeed great, especially [the article on] mourning ... superb." -A distinguished eastern professor

Call for Papers Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience Special Theme Issue September 2002

Some possible approaches include:

- Personal Accounts on How Your Perspectives on Religion Have Been Changed by Psychoanalysis
- Reconsidering Classic Thinkers Such as Freud and Weston LeBarre
- Religious Development in Childhood
- Religious Dreams and the Use of Dreams by Religious Leaders
- Terror in the Name of God (e.g., anti-abortionism, *jihad*)
- Sexual Abuse of Children by Priests
- Psychobiographic Sketches of Modern Preachers, Prophets, Messiahs (e.g., Robertson, Farrakhan, Koresh)

500-1500 words, due June 15

Contact Bob Lentz, Associate Editor

<lentz@telusplanet.net>

Professor Charles Strozier recently established a new **Center on Terrorism and Public Safety** at John Jay College, CUNY. The purpose of the Center is to study terrorism in ways that are familiar and appropriate for a university but also to search for concrete applications of that research to make the world a safer place. Professor Strozier's own particular area of research is a psychological study of the World Trade Center Disaster through interviews with witnesses and survivors; his special concern is with the apocalyptic meanings of the disaster. The Center on Terrorism, in other words, seeks to blend scholarship and commitment in the context of traumatic historical memory. Professor Strozier may be contacted at <chuckstrozier@juno.com>.

Call for Papers Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience

Special Theme Issue, September 2002

Some possible approaches include:

- Personal Accounts on How Your Perspectives on Religion Have Been Changed by Psychoanalysis
- Religious Dreams and the Use of Dreams by Religious Leaders
- Terror in the Name of God (e.g., anti-abortionism, *jihad*)
- Sexual Abuse of Children by Priests
- Psychobiographic Sketches of Modern Preachers, Prophets, Messiahs

500-1500 words, due June 15

Contact Bob Lentz, <lentz@telusplanet.net>

Book Review

There are no negatives in the unconscious.

Melvin Kalfus (1931-Feb. 24, 2002)

Mel Kalfus died of heart failure after a long struggle to maintain his health. There will be an extensive obituary in the next issue of **Clio's Psyche**. We urge friends and colleagues to **send us their memories** of this valued colleague, friend, and member of the Psychohistory Forum's Advisory Council. We wish to express our condolences to his wife Alma and their children.

"Home" Symposium

CFP: Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience - Sept. 2002 - See page 225

Call for Nominations: Halpern Award

for the
Best Psychohistorical Idea
in a

Book, Article, or Internet Site

Contact Paul H. Elovitz, <pelovitz@aol.com>.

Call for Papers: Children and Childhood - June 2002 - See page 224

Call for Papers September 11 and the Psychology of Terrorism Special Theme Issue March, 2002

Some possible approaches include:

- Initial Emotions: Shock, Disbelief, Sadness, Anger, Hate, Humiliation, Victimization, and Frustration: Case Studies
- Fears, Fantasies, and Realities of Anthrax, Bio-Terrorism, and Nuclear Terrorism
- Group Feelings of Victimization and Entitlement in the Face of Trauma
- The Power of Symbols: Blood (Shed and Donated) and Flags in the Face of Trauma
- The Power of Altruism in the Face of Danger: The Psychology of Fireman and Other Relief Workers
- The Psychological Defense Mechanisms of Israelis and Others in Facing Terrorism
- Bush's Personalizing the Hydra-Headed Monster of Terrorism
- The Psychobiography of Osama bin Laden and Various Terrorists
- Islamic Fundamentalism: America as the Great Satan
- Why Many People Hate the U.S.
- Presidents Bush as War Leaders
- Psychohistorical Perspectives on Terrorism: Case Studies
- The Sense of Obligation to Avenge the Dead: Turning Anger into Vengeance
- Cycles of Terrorism, Retaliation, and Violence
- Denial and Disbelief in Facing Terrorism: Fortress America and "It Can't Happen Here"
- Why Intelligence and Security Were Negligent or Ignored
- Security, the Cloak of Secrecy, and the Open Society
- Effects on America's Children
- Nightmares, Dreams, and Daydreams of the Attack
- Mourning and Closure
- Survivorship and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

500-1500 words, due January 15
Contact Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, Editor
<pelovitz@aol.com>

Forthcoming in Clio's Psyche

- Among the already submitted articles on "The Psychology of Terrorism, Tragedy, Group Mourning, Bio-Terrorism, and the War on Terrorism" are:
 - "Apocalypse Now"
 - "A Nation Mourns"
 - "Terror Victims"
 - "Enemy Images After 9-11"
 - "Pearl Harbor & World

Call for Papers Children and Childhood Special Theme Issue June 2002

Some possible approaches include:

- Changing Childhood
- What Is It Like to Grow Up in the Modern World?
- Growing Up With a Single Parent, With an Immigrant Parent, As a Refugee
- The Effects of Television or Video Games on Children
- Why American Students See High School as a Type of Prison
- Sonograms as a Prelude to Female Feticide (China, India, America, etc.)
- The Effects of Custody Disputes
- Children of Divorce
- Children in the Courts
- Children and Childhood Through the Ages
- Are Children Better or Worse Off in the Modern World?
- Cross-Cultural Childhood Comparisons

500-1500 words, due April 15

Contact Paul Elovitz, PhD, Editor

<pelovitz@aol.com>

Book Review

Inform colleagues of our March, 2002,
Psychology of Terror Special Issue.

Call for Papers Children and Childhood in The 21st Century June, 2002

500-1500 words, due April 15

Contact Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, Editor
<pelovitz@aol.com>

CFP: Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience - Sept. 2002 - See page 225

There are no negatives in the unconscious.

Wanted: In-depth Insight during Wartime
See call for papers on page 162.

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting Saturday, January 26, 2002

Eli Sagan

**"The Great Promise and
Anxiety of Modernity"**

Proposals for Psychohistory Forum Work-in-Progress Seminars are welcomed. Contact Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, Editor, at <pelovitz@aol.com>

Nominate a graduate student or psychoanalytic candidate for a **Young Scholar Award Membership & Subscription**. Contact Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, Editor, at <pelovitz@aol.com>.

Call for Papers
Psychobiography
 Special Theme Issue
 December, 2001

Some possible approaches include:

- Original psychobiographical vignettes
- Psychobiography-focused mini-interview with distinguished psychobiographers such as George, Mack, McAdams, Solomon, Strouse, and Tucker
- Symposium on Erikson's *Young Man Luther*
- Your experience in researching, writing, and publishing psychobiography
- Developments in psychobiography in the last 15 years
- Issues in doing psychobiography:
 - pathology and creativity

Call for Papers
Psychobiography
 Special Theme Issue
 December, 2001

Some possible approaches include:

- Original psychobiographical vignettes
- Symposium of the pros and cons of Erikson's *Young Man Luther*
- Your experience with psychobiography
- Recent developments in the field
- Issues in doing psychobiography:
 - pathology and creativity
 - the use of empathy
 - evidence and interpretation, reconstruction, and reductionism
 - countertransference
 - assessing childhood's influence
 - interpreting dreams
 - assessing living individuals
 - alternative approaches
- Reviews / review essays

Call for Papers
Children and Childhood in
The 21st Century
 Special Theme Issue
 March, 2002

500-1500 words, due January 15
 Contact Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, Editor
 <pelovitz@aol.com>

- the use of empathy
- evidence and interpretation, reconstruction, and reductionism
- countertransference
- assessing childhood's influence
- interpreting dreams
- assessing living individuals

- alternative approaches
- Reviews / review essays of psychobiographies by others
- Woman's (or Feminist) psychobiography
- Your choice(s) for exemplary psychobiography(ies)
- Oral history as psychobiography
- Film and docudrama psychobiographies

The Best of
Clio's Psyche -
1994-2001

New for 2001.
 This 132-page collection of many of the best and most popular articles from 1994 to the September, 2001, issue is now available for only \$25 a copy.

It will be distributed free to Members renewing at the Supporting level and above

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting
Saturday, September 29, 2001
Britton, Felder, and Freund
"Freud, Architecture, and
Urban Planning"

Call for Papers
PsychoGeography
Special Theme Issue
March, 2001

"PsychoGeography is the study of human projections upon geographic space and the psychic interaction between people and geography" (Elovitz). It investigates "how issues, experiences, and processes that result from growing up in a male or female body become symbolized and played out in the wider social and natural worlds" (Stein and Niederland).

Some possible approaches:

- The gender of geography (e.g., "motherlands" and "fatherlands")
- Psychogeography of rivers, islands, mountains, etc.
- Borders and borderland symbolism
- Cities, states, and countries as symbols of

Call for Nominations
Halpern Award
 for the
Best Psychohistorical Idea
 in a
Book, Article, or Internet Site
 Contact Paul H. Elovitz, <pelovitz@aol.com>.

Presidential Election 2000

Book Reviews

There are no negatives in the unconscious.

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting
 Saturday, January 27, 2001
 Jay Gonen, Mary Coleman, et al
"Role of Law in Society"

Invitation to Join

Join the **Psychohistory Forum** as a Research Associate to be on the cutting edge of the development of new psychosocial knowledge. For information, e-mail Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, Director, at <pelovitz@aol.com> or call him at (201) 891-7486.

Call for Papers
Psychological Uses of Law

Special Theme Issue
June, 2001

Possible approaches:

- The diffusion of law into every aspect of life (i.e., "the legalization of life")
- Emotional uses of law (e.g., legal expression of anger, law as intimidation)

Group Psychohistory Symposium

- Jury psychology
- Law as a system of gridlock
- Insanity and the law

Saturday, November
Psychohistory Forum
Psychoanalysts Co
Creative Pro

Call for Papers

**Psycho-
 biography
 of
 Ralph
 Nader
 Special**

Theme
March, 2001

Possible approaches:

- Psychodynamics and childhood
- Nader's appeal to intellectuals and Inde-

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting
Saturday, September 15, 2001
Britton, Felder, and Freund
"Freud, Architecture, and Urban Planning"

September 10, 2001
Forum Meeting
Confront the
Process

Call for Papers
Psychology and Law
Special Theme Issue
June, 2001

Possible approaches:

- The diffusion of law into every aspect of life (i.e., "the legalization of life")
- Emotional uses of law (e.g., legal expression of anger, law as intimidation)
- Jury psychology
- Law as a system of gridlock
- Insanity and the law
- Dysfunctional family courts
- Legal rights of children
- The law and individual freedom
- Humor in the law and lawyer jokes

500-1500 words, due April 10

Contact Paul Elovitz, <pelovitz@aol.com>

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting
Saturday, March 31, 2001
David Lotto

"Freud's Struggle With Misogyny: An Exploration of Homosexuality and Guilt in the Dream of Irma's Injection"

Call for Papers
Crime, Punishment, and Incarceration

Special Theme Issue
September, 2001

500-1500 words, due July 10

Contact Paul Elovitz, <pelovitz@aol.com>

Call for Nominations
Halpern Award
 for the
Best Psychohistorical Idea
 in a
Book, Article, or Internet Site

Contact Paul Elovitz, <pelovitz@aol.com>

Call for CORST Grant Applications

The Committee on Research and Special Training (CORST) of the American Psychoanalytic Association announces an American Psychoanalytic Foundation research training grant of \$10,000 for CORST candidates (full-time academic scholar-teachers) who have been accepted or are currently in training in an American Psychoanalytic Association Institute. The purpose of the grant is to help defray the costs of psychoanalytic training. Payments will be made over three years of training in installments of \$3500, \$3500, and \$3000 directly to the candidate.

The application is: a) A brief statement of 1000 words about the research proposed, b) A letter from a scholar in the field (e.g., department chair, colleague, or dissertation advisor) attesting to the validity and significance of the research, c) A letter of endorsement by the Education Director of the institute certifying the candidate is in, or has been accepted for, full clinical psychoanalytic training at an institute of the American Psychoanalytic Association, and d) An up-to-date Curriculum Vitae.

Applications are to be submitted in three (3) copies by April 1, 2001, to Professor Paul Schwaber, 258 Bradley Street, New Haven, CT 06511.

The Psychology of

Call for Papers The Psychology of Crime, Punishment, and Incarceration

Special Theme Issue
September, 2001

Some possible approaches include:

- Emotion in the courtroom
- Jury psychology
- Children and women in prison
- Immigrants and the INS
- The crime of punishment
- Comparative international studies
- Case studies
- Crime and punishment on TV
- How cameras change the courtroom dynamics

500-1500 words, due July 10

Contact Paul Elovitz, Editor
<pelovitz@aol.com>

Next Psychohistory
Forum Meeting
Saturday, September
15, 2001
Britton, Felder, and

The Best of Clio's Psyche

This 93-page
collection of many of the
best and most popular
articles from 1994 to the
September, 1999, issue is available for \$20 a copy.

It will be distributed free to Members

Call for Papers

Our Litigious Society

Special Theme Issue
March, 2001

Possible approaches:

- Psychodynamics

The Makers-of-Psychohistory Research Project

To write the history of psychohistory, the Forum is interviewing the founders of our field to create a record of their challenges and accomplishments. It welcomes participants who will help identify, interview, and publish accounts of the founding of psychohistory. Contact Paul H. Elovitz, <pelovitz@aol.com>.

See Calls for Papers
on pages 164 & 165:
PsychoGeography
Psychobiography of Ralph Nader
Psychological Uses of Law
Crime and Punishment

The Best of Clio's Psyche

This 93-page collection of many of the
best and most popular articles from 1994 to the

Saturday, November 10, 2001
Psychohistory Forum Meeting
Psychoanalysts Confront the
Creative Process

Clio's Psyche of Psychohistory Call for Papers

- Violence in Mass Murder
- The Future the Third 2000)
- Assessing Millennial-2000
- Psycho-
- Election biographies Gore, et al
- The Psy-
- Legalizing Society
- Psychobiog-
- Manias and nomics and
- The Role of server in
- Psychohis-

Volkan Honored

In honor of the retirement of **Vamik Volkan** and the work of the Center he created, the University of Virginia Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI) conducted a major conference entitled "Identity, Mourning and Psychopolitical Processes" on May 25-26. The featured presentations and discussions were on the human processes that lead to ethnic tension, conflict resolution, and the healing process. The speakers came from several disciplines -- psychoanalysis, psychiatry, psychology, political science, history, and anthropology -- and hail from the U.S and abroad. **Peter Loewenberg** of UCLA presented "The Psychodynamics of a Creative Institution: The Bauhaus, Weimar, Dessau, Berlin, 1919-1933" and **Howard Stein** of the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center, "Mourning and Society: A Study in the History and Philosophy of Science."

Volkan, who will retire later this year after 38 years on the University of Virginia staff, is currently the director of the CSMHI and a former president of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP). Volkan founded CSMHI in 1987 as an interdisciplinary center to specialize in conflict resolution and peace work, primarily in Eastern Europe and subsequently the newly independent countries from the former Soviet Union. He has developed theories for caring for severely traumatized populations in the wake of ethnic tension. "At the Center, we study preventive medicine for ethnic issues. In that sense, the Center is very unique," Volkan said. "When large groups

are in conflict, people die, they become refugees, they lose homes and their loved ones, and so they have to mourn. Without mourning, they cannot adjust. Ethnic identity is related to mourning. When people do not mourn, their identity is different." The Center is on the forefront of studies in large-group dynamics and applies a growing theoretical and field-proven base of knowledge of issues such as ethnic tension, racism, national identity, terrorism, societal trauma, leader-follower relationships and other aspects of national and international conflict.

For further information on Dr. Volkan and the Center for the Study of Mind and Hu-

the Forum

American Life and der as Disguised Sui-
of Psychoanalysis in Millennium (June,
Apocalypticism and ism Around the Year
Geography
2000: Psycho- of Bradley, Bush, McCain, Buchanan,
chology of Incarcera-
Crime
Life: Our Litigious
raphy
Depressions in Eco-
Society
the Participant Ob-
Psychohistory
torical Perspectives

November, 2001

Psychohistory Forum Meeting

In conjunction with the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (NAAP)

"Psychoanalysts Confront the Nature and Process of Creativity"

announces an American dation research training CORST candidates (full-teachers) who have been recently in training in an lytic Association Insti-

Call for CORST Grant Applications

The Committee on Research and Special Training (CORST) of the American Psychoanalytic Association grant of \$10,000 for time academic scholar-accepted or are cur-American Psychoana- tute. The purpose of

Clio's Psyche of the Psychohistory Forum

Call for Papers

- Violence in American Life and Mass Murder as Disguised Suicide
- Assessing Apocalypticism and Millennialism Around the Year 2000
- PsychoGeography
- Election 2000: Psychobiographies of Bradley, Bush, Gore, McCain, Buchanan, et al
- The Psychology of Incarceration and Crime
- Legalizing Life: Our Litigious Society
- Psychobiography
- Manias and Depressions in Economics and Society
- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a Model for Healing
- The Processes of Peacemaking and Peacekeeping
- The Psychology of America as the World's Policeman
- Entertainment News

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting
Michael Britton
**"Countertransference:
 Royal Road Into the Psychology
 of the Cold War"**

Saturday, September 23, 2000

Contact Paul Elovitz, Editor
See page 51

- Television, Radio, and Media as Object Relations in a Lonely

Call for Papers

The Psychohistory of Conspiracy Theories

Special Theme Issue
 December, 2000

Possible approaches:

- Psychodynamics and childhood roots of conspiracy theories
- Case studies of conspiracy theories in American history
- Survey of the psychohistorical and psychological literature on conspiracy theories
- Film and television treatment of conspiracy theories

Contact Bob Lentz, Associate Editor
<boblentz@cliospsyche.com>

The Best of Clio's Psyche


This 93-page collection of many of the best and most popular articles from 1994 to the September, 1999, issue is available for \$20 a copy.

It will be distributed free to Members renewing at the Supporting level and above as well as Subscribers upon their next two-year renewal.

Contact the Editor (see page three).

**Clio's
 Psyche**
 Now on

Letter to the Editor



Howard F. Stein

(Editor's Note: We welcome scanned pic-

Dreamwork Resources

The **Historical Dreamwork Method** is available to help the biographer better understand the dreams of the subject and other aspects of psychobiography. **Clio's Psyche** welcomes papers on historical dreamwork for publication and for presentation at Psychohistory Forum meetings. Contact Paul H. Elovitz (see page 51).

Call for Papers

- **Group Psychohistory (December, 2000)**
- **Conspiracy Theories (December, 2000)**
(See page 100)
- **PsychoGeography (March, 2001)**
- **Legalizing Life: Our Litigious Society (2001)**
- **The Psychology of Incarceration and Crime (2001)**
- **Television as Object Relations**

Contact Paul Elovitz, Editor
See page 51

Book Reviews

Life: Our Litigious Society
Contact the Editor (see page 3)

Letters to the Editor

**Nader,
Political Nightmares, and
Leaders' Morality**

Editorial Policies

Invitation to Join

Join the Psychohistory Forum as a Research Associate to be on the cutting edge of the development of new psychosocial knowledge. For information, e-mail Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, Director, at <pelovitz@aol.com> or call him at (201) 891-7486.

**Call for Papers on
The Psychology of Incarceration and Crime**
Contact the Editor (see page 3)

**Psychohistorians probe the "Why" of
culture, current events, history, and
society.**

The Best of Clio's Psyche

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• **Letters to the Editor**

The History of Psychohistory

Clio's Psyche's interviews of outstanding psychohistorians (see "An American in Amsterdam: Arthur Mitzman," page 146) have grown into a full-fledged study of the pioneers and history of our field. Psychohistory as an organized field is less than 25 years old, so most of the innovators are available to tell their stories and give their insights. Last March, the Forum formally launched the **Makers of the Psychohistorical Paradigm Research Project** to systematically gather material to write the history of psychohistory. We welcome memoirs, letters, and manuscripts as well as volunteers to help with the interviewing. People interested in participating should write, call, or e-mail Paul H. Elovitz (see page 119).

Awards and Honors

Award

The Psychohistory Forum has granted a **Sidney Halpern Award** of \$300 to Bob Lentz, Founding Associate Editor of **Clio's Psyche**, for Outstanding Work in Psychohistorical Editing.

CORST Essay Prize • Professor Janice M. Coco, Art History, University of California-Davis, winner of the First Annual American Psychoanalytic Association Committee on Research and Special Training (CORST) \$1,000 essay prize, will present her paper, "Exploring the Frontier from the Inside Out in John Sloan's Nude Studies," at a free public lecture at 12 noon, Saturday, December 20, Jade Room, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City.

Sidney Halpern Award for the Best Psychohistorical

Idea • The Psychohistory Forum is granting an award of \$200 to Michael Hirohama of San Francisco for starting and maintaining the Psychohistory electronic mailing list (see page 98).

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting

Saturday, January 30, 1999
Charles Strozier

THE MAKERS OF PSYCHOHISTORY RESEARCH PROJECT

To write the history of psychohistory, the Forum is interviewing the founders of our field to create a record of their challenges and accomplishments. It welcomes participants who

P
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O

Call for Papers Special Theme Issues 1999 and 2000

- The Relationship of Academia, Psychohistory, and Psychoanalysis (March, 1999)
- The Psychology of Legalizing Life [What is this???)
- Psychogeography
- Meeting the Millenium

Call for Nominations

Halpern Award
for the
Best Psychohistorical Idea
in a

Book, Article, or Computer Site

This Award may be granted at the level of Distinguished Scholar, Graduate, or Undergraduate.

Contact Paul H. Elovitz, Editor -- see p.

Free Subscription

For every paid library subscription (\$40), the person donating or arranging it will receive a year's subscription to **Clio's Psyche** free. Help

THE MAKERS OF PSYCHOHISTORY
RESEARCH PROJECT

The Psychohistory Forum is pleased to announce

The Young Psychohistorian 1998/99 Membership Awards

John Fanton recently received his medical degree and is doing his five year residency in Providence, Rhode Island. Currently, he is at the Children's Hospital, Women and Infants Hospital, and the Butler Psychiatric Hospital. His goal is to become a child maltreatment expert working in the area of Preventive Psychiatry. At the IPA in 1997 he won the Lorenz Award for his paper on improving parenting in Colorado.

Albert Schmidt is a doctoral candidate in modern European history at Brandeis University who plans to defend his dissertation in April when his advisor, Rudolph Binion, will return from Europe for the occasion. Rather than do a biography of SS General Reinhard Heydrich as originally intended, he is writing on the German protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia under Heydrich's dominance. In the last four years this talented young scholar has been awarded nine fellowships, grants, or scholarships.

Dreamwork Resources

The **Historical Dreamwork Method** is available to help the biographer better understand the dreams of the subject and other aspects of psychobiography. **Clio's Psyche** welcomes papers on historical dreamwork for publication and for presentation at Psychohistory Forum meetings. Contact Paul H. Elovitz (see page 43).

☆☆☆

Call for Nominations

Halpern Award for the Best Psychohistorical Idea in a Book, Article, or Computer Site

This Award may be granted at the level of Distinguished Scholar, Graduate, or Undergraduate.

There are no negatives in the

The Best of Clio's Psyche

This 93-page collection of many of the best and most popular articles from 1994 to the September, 1999, issue is available for \$20 a copy.

It will be distributed free to Members renewing at the Supporting level and above as well as Subscribers upon their next two-year renewal.

Contact the Editor (see page 51).

Letters to the Editor

Call for Papers

Special Theme Issues 1999 and 2000

- The Relationship of Academia, Psychohistory, and Psychoanalysis (March, 1999)
- Our Litigious Society
- PsychoGeography
- Meeting the Millennium
- Manias and Depressions in Economics and Society

Contact the Editor at

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting

Saturday, October 2, 1999

Charles Strozier

"Putting the Psychoanalyst on the Couch: A Biography of Heinz Kohut"

Letters to the Editor on
Clinton-Lewinsky-Starr

Book Review Essay

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting

Saturday, January 30, 1999

Charles Strozier

"Putting the Psychoanalyst on the Couch: A Biography of Heinz Kohut"

Call for Nominations for the

Best of Clio's Psyche

By July 1 please list your favorite articles, interviews, and Special Issues (no

Clio's Psyche of the Psychohistory Forum

Call for Papers

- Violence in American Life and Mass Murder as Disguised Suicide
- Assessing Apocalypticism and Millennialism around the Year 2000
- PsychoGeography
- Election 2000
- Psychobiography
- Manias and Depressions in Economics and Society
- The Psychology of Incarceration and Crime

Call for Nominations for the

Best of Clio's Psyche

By July 1, please list your favorite articles, interviews, and Special Issues (no more than three in each category) and send the information to the Editor (see page 3) for the August publication.

- Legalizing Life: Our Litigious Society
- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a Model for Healing
- The Processes of Peacemaking and Peacekeeping
- The Psychology of America as the World's

Clio's Psyche of the Psychohistory Forum

Call for Papers

- Future of Psychohistory and Psychoanalysis in the Light of the Demise of the Psychohistory

The Best of Clio's Psyche

The Psychohistory Forum is pleased to announce the creation of The Best of Clio's Psyche.

This 94-page collection of many of the best and most popular articles from 1994 to the current issue is available for \$20 a copy and to students using it in a course for \$12.

It will be distributed free to Members at the Supporting level and above as well as Two-Year Subscribers upon their next renewal.

Call for Nominations

Forthcoming in the June Issue

- Interview with a Distinguished Featured Psychohistorian
- "The Insane Author of the *Oxford English Dictionary*"
- "Jews in Europe After World War II"
- "A Psychohistorian's Mother and Her Legacy"

Hayman Fellowships

The University of California Interdisciplinary Psychoanalytic Consortium announces two \$5,000 annual fellowships to aid psychoanalytically informed research on the literary, cultural, and humanistic expressions of genocide, racism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, inter-ethnic violence, and the Holocaust.

The

The History of Psychohistory

Clio's Psyche's interviews of outstanding psychohistorians (see "An American in Amsterdam: Arthur Mitzman," page 146) have grown into a full-fledged study of the pioneers and history of our field. Psychohistory as an organized field is less than 25 years old, so most of the innovators are available to tell their stories and give their insights. Last March, the Forum