
Clio's Psyche

Understanding the "Why" of Culture, Current Events, History, and Society

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The Memoirs of the Hitler Family Doctor: Eduard Bloch

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SUNY-Rockland

Dr. Eduard Bloch (1872-1945) is well known to historians of twentieth century Germany, especially to Hitler scholars. As the Hitler family physician during Adolph's childhood and adolescence, he treated Hitler for various minor complaints, and was the first to diagnose then treat his mother Klara's breast cancer. This essay is a review of "The Autobiography of Obermedizinalrat Dr. Eduard Bloch,"

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Philip Pomper: A Psychohistorical Scholar of Russia

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Philip Pomper is a distinguished scholar of Russia and Communist leaders as well as the William F. Armstrong Professor of History at Wesleyan University. He was born on April 18, 1936 in Chicago

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Reflections on Civilians in Warfare

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My essay explores the experience of civilians in war and its implications for them and society. It is also about the effects of war on my family, my friends, and me. Though I have never fought in war, I have always lived with its effects. Upon reflection, it is apparent to me that, even in the U.S., few people have avoided its influence.

My own experiences with war placed me at the periphery of the "Italian Theatre" during WWII. A unit of the German army (the *Wehrmacht*) was stationed in our village, Afers (Eores), in northern Italy. We children enjoyed the fun of playing with the soldiers, including sitting on their laps as they shot their cannons at American and British planes droning overhead on their mission to bomb Austria and Germany. The FLAK (anti-aircraft artillery) hit some of the planes, sending them crashing into our mountains and forests. As soon as we deemed the situation safe, we children ran to investigate what was left of these unusual "things." I remember one plane in particular that had gone down in a forest near our farm in the spring of 1945. It remained relatively intact and we crawled all over it for hours; the cockpit was especially intriguing.

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ing. The modern machinery fascinated us, and we debated for weeks about the functions of parts of what we had seen. On one occasion, one of the accompanying fighters chased "our" farmer and his horse and plow, the bullets causing little springs of dirt to fly in the air. Another time, an English pilot landed in the village and because the inhabitants were pro-German and, in addition, none understood him, they turned him over to the German military. He returned in the mid-1950s with his wife to thank the villagers for not killing him.

In the meantime, my mother lived in Brixen (Bressanone), about 15 km away, trying to stay alive. The same bombers that the gunners tried to shoot down with FLAK were also bombing bridges as well as other key sites in and around the city. One evening, my mother and I ran into a bunker that had planks on the ground and in which every-

thing was wet, clammy, and smelly. My excitement about the adventure was matched by my mother's dread. At the war's end in May of 1945, my mother spent weeks under house arrest, and lost both her job with a local newspaper and her apartment. She quickly became malnourished; the only photo of the time shows her as very thin and careworn. At the very end of the war, my younger brother died of diphtheria; in a massive snowstorm right after Christmas, we could not transport him quickly enough to the hospital in Brixen. My mother did not know how to cope with this loss and never forgave us, and me, for it. After my father's second year in American prisons, this loss was followed with my parents' divorce; the war and its immediate and later consequences were too much for their relationship.

Far away, but during the same period, the future second wife of my father worked in Königsberg (Kaliningrad) as an actress and then, after it fell to the Soviets, in Nürnberg as a factory worker. During one of the bombings, the factory was completely destroyed and in another raid her parents' apartment was demolished as their entire street went up in flames. Huddling in the basement of the house, they had survived because the bomb landed on the other side of the main staircase, killing everyone there. Aside from the immediate physical dangers, by early 1945 hunger had never left them, she and her closest friend traveled for miles on their bikes to find potatoes and bread.

The war stories of my friends and acquaintances go on and on because of the older generation of Europeans, every single one has directly experienced an aspect of war. In addition, volume after volume has now been written about these experiences and their consequences, both on the individuals who experienced them and their neighbors. All of us, regardless of nationality, were civilians when we experienced war's traumatic events, whether we are Russians, Jews, Germans, Poles, Frenchmen or Czechs; but our ethnic affiliation made a difference. We are the other casualties of war. Almost everyone who cares to ask assumes that civilians will be involved in warfare, whether they are so by choice or by force. Nevertheless, prior to September 11, 2001, many U.S. citizens assumed that they would never be involved in warfare; that no bombs would

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ever rain down on them, and that no member of some barely known group would be successful in attacking us.

Even now, we live in a land of illusions. We are afraid that a terrorist might hurt some of us, but surely that will not happen in most of the country, especially rural America; such calamities are reserved for New York, L.A., and Washington, DC. Thus, most of us live on without grasping the pervasive immediacy and unspeakable horror and consequences of being involved as civilians in war. In this way, we are similar to Germans in the 1930s and, much more recently, Yugoslavians, Israelis, Palestinians, and Iraqis.

Civilian involvement in warfare may be viewed from at least three perspectives. The first involves civilians of leading national or ethnic groups, the second relates to those of non-leading ethnic groups, and the third highlights the cultural heritage of both, or either of these groups. The traditional view and the one that is caught up in an ideal view of European civil-ness, applies more to dominant than subordinate ethnic groups. I am thinking, for example, of the civilians in Vienna at the outset of the nineteenth century, who were totally astonished when Napoleonic troops were assigned to their houses. Some middle-class women protested, but to no avail. However, the treatment of civilians was civil, that is, civilized. Even during the Second World War, which brought so much anguish to people in many parts of Europe, including England, civilians in many regions were not disturbed and common courtesies continued.

For less powerful and often stateless ethnic groups, the sort of trauma civilians experienced in Europe during WWII was not new; they had been caught for centuries between warring parties, or targeted directly, like Native Americans and Indians in India, and treated no better than an expendable surplus. At the same time, their libraries, religious buildings, schools, and even their graveyards were demolished and dug up. Even as late as WWII, various dominant ethnic groups refined their assaults on non-dominant ethnic civilians, for example, when Germans attacked Jews and Gypsies, that is civilians, and Russians attacked Chechens, Ingushetians, and ethnic Germans who had lived as part of Russia for two centuries. In each case, to

reiterate this point, these civilians were members of ethnic groups that were perceived to be less than the leading ethnic groups.

But WWII also introduced a very significant and widely practiced shift from attacks on members of non-dominant ethnic groups to those of dominant ethnic groups. Thus, Germans bombed Belgians, Dutchmen, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Russians, and so on; and Englishmen and Americans bombed Germans, Italians, and so on. These attacks came not only in the form of bombs, but also in the form of partisan warfare in parts of Russia and Yugoslavia. Retaliatory raids by all sides used civilians as pawns in order to make a point. Of course, while people were being killed, various cultural expressions were also destroyed, often systematically, as in Yugoslavia. Since then, organized and disparate groups in various parts of the world have refined this approach to killing people while destroying their heritage. For example, we have the apparently organized horrors inflicted in Rwanda and the miseries imposed on the weaker groups in the disintegrating Yugoslavia. This brings to mind the even more recent and organized efforts of *al Qaeda* and other terrorist groups. They are, in many respects, no different from the anti-Russian fighters in the mid-Nineteenth-Century Caucasus, the Russian revolutionaries of the late nineteenth and early twentieth Centuries, the partisans of the 1940s, or the freedom fighters of the Caucasus Mountains of the 1990s. In a way, they are not significantly different than the most recent suicide bombers in several parts of the world; they are irregular units and yet they are a superbly efficient form of warfare. With each person who goes to his or her death several others are killed and there is little risk to the "regular" units of the group launching the attack. The targets of all of these groups are civilians, combatants, and the cultures of both, but the men, women, children, and artifacts affected usually are of a regional lead ethnic group rather than the weaker ones typically targeted earlier in history.

A discussion of civilian engagement in war must also include a definition of the word "civilian." Civilians are the persons who are not in regular or irregular fighting units; whether they are active or passive participants in the internal and external affairs of a nation or not; they are, very importantly, dominant and non-dominant ethnics in

every part of the world. But, having had a long-standing practice of some civilians being less valued than others, we extend this pattern to this day. Thus, civilians in Iraq are portrayed more like American Indians and other lesser ethnic groups, since they are seen as permissible targets, therefore more killable than Germans, Russians, and other dominant ethnics who have nation states behind them. The same thinking applies to the cultural expressions of such peoples. Thus, not too long ago Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the destruction and dispersal of Iraqi antiques, museums, and other cultural expressions as insignificant in the overall scheme of things.

Regular units are usually considered a part of an armed force, and irregular units are not part of a national army but behave in some ways like an army, that is, have a command structure, carry and use weapons, *etc.* Regular armies for centuries have attacked, injured, deported, enslaved and killed members of non-dominant ethnic groups, but full "permission" to do the same to civilians of dominant groups has only come within the older generation's memory. As soon as it became permissible for regular armed forces to attack members of dominant groups, for example, when members of the *Luftwaffe* bombed Spanish cities during the Spanish Civil War and, a few years later, Warsaw and London, the floodgates were opened not only to the bombardment of German and Japanese cities by the Royal Air Force and the American Air Force, but also to engage irregular forces to accomplish the same end. Everyone became a combatant, whether they agreed with the national government or not, whether they were pacifists or not. Not only did everyone become a combatant, all buildings, whether homes or churches, became targets of destruction as well.

Since this occurred, various groups, whether in armed forces or not, are engaged in war on civilians. It has become rewarding to attack members of a dominant ethnic groups and their cultural products; *vide* the Twin Towers in New York City. We know these new warriors well. They are the persons, usually men, but now also women and children, who use the cover of civilian attire and behavior to attack perceived enemies and their structures. Thus, Palestinian men, women, and children dressed as civilians attack persons and property in

Israel; in Iraq, men, women, and children dressed as civilians attack American, British, Italian, Polish, and other coalition forces as well as U.N. diplomats and the Red Cross/Crescent workers; and Chechens attack Russians in Chechnya and beyond. Quite consciously, they also destroy buildings that are significant to the opposing side.

One must not confuse these warriors with a different, more honorable tradition. History books speak, for example, of the heroic, final defense of the capital city of Carthage when old men, women, and children endeavored to stave off the Roman attack and save their city. Much later, during World War II, ordinary Muscovites were sent into trenches in front of the city to defend it against the German onslaught. At the end of the same war, mostly reluctant German old men and boys, including the father of one of my Jewish friends, were sent to defend what was left of the inner parts of Germany. These were defenders of their own places and spaces, not attackers. Thus, they should be seen as dissimilar from the revolutionaries, guerrillas, and terrorists who falsely claim the cover of defense in their attack on far away noncombatants.

Even the landscape of civilians caught in war has changed considerably over the last two generations. One thinks today of the accidental bombardment of civilians by guided missiles and the intended death of civilians during a suicide attack or during a bombing raid, like those performed by Germans, Russians, British and Americans during World War II. Here one may think not only of the adults and children who are shot as a part of someone's policy to terrorize an opposing group, but also the rape of women in Berlin at the end of WWII and, more recently, during the break-up of Yugoslavia. One must also include Jews and other minority groups, against whom the National Socialist government declared its own unique and perverse war in the 1930s and early 1940s. Surely, one should also not forget Stalin's deportations of millions of members of Soviet minority groups and their deaths in various parts of Siberia. He, too, was making war on mostly innocent civilians and everything and anything they considered their own and part of their cultural heritage (Eric Weitz, *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

Several semesters ago, a West African student in one of my World Civilization courses began to speak to me about the war that one tribe in his country had carried on against another. As a child, he was marched off to a concentration camp from which he escaped after eight years. My student recounted to me some of the most horrific tales of the guards' brutality toward everyone in the camp, especially women and children. This innocent young man was reluctant to tell some of the details, just as were my stepmother who survived numerous 1945 bombing raids in Nürnberg and one of my Jewish colleagues who was a hidden child during the same war and period. He had buried the detailed memories and the painful emotions associated with them deep inside, where they sit like a festering cancer that explodes off and on into unspeakable dreams and unusual behavior.

As psychohistorians, we are interested in understanding the involvement of civilians in war and the destruction of everything that is valuable to them, as well as with finding better ways to deal with war's impact on people who survive it. Thus for example, one ought not to emphasize only the extremes of civilian exposure to war. One can just as well remain with what may seem the ordinary. After a few days of exposure to modern war, ordinary human beings get headaches, cannot sleep, have nervous ticks, suffer from stomach aches, and allow themselves liberties, such as men not shaving, that they would not ordinarily permit themselves. Other, more dramatic occurrences shape the lives of civilians as well. They cannot obtain food regularly, so they quickly become undernourished, weak, and more vulnerable to health problems. Civilians almost immediately notice their inability to obtain medicines; some of these medications may be seemingly insignificant to a young soldier or a strategist sitting hundreds of miles away, but the high blood pressure pills may mean the difference between a shortened or prolonged life to a middle-aged man. As we have seen once more in Iraq in 2003/04, water, electricity, safety, as well as food, are life-giving necessities. As has been illustrated by the events of the last five years in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, inhabitants in cities become quickly irritated, agitated, and sometimes aggressive without these essentials: civilians weaken, and the oldest and youngest members of the community start to die.

In addition, every war is followed by a shift in the price structure. Almost immediately prices rise dramatically in the few traditional stores remaining open and reach exorbitant dimensions on the black market. Cigarettes and alcohol, often seen as nonessentials, quickly become essential commodities, partly because they seem to lessen anxiety. The list of inconveniences and horrors affecting civilians exposed to war could continue for pages, but one may be assured that no civilian remains unscathed. Even if people survive and their city is rebuilt from old photographs, as was the case in Warsaw and Nürnberg, the destruction wrought by war will be seared into memory. One may say something similar about the loss of a cathedral, mosque or temple because they were part of the symbols of a faith, a place where people spent hours in prayer or meditation. To see it ruined or gone, even temporarily, is a never forgotten source of sorrow. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) had no less impact in WWII, just because this diagnosis was not in use at that time.

We have made it easier for Americans, and others, to ignore or minimize the dangers to us as civilians and what they/we value. In large part, we have done so because of the way the media have presented some of the more recent wars. During WWII, some of the most horrifying destruction was shown in newsreels. By the time of the Vietnam War, our government had already begun to sanitize war footage. The Armed Forces presented what they thought was important to view. "Reality" was left to the movies and films. One may consider the reportage from Iraq by embedded journalists as a great service to our society, since they have informed Americans of the fine, heroic performance of our troops. However, in this context, one may want to consider another side to their reportage: the reports as a way of sanitizing and glorifying war, thus immunizing American civilians to its unspeakable effects. In addition such reporters may feel the dangers to which the soldiers are exposed and identify with them, rather than provide objective coverage.

A few new phrases will help make the point. When we today speak of a target having been "acquired," this phrase means that, somewhere, there is a human being who is about to be blown to pieces. When we now speak of targets being de-

graded, we most likely mean that people and buildings are being demolished by sophisticated weaponry. Not surprisingly, American TV audiences did not see many Iraqi casualties. Showing such reality would allowed us to feel empathy with the all too human enemy, considering him or her to be a civilian, a civilian who our government claims is excluded from combat. When evidence of civilian casualties was inescapable, our government asserted that it was merely "collateral damage;" too bad for the woman who lost a leg and the corner store that was leveled to the ground. In case we forget the other reality of civilian casualties, in many cases nothing is left of the destroyed human beings to photograph or videotape.

Like the war on (which included the displacement and marginalization of) American Indians in the nineteenth century, contemporary and later Americans could turn away from the misery of this civilian population because it was quickly sanitized; much like the most recent American violence against civilians in Iraq is ignored or cleansed. We can feel safe once more because we have suppressed another barbaric enemy. Because of the sanitization, we remain mostly ignorant of the horrors we have inflicted, the after effects we have imposed on traumatized civilians, and the damage we have done to their homes and places of worship. We remain even more ignorant of the fact that we have added further to the tradition of involving civilians in war and to all of the consequences this will have as others around the world relearn the lesson of including civilians and their homes, churches, libraries and schools in their considerations for warfare. Precisely because it is now "permissible," and politically "profitable," to include civilians and their heritage of lead ethnic groups in these considerations, none of the leading ethnic groups, including white Americans and our creations, will be excluded from future combat. No doubt, we, too, will remain civilian casualties.

How do we stop collateral damage? Robert S. McNamara, former Secretary of Defense, asked some very astute questions in a recent article: "Is it legal to incinerate 83,000 people (in Japan during WWII) in a single night to achieve your war aims? Was Hiroshima legal? Was the use of Agent Orange...a violation of international law?" Earlier he wrote: "We need a clear code, internationally ac-

cepted, so that not only our Congress and president know, but so that all our military and civilian personnel know, as well, what is legal in conflict and what is illegal. And we need a court that can bring wrongdoers to trial for their crimes" (*Charlotte Observer*, [August 7, 2003]:13A). Indeed, we need to be involved, not just as a country, but also as individuals.

I think once more of the people I know who were affected by war. All of them ignored or denied the signs of war around them, only to be surprised by its calamitous effects. Not to be involved in preventing war may mean that the life lost may indeed be one's own.

Peter Petschauer, PhD, is Professor of History as well as Director of the Hubbard Center for Faculty and Staff Support at Appalachian State University. He is the author of four books, various chapters of books, and many articles. Professor Petschauer sits on the Editorial Board of this publication and may be reached at <petschauerpw@appstate.edu>.

[Editor's Note: As the 2003 war in Iraq loomed, Professor Petschauer brought up such important issues on the impact of war on civilians in a book review on airborne warfare that I proposed that we coauthor an article on the subject. He readily accepted. However, it soon became apparent that he had much more to say on the subject than did I, and that it was best stated in the first person singular, so I requested that he write it himself. The author wants to thank the colleagues and graduate students of the History Department at Appalachian State University for letting him test an earlier version of this paper on them on October 3, 2003.] □

October 23, 2004 Forum
Meeting on the Psychology
Of Election 2004
Presenters: Barry, Elovitz,
Goertzel, and Mazza

Putting Parenting on Trial at a DC Sniper Trial

Dan Dervin

Mary Washington College

During the fall of 2002, with the country jittery over threats of terrorist attacks, people in the nation's capital, surrounding suburbs, and outlying towns were being subjected to actual acts of domestic terror. A sniper was picking off individuals at gas pumps and mall parking lots in a recklessly random fashion that left no one feeling secure. Psychics, amateur sleuths, media and mental-health oracles filled the vacuum of information with a collective portrait of a mastermind criminal, middle-aged and white, a loner with a likely grievance against the government or corporate world, someone very much like Hannibal Lecter, driving a white van. In the end, as an officer quipped, it wasn't a white guy in a van, but two black guys in a blue Chevy Caprice. By then there had been thirteen shootings and ten deaths. The suspects, John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, were tried and convicted of capital murder the following year. While Muhammad's legal strategy of innocence was thumbed-down by the jury, Malvo's insanity plea was more ingenious. His attorneys had "in effect, put parenting on trial" (Serge F. Kovaleski, "Malvo's Mother Defends Strict Parenting, Beatings," *Washington Post* [December 14, 2003]:C1).

The trial testimony peeled off layer upon layer of the 18-year-old shootist's troubled childhood. Though not always corroborated and in places disputed, the following narrative emerges. Native to Jamaica, Malvo's mother Una James took the boy from his father at age five and, as she moved around seeking employment, would leave him with various relatives, friends, and at age nine, even strangers. She beat him repeatedly with belts and broomsticks for minor misbehaviors. At age 12, his mother gave him a beating after learning that he was about to hang himself. Although she has denied this beating, she admits others. "Like my mother did to me, I used to flog him with a belt to discipline him," adding, "In Jamaica, we beat peo-

ple who are rude. In America, it's an abuse" (Kovaleski, "Strict Parenting":C1, C6). "Harsher forms of discipline" and "more autocratic parenting styles" are the norm among African Caribbean families. ("African American and African Caribbean Fathers," Jaipaul L. Roopnarine, in Michael E. Lamb, ed., *The Role of the Father in Child Development* [Hoboken: Wiley, 2004], p. 76.) In the pecking order of abuse, Malvo was humiliated by school bullies and vented his rage against stray cats, which he hunted with a slingshot. Malvo's father, a farm laborer who did not take an interest in his son, conforms to the African Caribbean macho model of "early and frequent heterosexual activity with several partners either serially or concurrently," with the "number of offspring" as "tangible proof of the man's virility" (Roopnarine, "Caribbean," p. 75).

Persian Gulf War veteran John Muhammad came into Una James' life in connection with a false passport scheme to let her emigrate. In 1999, Muhammad was living in Antigua with his three children, and often seeing them together left Malvo feeling jealous. Muhammad, who had "kidnapped" the children, was locked into a bitter custody battle and would soon lose rights to his ex-wife, recently moved to Maryland. An intense bond was formed along these emotional fault-lines by Muhammad and Malvo, who had again been left behind by his mother. Muhammad's words, "You're my son," "instantly warmed" Malvo (Tom Jackman, "Malvo Killed to Please Muhammad, Court Told," *Washington Post* [December 10, 2003]:B1,B4). Diane H. Schetsky, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that Malvo "merged" with Muhammad to the extent that "they were one and the same" (Jackman, "Killed":B4). After a few months Malvo converted to Islam, and Muhammad mentored the 15-year-old youth along military lines: taking him to target practice, giving him laps and pushups for poor performance. Malvo wore a black tee-shirt from a shooting club with the word "SNIPER" across the front (Sari Horwitz and Michael E. Ruane, *Sniper* [New York: Random House, 2003], p. 52).

Prosecutors countered that not every child who is dealt bad parenting turns into a serial killer and presented intercepted prison writings that portrayed the defendant as crafty and calculating. It

turned out that he had a history of petty crimes and scams; currently he was advising another inmate on faking his feelings while planning for escape. He is now seen as sociopathic or as suffering from a dissociative disorder. There is also paranoid grandiosity in his screed to “destroy” America and wistful fantasy in his shared scheme to extract several million dollars from the government to enable him and Muhammad to found a utopian colony in Canada. It was this scheme that apparently fueled the sniper killings. The jury found him not insane by reason of parental abandonment and abuse, but trial experts speculated that this testimony may have helped spare him the death penalty. The pathway from his childhood deficits and trauma to his adolescent crime wave was no doubt long and winding, no doubt leaving him susceptible to the manipulations of Muhammad, who had his own issues over parenting. A psychologist’s report not used in the trial, concluded Muhammad “endured several traumas as a child: [at age three], his mother died of cancer, his father abandoned him, unloving caretakers beat him often” (Josh White, “Early Trauma Altered Sniper, Psychologist Says,” *Washington Post* [February 10, 2004]:B3). Thus his remarks at sentencing about having had a wonderful childhood are strangely dissociated. To his friends he could be erratic as well as supportive and kind. To his beleaguered defense attorneys, he could be charming and even humorous. Both he and Malvo seemed capable of evoking different personae as circumstances changed.

Equally feasible, they were prone to identity-altering anxieties. Yet at various points along the way, a degree of choice should be granted to both killers; and parenting, if not decisive, factors in to the total equation. For it may be inferred that on deeper levels, the absences and failures of good-enough caregivers leave fissures in the psyche which are filled in with fantasies of rage, revenge, and magical self-regeneration. So well-fitted to Muhammad's own inner reality, the movie *Savior* (1998) was viewed often enough to be known by heart. In it, “Dennis Quaid plays an American whose family is killed in a Muslim terrorist bombing in Paris. He avenges them by slaughtering people in a local mosque, and then winds up as a mercenary and a sniper in Bosnia. But, in the end, he is redeemed by nurturing an infant born to a raped

Serbian refugee” (Horwitz, *Sniper*, p. 46). In this variant on classical American fantasies of rebirth-through-violence, Muhammad’s and Malvo’s needs fuse in the image of self-reparenting. Toward this overarching ideal, all else is subordinated – and permitted.

Dan Dervin, PhD, emeritus professor at Mary Washington College in Fredericksburg, Virginia, is a prolific author and frequent contributor to psychohistory. His book, Father Bosetti in America: A Biographical Study, is due out in August from Cache Glade Publications. Professor Dervin may be contacted at <ddervin@mwc.edu>. □

David Beisel Hitler’s Doctor Bloch

(Continued from page 1)

Leo Baeck Institute Year Book Vol. XLVII (2002), pp. 217-245 (ISBN 1571815821, \$45.00).

Over the years – and not surprisingly – different studies have given different weight to Klara’s importance, to her breast cancer, and therefore to Dr. Bloch. They range across the spectrum from biographies in which Bloch hardly shows up at all (Bullock, Fest, George Victor’s psychological study), to those in which he puts in an occasional appearance (Toland, Waite, Kershaw, Langer’s OSS psychiatric profile, Redlich’s psychiatric profile, and Bromberg and Small’s psychological study), to Rudolph Binion’s psychohistory, *Hitler Among the Germans*, which argues that Bloch figured centrally in the development of Hitler’s murderous anti-Semitism. Due to the important psychological issues raised by Binion’s 1976 study, Bloch has, in general, figured more significantly in the historiography of psychohistory than in narrative history, where, if at all, he appears usually in connection with his observing the unusual closeness which existed between Adolf and Klara, or his comment on the extreme emotional impact her death had on the adolescent Adolf – or both.

According to Binion’s re-construction, after a mastectomy in 1907 (performed by another physician with Dr. Bloch in attendance), Bloch himself treated her remaining cancerous breast with massive

amounts of iodoform, a highly toxic but at the time widely used compound, which, Binion's evidence proves, resulted in her long, painful death by iodoform overdose. Adolph, by her side every minute during the days and weeks of her dying, was still symbiotically linked to her, as he had been since childhood, and absorbed her symptoms as if they were his own, unconsciously blaming the Jewish Dr. Bloch for her death. Several of those symptoms of iodoform overdose later reappeared in Hitler's October 1918 wounding by mustard gas on the Western Front. This second trauma awakened memories of Klara's death and stirred the repressed murderous hatred he had harbored against Dr. Bloch since 1907. His wish to avenge Klara, by using the symbolic German Motherland as a fantasized Klara, was shaped by a third trauma, the intolerable news of Germany's defeat in November 1918, itself accompanied by a psychosomatic relapse, a hallucination calling upon him to avenge Germany's defeat, and the final displacement of his murderous rage from Dr. Bloch onto the Jewish people as a whole.

A single paragraph cannot do justice to the rich detail in Binion's work, which needs a full reading to appreciate both sources and arguments. Since other psychological historians and psychobiographers have weighed in on the Bloch issue, the appearance in print of a new Dr. Bloch memoir – even one 60 years old – is a matter of some importance.

The newly published memoir, written in 1941-1945, should be seen against the first, much smaller Bloch reminiscence, printed after his escape from Nazi Germany to the Bronx in 1940. That earlier memoir, "I Was Hitler's Doctor," published as a two-part as-told-to article in *Collier's Magazine* in March 1941, has since served as an important primary source for some historians. The *Collier's* piece mentions the extraordinary closeness between Klara and Adolph cited above, a fact corroborated by Hitler's boyhood friend Kubick and repeated in the newly printed memoir, where Dr. Bloch writes of Hitler: "He was his mother's darling and [he] idolized her."

Bloch's recently published memoir also offers some brief details of the Klara/Adolf story, stating that there came to him "at the beginning of

1907, a fifty-year-old woman...[who] complained about pains in the chest occasionally so intense as to keep her from sleeping." He remembered her as a "pale woman," recalling that the adolescent Hitler, who, Bloch judged, was "in no way different from other young people," had to be "especially... console[d]" after hearing the bad news about her "rather difficult" operation, so "totally shattered" was he by the news.

Scholars looking for more extensive revelations about the mother-son relationship will be disappointed, since this is about all one finds in the newly printed memoir. Bloch says nothing about his iodoform treatments, nothing more of Klara's breast cancer, nor of its impact on Adolf beyond stating that following her death on 21 December 1907 Hitler came to his "office to thank me for my efforts," pressing his hand while saying: "I will be eternally grateful to you, doctor." The memoir mentions in passing the well-known two postcards sent to Bloch from Vienna in 1908, one signed "your always grateful Adolf Hitler," the other: "In eternal gratitude, Adolf Hitler," both of which point to an important factual issue, not just for psychological, but also for narrative historians – Hitler's anti-Semitism in his Vienna years.

Specialists need no reminding how recent studies have shown that Hitler's anti-Semitism during the Vienna period was relatively mild and has been over-exaggerated by historians – as Hitler did himself in *Mein Kampf* as in several other statements. This in turn suggests that the conscious, murderous hatred, which (as Binion shows) was manifest only *after* the double trauma of 1918, was the result of something more than just, as the traditional argument maintains, the anti-Semitic pamphlets he encountered in the Austrian capital. Psychohistorians need no reminding either that Hitler's conscious gratitude toward Dr. Bloch, during this period and after, was an additional defense covering over his repressed rage and unconscious desire for revenge, which later emerged in displaced form in his conscious mind after the double "re-traumatization" of 1918.

Bloch's memoirs, combined with the two "gratitude" postcards from Vienna, thus serve as mutually reinforcing, if somewhat circumstantial, reminders which support the findings of recent his-

torians and Binion's argument.

The major value of the newly published memoir, however, centers not on the early Bloch/Hitler connection, but on some broader implications, many already well known, which pertain to the social, political, and intellectual life of nineteenth – and early twentieth-century Central Europe. For Dr. Bloch personally, the memoir emphasizes three things that were important to him. First, there is the deep pride at becoming a successful, caring physician, which he communicates by telling us that he received a doctoral diploma “awarded *summa cum laude*,” ran an office “open at all times to all who needed help” regardless of social distinction, and made house calls, answering “the call of every sick person, even in the coldest winter nights.”

Second, the memoir shows evidence of his pride in his patriotic service to the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a soldier before and during The Great War. As a student, he was a “a one-year volunteer with an infantry regiment,” then, after becoming a physician, found himself posted on 1 April 1898 to the Garrison hospital in Linz, the town where he later established his own private practice and met the Hitler family. Then, at the start of World War I, he left that practice to volunteer as a regimental physician, serving through the entire war with the rank of captain, and receiving numerous decorations.

Finally, there is Bloch's repeated emphasis on his special pride at being a Jew who overcame many of the obstacles of being Jewish in the later years of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He learned “the sacred writings of Jewish history” from his father, which generated, in turn, his love for history in general, but, since, he says, “a teaching position at a secondary school was nearly hopeless for a Jew,” he decided to study medicine instead, achieving his goals despite the difficulties Jews had in getting into clinics dominated by “anti-Semitic university teachers.” In Linz, he “visited the house of God almost daily” and proudly received a “special degree for the profession of rabbi and teacher.” He mentions that he had been given the title *Medicinalrat* in 1917 and was given the title *Obermedicinalrat* several years later, “thereby becoming the only Jew in the Alpine countries with this title.”

One of the most interesting aspects of the memoir for historians, as for general readers, will probably be Bloch's comments on life in Austria after the Nazi annexation of March 1938, and how his connection to Hitler helped him through this calamity. The memoir does not break new ground here, but adds to the long-list of earlier testimonies by others detailing the many persecutions and humiliations Austrian Jews suffered at the hands of the Nazis, which always make for distressing reading. Bloch reports, for example, that conditions during the first weeks after the *Anschluss* produced eight suicides alone in the small Jewish community of Linz.

But while Bloch's memoir is slightly guarded, it is still open enough on the issue of how the Hitler connection bestowed upon him a number of special privileges. Even before the *Anschluss*, he had heard that Hitler asked after his old physician, calling Bloch “an exception, an *Edeljude*,” quoting him as saying: “If all Jews were like that there would be no Jewish problem.” (Knowing Hitler, one finds this statement hard to believe, although Bloch does present it as hearsay evidence.) Bloch reports that during Hitler's triumphant entry into Linz, he looked up toward and saluted Bloch's window as his motorcade passed by his apartment house, and later asked about Bloch when he got to the Linz Town Hall.

Later, Bloch was obliged to turn over to the Munich *Hauptarchiv* some photographs, the aforementioned postcards, and his book of medical records, “which contained the medical history of Frau Hitler” so that an official Nazi biography could be written. Thus, Bloch's connection to Hitler was well known, and, as the memoir goes on to point out, if the connection became known, it allowed for some special treatment at the hands of local Nazi officials.

When all Jews were forced to move to Vienna, for example, he was allowed to stay in Linz, Eichmann himself promised he would vouch for Dr. Bloch's personal safety. “By order of Berlin” the Gestapo removed the sign “Jewish Doctor” from the nameplate of his office. Although several visits to and by the Gestapo had given him opportunities to gain more special favors as “Hitler's doctor,” (including, he says, the opportunity to have

himself declared "An Honorary Aryan,") he turned them all down, always maintaining, he says, his status as a *Volljud*. Nevertheless, unlike those who had to abandon their dwellings, he was able, also "by order of Berlin, to hold on to his apartment," an apartment which, he claims, became a refuge for Jews with sometimes as many as eight people staying the night. He had the "J" removed from his ration card (which meant his "servant did not have to stand in line at the grocery store"). He was able to send telegrams to America. When Jews were required to surrender their passports, he kept his ("I was the only one not affected by that measure," he says).

Dr. Bloch even had open supporters. It is now a commonplace among historians to recognize that while the Third Reich was a totalitarian state, it was not always as tightly controlled as we have been led to believe. Several kinds of dissent, both overt and covert, were sometimes openly enacted, or expressed through "hidden transcripts," or even tacitly permitted at various times. Bloch tells us that while many colleagues saw him as an outcast, tuned away, and refused to talk to him, others did not. Former patients visited him often, many denouncing the anti-Semitic measures enacted under the Nazis. "A high-ranking active officer who maintained his most loyal friendship and devotion to me until I left Linz visited me openly every week in full dress uniform. Many families from the nobility remained just as loyal," while some friends, parodying the Nazi salute, would meet him on the street by extending their arms and shouting "*Heil, Dr. Bloch!*" These examples, as with his references to Hitler, may suggest a need to show his importance, or are merely descriptive, but in any case, the memoir has the merit of reminding us that there were a few good Austrians.

Because Bloch strongly identified with being Jewish, it is clear that the humiliations he witnessed, even heard about, were experienced as his own, even if they were not directly perpetrated on his person. Bloch, in fact, says as much. When a colleague later wondered why he was trying to take care of other Jews, he says he told him: "The suffering and fate of my co-religionists affect me as if they were my own." In another place, he states how "I not only witnessed the full misery and misfortune of my brothers, but shared the depth and gravity of

their pain."

Taking Bloch at his word, one wonders how he squared these feelings with the contradictions produced from his special relationship with the *Führer*, one that had provided him with the "special treatments" he was enjoying. The psychological historian has to ask: Was there guilt? How much? How was it handled?

Bloch's memoir repeatedly tries to show that he was a good Jew, one who stood up to insult, one who helped others. But what additional conscious and unconscious processes were really at work? All historians know that memoirs must be handled with extreme care, and can never be taken at face value. To what extent was he putting a good face on his own motivations? Was there some secret pleasure in having known Hitler, which he hid even from himself? By itself, the memoir cannot answer these questions, only raise them, yet one hesitates even to raise them (or the many other tough analytic questions psychological historians are supposed to ask) given the real sufferings experienced by Dr. Bloch and his family.

For, like so many other victims of the Nazis, the family did suffer. When his daughter, "my only child," left for America in October 1938, Bloch says: it was "as if part of my heart was being ripped out"; there followed some apparent psychosomatic symptoms as he "experienced actual pain in the heart for weeks." At one point the family was scattered to the four corners of the world: his "grandchildren were in England, my son-in-law in Africa, my daughter in America, and I and my wife in Austria." As it happens, one of those grandchildren in England, who Bloch says "had to endure the stress of the bombings" in the war's early days, was the late historian George Kren, (1926-2000) who became a Holocaust scholar, was a pioneering psychohistorian, a Professor of History at Kansas State University, a long-time Contributing Editor to *Clio's Psyche* and *The Journal of Psychohistory*, a writer for and Featured Scholar in this journal, and the guardian of his grandfather's memoirs. Through his widow, Professor Margo Kren, George has donated that memoir, here under consideration, to the archives of the U.S. Holocaust Museum.

The scattered family was fortunate enough to

eventually reunite in New York. Dr. Bloch's account of his escape from Nazi Europe during the early months of The Second World War is harrowing in its own right, and matches scores of similar testimonies, with the exception that he had the benefit of his Hitler connection, although it is not quite true, as one scholar has mistakenly stated, that Hitler helped Dr. Bloch escape from Europe.

"Assistance" for Dr. Bloch was not mandated by Hitler, nor was his escape a matter of being overseen by the *Führer*. It can be called "assistance" only in the sense that Dr. Bloch possessed what proved to be a valuable document, a Hitler decree first seen by his son-in-law at Gestapo Headquarters in Linz, a decree which had helped at earlier times and was important (at least once) during his flight from Austria in 1940. The document, an *Erlass des Reichsministers und Chefs der Reichskanzlei*, dated 14 September 1938, stated that "all permissible easing of restrictions, including those affecting foreign currencies, are to be granted to Obermedizinalrat Dr. Ed. Bloch, Linz." This by itself wasn't enough to get the Blochs out of Europe, for, as was the case with so many other survivors and escapees, luck played a substantial role, either the luck of circumstance, or what in retrospect looms as the right decision at a timely moment. But the "Hitler decree" proved to play a pivotal role during the dreaded luggage inspection at the border between Germany and Belgium.

With ports blocked due to the war and a long Siberian journey virtually impossible, the plan shifted to escape by train to Lisbon, via Berlin, Belgium, France, and Spain, then into Portugal, and on by ship to the U.S. According to the memoir, "we left Vienna aboard the first transport for emigrants." It was a dreary day in November 1940. After a stopover in Berlin, the train took a different route from the one announced, and a swarm of S.S. thugs assaulted the passengers on the Belgian frontier, removing them from their compartments, kicking and beating them in order to prolong "the luggage examination as much as possible" in order to allow the uncoupling of cars "so that the emigrants would miss all other connections." Bloch claims he "screamed at an S.S. man," was brought to the commandant who was then shown "a copy of the decree from the Reich Chancellery." It was "like a stroke of magic"; everything suddenly turned around, the

bullying stopped, luggage and passengers were politely returned to their compartments, and the train soon moved away.

Thereafter there was uncertainty, uncomfortable accommodations, and a number of attempted successful and partly successful shakedowns by others before taking ship to America, this part of the memoir reminding the reader that the Nazi regime, and its occupation of Europe, encouraged theft of every imaginable kind, and that those who were able to sneak money away from the watchful eyes of the Gestapo were the ones who had at least some slight chance of success.

Bloch's Hitler connection, concretized in the Berlin decree, tuned out to be several times worth its weight in gold. That, and being at the right place at the right time, allowed for the escape. Like so many others who have come through an intense, long-term crisis, Dr. Bloch could not believe it all had been the result of mere circumstance and concluded that events had "been directed to a clear and certain aim."

The very length of a review (as long as this one has become) runs the risk of suggesting that what is under consideration may be of greater historical importance than is actually the case. Bloch's memoirs are, of course, important. Scholars will want to look at the original German manuscript, as well as the full text of H.J. Schmeller's English translation, published here only in excerpt by the *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*. Some specialists may want to mine Bloch's memoir for the many telling and colorful anecdotes not mentioned in this review, others for the insights it may provide into several psychological issues, not the least of which, as implied by Bloch's emphasis on being Jewish, is the question of identity so problematic in the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire, a subject which has been addressed by psychohistorian Peter Loewenberg's "Austrian Portraits" in his *Decoding the Past*. Beyond that, the memoir holds interest for those who are beginning to learn about what it was like to live in the Austrian Empire and survive under the Nazis.

David R. Beisel, PhD, is a Contributing Editor to Clio's Psyche and The Journal of Psychohistory, Professor of Social Sciences at SUNY Rockland, past president of the International Psychohistorical Association, and recipient of several teaching awards. His

new book, *The Suicidal Embrace: Hitler, the Allies, and the Origins of the Second World War*, was published early this year in paperback and will be released in hardcover for \$30.00 on September 15th. Professor Beisel may be contacted at <dbeisel@sunyrockland.edu>. □

Elovitz: Pomper as a Psychohistorian of Russia

(Continued from page 1)

and he took his degrees in history at the University of Chicago in 1959, 1961, and 1965. In 1964 he started teaching history at Wesleyan University where in 1992, he assumed the Armstrong professorship. At Wesleyan he teaches World History: A Psychohistory of the Modern World, Russian History, The Intelligentsia and Power, Stalin and Stalinism, and The Historical Evolution of Power and the Human Psyche. He also has held important positions of faculty leadership including the coordination of freshman courses and the chair of the History Department.

Professor Pomper is the author of a number of important books by well-respected presses. These include *The Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia* (1970); *Peter Lavrov and the Russian Revolutionary Movement* (1972); *Sergei Nechaev* (1979); *The Structure of Mind in History: Five Major Figures in Psychohistory* (1985); (editor) *Trotsky's Notebooks, 1933-1935: Writings on Lenin, Dialectics, and Evolution* (1986); *Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin: The Intelligentsia and Power* (1990); (Editor, with Elphick and Vann), *World History: Ideologies, Structures and Identities* (1998); and (Editor, with Shaw), *The Return of Science: Evolution, History, and Theory* (2002). Among his many articles and chapters are "Problems of a Naturalistic Psychohistory," *History and Theory*, Vol. 12 (1973), pp. 367-388; "Nechaev, Lenin, and Stalin: The Psychology of Leadership," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Vol. 26 (1978), pp. 11-30 and "Trotsky and Martov" in *The Trotsky Reappraisal*, edited by Brotherstone and Duke (1992). Currently, he is working on a book on Lenin's older brother, Alexander Ulianov.

In the course of his career, Professor Pomper has received a National Defense Education Act grant at the University of Chicago (1960-1962); Travel Grant at Moscow State University (1962-63); Ford Foundation Grant at the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam, continued in New York City (1963-1964); Social Science Research Council Grant for one semester for postdoctoral training in the applications of psychology to history at Yale University with Robert Jay Lifton (1968); International Research and Exchanges Senior Scholar Exchange at Moscow State University (1973); Visiting Scholar at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (1984-1985); Title VIII Fellowship at Hoover Institution (summer, 1987); Visiting Scholar at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (September 1987-March, 1988); Fellow, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C. (March-August, 1988); and a Fellow of the Russian Research Center, (July-August 1989 and 1991-1992). He is an associate editor of *History and Theory*. Dr. Pomper (PP) was interviewed in April by Paul Elovitz (PHE). He may be reached by e-mail at <ppomper@wesleyan.edu>.

PHE: What brought you to psychoanalysis and psychohistory?

PP: I found it difficult to explain the revolutionary career of Peter Lavrov without resorting to psychology. In 1963-64 I was in Amsterdam doing research at the International Institute of Social History and a few historians used to gather informally to discuss our work. One friend of a friend named Max Lesnik Oberstein suggested at one such gathering that Lavrov belonged to a category, *homo religiosus*, delineated in Erik Erikson's *Young Man Luther*. He highly recommended the book. I took his advice, read it, and saw the resemblance. However, I understood that any systematic effort to psychoanalyze my subject would be difficult, that I didn't know very much, and that my best course at the time was to take a broadly psychological approach but not to try to insert into the narrative systematic psychoanalytic comments. It was perfectly clear that Lavrov had an outsize superego that translated nicely into the doctrine of the Russian intelligentsia's "debt to the people," an idea that served "repentant nobles" very well. I began to think sys-

tematically about the relationship of personality and doctrine, but also about some of the decisions that he made and the reasons for them. Here, too, it was rather clear that personal loss and a sense of guilt precipitated actions and decisions that affected his commitment to a revolutionary career.

PHE: How have psychoanalysis and psychohistory impacted upon your work and life?

PP: I think that it gave me a valuable orientation that informed my choice of research topics. On the other hand, those of us who chose a psychoanalytic approach and psychohistory for our research programs in the early sixties found the historical profession marching in many different directions – away from the use of individual psychology. Historians reacted against approaches that emphasized individual agency in history. In addition, hostility to Freud and later to Erikson (in particular their shared notion that anatomy was destiny) affected the attractiveness of psychohistory after the initial enthusiasm of the late 1950s and early 1960s. It seemed to get lonelier and lonelier. One had to explain oneself to colleagues and even students who felt that the field had been discredited, although students remained open minded and even attracted to psychohistory.

PHE: What is your primary affiliation?

PP: History remains my primary affiliation. I acquired what I needed to conduct the investigations I had set into motion. I chose Russian history almost accidentally and the same is true for the psychoanalytic approach to biographies.

PHE: What brought you to Russian studies?

PP: That's a story. Two friends and I were hitch hiking through England and Scotland in the summer of 1957 as part of a four-month grand tour of Europe. We reached the Lake District sometime in August. One of the cow pastures where we had deployed our sleeping bags also served as temporary haven to a Cambridge geologist's "caravan." He and his two young sons were hunting geological specimens for his courses. He befriended us and we joined the rock hunting expeditions in the vicinity of Keswick and Penrith. After several days our geologist friend invited us to join him, his wife, and a Russian émigré couple for dinner at an inn in one of those towns. I remember the evening vividly: it was August 1957

and it was already chilly because the inn had a fire going. The Russian gentleman, a Cambridge mathematician (his wife taught jurisprudence there), was spell-binding. He told us that Khrushchev would propel the Soviet Union past the United States and everyone else; that Russian science and technology were making great strides; and that anyone who wanted to keep pace with the new world that was coming into being would have to study Russian. I was fascinated, but I had always been more interested in the French Revolution and I was heading in that direction. I knew French well and some German, but did not know any Russian. Sputnik in October 1957 seemed to confirm our Cambridge mathematician's predictions. The rest of the story is predictable. Although he was wrong, I was convinced and studied the Russian Revolutions instead of going into French history and studying the French Revolution.

PHE: What is the impact of psychoanalysis/psychohistory on the study of communism and Russia?

PP: There were some well known studies (the work of Nathan Leites on the operational code of the Politburo, for example) and efforts to try to find the sources of Russian national character in the early stages of the cold war when psychoanalysis was in vogue (Geoffrey Gorer, John Rickman, and Erik Erikson), but the social historians took over by the late ninety sixties, neo-Marxism gained adherents. People like Marcuse tried to add a psychoanalytic dimension to Marxism and there were various other hybrids (for example, feminism plus psychoanalysis), but only a few of us continued to practice psychohistory beyond the 1970s. The research programs of the younger generation took things in different directions. "Revisionism" in Russian and Soviet history tended to reduce the role of personal agency in history and made biographies of major figures seem otiose. This trend affected attitudes toward the roles of Lenin, Stalin, and others. Students of Soviet history emphasized social structures and played down the role of individuals. The notion of applying psychoanalysis to analyze groups (whether the Party or the Russian people) did not catch on. People simply downplayed psychology in favor of social structure.

PHE: How did your travel in Russia impact on your study of the field?

PP: It affected the way I thought about the fate of the revolution and tended to form in me a tragic vision of the revolutionary process. I began to look for the combination of factors, both structural and individual, that

led to the tragic outcome.

PHE: All three of your degrees are from the University of Chicago. Which instructors there helped open you to a psychodynamic approach?

PP: Only one did, Leopold Haimson. His book, *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism* (1955), was an eye opener for me. He showed that the different backgrounds and psychologies of Lenin, Plekhanov, Martov, and Akselrod produced different variations of Marxism. Not just social position and generation but personality contributed to the creation of these variations. Haimson prepared me to look for the psychological component in Lavrov's variation of socialist doctrine, but Erikson gave me the inspiration and a sense of Lavrov's development. Haimson (ahead of the trend stimulated in 1963 by E.P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*) had already moved over into social history and showed very little interest in psychobiography by 1961, when I began the research for my dissertation.

PHE: What special training was most helpful in your doing psychohistorical work?

PP: Robert Jay Lifton's Yale seminar on psychohistory that I attended in 1968 as part of a post-doctoral fellowship and my one-on-one sessions with him played a big role. I gained perspective on the evolution of psychoanalysis. Lifton, of course, was quite unorthodox. I liked his approach and his willingness to sponsor a tyro who had no clinical background. His critique of orthodoxy encouraged me to take an independent approach and to decide what was most useful. At some point in 1969 we discussed a project. I would go to Leningrad in 1970 (after attending the International Congress of Historians that was being held in Moscow in the summer of 1970) and test his notion of survivor syndrome by doing some psychiatric interviews on survivors of the siege of Leningrad. The notion of collective trauma and the application of psychoanalytic ideas to groups were attractive to me. Aside from his seminar and conversations with Lifton, my major preparation was reading Harry Stack Sullivan's *The Psychiatric Interview*. To make a long story short, the situation and, probably, my own lack of experience, made the use of the psychoanalytic "third ear" impossible. If symptoms were there, I could not find them in most of my interlocutors. I had no clearance to do such a study and chose my inter-

viewees opportunistically. Some of them had experienced the siege and others had learned about it from survivors. Part of the plan was to investigate the social memory of a trauma and its continuing effects. However, I was sufficiently discouraged to give up on work in the field of the sort that Lifton himself had done. I became convinced that if I were to do psychohistorical work it would have to be on the basis of a broad array of documents (autobiography, family history, memoirs, and letters), my knowledge of events, the use of the psychoanalytically inspired work of others that might provide models, and whatever sensitivity I had for the subjects of my inquiry. To get back to your original question regarding what special training I had to do psychoanalytic work, I had none aside from the 1968 seminar at Yale with Robert Jay Lifton.

PHE: Of which of your psychohistorical works are you most proud?

PP: My work on Trotsky and Stalin in *Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin: The Intelligentsia and Power* (1990) has gotten good reviews. I occasionally hear good things about my psychobiography of Nechaev (1979) and just learned that it is being translated into Korean (even though English version is out of print!), so somebody over there must have found it convincing. One of my younger colleagues who himself became a psychohistorian told me that my work on Lavrov inspired him to go forward with his plans to do psychohistory, so that made me feel that I had done something worthwhile. Generally, I am uneasy about reviewing my own work – given what I've learned about defense mechanisms! I do my best and hope for the best. I have always reached that moment of believing deeply in my interpretations of the lives that I study. But I am a firm believer that one has to place some faith in readers, hence I am most proud of the works that readers have found convincing. So, the fact that you are interviewing me as a featured scholar suggests that there is enough of an oeuvre and positive readings of it to give my work some standing in the field.

PHE: How do you explain the fall of communism in Russia?

PP: The collapse of the Soviet Union, that would be a tough one to answer briefly but here are a few thoughts: On the one hand, people wanted a consumer economy. The professionals and artists in

particular wanted the life lived by their Western counterparts. They felt ashamed of the Soviet failures to produce a genuinely modern economy and resented being kept on a leash. They also began to feel increasingly ashamed about the Soviet past. The trauma of Stalin's mass killings was revived at intervals. The leaders used Stalin's atrocities to distinguish his regime from Lenin's, but also to promote their own reforms. I saw the film *Repentance* in Moscow in March 1987. I think it was therapeutic, in that people wept openly. The film not only condemned the dictatorship, it poignantly brought home that their religious heritage had been virtually destroyed. Gorbachev's *glasnost* allowed Russians to see the past in vivid terms and stimulated a sense of collective victimization. Many of them now felt that the Soviet regime as a whole had been like a colonial regime, destroying their culture and despoiling the natural world as well. Chernobyl punctuated *glasnost*. So the attempt to save the Soviet Union by separating the good from the bad, Lenin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev from Stalin failed. Everything except World War Two looked pretty bad, and the younger generation no longer felt awed by that achievement. Gorbachev tried to make Lenin a beacon – and I think he truly identified himself with Lenin – but that didn't work.

It should be emphasized, however, that the majority of Soviet citizens would have tolerated the continued existence of the Soviet Union. They simply didn't care enough either to oppose its collapse or to participate actively in dismantling the system. They had been rendered passive and resentful, but not revolutionary. So they were vulnerable to revolution from above, which is what Yeltsin and the other leaders of the revolution from above accomplished. The professional and managerial stratum did want change along Western lines, but no one had planned what actually happened. When it did happen, the old *nomenklatura*, criminal organizations, and energetic and sometimes unscrupulous entrepreneurial types simply divided the spoils. I'm not suggesting it was all bad. After all, the Soviet empire was an anachronism and key figures in the power elite, as well as a large part of the professional and managerial stratum understood that. They also understood that they had to integrate themselves into the global economy and that could only be done by dismantling the command economy. But Gorbachev's failure to grasp the sig-

nificance of blurring the lines of authority by shifting power from the party to the state, and to elected presidents of the republics and Yeltsin's resentful and reckless behavior created the miseries of the late eighties and nineties. Gorbachev also failed to grasp that freeing the satellite states would simply accelerate the domino effect in what is now called "the near abroad." Furthermore, Gorbachev's response to the nationalists miffed the military professionals, who had to put down nationalist movements with arms and who got the blame for barbaric acts, whereas Gorbachev got the Nobel Peace Prize.

The August plotters also showed that they had little steel in their souls. No one wanted to spill a lot of blood, especially of their co-ethnics. They were not the tough, leather-jacketed types who made the revolution, survived the Civil War, and then carried out Stalin's commands. The generals looked for a convincing leader, someone who acted decisively and did not pass the buck as well as one who had legal authority. Gorbachev had so blurred the lines of authority that they could make their selection on the basis of leadership qualities. The professional military were disinclined to support either Gorbachev or the plotters in the August 1991 crisis. Yeltsin, on the other hand, looked like a courageous leader and in both 1991 and 1993 he showed his will to power. The professional military in each case went over to his side. There was something traditionally Russian and Soviet about it: small groups of men deciding the course of a vast state.

PHE: Turning to your book, *The Structure of Mind in History: Five Major Figures in Psychohistory* (1985), why did you choose to focus on Brown, Freud, Erikson, Lifton, and Marcuse as the "psychohistorical intelligentsia?"

PP: I'm very interested in theory and used to think of myself as an intellectual historian, so I decided to drop my work on Russian theoreticians and practitioners of revolution for a moment and try to understand psychoanalytic theories of history. The people that I chose to study in *The Structure of Mind in History* seemed to me to be the most distinguished theoreticians – including the founders of the field. They also had had enormous impact and, of course, that was what they wanted to do. I might have included others,

but I felt that the five represented the architectonics that I'll speak about below.

PHE: I regret that when Norman O. Brown (September 25, 1913-October 4, 2002) died, no one wrote an obituary of him for *Clio's Psyche* or one of the other psychohistorical publications. Did the two of you teach at Wesleyan at the same time and, if so, what was your experience with him?

PP: Norman O. Brown left Wesleyan University a few years before I arrived in 1964. I did meet him at conferences, but never had a chance to have an extended conversation with him.

PHE: In your acknowledgements, among others, you thanked the journal *History and Theory* and the University of Chicago scholar William H. McNeill. How open was and is *History and Theory* to psychohistory in its many varieties?

PP: *History and Theory* welcomes first-rate work from many schools of thought, but because it focuses on theory any psychohistorical submission would have to make a contribution in the area of theory. So, the usual practitioner of psychohistory would no more find a home in the journal than the usual practitioner in any other historical field. Rather, the work would have to be theoretical. For example, *History and Theory* ran a review of *The Structure of Mind in History* because of its theoretical approach rather than because of my presence on campus. I was not an editor at that time (1985).

PHE: How did and does the distinguished world historian William H. McNeill feel about psychoanalysis and psychohistory?

PP: Bill McNeill, who I've known for decades and who taught me European history, simply showed very little interest in the field or, for that matter, in individuals. However, he wrote a surprisingly psychologically oriented biography of Arnold J. Toynbee in 1989. McNeill and I have had many conversations about the usefulness of studying individuals, fewer about psychoanalytic biography as such. His macroscopic approach works very well for him and others – including me – so I do not fault him for brushing psychobiography aside. It's just a different way of doing things. He's interested in big patterns, but he willingly (perhaps out of the dedication a teacher has toward his students) reads my manuscripts and gives

sage advice. I feel quite indebted to him.

PHE: You use an unusual term, "architectonics." Why, how do you define it, and how widely has it been accepted?

PP: When working on *The Structure of Mind in History* I struggled to find what underlay the different theories. Norman O. Brown's notion that history had the structure of a neurosis, for example, struck me as the usual sort of "professional deformation" that I found in Hegel, who projected dialectic into history. Generally, it all looked like animism to me. I began to see if there were other principles operating in the theories that gave structure to continuity and change and decided that the theoreticians used the five architectonics that I named. They are structural principles widely used in a great many fields and I have never ceased to find them useful. For example, in my introductions to *Trotsky's Notebooks: 1933-35* I used architectonics to distinguish his dialectical approach from Bukharin's and Lenin's and tried to connect personality to architectonic. Unless my memory fails me, one reviewer (herself a practitioner of psychohistory) compared reading *The Structure of Mind in History* to smoking pot – not really necessary for a working historian. (I guess that she'd tried marijuana but didn't like it.) Many historians just don't like theory. I hardly get any feedback on architectonics. I am not the only one who uses the term – it's fairly old. It goes back to the seventeenth century in English usage and it's obviously from the Greek. Contemporary usages vary a great deal. You can find tens of thousands of references on Google. I wanted to avoid the word "structure" because it and "structural" have other theoretical meanings in sociology and anthropology.

PHE: Many of your publications have been biographical and psychobiographical. What is your approach to studying Lenin, Martov, Nechaev, Stalin, Trotsky, and others?

PP: I try to understand the psychological origins of their commitment to revolution, their political style, and historically important decisions. I immerse myself in the documents and try to find out everything that I can about their families and their early experiences. In my work on Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and Nechaev, I found that adolescent crises and sibling relationships were important for answering the question

about commitment. In Lavrov's case it was personal loss and guilt. Historians rarely uncover enough reliable material about early family experiences to make any useful connections, but I work hard to look for the early sources of identity in families. My approach is eclectic. I find the Freudian psychosexual approach useful in that many of my subjects show distinct anxieties about their masculinity and those anxieties affected their political behavior. Eriksonian notions of positive and negative identity also play a big role in my work. Most of my subjects had to deal with the wounds connected with minority status and negative stereotypes. Lenin and Trotsky were Jewish (and Lenin had German, Swedish, and Asian ancestry as well). Stalin, in addition to being a Georgian, had physical stigmata; Nechaev came from a poor family in a mill town and suffered the wounds of being a gifted child in that milieu as well as the resentments and problems of upward mobility. I tried to understand the psychological impact of moving from rural backwaters to cities. Much of my work is psychosocial or psychocultural. I find Lifton's notion of symbolic immortality useful for understanding the commitments and adaptations made by my subjects. Although I've studied object relations theory, pre-Oedipal materials lie beyond my grasp. However, I recognize the importance of paranoid ideation for anybody studying political behavior and the notion of the origin of paranoid thinking in pre-Oedipal traumas may be correct. Perhaps paranoid behavior has evolutionary origins. In any case, detecting and understanding the operation of paranoid mechanisms is important in my work. More generally, I find that investigating my subjects' identities and defense mechanisms yields a great deal for a study of political behavior. Understanding identification with the aggressor and identification with victims, ambivalence, resolution of unconscious conflicts, a variety of psychic wounds – all psychoanalytic approaches – inform my biographical work.

PHE: Do you monitor your own feelings while doing this work? How do you work with your own counter-transference feelings to your biographical subject?

PP: I've tried to understand my relationship to my subjects but perhaps more as a historian trying to be "objective." I knew that I liked Lavrov's ideas and admired his learning and theoretical skill, but I didn't develop (at least didn't detect) any strong feelings about him. I think I recognized that I belonged to the

same general type – a conscience-stricken member of the intelligentsia looking for progressive solutions to human ills. That's what attracted me to the field and to Lavrov. But revolutionary violence and destructiveness began to preoccupy me and I moved to actors like Nechaev, Lenin, Stalin, and Trotsky. As an older and presumably wiser historian (and one both teaching adolescents with revolutionary inclinations and raising my own children) I think I tended to look at my subjects as gifted adolescents. I recognized that if I were in their place I might easily have chosen their path. I saw their destructive and self-destructive sides, but tried to elevate the problem to a species problem – and I think that's in the Freudian tradition.

PHE: What are you working on now? When do you expect to have it published?

PP: I'm going to take a new look at Alexander Ulianov, Lenin's brother, who was hanged for his role in a conspiracy to assassinate Alexander III. I plan to work in archives in Moscow and St. Petersburg that were not accessible when I did my earlier work on the Ulianov family. Publishing schedules are hard to predict.

PHE: What training should a person wanting to be a good psychohistorian pursue?

PP: I think it's a good idea to consult psychiatrists when one is out of one's depth, although I admittedly did this very unsystematically in my own work and for a variety of reasons I never sought psychoanalysis.

PHE: How do you see psychohistory developing in the next decade?

PP: Right now I see interest mainly in such things as collective trauma. I imagine that terrorism and religious psychologies at the extreme end will attract increasing interest.

PHE: What do we, as psychohistorians, need to do to strengthen our work?

PP: I have no wisdom about this. Sometimes an outstanding book that becomes a model for young historians dramatically changes the direction of historiography. I imagine it will take another *Young Man Luther* or *Life against Death* to attract attention to the field, although obviously the book will have a different character and somehow fit the times. Timing

means a great deal.

PHE: What is the importance of childhood to psychohistory?

PP: I think it's extremely important, even though I do not think that we should get stuck in what Erikson called "originology." As I mentioned, adolescence seemed centrally important to most of the people I studied. I generally like the more open approaches to the structure of a life.

PHE: How do you explain the growth and psychology of fundamentalism?

PP: I just offer the common wisdom that intercultural contact, social mobility, the breakdown of not only family but other kinds of ties and continuity make the religious world view more important for quite a few people. But I also believe that the quieter process of secularization goes on and is the less noticed background for the chronic revivalism that accompanies urbanization, mobility, and secularization.

PHE: What are your thoughts on the psychodynamics of violence in our world?

PP: I'm afraid that violence has a very good future because the human species hasn't changed and aggressors always find ways to set groups against each other. Aggressive people will just find different groups to lead and different venues for their aggression. Europeans and their imitators became specialists in mass violence and suffered huge casualties until 1945 because of their religious wars, imperial competitions, revolutions, and arms races. Violent people in the future may no longer have the same mix of ambitions and state structures to develop and concentrate the technologies for violence, but they will go after opportune targets with the technologies available to them. Rwandans a mere decade ago presented us with the spectacle of genocidal slaughter without the use of advanced technology. Religious and ethnic groups will continue to use violent means to consolidate their cultural and territorial worlds. The government of the U.S.A. recently unleashed large-scale state-to-state violence in response to a small number of clever terrorists, but this was a misguided reflex based upon nostalgia for our success in WWII and its aftermath in Germany and Japan. I think that once people fully understand how terribly wrong this policy is, they will begin to develop measured and sophisticated re-

sponses to the new forms of violence sponsored by the present "politics of cultural despair." But that will not necessarily prevent large casualties based upon the choice of individuals with an all-or-nothing psychology and the cleverness to acquire or manufacture the means to kill large numbers of a targeted enemy.

PHE: How do you understand the psychology of terrorism?

PP: I do not think that there is a single psychology of terrorism. Rather, there are people of different types, different psychologies, who choose terrorism as a tactic.

PHE: To what extent is the experience of terrorism in Russian history applicable to current problems in understanding and explaining terrorism?

PP: The Russian revolutionary movement is a great laboratory for studying all forms of revolutionary violence, including terrorism. My own conclusion that there isn't any psychology of terrorism is based upon my study of Russian revolutionaries who chose terrorism as a tactic. Quite often their deep commitment to revolution and to each other rather than a fascination with violence as such (for example) or any unusual vindictiveness put them on the side of terrorism.

PHE: How can psychohistorians have more impact on history departments and universities, as well as on psychoanalytic institutes and in the analytic community?

PP: By writing intelligent books and presenting cogent cases and then praying that somebody notices.

PHE: What is your experience in teaching Psychohistory of the Modern World and other psychohistory courses? How open are students to the psychohistorical approach?

PP: I always find interested students who like the material very much. Some of them are seriously affected by the course – in a good way! They appreciate studying material that deals with such basic and global problems.

PHE: Please tell me about your teaching.

PP: My teaching style is designed to elicit respect for academic questions, to promote serious engagement with questions that many students have never

zation lurking behind the Greeks; but while enormous gains have since been made in exploring this hidden world, it need not be made to replace the other: the Greeks are still around. The intense urges, anxieties, and images arising out of primary ties may persist in some fashion, but they are also absorbed, assimilated, and restructured as urges and relations triangulate into the oedipal. That Bollas is tuned into these stages is deftly noted by Gabriela Mann as his sense that "psychoanalysis is trapped in an oedipal struggle between Papa-Freud and Mama-Klein" (Melanie Klein, p. 74). Bollas wants to maintain both tendencies: the empathic, intuitive, holding-supportive, maternal side along with the objective, defining, interpreting side. In agreeing with this aspiration, we also want to avoid implicitly Venus/Mars-style stereotypes.

The challenges for readers of *Clio's Psyche* are similar: we need to be inclusive in our reconstructions of the past, be it of individuals or groups; and we need to open ourselves widely to the many bewildering strands of subjective entanglements, all the while struggling toward a sufficient degree of clarity to be shared as knowledge.

Daniel Dervin's biography may be found on page 8. □

A Psychohistorical Critique in Honor of Friedhelm Nyssen

Peter Petschauer

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Review of Friedhelm Nyssen and Peter Jüngst, eds., Kritik der Psychhistorie: Anspruch und Grenzen eines psychologischen Paradigms (A Critique of Psychohistory: Appeals and Limits of a Psychological Paradigm), (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2003) ISBN 3-89806-222-8, pp. 363, 29,90 Euros.

Friedhelm Nyssen died late last year after an extended illness. Everyone who knew Friedhelm and read him will miss his superb scholarship and profound insights. This review honors this excellent scholar and human being.

The edition that Nyssen and his colleague and friend Jüngst created last year is an important appreciation and extensive critique of psychoanalysis and history. As such, it focuses on the theories and expositions of a number of authors, their value and their limits.

The *Kritik* is divided into four parts: An opening overview by Nyssen of the contributions to the book, entitled "A comparison of the 'independent psychohistory' and the contributions...;" Nyssen's theoretical overview of an "independent psychohistory;" four chapters on historical themes by Peter Jüngst, Hartwig Weber, Evelyn Heinemann, and Edmund Hermsen; and four chapters on contemporary themes by Wolfgang Prieß, H. Kallert, Evelyn Heinemann, and Marion Bornhoff-Nyssen. Without diminishing the importance of the other contributions, I will concentrate on Nyssen, Weber and Heinemann. For a review of an earlier and more extensive version of Jüngst's contribution, see *Clio's Psyche* (Vol. 10, No. 4 [March, 2004]:158-159).

Nyssen's main argument in the introduction emerges clearly in the following sentence: "What is so much in need of criticism in deMause's variety of psychohistory is its lack of complexity. This deficiency is actually a greenhouse spawned desire to elevate one factor as determinant in every conceivable problematic situation" (p. 26). "As usual with deMause," reports Nyssen, "once he has established a central concept, then he applies it without hesitation to all periods of history and phenomena" (p. 35). (All translations are mine.) Nyssen goes on to illustrate with specific examples. As he understands deMause, he sees the reason for high child mortality in the past and in poor countries today connected to one factor, namely parental child-abuse and child-neglect. "'Untoward circumstances,' like poverty, illness, and neglect do not enter the argument" (p. 26). That is why there is only, according to Nyssen, "one solution to all political problems, education of parents in 'Parenting Centers.'" DeMause ignores an approach that would include, aside from parental childrearing, such givens as improvements in diet, housing, working conditions, health care, etc. Another aspect of this reliance on one seemingly valid interpretation is that all political activities in the past and present are determined by group fantasies that grow

out of childhood experiences. Nyssen similarly interprets deMause's response to 9/11. DeMause saw the cause of it in the less than fortunate upbringing of terrorists in a psycho-genetically less advanced areas of the world. Implicit is that we in the West, especially the U.S., are far ahead of this part of the world in our childrearing and that we would not perpetrate such acts. Never mind, Nyssen counters, that our form of capitalism and militarism is creating a worldwide dilemma for poorer countries and their inhabitants.

In Nyssen's contribution to the volume, he takes on deMause's "'independent psychohistory'" – [as] a permanent abstraction" (pp. 79-134). Nyssen's principal critique is again that deMause places the relationship of parents and children at the center of all historical evolution. After explaining the psychogenetic history of childhood, Nyssen maintains that the improvements in the relationship between parents and children cannot have taken place in a static environment. As deMause has seen in my critiques as well, one must include political, economic, social, medical and other realities in considerations of historical evolution (p. 87); that is, the horror of childhood in the ancient world or the change toward intrusion in the sixteenth century cannot only be explained through relationships of parents to their children. As Nyssen points out, the Black Plague of the 1330s did not emerge in connection with poor childrearing. Similarly, in my opinion, one cannot ignore the image of the Virgin Mary and the infant Jesus on childrearing, nor the experiences of children and adults with art, music and literature.

As we know, deMause sees a gradual improvement in the way parents treated their children and explains this improvement as functions of certain psychoclasses; that is, groups of parents who relived the traumas and difficulties of their own childhoods and consequently set out to improve the relationship with their children. Importantly, this improvement moves history. Or, as Nyssen formulates the theory, it moves from history of childhood to history of psyche and from there to history in general. Because the history of childhood is filled with misery, one must not automatically assume that the history of societies, politics and culture are only influenced, if not determined, by the trauma of childhood and youth (p. 94). Nyssen sees the prob-

lem in the assumption that more traditional societies have arrived at earlier forms of childrearing and will thus be constituted by a pool of unhappier people than the societies that have arrived at later stages (p. 99). If one were to follow this argument, then we would have to maintain that the well adjusted U.S. vanguard, that is the one that has reached deMause's Helping Mode would have prodded the rest of our society into a happier and more humane society than the one we are obviously now designing.

Although he does not mention deMause, Hartwig Weber's "Child Sacrifices in the Old Testament and in Christianity" (pp. 185-210) could have prompted a powerful debate about deMause's ideas regarding infanticide and its influences on society. Weber's thesis is that "The existence of myths about the sacrifice of children documents that people were reluctant to undertake what they perceived inevitable – to put out their children and to kill them. When they had overcome their resistance [to the act], feelings of guilt remained. This is the basis of myths about child sacrifice" (p. 210). While Weber discounts specific tales, say of first-born sons being sacrificed because they cannot be proven – and would have been suicidal for societies – he does not doubt infanticide as a phenomenon. But he asserts that the myths served the purpose of excusing a murder by maintaining that a god/goddess ordered it.

A further effort to understand the relationships between history and psychoanalysis is Evelyn Heinemann's "Projection and Reality? The Contribution of Psychohistory and Ethno-psychoanalysis to the Understanding of Cultural Phenomena" (pp. 211-62). Freud, Lyndal Roper, deMause, and Peter Gay are among the authors she discusses in some detail. The development of the superego plays a major role in the elaborations. With Freud, she took up *Totem and Taboo*, *The Future of an Illusion*, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, and *Moses and Monotheistic Religion*, coming to the conclusion (p. 221) that Freud's "first work, *Totem and Taboo*, was still characterized by an empathic and empathetic attempt to study the strange (*Fremde*) and to interact with and understand that existing reality with the help of psychoanalytic insight. By contrast, the later works reflect an increasing neglect of reality in that they contrast unproductively

thought to ask, to offer new perspectives, to challenge them and take them to the frontiers of learning, in short, to be sure that it's higher education. I take teaching very seriously. That's why I chose a small undergraduate school. I like to lecture and like to engage students in seminars. I think that I'm equally good (or bad) at both. The feedback suggests that the students experience my courses as both intense and funny. The humor is usually spontaneous, but may be unconsciously designed to reduce the tension associated with the investigation of the very serious matters we study. Much of my work touches upon the atrocities of the twentieth century and shows how human beings form pseudo species (Erikson's term) and dehumanize each other. Other courses are designed to show the patterns of history and the evolution of power systems.

PHE: How can psychoanalysis and psychohistory have more impact on society in general?

PP: Again, people have to write intelligent and cogent books that attract the attention of the right readers. President Carter invited Christopher Lasch to discuss *The Culture of Narcissism*. I don't think that President Carter's campaign benefited from that, much less the American public, but the book is still in print. I would guess that Robert Jay Lifton's work has had considerable impact because he has gone into the field, interviewed a great variety of survivors, and written his books for a wide audience.

PHE: Do you think that universities and research institutions will someday begin hiring psychohistorians as psychohistorians (or psychohistorically informed historians), instead of for their other qualifications as is usually now the case?

PP: I do not see any movement in that direction right now. In fact, the postmodern moment set many people's minds against the systematic use of psychology and it may take a while for the profession to get over the rejection of psychology.

PHE: How can we recruit new people to the field?

PP: I suspect that people enter the field through the accidents of their research, but first of all historians have to accept the systematic use of psychology and they generally do not. I'm not certain that people within the history profession will be the ones to for-

ward the interests of psychohistory. Some of the most influential psychohistorians were not professional historians. They were people who wrote interesting books applying psychology to history.

PHE: What books were important to your development?

PP: It's easier to name authors rather than specific books: Freud, Erikson, Lifton, Norman Cohn, John Demos, Fred Weinstein and Gerald Platt. Bruce Mazlish and Benjamin Wolman edited some important collections of articles that I found very useful.

PHE: Who was important to your development as a student of psychosocial phenomena? What impact did Erik Erikson have on you?

PP: Several of the authors mentioned above affected my appreciation of psychosocial and psychocultural approaches. Erikson no doubt had the most powerful impact, although I very early came to the conclusion that he used his subjects mainly to illustrate something important to him rather than to conduct a rigorous historical investigation. It was easy to forgive someone who had such wonderful gifts and valuable insights.

PHE: What mentors come to mind?

PP: I think Robert Jay Lifton was closest to being a mentor.

PHE: How do you define psychohistory?

PP: To me psychohistory is a form of historical investigation that explains both individual and group behavior in given historical circumstances by means of the theories and clinical experience not only of psychiatrists and psychologists, but also the theories and studies of anthropologists and sociologists. The best psychohistorians integrate all of the disciplines mentioned in some fashion.

PHE: Please list the five people who you think have made the greatest contribution to psychohistory in order of their contribution.

PP: Freud, Erikson, Lifton, Peter Gay, and John Demos.

PHE: Thank you for providing this interesting Featured Scholar Interview. ▢

The Challenge Posed by Bollas

Dan Dervin

Mary Washington College

Review of Joseph Scalia, ed., The Vitality of Objects: Exploring the Work of Christopher Bollas. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2002. Paperback ISBN 0-8195-6535-0, xiii, 228 pages, \$24.95.

Although a major voice in contemporary psychoanalysis and a U.S. citizen for his first 30 years, Christopher Bollas has long since become prominent in the English Object Relations Movement while remaining largely unknown in America. This current volume in the *Disseminations: Psychoanalysis in Contexts* series should help remedy this situation. However, for unacquainted readers I would suggest starting with the long interview at the end of the book, proceeding to Bollas's writings, preferably *Forces of Destiny: Psychoanalysis and the Human Idiom* (1989) and *Being a Character: Psychoanalysis and Self Experience* (1995), and then winding back around to the present papers by fellow analysts, academicians, and creative artists.

One reason for this circuitous route is that in rethinking psychoanalysis, Bollas has introduced a daunting lexicon of terms: some pre-existing in the field but given a new twist, others taken over from diverse linguistic contexts. An example of the former is D.W. Winnicott's "true self," of the latter is "idiom," and of both is "transformational object." There is also the "aleatory object" and niggling terms like "psychic genera." So much mental labor is exerted in the introductory essays defining and refining these terms that they almost acquire a philosophical aura and to the uninitiated run the risk of assuming a cult-like mystique.

This murkiness dissipates when Bollas explains in his interview what he means, for example, by his revisions of Winnicott's rather unfortunate dichotomizing of the true/false selves. Bollas plays off a more spontaneous (the true self) capacity for experience and hence a creative potential for growth against the obstacles of social compliance

(the false self). This enables him to situate a positive dimension – visibly manifested as one's idiosyncratic style or idiom – in the Freudian unconscious. Bollas values Freud's early work on dreams, and takes the wishful aspect of dreaming as the inherent pleasure of representing *per se*, be it of desires, conflicts, or affects. Here is the working of a creative life-force to be recognized and cherished; the emphasis is less on the "seething cauldron" concept of the id and more on its potentials and on the ego's unconscious depths in Freud's later hypothesis. These deeper dimensions, like the dream's secondary elaborations in order to gain passage to consciousness, allow for an aesthetic principle to shape mental life. Bollas is quite taken with this creative possibility, and, whether or not we see his English influence coming out, he certainly has interesting affinities with the romanticism of Blake and Wordsworth as well as the vitalism of G.B. Shaw and D.H. Lawrence.

All of this is intriguing and amusing, but it also tends to draw psychoanalysis further away from its original scientific allegiances, which may be inevitable. Some would argue the scientific project had been a lost cause all along and more of an American than a British problem. Psychoanalysis has been challenged on scientific grounds much more in the States than abroad, and has suffered so severely from neurochemical encroachments that it may never regain any claim to objective knowledge.

Paradoxically, Bollas's great strength is also his liability. There is no question that he has reinvigorated psychoanalysis by radically rethinking its processes, and has cleared a place at the postmodern table of skepticism, which academic theorists require for legitimacy. Also, there is no question that in the present state of affairs all fields of knowledge are relative and pluralistic. So while Bollas has advanced and refined our ways of thinking about the intricacies of subjective processes and demonstrated that they are indeed more complex than we had imagined, he has further removed them from anything like scientific verifiability.

Moreover, as readers wind back around to this book's contributors, their interests, with a rare exception, are bracketed by the mother-infant dyad as the sole locus of child development. Freud referred to this area as the Minoan-Mycenean civili-

analogies and developments of progress.” She moved on to revisions and analysis of Freud, concentrating mostly on totem religions and witchcraft, both of which she sees Freud as misunderstanding. But rather than critique him from the contemporary context, one ought to understand him in this context, that is, that of the end of the 19th and the first half of the twentieth century. While he may have been aware of the insights of contemporary anthropologists, he based his findings on them and his own insights, neither of which were modified by our late twentieth century anthropological understanding.

Heinemann is particularly critical of Lyndal Roper. “Sadly,” she writes of *Oedipus and the Devil* (1995), Roper misunderstood the relationship between the victim and the torturer in the witch processes. Heinemann thinks she “is so stuck on Freud’s theories that her work will of necessity increase the resentment among historians” (p. 230). Evelyn Heinemann continues with psychohistory and deMause and praises him for the use of sources to solidify his theories in that “he tries to integrate the actual cultural development into his theory. But historical phenomena are more or less brought in as verification, or falsification, of his psychogenetic theory” (p. 240). By contrast, she finds Gay’s approach in *Freud for Historians* (1994) more useful because he sees psychoanalysis as a tool to reconstruct developments that would otherwise elude us (p. 241). She agrees with him that it is less important to simply apply psychoanalytic insights to the study of historical phenomena than to study and apply both carefully. In her concluding discussion of “Holiness, Possession (*Besessenheit*), and Hysteria” (pp. 248-60), Heinemann argues once more through the careful study of the holy, possessed and hysterical women in the Middle Ages, that grand psychological and psychohistorical theories do not serve us well in the understanding of historical phenomena.

Any review of these contributions, especially Nyssen’s approach to deMause’s concepts of group fantasies, ought to be moderated by these final considerations. No doubt, group fantasies exist, but like Nyssen, I doubt that one ought to link them exclusively to childhood experiences; in addition, I doubt that one ought to stick to the political realm. Jüngst shows with his studies of the San of the Ka-

lahari and other tribes that groups/societies adjust themselves to their surroundings based on many different givens, like mountains, deserts, cold, large tracts of land, shortages of arable land, etc. and use childrearing as one of the ways to do so.

I will conclude my review by applying the ideas of Nyssen and Jüngst to two areas of group fantasy. Many members of American society jumped with abandon into the war with Iraq; by contrast, most Germans, Frenchmen, Russians and many other Europeans, in spite of the stance of their governments, did not. I doubt seriously that this difference has as much to do with childrearing as it did and does with WWII; that is, it is less associated with childrearing than later life experiences. For almost all European age groups, “the war” to this day is WWII; and for good reason. The comparisons alone are amazing: America lost about 300,000 people; Germany lost more than 4 million, and Russia more than 25 million (Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at War: A Global History of World War II* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995], pp. 894). Of the most striking subtotals, Germany lost 600,000 civilians and more than 14 million homes; at least two thirds of the Russian losses were civilians, and Russia lost most of the housing in its Western regions. Very few Americans who are alive today recall WWII – or even Vietnam it seems. By contrast, every European, except the very youngest, recalls some aspect of “the war,” even if only in a story of calamities to a family member. That is, almost every single survivor and most families have been traumatized in some fashion. The opening of war for Americans in 2003 was like an adventure; the idea of war for most Europeans remains a genuine threat. Our American group fantasy was and is based on peace and success in war; theirs was and is based on unspeakable disaster and total mayhem, even in victory.

The second example deals with urban and other development. American urban planners have little influence as to where the next development will be placed in or near a city; developers usually make the decision for placement. German urban planners generally determine ahead of time where developments will be placed and then developers proceed to build in that area. To say that such cultural preferences are determined by good or bad childrearing should stretch the loyalty of almost any

deMausean. What is true is that these two societies have different values on this issue, and many others, and that they bring these values to their children, and adults. All the same, they have fantasies that have grown out of experiences other than with parents.

What is important in this short reflection is that men, women and children in both societies carry on conversations about what should or should not be done; in other words, they have developed, through conversation, media, advertising, *etc.*, images in their heads about how certain situations should be handled. They confirm these decisions by acting on them. At least in the above cases, and I suspect in many others, fantasies about what should and should not be done in certain situations have less to do with childrearing and more with later life insights that stem from direct experiences and insights; surely these insights are transmitted to children.

□ *Peter Petschauer's biography is on page 6.*

In Memoriam

Friedhelm Nyssen (1938-2003)

Peter Jüngst

Kassel University

Friedhelm Nyssen, sociologist, pedagogue, psychohistorian, and emeritus professor of education at the University of Frankfurt, died on 18 December 2003, after a long, excruciatingly painful illness that made his life intolerable. I lost a good friend with whom I enjoyed a close personal and professional relationship. We first met nine years ago at a meeting of the German Society for Psychohistorical Research where he lectured on "The Psychogenetic History of Childhood and Historical Demography: Do They Supplement Each Other?" We soon discovered we shared a passionate interest in modern and classic art, touring German and Dutch exhibits where we exchanged spontaneous associations on the psychosocial and aesthetic meanings of paintings, some of which Friedhelm used as source material in his psychohistorical work. It was a pleasure to associate with this out-

standing German psychohistorian.

Years earlier Nyssen, a student at the Free University of Berlin, had been a prominent member of the German student organization, which toward the end of the sixties had initiated an attack on the conservative-hierarchical structures of German universities. It helped bring about a German "cultural revolution" that was part of the transformation of Germany into a more open, democratic, and socially responsible society. Even then he had the reputation as a dynamic speaker, capable of appealing to thousands while remaining true to cognitively elaborated and differentiated argumentation. He was moved by a passion to democratize and improve social and educational conditions at universities and institutions of learning at all levels. He developed his careful reasoning at the University of Kiel and through his own scientific work as a sociologist and educator.

In 1972 Nyssen became a professor in the Department of Educational Sciences at the University of Frankfurt, which was well known as a center of critical theory. Up to the middle of the seventies Nyssen's publications aimed mainly at the interconnections of education, the history of education, political socialization, and society. Outside the scientific and university world he became well known for his book, *The Influence of Economic Interest Groups on Schools* [*Der Einfluß wirtschaftlicher Interessenverbände im Felde der Schule*] (1969), which was reprinted repeatedly. Beginning in the late seventies, Nyssen focused on the improvement of educational and socialization processes through the interconnections of psychoanalysis and the history of childhood. The latter became his life's work – a passion that may well have been rooted in his life history: he was born on July 28, 1938 in Düsseldorf and his childhood was deeply affected by his experiences during the violent displacement of millions of Germans from Germany's former eastern territories and its aftermath.

Professor Friedhelm Nyssen was the first author in Germany to examine thoroughly the historical sources of Lloyd deMause's "History of Childhood" and to open a discussion concerning their representative value (1979, 1984, and 1989). He became an important contributor to organized psy-

chohistorical research in Germany through activities such as the invitation of American scholars to a psychohistorical congress at Frankfurt University and especially as the author and editor of numerous essays and books. Among his publications were: "Concerning the History of Childhood: To Recognize and to Remember" (1979); "In Search of the Lost Self: Alice Miller and Michel de Montaigne" (1980); "Concerning deMause's History of Childhood: A Discussion of Sources"; "Childhood in Tsarist Russia" (1987); "The History of Childhood as 'Black Pedagogy'?" (1987); "Do Parents Love Their Children?" (1989); "Child Crèches and 'The Evolution of Childhood'" (1991); "A New Beginning or Repetition? Childhood and Christianity in the Past" (1993); "The Distorted Child Wish in the Christian Past" (1994); "The Psychogenetic History of Childhood and Historical Demography" (1997); and "Psychohistory, Social Inequality, and Political Changes" (2002).

Central to most of these publications was Nyssen's preoccupation with the reworking of anxieties (*zweite Angstbearbeitung*). Though this reworking meant that the anxieties of early childhood follow us through our entire lives, as mothers and fathers we have in our parent-child-relationship the chance for renewed and new possibilities in facing these anxieties, perhaps leading to better results for parents and children alike. In this sense, he endeavored to discover to what extent the evolution of childhood was embedded, that is a "natural psychogenetic" phenomenon, or to what extent it is supported, delayed or even contradicted by economic circumstances, demographic processes, and socio-historical developments. Among the latter he included the effects of religion and changing educational and medical thinking since the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and the more recent feminist discourse. The resulting enquiries enabled Nyssen to bring into play his social and educational scientific background, his rigorous theoretical training, and his extensive personal and theoretical knowledge in psychoanalysis and social-historical psychology.

Nyssen contrasted and supplemented the idea of a psychogenetic evolution of childhood with findings from the social sciences and historical studies. This meant for him a revitalization of

Lloyd deMause's theoretical approach and an important addition to existing explanatory modes of the social sciences. He hoped that the latter could gain – by including and integrating psychohistorical aspects – additional explanatory power. (An example of this is Friedhelm Nyssen and Marion Bornhoff, "Is There Any Such a Thing as 'Evolution of Childhood?'" *The Journal of Psychohistory*, Vol. 16. no. 2, [1988] pp. 184-188).

Through his studies, Nyssen came to the conclusion that a psychohistory that explains societal developments only through psychic processes and denies the influence of societal and economic factors impedes its further development. This view found its final expression and underpinning in *A Critique of Psychohistory: Appeals and Limits of a Psychological Paradigm* (2003), reviewed in this issue on page 22. This book represents the results of the research of an interdisciplinary group of scholars he had brought together and moderated for several years to inquire into the interrelationships between psychohistory and the social and historical sciences. In two extensive essays, he focused on an "independent psychohistory," as initiated by deMause, and expressed his deep fascination with this approach. Simultaneously, he carefully demonstrated that a psychohistory will founder if based only on psychic processes without being integrated with social and human sciences.

With this book Nyssen sought and found a link to the topics he faced at the beginning of his scientific career: the problems of political socialization and critiques of educational processes in capitalistic societies. This endeavor to integrate his scientific life had found an earlier expression in his seminal speech on "Psychohistory, Social Inequality, and Political Changes" at the Psychohistorical Symposium in Heidelberg in 2000. There he pointed out that much of the extent and intensity of abuse and maltreatment of children in today's globalized world cannot be understood without recourse to an interdisciplinary approach to global poverty.

Nyssen sought to integrate his earlier social science work with his later scientific pursuits and succeeded before his death, even if he was already worn down by intense pain. This breakthrough was not only of great personal significance to him, but it

is also of great importance for the scientific understanding (*Selbstverständnis*) of psychohistorians of themselves and the possibilities and standing of their field.

Friedhelm Nyssen taught thousands of students and familiarized all of these students with psychohistorical and psychopedagogical research and theory. I participated in one of his typical seminars: he was seated in the midst of over 100 students of different scientific fields and spoke about childhood and adolescence in various cultures. The students listened eagerly because they saw the relevance of the topic and approach to themselves. Professionally, and with great personal warmth and empathy, he handled the lively and controversial debates typical of Frankfurt University. He was so successful as a teacher because he was eager to see what the students would add to the topics under discussion, to learn something new he had not thought of himself. At such a moment he would express astonishment and do what he could to further develop the ideas expressed. Similarly, at the interdisciplinary work group meetings, he maintained an open and empathic style that was free of the competitive distortions one often finds at German universities. This ability to initiate and develop a topic or an activity openly will remain unforgettable to his students, colleagues and friends.

Contrary to present trends, the university was for Friedhelm Nyssen not an educational and research machine that aims at the efficient output of the highest possible number of usable products, including human ones. The university he worked to create was primarily a cultural and humanistic enterprise that encouraged a continuous self-reflective learning; he endeavored to gain an empathic understanding of the other and to encourage responsible autonomy and independence. Perhaps the latter was expressed in his conscious choice of death in the face of unbearable pain. He is survived by his wife Marion Bornhoff-Nyssen and sons Peter and Felix.

Peter Jüngst, PhD, is Professor of Applied and Social Geography at the University of Kassel and the author of various psychogeographic and psychohistorical books including "Raubtierkapitalismus?" Globalisierung, psychosoziale Destabilis-

ierung und territoriale Konflikte ("Predatory Capitalism?" Globalisation, Psychosocial Destabilisation and Territorial Conflicts) [2004]. Together with Friedhelm Nyssen he edited Kritik der Psychohistorie which is reviewed in this issue. Dr. Jüngst is a member of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für psychohistorische Forschung (German Society for Psychohistorical Research) and may be reached at <juengst@uni-kassel.de>. □

In Memoriam: Rita Ransohoff (1916-2003)

Joan Ransohoff Wynn
University of Chicago
With Paul H. Elovitz

Rita M. Ransohoff, psychologist, psychoanalyst, and author, died at age 87 on December 13, 2003 in Connecticut. A memorial ceremony was held for her on March 6th in Manhattan. She was a founding and active member of the Psychohistory Forum who periodically presented her research on women, Eleanor Roosevelt, and male attempts to dominate women, and often hosted Forum meetings in her elegant apartment on the 21st floor of 343 East 30th Street. She loved the intellectual exchange of our small group meetings.

Rita Mayer was the second of three daughters born on September 1, 1916 in Cincinnati, Ohio to prosperous Jewish Republican parents. Eschewing her families' country club life even at a young age, she instead chose an intellectual and socially committed life. While at Smith College, she led the parade for the Democratic Roosevelt through the streets of North Hampton, an event reported in the Cincinnati press, no doubt to her parents' chagrin. Rita and Joseph Ransohoff had been dating since they were 16 and were married before college ended.

In her clinical career her interests included an early focus on adolescents and the use and meaning of humor in their lives and later attention to the treatment of adults and issues of aging. With a bachelor's degree in social science from the Univer-

sity of Chicago (1941), a masters of social work from Adelphi University (1953), and a doctoral degree in psychology from the Union Graduate School (1979), her career reached an interwoven and impressive synergy when her interests and degrees in history and psychology, in people and places combined.

Dr. Ransohoff's interests were exemplified in her publications; first in her annotations to Edmund Engleman's photographs of Freud's Vienna home exhibited at the Jewish Museum in New York and published in *Bergasse 19: Sigmund Freud's Home and Offices, Vienna 1938* (1976). Subsequently she brought her interests and struggles to powerful light for herself and others in two books. *Venus After Forty: Sexual Myths, Men's Fantasies, and Truths About Middle-Aged Women* (1987), uses sources including modern cultural material, medieval myths, and psychological theory to reveal and rectify the powerful and pejorative myths about middle aged and aging women in America. *Fear and Envy: Why Men Need to Dominate and Control Women* (2001) is a cross cultural study of man's fear and deeply repressed envy of woman's power and sexuality. It traces men's feelings, fantasies, and internalized experiences that find expression in the practices of every day life: hiding women's bodies in cloaks and veils, restricting them to different parts of the mosque or synagogue, denying them an education and other forms of access.

In her professional life, among other positions, Dr. Ransohoff was an Assistant Clinical Professor in the Department of Psychiatry at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, a faculty member of the New York School for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at New York University School of Social Work. From the 1970s until the late 1990s she also maintained a private practice. Dr. Ransohoff lectured widely in the U.S. and abroad on a variety of topics. She was a Charter Member of the National Association of Social Workers and a Life Fellow of the American Orthopsychiatric Association.

Dr. Ransohoff's travels around the world fueled her interest in the treatment of women. Places she visited included the familiar, the well traveled and the less common place: Bamako and Timbuktu; Ephesus and Pergamon; Jerusalem and Jericho;

Bombay, Delhi, and Andra Pradesh; China, Japan, Sicily and England; Paris and Corsica were just some of these places.

As a person Rita Ransohoff was determined, elegant, and traveled; an avid, endless reader; and a person whose friends spanned continents and generations. Her surroundings were filled with wonderful taste in both furnishings and food. Her daughter remembers her mother moving into a summer cottage on the beach in Long Island, using a weather-beaten row boat for a room divider, filling the rooms with wild flowers, and providing breakfasts with her homemade tomato jam and dinners with local seafood. Over the years, her homes in Manhattan and Sag Harbor were elegant and equally full of life. She loved her garden and gardening.

Dr. Ransohoff was private, proud, uncomplaining and could be at least outwardly tough. An example of this was when her daughter, son-in-law, and their 18-month-old son were moving to Albany rather than New York City and the bosom of her family. Her daughter recalls that she called her mother in tears from London where she had lived for over three years. Her mother's reply to her sorrows was: "Oh, for God sakes Joan, pull your self together. You have a wonderful husband and son. Go learn how to plant cows and raise beans!" (The humor involved in this declaration was almost certainly intentional.) While Dr. Ransohoff could cut off family and friends with this apparent toughness, it was the same standard by which she lived her own life in which she suffered some major losses. She rarely complained about life and its disappointments, and then only briefly, even toward the end of her years when she could no longer live fully on her own, but moved to an assisted living facility near her son's home in Connecticut. In fitting with her life style, this residence was first rate and it provided many intellectual activities.

Rita Ransohoff died peacefully at home after a brief undiagnosed illness. Her children were by her side. She is survived by her daughter Joan Ransohoff Wynn, her son Joseph Ransohoff, and five grandchildren. Condolences may be sent by e-mail to her children at <jwynn@uchicago.edu> and <jordar97@earthlink.net>.

Joan Wynn is a Research Fellow at the Chapin Hall Center for Children at the University of Chicago, an applied policy research center. She is currently on leave to pursue her interests in photography and metal constructions. □

Bulletin Board

The next **Psychohistory Forum WORK-IN-PROGRESS SATURDAY SEMINAR** will be on **October 23, 2004** when four scholars representing the Forum's Research Group on the Childhood, Personality, and Psychology of Presidential Candidates and Presidents, will speak on "**Psychohistorical Aspects of Election 2004.**" The speakers and topics are as follows: **Herbert Barry**, PhD (University of Pittsburgh), "**Differences Between Candidate and President Kerry,**" **Paul Elovitz**, PhD (Ramapo College), "**Bush and Kerry as Their Fathers' Sons,**" **Ted Goertzel**, PhD (Rutgers University), "**Ralph Nader: The Political Psychology of a Puritanical Perfectionist,**" and **Jennefer Mazza**, PhD (Ramapo College), "**Psychological Explorations of the 2004 Election Rhetoric and Culture Wars.**" On behalf of the Presidential Research Group, at the 27th Annual Convention of the International Psychohistorical Association (IPA) on June 2-4, 2004, there were three papers given on the panel, "Psychobiographical Insights on the 2004 Presidential Election": Herbert Barry, "The Interaction between the Psychic Needs of Voters and Presidential Candidates," **Dan Dervin** (Mary Washington College), "Bush's Borderline Presidency: Accountability without Consequences," and Paul Elovitz, "A Psychobiographical Comparison of Bush and Kerry." These three papers are the basis of the fall issue of *The Journal of Psychohistory*. Other Forum members presenting at the IPA, held at New York University, were **Sander Breiner**, **Jennifer Eastman**, **Marvin Eisenstadt**, **Anna Geifman**, **Irene Javors**, **Nancy Kobrin**, **David Lotto**, **Ellen Mendel**, **Richard Morrock**, **Denis O'Keefe**, **H. John Rogers**, and **George Victor**. **David Beisel** had the honor of giving the IPA's "Distinguished Academic Lecture." April 2004 Forum seminars were by **Barry Shapiro** (Allegheny College) on "Conspiracy Thinking in the French Revolution," **Anna Geifman** (Boston University) on "Lenin's Personality Profile," and **Philip Pomper** (Wesleyan University) on "Trotsky's Self-

Clio's Psyche's Role in Psychohistorical Networking

Congratulations to **Thomas Blass** of the University of Maryland-Baltimore County on the publication of his book, *The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram* (NY: Basic Books, 2004, Hardcover ISBN 0-7382-0399-8, 360 pages, \$26.00). You can see the eye-catching book cover, as well as some readers' comments, by going to the Milgram website: <http://www.stanleymilgram.com>. "Readers may remember Professor Blass' article, "Stanley Milgram and His Obedience Experiments," (Vol. 4, No. 4 [March, 1998], pp. 109-112), in the special feature, *STANLEY MILGRAM AND OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY*, with other articles by George Kren, Andre Modigliani, and Francois Rochat. *The Library Journal* has called the book "among the best biographies of psychologists" and *Publishers Weekly* deemed it "an important contribution to...science history."

Recently, the author wrote us a note of thanks that reads as follows: "Clio's Psyche played a part in helping transform an idea into reality. In 1998, I wrote a brief article on Milgram which was seen by a literary agent, Theresa Park, because a client's book was reviewed in the same issue Clio's Psyche. She got in touch with me and the rest is history." A review of the book is scheduled to appear in these pages before the end of this year.

The Sidney Halpern Award For the Best Psychohistorical Idea or Achievement

For Details
Contact Paul Elovitz

Destructive Ambivalence.” **CONFERENCES:** The 32nd Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (NAAP) will be held on Saturday, October 9, 2004 at the Marriott Financial Center Hotel. Contact **Margery Quackenbush** at <naap72@aol.com> for details. **Avner Falk**, Anna Geifman, Nancy Koblin, **Elizabeth Marvick**, and Jacques Szaluta are among the Forum members and subscribers presenting papers at the 27th Annual Conference of the International Society for Political Psychology (ISPP) to be held in Lund, Sweden on July 15-18, 2004. **CONGRATULATIONS** to **Eva Fogelman** on the film “Breaking the Silence: The Generation After the Holocaust,” which she wrote and co-produced. **Flora Hogman** presented the paper, “The Press and the Hidden Children of the Holocaust: Reflections on Resilience,” on May 1 at the Annual Conference of the New York State Psychological Association held in Saratoga Springs. **AWARDS:** The Psychohistory Forum is open to nominations for the **Sidney Halpern Award** for the Best Psychohistorical Idea or Accomplishment. This may be granted at the graduate, undergraduate, or postgraduate levels. **RECUPERATION:** Our best to **Charles Gouaux** of St. Louis who is recuperating from surgery and may be e-mailed at <gouaux1@swbell.net> or called at (314) 863-6249. **OUR THANKS:** To our members and subscribers for the support that makes Clio's Psyche possible. To Benefactors Herbert Barry, Ralph Colp, and Mary Lambert; Patrons David Beisel, Andrew Brink, David Lotto, H. John Rogers, and Shirley Stewart; Supporting Members Rudolph Binion, Bob Lentz, and Jacqueline Paulson; and Members John Hartman and Maria Miliora. Our thanks for thought-provoking materials to David Beisel, Dan Dervin, Peter Jüngst, Peter Petschauer, Philip Pomper, and Joan Wynn. Our appreciation to Dick Booth and Bob Lentz for selected editing and to Jaclyn Dilling for proofreading. □

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The Best of Clio's Psyche

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September 2004

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- The current fascination with homosexuality
- Review essays of important books

500-1500 words, due October 15
(Early submissions welcomed)

Contact Paul Elovitz, Editor
<pelovitz@aol.com>

Clio's Psyche

Understanding the "Why" of Culture, Current Events, History, and Society

Volume 11 Number 2

September 2004

Psychology of Election 2004

Special Feature

“Bush Rage” & Its Consequences

Sara Konrath
University of Michigan

George W. Bush is a president who has polarized people like few others before him: A president many people love to hate. Spend a few minutes discussing President Bush with a politically liberal individual and it may not take long for accusations of his aggressiveness to come up. In the media, he is virtually inescapable. While driving we hear about him on the radio. While walking from the parking lot to our offices, we see his face on newspaper stands. While flicking through the channels, there he is again. What is the effect of President Bush's ubiquitous presence and so many people's hatred of him?

(Continued on page 48)

Geoffrey Cocks: Historian of Film and Nazi Germany

Paul H. Elovitz
Ramapo College & the Psychohistory Forum

Geoffrey Campbell Cocks, PhD, is Julian S. Rammelkamp Professor of History at Albion College in Michigan. He was born November 13, 1948, in New Bedford, Massachusetts, as the second of two sons to a Protestant upper-middle-class family. He earned degrees in history at Occidental College (1970) and UCLA (1971, 1975). At Albion he teaches the Irrational in History; the Holocaust; Great Issues in Fine Arts: Kubrick; Film Images of World War II; Europe, 1500-2000; Europe, 1789-1918; Europe Since 1918; Modern Germany; and Modern Russia.

(Continued on page 56)

Russian History and DSM-IV

Special Feature

Lenin's Personality Profile

Anna Geifman
Boston University

This paper focuses on Vladimir Lenin's psychological profile rather than on the details of his political career as a professional revolutionary or on his achievements as the head of the Soviet state. I am interested in answering the main questions of any psychohistorian: Why did he do the things he did? What motivated his actions? What were his dominant psychological reactions to the various circumstances of his life? How did they form his personality and behavior patterns. It represents my preliminary work on Lenin's personality.

With this in mind, I focus on three main issues. First, I emphasize those features of Lenin's personality, which seem particularly important in forming his character and influencing his behavior, his decision-making process, and his relationships. Needless to say, not everyone with similar personality traits chose Lenin's course of an ultra-radical subversive determined to overthrow the establishment for the sake of an envisaged "social paradise." Therefore, the second main theme I address has to do with the specific personal circumstances that drove him onto the revolutionary path and eventually into the position of power not only over his Bolshevik faction but also over the millions of citizens of the former Russian empire, subjects to – or perhaps better say, victims of – his "social engineering." Thirdly, I propose several considerations

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“The Future of Psychohistory”	Mar. 2000	“Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict”	Dec. 1994

– aspects of his personality analyzed in conjunction with ways in which they related to external factors – that in my opinion contributed to Lenin's success.

Among a number of other instruments designed to assess normal-range personality structures and dimensions, maladaptive personality traits, and psychopathologies, the Fourth Edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV)* of the American Psychiatric Association published in 1994 may be used for initial personality profiling. Leaving aside for the present discussion various assessment issues, including the *DSM's* psychometric validity and its reliability in reference to people long dead and thus unable to provide us with such first-hand psychological material as an interview, I propose that

Lenin closely matches the *DSM* criteria for the "narcissistic personality."

The *DSM* emphasizes the narcissist's grandiosity, and there is little need to emphasize that Lenin suffered from grandiose visions and expectations. In fact, in the year 1903, when he came out with *What Is To Be Done?* and positioned himself as the sole leader of the Bolshevik fraction of the Russian Social Democratic Revolutionary Party (RSDRP), one could, in all honesty, suspect that Lenin was affected by a delusional disorder of the grandiose type (*DSM*, p. 297) – so preposterous did his assumptions seem about the ability of the tiny party of self-proclaimed "professional revolutionaries" to overthrow monarchy in Russia and to replace the centuries-old traditional culture with an artificial social, economic, and political Marxist construction. Moreover, he claimed a monopoly on the know-how of the revolutionary process, ostensibly for his party, but in reality for himself because, from the first days of the faction's existence, Lenin was its personification; indeed, he was Bolshevism incarnate. Guided by his grandiose self-assurance and unwavering sense of infallibility as far as revolutionary decision-making was concerned, Lenin took for granted that he alone knew the most expedient path to the revolution.

Of the various preoccupations listed in the *DSM* – unlimited success, brilliance, beauty, ideal love – his was the preoccupation with power. There was nothing he was unwilling to sacrifice to his ultimate control over the Bolshevik Party, including his own Marxist principles. These he was invariably prepared to alter if such departure from the orthodoxy facilitated his primary goal of remaining in control first of the Bolshevik fraction and then the Soviet government.

Lenin acted as if he were "special," the one who could not be wrong as far as his singular political vision and policies were concerned. Often, his extreme ideas proved shocking even for other revolutionary Marxists, and he was supported only by a handful, but these were the only ones he appealed to, considering them "the chosen ones," who could appreciate his brilliance. Others, in his view, lacked the political acumen and were incapable of understanding his logic, and therefore he simply ignored them as unworthy of his time.

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Lenin fits closely the category that psychologists refer to as "cerebral narcissists" (as opposed to "somatic" ones, who are preoccupied with physical appearance and sexual self-assertion); the excessive admiration he required took the form of acceptance of his ideas *verbatim*.

This is related to his narcissistic sense of entitlement, that is, the requirement for "automatic compliance" with his expectations, which lay primarily in the sphere of the (party or state) policy-making, with the total obedience to his will being a must. When others, such as the Mensheviks, contested his claims – or, in psychological terminology, failed to "mirror" his opinions – he caused the split in the RSDRP and remained the leader of (literally) several people who were prepared to cater to his unlimited need for control. From its origins, the Bolshevik faction was reminiscent of a mafia, with Lenin the Godfather ruling over it, as if it were a family-based formation with a rigid and oppressive inner organization.

Under this family-like arrangement, those among the rank-and-file Bolsheviks who showed proclivity for independence ("disobedient children") were punished by ostracism ("the silent treatment") or expulsion ("being kicked out of the house"), even if they had been loyal ("good") in the past. In line with another marked tendency in Lenin's behavior – to be interpersonally exploitative – others appeared to him as real, live individuals only in so far as they served a purpose. When they refused to provide him with the "narcissistic supply" – total acceptance and recognition of his self-image as the man in charge, whose authority was not to be challenged, they ceased to exist for him.

More frequently, however, Lenin was not satisfied with "exiling" his wayward associates and rarely chose to ignore those who disappointed his expectations; almost always he preferred to strike against them. Rage is a most characteristic emotional reaction of a frustrated narcissist, and this is precisely how Lenin reacted to interpersonal setbacks, which for him was every attempt on the part of another to act independently. He struck out against his adversaries, usually seeking to devalue not their ideas but their personalities and personal qualities, typically as a variation of "bad" or

"stupid" – "cowards," "traitors," "judases," "idiots." This he did not only in polemical and journalistic articles, heavily punctuated with offensive and insulting diatribes such as Trotsky, "the political prostitute," but also in theoretical and philosophical works. Perhaps none of Lenin's contemporaries – politicians or journalists – resorted to such coarse language, peppered with profanities teeming on practically every page.

The narcissist's lack (or the absence) of empathy and his incapability to recognize the feelings and needs of others was a key characteristic of Lenin's personality: given his inability to consider another person's existence as autonomous from his own needs and purposes, feelings of others simply did not matter. All his associations with people were need-based and purpose-related, and his interactions with others were simply not emotional. There was no one that at any point in his life Lenin could call "friend." Relationships survived only for as long as he could sustain compliance and strict execution of his orders, and thus it is more appropriate to talk about "boss-subordinate" relations than friendships or even collegiality.

Relations with members of his family, although by definition emotion-based, reveal the same exploitative tendencies and lack of empathy. Philip Pomper's research demonstrates that Lenin's early family experiences were marked by strict, demanding, and extremely rigid parenting, with love (or, more appropriately, approval) depending on the children's adherence to their parents' perception of "a virtuous life – one of unremitting labor, of duty to one's calling," and of personal sacrifice. Praise was administered in microscopic doses and admiration was directly related to children's achievements in education and intellectual excellence generally, as defined by the mother and father in accordance with their own earlier experiences (Philip Pomper, *Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin: The Intelligentsia and Power*, 1990, pp. 6-7). In his childhood Lenin must have internalized his parents' implicit assumption that sentiments mattered little if at all. Tenderness or indeed any spontaneous expression of emotion was not favored in this austere, disciplined, intellectual household, and sources leave a very strong impression that Lenin did not know what it meant to empathize with the feelings of others; most likely he had little first-hand familiarity with empathy.

Moreover, Lenin's behavior toward family members evinced a perpetual lack of basic sympathy or kindness. In April 1891, when he busily prepared for law examinations, Lenin negligently brought his sister Olga, ill with typhus, to a second-rate hospital, where she contracted erysipelas and died on May 8, 1891. If he did have any feelings of guilt or remorse, Lenin did not show them; nor did he demonstrate any sign of depression over this loss, persevering in his work as usual (Pomper, *Lenin*, pp. 39-40). Regarding others exclusively as the instruments to achieve his objectives, Lenin exploited them, each in accordance with his or her particular capacities to satisfy his needs. This tendency is evident in Lenin's less-than-idyllic relationship with his mother, of whom he continuously took advantage of financially, but particularly in his behavior toward his wife, which showed undisguised emotional lacuna. Throughout their passionless years together, Lenin implicitly insisted on her sole function as provider for his comfort.

Narcissistic people are generally disliked and avoided, as was Lenin – and not only as a result of his unmitigated aggressiveness and cruelty toward “class enemies.” Even those who supported him noted his self-righteous, arrogant, and aggressive attitudes: “He was abrasive with people. Arguing with them, he mercilessly ridiculed them, sometimes even bitterly humiliated them” (Maksim Gor'kii, “V. I. Lenin,” <http://home.sinn.ru/~gorky/TEXTS/VOSPOM/lenin.txt>). Even his family members exhibited very ambivalent feelings toward him. Of all his siblings, only his sister Maria “seems to have genuinely liked him” (Pomper, *Lenin*, p. 34). Lenin was hated because of who he was – a man wrapped up in his cerebral grandiosity, unable to empathize (or indeed see others as truly human and thus deserving compassion), a slave to his deep anger and rage. Unaware of the true causes for this general attitude, it is little wonder that he felt victimized and wronged, perhaps slightly paranoid, assuming that others were out to harm him by outwitting him, to sabotage his efforts, and to misrepresent his ideas. This, in turn, justified his rage and desire to strike at and beat his rivals, to “smack their mugs” (Valentinov, *Vstrechi s Leninym*, p. 212).

It may be noted, albeit retrospectively, that among the early circumstances of the individual

whose life turned into one dominated by a single purpose and meaning, there may be key elements that serve to determine his as yet indiscernible future. In Lenin's case, it is the turbulent relationship with his older brother Alexander (Sasha) that appears to have “forced” or “provoked” him to espouse revolution as an all-consuming life-long occupation. Furthermore, what was probably the most important relationship in his life was dominated by competitiveness and envy.

In the context of their parents' preoccupation with performance and achievement, Vladimir was always “second-best” – not only because he was younger, but also since in the eyes of his parents (and, indeed, everyone else in the family) he never achieved Sasha's intellectual status. Conversely, in his early childhood Lenin's intellectual as well as physical development was slow, causing much anxiety for the parents, who first thought that he might be retarded and then that he was lazy. Although he later came to be a very good student, Vladimir was hardly a star like Alexander. It was Sasha who personified all their parents' aspirations and who was “chosen” as the favorite child, especially by the mother, for whom accomplishment was directly linked to love. In addition, Alexander clearly incorporated the sense of duty that his parents sought to instill in him and in his brothers and sisters; as a child and adolescent, he was invariably docile and respectfully submitted to his parents' rules and values. His dutifulness was interpreted as cordiality and affection, and, in return, his mother classified him as lovable. He certainly was not lovable to his younger brother, due to Vladimir's obstinacy, propensity to contradict, and angry outbursts.

Il'ia Nikolaevich, their father, died of a stroke in January 1886, when Vladimir was a 16-year-old gymnasium student and Alexander was pursuing his studies at the University of St. Petersburg, showing great promise as a young scientist. Even prior to Il'ia's death, Alexander had been invested with the role as the male head of the household because of the father's frequent work-related absences. Although he refrained from inflicting his authority forcefully on the other children, he did criticize his younger brother for his rudeness toward their mother; there have been “serious tensions between him and Maria Alexandrovna,” due to Vladimir's proclivity to behave “arrogantly and rebel-

liously" (Pomper, *Lenin*, pp. 22, 34). Vladimir typically took offense and responded brusquely. Consistent with the role imposed on him by his parents, Alexander, who "seemed hypersensitive to any form of ... verbal aggression" (Pomper, *Lenin*, p. 16), reluctantly persisted with efforts to discipline his insolent brother and punished him by silent treatment. He made no effort to conceal that he disliked Vladimir, and the already ambivalent relations between the two brothers would be severed for long stretches of time.

Il'ia's death reinforced Alexander's position as a classic "father-replacement figure" in his mother's eyes, her male "protector" (Pomper, *Lenin*, p. 34). One may suggest that in his relationship with the older brother, Lenin might have been forced to deal with misplaced "oedipal issues," artificially created by the specifics of his family situation and the exaggerated status attributed to the eldest sibling by the parents, especially the mother. (I am grateful to Christian Kalled, a student in my "Russian Revolution" seminar at Boston University, for making this observation.) His personality shaped by extremely rigid, emotionally detached, and achievement-oriented parenting, Lenin was in a psychologically onerous position of having to face the unresolved oedipal conflicts while simultaneously suffering from multiple narcissistic traumas.

Alexander became involved with radicals at the University of St. Petersburg and took part in a terrorist attempt against the life of Tsar Alexander III on March 1, 1887. Shaken by the news of Sasha's arrest, his family then suffered the shock of his rapid execution. In a famous, although evidently fictitious, episode, canonical in Soviet mythology, Vladimir reacted to his brother's death by what would have been a questionable consolation for his grieving mother when he allegedly said to her: "No, we won't take this path. This is not the path to follow." According to Pomper, "There was little reason to believe that Lenin would have taken a revolutionary path until he decided to identify himself with, but outdo, his brother. First he had to take Sasha's place at home; then he would succeed where Sasha had failed at a revolutionary profession" (Philip Pomper, "From Russian Revolutionary Terrorism to Soviet State Terror," unpublished paper, December 22, 2003, p. 9).

In fact, there seems to have been no other

psychological choice for Lenin: the only sphere of activity where Alexander attempted something and failed was revolution. In order for Vladimir to resolve his narcissistic envy and rivalry, and finally to outdo his brother, he had to become a revolutionary and win, demonstrating to his mother – and, most importantly, to himself – who of the two was the true star. He might have been aware that there was no other choice when he said to an acquaintance: "What is there for me to think about? ... My road has been paved by my elder brother" (Richard Pipes, "The Origins of Bolshevism: The Intellectual Evolution of Young Lenin," in Richard Pipes, ed., *Revolutionary Russia: A Symposium*, 1969, p. 38). His ineffectual and conflict-ridden inner life thus precluded an independent solution to self-realization and set Lenin off onto the revolutionary path – to attain recognition at the expense of Alexander, who, of course, could no longer compete.

Not that Vladimir knew at the age of 17 what the "other" revolutionary path would be. In fact, for a number of years, while reading avidly everything that might have explained his brother's radicalism, he toyed with a variety of radical ideas, for a long time being obsessed with terrorism, specifically with a dream of making an explosive device as small as a walnut. In fact, Lenin "did not really commit himself to the revolutionary profession until August 1893, when he left the family for good and went to St. Petersburg," although he "had chosen the putatively most scientific revolutionary doctrine, Marxism" by 1892 (Pomper, "From Russian Revolutionary Terrorism," p. 8).

That Lenin finally espoused Marxism as his credo was quite logical and consistent with his personality requirements of a "cerebral narcissist." Marxist thought was seen as the most "scientific" and rational of all the revolutionary ideologies available to someone who needed to justify his inner program, to make his inner drives legitimate with the help of a formal theoretical doctrine. Once a Marxist, Lenin no longer needed to struggle with what Russians call "the accursed questions": What is the purpose of one's existence? How does one deal with the issue of life's finality? What is the meaning for good and evil? How does one go about attaining happiness? Within the Marxist schematic representation of reality, these issues were easily resolved with the ready-made and always-available

answers. Indeed, the artificial, generic, and sterile solutions provided by the Marxist creed suited precisely and conveniently Lenin's own inner life – flat, monotonous, emotion-free, defensive, and rationalized to the point of ultimate unawareness. The newly-acquired Marxist worldview thus became a perfect solution for a narcissist out to assert himself through revolutionary destruction and power. Thanks to his new faith, which blinded him to the complexity of life, as well as to its nuance, he felt empowered to attempt the impossible, the unprecedented.

Key aspects of Lenin's personality and behavior patterns also contributed to his success as a revolutionary leader. His choice to pursue revolution as a profession that became not only a full-time commitment, but also a lifestyle and a dominating compulsion, rendered him determined to succeed at all cost – something that was hardly the case with many other radicals, who were not slaves to similar “one-track thinking,” who allowed themselves alternative engagements, and therefore had less personal stakes in the final victory of their cause as a justification of life's purpose and meaning. For few of them, it seems, was the revolution an emotional issue, stemming from unresolved childhood and adolescent conflicts, to the extent that it was for Lenin. Moreover, not many of them had integrated the parental standards that largely accounted for Lenin's dubious advantages of methodical perseverance and rigidity of purpose, which predisposed him to “pursue the goal of revolution as dutifully and resolutely in the face of every calamity as he had been taught to pursue education” (Pomper, *Lenin*, p. 20).

Lenin's narcissistic needs also contributed to his ability to control with an iron hand the party which, contrary to the Marxist belief in mass participation, came to be the chief instrument for the seizure of power. The principle of “democratic centralism” – Lenin's creation that precluded democratic decision-making within the revolutionary ranks – rendered the Bolshevik faction more tightly-knit, organized, and centrally-controlled than any constituency-based party in the Russian radical camp. When time came to test its ability to seize and retain power, this mafia-type organization proved to be more efficient than representatives of their democracy-oriented socialist rivals.

Lenin's takeover in October 1917 was an

opportunistic venture indeed; yet, it was also an initiative of which no other revolutionary leader found himself capable precisely due to his lack of adventurism, immeasurable self-confidence, or propensity for heedless political gambling. Whereas at the 2nd Congress of the Soviets the moderate socialists admitted that there was no political party in Russia which would realistically be able to assume control over the deteriorating political, military, and economic situation, Lenin, the leader of the seemingly impotent handful, was the only one who volunteered: “There is such a party. The party of the Bolsheviks.” While others hesitated, burdened perhaps by greater ideological and ethical scrupulousness, as well as a sense of responsibility, Lenin saw an opportunity and launched ahead with his extreme political experiment. Similarly, Lenin rejoiced at the news about the outbreak of the First World War; unlike other socialists, Lenin immediately realized that under the new conditions of mass slaughter and economic devastation the chances for the revolution tremendously increased.

When revolution did break out in Russia in February 1917, the Provisional Government and the moderate socialists in the Petrograd Soviet were unprepared to make an impetuous leap into the future at the cost of further disorganization of the country already ravaged by war and revolution. Even members of the Bolshevik Central Committee, such as Kamenev and Zinov'ev, opposed the coup, and perhaps it was Lenin's frustration and fanatical obsession with power that rendered him capable of seeing and acting on the opportunity for a takeover in October. His arrogance and narcissistic conviction in the “irresistible power” of his own political acumen further contributed to his success. His boundless self-righteousness as a revolutionary leader was empowering indeed, especially in comparison with the vacillation demonstrated time and time again by his liberal and socialist rivals. It was not the fanatic adherence to dogma that blinded him to difficulties; rather, it was his exaggerated and defensive mental cockiness based on the narcissistic demand that life conform to his formula that enabled Lenin to dismiss all obstacles.

Lenin's readiness to sacrifice theoretical principles for practical benefits separated him from most of his political rivals and gave him additional advantage. In critical moments when power – Lenin's underlying motive and irrepressible passion

– was at stake, it was easy for him temporarily to renounce any ideological obstacle to his essential goal – a facility that always placed him one step ahead of the other, more levelheaded and conscientious, adherents to the doctrine.

From the earliest days as the head of the state, Lenin's behavior was determined by two factors, intensified by his distinctive emotional response: the fear of defeat – expected within months, if not weeks – and the hatred for those (initially potential) opponents, who might be its cause. Overwhelmed by anxiety and rage, Lenin sought to mitigate his apprehension by unleashing a mass campaign of escalating violence against real, alleged, and would-be enemies. The practice of terror crushed or intimidated his opponents – the more blood was shed the greater was his need to reaffirm his fanaticism. The dominant features of Lenin's personality – his all-consuming narcissism and his strong propensity for antisocial behavior – came to serve as empowering devices in the situation that required the use of unmitigated violence for the sake of retaining political control.

Due to his detrimental emotional circumstances, his desire to destroy the hated present was perhaps greater than that of any other revolutionary leader. Lenin's obvious enjoyment of the very process of destruction probably contributed to his eventual success.

Needless to say, the Russian revolution and Bolshevik victory may not be explained solely by emphasizing Lenin's personality attributes, as political, social, economic, and military factors came to provide suitable conditions for the breakdown of the old order. The ensuing outburst of anarchy and violence inundated the country and provided the extremists with opportunities for a takeover. Lenin was a truly exceptional leader who personified, articulated, and justified feelings within the hearts of his followers, whose interests, grievances, and priorities must be analyzed in connection with those of the Bolsheviks. This, of course, is a subject for a much larger study.

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1894-1917 (1993) and Entangled in Terror: The Azef Affair and the Russian Revolution (2000). She is also the editor of Russia under the Last Tsar: Opposition and Subversion, 1894-1917 (1999). Professor Geifman has authored a number of journal articles and book chapters on Russian political and cultural history, and is currently working on a volume of essays tentatively titled Psychohistory of the Russian Revolution, addressing such themes as psychology of political violence, aggression, and self-destructiveness of political extremists. She may be reached at <geifman@bu.edu>. □

A Dialogue on Applying DSM-IV Categories to Learn Psychohistory: Lenin as Exemplar

Paul H. Elovitz

Ramapo College and the Psychohistory Forum

Anna Geifman

Boston University

Paul H. Elovitz (PHE): What brought you to the study of Russian history and Lenin and other revolutionaries?

Anna Geifman (AG): I became a student of Russian history as part of my adolescent rebellion against my parents. I was born in Leningrad, U.S.S.R., and immigrated to America with my family when I was 14 years old. Like many Russian-Jewish political émigrés, my parents wished to leave behind everything that had to do with their past in a totalitarian and anti-Semitic state and wished me to assimilate into the new culture as soon as possible. Naturally, the minute I set my foot on American soil, I declared to my dumbfounded mother and father that there was no way I would ever accept the “American way of life” and would always remain true to “Russian culture.” In fact, having met exactly one American at the time, I was not quite sure what I was referring to, and, as an early adolescent, I knew little of the cultural heritage of the rich Russian civilization and its literature, arts, and history. All through high school I was busy reading Russian books, although, admittedly, I did capitulate into learning English and a little about my new country. After having entered

Boston University as an undergraduate history major, with a short detour into French history, I began systematic study of the history of Russia and the U.S.S.R. My first mentor was Professor Norman Naimark, then of Boston University, now at Stanford, an inspiring, patient, and caring teacher, to whom I am always grateful for introducing me to his own research on the Russian revolutionaries and the issues of terrorism and political violence. I investigated these themes since in my junior year in college, in graduate school at Harvard, and in my professional career. Presently, my interest has shifted from political history to psychohistory: political violence and terrorism provide amazing insights into human behavior, particularly aggression, submission, and the collective unconscious.

PHE: Your motivation for studying Russian history is interesting and related to my own in focusing on it when I began graduate school. My parents, who came to the U.S. as 13- and 14-year-old immigrants from Eastern Europe, did not want me to know about their European pasts. I rebelled against my father's plan that I should become a medical doctor and became a historian to learn mostly about my father's brief involvement in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution in Poland. How did growing up in Russia impact on your approach to the subject?

AG: One obvious impact is that Russian is my native language, and another is that I am intimately familiar with the general social and cultural context of the environment in which all my "characters" operate. I do not mean to suggest that a foreigner cannot appreciate Russian history, but understanding the nuances of culture provides numerous privileges, if only because I know what may be said between the lines and implied as "inner meanings." Being naturally aware of the cultural codes and symbols helps a great deal and also insures against a *faux pas*. Perhaps another – and not such an obvious – advantage of having grown up in the Soviet Union is my understanding of the impact of the collective, as opposed to individualistic, lifestyle – its advantages in the form of special defenses against the vulnerability of individuation as well as weaknesses for the person who strives to live as "I," not "we." I imagine that at times it may be difficult for an American historian – someone who takes individualism for granted – to appreciate fully the im-

port of collective existence on the individual. Yet, in Russia, it is an inherent and dominant trait of culture, where, for example, there is no word for privacy.

PHE: In getting your doctoral degree at Harvard and in being affiliated with its Davis Center for Russian Studies, how open have you found the faculty to be to psychoanalysis and psychohistory?

AG: I don't think there is a particular "ideology" with regards to psychoanalysis and/or psychohistory either at Boston University or the Davis Center at Harvard, and the attitude depends primarily on the person you talk to. In the initial stage of my interest in psychohistory I felt quite isolated because most of my colleagues in the Boston University History Department and in Russian Studies generally prefer other modes of inquiry, working primarily in political, social, or intellectual fields. In part, the isolation was self-imposed: I hesitated to talk about my work, assuming that fellow-historians would not be receptive to discussion of anything which is not directly stated in the source. Or, I thought, they would be disinterested in issues outside their areas of research. Most likely, I was simply projecting my own doubts onto them. But since that time, I've met a number of colleagues (in Boston and elsewhere) who are either psychohistorians or sympathetic to using psychological methods of analyzing the past. Now the problem is how to find time to talk to the many people who are willing to share their psychohistorical work and to find out about my own.

PHE: Many historians, political scientists, and other scholars look to expert knowledge in their search for sound psychological knowledge to apply to their research subjects. Consequently, I am pleased that we can probe the advantages and disadvantages of using the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - Fourth Edition (DSM-IV)* (1994) of the American Psychiatric Association for this purpose. Please tell me about what led you to write the preceding paper?

AG: There is, of course, an enormous scholarship on Lenin, but most of it is concerned with his political career as a professional revolutionary and his policies as the head of the Soviet state. In attempts to explain Lenin's behavior, many scholars empha-

sized Marxist ideology as a driving force for his actions. Others stressed his insatiable need for power, for which he was prepared to sacrifice his own dogmatic principles. There have been, however, only a few attempts to understand Lenin as a person – something that could provide multiple clues to his behavior patterns, his political choices, and his decision-making. I think that the best psychohistorical work on Lenin to date is by Philip Pomper, who wrote a compelling analysis of Lenin's childhood, focusing primarily on his family dynamics. Using psychohistorical approaches other than those based on childhood may contribute to solving many riddles associated with this man, and I attempted to do so by looking at the various features of his personality, at what may be called his "personality constellation."

PHE: Why do some people have a driving need to change society by any means possible?

AG: There could be a variety of reasons, of course, but while writing about revolutionaries I always think of a metaphor: a person lives in a house and hates every minute of his life, every aspect of his home, every detail of his dwelling. He decides to set his house on fire, to destroy it, to burn it to the ground, leaving no traces of it, so that on its ashes, a new, beautiful, and happy home may be built. So he does exactly that – starts a fire in his home. The problem is that he himself is inside, and he will inevitably die in the flame, which he had started because the life in the old house was simply unbearable for him. What I'd like to stress here is that that life was not objectively unbearable – that is, it was perhaps not horrible for other members of the household – but only for the one who set out to destroy it. In other words, as Walter Laqueur noted perceptively, "objective circumstances per se are not a sufficient, perhaps not even a necessary condition" for the escalation of political extremism and violence (*Terrorism*, 1977, p. 145). Therefore, in my own work, I hope to shift the focus from the important external circumstances and even the revolutionaries' rationalization of their own behavior via their ideology and rhetoric to the radicals' personal needs, based on deeper and often aberrant inner states, necessarily analyzed in the context of their social, economic, political, and cultural environment.

PHE: What do you think of revolutionaries? Are they, by their very nature, pathological, as your first draft of the "Lenin Profile" seemed to imply?

AG: I would not go as far as this generalization, but – keeping the above-mentioned metaphor in mind – I would like to emphasize the importance of the fact that much of their behavior was not only destructive (and by definition anti-social) but also self-destructive. Many of these people, particularly the activists, the actual "doers" as opposed to their ideologists, were prepared to and in fact died in the revolutionary flames. Terrorists are an explicit example. The reasons for their behavior were frequently suicidal, regardless of our opinion about the legitimacy of their cause. Whether or not their behavior may be classified as pathological is also a matter of opinion; mine is that it was.

PHE: If revolutionaries are self-destructive and "frequently suicidal," then how do you explain the English Revolutionaries of the 17th Century who created a representational government in the name of popular sovereignty and the revolutionary founding fathers of America who created the most successful and oldest written constitution?

AG: By no means do I wish to imply that *any* political activism is self-destructive or suicidal. What I do wish to stress is that the Russian revolutionaries were involved in the process that might be referred to as "social engineering," in which their goals reached far beyond changing a form of government. These extremists sought to undermine their own social and cultural context in its entirety: to do away with all traditional forms of human existence, including people's fundamental values, beliefs, mentality, and even (in Trotsky's case) physiology. They thereby strove to create the new species, "the new man," operating in an environment to be built on the ashes of the old civilization, which – I'd like to emphasize this again – was *subjectively* unsuitable for its destroyers, the radicals. Psychologically unable to deal with the exigencies of their own world, they attempted to obliterate it.

PHE: In your analysis, would you differentiate between the ethnic minority revolutionaries – Jews, Georgians, Finns, Poles, *etc.* – whose grievances were much greater and more specific than those of the Great Russians?

AG: Yes, but my general point about self-destruction applies to them as well. I did attempt to explain the nuances of their specific situations in my *Thou Shalt Kill* (1993) and will try to extend my analysis in the *Psychohistory of the Russian Revolution*. The topic is too complicated to be dealt with in this dialogue. The important thing here is that even for the Jews, Poles, and other minorities, the incentives for radical participation were more often psychological than political.

PHE: How revealing are diagnostic categories?

AG: Perhaps they may be seen as initial clues, or “road signs,” pointing to the “right direction.” By looking at a road sign one does not learn what it is like in the town one is going to – what the streets look like; what sort of trees grow there; how friendly or unfriendly the inhabitants are. But one does get a general idea how to get there. So it is perhaps with the diagnostic categories, which provide only clues rather than knowledge about the personality under investigation.

PHE: How do you deal with the fact that the *DSM*, which is a bureaucratic formula, arrived at by a committee after long negotiations, keeps changing?

AG: I see nothing wrong with it; in fact, I am glad it does. The definitions and diagnostic categories become more precise and, hopefully, reflect our growing knowledge of psychological disorders. The changes also serve as reminders that human psyche is hardly static and thus requires room for flexible re-evaluation.

PHE: A problem I have with the *DSM* is that in it only a shadow of the individual shows from the diagnostic categories. It does not show the complexities of the personality under consideration, it is static rather than dynamic. How do you answer these concerns?

AG: This is exactly what I meant when I said that the *DSM* criteria were “road signs.” If we take them as clues to discovering a personality, it is then possible to go deeper and try to recreate the complexities of the historical character that is being studied, taking advantage of knowing the general direction for further investigation. At the “*DSM* level,” the individual is indeed a shadow, and his image is reminiscent of a child’s drawing – a rough

sketch, which gives only a very approximate idea of the person being represented. Then one can always try to employ other means of psychological discovery to reestablish a more complete picture. For example, the psychohistorian can ask questions about the childhood and the family dynamics, attempt to determine behavior patterns, talk about leadership style of those in power, look at the character’s emotional relationships, and come up with a more dynamic, as opposed to static, image.

PHE: My fundamental objection to using the *DSM* as an important ingredient in working to understand a historical personality is that this guarantees a psychopathological approach. As long as psychohistory is associated with the Hitlers, Lenins, Nixons, Stalins, and other infamous leaders, it will not gain full acceptance in academia and among the educated public. I want to encourage the development of a psychohistory that is not simply focused on the people that society does not like – though it may secretly admire them. My goal has been on how to use psychoanalytic/psychobiographical knowledge to empathetically focus on childhood, coping mechanisms, creativity, innovation, leadership, overcoming trauma, and personality development. What are your thoughts in this regard?

AG: I completely agree. To have a complete picture, we do need to consider those aspects of the personality that every human being, whether or not suffering from psychopathology, has to deal with in the course of his life. So, it is very important to address the issue of creativity and to talk about the person’s ability to cope and to overcome trauma, for example. These questions will allow the historian to be more empathetic and perhaps reply on personal emotional experience to understand the problems and solutions the character faces in the course of his/her development. The approach is not dissimilar to that of fiction-writing, where the author has to have deep personal, experience-based “knowledge” of the character’s inner processes to provide the reader with a lifelike, as opposed to a “flat,” image. At the same time, it is important to remember that psychopathologies – if there are reasons to suspect any – do impact personality as a whole and will seriously hinder, for example, the person’s ability to develop or to regenerate after a traumatic event.

PHE: A problem I have with your focus on Lenin as a narcissistic personality is that so many people are narcissistic. In my first psychohistorical published paper in 1977, I called Jimmy Carter a narcissistic personality and almost immediately regretted it. This is because, when I stopped to think about it, I realized that virtually all successful political leaders are narcissistic. How do you respond to the possibility that Lenin's narcissism was not at all unique and that other factors might be more important?

AG: The issue here is the degree to which narcissism affects (and impairs) personality, and perhaps here the *DSM* may be useful. A leader may have greater or lesser narcissistic tendencies, and his behavior will be more or less affected. If, as it appears to be in Lenin's case, nine out of nine *DSM* criteria for the narcissistic personality disorder seem applicable (*DSM-IV*, pp. 649-650) – based on what we know about his emotional responses, his personal relationships, and his tendency to treat people generally – there is reason to assume that Lenin's narcissism might have played a very significant role in his life and his political behavior. A strong indication that Lenin might have been simultaneously affected by what the *DSM* describes as an antisocial disorder – seven out of seven criteria seem to apply (*DSM-IV*, p.661) – validates a suggestion that this comorbidity not only augments the political implications of narcissistic tendencies but also gives them a particularly venomous quality.

PHE: At various points in your paper you relate Lenin's narcissism to his success as a revolutionary leader. What of the downside of narcissism – of being cut off from the feelings, hopes, and needs of other people, of being unable to really give of yourself?

AG: The downside of narcissism is multifaceted and is primarily detrimental for personal relationships, although professional and other interactions do suffer as well from the narcissist's tendencies to dominate, to manipulate, and to ignore the needs of others. But I am particularly struck by how harmful pathological narcissism can be in interpersonal emotions-driven situations. This is because of the narcissist's inability to have empathy with, or even to acknowledge, another person's existence as separate from his own, leading to what in my opinion is

psychological murder – objectification of a human being. Yet, someone in an intimate relationship with a narcissist, who is usually extremely skillful in taking advantage of his victim's emotional weaknesses and also in rationalizing dehumanization on intellectual or ethical grounds, is particularly vulnerable to psychological enslavement and disintegration.

PHE: Prior to your April 24, 2004, presentation to the Psychohistory Forum, you raised the issue of whether “it would be appropriate to use the *DSM* in conjunction with other personality assessment tools, such as the *Millon Inventory of Diagnostic Criteria (MIDC)*, which establishes 34 normal and maladaptive personality classifications congruent with Axis II of the *DSM-IV*?” Have you explored this possibility and what are your current thoughts on this issue?

AG: Unfortunately, I haven't had a chance to explore this further, but I think that an attempt to juxtapose the *MIDC* classification with the *DSM* criteria may perhaps render a useful method for establishing a more accurate, if only initial, personality profile – to be followed by a more thorough in-depth analysis of character and behavior patterns.

PHE: Your reference on page 36 to Lenin being the leader of literally only “several people” in the Russian Social Democratic Revolutionary Party (RSDRP) after he caused its split seems extreme. Is it documented that only a tiny number of people – several represents four or five to my thinking – followed Lenin when he split the RSDRP in 1903 and claimed that he represented the majority – the *Bolsheviks* (the Bolsheviks)?

A.G.: It is hard to verify the exact numbers, however, given Lenin's subsequent success, it is striking how few people supported Lenin at the time of the Bolshevik-Menshevik split and, in fact, prior to 1917. The number was always very small. I checked with Phil Pomper who confirmed my judgment.

PHE: Our work as psychobiographers is extremely difficult because evidence of early childhood is so limited for historical figures prior to very recent times. Thus I am troubled when you write, “In his childhood Lenin must have internalized his parents' implicit assumption that sentiments mattered little if

at all.” (p. 36). How can you prove this?

AG: Admittedly, I cannot prove this. Perhaps I should have not said “must have internalized” but “probably” or “was likely to have internalized,” or something of the sort – a bit less categorical. However, I do think that, like most children, early in his life Lenin did internalize a great deal of what was going on in his household, including, at least in part, his parents’ essential attitudes and values. Although it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove, it seems that the parents’ emotional positions may be internalized most easily, as the child’s automatic response, requiring no thought-process. I would appreciate any feedback on this idea from our readers, particularly those who are child psychologists.

PHE: I agree with you about the probability of internalization and would also note that traditional historians commonly accept many unproven generalizations about their subject’s childhood from well-respected biographers based upon their intimate knowledge of the individual they have devoted years to studying. We psychohistorians are held to a higher standard and usually hold ourselves to one because of our greater knowledge. Let me turn to another subject. When you write of Lenin’s “rage and desire to strike at and beat his rivals, to ‘smack their mugs’” on page 37, I am reminded of just how much he is in the tradition of Marx, who vilified his opponents on a personal level. Do most scholars of the Russian revolutionary movement agree with you that he carried this vilification further than his contemporaries?

AG: I would say, “Yes.” Lenin’s rudeness and extreme vulgarity when it came to vilifying his opponents were not customary in polemics at the time and attracted the attention of many contemporaries and later-day scholars.

PHE: Please help me understand Lenin’s response to World War I. When you write on page 39, that “Lenin rejoiced at the news about the outbreak of the First World War; unlike other socialists, Lenin immediately realized that under the new conditions of mass slaughter and economic devastation the chances for the revolution tremendously increased,” I am puzzled. This is because I think of his statement, during the war, to the effect that maybe revo-

lution might only come in the time of our children or grandchildren – or something similar.

AG: I was referring to Lenin’s singular stand at the Zimmerwald conference in 1915, where a main point of disagreement had to do with the socialists’ attitudes toward WWI. Whereas most radicals denounced the war as an imperialist venture and called for immediate cessation of hostilities, which they perceived to be a new militant form of exploitation of the proletarians by the international bourgeoisie locked in fierce competition for markets, Lenin welcomed the “imperialist conflict,” which, he believed, had the potential to transform into a Europe-wide “class war” after the proletarians of various nations would turn arms against their exploiters. As hostilities continued and the anticipated class war did not materialize, Lenin – I believe this was in late 1916 or very early in 1917 – grew increasingly depressed, disillusioned in his hopes for the revolution occurring soon (or, in fact, in his lifetime), and even talked about emigrating to America.

PHE: In 1977, when I was sitting in a psychoanalytic class, *Narcissism and Borderline Conditions*, I felt very anxious about publishing my first psychohistorical article and decided to refer to Jimmy Carter as a narcissist. It did not take me long to decide that using the label was an inappropriate expression of my own anxiety, and perhaps my own narcissism. How do you deal with the feelings that you bring to your subjects and the impact of these feelings on your scholarship – what we call the “countertransference” feelings – which are not induced by the subject?

AG: I am absolutely certain that we do not accidentally choose our topics, our characters, and our ways of explaining phenomena. I thought about this for the first time after having completed my psychobiography of Evno Azef, the head of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, Russia and the world’s largest terrorist organization in the first decade of the 20th century, and simultaneously the most important agent of the imperial secret police, in charge of investigating the terrorist activities of the same party. Contrary to all previous attempts to explain Azef’s involvement with both the terrorist and the security forces, in which political observers and historians offered what one may call “rational ex-

planations" – from material interests to power hunger and desire for revenge – I felt that Azef was driven by a set of psychological problems most closely matching a free-floating anxiety. His choice was either to acknowledge his condition or – and this was what he did – to put himself in an objectively dangerous situation, thereby validating his irrational fears. He placed himself in an objectively frightening situation – out between the terrorists and the authorities, thus transforming his anxiety into a fear of something real – of being exposed as a spy or punished by the government for his role among the revolutionaries. To a large degree, this book is about a common response to anxiety, which is rendered justifiable, indeed normal, by constructing artificial jeopardy and thus jeopardizing one's life. I have no doubt in my mind that I chose this particular approach to and this interpretation of the Azef affair largely as part of my attempts to understand and deal with my own anxieties. This said, I think it is very important to investigate the impact of one's own inner issues on scholarship and to learn about countertransference, even if one is engaged in work with historical subjects, people long dead, rather than with patients in therapy. This is one of my reasons for looking into attending a psychoanalytic institute.

PHE: Your exploring the possibilities of receiving psychoanalytic training in the Boston area seems to me to be an excellent idea. Such training will strengthen your scholarly work and help you to understand the limits of using the psychiatric categories in your research. I suspect that you would find such categories less appealing after becoming a psychoanalyst. I want to wish you success in this important endeavor.

AG: Thank you very much! I am in the process of deciding whether I wish to pursue traditional psychoanalytic or Jungian training and, in fact, am leaning toward the latter. The final decision will be based on a number of intellectual and practical considerations, but it will also be partly intuitive. In any case, I very much hope that analysis and training will enhance my insight and strengthen my psychohistorical work.

Biographies for Anna Geifman and Paul Elovitz can be found on pages 40 and 48. □

There are no negatives in the unconscious

Psychohistorical Questions and Reflections on the Russian Revolution

Paul H. Elovitz

Ramapo College and the Psychohistory Forum

Revolutionary Background

Why revolution? Why go through the incredible anxiety, work, and danger of attempting to create a radically different society? Why not simply leave well enough alone? When I teach the history of Western Civilization, I cover the English, American, French, Russian, Scientific, and Industrial revolutions. The history of modern society as depicted in most 20th-Century American textbooks is to a great extent a recounting of revolutions, nation-building, and wars. When as an undergraduate history major I eagerly approached the subject of revolution, I was sure that revolutions occurred because the oppressed could no longer tolerate the oppression of the ruling class. In the great French Revolution (1789-1794) I focused on the Tennis Court Oath, the fall of the Bastille, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the execution of King Louis XVI, Robespierre, and the Terror. Graduate school was a rude awakening. I was soon taught that even the great revolutionary Trotsky acknowledged that oppression and misery were insufficient causes of revolution. Indeed, poverty and exploitation were a constant of history and revolution is a rarity. In reading Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (1965), I discovered that basic to revolutionary change are an alternate ideology, an alternate leadership, and the collapse of the existing regime. My professors focused mostly on the impact of the Enlightenment, the collapse of the old regime, the "Great Fear," and the role of the crowd.

A crucial question became, What happens to a government that loses the support of the privileged elite? Why doesn't the ruling class tenaciously hold onto power, as is usually the case, or at least have it taken from them at the point of a gun? What are the differences between a *coup d'état* and a transforma-

tional revolution? The need to answer these questions helped open my mind to the psychohistorical approach to history. As I approach the subject today, my interest is in the psychodynamics of revolution and the relationship of the leaders and the led. I wonder what psychodynamic ideas are relevant to revolution? Oedipal rebellion, ambivalence, anxiety, the death wish, ego ideals, groupthink, regression, repetition compulsion, and repression are but a few that come to mind. I also think of the psychological discussions of the purge trails and Stalin as well as around the possible effects of swaddling on Russian national character.

The 1917 Russian Revolution

Revolution occurs only when the existing structure is profoundly discredited. This came about in 1905 and 1917 because of the government's ineptness in the Russo-Japanese and First World wars. The Czarist governments simply lost the hearts and minds of the policemen, soldiers, and bureaucrats as well as of the common people. A government that could not even provide rifles and ammunition to soldiers sent into battle found itself with an eroding basis of support. A dangerous step for the monarchy was the assassination by high aristocrats of the royal favorite Rasputin, in a vain attempt to save the monarchy from itself. The actual collapse occurred months later in early March, 1917, when the police and soldiers lost the will to disband crowds of unemployed workers and women protesting the high cost of bread.

When "our little father, the Czar" abdicated on March 15 it was in recognition of the loss of popular support. People felt abandoned by the government which had failed abysmally in the conduct of the war and they in turn abandoned it. A system of dual government was established which put responsibility in the hands of the Provisional Government and the power that comes from popular support in the hands of the Soviets (democratically elected councils of workers, soldiers, etc.). Kerensky, a young Social Revolutionary, soon came to dominate the Provisional Government but not the Soviets. The democratic Marxism of the Menshevik leaders of the Petrograd (Leningrad) and Moscow soviets precluded their taking control of the functions of government from the Provisional Government since the working class was still a minority (15 of 170 million) in a country of peasants. They felt that they were witnessing a bourgeois (capitalist) revolution and that they had to

stay on the sidelines. To many of the masses the Menshevik "wait and see attitude" seemed an excuse for ineptitude while they suffered. In the unconscious, food usually equals love and the doubling of bread prices in 1917 left average Russians feeling unloved by the Provisional Government and even the Soviets. The average Russian wanted land, peace, and freedom.

"Bread," "Peace," "Freedom" was the program Lenin declared not long after his return to Russia in April, 1917. He soon won his Bolshevik party over to it and subsequently (by the fall) the majority of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets. Slogans like "All power to the Soviets," "All land to the peasants," and "Stop the war now" were extremely effective in winning popular support. In a sea of revolutionary uncertainty the Bolsheviks seemed like the one group ready to take resolute action. People torn by their own ambivalence over what was happening gravitated to the certainty that Lenin presented. The most important single convert was Trotsky, who at its birth had warned that Bolshevism meant dictatorship, but who now embraced it warmly for reasons of his own.

Revolution aroused feelings of rebirth, of infinite possibility as well as of incredible anxiety and grave distrust of government. The gap between the ideal and reality became enormous. Kerensky, a moderate socialist whose agrarian party could claim to represent the majority of Russians (peasants) soon found that the reality of revolutionary leadership was like riding on the back of a tiger. Though theoretically in charge of the army, he was more of a "persuader in chief," than a "commander in chief": no army unit seemed to follow his orders to advance unless he personally persuaded its members that they had to obey for the good of Russia and the revolution. Yet the fantasy of winning the war was maintained even though the army was so inept that by August 1917 it could not even overthrow the revolutionary government let alone drive back the invading Germans. To many ethnic minorities revolution aroused hopes of freedom from Petrograd's control. Amidst this chaos Kerensky had title more than power; soon his title was taken away with the Bolshevik *coup d'état* of November. Lenin, until the day he died in 1924, saw the Bolshevik revolution as simply the first step in a world revolution. Immediately, the communists faced the problems of holding onto power and creating a new society in the face of the collapse of

all central control, ethnic disintegration, the opposition of the majority of the Russian people, and the invading German armies. Their success had an enormous impact on the history of the 20th Century as did the fact that it was achieved at the expense of the high ideals that had brought many to communism.

Additional Questions

The success of the Bolshevik Revolution raised many questions which psychohistorians may be able to answer. Why is revolution less an issue of the "have nots" versus the "haves" than of the "have some and want more" versus the "haves?" The answer is intimately connected with the psychology of frustration in a period of formally rising expectations. Is revolution a young man's occupation? What is the relationship of childrearing to revolution? Are there different psychoclasses based on different childrearing modes in the Russia? What is the role of group dynamics in the massive shift of attitudes in 1905, 1917, and more recently under Gorbachev when communism collapsed? What is the psychology of renunciation of power by groups that previously would have fought to the death to hold onto power? What caused the most dedicated of old Bolsheviks to confess to non-existent crimes in the purge trials of the 1930s? Why are there not more good psychobiographies of 20th-Century Russian leaders? Did Stalin's paranoid defenses help him to achieve and hold power? Did Trotsky's failure in his power struggle with Stalin stem from his ambivalence and self-defeating tendencies? How did the incredible human suffering of Russia in the Civil War, collectivization of agriculture, purges, and the world wars effect the psychology of the communist leadership and Russian people? Can Russian's sufficiently break the cycle of dependency on governmental power fostered since the Revolution to allow a significant capitalistic component in their society? Can Russians achieve a real democracy despite the nostalgia for the old ways and the flight from the choices occasioned by freedom? These are but a few of the questions that are worth exploring psychohistorically.

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was no longer an enemy. He is editor of this publication and may be contacted at <pelovitz@aol.com>. □

"Bush Rage" & Its Consequences

(Continued from front page)

I am a Canadian doctoral student studying in the United States with an advisor originally from Germany. Being foreign-born, we have a unique perspective on American politics, which was predictably a frequent topic in our research meetings during the Iraq war. My advisor and I, along with an aggression researcher in North Dakota, wondered what effect pictures of President Bush would have on people's thoughts and behaviors. We believed that exposure to President Bush might make people more aggressive.

We decided to use the method of "priming," which has had a short but prolific history in social psychology. Psychologists find that people are constantly being influenced by their exposure to objects and people ("primes") in their environment. For example, when people are unobtrusively reminded about the elderly stereotype they start to walk slower, without even realizing it. Recent research has shown that being exposed to IBM computers can reduce levels of creativity. (Since I am using an IBM to write this article, please be patient as I continue to explain.)

In the first two studies, we exposed people to pictures of President Bush and then asked them to complete various tasks. In order to ensure that participants were unaware that they were being influenced by the pictures they saw, we told them a cover story. Individuals sat at a computer and had to quickly categorize words as "helpful" (for example, *love* or *forgive*) or "aggressive" (*hit* or *murder*) after seeing a picture of President Bush (or a control picture of either a chair or President Clinton). (The faster that people respond to these words, the more heavily associated the picture and the concept is in their minds.) In the last two studies, people completed a survey in which they saw a photo of Bush (or a control picture of President Clinton) and then read an ambiguous unrelated story about a man ("Donald") and were asked to rate his aggressiveness. In the final study, a few hundred participants

were also asked to grade me on my survey after they had completed it, a task they believed was unrelated to the experiment.

The results confirmed our hypothesis, which was that President Bush is associated with aggressive cognitions, perceptions, and behaviours. In the first two studies, people were faster to categorize aggressive words as compared to helpful ones after seeing pictures of President Bush (as compared to a chair or President Clinton). This meant that they associated him, but not a chair or Clinton, with aggressiveness. In the last two studies, they were more likely to rate Donald as aggressive after seeing Bush. Finally, in our final study, people gave me a lower grade if they had seen a picture of Bush rather than Clinton.

However, not all people responded with aggression; we found that it was liberals who were driving our predicted effects. How could this happen to the very type of peace-loving people who protested the Iraq war all over the world? In hindsight, it's simple: according to a popular bumper sticker, "You become what you hate." It is precisely because liberals think of Bush as aggressive that the effects were so pronounced in them.

But don't run out and tell all your liberal friends that they have been "Bush-whacked" just yet. Not every liberal will perceive hostility in innocent bystanders or act more aggressively after seeing President Bush. In one study, we found that our effect disappeared when people became aware of the prime, which is consistent with past priming research. We asked a group of people to list the traits that came to mind after seeing President Bush, and this group did not perceive Donald as any more aggressive than controls. So, the best remedy for Bush rage may be mindfulness.

Reflecting on my research, I wonder if I began this "aggressive" line of research after being exposed to President Bush a little too much last year. Now that I am aware of the potential effects of exposure to him, my friends tell me I have become a much nicer person.

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cle was presented at the American Psychological Society in Chicago and the International Society for Political Psychology in Sweden, 2004. The author may be contacted at skonrath@umich.edu. □

Religion in the Life and Politics of George W. Bush

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The attacks on America of September 11, 2001, inextricably linked President George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden as adversaries in the history of the 21st century. Since both men are religious fundamentalists, their adversarial struggle may be termed a religious war of potentially global dimensions.

In an earlier paper ("The Psychology and Ideology of an Islamic Terrorist Leader," *The International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2004, pp. 121-139), I described Osama bin Laden as a messianic leader. (Borrowing from Merriam Webster's *Collegiate Dictionary*, a messianic leader is "marked by idealism and an aggressive, crusading spirit" and a "sense of historic mission.") I further identified Islamic fundamentalism (*Wahhabism*) as one of the essential elements in bin Laden's evolution as an Islamic terrorist leader who has declared a religious war, a *jihād*, against America, which he calls "Satan." On the basis of his statements and video broadcasts, I also described bin Laden's worldview as Manichaeic, that is, dichotomized into "us" versus "them," and I inferred the presence of narcissistic fantasies in his conscious and unconscious mind such that bin Laden imagines that in committing atrocities against America, described in his words as "Jews and Crusaders," he is walking in the footsteps of the Prophet Mohammed.

In this paper I similarly identify George W. Bush as a messianic leader and, further, suggest that his religion (or, to express it more accurately, his interpretation of scripture) has played an integral role not only in his dichotomization of the world into "good" and "evil," but also in his declaring a war on terrorism, which, in his mind, includes the current and ongoing conflict in Iraq. Bush is an avowed Christian fundamentalist, that is, an evan-

gical or born-again Christian ("Jesus Factor," "PBS Frontline," April 29, 2004). In the PBS broadcast, Bush is quoted as saying that his "faith in God through Jesus Christ" has given his life "meaning and direction." In the same broadcast, Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention claims that while Bush was still Governor of Texas, he acknowledged to religious leaders that he believed that God wanted him to be president.

The attack on America of September 11 occurred only about eight months after Bush took the oath of office as the 43rd president of the United States. Given the juxtaposition of these events as well as his interpretation of scripture, Bush may have imagined that he was destined to be president in order to fulfill some historic mission of the nation. Bush's speeches after the attack expressed recurrent themes of good and evil. For example, his Pentagon Memorial speech of October 11, 2001, concluded with the words: "This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail" (www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/terroristattack/bush-speech-9-12.html). In addition, after 9/11, it seemed that Bush had acquired a missionary zeal and had assumed the qualities of a messianic leader. In an address he gave on September 20, 2001, to Congress, entitled "Justice Will Be Done," Bush said that "in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment" (www.whitehouse.gov/pres/dent/gwbbio.html). This statement suggests that Bush felt inspired regarding his role to lead the nation in its mission of undertaking a monumental struggle against evil.

Heinz Kohut described a messianic leader as one whose sense of self is merged with the idealized superego or the idealized omnipotent and omniscient self (the "self-object"). In Kohut's words, "his self and the idealized structure have become one." In the case of George W. Bush, the idealized is Christ or God. According to Kohut, messianic leaders "display an apparent self-confidence, voice their opinions with absolute certainty, and are able to play the role of the idealized self-object [for those who need one, for example, a nation in crisis]." Moreover, "the maintenance of their self-esteem depends on the incessant use of certain mental functions: pointing out the moral flaws of other people" (Heinz Kohut, *Self Psychology and the Hu-*

manities [NY: W.W. Norton, 1985], pp. 195-197).

The President's unshakable self-confidence is evident in the interview of Bush by Bob Woodward (*Plan of Attack* [NY: Simon and Schuster, 2004], p. 420) when he was asked if he had suffered any doubt about the war in Iraq. Bush responded, "I haven't suffered any doubt." Woodward asked, "Is that right? Not at all?" Bush replied, "No. And I'm able to convey that to the people." This last statement expresses the President's wish to act as the omniscient, idealized leader (a self-object) to the people of the United States. Woodward further reported (transcript, "60 Minutes," CBS, April 18, 2004) that after Bush had given the order for war against Iraq, he "prayed for strength to do the Lord's will" and that he might be "as good a messenger of his will as possible." Given what I believe is the coalescence of President Bush's sense of self with Christ, when Bush referred to himself as a messenger of God's will, I speculate that Bush was verbalizing his fantasy that he is omniscient and able to discern the will of God. Accordingly he is absolutely certain that his actions regarding war are in accord with God's will.

Another important element that has appeared in the President's speeches since September 11 is his alluding to the United States as a "beacon." In the President's speech to the nation that day, Bush said, "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining" (myfreegold.com/Documents/bush911address.htm). As pointed out by Jim Wallace, editor of the liberal evangelical magazine, *Sojourners*, in "The Jesus Factor," this terminology alluding to the Light that shines in the darkness and that darkness will not overcome it is taken from the Gospel of John. However, as explained by Wallace, this Light refers to Christ and the word of God. Wallace states that Bush, in substituting the nation for Christ, has "changed the text" and is guilty of "bad theology." In addition to its being "bad theology," this idealistic notion of America as the "beacon" allows Bush to see the nation as having the God-given right to wage war against people and nations that he judges to be evil.

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A Second "JFK" Presidency?

Herbert Barry
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People who share the same name usually feel mutually affiliated and are perceived by other people as closely connected. President George W. Bush, for example, is obviously associated with his father, former President George Herbert Walker Bush. Nevertheless, differences seem to be more prominent than similarities in the two Bush presidencies. The incumbent President Bush ardently hopes that his potential re-election will be one of the differences.

Senator John Forbes Kerry shares many similarities with President John Fitzgerald Kennedy. A seemingly trivial difference was noted in a recent letter in the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*. The writer stated that she was too young to vote for JFK for President in 1960 and that she intended to vote for "JFK" for President this year.

John F. Kerry for a long time has been aware that he shares the same first name and the same three initials with John F. Kennedy, as well as the same liberal values and internationalist approach to the world. In 1960, Kerry supported Kennedy for president, contrary to the sentiments of most of the other students at his boarding school, St. Paul's School in Concord, New Hampshire. Kerry met Kennedy briefly a couple of times while Kennedy was President because Kerry was dating Janet Auchincloss, the half-sister of Jacqueline Kennedy. Kerry deeply grieved the assassination of Kennedy.

Presidential nominees Kerry and Kennedy differ in some important respects. Kerry is older, has had a longer political career, and his parents died prior to his run for the presidency. Unlike Kennedy, he divorced and remarried, and his second wife is older, richer, and born abroad, in con-

trast to Jacqueline Kennedy. Kerry's recent prostate surgery is better publicized and a less severe health problem than Kennedy's Addison's Disease.

Kerry and Kennedy are similar in important respects. Both were Democratic nominees for the presidency two years after being re-elected to the U. S. Senate. It was the first re-election for Kennedy, the third for Kerry. Both were the Junior Senator from Massachusetts. The Senior Senator from Massachusetts was Republican Leverett Saltonstall for Kennedy, Democratic Ted Kennedy for Kerry. Both candidacies for president featured their status as war heroes and their Democratic Party affiliation. The religious membership of both is the Roman Catholic Church. Both wrote campaign autobiographies, Kennedy's *Profiles in Courage* (1956, during his bid for the vice presidency, reissued in paperback in 1960 during his presidential campaign) and Kerry's *A Call to Service* (2004), stressing service to the country. Both were decorated naval heroes who lacked administrative experience prior to running for the presidency.

A potentially influential similarity between Kennedy and Kerry is that the middle name of both is the maternal family name. Mother Rose Fitzgerald was daughter of a popular Mayor of Boston. Mother Rosemary Forbes was a member of a wealthy and prestigious family. That similarity may have contributed to their emphasis on public service, ambition for the presidency, and popularity among female voters.

The maternal family name was reproduced in the middle name of several presidents of the United States. In addition to Kennedy, they were James Knox Polk, Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Lyndon Baines Johnson, Richard Milhous Nixon, Ronald Wilson Reagan, and George Herbert Walker Bush. Biographies of these presidents, who generally exhibited emphasis on public service, indicate special affiliation and similarity of traits between the president and his mother's family.

Sons share the surname in addition to the gender of their father. Presidents whose middle name reproduced the maternal surname generally also developed strong affiliation with the father. President Kennedy imitated the compulsive adul-

tery of his father. John Kerry imitates the intellect and emotional restraint of his father.

John Forbes Kerry's first name reproduces the middle name of his father, Richard John Kerry. A presidential precedent for dual maternal and paternal names is Rutherford Birchard Hayes. Born after the death of his father, Rutherford Hayes, Rutherford B. Hayes was a heroic Major General in the Civil War. The circumstances of his election as President in 1876-1877 were closely similar to those of George W. Bush in 2000. The inaugural address by Hayes stated that he owed his election to the "zealous labors of a political party" but that "he serves his party best who serves the country best." His highly conscientious, honest, conciliatory, and peaceful presidency is potentially an admirable precedent for John Forbes Kerry, who I anticipate will be our next president.

Herbert Barry, III, PhD, is a psychologist and Professor Emeritus at the University of Pittsburgh. He is a Psychohistory Forum Research Associate; Co-Director of the Forum's Research Group on the Childhood, Personality, and Psychology of Presidential Candidates and Presidents; and a former president of the International Psychohistorical Association (1991-1992). His more than 250 publications include contributions to the fields of psychology, psychohistory, anthropology, political science, pharmacology, and alcoholism. Barry may be contacted at barryh@pitt.edu. □

Ralph Nader: The Political Psychology of a Puritanical Perfectionist

**Ted Goertzel
Rutgers-Camden**

Regular readers of *Clio's Psyche* will be familiar with Ralph Nader's childhood history from Peter Habenczius and Aubrey Immelman, "Childhood Denied: The Roots of Ralph Nader's Righteousness," in the March 2001 issue. More details about Nader's childhood are available in several published biographies; his mother's book, *It All Happened in the Kitchen: Recipes for Food and Thought* (1991); and on the Internet in a paper, "Ralph Nader's Childhood Roots" by Annie Bird-

song (<http://squawk.ca/lbo-talk/0008/0394.html>). All draw on a very limited amount of information because Nader places great value on personal privacy and has not shared many childhood anecdotes.

Born in 1934 to parents who had emigrated from Lebanon to Connecticut, Ralph had two older sisters and an older brother, with whom he is described as being very close. His parents were ideal in many ways: socially concerned, health conscious, and valuing education and civic activism. His father, Nathra, coached him to think independently and went out of his way to praise people who spoke up as dissenters in town meetings. Rose, his mother, told the children stories that were full of politically correct heroes and morals. She gave them raw chickpeas for snacks instead of chocolate. Biographer Justin Marin (*Nader: Crusader, Spoiler, Icon* [Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2002], p. 8.) reports that "Whenever the Nader children invited someone over for a birthday party, Rose would dutifully prepare a perfect cake – chocolate frosting, candles, the works. But it was only for display." Then, "before anyone could take a bite, she would strip away the frosting, asking 'You don't really want that, do you?'"

As a child, Nader never rebelled against this puritanical – "goody-goody" – upbringing. As an adult he has lived the life his parents wanted him to live. As he puts it: "I was brought up to aspire to advance justice as an active citizen, not as an elected politician. Not that there was anything wrong with running for office. It was just that my parents instilled in me a sense of social justice that wore no party or political brand" (Nader, *Crashing the Party*, 2002, p. 18). He graduated from Princeton and Harvard Law School, but eschewed a conventional legal career. Instead, he devoted himself to travel and journalism, with only modest success until a crusading publisher helped him to write *Unsafe at Any Speed* (1966) and General Motors foolishly hired private detectives to follow him and try to lure him into illicit sexual affairs. The ensuing scandal made him a celebrity and led to remarkable advances in auto safety and economy. Nader invented the consumer movement as a force for social change.

It's an admirable history, and Nader could have lived the rest of his life as the respected elder

statesman of the consumer and environmentalist movements. He might have even settled down a bit, married, and raised a family. But Ralph is not a man to rest on his laurels. He lives an austere, celibate existence, with no time for any of life's luxuries. He struggles seven days a week, 18 hours a day, against the powerful demon that threatens us all: Corporate America. He's not against capitalism in the form of small businesses such as his father's Highland Arms Diner in Connecticut. He's against businesses that become large, successful, and enjoy the fruits of their enterprise.

Psychologically, Nader is a remarkable example of the Puritanical Compulsive type as described in Theodore Millon and Roger Davis, *Personality Disorders in Modern Life* (2000). He is austere, self-righteous, dogmatic, zealous, uncompromising, indignant, and judgmental, with a grim and prudish sense of morality. Psychoanalytic theorists such as Sandor Rado and Wilhelm Reich believed that "all compulsives experience a deep ambivalence between obedience and defiance which they resolve through sublimation, reaction formation, and displacement. Those who sublimate this conflict seem more normal, those who displace their aggression seem more sadistic, and those who react strongly against their internal anger become self-righteous" (Millon and Davis, *Personality Disorders*, p. 178).

Nader clearly falls into the self-righteous category. Of course, there is much in the world to be critical of and, as Millon and Davis observe, "the final assessment of the puritanical compulsive often depends on which side of the fence you find yourself. One person's orator is another person's idiot." But as Ralph Nader has grown older, the unconscious roots of his behavior have become more and more apparent.

His campaigns for auto safety and better gasoline mileage made sense and did a great deal of good, yet his rhetoric makes it clear that psychologically he was fighting a holy war against the "reckless, unsafe hyper-horsepower-minded automobile industry" (Nader, *Party*, p. 8). Even after winning the war, he has denied himself the fruits of victory. He has never owned an automobile, not even an air-bagged, crash zone-protected Volvo or a gas miserly little Toyota Prius gas-electric hybrid

car.

His assertion that celibacy is forced on him because he is simply too busy for a family is unconvincing. He is not, in fact, the active manager of many of the causes he has inspired, such as the Public Interest Research Groups in every state. There is no objective reason to believe that his causes would suffer inordinately if he set aside a little time for a personal life. Millon and Davis say most Puritanical Compulsives "feel the persistent press of irrational and repugnant aggressive and sexual drives and adopt an ascetic and austere lifestyle to prohibit their own dark impulses and fantasies" (p. 178). Nader fits this pattern well, although he has shared nothing of his inner impulses and fantasies.

His persistence in running for president suggests that his psychological needs are stronger than his desire to advance his causes. His response to critics who point out that his candidacy helped to elect George W. Bush in 2000, and may do so again in 2004, is to point to the Democratic Party's failures to enact the full range of reforms advocated by the Greens. Politically, the Puritanical Compulsive becomes the puritanical perfectionist, the activist who refuses to enjoy modest success by supporting a candidate with a realistic chance of winning. *Crashing the Party* is Nader's book about the 2000 campaign. His greatest fear is that he will succumb to the invitation to join the "party," thus losing the target for his anger.

Nader's childhood suggests that even the most liberal and well-meaning parents may be too controlling and moralistic. A child who is not even allowed to taste the icing on his birthday cake may grow up into an overly austere, self-punishing adult, sadly unable to enjoy the small or even major victories that life brings him. Furthermore, his uncompromising approach causes him to weaken the causes he has devoted himself to supporting and makes him a *de facto* ally of his lifelong opponents.

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Political Belief and Disillusionment (1992). In 2004 he updated and co-edited his parents' 1962 book, Cradles of Eminence: Childhoods of More Than 700 Famous Men and Women. Prof. Goertzel may be contacted at <goertzel@camden.rutgers.edu>. □

Political Bias at an Academic Meeting

**Lucian Gideon Conway
University of Montana**

It troubles me that psychology, and especially psychoanalytic theory, is used at professional meetings for political purposes. For example, at the July 15, 2004, International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP) conference at the University of Lund in Sweden, an American psychiatrist claimed that President George W. Bush (Bush 43) was suffering from “oedipal issues” – some sort of unresolved need to best his father – and that this inspired the war in Iraq.

The idea was that because his father (President George Herbert Walker Bush – generally referred to as Bush 41) had also gone to Iraq but had not removed Saddam, this gave Bush the son an opportunity to out-do him. This is an interesting and on the surface compelling idea but at the end of the talk, one of his fellow panelists asked the essential question: “What evidence do you have of this?” The speaker’s reply was that, first, Bush denied that he had ever made a mistake as president, and, secondly, that he refused to admit that he had spoken with his father about his decision to go to war with Iraq, despite rumors that he had talked to him once a week.

A member of the audience quite reasonably pointed out that this is not really evidence of some sort of angst about bettering his father. If the fact that Bush refuses to admit mistakes is evidence of an oedipal complex, then it must be a psychological difficulty uniquely ubiquitous among presidents, since this is simply standard political fare and has been for as long as I can remember. By this standard, the vast majority of presidents have probably had such a complex! Bush’s refusal to admit conversations with his father also needs no other expla-

nation than that it would be a political disaster for him to admit such a conversation. One might as well say that Clinton had an oedipal complex because he did not want to admit to sexual improprieties, or that everyday employees have oedipal complexes because they don’t point out major errors of their bosses. Politicians, like most other people, generally try to avoid saying things that will get them fired. The speaker needed much better evidence to make this point in a viable manner.

So, if not from facts, where did this interpretation come from? Other parts of the speaker’s comments laid bare the real meaning of Bush’s apparent oedipal complex. In his preparatory comments, he said that he “hoped Bush would not be president after November,” and about halfway into his talk launched into some laudatory prose about the glorious abilities of Bush’s opponent, John Kerry. (He apparently was impressed that Kerry had dodged some questions on a TV show – in his mind *this* sort of dodging did not seem to indicate an oedipal complex). My own interpretation as a political psychologist with no training in psychoanalytic technique is quite different. The speaker’s interpretation of Bush seemed to say more about him than Bush, representing his deep-seated desire to see Bush removed from office. The main thing I learned from his talk is that the speaker did not think Bush was a good president, and that his interpretation of an “oedipal complex” was a means of undermining Bush’s credibility. After all, who wants a president in office that takes countries to war so he can out-do his father?

There is something to be said for a speaker, as in this case, making his opinions known openly, so that his biases can be easily seen by others. But what about those cases where presenters hide their biases from themselves and others? They may be projecting onto the politician their own psychological needs and political biases. Political psychobiographers should be aware of and monitor their own countertransference feelings regarding their subject, but how many actually live up to this ideal? Based on what I witnessed at the ISPP, not enough do. I do not appear to be alone in this concern: It was my impression that the distinguished psychoanalytic psychobiographer who chaired the aforementioned session was politely uncomfortable with the speaker’s rambling comments, as were at least

one of the panelists and others in the audience.

I have been unable to determine if the presenter, who has a university affiliation, has ever published anything on political psychobiography or if he was simply pontificating outside of his field of expertise in psychiatry. The Code of Conduct of the American Psychiatric Association prohibits psychiatrist members from writing about living subjects without their written permission. Did the speaker have such permission, or did he perhaps feel that he was freed from this canon of his profession because he was an ocean away?

I am not, however, here trying to attack a particular individual, but rather echo a warning that I think is currently on the minds of many political psychologists. Everyone has biases – myself as well as this particular ISPP speaker – and it is impossible to root all these biases out. However, if we are truly to consider psychobiography a scholarly discipline, we must not give up on the goal of being objective; we must try hard not to assume that our hated political rival is more likely to have destructive psychological issues than our pet political icon. We must be ever-vigilant to guard against those biases when they creep in.

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Bias, Countertransference, and Father Son Issues: A Response to Conway

Paul H. Elovitz

Ramapo College and the Psychohistory Forum

As a scholar of contemporary presidents and candidates, I am quite sensitive to the issue of bias as I struggle to write jargon-free political psychology focused on childhood, coping mechanisms,

empathy, personality, and overcoming trauma. For an example of this, see my article on Bush and Kerry, "A Psychobiographical Comparison of Bush and Kerry," *Journal of Psychohistory* (Fall 2004, pp. 109-142). It troubled me that the biased presenter described by Professor Conway was a substitute for me when I could not attend the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP) meetings in Lund.

However, I must disagree with Conway's claim that the President refused to acknowledge asking his father's advice about going to war with Iraq in early 2003. Though the younger Bush spoke often with his father, it is my sense that he had no reason not to admit he asked about the war: he had no need to ask since he knew his father would want him to continue down the complicated diplomatic road that he had decided to forgo after many months of frustration. Why ask a question when you already know the answer? Similarly, he never asked Secretary of State Colin Powell if he should go to war without renewed UN support (See Robert Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 2004, pp. 269-272).

Regarding the President's oedipal issues, though I do not use this term in my article, cited above, I think a strong case may be made for these, especially regarding the 2003 Iraq War which enabled him to both vindicate his father's 1991 Iraq war and outdo him by deposing Saddam Hussein and occupying the country in the name of liberation and democratization. Professor Rudolph Binion presents the evidence for Bush's rivalry with his father in the context of Bush's war with Iraq as a case of traumatic reliving of September 11, 2001 ("Bush's America Goes to War," *Clio's Psyche*, Vol. 10 No. 1, June 2003, pp. 1-3). That the term *oedipal* is used so loosely in our society is not a reason to dismiss it out of hand.

An additional issue is that I think it is a mistake to see the feelings of the political psychobiographer as simply a problem to be eliminated. Countertransference feelings toward a patient or a subject of research may be an asset as well as a detriment to the work of the analyst. They may provide vital information to the analyst, especially if they are clearly induced by the subject. Even if they are projections of the analyst, they can be informative, if s/he is well analyzed and determined

to understand what motivates the many choices which are made in the course of psychoanalytic and psychobiographical work. Clearly, the individual who prompted Conway's article showed no signs of using this information to improve his scholarship. □

Geoffrey Cocks: Historian of Film and Nazi Germany

(Continued from front page)

Professor Cocks is the author of *Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: The Göring Institute* (1985, 1997), *Treating Mind and Body: Essays in the History of Science, Professions, and Society Under Extreme Conditions* (1998), and *The Wolf at the Door: Stanley Kubrick, History, and the Holocaust* (2004); editor of *The Curve of Life: The Correspondence of Heinz Kohut, 1923-1981* (1994); and co-editor (with Travis Crosby) of *Psycho/History: Readings in the Method of Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and History* (1987), (with Konrad Jarausch) of *German Professions, 1800-1950* (1990), (with Manfred Berg) of *Medicine and Modernity: Public Health and Medical Care in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Germany* (1997), and (with James Diedrick and Glenn Perusek) of *Depth of Field: Stanley Kubrick, Film, and the Uses of History* (2005).

Professor Cocks has been the recipient of grants from the *Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst* (1973-1974, 1985); the *National Endowment for the Humanities* (1980, 1987, 1988-1989); the *American Historical Association* (1988); the *International Research and Exchanges Board* (1988); the *Heinz Kohut Memorial Fund* (1991); and the *National Institutes of Health* (1991-1992). He has been a referee for many fine presses, including Cambridge, Harvard, Oxford, and UCLA. From 1994 to 2002 he was *Royal G. Hall Professor of History at Albion College* and since 2002 has been *Rammelkamp Professor at Albion*. Dr. Cocks (GCC) was interviewed in August by the Editor (PHE). He may be reached at <Gcocks@albion.edu>.

PHE: What brought you to psychohistory?

GCC: I first confronted psychohistory in the form

of a seminar I took my senior year at Occidental College from American historian Andrew Rolle (see "Teaching and Writing Psychohistory: Andrew F. Rolle, An Interview by Geoffrey Cocks," *Clio's Psyche* 4 (1997): 81-86). Rolle was the one who introduced me to Freud's work and, subsequently, to Peter Loewenberg at UCLA, who was just publishing his essays on the Nazi youth cohort and on Himmler's failed adolescence in successive issues of the *American Historical Review*. Since I had always been interested in German history, and in particular the history of the Nazi period, this represented an easy opportunity to combine an old interest with a new one at the graduate level. It was at Occidental that I had decided I wanted to become an historian. This was not only a function of the excellent instruction in history I received at Occidental, but also from the fact that I grew up in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War in a home filled with books and within a familial environment of great interest in history and current events. As for my deeper motivation to explore psychohistory, I think, among other things, I must have viewed my boyhood interest in World War II, the Nazis, and the German military in particular as morally and psychodynamically problematic.

PHE: I am always interested in why my students, colleagues, and I choose to study certain fields. Consequently, your description of your interest in WWII and German military history as "morally and psychodynamically problematic" draws my attention. Please explain.

GCC: At least that is how I view it from the perspective of adulthood. I still find myself attracted to the study of the absolute worst in 20th-century history and I recognize that such attraction is anything but just a matter of intellectual purity or professional idealism. I still find the history of the Second World War in general (and German military hardware in particular) fascinating, an interest that is, among other things, morally and psychologically problematic. I hasten to say, however, that I think I have very successfully sublimated the relevant unconscious conflicts and aggressions into productive teaching and scholarship. First, I think my interest in psychoanalysis was partly related to my struggles over my interest in the history of Nazi Germany, an interest certainly also stemming from deeper unconscious conflicts. Second, my teaching and scholar-

ship have over the past 20 years been ever more focused on the Holocaust. I have not lost my research interest in those areas of Nazi society not directly related to Nazi persecution and extermination (the professional history of psychotherapy and the social history of illness in the Third Reich), but my study of the plight of Jews and others in Nazi Germany is more than just a reflection of growing academic and popular interest in that particular subject over the past score or so of years. I like to think that, even in the absence of my own personal psychoanalysis, I am working through conflicts much more than acting them out in my work as an historian.

Perhaps this struggle itself, therefore, is one – or even a major – reason why I remain an enthusiastic and effective teacher and scholar. My involvement with students and faculty at Albion and at Alma College since 1999 in restoring the New Jewish Cemetery in Wrocław, Poland, as part of a biennial Holocaust Service-Learning Project is one instance of this in terms of teaching. Even this interest and commitment is in part a psychodynamic function of what Conrad called the “fascination with abomination” that is one danger – although also one motive toward ethical action and education – of the study of evil. On the other hand, being at Treblinka and Auschwitz on these journeys stripped fascination away and replaced it with sorrow and outrage. My basic point here is that such work is not just a function of virtue or interest, but of personal experience and psychological compromise.

PHE: Of which of your works are you most proud?

GCC: Though I have written about psychotherapy in the Third Reich, done some psychobiographical work on A.A. Milne and Stanley Kubrick, and edited Kohut's letters as well as a book of psychohistory readings, I do not think I have written a significant psychohistorical work. This is due to the absence of a personal psychoanalytic experience. I never mustered the courage to undergo psychoanalysis, even though I consistently stress to my students the validity of psychoanalytic insight. Perhaps my own guilt and self-consciousness over shying away from something that would be in accord with my intellectual interests and convictions gives me some extra energy in providing students at least some intellectual exposure to psychoanalysis and

psychohistory. Moreover, the argument for psychoanalysis even in the absence of personal experience has intellectual force and one can't spend many years reading psychoanalysis without it having some salutary effect on one's own self-reflection and the ability to teach (and learn) about human beings past and present.

But the lack of personal insight makes me as unwilling as I am unable to produce a purely psychohistorical work. It was during my graduate years that I gave up on Hitler psychobiography. I found the subject too depressing, but it was also the case that I was unwilling to undergo psychoanalysis as a means to understand myself more fully before undertaking to understand someone else on a deep psychodynamic level. Of course, my decision was overdetermined.

As a result of this professional turn my scholarly reputation rests chiefly on the two editions of *Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: The Göring Institute* (1985, 1997), essentially a montage of my two areas of interest, German history and the history of psychoanalysis broadly conceived. This was certainly a compromise formation: if I could not undergo psychoanalysis and exercise full psychoanalytic and psychohistorical inquiry, then I could at least construct the historical context of psychoanalysis at a certain time and place of particular interest to me. This combination was a way of avoiding the prospect of my own analysis and thus confrontation with my own unconscious conflicts, but at least something of scholarly value came of this avoidance. Indeed, it occurs to me now that a defensive pattern of avoidance – of what exactly I can't by definition say – has been part of my whole approach to scholarship. This approach seeks to avoid the usual areas and angles of research to explore unique subjects out of the way of direct confrontation with prevailing schools of thought and scholarly controversies. Ironically, but also logically, my work has occasioned controversy: some criticism was wrongheaded but some was insightful and my work stood up as substantive and defensible. *Psychotherapy in the Third Reich* was one such “unknown” and “impossible” subject; so was the issue of Heinz Kohut himself being the subject of “The Two Analyses of Mr. Z,” his most famous case study; and, to answer the question about the work of mine of which I am most proud (at least at

the moment), so is Stanley Kubrick's all-but-hidden preoccupation in his films with the Holocaust. My work has always been on the margins, consistent with a pattern of avoidance of issues "closer to home," as it were, but also with some scholarly and pedagogical advantages in an increasingly interdisciplinary academic world. Perhaps ironically, it has kept me in close contact with psychoanalysis as a discipline and mode of inquiry since Freudian perspectives have continually been reworked and enriched in a variety of fields, including history, film, literature, and culture.

PHE: A psychohistorian for over three-and-a-half decades, I have to strongly disagree with your generalization that one cannot do psychohistory without personal analysis. Even though I consider personal analysis an invaluable asset in doing our work, I must argue against this being a *sine qua non* for psychohistory, and I could give the names of individuals who have written valuable work without it. Why do you think you cannot do psychohistory without personal analysis?

GCC: I have doubts that I can do psychohistory adequately and in enough depth. Yes, as a result of relying on empathy and experience some significant insight is available to all human beings. Wilhelm Dilthey's *Einfühlung* or Erik Erikson's "disciplined subjectivity" describe, respectively, the added advantage of historical and psychoanalytic training. My feeling of psychohistorical inadequacy is also probably based on the very same unconscious conflicts that prevented me from undergoing analysis in the first place. I probably do have some of this type of basic and schooled insight into my subject matter. I like to think that my first publication, on A. A. Milne ("A. A. Milne: Sources of His Creativity," *American Imago* 34:4 (1977): 313-26), whatever its limitations as a graduate exercise in the application of Kleinian theory to biography, represents this sort of schooled ability to look into another person's psyche.

PHE: I wonder if your being so hard on yourself is related in part to a feeling that you have not lived up to the ego ideal set up by your doctoral advisor, Peter Loewenberg, of UCLA? He encouraged but did not insist upon psychohistory students undergoing psychoanalysis and training at the Southern California Psychoanalytic Institute.

GCC: I expect that you are right about this. Peter is the quintessential non-directive psychoanalyst. One has to do one's work oneself. He let me go my own way, which has worked out well in terms of my scholarship and teaching. Certainly the opposite extreme of a highly directive *Doktorvater* (doctor father) would almost certainly have resulted in my never stumbling upon the Göring Institute as the subject for a dissertation

PHE: What are you working on now? What is its importance and when do you expect to have it published?

GCC: I have just (August 2004) published *The Wolf at the Door: Stanley Kubrick, History, and the Holocaust*. This book had its genesis in my attendance at a showing of *The Shining* in the summer of 1980 at the Golden Bough Theatre in Carmel, California. I mention the time and place not only because such is the default setting for an historian but also because Carmel was where my father and mother lived for the last 30 and 39, respectively, years of their lives. In 1980 I was living with my wife and daughter in Carmel while on leave from Albion to write what became the first edition of *Psychotherapy in the Third Reich*. I was not at first impressed much by *The Shining*. I had gone to see it because I had seen an advertisement for it on television (a scene I have since argued is a central Holocaust symbol) and had seen other films by Stanley Kubrick before, beginning in 1964 when my father took me to see *Dr. Strangelove*. What strikes me now about the coincidence of time, place, and event is that *The Shining* (I did not know then) is the most autobiographical of all of Kubrick's films and, not coincidentally, is the film in which Kubrick's approach-avoidance syndrome with regard to the Holocaust leaves its greatest latent traces. The film is essentially about violence within families, the Torrance family of the book and the film *and* the human family in general. I am not speaking here of violence within my own family – in fact my upbringing was supportive in the emotionally restrained way perhaps typical of those with Anglo-Scottish-German ancestry – but rather of the more general issue of normal problematic dynamics inherent in the subjective realm of human experience. Suffice it to say there was (and is) something going on with respect to my own approach-avoidance with regard to psychoanalysis

and my own family history and the discipline of history I first embraced as a young adult.

PHE: It is good that you pay attention to the connections between your life and that of your subject. Tell me more about this book.

GCC: I think my book on Kubrick is the best work I have ever done – or at least it has the boldest thesis. It certainly has involved the most thought and the most learning on my part. My first impression of the film had been quickly undermined by a nagging sense that there was much more going on in the film than I had first noticed. It turns out that this is always the case with Kubrick films, for the simple reason that he painstakingly places many levels of meaning into the visual and aural discourse of his films, the detection of which requires repeated viewings and reflection. I subsequently became convinced that there is a striking indirect pattern of symbolic discourse in *The Shining* on history in general and the Holocaust in particular. I published an essay on this in *The Psychohistory Review* in 1987 and another, improved, one in the *Psychoanalytic Review* in 1991. With Kubrick's death in 1999, a flood of information about this reclusive filmmaker became available, much of which seemed to provide strong support for my original insight into Kubrick's interest in history, the Germans, and the Holocaust as represented by and in *The Shining* in particular. Kubrick himself was also very interested in Freud and the screenplay he wrote with Diane Johnson for *The Shining* was largely based on Freud's essay "The 'Uncanny'" (1919) and Bruno Bettelheim's book on fairy tales, *The Uses of Enchantment* (1976). Indeed one of the reasons why Kubrick's films require reflection is that he constructs them like dreams, in which small objects represent large hidden forces of mind and history. *The Shining*, in great measure because it deals – reflexively and deconstructively – with horror beyond all other, surpasses all other Kubrick films in its recourse to this indirect method of exposition and discourse. Once again my background in history and in psychoanalysis was peculiarly appropriate for exploration of subject matter previously unrecognized. Perhaps my own history of approach-avoidance made me sensitive to Kubrick's own approach-avoidance syndrome with regard to the Holocaust.

The book is not psychohistory *per se*, although I make much of what I see as such dynamics as Kubrick's defensive identification with the aggressor, his culturally bred critical insight into the anxious and angry hypermasculinity that underlay much of Nazism, and the Oedipal struggles that are a manifest subject of almost all of his films. I did not know it at the time I began my work on Kubrick, but Kubrick, too, had a fascination with the Germans and their machines of war, an orientation reflected in his films that could well have intuitively generated some degrees of identificatory interest on my part with his struggle over this. As another sign of the reinvigorating of Freudian thought, Chodorovian and Lacanian insights have proved to be important components of recent scholarly discourse on film in particular. These therefore also contribute significantly to my analysis of Kubrick, especially in terms of the pre-oedipal dynamics of masculine fear and desire (*Fear and Desire* was the title of Kubrick's first feature film) revolving around the original female caretaker (Jack Torrance is the nominal "caretaker" of the Overlook Hotel in *The Shining*, but it is his wife who actually does all the work around the place).

My main emphasis is, however, once again historical. I focus on Kubrick's experience as a preternaturally perceptive young Jew born in the Bronx in 1928 and growing up in an era of depression, fascism, and war. All his life he attempted to confront artistically the reality of a dangerous and a contingent universe. At the center of this maze of malevolence lay the Minotaur of the Holocaust. (One of Kubrick's first films was a "Minotaur Production.") His approach-avoidance syndrome with respect to the Nazi Final Solution was complicated by his marriage into a German family that included the infamous Nazi film director Veit Harlan. The result of this confluence of personal and historical is a curiously spasmodic and largely symbolic presence of Germans in Kubrick's films and the absence of Jews. The growing cultural preoccupation with the Holocaust beginning with the Eichmann trial in 1961 and the "Hitler Wave" of the 1970s also played a role in Kubrick's laying of an historical subtext on the Holocaust in *The Shining*. We know the subject was on his mind: In 1975 he told his executive producer to read Raul Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews* (1961) and then sent him to ask Isaac Bashevis Singer to help write a

screenplay for a Holocaust film. Singer refused, saying he knew nothing about the subject. Kubrick pestered Hilberg over the years about a source for a film and even wrote a screenplay, "Aryan Papers," based on Louis Begley's *Wartime Lies* (1991), which, however, he never filmed.

To the degree my book on Kubrick represents "psychohistory" at all, it might be in the sense outlined brilliantly by Tom Kohut in a recent essay (the *Annual of Psychoanalysis* 31 (2003): 225-236). Kohut argues that history affects the psyche just as the psyche affects history, that "psychoanalysis ... has demonstrated that we are psychologically constituted through our experience of the environment ... [an] environment that is constituted by history [and that] ... [t]herefore history constitutes our psyches" (p. 226).

PHE: What has been the early reception to your Kubrick book?

GCC: It's too early to say. I've had some excellent help from a number of film scholars and Kubrick authorities that suggests some interest in my approach and findings. Kubrick biographer Vincent LoBrutto (*Stanley Kubrick*, 1997) is very positive about my book. Kubrick's brother-in-law and executive producer Jan Harlan and his wife Christiane Kubrick are, I think, skeptical about my thesis, although they, too, provided a good deal of important material for the book. I think their skepticism is based on the fact that they are too close to the subject and therefore lack the perspective that distance and disciplinary expertise brings. I have a feeling that the reception will be polarized – significant enthusiasm from some and rejection from others. One disciplinary aspect of this is that film people in general and postmodernists in particular tend to appreciate history less than they should.

PHE: What is your primary affiliation?

GCC: For the reasons we have already discussed, I think by nature and practice I have always been an historian. But being an historian necessarily makes one open to a wide variety of subject matters and methods. Psychoanalysis is by nature an historical discipline, since it seeks to investigate the past for its own sake and for keys to understanding the present. Film was *the* new artistic medium of the 20th century in which I began and lived most of my life.

I took on Kubrick because he, too, was greatly interested in the history of the modern era and also in psychoanalysis as a means to understand dark human motives and actions. I teach "psychohistory," although I think recent developments in a wide variety of fields including history have rendered that term unnecessary. The irrational as understood and explicated by Freud and others is now as a matter of course recognized as a vital area of human experience. I was never convinced of the necessity of having a separate discipline of "psychohistory" and certainly not as a predictive science like that proposed by Lloyd deMause.

Psychoanalysis or "psychohistory" cannot substitute for history, but rather it must serve history. It seems to me that the crucial thing about history is that it insists on the multiplicity of factors in explaining human lives and events as comprehensively and as meaningfully as possible. For example, I now have a greater appreciation for the possibility that Rudolph Binion's research on Bloch's use of iodoform to treat Klara Hitler's cancer has something to say about Adolf's development. Binion is perhaps right that the Führer's later protection of Bloch was based on denial of his own role in allowing or urging the treatment that Binion concludes killed Hitler's mother, because since Freud we know that the mind can work like that. On the other hand, though, such preferential treatment (see David Beisel's review of Bloch's memoirs in *Clio's Psyche* 11:2 (June 2004): 1, 8-12) does raise the strong possibility that Binion's focus on the treatment of Hitler's mother is not (as) central to an explanation of Hitler's murderous hatred toward Jews. In other words, Hitler's protection of Bloch could have been based on other factors, including (or not) denial of complicity in his mother's death. It is Binion's method that I think is most questionable because of its insistence on exclusive validity in explaining Hitler's obsession with gassing the Jews. This insistence in turn is problematically based on the argument that confirmation of Binion's thesis comes only by means of the same result won by the same empathic immersion in the documents Binion himself experienced. Such conviction and certainty is not in line with the historian's traditional search for multiple conditions rather than single causes or with postmodern emphasis on the inherent multiplicity of explanation. Binion's embrace of Freud's early traumatic model

to the exclusion of all other psychodynamics and theoretical constructs seems risky, particularly when Binion posits a collective German trauma to which Hitler's trauma "linked." In sum, on the principle that in history more things rather than fewer things about a given phenomenon tend to be true, I think Binion's thesis may have *something* to say about Hitler and the Germans, but I am thus also still very unsure about the claim of his thesis to absolute and exclusive authority on the origins and effects of Hitler's hatred for the Jews.

PHE: How do you define psychohistory?

GCC: I see "psychohistory" as history, since it is impossible to separate the irrational lives of individuals and groups from the other conditions comprising human experience over time. The growing interest in psychoanalytic perspectives in a wide variety of disciplines in my view makes strict demarcation of the "field" of "psychohistory" unnecessary.

PHE: What special training was most helpful in your doing psychohistorical work?

GCC: Being introduced to Freud by Rolle, who was in psychoanalytic training at the time, was the crucial first step. Andy emphasized psychoanalysis as a means to understanding the motives and actions of individuals in the past. Loewenberg, as both practicing historian and psychoanalyst, deepened not only my knowledge of German history but also the intellectual milieu from which Freudian theory emerged. Peter also had his students attend sessions at the Southern California Psychoanalytic Society. I remember, for example, hearing Fawn Brodie present her initial findings on Jefferson at one of these meetings. I also took a couple of courses at the school of neuropsychiatry at UCLA.

Since I did not undertake formal psychoanalytic training, the most important work I did subsequently was simply to read. In this regard, Freud was and is the most important source for me as a "psychohistorian." This is because my chief area of interest is one in which Freud's emphasis on conflict and irrationality seems particularly manifest. For me, Americans by contrast are still too culturally naive. Erikson was an early inspiration. His *Young Man Luther* (1958) was assigned in my first-year Western Civilization course in college and

none of us read it. But I remember saying to my friends that we would eventually recognize it as an important book. Now, of course, much of its luster has been diminished by subsequent historical critique, but it at least showed the important possibilities for psychological understanding in history. In my seminar *The Irrational in History*, I find Erikson's essay on Bergman's *Wild Strawberries* (1957), read in conjunction with viewing the film, to be an effective and persuasive piece of thinking for young people about individual human lives in their temporal totality and personal relationships. I have also for some years used Nancy Chodorow's *The Reproduction of Mothering* (1978, 1999) as a means of introducing a gender perspective along with inquiry into pre-oedipal dynamics. Most recently, I have introduced the students to the work of Lacan, utilizing Slavoj Žižek's *Looking Awry* (1991) in conjunction with the Alfred Hitchcock films *Rear Window* (1954) and *Vertigo* (1958).

PHE: Your reference to Lacanians interests me. Can you identify some Lacanians with a good clinical and historical sense.

GCC: I'm not familiar with clinical or historical work from a Lacanian perspective since my exposure to Lacanian theory has come from film theory in my work on Kubrick. Lacanians tend to cluster in the realms of critical literary theory and semiotics, since Lacan's view is that "the unconscious is outside," that is, the psyche is a function of the use of language between and among people. Lacan therefore tends to be most useful in terms of deconstructing "signs," particularly of the "lack" that exists at the center of all knowledge and personality. According to Lacan, men in particular are consumed by desire for an original union with the mother, which in fact never existed. If accepted, the universal concerns of this theory make it useful for analyzing the common background of all human activity. For Lacanians, as for most postmodern theorists, metonym (a figure of speech) prevails over the facticity on which historians base their work. Freud, Kohut, and Chodorow are more useful to historians since they stress more specific histories – that is, case studies – of individuals interacting with their environment from birth onward. All of these levels of dynamic generality and specificity can be useful when used together by the historian. This is one of the things I have done in my

book on Kubrick; his films can be read on all of these levels. For example, an elevator disgorging blood in *The Shining* can be read as male terror of the female (Lacan, Freud), as the pre-oedipal project of masculine identity as distinct from the dominant female caretaker (Chodorow), as oedipal conflict (Freud), and as historical representation of murder and genocide (Cocks). The whole postmodern movement, of which Lacan's theory is a part, is basically a matter of applying an "uncertainty principle" to human thought and action. As an historian, I would note that this valuable set of insights is also a product of history and largely of that greatest era of the generation of uncertainty about everything, the Second World War and the Holocaust. Interesting in this regard is that Lacan himself worked as a psychoanalyst in Paris during the Nazi occupation of France (Alain de Mijolla, "Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalysts in France between 1939 and 1945," *International Forum of Psychoanalysis* 12 (2003): 136-56).

PHE: Have you published, or do you plan to publish, an autobiography or any autobiographical writings?

GCC: I have no plans in that regard, although, of course, everything I have written reveals something about me. Perhaps the closest I have come to more direct personal revelation is an unpublished novel based on my work on psychotherapy in the Third Reich.

PHE: What training should a person entering psychohistory today pursue?

GCC: The appropriate training for a "psychohistorian" can vary depending on the individual. In general, though, it is *best* to have formal training both in history and in psychoanalysis as well as to undergo a personal psychoanalysis. Even in the absence of such training in the case of the overwhelming majority of historians, there is potential and actual growth in the field of "psychohistory" due to the natural interests of social historians in emotion and agency apart from or within structural conditions. The poststructuralist emphasis upon perspectives as well calls upon the insights won from a psychodynamic point of view. Within "traditional" psychohistory, the application of Kohut and also – mostly from the direction of

literature and cinema – Lacan has been evident. To encourage such exploration, historians using psychoanalysis must continue to balance psychoanalytic interpretations with conscious, external, and social conditions. In this respect, the importance of childhood to psychohistorical work is not a matter of strict determinism but of a holistic understanding of a life entire. As Freud himself understood, a personality is a unit over time and not just the creation of environmental influences at particular junctures.

PHE: What do you mean when you say that "personality is a unit over time"?

GCC: I mean that while internal and external change over time matters very much in life and in history, a person largely remains the same person her or his entire life. This view emphasizes the Freudian emphasis on the importance of childhood in human development, but it also stresses the degrees to which human beings exercise agency in shaping their personality on the unconscious as well as conscious level. By this I mean that there is a constant negotiation going on at the interface between the conscious and the unconscious. Likewise, each of us deals in a like manner with our own experience of the external world and its constraints as well as opportunities at our own time and place.

PHE: How do you see psychohistory developing in the next decade?

GCC: I am sure the subject matter of the unconscious and the irrational will continue to be integrated into the work of historians and into other disciplines as well. German history, my own field of specialization, has long been the subject of psychohistorical inquiry, but in spite of that or rather because of it, we must guard against the loss of sensitivity to the dynamics of the unconscious to the present – and valid – attempt to "depathologize" German history and "historicize" the Third Reich.

PHE: Your references to depathologizing German history raises the general issue of pathology and psychohistory. What pros and cons do you see in my efforts as editor of this publication to write a jargon-free psychohistory based on childhood, coping mechanisms (the mechanisms of defense), creativity, empathy, innovation, and psychohistory?

GCC: I think your efforts as editor of *Clio's Psyche* are crucial and in line with much of the best work that is being done across the disciplines to integrate psychoanalytic insights into the full range of human experience and explication. After all, one of Freud's great contributions was to break the old 19th-century positivistic psychiatric insistence on the *qualitative* distinction between the "insane" and the "sane," the "abnormal" and the "normal," through his study of *quantitative* differences in human motivation and behavior. Along with this came an empathy for all human beings in having to deal with conflict and "disability," an accurate and, more important, humane divergence from contemporaneous "scientific" attempts to classify human beings as individuals as well as groups into those more or less "valuable," a tendency that of course would have particularly drastic and despicable political effects in the first half of the 20th century.

PHE: What is the state of psychohistory in Germany?

GCC: I can't rightly say, which is part of the answer to your question in that psychohistory as a distinct entity has, to my knowledge, hardly existed in Germany. Interest in Freud has remained generally strong, with particular impact among psychoanalysts themselves and among literary theorists. To overgeneralize badly, the older postwar historians remained in the Rankean tradition and disregarded theory of all kinds, while many younger historians after 1945 and up to the present day have been drawn to variations of Marxist critical theory to help address Germany's descent into fascism. For example, Hans-Ulrich Wehler in the early 1970s edited a collection of previously published essays on psychoanalysis and history (*Geschichte und Psychoanalyse*, 1971), but except for Wehler's introduction, none of the five essays was by a German; four were well-known pieces by Americans (Hughes, Strout, Alexander and Juliette George) and the other was by Alain Besançon. Wehler was a leading member of the Bielefeld school, which applied social science theory to history, but his and his school's work exploited primarily on sociological and economic theory in order to make a case for German exceptionalism in explaining Hitler. More recently, some good cultural history has taken the role of the unconscious seriously in psychodynamic terms, for example, Joachim Radkau's *Das Zeitalter*

der Nervosität: Deutschland zwischen Bismarck and Hitler (1998). In terms of the study of German history generally, British historian David Blackbourn's *The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780-1918* (1997) posits a uniquely strong Prussian/German hypermasculinity as a cultural style. Blackbourn's work reflects the strong current of gender analysis in historical studies on both side of the Atlantic including Germany, which in post-Freudian forms emphasizes the importance of sexuality and sexual identity at all levels of the individual and society.

PHE: What do we as psychohistorians need to do to strengthen our work?

GCC: Historians in general should seek to respond to outreach programs developed by psychoanalytic institutes and societies. In turn they should offer to teach "applied psychoanalysis," perhaps first as a non-credit seminar and then, perhaps, with experience and further psychoanalytic training, such a seminar could become a regular part of the curriculum at the institute. I do not believe that courses in "applied psychoanalysis" should be taught by analysts who have no training in a relevant additional discipline (such as history, sociology, anthropology, etc.). "Distance learning" via electronic media could offer another way to reach academia and society as a whole, although I as a professor at a liberal arts college value, as of course a psychoanalyst even more crucially must, face-to-face teaching and learning. Popular and scholarly interest in sexuality and gender are natural preconditions for receptivity to psychohistorical analysis. "Psychohistorians" – I use this term and "psychohistory" as convenient shorthand – should also strive to master critical film analysis, not only because movies are rich sources of insight into society and are popular topics of discussion especially among the younger generations but also because it has long been recognized that going to the cinema is like dreaming, something that makes film an excellent source for the understanding of unconscious processes.

There are, of course, still only a very few universities that have graduate fields in psychohistory or colleges that offer courses in psychohistory. Although psychohistorical points of view can influence the education and work of historians outside the boundaries of formal fields or training, it is in

my view important that the older generation of psychohistorians “reproduce themselves” by making sure that their positions are filled with successors who have psychohistorical interests and training. This happens rarely, particularly at the undergraduate level: Tom Kohut replacing Robert Waite at Williams is one of the few exceptions to the rule, of which I am aware. In this respect, moreover, I have rethought my earlier partial agreement with Andy Rolle that undergraduate courses in psychohistory do nothing to advance the field. While it is true that I have never had one of my students go on to study psychohistory at the graduate level, it is also true that I went on to such training as a result of an undergraduate course. I did have one student express an interest in such training, but he did not have the qualifications for graduate school in history. Another student, who was inspired to get a PhD in history as a result of taking my psychohistory seminar, went on to a graduate program that had no psychohistory and was and is actively hostile – or at least indifferent – to psychohistory. As a result, he turned to work not directly related to a psychoanalytic perspective. Just last year, I had a student – who has since undertaken study in Russia and transferred to Hamilton College – tell me that my seminar on the Irrational in History had made him reflect on what it means to be a human being in ways he never had before.

PHE: What is the importance of childhood to psychohistory?

GCC: It remains crucial, particularly as we learn more from fields as diverse as sociology, anthropology, and neuropsychiatry – more about the ways in which the irrational and emotional is a lifelong phenomenon in human experience

PHE: Did what you learned about childhood in studying psychohistory impact on your own parenting?

GCC: I think it made my wife and me more sensitive to the importance of affect in nurturing our child's development as a confident and empathic human being. There may too much emphasis lately on raising “superkids” in terms of intellectual achievement and upward mobility, often at the expense of the self-reflection, creativity, and compassion that come with a greater (psychoanalytic) em-

phasis on honest and joyful confrontation with the challenges as well as the opportunities that come with being a human being.

PHE: How have your Albion and other colleagues responded to your interest in psychohistory and psychoanalysis?

GCC: I have had a few colleagues participate in my seminar, the Irrational in History, originally titled Psychohistory, but I have little contact regarding psychohistory with the Department of Psychology at Albion. I made a couple of presentations to it on psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in Nazi Germany. I don't think this was another academic psychology attempt to further sully Freud's name. The present direction of that department is toward neuropsychiatry along the lines of traditional empirical psychology. On the other hand, as I noted, some current neuropsychiatric research has confirmed some of Freud's hypotheses about the role of memory and emotion, and so there may be some collaboration in the future. But a psychoanalytic viewpoint is still most comfortable in the other social sciences and in the humanities, and so there is even greater potential with colleagues in those disciplines. Finally, the most important cross-fertilization occurs in the minds of students who take courses across the curriculum, taking and bringing their knowledge and perspectives across disciplinary boundaries for their own benefit and that of other students and the professors (see “Teaching Undergraduates Psychohistory,” *Clio's Psyche* 4 (1997): 86-87).

PHE: Congratulations on your 2004 Teacher of the Year Award. What is your philosophy of teaching? Has it been influenced at all by your psychohistorical/psychoanalytic education and associations?

GCC: I am an enthusiast by nature and I think I can enthuse students about the drama and significance of history and human experience. I think exposure to psychoanalytic thought only strengthens this enthusiasm for discovery in all realms of human life; the subtlety and difficulty of psychoanalysis also sharpens the mind, the effects of which are another boon to students who are looking for insight and inspiration. I also think that the combination of my expertise in modern German and European history with psychoanalysis enhances a certain ethical *gravitas* I regularly feel inside and outside of the

classroom. Both history and psychoanalysis demonstrate that human motive and action can be very difficult and damaging, so the potential and actual joy in life should be treasured while also maintaining the awareness, for ourselves and others, of the dangers of the world.

PHE: Has your intellectual knowledge of psychoanalysis and psychohistory helped you with your administrative duties as departmental chair at Albion?

GCC: It might be best to ask my colleagues about that! I can say that my administrative style is “hands-off,” that is, I try to minimize the amount of administration and allow colleagues to do their own and the college’s work. This, of course, resembles the non-directional approach of a psychoanalyst. It also corresponds with my dislike of too much administrative work, which in turn might represent a reaction against my authoritarian tendency to take care of things myself rather than leaving them to others. All of this, I am sure, reveals elements of unconscious conflicts and motives.

PHE: What is the Heinz Kohut Fund and what did the grant from it that you received in 1991 support?

GCC: The Heinz Kohut Memorial Fund is based at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis and supports research into the life and work of Heinz Kohut. In my case, a generous grant from the Kohut Fund helped, along with a National Library of Medicine Publication Grant, finance a yearlong sabbatical to edit the Kohut correspondence.

GCC: I think Strozier’s book is a very well-written and well-researched biography of Kohut (see my review in *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 50 (2003): 1385-90). There are a few errors of fact, some of which are perhaps related to his strong preference for Kohut’s self psychology over Freud’s drive theory. As Peter Loewenberg points out in this regard, Strozier mistitles Freud’s “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death” (1915) as “Thoughts on War and Peace.” Along the same lines, I think Strozier makes too little of the controversial issue of Kohut himself actually being the patient in his famous case study, “The Two Analyses of Mr. Z” (1979). Strozier is properly skeptical of both sides in the debate, but he soft-pedals his own claim to have early on at the Chicago Institute

argued for the fact of Kohut’s “deception.” If Strozier was among those who at the time or soon after had intuited Kohut as “Mr. Z,” then in my view he deserves more credit than he gives himself by scattering references to the similarities between Kohut’s life and that of “Mr. Z” throughout the book to the detriment of the emphasis such a possibility – or likelihood – deserves. It may be that Strozier feels that he is betraying those close colleagues of Kohut who have always maintained that Kohut would never have constructed what they regard as an unethical strategy of deception.

PHE: When did you first develop an interest in film and how do you explain the intensity of this interest?

GCC: I’ve always loved film – it was an adjunct to my early interest in reading history. In college I took a course in film, wrote one of my first papers in German history on Siegfried Kracauer’s *From Caligari to Hitler* (1947), and have always striven to use films in my classes. Feature films, particularly those made with intellectual and artistic integrity, can tell us a great deal about a time and place. So can run-of-the-mill entertainment fare, too, as I have found especially in my team-taught (first English, now Political Science) Film Images of World War II. Students, as even more products of a visual culture than I was, respond well to film. They often don’t read so well, but they are visually attuned to notice things in the structure of film. The only problem lately is the style of quick-editing pioneered by MTV and advertising media gives contemporary students very short attention spans, so they tend to lose focus unless something different and (thus) “interesting” is happening every few seconds. All the more reason, of course, to have them watch films *and* read books.

As for the “intensity” of this interest, I’m sure it has something to do with my unconscious but I can’t tell you what that is. I think, maybe a little like Kubrick, I have always seen film as a curious and compelling window on the world, particularly on that world of the century when film was invented. In a way, a film even more than a book can be like history, a *Gesamtkunstwerk* of words, images, and sounds that represents the world of human experience, filled and overfilled with conditions, choices, and contingencies. At the same time,

I never rely just on film. Books, both non-fiction and fiction, remain the primary complement to, and basis for, lecture and discussion in all of my classes.

PHE: How open have you found the historical profession to be to the study of film?

GCC: My contemporaries and younger colleagues at Albion and elsewhere take its value as self-evident. Some older colleagues have reservations, but even most of them over the years are at least willing to grant the value of film study even if they themselves don't exploit it.

PHE: You rightfully show the connection of dreams to the cinema. In your dreams do you get information you can use in your scholarly research?

GCC: I can say that I use dreams in my teaching, particularly by way of illustration of dreamwork in my "psychohistory" seminar. More often, in my scholarly work I've experienced the common phenomenon of inspiration or interpretation coming from daydreaming or half-consciousness, which I suppose operates along similar lines as full-fledged dreams.

PHE: In your experience and life, are high achievers more identified with their fathers?

GCC: I don't know if high achievers are more identified with their fathers. Is this question meant to apply equally to men and to women, to heterosexuals and homosexuals, to members of all ethnic and cultural groups? I would be uncomfortable with any such generalization. Is identification – however that troublesome term may be defined – the only or most important dynamic in terms of achievement? How do we define "achievement"? Hitler had a life of achievement just as did Freud, but of course the origins, direction, and effects of these respective achievements had to be drastically different. As for me (and my modest achievements), I see much of my father in myself but that is true as well of certain characteristics of my mother.

PHE: Following up on an issue raised by Freud, what is the impact of parental loss on your level of achievement and those of subjects you have studied?

GCC: My father died in 1991 when I was 42 and

my mother when I had just turned 52 in 2000. I have been fairly steady in my level of achievement in teaching and scholarship over the years, with a "burst" of scholarly publication in the mid-to-late 1980s and another "burst" in the mid-to-late 1990s. I've published less since my mother died, but I don't know if her death had anything to do with it. I assume that if I were doing psychohistorical or, especially, psychobiographical work, the impact of such events on my work would be more evident. My father died, after an extended stay in a hospice, during my work on the Kohut correspondence and I remember Elizabeth Kohut saying that work must be a balm at such times – and she was right.

PHE: How do you explain the growth and psychology of fundamentalism?

GCC: I have no particular thoughts about issues of fundamentalism, violence, terrorism, or the millennium. Well, yes, I do have one: I find all types of fundamentalism (religious, political, or whatever) disturbing, because of its resort to narrowness of mind and spirit. It lacks the humility and empathy that comes from understanding, as psychoanalysis and history do, that the world and human life are complex and irreducible to the type of certainty that fundamentalism embraces in an attempt to escape the responsibility of facing common human challenges honestly and bravely.

PHE: What are your thoughts on the psychology and psychodynamics of violence in our world?

GCC: I don't know that I can say anything in brief fashion that has much value. I will say that I am on the political left (social democrat/democratic socialist) not because I believe that human beings are basically good. I think we must strive to take care of each other as best we can, not only because it is the right and kind thing to do but also because my hard-headed Freudian realism tells me that people who are treated badly will be the worst they can be while people who are treated well can be expected to behave better. Peter Loewenberg put this very well once when he spoke about Freud maintaining a *Weltanschauung* that sought for human society a liberty that is not license. A nice balance, that, I think, between agency and constraint and between hope and fear.

PHE: How do you understand the psychology of

terrorism? How has 9/11 impacted on our society and what psychohistorical insights do you have about this?

GCC: Terror has been pretty universal in human history and it has taken many forms. My concern about *Al Qaeda* is that it is comprised of fundamentalists who see nothing but themselves in their construction of "God." I would not define terrorism only as Americans now understand it after 9/11. Support for *Al Qaeda* can and does arise from the effects of a history of terror in other forms – in particular, bombing from the air – exercised by Western nations around the world. There is also no doubt that individual psychology, along with history and cultural influence, plays a role in the creation of a terrorist. There is clearly a *passion* within human beings for violence and destruction that can all too easily be mobilized by external conditions. Kubrick's *Dr. Strangelove* (1964) is an excellent study of the type of violent "apocalyptic thinking" based on a hyperrationalized and hypermasculinized war culture that characterized certain segments of the military and political elite of the major powers during and after the Second World War. It certainly overlaps with the mindset of those we more readily label terrorists.

PHE: What books were important to your development?

GCC: Norman O. Brown, *Life Against Death* (1959); Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*; Peter Loewenberg, *Decoding the Past* (1983); Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (1962); Marc Bloch, *French Rural History* (1931); Robert Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution* (1960); I. F. Stone, *In a Time of Torment* (1967); John Steinbeck, *The Grapes of Wrath* (1939); A. A. Milne, *Autobiography* (1939); Thomas Pynchon, *Gravity's Rainbow* (1973); and Paul Carell, *The Foxes of the Desert* (1961).

The last book was one that early on most reinforced my interest in German history, though in the problematic way I have alluded to before. Carell's book is typical of those at the time (and since) that idealize the German military (for example, "no SS in the Afrika Korps") in the Second World War. This was – and still is – especially the case with Rommel, who was admired in the West

during and after the war as a "gentleman" soldier and an opponent of Hitler. We now know that this portrait must be corrected by the context of Rommel's early support for Germany's rearmament under Hitler and his late and conditional opposition to him for ruining Germany – and not so much, if at all, for exterminating Jews. I do remember, however, somewhat of a *kairotic* moment (the right opportunity) when my boyhood "WWII buddy" in Los Angeles made a joke about the mechanical killing of Jews and I thought *that* was not funny *and* unrelated to my interest in the German military. It was not unrelated, of course, and I think that from that time on I began to doubt my – and my culture's – convenient division of "good" Germans and "bad" Nazis, a perspective that informed my dissertation research on psychotherapists in the Third Reich and the concomitant trend in the study of Nazi Germany toward more complicated, differentiated, but also more comprehensive assessments of individual and collective blame for Nazi crimes.

I would also add, if I may, the following *films*: *Rashomon* (Akira Kurosawa, 1951); *Blow-Up* (Michelangelo Antonioni, 1966); *To Kill a Mockingbird* (Robert Mulligan, 1962); *How I Won the War* (Richard Lester, 1967); *Night and Fog* (Alain Resnais, 1955); *Ararat* (Atom Egoyan, 2002); *Chinatown* (Roman Polanski, 1974); *Tess* (Roman Polanski, 1980); *Fontane Effi Briest* (Rainer Werner Fassbinder, 1974); *No Regrets for Our Youth* (Akira Kurosawa, 1946); *Orlando* (Sally Potter, 1993); *Rosa Luxemburg* (Margarethe von Trotta, 1986); *The Sorrow and the Pity* (Marcel Ophuls, 1971); *Wild Strawberries* (Ingmar Bergman, 1957); and all of Kubrick's films.

PHE: Who was important to your development as a student of psychosocial phenomena? Did Erik Erikson have an impact on you? What mentors come to mind?

GCC: Erikson was an early inspiration – one of my early essays on Hitler used Erikson's "The Legend of Hitler's Childhood" as a point of departure both for an analysis of Guy Sajer's *The Forgotten Soldier* (1971) and an attempt at a Rankian analysis of Hitler's psyche. Loewenberg's essays were, of course, the best and most immediate sources of direct inspiration in terms of applying psychoanalytic theory to my major field of German history. My

obvious – and ongoing – mentors were Rolle and Loewenberg. Since I ended up in a small history department at a small college in the Midwest, I did not have the opportunity to work closely with other people in the field of “psychohistory,” but (or therefore) still happily spent a great deal of time teaching and learning European history generally.

PHE: Please list the five people who you think have made the greatest contribution to psychohistory in order of their contribution.

GCC: They are Sigmund Freud, Erik Erikson, Peter Loewenberg, Bruce Mazlish, and Fawn Brodie.

PHE: Thanks for an interesting interview. □

The Causes, Meanings and Aftermath of Violence in Contemporary America

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Review of Howard Stein, Beneath the Crust of Culture: Psychoanalytic Anthropology and the Cultural Unconscious in American Life. New York: Rodopi, 2004, paperback. ISBN 90-420-0818-0, ix-xv + 137 pp., \$44.00.

In the wake of the September 11th attacks, the possibility of widespread violence in the United States is more palpable than ever before. As I commute from my home in New York City to Ramapo College in New Jersey, I occasionally find myself wondering whether the George Washington Bridge will be the target of an attack, and whether this might happen as I transverse it. Many people in the New York metropolitan area share such anxieties, which are fueled by the government's periodic security alerts. This makes the book *Beneath the Crust of Culture* particularly timely. It aims to help us understand the causes and meanings of some of the key crises in American history during the past decade: the attacks of 9/11, the Columbine high school massacre, the execution of Timothy McVeigh, hypernationalism, and corporate downsizing. Even more significantly, the book addresses the issue of how we confront and cope with disasters and loss.

As a graduate student in anthropology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, I was not introduced to psychoanalytic anthropology which remains a less common approach in the field. Most anthropologists would agree with the fundamental premise of the book: that the most visible and tangible aspects of culture cannot be taken at face value, and that the deeper meanings of culture must be uncovered through research. Howard Stein employs psychoanalysis as a way of revealing these inner meanings. As he argues on page 121, “psychodynamic processes are often the underpinnings (the ‘core’) of what we observe on the surface as the ‘whole’ culture (the ‘crust’).” Demonstrating the utility of this theory for analyzing culture is one of his main motives for writing this book. While Stein offers many interesting insights into these crises and problems, many anthropologists will remain skeptical of the utility of this approach.

One fundamental problem with Stein's book is that he seeks to analyze American culture as if it were a united and homogenous entity. In this vast country, marked by class, race, regional and other differences, the concept of an American culture is probably best understood as an ideological prototype. People gain the sense that they share a culture through representations, particularly those in the media, as Benedict Anderson argued in his landmark study, *Imagined Communities*. For example, it is primarily through the media that people throughout the country were able to experience and to know the events of September 11, and thus were able to reaffirm the sense that they belong to a wider national community.

It is not surprising then that in his effort to analyze “American culture,” Stein focuses on many events that have been the focus of major mass media attention. Even while he cautions against assuming that there is one meaning of a disaster or other event, he makes broad generalizations about what these events meant to people in America. I believe that this shortcoming stems from the fact that, unlike most anthropologists, he infrequently uses data that is based upon ethnographic fieldwork. Much of the data that Stein draws upon come from these media representations. I believe that Stein could convince many anthropologists to see the merits of the psychodynamic approach if his arguments were more grounded in the experiences of

particular communities and individuals in the United States.

The first chapter focuses on the meanings and causes of the attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the responses to the attacks. He argues that people bring meaning to disasters and shows how the interpretation of these events drew upon shared unconscious fantasies, fantasies that are sustained in films, videogames and other media. These fantasies were not the direct cause of the attacks; rather they were linked to the attacks through what Stein identifies as a "tacit cultural suggestibility" (p.6). In another section, he uses Freudian theory to analyze the symbols of the attacks and to comprehend the motivations of the attackers. He makes the important critical point that the terrorists were not just responding to U.S. policies and actions, but also to what the United States represents (p.16).

Chapter two investigates the Columbine high school massacre. His central argument here is that the massacre was, in part, a reaction to the feelings of "disposability" generated by corporate downsizing. This is a satisfying theory in that it seeks to historicize this tragic event by relating it to the larger economic context. While Stein's fascinating analysis of the symbolic violence manifested by massive corporate layoffs is convincing, he does not adequately demonstrate whether and how this phenomenon was experienced in the community in Littleton, Colorado. He merely shows that there are parallels between the forms of symbolic violence enacted by corporations and the types of violence carried out by the youths who carried out the massacre. Here, ethnographic fieldwork in this community would provide data to bolster his argument, as would some supporting data regarding the economic context in that particular place. Stein devotes a fair amount of time to analyzing the two youths who carried out these acts, examining their thirst for revenge against high school peers and the meanings of the symbols that were employed in the massacre. Yet he also attempts to link the motivations of these youths to forces in wider society. For example, he shows how social dynamics in high school mirror those in the corporate world. Despite his allegiance to psychoanalysis, Stein eschews the use of narrowly bounded individual psychology as a means of understanding acts like these massacres (p.27). His key point in this chapter is that adoles-

cents who commit such heinous acts are not aberrant monsters but are in some way produced by processes within our society. This is a provocative and important argument that goes against many popular assumptions. Only by taking responsibility for people who commit acts of violence will society be able to address the root causes of such problems.

Chapter three is a brief, five-page interpretation of the execution of Timothy McVeigh. Here, Stein continues the theme that society disavows any connection with those who commit acts of large-scale violence. Most of the chapter reviews McVeigh's life and examines the meaning of the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma for him.

Chapter four addresses hypernationalism and xenophobia, as manifested in corporate America. Here his main agenda is to highlight the parallels between the psychodynamic processes of group formation that function in ethnic and nationalist movements and those that operate in corporations. This is one of the few chapters that draws on ethnographic data, and his vignettes from workplaces illuminate how groups are created by identifying enemies. Stein is on less solid ground when he moves from showing the similarity between dynamics of ethnic and nationalist movements and the corporate workplace to arguing that they are equivalent. His suggestion that the style in which corporations carry out mass firings "illustrates the presence of hypernationalist, xenophobic thinking in ordinary workplaces" seems to overstate the case (p.65).

The focus of chapter five is on how we make sense of disasters. At the end of the chapter, Stein summarizes his important recommendations for dealing with disasters. Disasters do not mean the same things to everyone, he asserts: people employ multiple, competing frameworks for making sense of any disaster. This is an excellent point but it could have been demonstrated with more concrete examples. Furthermore, this point could be brought to bear on his interpretation of the events of 9/11 in chapter one.

In chapter six, "Mourning and Society," Professor Stein shows how mourning is a far more prevalent practice than usually assumed. He argues that "the idea of mourning and of defenses against it

help to account for a wide array of otherwise mystifying phenomena” (p.115). Humans engage in mourning not just following the loss of a loved one or after some other tragic event; rather, mourning is part of ordinary social life. Shifts in scientific theories, for example, are accompanied by mourning, since people must adjust to leaving an old view of the world behind. Wars and ethnic conflict can be explained partially as defenses against mourning, he argues. This is an intriguing argument and can help us to understand the emotional dimension of the experience of social change.

Many of Stein's insights could also be applied to other contexts beyond America. As I read the book, I thought of how a psychodynamic approach might help us to analyze the current Maoist conflict in Nepal, my main research site, where an estimated 10,000 people have been killed since 1996. While it is clear that both the government's army and police forces, as well as the army of the Maoists are to blame for these deaths, the government in Nepal has been quick to label the Maoists “terrorists” and to demonize them. How is the violence, both by Maoists and the government, made possible by other forces in Nepali society? What are the psychological effects of the various forms of symbolic and real violence for people in Nepal? What are the multiple frameworks that people are using to make sense of the trauma of the death or “disappearance” of kin and neighbors, and of the loss of homes, as people flee their homes to escape the violence? How does unresolved mourning perpetuate, rather than resolve, the violence in Nepal? Addressing these questions, inspired by Stein's analysis, would lead to a deeper understanding of the conflict that would supplement the prevalent political and economic analyses.

Although earlier versions of the essays comprising this book have been published elsewhere, collected as a group, these essays provide the reader with a solid sense of the variety of Stein's applications of group psychoanalysis/ psychohistory. In sum, this is a compelling and challenging book that will raise many questions for both academics and non-specialists about the deeper meanings behind major crises in American society.

Psychohistory makes the unconscious conscious

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Creative and Destructive Leaders of Large Groups

Peter Petschauer
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Review of Vamik Volkan, Blind Trust: Large Groups and Their Leaders in Times of Crisis and Terror. Charlottesville, VA: Pitchstone Publishing, 2004. Hardcover ISBN 0-9728875-2-0, \$29.95, paperback ISBN 0-9728875-3-9, \$19.95; 368 pages.

Once more, Vamik Volkan has given us an exceptionally stimulating analysis; this time he wrote specifically about large groups, how they function, and how their leaders “use” them for good or ill. Particularly refreshing about Volkan's work is the breath of his insights. He applies psychology, history, political science, and his own experiences with international negotiations in addition to his many interviews.

Especially convincing are Volkan's comparisons between leaders who repair their societies for societal benefit as opposed to those who undermine and even destroy their people for their own personal benefit. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Julius Kambarage Nyerere, and Nelson Mandela are men whom Volkan sees as positive influences for their societies. Not surprisingly, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Slobodan Milosevic, and Enver Hoxha of Albania are his examples of destructive leaders. Between these extremes, Richard Nixon stands as an example in the balance. The discussion on how each of the repairers integrated traumatic childhood and adulthood experiences into a positive construction of his personality and how destroyers attained the opposite result is totally absorbing. The repairers, who are often teachers, turned truly horrid events of their lives, as Mandela did with his extensive prison stays, to insights that up-

lifted both them and their societies. By contrast, the destroyers were unable to integrate their traumatic experiences or the disliked parts of their personalities to this degree, externalizing them instead as abuse and hatred of those whom they learned to despise.

Interesting, too, is how each of these men dealt with enemies. Mandela pinpointed the abusive system of apartheid, and Ataturk, the illiteracy and ignorance of the population as a whole and the traditional leadership. By contrast, Hitler saw the enemies as persons, that is, Jews, Gypsies, and other undesirables, and Milosevic saw them in the Muslim descendants of the men who defeated Prince Lazar in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389.

These discussions about healing or poisoning leaders, largely based on insights regarding narcissism, are matched by equally insightful analyses of Islamic fundamentalism. Very helpful here is Volkan's ability to separate deeply held religious faith, like that of a befriended Russian Orthodox priest in Estonia who tolerates other believers, from fundamentalists of various sorts, including Muslims, Christians, and Jews who react negatively toward "outsiders." The elaborations on Islam, from the earliest days of the Prophet Muhammad, through the Ottoman Empire's defeat in front of Vienna on September 11 (actually 12), 1683, to bin Laden are "a must read" for understanding today's confrontations in the Middle East. Although Volkan warns us to hold off judgment as to evaluations of President George W. Bush's approach to "terrorism," many who have studied ethnic/religious violence, warfare, and recent military occupations, are ready to argue that the U.S. was ill advised in its recent approach to the Islamic world in Iraq.

Volkan's approach is similar to the school of psychohistorians that emphasizes the experiences of childhood and group fantasies as determiners of the course of history. Somewhat in contrast, Volkan very carefully analyzes the childhoods of numerous individuals and the experiences of very specific groups. In doing so, he describes the influences of traumas on personality development and leaders' positive and negative manipulations of children, young people, and adults, including the constructive and destructive energies to which they are

able to harness such experiences. I suspect that this talented psychiatrist and founder of the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI) might have used to his advantage the insights of this group of psychohistorians.

No doubt, Hitler and his minions endeavored to create a *Volksgemeinschaft* (Community of the *Volk*) in ways that Volkan describes. The National Socialist regime tried to make families serve its needs and to pull children away from their families for the greater good of Germany, a point well illustrated in the film *Europa, Europa*. However, the author overlooks the great variety of Germans and Germanies that existed in the 12 years of National Socialist rule. For example, while he is correct that the number of youths who attended Youth Film Hour increased into the millions by 1943, most of us also attended church on Sundays and were offered *Religionsunterricht* (catechism) in *Volksschule* (elementary school) by a priest or a minister. In reality, only one of my friends and acquaintances who grew up in various parts of Germany in the 1930s and 1940s felt that her family's authority was undermined. Especially in cities, children were glad to get out into "mother nature" and equally glad to be back home for a decent meal.

I am troubled by the consistent misspelling of German words. For example, "*Mutter, erzähl von Adolf Hitler! ... Ein Buch zum ... Nacherzahlen und Selbstlesen für kleinere und grössere Kinder*" (pp. 75-76) [Mother, tell us of Adolf Hitler!...A book to ... retell and read oneself for smaller and larger children] should be "*Mutter, erzähl von Adolf Hitler! ... Nacherzählen ... für ... grössere Kinder.*" The problem that emerges with *nacherzahlen* instead of *nacherzählen* is that *nacherzahlen* could easily be mistaken for *nachherzahlen*, that is, to pay later.

Misspellings sometimes warn us of problems with large group analyses. But none of the above critiques imply more than that in a vast survey – with many different fields, geographic areas, and persons involved – an author will not be in control of every detail. They also do not imply other flaws. *Blind Trust* is a brilliant book that should be read by everyone who is at all concerned with leadership and large groups, and how leaders' child-

hoods and adulthoods create the positive and destructive ways with which they lead their own and other societies.

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Psychohistory Applied to Military Leadership

Amy C. Hudnall

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Review of Robert Pois and Philip Langer, Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. Hardcover ISBN 0-253-34378-X, xviii, 283 pages, \$29.95.

Pois and Langer claim in *Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership* to show “that psychology has an explanatory role to play in historical analysis rather than to serve simply as a vehicle for extraordinary generalizations on the nature of man” (p. x). In accomplishing this end, the authors provide us with the first text that concisely examines a process of thought: “military failure due to dysfunctional personal rigidity” (p. ix) across historical events and the individuals that helped form the outcomes of those events. The idea is intriguing and to do it justice requires a tremendous amount of research, which Pois and Langer perform admirably. Through this concept, they open the door of psychohistory even wider, inviting analyses in new and expanding forms. However, I hope that those following in the footsteps of Pois and Langer can refine this new way of psychologically analyzing aspects of history; for although the concept is inspired, the outcome, at times, becomes plodding and repetitive, and their choice of leaders is imbalanced.

Command Failure in War includes an evaluation of Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf; Napoleon in Russia; Robert E. Lee, George

McClellan, and John Hood, all of the American Civil War; the British military during World War I; and the German military at Stalingrad during WWII. Herein is my first criticism of the book, their choice of generals appears to be random at best. In their introduction, the authors do acknowledge that they chose military leaders in whom they had a personal interest or background, and “there was no attempt to provide any balance” (p ix). But this reasoning is insufficient; the reader needs to understand why the choice is so skewed toward 20th-century leaders, the American Civil War, and a Western point of view – not merely because it is an “odd sort of read,” but because particular behaviors are influenced by time, culture, and environment. In all fairness, the authors include in their conclusion one mention of Japanese generals in WWII and the impact of different times and cultures on their argument. But the comment comes a little late in the text. Their hypothesis would carry more weight if proven across these variables or if they had addressed the reason for particular omissions from the beginning. How can they successfully argue any common outcome when three of the six chapters of analysis are devoted to Civil War leaders? How do they know that some of the choices made by these leaders were not unique to the particular culture or time? Granted, drawing in non-Western military leadership would probably have been an impossible task, but it would have soothed this reader if the authors had at least acknowledged that battles and leadership mistakes occur in parts of the world other than the West.

Although the authors’ choice of leaders weakens their otherwise promising argument – that rigidity in leadership is the common theme/mistake found across these case studies – they still provide a thought-provoking and groundbreaking analysis. By using various models of in-depth psychology – identity diffusion, group think, field theory, achievement need, cognitive dissonance, frustration-aggression hypothesis, and *folie a deux*, to name only a few – Pois and Langer argue that they always came to the same conclusion: even among generals with a string of successes, the moment of failure occurred because of an inability to adapt to changes in the battle, a lack of flexibility. If this thesis holds true it could have a resounding impact on the training of future military leaders.

In the individual details of the generals and their failures, the book provides deeply complex and thoroughly researched evaluations. Pois and Langer's recounting of moment-by-moment events provide the reader with a vivid sense of each leader's heightened emotions. Their choice of psychological model for any given event is carefully argued and convincing. Sometimes, though, it is too well argued, to the point of becoming tedious. I questioned whether I was missing some subtle point. Perhaps my stronger grounding in history overshadowed my psychology background, causing me to overlook the need for such repetition. But I don't think so. For example, the authors repeatedly refer to McClellan's tendency to avoid actual combat and continue training his men. Granted this is a key part of their analysis, but, unnecessarily, their point was made multiple times. In discussing the untenable situation at Stalingrad, the authors reiterate – three times, in three different ways – that the German Commander Paulus was waiting for a clear order to withdraw and seemed paralyzed to commence the withdrawal without such an order. Again, this is an important point in arguing for the development of groupthink, and his inability to act with only vague orders did result in the destruction of his army. But does the reader need to be told three times?

In regard to the technical aspects of this book, Indiana University Press is to be commended for finding the funding to allow for copious endnotes, a complete bibliographic section, and an index. Given the current financial difficulties of many university presses, it is all the more relevant that a publisher continues to maintain a certain level of scholarly development. If the text were to go into a second printing, however, the reader might find some of Pois and Langer's many battle details more understandable if maps were provided. Not all of the case studies require them, but some of the more complex battles, like the Battle of Stalingrad and McClellan's battle at Malvern Hill, would be easier to comprehend with maps.

In conclusion, although I have made criticisms of the text, I believe that Pois and Langer have contributed a groundbreaking book to the field – groundbreaking in its form of analysis and through its suggestion that rigidity in the field typically results in failure. The premises at the heart of

the book are well argued, and it opens the door to new and more complex studies. Globally, Pois and Langer's book begs the question that if we claim war is dysfunctional, then how can we claim battle strategies and plans to be "functional" – as all analyses of wars implicitly do? If war allows leaders to shine for a moment in their lives, does this infer that outside of war they likely will not succeed because they are dysfunctional? If that is the case, then how do we help these social "outsiders" become functional without war – or, if there is war, and these would-be successful leaders have become functional, can they still succeed? Locally, one could hope that this work will encourage similar studies across cultures, periods, or classes of warfare. Finally, *Command Failure in War* seems to be a fitting memorial for a respected psychohistorian, Robert Pois, who died January 18, 2004, leaving us with a significant final legacy and many new probing questions.

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A Rich Psychological Meal

Marshall S. Harth
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Review of Leon Rappoport, How We Eat: Appetite, Culture, and the Psychology of Food. Toronto, Ontario: ECW Press, 2003. Paperback, ISBN 1550225634, 224 pp., \$15.95.

Eating is the primal communal human ex-

perience. From the original placental connection through nurturing nursing to breaking bread and the ultimate ritualized spiritual communion, how, what, and why we eat constitutes an essential component of what it means to be human. It is the reflective experience of this reality of our existence that serves as the focus of Leon Rappoport's volume. He presents the perpetual dialectic between autonomy and dependency with respect to food that each of us has attempted to traverse in our own development. No matter how much we want to be independent, we are eternally dependent upon food. It is the umbilicus of our consciousness of self in a natural world of eating and being eaten.

I feel that Rappoport clearly points out the need for a psychological analysis of how we eat. The "hook" for this reader was already in the Introduction when Rappoport shares his very own journey between the starvation of the Holocaust survivor and the asceticism of the Zen practitioner, which coalesces in the focused attention of the psychological experience of "no food." The meanings of this experience transcend the usual and point to the essential human existential drama of eat/no eat. One by chance, one by choice.

Rappoport takes an interdisciplinary tour of food by looking at historical, anthropological, sociological, philosophical, psychological, and metaphysical perspectives. Such a broad range provides a most interesting perspective. Rappoport tells us, "It took me another few years to realize that, where the meanings of food are concerned, the absence of a central thesis is the central thesis." This becomes a central point of the book. In the absence of meaning, we construct meaning. This leads to the enculturation of food and, via geographical isolation, the almost literal perception of the speciation of food as representations of culture. Culture viewed as absolutely categorical to such an extent that we eventually end up with the view that "What 'we' eat is good, what 'they' eat is bad." This, of course, results in the eventual relativistic assessment of food values.

Having established in the Introduction that the field of psychology has essentially overlooked food, Rappoport goes on to explore its interstices with human experience. He offers a psychological perspective on how we eat as a major organizing

theme. In Chapter 1, "From Myths to MacAttacks," he points out, "It is precisely because so many of our common eating behaviors appear to be irrational that the social and psychological meanings of food are so powerful." For example, the popularity of fast foods among the urban poor is explained as a reaction to the barrenness of life: "...when people are leading boring, unhappy lives, they are not interested in healthy foods but prefer anything that is stimulating, cheap, and convenient." This is a demonstration of how Rappoport uses the psychohistorical approach of taking the obvious and exploring the hidden as well as taking the hidden and making it the obvious. For example, "...children today not only do not eat what their parents ate when they were children but also eat food items that did not exist when their parents were children." Does this "disconnect" have an impact on our continuity of cultural experience? Such are the questions that come to mind as one reads *How We Eat*.

In Chapter 2, "You Are What You Eat," the genderization of food is discussed. Food is an indicator of gender identity: there are feminine foods such as rice, cake, and tea compared to masculine foods such as meat, potatoes, and coffee. This is, of course, all attributable to the psychological principle of conditioned associations, as Rappoport ably points out. There is also an interesting discussion of the "morality" of food. "'Ours' is right and superior and smells good; 'theirs' is wrong and inferior and smells bad, no matter whom 'they' are." This attitude generates the basis for many ethnic slurs in our culture. All of which substantiate the "fact" that "You are what you eat."

Clinically the best chapter is "Feeding Frenzies" (Chapter 3), which offers an up-to-date overview of the psychopathology of eating disorders and their psychological underpinnings, especially as related to the original question of independence/dependence on food. Rappoport presents a compassionate and compelling case for taking a biopsychosocial approach to the current increase in reported cases of eating disorders as a societal response to industrial modernity. He says we have changed our view of our body from "something given to us" to an "object we possess." This then gets warped in the trappings of low self-esteem and frustrations over insecurities during early feeding incidents. Rappoport also introduces, in addition to this psy-

choanalytic analysis, a contemporary feminist analysis of the situation as it relates to young women's rejections of the societal demands of the adult female role expectations as they enter puberty and the option of "dieting" as a means of control and asserting independence becomes possible.

In, "The McDonaldization of Taste" (Chapter 4), the social and emotional exchange value of food is explored, frequently from a Marxist perspective. "Food ideologies influence how we think, and try to persuade us how we ought to think, about" food. Rappoport contends that we no longer have direct contact with our food, that is, an "immediate food experience"; rather, we have a "mediated food experience." We do not directly taste; rather we contextually taste. Whether it is good or not good depends. The three main ideologies presented for analysis are hedonism, nutritionalism, and spiritualism. Rappoport notes that hedonism promises pleasure, nutritionalism promises health based on the modernity of science, and spiritualism promises a metaphysical or moral state of grace. Since all three play contrasting but essential roles in the determination of what and how we eat, Rappoport here helps the reader to embrace the built-in conundrum of human existence by pointing out that the original function of eating is for survival. Ironically, he points out that humans are the only species that engages in ritual fasting and ritual feasting. We flirt with the extremes – a dance of dependence-independence, no doubt.

Another context, the social/political is exemplified by the following: "McDonaldization is the process whereby all or most other social values become subordinated to efficiency, convenience, and immediate gratification of artificial needs. All this, of course, follows from the entrepreneurial profit motive, and never mind the traditional values that get pushed to the wall."

Psychohistorians will enjoy the chapter that explores the history of food, "From the Raw to the Cooked to the Haute Cuisine" (Chapter 5). Herein he explores the theories of Carl Jung, Sigmund Freud, and Claude Levi-Strauss, while examining the development of the open-air food market. How does it satisfy our needs for feelings of security, pleasure, and the primitive connection between the raw and the cooked? I was especially intrigued by

the class distinctions pointed out by Levi-Strauss with regard to why the rich "roast" and the poor "boil." The rich can afford to waste.

There is insufficient space to mention all the topics I enjoyed. Rappoport discusses the development of table manners, food vocabulary, military rations, "nutraceuticals," champagne slippers, and even the "Twinkie Defense." He makes wonderful use of Freud's defense mechanisms to elaborate on the relationships between food and sex and food and aggression.

By the last chapter we have been amply prepared for the answer to the big existential question about food. Rappoport says, "I am suggesting that the critical self-awareness about food relates in *fundamental* ways to central issues of personal meaning in the life course of any person." Self-awareness is crucial: "Without eating there is no being." So one *must* deal with food. *How We Eat* ends with a psychological flair that entices the reader to reflect on self and food, now and forever.

I thoroughly enjoyed my time with this book. I recommend it for general audiences as well as for those with more professional concerns, including chiefs and restaurateurs. Psychologists, psychohistorians, clinicians, and students both graduate and undergraduate will also benefit. For the scholar, it will be challenging to follow up on many of the research results discussed since there are no formal references. There is a list of general sources that will prove helpful as a place to begin.

Marshall S. Harth, PhD, received his doctorate in psychology from Rutgers University and is Professor of Psychology at Ramapo College of New Jersey where he is now in his 33rd year. He is the convener of the Substance Abuse Minor and former convener of the College Seminar Program. Dr. Harth, who recently has been writing poetry, has a private practice in psychotherapy in New York State. He can be contacted at <mharth@ramapo.edu>. □

Bulletin Board

The next **Psychohistory Forum WORK-IN-PROGRESS SATURDAY SEMINAR** is on **October 23, 2004** with the following speakers and presentations: **Jennefer Mazza, PhD** (Ramapo Col-

lege), "Psychological Explorations of the 2004 Election"; **Ted Goertzel, PhD** (Rutgers University), "Ralph Nader: The Political Psychology of a Puritanical Perfectionist"; **Paul Elovitz, PhD** (Ramapo College), "Bush and Kerry as Their Fathers' Sons and Contradictory Interpretations of George W. Bush"; and **Herbert Barry, PhD** (University of Pittsburgh), "Differences Between Candidate and President Kerry." The general topic is "Psychohistorical Aspects of Election 2004" and it is sponsored by the Forum's Research Group on the Childhood, Personality, and Psychology of Presidential Candidates and Presidents. E-mail pelovitz@aol.com for details. **CONFERENCES:** The 32nd Annual Conference of the **National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis** (NAAP) will be held on Saturday, October 9, 2004 in Manhattan. E-mail naap72@aol.com for details. The **Pacifica Graduate Institute's** October 15-17, 2004 conference, "When History Wakes: Cultural and Ecological Memory," is in Santa Barbara. The **Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction** (CSMHI) of the University of Virginia on October 23-24, 2004 is sponsoring the seminar, "Unraveling Trauma: Perspectives of Psychoanalysts, Psychosocial Providers, and Tribunals" in Charlottesville. The 15th Annual Conference of the **International Federation for Psychoanalytic Education** (IFPE) is scheduled for November 5-7, 2004 in Chicago. The 19th Annual Convention of the **German Society for Psychohistorical Research** will be held on March 11-13, 2005 in Zurich, focused on "Fundamentalism in Politics, the Economy, and Religion." The Calls for Papers are listed for the 28th annual conferences of the **International Psychohistorical Association** (IPA) in Manhattan on June 8-19, 2005 and the **International Society for Political Psychology** (ISPP) in Toronto, Canada, on July 3-6, 2005. E-mail contacts are psychhst@tiac.net and felicia.pratto@uconn.edu, respectively. **CONGRATULATIONS** to **Geoffrey Cocks** on the publication of *The Wolf at the Door: Stanley Kubrick, History, and the Holocaust* (NY: Peter Lang, 2004; ISBN 0-8204-7115-1) and **David Beisel** on the hardcover edition of *The Suicidal Embrace: Hitler, the Allies, and the Origins of the Second World War* (Nyack, NY: Circumstantial Productions Publishing, 2004; ISBN 1-891592-15-7, selling for \$30.00. Also, to **Flora Hogman** on

the publication of her article, "Reflections on Resilience, the Press, and the Hidden Children of the Holocaust," which was recently published in the *NYSIPA Notebook* (Vol. 16 No. 4), the official publication of New York State Psychological Association. **AWARDS:** The Psychohistory Forum has available the Young Scholars Membership Award, the *Clio Psyche* Subscription Award, and the Sidney Halpern Award for the Best Psychohistorical Idea or Accomplishment. The last may be granted at the graduate, undergraduate, or postgraduate level. **DEATHS:** **Margaret Brenman-Gibson** (1918-2004), ego psychologist, social activist, teacher, therapist, author, and colleague of Erik Erikson, died on May 10 after a long period of declining health. **Norman Cantor**, a distinguished medieval historian, died in Florida of heart failure on September 18, 2004 at age 74. He had published a small piece in these pages. **John E. Mack** of the Harvard University Medical Center was killed at age 74 by a reportedly drunk driver while in London, where he was scheduled to give a talk on T.E. Lawrence about whom he had written a Pulitzer Prize winning psychobiography. This psychiatrist had headed the Center for Psychology and Social Change and done controversial research on people who reported alien abductions. **OUR THANKS:** To our members and subscribers for the support that makes *Clio's Psyche* possible. To Benefactors Herbert Barry, Ralph Colp, and Mary Lambert; Patrons David Beisel, Andrew Brink, Peter Petschauer, H. John Rogers, Shirley Stewart, and Jacques Szaluta; Sustaining Members Charles Frederick (Fred) Alford and David Lotto; Supporting Members David Felix and Bob Lentz; and Members Suzanne Adrion, Margaret (Peggy) McLaughlin, Geraldine Pauling, Vivian Rosenberg, Charles Strozier, and Richard Weiss. Our thanks for thought-provoking

Praise for Clio's Psyche

"I like to think the [*Psychohistory*] Review has been reincarnated in Clio's Psyche!" Charles Strozier as quoted in "A Conversation with Charles Strozier on Heinz Kohut," (*Clio's Psyche*, Vol. 8, No. 2, September 2001, p. 90).

"Paul – Its up to you now – good luck with Clio. Larry." This is a hand written note on a May 1, 1999 letter from Larry Shiner, Editor of the *Psychohistory Review*, advising that the Review was ceasing publication. (Published with permission)

Clio's Psyche

Understanding the "Why" of Culture, Current Events, History, and Society

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The Scholarly Value of Dreams

Special Feature

A Dream of a Concentration Camp

Peter Petschauer
Appalachian State University

If anyone had told me a few months ago that a colonoscopy might have anything at all to do with psychohistory, I would have laughed; I have learned otherwise. Those who have experienced this intrusive procedure know that the day and night before it are uncomfortable as one drinks a vile liquid that purges one's bowels so that the doctor may have a clear view of any growths or obstruction in them. I experienced no exception. But the discomfort had the unique consequence in that for the second time in my life, I had a terrifying dream about a specific aspect of the past that interwove my conscious and my unconscious. Below I will describe my dream of January 14, 2004, and then give my associations and analysis.

The Dream: In the first scene of the dream, I was running to the latrine in a concentration camp; I was wearing poorly fitting and dirty prison garb. I desperately had to visit the latrine but an SS guard stopped me in the muddy area in front of the latrine. It was horrible to be stopped and the area itself was disgusting. He had me do push-ups until the pressure in my bowels exploded, soiling my pants further. I was disgusted with myself and ran on as the guard laughed. All this was truly upsetting because on the inside I felt like a lieutenant in the regular German army (*die Wehrmacht*). In the next scene I realized that I was half German and half Jewish, and that I was kneeling at the edge of a ravine. I was about to be shot by someone whom I could only see as a shadow from the corners of my eyes. Half turned, I told the man that I was a lieutenant in the army. "Ja, ja, me too," he said sarcastically. All
(Continued on Page 87)

IPA Group Process

Symposium

Attempting Group Analysis

Henry Lawton
International Psychohistorical Association

"Why We Attempt Group Process Analysis at the International Psychohistorical Association Convention" is the full title of this paper, which was distributed at the 2004 convention. Psychohistorians seek to understand why humans act as they do in history, primarily utilizing psychoanalytic theory. This involves understanding historical motivation on both individual and group levels. Toward this end, it is important to understand the reciprocal effect of individual on group and vice versa.
(Continued on next page)

Sigmund Freud's Medical Ego Ideals

Jacques Szaluta
United States Merchant Marine Academy

Sigmund Freud was a man of many professions. In addition to becoming a physician and, ultimately, a psychoanalyst, he wrote on art and artists, did translations, and studied philosophy and history. Freud admired and wrote about many different kinds of people, who can be categorized as medical, biblical, and philosophical personages. The men Freud admired, who may be designated as his "ego ideals," played a key role in his life and career. On the one hand, because of his interest in the study of the past, Freud sought historical figures for inspiration, and on the other, because of his revolutionary discoveries,
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A fair amount of a person's life takes place in the context of various groups (culture, town, religion, family, work, professional groups, etc.). Groups cannot exist without the individuals who belong to them; groups are made by their members, and members are made by their group experiences. There can be no "group mind" apart from those that constitute the group. More properly, "group mind" is an illusion, for how can there be a mind apart from those that make up the group? Whatever groups do—for better or worse—on the stage of history is the product of shared feeling, emotion and fantasy by the members of the group. Shared emotion/fantasy is crucial for understanding how and why groups work as they do rather than as the result of any sort of group mind. But such shared emotion and fantasy tends to be quite complex and intense, as well as anxiety provoking to try and understand. So perhaps it is not surprising that many scholars try to pretend such issues do not exist or resort to intellectualizations of varying degree in order to keep what can be quite terrifying

emotion/fantasy under control. One can make a case that much of traditional scholarship is to some degree a defense against the anxiety of facing the full emotional magnitude of groups, most especially the large group. Group psychohistory strives to avoid such defensiveness with varying degrees of success.

The key question remains—what does it take to understand groups and how they work? First of all, we read the writings of people such as W.R. Bion, John Hartman, Graham Gibbard, Richard Mann, Philip Slater, A.K. Rice, Didier Anzieu, Pierre Turquet, W. Gordon Lawrence, Lloyd deMause, and Helm Stierlin. We learn about small group and large group theory, leaderless self-analytic groups, group relations work, and approaches pioneered by the Tavistock Clinic. We learn about group fantasy, shared emotions and how group process works. This is not so simple because these things are essentially unconscious phenomena. One thing that can help is experiential learning, and indeed many of the workers in

this area have come up with various schemes of experiential learning to facilitate comprehension of group process. The approach we use in IPA is taken from the work of W.R. Bion, John Hartman and workers in small, leaderless self-analytic groups. The IPA is a large group (30-50+); hence, we generally have one or more persons who serve, with varying degrees of expertise, as facilitators of the group's effort to examine its process. Without attempting to impose any structure, we try to understand what is going on in the group as it happens. Such an approach is hardly perfect; while some of us see what happens as a chaotic theater for personal acting out by some members in service of their own pathology, some of us see it as a living laboratory for understanding how the group works and the often scary shared emotions and fantasies that constitute much of any group's life and history. If we wish to under-

stand group processes in historical groups how can we shrink from seeking to look at them among ourselves? Because this sort of effort is not for everyone, at the IPA, participation is strictly voluntary.

We continue our efforts to understand. How well we do varies from year to year, but we keep trying because understanding group process in history is important. Psychohistory is not some sterile exercise in intellectualization—we put ourselves on the line emotionally, because the better we understand ourselves in the life of the group, the better we can understand the “why” in history. Even though such effort can provoke anxiety and stimulate ambivalence among some of us, I continue to believe that as psychohistorians this is what we are supposed to be about.

Henry Lawton is a retired child welfare worker and has been a productive independent scholar in psychohistory for the last 30 years. Included among his many publications is The Psychohistorian's Handbook (1988). He has been group process analyst more than any other colleague at the IPA and may be reached at: <hwlipa@aol.com>. □

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Some Thoughts on Group Process at IPA Conventions

David Beisel
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Enthusiasts who argue for group process analysis as a regular part of the IPA conventions do seem to have a point. Mandating group process analysts at every IPA convention, with a formal group meeting at the end of every day's work, was established as a requirement at the very first IPA Convention, and was written into the IPA Constitution. It seemed to many of us a good idea at the time.

Theoretically, the notion makes very good sense—theoretically. The practice should ideally help members understand the unconscious motives and impulses, fantasies and fears, envy, angers, and insults at work in group members (they are, of course, at work in all groups), allowing time to express those feelings, and even provide an opportunity to interpret them based on the symbolic behaviors and preoccupations of group members. This is, after all, what we do, sometimes successfully, as psycho-

logical historians for historical groups, as well as for public political processes outside the IPA. The notion of the macrocosm in the microcosm is familiar in the social sciences, and even if it was not, experiencing group process analysis is at least a way of being reminded again of how all groups carry hidden emotional material, sometimes acting it out in self-defeating ways.

As a founding member of the IPA, and its first Convention Chair, I well remember the enthusiasm for our first group process, so ably handled by our first group process analysts, John Hartman and Alice Eichholz. Since then, I've seen many outstanding scholars—competent, caring, hard working people—have a go at it. It's been a testament to their courage and commitment, since what I've seen at virtually every IPA convention—I've been to 26 of the last 27 annual meetings—is not the intended outcome, but its exact opposite, no matter how hard those group process analysts worked to do the right thing.

Instead of the group pretty much staying together year after year, and going on with good work because people have been allowed to vent or at least hear an interpretation of the group's unconscious fantasies and, hence, becoming less inclined to act out, I've found, as many have, the opposite: group process serving as an *excuse* for acting out, allowing people to say insulting things, or, in the name of therapy, behaving in the most hurtful ways.

There have been on average 100 attendees at every IPA convention, about 2700 bodies overall. Accounting for repeat attendees (there are at my count three who've never missed a conference) as well as for death and the infirmities of old age, both of which have thinned the ranks of our founding members, the fact remains that hundreds of good psychological historians have never returned because of the hurtful things that have been said to them at the group process analysis. It is, of course, not only group process which has driven some away; people find many rationalizations, as well as real reasons, for never coming back. Nevertheless, each of us knows scores of fine scholars—and there must be many more we don't know about—who should still be with us but who refuse to be part of the IPA because of what was said to them, or because of what they've seen regularly at the annual conventions.

It is simply false, and wrong, to pretend that no harm has been done, that only a few people have been affected, that the absence of many is irrelevant. That contemptuous, self-defeating attitude is one of the reasons IPA membership has remained relatively small all these years. I've never been one to air our dirty little secrets in public; it's unprofessional and counter-productive. And while I know full well that critical observations run the risk of being dismissed as "defensive," the fact remains that, in practice, on either the giving or receiving end, narcissistic self-indulgence and the hurtful acting-out of some group members have been for many the core experience of IPA group process, despite all its theoretical good intentions. Psychological history is the worse for it.

David Beisel, PhD, is a founding member of the IPA who has twice served as its president. He is a distinguished scholar, an award winning teacher of psychohistory, editor of the Journal of Psychohistory for almost a decade, and on the editorial board of this journal. Professor Beisel may be contacted at <dbeisel@sunyrockland.edu>. □

Group Process is a Success

Lloyd deMause
International Psychohistorical Association

Sharing our emotional reactions to the day's events at the IPA Convention has worked very well over the past 27 years. True, some attendees complain (and don't come back), but they don't really believe in studying emotions of groups so nothing is lost. True, sometimes (not often) some people feel insulted briefly, but they say so, and the issue is handled in the group and doesn't fester. Discussing emotional matters makes a big difference in the group. During all this time, we haven't split into several groups, we don't complain in the hallways, and we bring up our differences in the group and usually resolve them there, without the usual group difficulties. Since we discuss lots of upsetting matters in our conventions, that's an astonishingly successful outcome of our daily group process sessions.

Lloyd deMause is current and founding president of the IPA. His most recent book is The Emotional Life of Nations (2003) and he may be reached at <psychhst@tiac.net>. □

The Costly Group Process Experiment

Paul H. Elovitz

Ramapo College and the Psychohistory Forum

Scholars and therapists benefit from understanding the power and dynamics of groups and this knowledge is best gained experientially as well as intellectually. The issues are how to do this most effectively and in what venues. The IPA vision of becoming a self-analytic group was brilliant and courageous. The reality is more destructive than constructive. After over a dozen years of working extremely hard to make group process a success, I withdrew from active participation in this pursuit. Below I will describe my group process model and goals and then survey the reality of group process leading to my pessimistic conclusions and recommendation that it be improved significantly or discontinued.

My paradigm of group process involved a group eager to be self-analytic and skilled, highly empathetic facilitators creating a safe environment, enabling people to freely express their feelings and thoughts about their experiences at our conference. All participants would have an equal opportunity to speak, rather than mainly the leaders. The primary focus would be on getting at the emotions and fantasies of attendees. Thoughts and feelings expressed would be kept in confidence, much as it is in group therapy. At our first convention, under the able guidance of John Hartman and Alice Eichholz, group process was a resounding success and I was inspired to become one of its most vocal advocates.

When I was group process analyst in the 1980s, my goals were to create a safe environment for people to gather at the end of every day to learn about themselves and our common group process. I discovered that the varied expectations and prior experiences of participants are some of the reasons making it problematic. Newcomers who had traveled across the continent, an ocean, or the street, had all sorts of reactions, emotions, and anxieties they wanted to talk about. Often they feel unheard. Furthermore, some have told me that they have felt like they have walked in on conversations and sometimes arguments that had been going on for years or even decades. An IPA shortcoming has been its failure to adequately deal with the needs of those who come

from a distance to our meetings, all but one of which have been in New York City. The metropolitan New York area attendees, usually a majority, have had far less openness to the problems of traveling to a conference at a great distance than if we were doing the traveling on a regular basis. These travelers find the group process sessions far less attentive to their needs and feelings than they would be if the meetings moved around the country and world, as do most international professional organizations.

The role of the group process analyst is quite important: I have usually been impressed by the qualifications and dedication of those assuming this position. The late Melvin Goldstein (1926-97) comes to mind as having brought exemplary qualification and dedication to the task. This psychoanalyst and University of Hartford professor of English brought group therapy know-how and decades of experience teaching medical doctors about feelings during their internships. For three years he worked hard to raise the level of the group process as he listened carefully to what people said verbally and nonverbally. One incident comes to mind. I brought a young psychology professor to the IPA and he was quite impressed by what he observed until he got to our group process session. At this session, Mel tried to get him to recognize the hostility in an off hand comment he made. Mel was totally correct about the disclaimed feeling, but the psychologist had no idea of what he was talking about and never returned to our organization.

One of the least successful examples of group process involved two leaders seeing themselves not so much as facilitators, but as experts telling the participants what they were feeling and where they fit in the analysts' group schema. Not surprisingly various members loudly protested against this approach. A very disruptive conference involved a group of Modern Analysts eager to bring feelings of anger to the surface during the sessions at the end of each day. The expression of the feelings was far more destructive than constructive to both individuals and the group. My recollection is that several valued colleagues never came back to the IPA.

Conference attendees often come to group process sessions for many reasons other than to better understand themselves and the nature of groups. These include curiosity, the desire to vent their frustrations, the fact that they are looking for an audi-

ence, and the desire to learn more about the leadership of the organization. I remember a South African who came to sessions to fight with people and threatened to sue the officers of the IPA. Though he never seemed to have developed any sense of what psychohistory is, he got the attention he craved and he carried on a lengthy, threatening correspondence with officers.

A major problem has been that there has never been any general agreement as to the rules of group process. Some approached it as if it were group therapy with confidentiality being the standard, only to find that specific accounts were then published in our newsletter. (Fortunately, because of the loud complaints of people like me, this practice was soon discontinued.) Attendees often had agendas other than self-knowledge when they came to group process meeting. I recollect the late Bernard Flicker, a fine IPA president and human being who believed passionately in the rights of children and preventing war, using a group process session to organize a march from the IPA meeting to a large anti-war rally in Central Park. Some used it as a platform for less admirable causes and others to ride roughshod over and bully vulnerable individuals. Many colleagues have appeared oblivious to the feelings of colleagues, sometimes even telling them what they were allegedly feeling. On one occasion a past IPA president came to group process outraged about a failure of academic standards. He felt so unheard that, together with a close associate, he walked out of the group process session, never to return to our organization despite the efforts of several colleagues to get them to reconsider. This is but one of many instances of the group being hurt by our unique institution.

In inviting colleagues with knowledge of group process to comment on Henry Lawton's paper, some felt strongly that it hurt the organization but would not publicly comment for a variety of reasons. Jerry Piven, a professor, psychologist, IPA vice president for two terms (until last June), and an active IPAer for the last eight years who attended the group process sessions, does want his views to be known. He believes it "has failed almost entirely, except in venting rage or misery and injuring others." He reports having observed "individuals insult, demean, accuse, humiliate, assault, and manipulate others" and make inappropriate requests. Clearly, Piven is disillusioned by the experience.

My own sense is that group process suffers from being "neither fish nor fowl." It does not offer the clear boundaries and professional expertise of group therapy. Participants with years of experience in analysis and group therapy have very different expectations and behave differently than those without any therapeutic experience. My own experience with groups has led me to believe that the essential issue is how to create a safe and secure environment in which people can freely express their fears, feelings, and hopes. In our first year group process honeymoon period this was achieved, however, after the *bar mitzvah* (to use Hartman's analogy cited below) the motorcycle jacket was taken out of the closet and the emotional tone has often been anything but conducive to an open and easy exchange.

Though group process is the brainchild of Lloyd deMause, it is my impression that Henry Lawton, our longtime secretary and past president, does the most to maintain it. Indeed, he has served as facilitator on at least seven or eight occasions and has been the force behind it when it has had no designated leader. This is all the more reason why it is astounding that after so many years he is writing a justification for it with little regard to what has actually been happening at group process sessions. Furthermore, through the years I have seen little evidence that group process sessions have directly inspired individuals to work on group psychohistory.

As one of three colleagues who have attended all 27 conferences, my conclusion is that while some people have learned things about the function of groups at the IPA, it has been at a great price to the organization. Many colleagues have come away feeling that the group allows wild analysis, and more than a few have decided to avoid the whole process or leave the IPA altogether. In the interest of our organization and field it is time to consider concluding a unique experiment.

Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, editor of this publication, is a historian and psychoanalyst who has led different types of groups. He may be reached at <pelovitz@aol.com>. □

The next IPA Convention will be at Fordham University in New York on June 8-10, 2005

Reflections by One of the First Group Process Analysts

John J. Hartman
University of South Florida

Reading Henry Lawton's explanation of the utility of group process analysis at the conventions of the International Psychohistorical Association brought back poignant memories for me. I recall that in his initial planning for the founding of the IPA, Lloyd deMause wanted this to be a part of every convention in order to try to reduce the irrationality of groups, to bring it under more reasonable control, and to serve as an experiential learning experience in the same way that classes Graham Gibbard, Dick Mann, Phil Slater, and I had taught at Harvard and Michigan had done. I thought this was an excellent idea, even an inspired one.

Alice Eichholz and I were the facilitators of the group process sessions at the first IPA convention. I recall that, as facilitators, we tried very hard to summarize as much of the underlying fantasy material as we could discern over the period of the convention. The thing that I remember best is an interpretation I made about the group being like a bar mitzvah boy hiding his motorcycle jacket in the closet. This was a somewhat arcane attempt to address the resistance we saw operating in this first group against revealing too much, particularly negative feelings. The interpretation generated a great deal of questions, feelings, and reactions. People came up to me afterwards as well, some asking what I meant and others asking how dare I say such a thing. I do remember, however, that Howard Stein was quite interested in what I had to say and seemed appreciative of our efforts to bring understanding to the group. In any case, Alice and I felt we had done a reasonable job in making the group process palpable and useful to the group.

I have not been a regular attendee at the conventions, and so cannot document first-hand the success or failure of subsequent group process sessions. I firmly believe that the idea remains a useful and perhaps necessary one for the effective functioning of any group. However, like individual exploration of unconscious processes, it is difficult, problematic, and uneven. It is also not for everyone.

I attended a large conference on the application of psychoanalysis to the humanities and social sciences held in Ann Arbor in the early nineties, which attracted some very notable contributors. The meeting was in the usual paper-giving format with different moderators introducing speakers and keeping time. None of the mostly male speakers kept to their time allotment, ignoring the moderators, some of whom were women. Midway through the second day, in a discussion period, a prominent female analyst made note of the fact that male speakers were ignoring the time limits of the female moderators, stressing the gender inequity in the conference as a whole. This was a bombshell which first elicited strong emotions and then went underground as the time constraints of the conference led to the next male speaker. That evening a dinner was held for all of the participants. I sat with a prominent psychoanalyst with whom I had a nice chat about Bion, who had been his analyst. The table conversation then turned to what had happened during the day with the observation about gender inequity in the conference. Various people offered their perceptions and views about it but none offered any group observations. I contributed my own understanding of this from a group process standpoint, having to do with anxieties about the large group focusing on splitting and projective mechanisms. Bion's patient and my new acquaintance, himself an established expert on splitting and projective mechanisms, had an untoward reaction to my comments. He declared that he had been analyzed once and was not prepared to be analyzed again, and abruptly left the dinner for his room! However, the others at our table were intrigued with the idea that one could apply such notions to an academic conference and the discussion about this lasted well past dessert. Most agreed that some kind of group process explanation was the only way to explain the widespread group reaction both to the time limit issue and its gender implications as well as to the female analyst's outburst in the middle of the conference. This experience is meant to convey my conviction that group process understanding is potentially powerful but risky if not conveyed tactfully, sensitively, and with some kind of informed consent of the participants. And, again, it is clearly not for everyone.

However, for those who do participate and are able to gain from these group experiences a greater understanding of group organization and

group process, this kind of experiential learning is unique and powerful. Further, I believe that the systematic empirical studies of small groups like those I conducted with Gibbard and Mann form an important evidential base for psychohistory itself. Psychohistory began as psychobiography, utilizing concepts from individual psychoanalysis. Conceptually the field took two big steps forward with the studies of the history of childhood itself and with the addition of a psychoanalytic group psychology approach to historical events. The empirical nature of the Mann, Gibbard, Hartman studies can be compared and contrasted with one's own emotional experiences in groups like the IPA groups.

I would like to close with a word about the role of facilitator in groups such as these. Ideally, the facilitators should be outside of the social system they are seeking to facilitate in order to be able to make useful comments about the process without being seen as involved in the organizational structure of the group. This is to prevent bias or the perception of bias and to try to ensure some emotional distance from the powerful currents of the group. This kind of neutrality is not the same as indifference or arrogance, simply a vantage point to facilitate an analytic attitude. Therefore, it is hard for me to envision a meaningful group process in which leaders of the organization serve as facilitators. That is, it seems to me as if it is hard for people to open up about organizational tensions when leaders of the organization upon whom advancement or publication decisions may depend are themselves the facilitators of the group process. It would be best, then, to have facilitators from outside the group or at least marginal to the organizational structure of the group. Practical considerations may mitigate such a choice. It is also best to have continuity over time with the same facilitators. However, "leaderless" groups tend toward trouble. Groups abhor a leadership vacuum, and so leaders appear who may or may not have the self-analytic values for which the groups were intended. The facilitator should serve functions we think of as involving the ego in individual personality organization. That is, the facilitator focuses for the group the values of growth, integration, self-understanding, empathy, and problem solving.

John Jacob Hartman, PhD, is a training and supervising analyst at the Tampa Psychoanalytic Institute and President-Elect of the Tampa Bay Psycho-

analytic Society. He is Clinical Associate Professor in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of South Florida. At both Harvard and the University of Michigan, he led leaderless groups for many years. Hartman is co-editor (with Gibbard and Mann) of the book Analysis of Groups (1988) and has written (with Gibbard) a number of papers on the systematic study of small groups. His recent interests concern the emotional significance of mass propaganda and ethnic conflict. He maintains a private practice in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Dr. Hartman may be reached at <jjhart@umich.edu>. □

Lawton Responds to the Commentators

Although I do not completely agree with the position of Paul Elovitz on attempting group process analysis at IPA Conventions, he deserves our thanks for facilitating this opportunity to more openly discuss the issues involved.

My statement, "Attempting Group Analysis," printed above, was distributed as a hand out to those attending the conference who might be curious about the rationale for such an effort. Similar handouts have been distributed in the past from time to time. After the 2004 Conference, Paul Elovitz asked me if I would agree to have my handout published in *Clio's Psyche* with comments, as a way to stimulate debate on a part of IPA that for some remains quite controversial. I readily agreed and here we are.

People come to group process at IPA with widely varying expectations and fantasies about what will occur, e.g. some hope they might experientially learn more about how groups work and do not work emotionally; some desire free therapy or to be able to verbalize personal traumas; others use the group as a kind of theater to act out their own neurotic pathologies; some actually try to work with friends and colleagues in the service of understanding, and to work though, with varying degrees of success, feelings positive and negative about what they have learned and experienced at the conference; and on and on it goes. Some come away from the experience feeling they have gained valuable insights into how groups function; others tend toward the opposite view and believe the whole effort is counterproductive and injurious to IPA; if they have a viewpoint at all, most

are probably somewhere in between these two poles of opinion.

For anyone interested in the subject of group process, John Hartman's work is basic, along with that of Bion, Anzieu and a few others. I find myself in total agreement with what he says. He states that the idea of group process work "remains a useful and perhaps necessary one for the effective functioning of any group. However, like individual exploration of unconscious processes, it is difficult, problematic, and uneven. *It is also not for everyone*" (Emphasis mine). This is why we began, a number of years ago, to stress the voluntary nature of participation in the sessions. That the facilitator should be relatively outside the group and not one of the leaders (as has too often been the case) is totally correct. Sadly, this principle has to some degree gotten lost in IPA. Finding people on the periphery of the group to handle facilitation duties has always been very hard. Getting co-leaders or a team has been even harder, but on the occasions when this has proven possible our process work has tended to be a more positive experience.

Lloyd deMause is emphatic in his belief that group process has been successful. I am not sure he is correct to claim that those who do not return, really do not "believe in studying the emotions of groups so nothing is lost." Even though he has a point, I would not be quite so absolute on this issue. I was surprised that he does not mention that Group Process is supposed to be an experiential learning process, rather he seems to see it as a sort of therapy (verbalizing and working through difficult feelings, *etc.*). While this can be a part of what goes on, I have always viewed what we seek to do as more of a learning process than a therapeutic one.

David Beisel gives a lucid statement of the rationale for group process in the first two paragraphs of his comment that I agree with. He is adamant that the effort has not lived up to its promise. He believes that group process too often "serves an *excuse* for acting out," and is responsible for having driven many, who might otherwise stay, away because they are appalled at the level of acting out that the group can be capable of. But he admits that people leave the group for many reasons. This is quite correct. In my capacity as IPA Secretary I have done intermittent survey of members who did not renew to

find out why they left with an eye to ascertaining what we might be doing wrong. Reasons given varied quite a bit – excessive dues, inability to afford travel costs to the conference, retirement, changed interests, and even upset about group process. But to claim that "hundreds" have not returned because of upset about group process analysis is, in my experience, an overstatement. He goes on to remind us that it is false to claim, "no harm has been done, that only a few people have been affected, that the absence of many is irrelevant." Quite simply, while David Beisel does have a point, the reasons for lost members are more varied and complex than he may realize or wish to believe. Yes, we have people in the group who engage in hurtful acting out behavior, and we know who they are. Some leave but there are also some that try to understand why this goes on and fight such conduct as best they can.

Paul Elovitz's position is much the same as that of David Beisel. Like Beisel, Elovitz seems to feel that group process was a great idea that, for a variety of reasons, has not lived up to its promise. I would be the last to deny that there isn't *some* truth to this assertion. He next expresses concern about newcomers feeling unheard or not welcomed. Despite some progress (the Wednesday evening party), this remains a problem. I would agree with his belief that the role of the group process Analyst is important. Certainly the quality of our analysts over the years has been variable. As John Hartman noted, ideally the analyst should be on the periphery of the group rather than part of the leadership. But getting a decent, experienced person has often been harder than Paul Elovitz seems to realize. People "come to group process sessions for many reasons" aside from wishes "to better understand themselves and the nature of groups." This is true and quite beyond our ability to control. There is always going to be an edge of uncertainty about the character of the group that will excite some and be anxiety provoking for others. Like David Beisel, Elovitz points out that group process can be alienating and hurtful. Even though I would differ with them about the degree to which this goes on, the concern is a valid one. "My own experience ... has led me to believe that the essential issue is how to create a safe and secure environment" in the group. Fair enough, but groups, despite our best intentions, are not always safe, nor can we expect a group to be all sweetness and light. Where do you draw the line? Do we want to help

people to understand groups as they are, warts and all, or as we would like them to be? I have to say here that there was one year when we did not list group process on the program but left time for it. If the group process had been so hurtful one might have expected that it would have silently died. But that was not the case. When they saw that nothing had been set up, a number of attendees (outside the leadership) spontaneously took matters in the own hands and set the sessions up on their own each day. It was quite amazing.

When Paul Elovitz notes that some of those "with knowledge of group process" whom he invited to respond "felt strongly that it hurt the organization but would not publicly comment for a variety of reasons," what am I to say to this? While these people are certainly entitled to their reticence I must wonder what they expected had they chosen to reveal themselves? I feel some disappointment at being denied an opportunity to respond to them. Sadly, Jerry Piven's disillusionment with "the experience" is valid, but it is more complex than what is stated. Paul Elovitz goes on to suggest that even though group process is "the brainchild of Lloyd deMause," I have been a major force keeping it alive. He seems to believe that my handout was intended as a justification when, in point of fact, it was intended as a statement of rationale rather than a justification. To suggest that I have "little regard" for what has "actually been happening" in the group process, when he admits that he has not been there on a regular basis for a number of years, seems to me a bit much. I have been the recipient of attacks and acting out behavior over the years, and, yes it is unpleasant, but rather than packing it in I have always *tried* to understand what was going on and why. More properly, the comments by Elovitz, Beisel and others clearly show that we see the issues involved differently.

In conclusion, I want to offer some personal observations and make some suggestions about the conduct of our group process work. Our group is too large to be a leaderless group. Even a single leader is questionable; we need co-leaders or, better yet, a team of at least four people who could work together. A team would help defuse much of the acting out that can occur in a single leader or leaderless group. In those rare years when we were able to have co-leaders or a team the quality of the work tended to be

much more positive. What are the reasons for the limited success of such efforts at improvement? A lot of it had to do with ignorance of the issues involved. Large groups by their very nature can also be quite anxiety provoking. It is simply not easy to find people emotionally suited or with necessary experience to lead. Should we stop trying? The answer seems obvious to me.

Group process as we attempt to practice it is a radical enterprise. Other organizations do not attempt to do this, despite the fact, as John Hartman shows, that it could be beneficial. Why is this? It could be do to anxiety, intellectual conservatism, concern about how others might see us, etc. Does attempting group process make IPA look like a group of crazy people? In the eyes of Elovitz, Beisel, and, possibly, many others, the answer would seem to be yes. Does this mean that IPA is crazy? In my view it does not! One of many reasons that psychohistory remains something of a marginal field is because of resistance to facing and accepting the importance of emotion and fantasy as basic features in the mix of reasons for any historical motivation. If we shrink from trying to look at the force of emotion and fantasy in our own group and ourselves, how can we look at such issues in historical groups with the honesty that is necessary? The IPA has to attempt group process. If we shrink from doing so because of anxiety, concern about how others may see us, or whatever, we stand revealed as hypocrites!

But group process still can be hurtful, intimidating, and drive some, maybe many, away. Why have we largely failed to make it safer? As I have tried to suggest, there are ways that the experience can be made better, safer, and less hurtful without creating something that is artificial. Are those who like to use the group for acting out their own destructive pathologies perceived as too strong? The answer seems obvious. Has the group felt powerless against such types? Sadly, this too seems obvious. Why is this? It is not always easy for people of good will to confront such types. Maybe members have not seen these issues with enough clarity. Even when members try to speak out on the problems of acting out, nothing much seems to happen. Things may calm down for a while, only to newly erupt in subsequent years. All of this involves questions of group process that are seldom voiced. An obvious answer would be to more aggressively verbalize concerns about acting

out and attacking when they emerge. But the offenders would counter that they also have a right to be heard without censorship. So where do we draw the line? Should we stop trying to understand? Does this mean we should give it up, as Paul Elovitz suggests, because in the eyes of some group process damages the reputation of IPA and reflects poorly on our field? How important is the question of how others see IPA and our field? How correct are their perceptions? Do some of those who feel this way express resistance or anxiety to what psychohistorians try to do? Is their concern—well-meaning though it may be—misplaced? I think we could agree that psychohistory tries to ask hard questions, which is a scary proposition. It asks us to face irrationality in our institutions and ourselves without shrinking and/or trying to hide. I am the first to agree that our group process is hardly perfect and that it can be hurtful to at least some (myself included), but I must respectfully disagree with my academic colleagues. If we are worth the name psychohistorian we cannot shrink from trying to understand the full range of historical motivation, rational or irrational. In the case of group process there are ways we can and should be trying to make it better. Whether we will succeed or fail only the future can tell. But you would certainly be mistaken to think that such uncertainty is grounds to absolve us from continuing to try. ◻

A Dream of a Concentration Camp

(Continued from front page)

the same, he shot the pistol next to my ear, simultaneously kicking me into the ravine. Oddly, I did not hear the shot go off. In the next scene, I was buried under several bodies. I felt tremendous weight on me; blood and filth were everywhere and the stench was unbelievable. I recall trying to crawl from underneath the bodies and out of the ravine. People were moaning and some of them were also attempting to escape. As the scene progressed, I crouched at the top of the ravine, bloody and filthy; all was quiet between the nearest barracks and me. I realized immediately that I had to find water and clean myself up so I did not end up at the edge of the ravine again, this time with a bullet in the back of my head. In the next scene, I had found water because I was now clean and looking for my uniform inside the infamous warehouse in Auschwitz. It was between the walls at the place I had hung it. I put it on, being sure

to place the iron cross first class, the wound badge, and the tank medal in the correct positions. In the final scene, I walked out of the camp, saluting smartly and being saluted smartly.

My Associations and Analysis: Dreams have intrigued human beings since the ancient world and it is not uncommon for a dream to allow access to a world of thoughts we sometimes avoid consciously. Freud taught us this.

The scenes in my dream stem from my imagination because I do not have any experience with a concentration camp nor with service in the German military. But the dream brought to the fore my longstanding concern with German history, the role of the Holocaust in it, and my personal relationship with both. The dream became so specific because of other relevant experiences, many conversations, much reading, and considerable reflection on all; they moderated the progression of the dream. Naturally, the colonoscopy put a lot of pressure on my bowels and that given showed up in my dream in having to run to a latrine and in scenes of filth. In some ways, the filth reminded me of the open outdoor toilets of my childhood. The one that was particularly offensive was attached to our elementary school; it literally stank up the entire three-storied building. The filth also reminded me of the smelly chicken coop on our farm where I collected eggs as a child. This recollection in turn evoked aspects of the thoughtful Alan Dundes and Gerald Dumas, *Life Is Like a Chicken Coop Ladder: A Study of German National Character Through Folklore* (1984). It likens life to a chicken coop ladder with people on different places in the pecking order. Those at the bottom are forced to spend most of their time in chicken shit. While I doubt that Germans are more scatologically oriented than most other Europeans, this background allowed concentration camp officials to design amazingly effective ways to dehumanize and depersonalize camp inhabitants by sticking them into poorly fitting and filthy uniforms, and exposing them to all sorts of other abuses, one of them being the open latrines. I understood in the dream that being filthy and becoming depersonalized would be my end, and I was not about to let that happen.

The source for the idea that I would be half Jewish and half German stems from Bryan Mark Rigg, *Hitler's German Soldiers: The Untold Story of*

Nazi Racial Laws and Men of Jewish Descent in the German Military (2002) and several pictures in it. On picture that has intrigued me in particular is of the subsequent German Prime Minister, Helmut Schmidt, who is a quarter Jew by Nazi racial doctrine (insert following p. 247). Another is of two half-Jewish generals, Johannes and Karl Zukertort. As I read this book last spring, I felt profound empathy for the 150,000 or so quarter-, half-, three quarter- and small number of full Jews who served in the *Wehrmacht* during WWII and who faced increasing difficulty toward the end of it. With time, I became even angrier with the Nazi Regime, which on the one hand accepted these soldiers for years and on the other created the devaluation of the long-standing tradition of Jews serving in the German and Austro-Hungarian armies. The more I thought about it, the more my anger grew at the destruction of the patriotism and the murder of most of the soldiers' relatives—and with them, German-Jewish culture. This anger has peaked over the last few years when my good colleague Professor Zohara Boyd and I, she a hidden child and I the son of a German officer, presented our stories to students and teachers in western North Carolina. The more we dug into our pasts, the more we realized that while we needed to tell the story of the National Socialist (NS) regime, the more difficult it had become for us to bear the anguish that we feel because of it and some of the policies of our own present government.

The image of being rescued stems in part from Marcel Reich-Ranicki's autobiography, entitled *Mein Leben (My Life)*, (2000). In it he describes two pertinent scenes from Warsaw. In the first, he had just arrived on a transport from Berlin and was to help with clearing a pool; as he stood and waited for his assignment, he began to talk with a young soldier guarding him and others. Their conversation quickly turned to Berlin, their common home city, and their favorite soccer team. The soldier then told him to leave the area, thus most likely saving him from considerable hardship; Ranicki did not hesitate. In the second scene, several months later and as the remaining Jews were taken from Warsaw east to Treblinka, Ranicki and his wife ran away from their column and for some reason none of the soldiers shot at them. These rescues and several others allowed Ranicki to survive and become Germany's most famous literary critic.

The third point deals with having available a clean uniform and walking out of Auschwitz. This scene is described similarly in Thilo Thielke's *Eine Liebe in Auschwitz [A Love in Auschwitz]* (2000) in which a Polish Catholic and a Polish Jew fell in love in the infamous warehouse, and he carefully planned their escape. To do so, Jerzy Bielecki gradually assembled an SS officer's uniform in the warehouse where he served as a prisoner supervisor and hid it in a wall between some boards. When he had all the parts of the uniform assembled, and placed other details, he posed as an SS officer and led his Jewish love, Cyla Cybulska, out of the camp, with a pistol trained on her back. They escaped to freedom, unlike most others who attempted to escape.

The medals are important to me as symbols of high honor and good work. More importantly, they are symbolic of the heroic Jewish contribution to the Austro-Hungarian and German military and my disdain for the NS regime because they threw away the awesome gift to those countries. The medals were (and are) to me symbolic of cultural and other contributions to those Central European areas and the disdain with which the NS regime treated them.

Dealing with parts of the dream will hopefully now also allow getting closer to the center of the mission of the psychohistorian. But before I elaborate about this aspect, I must admit that Professor Jay Wentworth, one of my dearest colleagues at Appalachian State University, told me years ago that one can rescue oneself from a bad dream by taking an active part in it, to go on the offensive, so to speak. Thus, in this dream, too, I probably assumed a more active part than I would have without this advice and was able to rescue myself. I am grateful to Jay, Zoe Boyd, and Professor Paul Elovitz of Ramapo College for assisting in the following interpretation.

Quite obviously, the pressure in my intestines during the night that preceded the colonoscopy brought forth the first image, but the others need further elaboration. Because I am German by birth and descent, have had many family members in the German military since the 18th century, and am a historian, World War II and the Holocaust chose me long ago. For example, I endeavored to understand my father's role during that time ("Father, Son and Uncertain Solutions: Conversations and Reflections about National Socialist Germany," *Biography: An*

Interdisciplinary Quarterly, Vol. 7, No.3 (Summer, 1984): pp. 189-205). Additionally, I listened, often carefully, to many stories of relatives and friends regarding the horrors and traumas for everyone who remained alive during this time. But the Holocaust gained renewed immediacy recently through my colleague Zoe Boyd; her telling of her experiences give further coherence to all of these tales of woe and my reflections on them.

Uniforms are one of the underlying themes of the dream—those of the *Wehrmacht*, the SS, and the camp detainees. My most appreciated images are associated with the first, and thus I wore it in the dream. It was the uniform of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, my favorite German officer; most of the men I have known since the war; and the German-Jewish soldiers. This uniform, in addition, is an affirmation of my heritage and its implicit courage, in this case the family of my mother, and some of my conflicts with that part of the family. Simultaneously, it represents a way to stand my ground against authority, both that of my mother's family and also my father, and father figures since then.

Importantly, the *Wehrmacht* uniform was not my father's uniform; as a diplomat in Italy, he wore that of the SS. It was also the uniform of the death camps and the *Waffen-SS* (weapons storm troopers): despised, disdained, and maligned. Nevertheless, it was the uniform of the man in the dream who did not shoot me, thus allowing me to gain my freedom. For me this uniform stands for doubt, hesitation, and complete and utter disappointment with the NS regime. The NS administration not only threw away the loyalty of the Jewish-German soldiers, it threw away the loyalty of all Germans by dragging them into a disastrous behavior toward their fellow human beings and a terrible war.

Finally, a word, too, about the "uniforms" of the camp inhabitants; they were the antithesis of the other uniforms. They were the miserable garb of the men and women who were assigned as laborers to keep alive the machinery of death.

The uniforms thus carry tremendous symbolic weight. Because my father did not wear the uniform of the regular army, I may have been able to show a distance to his uniform and at the same time an affinity to him. Because my parents were di-

vorced while my father was in one of 14 American prison camps, we were distant by the very fact that he and I lived in different places and worlds until we met once more when I was about 10; but even after that, we rarely saw each other. The man behind me at the edge of the ravine may indeed have stood for my father; he was, after all, the man who rescued me at a critical point in my life when he encouraged my emigration to the U.S.

Unlike "regular" historians, as psychohistorians we are to gain empathy for our subject so that we may, to paraphrase Peter Gay in *Freud for Historians* (1985), recreate/relive the events of the past and thus understand them more fully. Thus, the way to gain insight is not to create distance from our subject but rather to embrace it, to enter it. The Jewish-German soldier I imagined myself to be in the dream is one example of how one can enter the context of these men. Imagine being a career soldier who discovers one day, when his family recreates its family tree, as everyone was required to do in those days in Germany, that he is not of pure German blood but rather a *Mischling* (of mixed blood). A whole world must have collapsed around the young man. Having heard, read about, and seen enacted the anti-Jewish policies of the NS Regime, and knowing some of his relatives to be Jewish, he had two principal options. He could stay in the military or he could leave the military. In the first case, he had a genuine chance to survive and hopefully protect his family; in the second, he endangered himself and his family. Most soldiers chose to stay, some saved themselves and, in some more cases, their families. In my dream, I was one of the ones who stayed, but because of some infraction, I ended up in a camp, as did some of my would-be comrades, only to be saved, so to speak, by a man in SS uniform.

The escape from the imaginary camp is a function of having learned to deal with negative dreams, but it is also a function of having enough spunk left after a few weeks in the camp to attempt an escape. The issue of cleanliness is directly connected to it. Aside from being a person who does not thrive on dirt, I would like to offer two other explanations. First is the obvious need to clean myself up in order not to appear as a prisoner because anyone who looked like a prisoner was a prisoner. Second, I associated the dirt of the camp with the filth of the regime and, if I was to walk out "clean," that is, untainted by

it, I had to be rid of its dirt. Of course, I am aware that I wore a uniform that fought with the regime.

The father figures I referred to earlier, and whose opinions and behaviors I often admire and sometimes wonder about, include colleagues in psychohistory who would have us believe that our understanding of the past and our behaviors in the present rests principally, if not exclusively, on our childhoods. No doubt our personal essences rest on our relationship with our parents and our other experiences in our childhoods, however good, indifferent, or bad they may have been. But they also rest on later life's experiences and insights. As this dream illustrates, hopefully clearly, with time these later experiences, and our reflection on them, may tend to dominate our very psyche, understanding, and action.

In conclusion, this dream is about several issues important to me and possibly to psychohistorians. Triggered by the preparation for the colonoscopy, it revealed undercurrents in my understanding of the Holocaust and World War II, and my connection to both. I had gained these understandings through conversation, reading, and writing, but some insights remained hidden below the surface. Thus, the placement of the dream in a concentration camp allowed insights to surface that had not emerged during waking hours. I gained a better understanding of the dehumanization of the concentration camps through filth, arbitrary rules, starvation, overwork, and murder. Yet in this very misery was also the hope for resolution by walking out of it. I was able to get closer at sorting out my admiration for the regular German army and the contribution to it by German-Jews. I was able to address further the difficulty with my father's SS uniform and the general implications of it and having to live with him as my rescuer. The broader implication of the dream for me as a psychohistorian is that one needs to embrace one's childhood and later life experiences as an integrating part of any analysis of our chosen topics, or the topics that choose us. Without getting at the underlying currents that shape our conscious thoughts, genuine honesty and caring generosity with our topics will elude us.

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books and several dozen articles and chapters of books. He may be contacted at <Petschauerpw@appstate.edu>. □

Questions Come Before Answers

Montague Ullman

Albert Einstein College of Medicine

Given the background of the dream it is not a surprise that he had this particular dream in connection with the preparation for the colonoscopy. Although he did not personally endure the misery of the concentration camp, he had a dream that was apparently experienced as what might be called a vicarious "flashback," one that ranged from terror to hope.

Dreams have an immediacy in the sense that they are triggered by recent feeling residues. Asleep and dreaming they are worked over in a way that reaches into their past origins. The dreamer on awakening is faced with the challenge of discovering how the dream speaks to current feelings that had not yet been fully acknowledged. The detailed historical associations are important data but the larger question remains:

What aspect of his current life predicament are they addressing? What are the personal issues at the time of the dream that created so poignant a narrative? The alternative is to settle for the dream simply as a deeply felt empathic response.

What are the personal issues beyond the potentially factual depiction of the concentration camp experience? If he had actually been in a camp, the dream as a flashback experience would be understandable as an indelible replay. The account as given seems to go beyond that and hint at issues from childhood, his relationship to both parents and his current feelings about life here in the United States. Without the more personal data elicited by exploratory questioning, there is no way of knowing what else the dream might be saying.

This is a powerful dream. Despite the dreamer's elaborate discussion of the imagery and the sources cited as a help to his deeply felt interest in the Holocaust, I came away feeling that he dealt with it in a scholarly fashion rather than in a more personal way. To get to it as a dreamer and with a

dream as deep-seated as this one, much more personal information would have had to be exposed. To be more precise the only way I could be of help would be to raise a number of simple questions that might have paved the way for how the current issue in the life of the dreamer was touched off by the colonoscopy. Their goal is to reconstruct what I refer to as the recent emotional content of the dreamer. Without that information I hesitate to say what that was. As the dream recedes in time it may be difficult to answer some of these questions.

Question: What concerns, preoccupations or feelings can you recall going through your mind just before you fell asleep the night of the dream?

When dealing with a recent dream further, more specific questions would follow.

Question: Look over your experiences the evening and the day before the dream. Are there any other residual feelings you can bring back?

Question: Take a bigger bite. Look over your life during the two weeks before the dream. Were there any other feelings or concerns that surfaced during that time that stayed with you?

Question: You alluded to anguish about some of the policies of our own government. Is there anything more you want to say about that?

Question: You mentioned that this was the second time you had such a terrifying dream. As you think back to the first dream, do you recall any analogous life experiences at the time relating to that dream? Anything suggestive of the "flashback" quality of the current dream?

Then in a series of open-ended questions there would be an attempt to explore further associations to the specific imagery of the dream, e.g. dirtiness and cleanliness, the life saving aspect of the uniform, the anger at the German military, the degrees of Jewishness, the childhood memory of the pecking order, etc. The questions are geared to eliciting more of the personal issues underlying his dedication to holocaust studies. Getting that information is the task of the dreamer himself, working alone or with a helper, or better still, a group of helpers.

For what it is worth, a passing conjecture is

that one sometimes has to identify with the aggressor as a life-saving maneuver. He identifies with the punishing authority to avoid punishment. Balint describes this as a form of dependent identification.

Montague Ullman, MD, Clinical Professor of Psychiatry Emeritus at Albert Einstein College of Medicine of Yeshiva University, has had a career spanning a formative era in the practice of neurology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis prior to his moving into community psychiatry before becoming director of the Department of Psychiatry of the Maimonides Medical Center. He later opened a sleep laboratory devoted to the experimental study of dreams and telepathy. In recent years Dr. Ullman has been in the forefront of the movement to stimulate public interest in dreams and to encourage the development of dream sharing groups. He has published extensively. His books, some co-authored or co-edited, include [Appreciating Dreams - A Group Approach](#), (1996); [Dream Telepathy: Experiments in Nocturnal Extrasensory Perception](#), (1973, 2003); [Handbook of Dreams](#) (1979); [Handbook of States of Consciousness](#) (1986); [The Variety of Dream Experience, 2nd edition](#) (1999); and [Working with Dreams](#) (1979). Though Ullman does not e-mail, colleagues in Sweden maintain a website for him at <http://siivola.org/monte/index.html> and provide contact information. □

Petschauer's Dream

Kelly Bulkeley

**The Graduate Theological Union
and John F. Kennedy University**

I appreciate Professor Petschauer's willingness to share this remarkable dream and his personal associations to it. Since I believe the dreamer is always in the best position to understand the meanings of his or her dream, I don't want to take anything away from Petschauer's detailed discussion of his dream's psychohistorical roots. My only contribution to his reflections is to continue exploring the question: Why did this dream come *now*? The immediate answer seems to be, because of the impending colonoscopy. The anxieties surrounding that invasive medical procedure expressed themselves symbolically in the fantasy of the concentration camp. The interpretation of the dream leads Petschauer back to troubling childhood memories and unresolved

emotional difficulties with his father.

I wonder, however, about the dream's orientation toward the *future*, and specifically toward Petschauer's relationship with the health care system. To make it clear that I'm offering my own projections rather than a detached, authoritative pronouncement about the dream, let me put it this way: if I had this dream, I would wonder about its anticipation of my future, as I get older, my body becomes more prone to illness and injury, and I become increasingly subjected to the power of medical professionals. I can easily imagine that future as one that feels like being a prisoner in a concentration camp: a powerless individual in a depersonalizing environment, surrounded by strangers in uniforms, enmeshed in a faceless bureaucracy, plagued by concerns about cleanliness and pollution, with the conditions of my life and death determined by ideological forces that are out of control. If I were about to have a colonoscopy, I suspect these anticipatory fears of the health care system would be activated and would express themselves in my dreams. The fact that the dream draws upon concentration camp imagery would, for me, be an invitation not only to look *back* to early family history, but also *forward* to what awaits me in the final stages of my life cycle.

Ultimately, I share Petschauer's feeling that the dream provides some hope for the resolution of these fears (another of my dreamwork axioms: dreams never come simply to tell us we're stuck with a problem; dreams almost always provide images of possibility, change, and hope). The facts that the dreamer finds water to clean himself and is able to walk out of the camp on his own power indicate a potential to overcome the oppressive forces threatening to destroy him. One last question, though—is the dream suggesting that escape from oppression is only possible by becoming an oppressor oneself? Or at least a collaborator with oppression? That's a question I would carry with me and reflect on in connection with future dreams.

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Dreams and the Historian's Mindset

Paul H. Elovitz

Ramapo College and the Psychohistory Forum

Professor Peter Petschauer is a fine academic, colleague, and historian. He is a good human being who is generous, open minded, and courageous. To an unusual extent he is also giving to his colleagues. Yet his thorough historical training and the resulting mindset, keep him from maximizing his ability to understand his fascinating dream. Let me start by describing his accomplishments and attributes, relating them to his history, and then showing how they paradoxically limit his work with the dream in question.

Petschauer's accomplishments are manifest. He has achieved excellence as a colleague and historian at Appalachian State University (ASU) in the beautiful mountains of North Carolina. When he arrived there in 1968 it was a backwater, undistinguished educational institution which he and his colleagues have continuously worked to improve (Peter Petschauer, "Rediscovering the European in America: From the German Boy in Italy to the Man in North Carolina," in Paul Elovitz and Charlotte Kahn, eds., *Immigrant Experiences: Personal Narrative and Psychological Analysis* [Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1997], pp. 25-46). He has held the History Department's I.G. Greer Distinguished Professorship, served as chair of the university's Faculty Senate, as well as chair of the Faculty Assembly of the University of North Carolina State University system, co-founded his university's interdisciplinary studies program, has mentored many colleagues, and presently serves as a director of a center that mentors faculty and staff at ASU.

Professor Petschauer's considerable accomplishments may also be measured in the variety and quality of his publications on subjects such as childhood, the education of German women in the 18th century, women artists of the 18th century, human space, human rights in a threatening world, and psychohistory. He has published in the *Journal of Psychohistory* and elsewhere enough about his own life story to give us great insight into his thinking and formative experiences. Peter was born in Germany but spent World War II mostly in a German-speaking

rural area of Northern Italy where he was separated from his parents and overcame the death from diphtheria of his only sibling, a brother. He established warm relations in the matriarchal society of the farm. After the war his father was incarcerated in 14 American prison camps and his self-involved mother was reduced to near poverty while he was sent off to various monastic boarding schools. He came to the United States alone as a 17-year old where he worked first in a factory in New Jersey, then in various offices in New York City. He jumped at the opportunity to get an education at New York University where he took a doctoral degree in modern European history at night and then began his teaching career in North Carolina. Clearly Peter is a survivor. It is my sense that wherever he has lived he has established constructive and warm human relationships and felt a strong connection to the people he has left behind, he visits and feels a sense of responsibility for them.

Peter is also quite open to new experiences as reflected in his willingness to publish on his powerful and fascinating dream. Last January he was just back from an exhausting trip to Europe and commented that he had a dream as we exchanged colonoscopy stories. Since the dream was so vivid and powerful, he wrote me about it and I encouraged him to write more, eventually suggesting that he might make it the subject of a pioneering piece on how scholars can use dreams to better understand their lives, interests, and work. For six months we discussed his dream as several of us sought to help him delve into its meanings. However, in the process of it becoming the subject of an intellectual exercise, the tendency was for the main ingredient (emotion) of understanding being overshadowed.

As a finely trained historian and academic, Peter's response to my request for the precise feelings, associations and additional details of the associations he had given, was to the intellectual work of others. Thus Bryan Mark Rigg's book on German-Jewish soldiers, Marcel Reich-Ranicki's autobiography, and Thilo Thielke's description of love in and escape from Auschwitz. As historians we were trained to give bibliographies, not emotions. Indeed, as David Beisel has often pointed out, historians of our generation were specifically trained to reject emotion. As is the case with many intellectuals, in the analyzing the dream it seemed easier for him to recognize and accept the emotions of others rather

than his own. Peter reached some associations of the dream that touched his feelings and life, but as time went on I felt that despite his intellectual courage in probing, my queries were as often moving him away from his real feelings about the dream as toward them. I just wished we could have been communicating face to face, rather than via e-mail and occasionally on the telephone, so that signs of emotional valence could more easily have been noted and picked up upon. Or better still, that we were in a Montague Ullman style dream group that does a superior job of helping the dreamer to get at the dream's underlying emotions, associations, and fantasies. In my experience, such groups are more successful than psychoanalysis in uncovering the unconscious content of dreams and that such dream analysis works best with the ordinary population. Though intellectuals tend to cloud the issues this method is still quite effective in helping them understand their dreams.

I also felt that if the dream were mine, I probably would *not* have been able to delve as deeply as Peter did into its emotional content *prior* to my having had a long psychoanalysis, group therapy, and Ullman dream group experience as both a member and a leader. These experiences changed my consciousness and taught me to approach dreams in a radically different manner.

Professor Peter Petschauer does scholarship, history, and psychohistory a valuable service by sharing his "terrifying" dream of being in a concentration camp, associating to it, and analyzing it for our (and his) benefit. He has even encouraged others with expertise in the field to comment on it. He finds the responses to be meaningful and fascinating and recognizes that they "say as much about the dreamer as they do about the analysts; a very normal situation." Peter chooses to not comment on them "because that would detract from their thoughtful insights," preferring to let them stand on their own." Nevertheless, he reports that the books he mentioned awoke his soul, in a way that my questions did not (personal communication). He is a man who is both open to experience and honest about his feelings, but who also thinks, following Elie Wiesel's advice, it wise to not delve too deeply into some areas of his life.

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personages to better help the biographer to understand his/her feelings about the subject. He has published several articles and chapters of books on dreams and dream methodology. Elovitz may be reached at <pelovitz@aol.com>. □

Freud's Medical Ego Ideals

(Continued from front page)

he sought those with whom he could identify. Freud identified with men of great accomplishment, stimulating his own creativity and minimizing his intellectual isolation. Moreover, Freud's ego ideals contributed to the very foundation of his own discoveries.

In recognition of the importance that ego ideals played, Freud wrote a pioneering work devoted to the subject, *On Narcissism: An Introduction* (1914). In this pivotal work, Freud introduced, developed, and defined the concept of the ego ideal. In a key sentence, which has a bearing on the theme of this paper, he explained that "Idealization is a process that concerns the *object*; by it, that object, without any alteration in its nature, is aggrandized and exalted in the subject's mind" (p.94). He elaborated on this concept in the *Ego and the Id* (1923), in which he called the ego ideal the heir of the Oedipus complex.

The subject of narcissism has received much attention, and the psychoanalytic literature on this topic is extensive and complex, as it deals so extensively with pathology. Narcissism, however, also applies to issues of self-esteem, ego-syntonic objects, and what is considered as reality based and normal narcissism, which led, as in the case of Freud, to positive and socially responsible aspirations and identifications with positive ego ideals.

This paper will focus on Freud's medical ego ideals, namely Wilhelm Fliess (1858-1928), Joseph Breuer (1842-1894), Ernst Brücke (1819-1892), and Jean Charcot (1825-1893). Before presenting the theoretical significance of idealization, the leading personages to be discussed in this paper will be briefly introduced. Initially, Fliess played a major role as Freud was groping toward the development of psychoanalysis.

Fliess, a nose and throat specialist, impressed Freud because he was a researcher whose interests

ranged beyond his medical specialty. Breuer, a physician of wide learning, shared many intellectual interests with Freud, and treated Fräulein Anna O., the first psychoanalytic patient. Brücke, one of Freud's professors at the University of Vienna Medical School, was called a "model" by Freud. He also said that Brücke "was the greatest authority who affected me more than any other in my whole life." Charcot did pioneering work on hysteria, and Freud went to Paris to study with him. Of Charcot, Freud said that he was "one of the greatest of physicians and a man touched by genius" (Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, 1953, Vol. 1, pp. 28-29).

The literature on Freud is enormous, and there are many biographies of him as well as numerous works that specialize on some aspect of his life, career, and background. However, I depart from the traditional approach to Freud by trying to understand him from the perspective of the men he admired, or tried in some way to emulate, employing his concept of "ego ideals." Fundamentally, because Freud was going to eventually radically alter mankind's thinking about itself, he needed powerful "father images" to identify with, hence his need for ego ideals. My approach adds a new dimension to this extraordinary man.

The concept of ego ideal needs clarification and explanation, especially as it is employed in the context of this paper. Essentially, the representation of the ego ideal stems from an early identification with idealized parents. The ego ideal, however, may also have a pathological or antagonistic identity. Joseph Sandler in "The Ego Ideal and the Ideal Self" examines the many shadings of the definition of this concept. Although there are similarities between the concept of ego ideal and superego, there are also some aspects of the ego ideal that are distinct from the superego (Sandler *et al*, *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 1963, Vol. XVIII, pp. 139-141).

The term ego ideal is an omnibus one, and denotes moral conscience, self-observation, and ego functions. Quoting Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), Sandler says that the ego ideal "is the heir to the original narcissism in which the ego enjoyed self sufficiency; it gradually gathers up from the influences of the environment the demands which that environment makes on the ego and which the ego cannot always rise to; so that a

man, when he cannot be satisfied with his ego itself, may nevertheless be able to find satisfaction in his ego ideal which has differentiated out of the ego" (p.142). In a general formulation, which is pertinent to Freud, Sandler says: "In normal development parental ideals, which have previously been taken over, will be modified and displaced in a reality-syntonic fashion and will be integrated with the ideals taken over from other figures throughout life—such figures as friends, teachers, and colleagues; indeed from any admired object. Ideals may also be derived from feared objects, through a mechanism similar to identification with the aggressor" (p. 155).

Sandler points out that in the *New Introductory Lectures* (1932) Freud used a different meaning than in the *Ego and the Id* (1932). The significance of the revision implies a distinction between the superego and the ego ideal and shows how Freud "measured" himself. Freud's conceptualization is pertinent to the choice of his own models and of inspirational figures such as Fliess, Breuer, Brücke, and Charcot. Freud wrote: "We have now to mention another important activity which is ascribed to the superego. It is also the vehicle of the ego ideal, by which the ego measures itself, toward which it strives and whose demands for ever increasing affection it is always striving to fulfill. No doubt this ego ideal is a precipitation of the old idea of the parents, an expression of the admiration which the child felt for the perfection which it at times ascribed to them" (Quoted in Sandler, p. 143).

In a paper written some twenty five years after the one by Sandler, David Milrod, in "The Ego Ideal," recognized that the ego ideal is an important concept, but he says it is "poorly defined and often in contradictory ways." Paraphrasing Freud, Milrod notes that as a person matures, "the individuals growing critical judgment as well as the criticism of others shatters the child's sense of narcissistic perfection, and tries to recover it in the form of an ego ideal" (*The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 1990, Vol. 45, p. 46). Milrod distinguishes between "idols" and "ideals." It is one thing to admire and to emulate an idol, but ideals are "depersonalized, abstract, and decontretized"; there can be a shift, however, from idols to ideals. After the superego is developed, and with it the ego ideal, "praise or disapproval of important love objects becomes secondary" (p.46). The values that constitute the contents of the ego ideal

"follow the phase development of the drive and include gratification, strength, power, possessions, and phallic attributes. All are highly personified and often connected with personal idols" (p. 49).

In an apposite observation, bearing on Freud's interest in his personal ego ideals, Jones, who knew him personally, is of the opinion that "A profound self-confidence had been masked by strange feelings of inferiority, even in the intellectual sphere, and he tried to cope with these by projecting his innate sense of capacity and superiority onto a series of mentors on some of whom he then became curiously dependent for reassurance" (Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, 1961, p. 191). Freud at times felt that he was not well endowed intellectually, but he sensed that he was going to revolutionize mankind's thinking, as Darwin had done, plunging him into heated controversy. Jones recognizes that this led Freud to "idealize" Brücke, Meinert, Fleischl, Charcot, Breuer, and Fliess in his early career (Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, 1955, Vol. 2, p. 3). The four most significant of these are discussed in this paper.

Idealization is related to the concept of ego ideals. To give another example, idealization can be compared to a patient having a positive transference, as in psychoanalysis, when the analysand aggrandizes and admires the psychoanalyst, a dependence necessary in treatment. With regard to these concepts, Freud serves to demonstrate in another communication, as in "Some Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology" (1914), the role that teachers play in this development. His ego ideals can be seen as derivations of admired teachers. This essay, written for a *Festschrift* on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the "Sperlgymnasium," which he had attended from ages nine to seventeen, may be read as an introspective on the significance of ego ideals. He writes as follows: "It is hard to decide whether what affected us more and was of greater importance to us was our concern with the sciences that we were taught or with the personalities of our teachers" (p. 242). He recounts that some students were stimulated by them, while others were impeded by them. The students, he says, studied and observed them closely and the teachers evoked ambivalent feelings in their students: "...we studied their characters and on theirs we formed or misformed our own" (p. 242). He adds: "At bottom we felt great affection for them if they

gave us any ground for it, though I cannot tell how many of them were aware of this" (p. 242). Following a discussion of the role of the father, whom Freud points out "becomes a model not only to imitate but also to get rid of" (p. 243), he relates this attitude to the role school teachers play for young students. The notion of models who are discarded has special bearing on Freud himself, because he had at one time paid close attention to philosophers, for example Schopenhauer, Brentano, and Feuerbach. In time, he got "rid" of these philosophical ego ideals (see Jacques Szaluta, "Sigmund Freud's Philosophical Ego Ideals," in Laurie Adams and Jacques Szaluta, eds., *Psychoanalysis and the Humanities*, 1996).

Freud accords teachers an enormous importance, stating "These men, not all of whom were in fact fathers themselves, became our substitute fathers. That was why, even though they were still quite young, they struck us as so mature and so unattainably adult" (p. 244). Although Freud wrote this essay in his mature years, the feelings he describes here are the feelings he transferred to university professors and later to his intellectual mentors.

Freud's search for creative intellectual models must also be considered in a historical context. Until the 1880s, Jews living in Germany had opportunities for becoming acculturated into German society. The fortunes of Freud and his family reflected these historical conditions, but after 1880, anti-Semitism escalated in Austria, leading to the election of the notorious Karl Lueger as Mayor of Vienna. Lueger had campaigned on a distinctly anti-Semitic platform. Freud took the growing anti-Semitism personally and sought to distance himself from Gentiles in the early 1900s. As Peter Homan says in "Disappointment and the Ability to Mourn: Deidealization as a Psychological Theme in Freud's Life, Thought and Social Circumstances, 1906-1914," Freud's disappointment led him to "search out other Jews for emotional support, pride, energy, and self-defense" (*Freud's Appraisals and Reappraisals*, ed. Paul E. Stepanky, Vol. 2, p. 59). In effect, anti-Semitism stimulated Freud to excel, to be creative, to respond to its challenges, to fight back in the only way he could. This climate accentuated Freud's motivation to collaborate with Breuer, who was Jewish. As Homan notes, "Freud sought advice from Breuer on personal and Jewish matters and depended on him 'like a son'" (p.59). In the context of Freud's ego

ideals, the relationship with Breuer was like a replacement of his earlier relations with his father and Dr. Samuel Hammerschlag, Freud's esteemed teacher of Jewish religion and Hebrew at the Sperlgynasium. Fliess, who was Jewish, belonged to his circle of friends and idealized figures.

The first question to consider is what kinds of qualities Freud's ego ideals possessed. In general, they were intellectual innovators, who had risen to preeminence in their fields, and who demonstrated independence of thought and courage. For example, Freud preferred the leading fiction writers in their respective national languages who were insightful about the human condition: Goethe in German, Shakespeare in English, Cervantes in Spanish. Sometimes he admired men who were aggressive. Freud also sought inspiration from political figures who had confronted great odds, namely, Bismarck, Garibaldi, and Cromwell (Jacques Szaluta, "Freud's Ego Ideals: A Study of Admired Modern Historical and Political Personages," *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 1983, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 157-186). In order to qualify as ego ideals for Freud, political leaders had to be progressive-minded men or be supportive of liberating politics. In some sense, he appreciated men who were mavericks.

Bismarck, who fascinated Freud, was the dominant statesman in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. Bismarck eventually came to be regarded as a man of peace, once he had achieved his goal of unifying Germany. However, he had accomplished this feat by aggressively and defiantly pursuing wars and overcoming perilous obstacles. Nevertheless, Freud paid close attention to Bismarck, and when the "Iron Chancellor" came to Vienna on a state visit, Freud waited in the street two and a half hours to see him! In this instance Freud's great appreciation of Bismarck may be regarded as an identification with the aggressor (see Jacques Szaluta, "Freud on Bismarck: Hanns Sachs' *Interpretation of a Dream*," *American Imago*, 1980, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 215-244).

In the broadest ideological sense, Freud stood in the tradition of the Enlightenment, which had its roots in the Renaissance. Before the French Revolution of 1789, the *philosophes* had thought critically about society, and as such were a beleaguered minority. By Freud's time, their ideas had become better

established, certainly in Western Europe. Eighteenth-century rationalism, which stemmed from the scientific revolution of the previous century, generated liberalism in the nineteenth century. This background promoted individualism, secularism, hedonism, and materialism, and laid the basis for modern thought. As these movements coalesced, they led to the emancipation of the Jews, and Freud in his youth benefited from them, as reflected in his *Weltanschauung* (world view). Accordingly, Freud did not accept the status of the human condition on the basis of faith. He wished to contribute to solving the "riddles of mankind."

While a young man, Freud had many career interests, but he made the decision to go to medical school after being inspired by a reading aloud of Goethe's essay on "Nature" at a public lecture. Actually, Freud had not been attracted to medicine as such, but Goethe's essay, which dealt with comparative anatomy, presented a "romantic picture of nature as a beautiful and bountiful mother who allows her favorite children the privilege of exploring her secrets." This prospect which attracted Freud was fortuitous, and as he himself was to write, "After forty-one years of medical activity, my self-knowledge tells me that I have never been a doctor in the proper sense. I became a doctor through being compelled to deviate from my original purpose; and the triumph of my life lies in my having, after a long and roundabout journey, found my way back to my earliest path." (Jones, 1953, Vol. 1, p. 28).

Freud's self-appraisal is instructive because it is indicative of his feelings, his intentions, and is decisive for the creation of psychoanalysis. Again, in his own words,

In my youth I felt an overpowering need to understand something of the riddles of the world in which we live and perhaps even to contribute to their solution. The most hopeful means of achieving this end seemed to me to enroll myself in the medical faculty; but even then I experimented—unsuccessfully—with zoology and chemistry, till at last under the influence of Brücke, the greatest authority who affected me more than any other in my whole life, I settled down to physiology (Jones, 1961, p.22).

The conjunction of Freud's ambition, societal changes, his educational background, and the sequences of relationships with talented men at critical

moments in his life became the stimulus for Freud's creativity. Ultimately, it enabled him to develop psychoanalysis.

Ernst Brücke, whom Freud credits for having influenced him so much, and after whom he named one of his sons, was the Director of the Physiology Institute at the University of Vienna, and one of the leading physiologists of his time. Freud's association with Brücke lasted six years, which corresponds to the period that he spent in medical school. Brücke advocated the radical scientific concept of dynamic physiology, meaning that the principles of physics and chemistry could be applied to living organisms. Freud became so imbued with Brücke's instruction that he later assiduously tried to apply his theories to the study of psychological disorders in people. In this particular respect, Freud's initial attempts were not productive, but he succeeded when he was "able to apply them empirically to mental phenomena while dispensing with any anatomical basis" (Jones, 1961, p. 32). Ultimately, Freud created a dynamic psychology, demonstrating that scientific laws could be applied to man's personal development. Clearly, Brücke was an inspiring and respected mentor for Freud.

Exceptional in Freud's search for mentors, Fliess was two years younger than Freud. Fliess, who practiced in Berlin, which at the time was more liberal than Vienna, was a cultured man, with wide interests in the humanities, especially literature. Fliess and Freud were close friends from 1887 to 1902. They had a similar educational background and engaged in a lively and regular correspondence, meeting frequently to discuss professional and intellectual matters. They had first met when Fliess did postgraduate work in Vienna, and it was Breuer who had recommended to him that he attend a lecture by Freud. Fliess had also been to Paris to study with Charcot. Freud developed a marked emotional dependence on Fliess, which was rooted in an idealization of him. Although Fliess was successful professionally, he was not considered to be Freud's intellectual equal.

Nevertheless, Fliess' friendship reduced Freud's intellectual isolation, and also contributed to the development of psychoanalysis. They frequently exchanged information about their health and physical ailments. Both suffered from migraines, and

Freud feared heart problems and had gastrointestinal ailments. They both expressed their enthusiasm about their work to each other, which were followed by bouts of depression. Based upon their letters, Didier Anzieu considers them to have been hypochondriacs. Anzieu writes: "They exhibited, described, and entrusted to one another their sick bodies, just as a child whose masochism has been keenly fostered believes that his mother can love him only when he is ill" (*Freud's Self-Analysis*, 1986, p. 164). And, Anzieu, citing Octave Mannoni's work on Freud, feels that Freud's relationship with Fliess was narcissistic.

Freud as a young man was particularly ambitious, consciously so, but seeking to be a scientific pioneer needed such a friend as Fliess. Freud's appreciation of Fliess is amply demonstrated in his correspondence with him. Fliess had many interests, and he was quite imaginative, for example, in his theories of numbers and rhythms and bisexuality. Later, Freud was to incorporate Fliess' notion of bisexuality, but was to go beyond Fliess in his work.

Jones notes a paradox in their curious emotional relationship. Jones says Freud's self-depreciation in letters to Fliess "sprang not from an inner weakness, but from a terrifying strength, one he felt unable to cope with alone. So, he had to endow Fliess with all sorts of imaginary qualities, keen judgment and restraint, overpowering intellectual vigor, which were essential to a protective mentor" (1953, Vol. 1, p. 295).

In so many of his letters Freud's tone is exuberant and reverential, as when he refers to Fliess as the "other," and says "you are the only other, the *alter*." In a letter dated July 14, 1894, he writes, "Your praise is nectar and ambrosia for me, because I know full well how difficult it is for you to bestow it – no more correctly, how seriously you mean it when you bestow it" (*The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess*, trans. and ed. by J. M. Masson, 1985, p. 87). In a letter of January 1, 1896, Freud writes exultingly: "How much I owe you: solace, understanding, stimulation in my loneliness, meaning to my life that I gained through you, and finally even health that no one else could have given back to me. It is primarily through your example that intellectually I gained the strength to trust my judgment, even when I am left alone—though not by you—and like

you, to face with lofty humility all the difficulties that my future may bring. For all that, accept my humble thanks! I know that you do not need me as much as I need you, but I also know that I have a secure place in your affection" (*The Complete Letters*, 1985, p. 158). Clearly, such sentiments aggrandize Fliess and, in line with the thesis of this paper, express that he was an ego ideal for Freud.

A most fortunate occurrence for Freud was when he received a fellowship in 1885 to study diseases of the nervous system with Charcot in France. Charcot's influence was to be decisive at this juncture in Freud's life, for Freud had also become interested in the phenomenon of hysteria. Charcot had established a large medical complex for neurological disorders in Paris—a treatment, research, and teaching center. So prominent was Charcot that his stature in French medicine was compared with that of Louis Pasteur. In addition to studying the "hysterical crisis" (*grande hystérie*), Charcot concerned himself with the manifestation of epileptic convulsions, the uses of hypnosis, and traumatic paralysis. Charcot further demonstrated that paralysis varied in etiology, and those stemming from mental trauma were symptomatically different from organic ones. Indeed, Charcot was a pioneer and bold researcher in the causes of mental disorders, achieving world wide recognition in his own lifetime. Nevertheless, Charcot's work was controversial, departing from orthodox medical practice, as he defiantly put forward the diagnosis that hysteria also occurred in males. However, Charcot being an innovator—and a maverick—only served to enhance his standing with Freud.

Profoundly impressed by Charcot, Freud wrote to his fiancée that "Sometimes I come out of his lectures as from Notre Dame, with an entirely new idea about perfection....Whether the seed will ever bear fruit I don't know, but what I do know is that no other human being has ever affected me in the same way" (Jones, 1953, Vol. 1, p. 185). Because of such a tribute Jones says that it is justified to conclude that he decisively influenced Freud to change from being "a neurologist into a psychopathologist" (Jones, 1961, p. 123). Furthermore, the significance of Charcot's medical discoveries for Freud, which advanced his professional thinking, is the demonstration that hysteria was psychogenic in nature, that it was governed by a hidden mechanism, and that it was not unique to women.

During the many months that Freud was in Paris he established a personal relationship with Charcot, which profited both men professionally. Freud's interest in Charcot's work was so marked that, with Charcot's approval, Freud translated his book *Leçon sur les maladies du système nerveux* into German. The German title was *Neue Vorlesung über die Krankheiten des Nervensystems insbesondere über Hysterie* (New Lectures on the Diseases of Nervous System, Particularly on Hysteria). Some years after he had left Paris, reflecting on the profound impression that Charcot's experiments had made on him, Freud noted that he came to recognize "the possibility that there could be powerful mental processes, which nevertheless remained hidden from the consciousness of men." At another time, when Charcot came by to shake hands with Freud, he remarked that "Despite my feelings for independence I was very proud of this mark of attention, since he is not only a man to whom I have to be subordinate, but a man to whom I am gladly so" (Jones, 1961, p. 123). In honor of Charcot, Freud named his first born son Jean Martin after him.

When Charcot died in 1893, Freud wrote a moving obituary: "In him, all too soon, the young science of neurology has lost its greatest leader, neurologists of every country have lost their master teacher and France has lost one of her foremost men" (1900, Vol. 3, p. 11). Of Charcot as a teacher, Freud said that he was "positively fascinating," adding that: "Each of his lectures was a little work of art in construction and composition; it was perfect in form and made such an impression that for the rest of the day one could not get the sound of what he said out of one's ears or the thought of what he had demonstrated out of one's mind" (Freud, 1900, p. 17). All of these observations show a high respect for Charcot, that he was emulated and idealized in positive identification.

The last person to be considered as being of special significance to Freud is Joseph Breuer, a Viennese physician, an internist of considerable standing, who was fourteen years his senior. Unlike the other figures cited so far, he was Freud's colleague. They met in Brücke's Physiology Institute and became close friends and collaborators. Breuer was an exceptional physician, respected for his clinical abilities; in recognition of his medical acumen, he was a physician to other physicians and notable persons in

Vienna, among them Brücke and Brentano. Breuer was not only an exceptionally good friend and mentor to Freud, but he was also very generous toward him, loaning him money for a period of years when Freud was an impecunious student. After Freud became financially successful, and he wanted to repay him, Breuer refused to accept his money.

What is pertinent here is that Freud always expressed a high opinion of Breuer. Albrecht Hirschmüller, in his exhaustive *The Life and Work of Joseph Breuer: Physiology and Psychoanalysis*, (1978), includes a detailed examination of Breuer's and Freud's collaboration and has many illustrative letters of their close relationship. Hirschmüller notes that Breuer sent many patients to Freud, and the two discussed patients continuously, and that at first "Freud's methods of treatment were wholly conventional" (p. 141). However, eventually Freud departed from this approach, and with regard to patients with mental illness, became more audacious by pioneering free association. Yet, despite their mutual interests and the benefits they derived from them, Breuer and Freud became estranged over Freud's increasing stress of the importance of sexuality as a cause of neurotic disturbances. Breuer had a high opinion of Freud, as expressed in a letter to Fliess in 1895, in which he wrote to him: "Freud's intellect is soaring at its highest. I gaze after him as a hen at a hawk" (Hirschmüller, p. 315). Again, Freud recognized the enormous impact Breuer had had on him in a moving letter to Breuer's son Robert on the death of his father in 1925, and expressed his deep feelings of appreciation for him. He wrote:

I was deeply moved by the news of the death of your father. You are well aware of the importance of his personal influence on my own life, and the vital role his teaching and stimulation played in respect of my work.

Please convey to your dear mother the deepest sympathy felt by each member of my own family, and allow my circumstances to serve as a valid excuse if I am unable to be present at the funeral.

The next issue of the *Inter. Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse* will attempt to do justice to the magnificent part played by your late father in the creation of our new science.

Yours,
Freud

The work that Freud and Breuer pioneered was decisive to the development of psychoanalysis.

The key figure in their collaboration was a gifted young woman twenty-one years of age, known in the psychoanalytic literature as "Anna O." In effect, she was the first psychoanalytic patient. Anna O suffered from hysteria, paralysis, loss of speech and sight, as well as other disturbances. In 1880, Breuer began attending to Anna O using hypnosis with some success, and in 1882 began to discuss this case with Freud. Freud then developed a strong interest in Anna O's condition, to the extent that he became Breuer's collaborator in writing the case. In time, many of Anna O's symptoms were relieved, and although there is some question about the complete attainment of her physical coordination and speech she regained her ability to work.

Breuer's and Freud's consultations resulted in the publication of a joint paper in 1893, "The Psychological Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena," which was followed by their book *Studies on Hysteria* in 1895. This book reflected a father-son dyad and marked the beginning of psychoanalysis, providing case histories and a theory of neurosis. As was noted above about the persons he admired, Freud named one son after Brücke, and another after Charcot. When one of his daughters was born, he named her Mathilde, after Breuer's wife.

Many other men influenced Freud, but they are beyond the scope of this study. Regarding Freud's idealization of many persons, as discussed in this paper, there are varied opinions of Freud, with some seeing him as appearing to be needy and others seeing him as courageous. In fact, Freud was psychically strong, often standing alone even when he was severely disparaged for his theories. The medical personages who are presented here were important and decisive for Freud in being leading authorities in their field, in his respect and admiration for them, and in their professional intellectual stimulation of him. Ultimately, he transcended their contributions. This consequential formative period of engagement with them was marked by Freud's increasing focus on the etiology and treatment of neurosis, culminating in his *magnum opus* in 1900, *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

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Freud's Wolf Man

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Review of Lawrence Johnson, The Wolf Man's Burden. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. Hardcover ISBN 0-8014-3875-6, x, 188 pages, \$41.95.

Who is the Wolf Man, and why should we be concerned about his burden? Lon Chaney sprouting fangs and facial hair under a full moon? It is not this one, but rather the other one: Sergei Pankeev (1887-1979). A promising painter of landscapes and student of literature, he was a "typical Russian intellectual" at the beginning of the last century, according to Alexander Etkind's history of psychoanalysis in Russia (*Eros of the Impossible*, p. 81). As a youth, Sergei developed symptoms, which he later called "unconscious grief," which were viewed at the time as depression. According to Etkind, Pankeev felt his life hollow and his experiences unreal, and others seemed like wax figures or marionettes (p. 84). After a foray into hypnosis, he traveled to Munich to consult with the renowned Kraepelin, who diagnosed him as manic-depressive, as was his father. By 1910 Pankeev ended up on Freud's couch. Early in his treatment, he recalled a dream of waking to the sight of several wolves perched on the walnut tree outside his bedroom window and staring in at him. Terrified of being eaten, the four-year-old screamed and awakened. In analysis he made a sketch of the dream-vision for Freud.

Thus was born the Wolf Man, whose terrors form the core of one of psychoanalysis' most famous case histories. "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" was written by Freud in 1914 and published in 1918 when World War I ended. Freud famously interpreted the dream as a primal scene derivative, that is, of Sergei's early exposure to parental lovemaking in the mode of mating beasts. The case material was tailored to Freud's urgent needs to confirm his theor-

ies of infantile sexuality and counter the skepticism of Jung and Adler. But what was intended to be a decisive victory proved to be the opening salvo in battles that still flare up today. Not only did the issues not get resolved—the Wolf Man did not get cured. He returned from time to time to Freud but was also passed on to other analysts. By the time he expressed his own misgivings in memoirs and conversations, there were casebooks within the analytic community and extensive second-guessing outside it (see Muriel Gardiner, ed., *The Wolf Man by the Wolf Man*, 1971, and Karin Obholzer, *The Wolf Man Sixty Years Later: Conversations with Freud's Controversial Patient*, 1982).

Lawrence Johnson's title captures the paradox of the Wolf Man: burdened to be both the exemplar of psychoanalysis and its failed patient—its "greatest prize and [Freud's] archnemesis" (p. 2). While the nature of his conflicts may have rendered him a pawn in psychoanalytic politics, Johnson supports those who see a strong personal level of interest on Freud's part. Not only did he see Sergei daily six times a week for four years, but he also offered occasional free analysis, took up a collection for him when he emerged penniless after WWI, and exercised a certain veto power over his wedding plans. Noting that the key image for the West is Oedipus but that that of the East is the Sphinx, Etkind proposes that "Freud was drawn to Dostoevsky and Pankeev because ... their conscious minds had more direct access to the universal mechanisms of the unconscious" (pp. 96-97). On the other hand, Johnson quotes sources who maintain that Pankeev's linguistic dexterity (he had a polyglot mix of English, German, and Russian) fostered a tendency to speak in a sort of "crypt," which in the analytic situation worked as resistance and rendered him an "enigma" (p. 64; Johnson also uses *crypt* more idiosyncratically to address a sort of preserved and protected intrapsychic burial chamber, or "monument of a lost object preserve within the split ego" (p. 15), the meaning of which is far from clear to me). That Freud in any case did not deeply hear his patient or penetrate these barriers raises issues of countertransference. His technical papers around this time were exploring psychoanalysis as the love-cure, that is, drawing on the ways the patient transfers feelings and fantasies from prior libidinal ties to the analytic situation; but Freud lagged somewhat in exploring how analysts bring their own baggage into analytic work. He tended to interpret manifest events,

such as the dream, in terms of latent layers revealing an archaic past. This is what happened when the Wolf Man's dream was interpreted as a primal scene fantasy, which both reinforced and threatened the foundation stones of the psychoanalytic edifice being constructed during the 1914-1918 period.

So it is not difficult to appreciate how generations of scholars continue to be intrigued by this material. Johnson's contribution issues from a careful reconstruction of the two men's lives, and how their personal histories, unresolved conflicts, and current preoccupations could likely have become interwoven. Pankeev's "personal history" seems "to have echoed Freud's own internal drama" (p. 23). In this scenario, the "institution of psychoanalysis had reached an impasse as a result of Freud's attempt to work through particular repressed material of his own," and then "found its reflection (its mirror image and exact opposite) in the Wolf Man's crypt, leading Freud to posit the Wolf Man within his own internal drama as a rival for the control of psychoanalysis...." (p. 18). This is a large, extremely ambitious enterprise. It is given some support through careful and often ingenious readings but must remain speculative insofar as the intensely private exchanges of a protracted analysis can never be fully reproduced and are inevitably prone to selective recollections, distortions, and overdetermined revisions. Instead of encoding a primal scene, the Wolf Man's dream for Johnson encodes other infantile material that reverberates cryptically between the two parties. Revisiting previous analytic speculations from Ernest Jones that the death of baby Julius when Freud was 18 months constituted his primary trauma, and that baby sister Anna, arriving soon after, inherited this complex, according to Max Schur, Johnson proposes an alternative. "Let us consider that if Sigmund had wished away his sister like he claims to have done with Julius, he will have seen his wishes realized in an unthinkable event: he wishes Anna away, but it is the other Anna (his Amme-Nana [the family nanny] who disappears." She was fired by his mother, allegedly for stealing (which Johnson questions). Thus through the "medium of a homonymic confusion," he loses his "surrogate mother-object" (p. 61). The Wolf Man also had a nanny, one given to cautionary folktales of werewolves and prone to restraining male children by grabbing their genitals, and he had a rivalrous-libidinal tie to his sister Anna, which entailed fantasies (or instances) of genital-fondling. The number

of wolves in the dream as six (which also was given as seven, and was five in the drawing) lends itself to a provocative chain of associations linking *sister – sex – siesta* (the afternoon nap the parents would take which involved lovemaking) in part through the Russian *siestorka* (sister) and *shiestorka* (pack of six) (p. 137).

All of which is intriguing, but Johnson's argument is weakened by what strikes this reviewer as gratuitous diversions into current academic trends. For a short, extremely concentrated study, it is dismaying not to have the principals stage-center for the first 55 pages. Instead there are excursions into the writings of Lacan, to Derrida's problematics, to a cameo appearance of Nietzsche, to extensive treatment of Stephen Greenblatt's theories of improvisational writing as self-fashioning (which Freud supposedly practiced), and on to invoking something called "heterothanatology" (p. 19). In concluding, Johnson injects the question of his own transference only to embark on a "general understanding of the transference relation" (p. 175). Regrettably, all these flights of ideas succeed only in distracting and diluting from Johnson's main points.

Daniel Dervin, PhD, emeritus professor at Mary Washington College in Fredericksburg, Virginia, is a prolific author and frequent contributor to psychohistory. His book, Father Bosetti in America: A Biographical Study, was released in August from Cache Glade Publications and is reviewed on page 103 of this issue. Professor Dervin may be contacted at <ddervin@mwc.edu>. □

Appreciating Freud

David Felix
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Review of Lydia Flem, Freud the Man: An Intellectual Biography, Translated by Susan Fairfield. New York: Other Press, 2003. ISBN 1-59051-037-2, x1, 213 pages., \$28.00.

Oddly, idiosyncratically intelligent, this book is not what it tells us it is. Indeed, it goes on to provoke repeated objections in its smaller statements as well. Yet it also defeats pedantic concern by its sensitive response to various facets of Freud's grand and various being.

Making no effort to support its claims, *Freud the Man* is not an intellectual biography. I wonder if an editor imposed such a subtitle on a manuscript defying definition, which, furthermore, consorts oddly with the broad *the Man* before the specification. In any case the text makes no effort to establish and pursue the structure of intellectual biography, with its identification of ideas, their origins, development, and conclusions. *The Man*, moreover, is just barely a son, spouse, father, and world historical personality. He is the subject of a succession of pictorial slides, individually acute, exquisite, wrongheaded, and repetitive.

Consider the first three of the ten chapters teasingly headed "Creation Day by Day," "Through the Train Window," and "The Archeologist." The first, sounding a number of themes, shows us Freud greeting one of his cherished *objets d'art*, pursuing "archaic history, link[ing] his archeological collection and his psychoanalytic approach," receiving his patients transformed into the "tragic hero[es] Hamlet, Lady Macbeth, Dr. Faustus or the Witch," lunching at one o'clock with wife and six children, writing to friends, and "dream[ing] of going to Italy at the end of summer." This fine condensation sounds a number of themes which will be repeated throughout the book. The train window chapter travels through his Moravian past, his railway phobia, his dreaming of journeys, his "structural theory of the geography of ego, superego, and id," and, again, archeology, which "presents us with a metaphor for the unconscious." The third chapter, "The Archeologist," develops the subject subtly, if repetitively, with notes on the "layers and stratifications in psychic material." The other chapters operate similarly.

Rendered in English by a translator of comparable taste, these are expressions of an appreciation by a psychic and literary gourmet of the highest order. Yet too many statements are elliptical even to a knowledgeable person, claim too much, contradict themselves, or substitute sensibility for sense. Thus, "In his own eyes, Freud is not a therapist but a conqueror, an archaeologist, a detective of the human soul." But is it not the essence of his works that he is at the same time therapist, conqueror, and all the rest? And why does Ms. Flem speculate on a time "when psychoanalytic treatment will have long disappeared?" She should, at least, argue the point. And why must she see an opposition between "scientific

discourse” and psychoanalysis as “based on the particular, on language and emotion”? Surely the *raison d'être* of psychoanalysis is that though it is scientific it still must be *felt*. Contrariwise, Ms. Flem insists on seeing a profound similarity between Freud the archeologist (permit the repetition!) of private souls and the journalist and public man Theodor Herzl.

This is not the life of Freud “the Man.” It reads like an analysis, passing by vast areas not pressingly relevant to the cure, concentrating obsessively on others, quickly skirting others, or breaking off trains of thought when the hour is up. It is, however, a collection of fine insights, an appreciation to be appreciated.

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The Catholic Culture Bearer to the Rockies

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Review of Dan Dervin, Father Bosetti in America: A Biographical Study. Denver: Cache Glades, 2004, paperback. ISBN 0-9724792-2-8, vii-xi + 226 pp., \$15.95.

Given the current and decidedly cloudy image of Catholic priests who work with adolescent boys, Father (Fr.) Joseph J. Bosetti, the subject of Dan Dervin's biography, seems too good to be true. An Italian immigrant, this priest drew on the rich cultural heritage of his native Milan to compose sacred music as well as direct operas like “La Traviata” and “La Boheme” for the Denver Grand Opera Company. He provided the “proper auspices” for seminarians to drink alcohol under his supervision at his camp in the Rocky Mountains. He embraced some aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis while teaching a University of Colorado Extension Course in the 1920's. As extraordinary as Fr. Bosetti was, Dervin, a former camper and counselor at the priest's Camp St. Malo for Catholic seminarians and altar boys, never resorts to hagiography or myth-making. In fact, in various

places throughout the book, Dervin attempts to unlock some of the significance of Fr. Bosetti's life through psychoanalytic readings of certain memories, creative acts, and interpersonal incidents.

In the end, though, the book's ability to render a deep and incisive picture of what appears to be simply a remarkable human being is undermined by some structural problems in the presentation of the narrative and a certain unevenness in the writing (including several typos). Fr. Bosetti's life is presented in roughly chronological order, but is also structured around his great loves, apart from his priestly vocation: music, mountaineering, and, related to both, his camp. Part I is devoted the origins and impact of the priest's mission to Denver (chapter one), his music in and out of the church (chapters two and three), and his love of the mountains (chapter four), which he shares not only with Catholic boys but also the Pope at the time, Pius XI. Yet the next three chapters in this section, while related, are somewhat incongruous with what has preceded them. There is a brief account of the history of St. Catherine's Chapel on the Rock on the grounds of Camp St. Malo; an estimation of the intellectual significance of Fr. Bosetti's Extension Course on psychology; and an excursus on the campers' ascents up nearby Mount of the Holy Cross. Dervin then interrupts his chronology with Part II, a selection of Fr. Bosetti's writings on mountaineering and music. Part III follows with two chapters on the final years of the priest's life and his impact on others and concludes with an appendix on his seminary years in Rome and Switzerland, which includes a prescient report of sexual abuses by one of the seminary priests.

One should recognize that Dervin has not set out to write a psychobiography of this priest, who clearly meant much to the author. But such an acknowledgment only serves to accentuate the excursions into psychoanalytic interpretation. Some of these are tentative, at best (such as his reading of screen memories of the composer Giuseppe Verdi, pp. 37-39), but others suggest perceptive ways to tie the significant parts of the priest's life together. One occasion where Dervin successfully achieves such an insight into the whole of Fr. Bosetti's life comes (probably not coincidentally) in the chapter on the psychology course (chapter six), “Such Sublimity of Mind.” The title here refers to Dervin's exploration of the dual significance of the word “sublime.” On

the one hand there is the religious, ecstatic, even mystical meaning that in many ways lies at the spiritual core of the priestly vocation. On the other is the Freudian concept of sublimation, highly pertinent for a celibate who was also celebrated in religious and secular society for his role as a "culture bearer" to the remote western outpost of early twentieth century Colorado. Dervin writes, "the sublime forms a unifying thread in the total Bosetti tapestry," encompassing not only the priest's love of religion and music but also the mountains (p. 145). For Fr. Bosetti, Dervin argues, mountains represented not only the literal peaks of natural beauty but also the peaks of the human encounter with God, as seen in the numerous sacred heights consecrated in the Bible. Even mountaineering, so central to the priest's life and the lives of his campers, can be easily understood as a metaphor for transcending our limitations in both the religious and psychological senses (pp. 146-47).

The play of the sublime and sublimation Dervin discusses neatly illustrates Fr. Bosetti's remarkable ability to stay grounded in the world while reaching out to its transcendent aspects. However, after using the word "sublime" on the first page of the introduction and briefly alluding to sublimation in the second chapter ("Though their collaboration was long-lasting and fruitful, celibacy makes strange bed-fellows with art," p. 38), Dervin does not develop this theme until well into the second half of the book – and subsequently abandons it. Consequently it is difficult, overall, to understand what is so compelling or illustrative about this particular man of God. Fr. Bosetti arrived in America at 25, Dervin writes, "to all intents and purposes a fully formed adult, a priest committed to his vocation, well equipped to engage the many unforeseen challenges of the New World" (p. 41), a point he reiterates near the end of the book, adding that he "suffered little doubt or uncertainty" (p. 200). Perhaps part of the problem Dervin faces in revealing an absorbing portrait of this subject stems from the fact that he appears so well-balanced and well-suited to his chosen role that little of the internal conflict or outward struggle that one might anticipate from a cultured, non-English speaking missionary to one of the rough edges of American civilization is apparent.

Even when confronting injustices brought about by others' immoral behavior or unreasonable stances, the priest is unfailingly portrayed as taking

an unequivocally upright and sensible position. While he does not back down, he often accedes to withdraw from a situation, as when the "censorious" Bishop of Denver objects to the mixed acting company and romantic situations of the opera "Romeo et Juliette" (p. 34) or when one of Camp St. Malo's benefactors threatens to cut off funding (pp. 98-104). Dervin introduces an Oedipal theme of obedience regarding Fr. Bosetti's reaction to his superior in Denver and expands on it through the screen memory of Verdi, who "became a source of both idealization and identification," providing "the missing role as an idealized, sponsoring parent" (pp. 35-39). As an adult, the priest misremembers Verdi's relationship to Catholicism, seeing him as he no doubt saw himself: "obedient" (i.e., Orthodox) but creative within its constraints. Throughout his life Fr. Bosetti is never portrayed as chafing under these constraints or surreptitiously subverting them; this culture bearer voices no discontent with the repressive forces of his civilization. Though Dervin asserts that Fr. Bosetti, like Freud, was "deeply ambivalent toward civilization," he is content to accept at face value the priest's devotion to religion—and mountaineering—as "solutions" to its "hypocrisy of conventionalities and 'ennui'" (p. 197). The story of Bosetti's life would be more fascinating and still more richly human if Dervin had been able to not only depict the priest's great strengths but the inner struggles and constant sacrifices they most certainly required.

Still, the priest's sense of fairness and justice was acute, at least when injustice threatened to impact the welfare of the young men in his world who had devoted their lives to God. We see true moral indignation when his benefactor jeopardizes his camp, resigning for two years in protest. More striking still is the letter he writes, at age 19, to make known the sexual improprieties conducted by one of the priests at the Bethlehem Mission in Immensee, Switzerland, where he had begun his training (pp. 220-23). Appealing to the issues of trust, morality, and justice upon which such a scandal, left unaddressed, would inflict immeasurable damage for the young seminarians and the Church itself, this letter demonstrates just what a force this man was in all his reasonableness and measured passion. It is unfortunate then that this episode from the beginning of his career is relegated to an appendix at the end of a book on his life. Had Dervin integrated all the aspects of Fr. Bosetti's life as well as the man himself

had, he could have produced an extraordinary biography, rather than an uneven biography of a model priest that only offers glimpses of what made him that way.

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Milgram's Legacy

**Eva Fogelman
Private Practice**

Review of Thomas Blass, The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram. New York: Basic Books, 2004. Hardcover ISBN 0738203998, 360 pages, \$26.00.

After World War II, Holocaust survivors who were liberated from concentration camps were often accused of committing devious acts in order to survive. At that time *The Saturday Evening Post* and the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* reported: "The few that remain to us in Europe are not necessarily Judaism's best. The nation's jewels were destroyed first, and many of the survivors are suspected of low morality." How ironic that the victims were blamed for their survival! The perpetrators, many of whom managed to escape, were not subjected to such denigration.

Perhaps it should not have surprised us that the man who tried to discover what was behind such barbaric inhumanity is a person who has been accused of immorality. Stanley Milgram, the world-renowned social psychologist, is best known for his studies of "obedience to authority," even though his other research findings, such as "six degrees of separation," have become part of everyday popular culture. Thomas Blass in his exquisite portrayal *The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram*, removes Milgram's anonymity and restores for us the panoply of Milgram's contributions to our own understanding of human behavior.

Blass sheds insight into the question of why the man who legitimized the field of social psychology is only mentioned in passing in the writings of the history of psychology.

One explanation proposed by Blass for Milgram's lack of recognition is that Milgram did not have a school of thought that followed him. Yet, Milgram had more graduate students than most members of the faculty at the Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York. I am a case in point. I was one of Stanley Milgram's students, one whose work would not be identifiable in a "Stanley Milgram school of social psychology." Or would it?

Being interested in moral capacity in human beings, I was intrigued by the minority in Milgram's study who disobeyed authority when asked to shock a person who gets a wrong answer to a word-association test in an experimental laboratory. What enabled certain individuals to maintain their moral integrity? I did not avail myself of Stanley Milgram's simulated shock generator. Rather, I did a case study of non-Jews who risked their lives to save Jews during the Holocaust. I also attempted to develop a "Tendency to Help" personality measurement. Although my methodology was different from Milgram's approach to uncovering human behavior in different situations, he applauded my qualitative methodology. He helped me draft a letter to *Psychology Today*; and indeed, my preliminary findings were published in that popular magazine. Milgram died at the age of 51, shortly after he approved my dissertation proposal.

In 1981, when I began to voice interest in moral issues during the Holocaust, and more specifically in altruistic behavior, I discovered that most people were suspicious of altruistic behavior. They would declare that psychoanalysts say that altruism does not exist; unconscious motivation—narcissistic gratification—is at the core of helping others. People would say, "The rescuers must have had ulterior motives." Holocaust survivors would say, "Don't make such a big deal about the rescuers; there were so few." Although I was not accused of being immoral, the idea that non-Jews risked their lives to save Jews without financial or other rewards is not accepted by all, no matter what my interviews with rescuers and those they helped show. I empathized with Mil

gram's encounter with criticism of his findings that a majority of people will comply when told to harm another person by an authority figure.

My first encounter with Stanley Milgram was in 1978 in Jerusalem, where he was an invited speaker at an international conference on psychological stress. He took a particular interest in my producing a film. From Milgram I learned about film as a medium to communicate knowledge, and how it is different from the written format. He lived long enough to see my documentary, *Breaking the Silence: The Generation After the Holocaust*, air on national PBS and the ZDF in Germany.

I was one of many of Milgram's students who Blass tracked down and interviewed. Blass's portrait of Milgram as a teacher is not a glorification of the dead. He depicts Milgram with all his wounds and strengths. Indeed, Blass reports on the students' diverse research interests and on their reactions to Milgram. Professor Milgram was imaginative and possessed an insatiable curiosity. It is that quality that he passed on to his students. If there is a "Stanley Milgram school of social psychology" it is that each student should pursue a question that most intrigues him or her about the social world and human behavior, and find interesting ways to answer the question. The dependent variable has to be attention-grabbing.

Milgram's curiosity about the world around him and invention of experiments to prove one thing or another was a part of his core self from childhood. He was curious about how "everything worked." Blass's informative psychohistorical biography is enriched by interviews with Milgram's brother, sister, wife, children, childhood friends, and by previous interviews.

In recounting Milgram's childhood, Blass highlights two incidents that in hindsight serve as a harbinger to Milgram's professional interests. In the first incident, a child was knocked down by a car in Milgram's neighborhood in the Bronx. Milgram watched as a crowd of protesters gathered on the sidewalk to chant, "Sit down strike! Sit down strike!" They built a barricade from milk crates across the width of the street and sat on the crates. Shortly after, a one-way street was established. The power of groups did not bypass the keen observer Milgram.

The second critical incident occurred when Stanley Milgram was four or five years old, and playing with his cousin in his room. Milgram wanted to measure the distance between two beds with a belt that stretched. According to Milgram, "The belt slipped, and the buckle, with its sharp spindle, fell on Stanley's [his cousin] head causing a small flow of blood. Even though it was an accident, Milgram was scolded by his mother. Years later, Milgram contemplates this encounter: "Still, to be blamed for such things was a burden. But whether I learned my lesson remains unclear. For many years later, was I not again to become an object of criticism for my efforts to measure something without due regard to the risks it entailed for others?"

What is most striking to me is that Milgram's immigrant parents, who valued their children as "treasures," were role-models for never giving up in the face of hardship. They overcame financial limitations with dignity and perseverance. It is those qualities that one also observes in Milgram. When he was not admitted to Harvard graduate school in psychology, because he had not majored in psychology as an undergraduate, he did not take "No" for an answer. Milgram figured out how to get accepted, and worked very hard to get himself ready for the challenge.

When Milgram's father, a baker and cake decorator, died at fifty-five years of age of a coronary thrombosis, Milgram was in college and living at home. The father's bad investments left them poverty-stricken, but his "resourceful and resilient" mother found a job. The father's death brought on a premonition in Milgram that he would die when he was fifty-five years old. Milgram also resolved to protect his own future family from financial disaster should he die young. Family was a high priority in Milgram's life. His drive and ambition academically did not undermine his valuing of family life, and the close knit-family of his childhood was replicated in his adult life.

Thomas Blass's detailed sequential narrative of Stanley Milgram's life and work probably would not have been possible without the meticulous archive Milgram left behind. The attention to specifics is what made Milgram the scientist *par excellence*. This certainly comes through in the engaging, readable, page turning biography, whose readers are ea-

ger to know: "what is Stanley Milgram up to next?"

Milgram's inquisitive nature led to many questions about observable social behavior. A lost letter addressed to what kind of an organization is more likely to be mailed? Who would succeed in getting passengers on a New York subway to give up their seat? Are New Yorkers more or less helpful than people in various European cities? Are Americans more or less obedient to authority than are Norwegians or French? Milgram explained that he was an "experimentalist" because "only in action can you fully realize the forces operative in social behavior. Picking up a "lost letter," or giving up one's seat on the subway, or observing familiar strangers at a train station, behavior in crowds are a few of the concrete dependent variables.

Milgram did have some studies that did not fit this paradigm, such as the study of cognitive maps of different cities. His study on television's effects on antisocial behavior is a landmark contribution as well. Milgram's appetite for filmmaking was whetted when he was in Hollywood during the filming of *Medical Center*. He prolificacy in low budget films such as *The City and the Self* was astounding. Blass captures the excitement that Milgram experienced in using this medium.

In reading *The Man Who Shocked the World*, several of Milgram's personality traits come alive and in essence shape the format of Blass's book. Milgram is portrayed as having been very organized. He was meticulous in recording conversations, correspondences, procedures, and day-to-day events, and his letters reveal much about relationships with colleagues, family members and friends. Milgram documented each research project or film project from its beginning, through its middle, and to the end. He was a great believer in the finished product: What would it look like? Would it be interesting? To be able to have so many details, almost as if Milgram wrote it himself, must have been a biographer's delight.

Despite Milgram's prominence, his proposals were not always accepted for funding. Blass illustrates how critics of Milgram limited his ability to get funds for certain projects. Throughout Milgram's life, criticism of the obedience studies continued to pop up here and there and needed constant attention. The American Psychological Association's ethics

committee and IRBs (Institutional Review Board) became very stringent as a result of the criticism. It is highly unlikely that such experiments would pass a review board today.

Blass does not focus only on Milgram's research. *The Man Who Shocked the World* is full of tidbits about Milgram's social life, early dating, and the courtship of his wife Sasha, as well as the social life they enjoyed together, and his role as a father. Milgram loved pranks and had a sense of humor. He was an experimenter and his experimentation included, unapologetically, drugs.

Stanley Milgram died almost twenty years ago. His ideas have become part of our vernacular: "What a small world"—a Milgramism—is what we say when someone tells us he met someone we know. When I read in the press about soldiers who are obeying or disobeying orders, workers who are conforming to group pressures, the familiar strangers we noticed on September 11, 2001 when we were stuck on subway stations in New York City or walked miles to reach our homes with thousands of others, I think about Stanley Milgram. Thomas Blass's *The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram* is a "must read" for those who want to see the world through an inspiring, uncommon lens.

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**Historical amnesia is a grave danger
of our age**

Psychological Insights into the Life of Saint Rose of Lima

Paula Straile-Costa
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Review of Frank Graziano, Wounds of Love: The Mystical Marriage of Saint Rose of Lima. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Hardcover ISBN 0195136403, 338 pages, \$49.95.

Frank Graziano, John D. MacArthur Professor of Hispanic Studies at Connecticut College, adeptly elucidates the life of Isabel Flores y Oliva (1586-1617) and her transformation into Rose of Lima, the first saint in the Americas. Approaching the saint's life through the fields of history, psychoanalysis, clinical psychology, and cultural studies, he delivers a remarkable account of the social and individual motivations inherent in penitent mysticism in the New World during the Counter Reformation. He begins by addressing the scholarly attacks mounted against psychology and psychoanalysis when used to examine historical figures, particularly female mystics. He affirms that: "our fullest understanding of Rose of Lima's mysticism, sainthood, religious culture, and textual representation is afforded when history, cultural theory, and psychological analysis can negotiate a methodological compromise" (p. 20). Graziano's purpose is to highlight what scholars have brought to light in recent years "while at once recuperating the erotic and psychological aspects of mysticism that have been devalued" (p. 15). The scholar's analysis avoids reductionist labeling of religious behavior as simply pathological, deviant, or hysterical. He sees the saint as a product of her culture, her behaviors conditioned by it. He examines the many factors involved in Lima's creation as a saint, including her childhood trauma, pervasive religious fervor, political milieu, and desire to sacrifice herself for Christ. In *Wounds of Love: The Mystical Marriage of Saint Rose of Lima*, Graziano offers a multifaceted, complex reading of the saint's life, one that permits multiple meanings.

The scholar uses the image of the palimpsest to describe the complex textual world he enters in order to extract the truth about Rose's psychological condition. The palimpsest is a tablet that, having been written upon several times, the texts imperfectly

erased, leaves the previous texts still visible. Included in this image are the obviously biased canonization documents in the Vatican's archives as well as the many layers of complicity that support Rose's sainthood from her cult of followers and patrons to her confessors and inquisition interrogators. He explains how saints are created "from the bottom up." Popular oral tradition is read, recorded, edited, sanitized and repeatedly revised by the Church, providing the official narrative with "canonical definitiveness and sacrosanct closure" (p. 36). Rose's hagiography, then, is invested in proving that she was not only sane but saintly in order to affirm the church's claim to represent the one true faith. As a saint, Rose's symbolic uses are multiple and, furthermore, extend beyond the theological to the political realm. As a New World saint she provides an economy of sanctity that spans the continents justifying the colonial project and further legitimizing the Church, the Dominican Order, and the Spanish Crown, along with all its institutions in the Americas. Interestingly enough, despite possessing no indigenous blood, she becomes a symbol of syncretic faith, the way the Virgin of Guadalupe does for Mexicans. She was invoked in Creole independence uprisings as well as in indigenous rebellions, even as the Spanish continued to read her as an atonement for the sin of native paganism and idolatry. Graziano engaged in considerable speculation to understand Rose of Lima's psychological health and mysticism, which is perhaps inevitable due to the lapse of time and her prominence as a Saint.

From the age of five and increasingly as she grew, Rose practiced fasting and celibacy, and mortified her flesh with scourging, wearing a crown of thorns and a metal chain wrapped tightly about her waist. She deprived herself of sleep, slept on a torturous bed, vomited if she tried to eat something other than the Eucharist, and constantly and with apparent self-loathing inflicted many other creative forms of suffering on herself. At least 15 years of mortification and self-starvation resulted in Rose's death: a death eagerly awaited, since in her mind it meant that she would wed Christ as a martyr. Of course, as a faithful Catholic, she could not directly kill herself. Graziano indicates that Rose displayed a number of modern disorders including anorexia nervosa, delusion, masochism, narcissism and paranoia. The scholar explains that these illnesses were made possible and perhaps inescapable by her culture, in

which “aspects of Catholicism, particularly, penitent mysticism provided self-abuse a precedent, forum, method, legitimacy, purpose and meaning” (p. 168). At this time, when New World colonies were pervaded with religious zeal, Lima was like “a huge convent” (p. 7). Furthermore, the mindset of the Counter-Reformation, focusing on Christ’s passion and penitence, held the notion of life on earth as martyrdom and a human being as a “bag of excrement,” or “food for worms” (p. 165). The author also points out that manifestations and behaviors that are viewed as pathological or dysfunctional today ought to be understood as not only essential to an individual’s saintliness but also as having been positive and effective in his or her society. On the other hand, despite cultural incentive of sainthood in colonial Lima, very few women exhibited these behaviors. Thus, while cultural factors enabled her behavior patterns, it was clearly something unique in Rose that allowed her to follow her agonizing path.

As is the case with other penitent mystics and modern neurotics, Roses’ early childhood and family life were formative factors. Her father, an elderly, distant, and inconsequential man, left the care of Rose to her mother, whose parenting reinforced many of her behaviors. Rose’s mother often resorted to harsh physical punishments to halt her mortifications but succeeded only in fueling her daughter’s passion for self abuse. The young girl suffered countless childhood illnesses and injuries, with many cures so painful as to be considered child abuse today, which she bore stoically as if they were happening to another’s body. When it came time for courting, Rose attempted to separate from her abusive mother and her own powerlessness. Mirroring modern masochists, Rose identified with the source of her pain and began inflicting it on herself. The only way for Rose to cope with the double bind of her aversion to her mother’s demands that she marry and her desire to be one with God was through mystical marriage with Christ. Rose experienced Christ as often having such utterly worldly characteristics as jealousy, pettiness, impatience, lack of charity, and even hedonism. In her mind, he took on significant elements of her mother’s personality, becoming: “domineering, demanding, totalitarian, controlling, pain—and guilt—inducing” (p. 154). From this point on, in seeking to become the “bride of Christ,” Rose systematically worked to destroy her previous sense of self in order to be one with “Him.” In doing this she displayed the

modern masochist’s “slavish devotion, mediating her love through [...] guilt and unworthiness” (p. 155). Graziano explains that biochemical and psychological elements may have created an addiction to starvation and, likewise, pain dependency could have resulted from endorphin release and a predisposition caused by sleep deprivation and isolation. Rose interpreted her suffering (the self inflicted and that which she saw as induced by God) as an effort to purify herself so that she might unite with Christ as His bride.

Rose associated her love of Christ with suffering, and she gleaned periods of erotic pleasure and ecstasy from union with her image of him. Graziano treats mystical eroticism seriously, rather than simply devaluing the behaviors as bizarre or titillating. He explains that Rose’s erotic devotion is in line with a tradition of mystic penitents. Simply put, she had several role models. He identifies the biblical *Song of Songs*, combined with centuries of exegetic writings derived from it, as the main source for erotic imagery representing love and union with God. He explains that this body of literature provides an outlet for repressed sexual urges that are rechanneled in the idea of mystical marriage and acted out in penitents’ behaviors (kissing, fondling, copulation, sucking at Christ’s “breast” or wound).

Graziano explains that many of the ecstatic, or visionary, experiences of penitent mystics like Saint Rose are common with those of schizophrenics, for instance, a sense of omniscience, union with God, a loss of one’s own boundaries. Rose’s visions and locutions were consistent with her Christian beliefs and affirmed by her society. For instance, she stated that several saints, including Catherine of Siena, the saint whose life she imitated, visited her. She also reported that she communicated with statues of the Virgin of the Rosary and the Christ child, who spoke in muted voices or in her thoughts or with signs and facial expressions. Implying that some of Rose’s experiences could have been normal meditative states, Graziano notes that subjects of meditation experiments have also reported such sensations. For instance, they have perceived “visions of light and the dissolution of their psychic boundaries. One woman felt as though everything, herself included, dissolved into an amorphous, enveloping bundle of energy” (pp. 177-8).

As one who seriously practices yoga meditation, mysticism plays an important role in my own life. Thankfully, my culture doesn't require agony in exchange for ecstasy, and my mystical philosophy views suffering as part of the human condition but certainly not its nature or deserved punishment. Meditation can lead to altered states of consciousness not commonly experienced in the normal waking state where dualities break down and peace and stillness reign. These well-documented experiences can be interpreted absolutely, as transcendental reality or the presence of the Holy Spirit. On the other hand, being a member of a subculture of academics informed by Western empiricism, I share Graziano's apparent skepticism regarding claims made in the name of the transcendental. While we don't need to look back in time to find fearsome examples of suffering caused by religion, recalling the lives of penitents and the Inquisition urges questioning of religious postures. This book encouraged me to contemplate the relationship between my culture and intellectual milieu and my mystical experiences in meditation. I find that while my belief in a transcendental reality is problematic, there is space for a kind of faith and wonder that urges seeking, study, a desire for deeper understanding and meaning in life.

The great strength of Graziano's inquiry is this spirit of wonder, its openness to simultaneous meanings and its resistance to definitive diagnoses. His interdisciplinary perspective rightfully brings into question single disciplinary, reductive approaches to this complex case. Resisting the expert's arrogance at having fully understood his subject, he indicates that neither the cosmos nor the human psyche can be captured under a microscope or explained through facile naming. The author's ethos, his humility, consideration of how much is at stake for his readers and great respect for his subject make this work special. Even while relating behaviors that appear horrifying or even laughable to modern readers, he treats Saint Rose of Lima and the various complicit groups involved in her creation with serious attention and studied sensitivity. Graziano's text illuminates history of Saint Rose of Lima, offering an illustration of the incredibly rich interaction of culture and the individual psyche that, if we can apply it to our own life and times, may lead us to become freer individuals.

Paula Straile-Costa, PhD, an assistant pro-

fessor of Spanish at Ramapo College of New Jersey in the suburbs of New York City, has a strong interest in the psychology of religion. She earned her doctorate in comparative literature from Pennsylvania State University where she specialized in Inter-American literatures. Previously she was chair of the foreign language department at Hampton College in Virginia. Professor Straile-Costa may be reached at <pstraile@ramapo.edu>. □

Creative and Destructive Leaders of Large Groups

**Peter Petschauer
Appalachian State University**

Review of Vamik Volkan, Blind Trust: Large Groups and Their Leaders in Times of Crisis and Terror. Charlottesville, VA: Pitchstone Publishing, 2004. Hardcover ISBN 0-9728875-2-0, \$29.95, Paperback ISBN 0-9728875-3-9; 368 pages, \$19.95.

Once more, Vamik Volkan has given us an exceptionally stimulating analysis; this time he has written specifically about large groups, how they function, and how their leaders "use" them for good or ill. Particularly refreshing about Volkan's work is the breath of his insights. He applies psychology, history, political science, and his own experiences with international negotiations in addition to his many interviews.

Especially convincing are Volkan's comparisons between leaders who repair their societies for societal benefit as opposed to those who undermine and even destroy their people for their own personal benefit. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Julius Kambarage Nyerere, and Nelson Mandela are men whom Volkan sees as positive influences for their societies. Not surprisingly, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Slobodan Milosevic, and Enver Hoxha of Albania are his examples of destructive leaders. Between these extremes, Richard Nixon stands as an example in the balance. The discussion on how each of the repairers integrated traumatic childhood and adulthood experiences into a positive construction of his personality and how destroyers attained the opposite result is totally absorbing. The repairers, who are often teachers, turned truly horrid events of their lives, as Mandela did with his extensive prison stays, to insights

that uplifted both their societies and themselves. By contrast, the destroyers were unable to integrate their traumatic experiences or the disliked parts of their personalities to this degree, externalizing them instead as abuse and hatred of those whom they learned to despise.

Interesting, too, is how each of these men dealt with enemies. Mandela pinpointed the abusive system of apartheid, and Atatürk, the illiteracy and ignorance of the population as a whole and the traditional leadership. By contrast, Hitler saw the enemies as persons, that is, Jews, Gypsies, and other undesirables, and Milosevic saw them in the Muslim descendants of the men who defeated Prince Lazar in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389.

These discussions about healing or poisoning leaders, largely based on insights regarding narcissism, are matched by equally insightful analyses of Islamic fundamentalism. Very helpful here is Volkan's ability to separate deeply held religious faith, like that of a befriended Russian Orthodox priest in Estonia who tolerates other believers, from fundamentalists of various sorts, including Muslims, Christians, and Jews who react negatively toward "outsiders." The elaborations on Islam, from the earliest days of the Prophet Muhammad, through the Ottoman Empire's defeat in front of Vienna on September 11 (actually 12), 1683, to bin Laden are "a must read" for understanding today's confrontations in the Middle East. Although Volkan warns us to hold off judgment as to evaluations of President George W. Bush's approach to "terrorism," many who have studied ethnic/religious violence, warfare, and recent military occupations are ready to argue that the U.S. was ill advised in its recent approach to the Islamic world in Iraq.

Volkan's approach is similar to the school of psychohistorians that emphasizes the experiences of childhood and group fantasies as determiners of the course of history. Somewhat in contrast, Volkan very carefully analyzes the childhoods of numerous individuals and the experiences of very specific groups. In doing so, he describes the influences of traumas on personality development and leaders' positive and negative manipulations of children, young people, and adults, including the constructive and destructive energies to which they are able to harness such experiences. I suspect that this talented

psychiatrist and founder of the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI) might have used to his advantage the insights of this group of psychohistorians.

No doubt, Hitler and his minions endeavored to create a *Volkgemeinschaft* (Community of the *Volk*) in ways that Volkan describes. The National Socialist regime tried to make families serve its needs and to pull children away from their families for the greater good of Germany, a point well illustrated in the film *Europa, Europa*. However, the author overlooks the great variety of Germans and Germanies that existed in the 12 years of National Socialist rule. For example, while he is correct that the number of youths who attended Youth Film Hour increased into the millions by 1943, most of us also attended church on Sundays and were offered *Religionsunterricht* (catechism) in *Volksschule* (elementary school) by a priest or a minister. In reality, only one of my friends and acquaintances who grew up in various parts of Germany in the 1930s and 1940s felt that her family's authority was undermined. Especially in cities, children were glad to get out into "mother nature" and equally glad to be back home for a decent meal.

I am troubled by the consistent misspelling of German words. For example, in the sentence "*Mutter, erzähl von Adolf Hitler! ... Ein Buch zum ... Nacherzahlen und Selbstlesen für kleinere und grössere Kinder*" (pp. 75-76) [Mother, tell us of Adolf Hitler!...A book to ... retell and read oneself for smaller and larger children], the use of *nacherzahlen* instead of *nacherzählen* is problematic as this could easily be mistaken for *nachherzahlen*, that is, to pay later.

Misspellings sometimes warn us of problems with large group analyses. But none of the above critiques imply more than that in a vast survey—with many different fields, geographic areas, and persons involved—an author will not be in control of every detail. They also do not imply other flaws. *Blind Trust* is a brilliant book that should be read by everyone who is at all concerned with leadership and large groups, and how leaders' childhoods and adulthoods create the positive and destructive ways with which they lead their own and other societies.

Peter Petschauer's biography may be found on page 90. □

Bulletin Board

One of the forthcoming **Psychohistory Forum WORK-IN-PROGRESS SATURDAY SEMINARS** will be on **April 2, 2005** when **Anna Geifman** (Boston University) will present "**Profile of the Modern Terrorist**," from her forthcoming book, *Death will be Their God*.

CONFERENCES: At the **International Psychohistorical Association (IPA)** at Fordham University on June 8-10, 2005, the Forum's Research Group on the Childhood, Personality, and Psychology of Presidential Candidates and Presidents will sponsor a session on the first 100 days of the Bush administration and the prospects for the next four years. The presenters include **Herbert Barry, Dan Dervin, Paul Elovitz,** and **Jennefer Mazza.** (**Rudy Binion, John Hartman, David Lotto,** and **H. John Rogers** are some additional Forum members noted on the program.) **Jacques Szaluta** (E-mail: szalutaJ@usmma.edu) has taken the lead in arranging for psychohistorical panels at the **International Society for Political Psychology (ISPP)** in Toronto, Canada, on July 3-6, 2005 and he has asked Paul Elovitz to set up a second panel and perhaps a roundtable. Contact either for details. **AWARDS:** The Psychohistory Forum has available the Young Scholars Membership Award, the Clio's Psyche Subscription Award, and the Sidney Halpern Award for the Best Psychohistorical Idea or Accomplishment. The last may be granted at the graduate, undergraduate, or postgraduate level. **DEATHS: Lucy Freeman,** a pioneer in reporting on mental health/psychoanalysis, author of 78 books, and a friend to psychohistory died at age 88 in December from complications of Alzheimer's Disease. **OUR THANKS:** To our members and subscribers for the support that makes *Clio's Psyche* possible. To Benefactors Herbert Barry, Ralph Colp, and Mary Lambert; Patrons David Beisel, Peter Loewenberg, Peter Petschauer, H. John Rogers, and Jacques Szaluta; Sustaining Members C. Frederick (Fred) Alford and David Lotto; Supporting Member Hanna Turken; and Members Sander Breiner, Paul Elovitz, Alberto Fergusson, Richard Harrison, Flora Hogman, Glen Jeansonne, Margery Quackenbush, Robert Quackenbush, and Roberta Rubin. Our thanks for thought-provoking materials to David Beisel, Kelly

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In the March Issue of *Clio's Psyche:* **The Voice/Personal Experience and Psychology of Women at Work and in Modern Life**

"My Journey from Oxford to Psychohistory"
 "Physics and Pantyhose Days"
 "My Personal Experience in National Defence"
 "Finding My Own Path"
 "Women's Freedom to Choose"
 "Being a Feminist in Israel"
 "The 'Jewish Mother' in Myth and Society"
 "Remembering My Mother"
 "Overcoming Pain through Writing"
 "The Gender Gap in Voting"
 "Martha Stewart and Her Gender Role"
 "Sexism at the Hardware Store"
 "The Beauty Myth: The Culture of Appearance"
 Distinguished Scholar: Nancy J. Chodorow
 (*Reproduction of Mothering*)

Psychohistory Forum
 Saturday Work-in-Progress Seminar
 Proposals Are Encouraged
 Electronically Send an Abstract or a
 Draft Paper
 to Paul Elovitz Who Will Share Your
 Ideas With the Program Committee
 A Biography is Requested

Clio's Psyche

Understanding the "Why" of Culture, Current Events, History, and Society

Volume 11 Number 4

March 2005

The Voice/Personal Experience and Psychology of Women at Work and in Modern Life Special Issue

Nancy J. Chodorow: Psychoanalyst and Gender Theorist

Paul H. Elovitz

**Ramapo College and the Psychohistory Forum
and**

Bob Lentz
Clio's Psyche

Nancy J(ulia) Chodorow, PhD, was born in 1944 in New York City. In 1966 she received her AB summa cum laude in social relations/social anthropology from Radcliffe-Harvard. She did two years of graduate work in anthropology, and she received her MA in 1972 and PhD in 1975 in sociology from Brandeis University. She trained as an analyst at the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute from 1985 to 1993, and was certified in Adult Psychoanalysis by the American Psychoanalytic Association in May 2000.

Professor Chodorow has been an active academic and clinician. She taught in the Sociology Department at University of California, Santa Cruz from 1974-1986 and since 1986 in the Sociology Department at UC, Berkeley. After 30 years of teaching, and clinical work since 1986, Professor Chodorow left the university at the beginning of 2005, where she is now Professor Emerita, to devote her time to her private practice and writing.

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Introduction: Women in Society: Changes and Challenges

Nancy C. Unger
Santa Clara University

In 1905, Belle Case La Follette, the first woman to graduate from the University of Wisconsin Law School, wrote to her husband, Senator Robert M. La Follette, that whenever she got discouraged, "I always think there is nothing I would rather be than your wife and the mother of your children and I have no ambition except to contribute to your happiness and theirs and to your success and theirs." Six years later she was a self-professed feminist, publicly advo-

(Continued on next page)

The "Jewish Mother" in Myth and Society: A Psychoanalytic Approach

Sari Goldstein Ferber
University of Haifa, Israel

The Problem

Throughout the decades a distinct personality style was related to Jewish mothers and embellished by the term "Jewish Mother." Literature in the early-to-mid 20th century (including fiction, movie scripts, and jokes) portrayed the Jewish mother figure in vivid colors and images as different from other maternal roles and behaviors known in the Western societies of that time. These portraits consisted of

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cating a very different view of women's work and position in modern life. She encouraged women to participate fully in society, urging them to free themselves from their parasitic dependence on their husbands, develop their talents, and be of service to humanity. She no longer saw her husband's various frustrating behaviors as indicators of her own failures but viewed them instead as qualities of his personality that she was entirely unable to change. Relieved of this great burden of guilt, she turned her attentions increasingly to advocating reform, especially the expansion of women's rights.

Women's views of themselves and their place in society as individuals and as a sex continue to evolve, frequently demanding psychological adjustments not only from generation to generation, but within a single lifetime. A century ago, La Follette's mindset changed profoundly over just a few years — society is still catching up to her vision of the proper

role of women within the family and in society as a whole.

In my own life, psychological adjustments concerning women at work and in modern life have been remarkably dramatic — and maddeningly slow. I am grateful to the women before me who blazed the academic trail, proving that women can not only hold their own in the various disciplines previously reserved for men, but make unique contributions that enrich those fields. Occasionally I feel at a disadvantage professionally because of my gender. The far greater threat of oppression I see among my colleagues and neighbors, however, stems from the attitudes by and towards "superwomen" who struggle mightily to juggle career and family and, like Belle La Follette before her transformation, suffer from guilt when they do not succeed at something in which they are doomed to fail.

My own career and family thrive not because I am a superwoman, but because I am a partner in an egalitarian marriage. The defining moment in our relationship came the day we brought our first child home from the hospital. My husband, an only child with minimum previous exposure to newborns, was holding our day-old son. When the baby began to fuss, my anxious husband prepared to hand him over to me. Part of me wanted to claim the power and authority implied in this act, but the wiser part inspired me to say, "You've been a parent just as long as I have, and you're doing fine." By resisting the temptation to claim any superior ability to comfort our son by virtue of my sex, I empowered my husband, giving confidence to his abilities as a father. From that day to this (that newborn son has just been accepted into college), we have shared equally in all household and child-rearing activities (our children were bottle-

fed), including laundry, homework assistance, and cooking.

Combining career and family is never easy. My husband and I, both busy professionals, found ourselves pushed to our upper limits on more than one occasion even as we shared all home duties and responsibilities. Had either of us prescribed to the prevailing mentality that, especially when it comes to housekeeping and childrearing, women are hardwired to carry out these responsibilities and should do so because they are better at them than are men, I would have felt overwhelmed, inadequate, and guilty.

The prevailing psychology damages women at work and within the family, and is self-perpetuating. A recent study reported in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* reveals that the few men who take paternity leave perform much less child care than do their female counterparts. Rather than asking *why* women continue to carry out the majority of baby care activities, and encouraging a new psychology of parenthood as a series of equitably shared responsibilities (not to mention the accompanying joys), the study concludes only that continuing to extend paternity leave may be unwise, perpetuating and solidifying the superwoman myth.

At a recent public presentation, Gloria Steinem concluded, "I'll know when we're really succeeding when, after a talk at a campus like this one, as many men come up to me as do women, to ask, 'How can I successfully combine career and family?'" As long as that question continues to be asked primarily by women, and matters involving children and family continue to be perceived, personally and publicly, as "women's issues," the prevailing psychology will persist, exhausting "superwomen," and robbing both men and women of the satisfactions of genuine partnership.

What it means to be a woman continues to be redefined, however, as do perceptions of a woman's work and her proper role in society. This "Women in Society" issue of *Clio's Psyche* examines a broad range of women's experiences in the modern era, as influenced by a variety of factors.

This issue's Distinguished Scholar interview with Nancy Chodorow gives new insight into the thoughts of this enormously influential and innovative psychoanalyst. Chodorow's role as a leading theorist in psychoanalysis and feminist psychology is grounded not only in her comprehensive grasp of the

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psychoanalytic discourse, but also in her evolution of thinking about gender issues, particularly as they influence parenting. Her wide-ranging personal memories and professional observations frame and provide important context for the issue's essays, which examine an array of topics ranging from Martha Stewart to feminism in Israel.

The first essay provides a psychoanalytic perspective on the myth of the "Jewish Mother," highlighting the interrelationships between psychology, religion, linguistics, place, and culture. The next four essays concern the world of work and provide first-hand accounts by women (a computer specialist, a historian-military analyst, a psychohistorian, and a professor of physics and astronomy) training and working in professions previously reserved for men. The psychobiographical accounts of their pioneering efforts reveal what inspired them to reject prevailing gender stereotypes, how it felt to be viewed as "other," and the challenges and rewards of struggling to break gendered social barriers in order to pursue professional passions.

The next two essays provide psychological insight into the powerful interplay between gender, ethnicity, and culture across the generations. The first of these provides a view of women in Israeli society that is in sharp contrast to the earlier essay on the "Jewish Mother," as the author examines, through personal experience, the tensions between popular perceptions of Israeli egalitarianism and the realities of ongoing oppression. It is followed by a personal account of an elderly woman's Alzheimer's-induced decline and the emotions it unleashes in her daughter.

The final four essays bring insights to bear on more recent gender-charged events and personal experiences. This grouping begins with an investigation into the role of psychological dynamics in American women's political attitudes and voting patterns. It is followed by an analysis of the role of gender in the fate of Martha Stewart, especially as she exhibited dual gender role identities. The impact of persistent gender stereotyping on men as well as women is presented from the male perspective, preceding an account of the challenge to young women's self-esteem wrought by Western culture's current obsession with female appearance. The essays conclude with Paul Elovitz's far-ranging and cross-cultural thoughts about the effect of the remarkable gender transformations of recent years on both men

and women, and of the trials and triumphs emerging from the ongoing tensions and adjustments.

Taken together, the essays in this "Women in Society" special theme issue highlight the many areas in which psychological adjustments remain ongoing in response to the changes and challenges emerging from the powerful interplay between women, work, and modern society.

Nancy C. Unger, PhD, is Associate Professor of History, Women and Gender Studies, and Environmental Studies at Santa Clara University. She is the author of Fighting Bob La Follette: The Righteous Reformer (2000), as well as several psychobiographical articles on the La Follette family. Her current book project is Beyond "Nature's Housekeepers": Women and Gender in American Environmental History. Professor Unger may be reached at nunger@scu.edu. □

Finding My Own Pioneering Path

Edryce Reynolds

Psychohistory Forum Research Associate

When I entered the workforce in the early 1950s, women were not supposed to have anything resembling a "career." After World War II, women were encouraged to go back to the home from any factory jobs so that the returning veterans could work. Women were also encouraged to find a man, marry, and have babies. Any job after high school or college was considered temporary, often more of an opportunity to find an appropriate life partner. One way of categorizing the prevailing atmosphere could be that discrimination against women was built-in — part of the culture, similar to "coloreds only" in the South. In this environment, I felt somewhat lost. I could not relate to the women I worked with in my first two or three jobs because there was no one like me in the group. I wanted to work, I wanted to *do* something — something that would be meaningful to the world. I was not ready for marriage and did not want children. The idea that women could have more was not prevalent at the time.

After stumbling for a few years, searching, changing jobs, and moving from one coast to the other, I finally married because it seemed the only way to quiet the critics. But that didn't completely shut them up because then they started with, "When are you going to start a family?" There I really

balked: I did not want children; my husband did. So, divorce after three years opened up a new freedom for me. The critics were silent. They were embarrassed for me, a divorced woman, a failure. But I was free.

By my mid-20s I found my way into a really interesting job. Before it was considered a "field," I entered the world of computers. I also entered a world of men in which women were a minority. That was really new; the only men I had previously encountered at work were my supervisors. I remember deciding that if I wanted to be included in the general conversations, I would accept the language they used, the "bad" words I had been taught (as a "good Southern girl") never to say or even allow to be said in my presence. (Besides, I had always wondered why such language was considered so "bad," anyway!)

I loved learning about automation. I enjoyed the rapid pace of change. I felt accepted, along with the other women in our group, as equal to the men. We were all pioneers, learning and doing something new that made our group different from other work groups of the times, something that seemed important for the future. I learned later that there were very few people willing to consider jobs like ours, in part because of the requirement of a major in mathematics. (I had earned a double major in math and physics in 1949.) Our members came from all over the country, so I learned quite a bit about diversity. I was sheltered, though, from mainstream workers, so that when I left to pursue a management position, I had a rude awakening.

In those days classified ads were divided into "Help Wanted: Male" and "Help Wanted: Female." The ads that applied to my background were under the male section, so when I applied there would sometimes be interesting if not comical results. I clearly remember having a male interviewer tell me in the 1960s, "I know that you are qualified. I know you can do this job. But if I hired you, all my men would quit." Naturally that was disappointing. In today's world, that would be abhorred as outright "discrimination" and "sexism." My focus, however, was on finding a way to use my skills and interests. I was not a revolutionary (though later, in the 1960s, I applauded the new social awareness).

One area of life did become open to me: education. I found management positions first as the director of the computer center for a university and

later as the dean of a junior college. In those positions I used the knowledge I had gained by watching my own supervisors and deciding what I would do differently when I had similar responsibilities. I was also by then studying psychology in evening classes. I began to understand myself as well as society better. My path was not yet clear, but it at least seemed hopeful.

A second marriage and moving to Texas presented an opportunity to continue my education. In 1972 I obtained my doctorate in Counseling Psychology. I had long wanted to experience the entire spectrum of education, and this sojourn satisfied me. Working as an organizational development consultant later, though, led me to feel the need for more of a business credential, so I obtained an MBA in Managerial Leadership in 1992, from an institution where I was doing part-time teaching.

My intense desire to make a significant contribution eventually led me to teach for over nine years in a local prison. Nowhere have I felt my presence so appreciated. Inmates who wanted to improve their lives and live freely were wonderful students. I felt I had finally found an avenue for contributing to my society. I never felt threatened or that being female was a negative.

In the 21st century, my experience with gender discrimination may seem quite wimpy. Why didn't I fight it? Two main reasons come to mind. First, I may have the soul of a rebel, but I apparently do not have the courage of one. I wanted to find ways to make changes without fighting. I did not allow myself to feel discriminated against; I believed I could find ways to demonstrate my competence. Second, I saw men being discriminated against, too. One manager said he would never hire a man with a beard; another said pipe smokers were lazy. After all, we are in this world together.

I feel I was fortunate to experience a feeling of equality in an earlier era, when things seemed much simpler and less divisive than they are today. I still feel like a pioneer. Although I am of an age when I am supposed to be playing with grandchildren or traveling, I am working well past the age of retirement. I spent the entire year of 2001 in Beijing, China, teaching Foundations of Management and Information Technology at a university. I enjoy my work and my colleagues of both sexes. Somehow I feel that my contribution has been and continues to

be that I exist, in my mid-70s, with few scars and tremendous optimism about the future, and enjoy sharing with students and workshop participants my personal view of the world. Even more important, I get tremendous satisfaction in providing support for learners as they discover how exciting learning can be. I look forward to many more years of learning, exploration, and creating my own path.

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My Experience in Fields Previously Reserved for Men

Jean Cottam

Independent Scholar, Ottawa, Canada

I was born in 1930 in Poland during the Depression as an only child. Though my middle-class parents were not affluent, they sent me to a private school when I was six. My environment was intellectually stimulating and I did well in school. By the time I was eight I read adult books. I was baptized and confirmed in a Protestant church though some members of my family were Catholics.

When World War II broke out in Europe I was nine. At the age of 10 I was forcibly exiled to the north of Russia with my immediate family. Both my parents were to die there in 1943 from malnutrition and disease. I was fortunate to be eventually transferred, in November 1943, to a model Polish children's home near Moscow where our diet included some American food. In the children's home there were caring staff and friendly children. We felt wanted and well cared for.

In 1946 I was repatriated to Poland and in 1947 I went to live in Warsaw with my mother's first cousin, an Anglican minister, married to a French-Canadian woman and doing post-war relief in Poland. Fearful of an arrest by the Communist authorities, my adoptive family abruptly returned to Canada in December 1948, and I followed them three weeks later.

A few months after my arrival, I graduated from high school. The process of my education had come to an abrupt halt, to which I was only partially

resigned. The attitude of my adoptive family toward the education of women was highly troublesome and unprecedented to me. My "half-sister," adopted as an infant, annoyed me tremendously by playing with noisy toys when I was trying to do my homework. An elementary school dropout, she was married at the age of 18.

By mid-1950 I was entirely on my own, working in a Montreal bank. I married in 1951, by which time I had secured a much better position with an insurance broker. In 1956, when the political situation in Poland improved, I resumed my correspondence with school friends in Poland, learning that by this time most of them had attended university and secured good jobs, including university teaching. Coincidentally, I inherited a small sum of money enabling me to enroll in the evening BA program at Montreal's Sir George Williams University (SGWU).

The encouragement of my history professors at SGWU to continue my education beyond the BA played an important part in my decision to pursue an academic career. However, the more typical attitude toward the higher education of women at the time (1957), which made my blood boil, was that of my professor of French, who did not take my long-term plans seriously. He suggested that women's university education was merely a means of offsetting the boredom of housekeeping and childrearing.

When I graduated with a BA in the spring of 1964 I ranked highest in a graduating class of over 300 and won several awards. Though nominated for a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship, I didn't receive it. It was suggested to me that at the time that the fellowship was probably not intended for married women with two small children.

At the University of Toronto, where I enrolled in a graduate history program in 1965, I was the only woman in all of the graduate seminars I attended, with the exception of British History where there were three women pursuing an MA. Apparently, I was fully accepted by my fellow mostly male graduate students. Many years later, in 1980, at a Women's Studies conference at Concordia University in Montreal, one of the women participants told me that she was glad to finally meet me in person, as for many years her husband, who had been one of my fellow graduate students, kept mentioning me. As the sole woman participating in these graduate semi-

nars I was highly visible as to both my behavior and performance, and fortunately both seemed to have been viewed in a positive light.

However, I experienced some discrimination when looking for a university teaching job. Indeed, my timing was bad. Because of the ongoing Cold War there were many male candidates from the United States competing for Canadian university teaching jobs in my main field, Russian and East European history. But when I sensed I was being discriminated against I always fought back. As a result, I met wonderful people of both sexes along the way, especially well-known Canadian writers and poets, both inside and outside universities.

In 1971 I made the front-page news in the now defunct *Toronto Telegram*, where I was cited as saying: "Not every Tom, Dick, and Harry has a PhD degree in history from the University of Toronto." The name of Toronto's York University dean who was instrumental in rejecting me in favor of a male graduate student from Wisconsin with an incomplete PhD was "Harry." In a York University student newspaper my activities were also featured on the front page. It was ironic that both the York University President and I arrived in Ottawa roughly at the same time to take good government jobs. Meanwhile, toward the end of 1973, I produced a pamphlet on university hiring, which is still generating royalties.

While I was not prepared to easily give up my quest for a university teaching appointment in Canada and elsewhere — I once applied for a university teaching job in Australia, upon advice from a colleague working at an Australian University — I also pursued other employment options. I was conditioned by my upbringing to be stubborn and determined and not to behave as a "victim," as some North American feminists were prone to do.

While searching for appropriate employment in Toronto and elsewhere, I was again working as a claim adjuster for the same insurance broker who had employed me in Montreal. Only once did my personal situation depress me to such an extent that I followed a friend's advice to see a psychiatrist. This proved beneficial to me in a totally unexpected way. Witnessing this man's bullying a hapless female patient on the phone made me lose my temper, so I scolded the psychiatrist for abusing the woman patient. He became very apologetic and instructed his

receptionist that I needed no further appointments.

My perseverance in seeking professional employment paid off when in 1973 I secured a good job as a military intelligence translator/analyst in a civilian section of the National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. Finally, I was a professional with a certain status and adequate salary. My life was completely transformed. Eventually I was able to do some part-time university teaching at the University of Ottawa, in addition to my regular government job. (I had separated from my husband in 1971 and was divorced in 1976.)

I was the only woman professional in my work section for a number of years. When my chief, a retired lieutenant-colonel, became seriously ill in 1979, I was appointed acting chief by the director, even though I had neither the required seniority nor appropriate experience. When I told this to the director, he impatiently retorted that he knew what he was doing when he selected me. With the help of both male colleagues and superiors, I successfully managed the section until my chief returned seven months later. I continued as acting chief during the chief's brief absences from the office, whether on business or during his vacations.

Having had the experience of teaching undergraduates on a part-time basis, I came to appreciate the advantages of my government job where I supervised adult men. Yet they were not just ordinary men — some were retired military officers and supposedly difficult to handle. The instructions from my superior were: "Call the military police, if necessary!" I never had to do this. The officers obeyed me unconditionally and proved far less troublesome to me than did a lowly woman clerk.

I have now been "retired" for nearly 10 years. Published since 1972, during my retirement I have contributed many items about women in the military to military encyclopedias and dictionaries, as well as publishing my latest series consisting of four books on Soviet women in combat in WWII.

I have no employment-related regrets, having had the satisfaction of leading a productive life and in a modest way blazing new trails for women. My advice for younger women is: Don't be victims — fight for your rights!

Kazimiera J. (Jean) Cottam, PhD, lives in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. □

My Journey from Oxford to Psychohistory

Ruth Dale Meyer
Pacifica Graduate Institute

In 1979 Corpus Christi College, Oxford, England, opened its gates to female undergraduates for the first time since its founding under the Tudors in 1517. The college is one of Oxford's smallest with about 230 students. With Margaret Thatcher, Britain's first female Prime Minister leading the country's government, a small group of 19 new female undergraduates huddled together for support on their first day at their chosen educational institution. I was one of them. I was there to study modern history, which focused mainly on Western civilization and in particular on traditional British constitutional and political history.

This article will trace my personal journey from Oxford University, England, to Pacifica Graduate Institute in Santa Barbara, California, from undergraduate studies in traditional history to doctoral research in psychohistory. My memoir is inspired by fellow psychohistorian David Beisel's article in the *Journal of Psychohistory* (1978, Vol. 25, No. 4), entitled *From History to Psychohistory: A Personal Journey*. I discovered this article in 1998 when I was researching psychohistory in the classroom for my master's dissertation in history in education (*Is There a Place for Psychohistory in the Classroom?*) at the University of London, England. Beisel's work caused me to begin asking questions about my transferences toward history. He legitimized the value of telling one's personal story and of using the self as a research instrument.

All of this was anathema at Oxford, just as it was for Beisel in his graduate studies in the U.S. The self was to be kept out of research at all costs. Beisel goes so far as to say that in his early days as a history professor he penalized students who used the word *feel* in their exam books. Research by Jean Baker Miller, Carol Gilligan, and Mary Field Belenky suggests that women learn through developing a strong connected relationship with their work and through developing a web of empowering relationships with their fellow learners. Looking back, I think my greatest source of support through those years at Oxford was my friend Patti. We wrote poems expressing our frustration with our professors, which was a

great emotional release. But it did not solve the problem that I was unable to voice my true feelings and opinions about the history I was studying to the people who mattered: my professors and tutors. I suffered during my three years at Oxford from recurrent bouts of tonsillitis and painful sore throats.

The young men in my tutorials were addressed by their last names — a British public school custom — that further served to distance students and professors from one another. It also served to enforce a gender divide as the female students were addressed by their *first* names. All of my tutors were male. When I once summoned the courage to voice my feelings about the force-feeding of suffragettes in British prisons during the early 1900s, I angered my tutor. After that encounter, I rarely ventured a personal opinion on the history I studied. I was not fortunate enough to discover until much later, that my strong feelings about the suffragettes were evoked by a feeling of allegiance to fellow women pioneers, engaged like me in a struggle for survival in a male-dominated world.

Those insights came partly through psychotherapy in the 1990s and partly through a special class which I took at Pacifica Graduate Institute in May 2000 with the feminist writer, social historian, and poet, Susan Griffin. We were assigned Griffin's autobiographical work, *What Her Body Thought* (1999), in which she traces the complex web of connections between her own experiences of chronic illness and poverty and those of courtesans in 19th-century Paris. In her class, she encouraged us to recall a time we had felt undervalued and unheard. I went straight to my experience at Oxford with the suffragettes. Griffin made a suggestion which, had it come when I was at Oxford, might have empowered me to do valuable research into that topic.

She suggested I go back to my feelings at that time in my Oxford education and then look for parallels with the lives of the suffragettes. She suggested that I play with the material and see where it led. For example, if I was suffering from acute sore throats, what illnesses did these women suffer from? Did they write journals? What were their hopes and aspirations? Through first examining my feelings and then looking for parallels in the lives of the suffragettes, I would not only be gaining a different perspective on my own troubles, but I would also feel emotionally connected to the material and therefore

be more energized and revitalized by my research. But these valuable insights came over 20 years after my struggles at Oxford. I just remember feeling deeply inadequate as a historian and suffering from disturbing bouts of anxiety at the time of my finals in 1983.

On our first day at Oxford, all of the women remained together: sitting in groups, drinking tea in one another's rooms, and shopping for our black and white gowns and matriculation attire. Later a few of us ventured into the Junior Common Room — a cozy communal room meant for relaxation and reading newspapers, but we were put off by the awkward silences and strange looks whenever we entered. We felt vulnerable and on view. I discovered later that the male students were ranking us in order of sexual attractiveness and desirability for dating. My source for this information is my husband — who was then part of this group of gazing men.

Such attitudes may have come from the top down. Nothing had been done to prepare the community of young male undergraduates, professors, and college servants, or even the services and accommodations, for the arrival of women. The college president at the time, the classical scholar, Sir Kenneth Dover, recalls the arrival of women at Corpus Christi in his memoir, *Marginal Comment* (1994). He talks of the "civilizing effect" of women on the hard-drinking, glass-smashing rugby club set, but he devotes far more space in his memoir to describing the sexual problems which he sees as caused by the arrival of women. One young man was so obsessed with his female classmates that he could not concentrate on his studies and he had to take a year off. Dover was annoyed, he writes, to discover that some of the valuable college plaster had been pulverized by energetic lovemaking in one of the female undergraduate's bedroom. Loaded condoms were left on floors for college cleaners to pick up. Thus, in Dover's memoir, the complex phenomenon of the arrival of women in a previously all-male undergraduate student body is reduced to sexual peccadilloes. Nowhere is the arrival of women celebrated for the new insights women might bring to the educational process or for the diversity that their new ideas might offer to the cloistered environment of this tiny college.

On the practical side, little was done to accommodate our needs. All bathrooms, previously designed for men, were now shared. There was no

place in the toilets for the disposal of sanitary napkins and no place in the college where you could buy them. The only sport on offer was a place on the all-women's rowing team. The only woman in a position of authority whom I could talk to was the college nurse. Finally, there were no counselors and no where to go if you had psychological problems (as many of us did), other than the jolly old college doctor, who regularly dosed us with Valium.

I graduated from the University of Oxford with Honors and a BA in Modern History in 1983. However, it has taken me years to work through my experiences of alienation and disappointment. My first dream when I entered therapy was of a young girl lying murdered in an Oxford college quadrangle, with a pool of dark blood seeping from her wound. At the time of entering therapy, I was blocked in the writing of my master's dissertation. I found help from an older female therapist, practicing with a Jungian orientation in London. She worked through dreams and sand tray therapy. Gradually my dreams and sand tray figures moved from images of victimization, sickness, and death toward travel and research in libraries. She encouraged me to explore psychohistory as an exciting new avenue of research where I could combine my new interest in experiences of the unconscious with my passion for history. In 1998, I got my first computer and when I typed in the word "psychohistory," I discovered the work of Lloyd deMause and the *Journal of Psychohistory*. When I wrote deMause that I was researching teaching the Holocaust using psychohistorical insights, he invited me to New York City to present my research to the International Psychohistorical Association's (IPA) annual convention.

After a year of therapy in London, my writer's block regarding my dissertation was over, and I was deeply engrossed in teaching and writing about the Holocaust. The IPA invitation came at exactly the right time. I already knew that my interest in psychohistory was going to take me beyond my master's and I was looking for a PhD program. A colleague at the IPA told me about Pacifica Graduate Institute and I immediately began the long process of applying to study in the United States. I left my family and friends behind in England and came to the U.S. on a student visa.

As far as I was concerned, there was no comparable program anywhere else in the world. My ori-

entation in therapy was and still is Jungian, and I particularly admire the work of archetypal therapist and writer James Hillman. Pacifica Graduate Institute is unique in that it offers a PhD program in depth psychology with a strong Jungian and archetypal orientation. I was thrilled to take a class with James Hillman in 2000 and I have studied his personal papers, which are available at Pacifica's library for researchers.

The best part of studying in America is working in a supportive environment, where my opinions and insights are valued and honored. At Pacifica Graduate Institute, female undergraduates actually outnumber male. Many of my professors are vibrant women who value empathy and intuition as part of the research process — just as many psychohistorians do. If I have a problem, there is a clearly identified group of faculty available to offer help and advice. A key part of the American college education system, which does not exist in England, is the system of counseling. Looking back if I had been able to talk to an experienced counselor about my difficulties in understanding how to fit in to the Oxford system, rather than seeking help from the college doctor, I might have fared better.

I realize that much may now have changed at Oxford University since 1979. For example, the number of women attending the college has gradually grown over the years. There are also signs that other women are beginning to re-visit some of these experiences of gender discrimination. Shortly after I began working on this article, a fellow alumna contacted me because she was researching the question of women arriving at Oxford for an article in the annual college record. From our telephone conversation in December 2004 it seems that many of that first group of 19 are now ready to talk about their experiences.

At Pacifica Graduate Institute meanwhile, I am close to completing my doctoral research into historians who dare to embrace unconscious encounters in their work. The provisional title of my dissertation is *Clio's Circle: Historians Who Dare to Embrace the Unconscious*. Since so much of my early historian's life was spent in denial of my transferences to the material, I now have total fascination for those historians such as Richard Cobb and Simon Schama who discuss dreams and altered states of consciousness in their work.

Ever since I entered Oxford I have yearned to pursue doctoral studies, and so the journey from history to psychohistory is part of a long-cherished wish.

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Physics and Pantyhose Days

Kristine Larsen

Central Connecticut State University

"This is Quantum Mechanics, you know."

"Yes, I know."

Although the exchange was 20 years in the past, I can still hear the words reverberating in my head as if it were literally yesterday. It was late January 1985, my first day of graduate school at the University of Connecticut (UConn). After finishing my undergraduate degree in physics in three and a half years, I had plowed straight ahead to graduate school, eager to achieve my life goal of achieving a PhD and becoming an astronomy professor by the age of 27, what I considered the earliest, realistically possible, date. Because I was starting mid-year, there were a limited number of courses open to me, so it was decided that I would sit in on a quantum mechanics course taught by Dr. Ronald Mallett, my thesis advisor and the main reason I was attending UConn.

The road leading to that moment had been a decidedly unconventional one. My earliest memory is of sitting at age three in the back seat of my family's station wagon on an agonizingly long ride home from the Bronx Zoo, a package of plastic dinosaurs clutched in a vise-like grip in my impatient fingers. I was under strict orders to not open my precious prize until arriving home in Connecticut. Within the next few years, paleontology had become my overwhelming passion, and the dinosaur room at the Peabody Museum of Natural History at Yale University my own personal Eden, where, to the palpable embarrassment of my mother, who somehow never seemed to understand my science obsession, I would correct the tour guides with all the self-assured authority a first grader could muster. In those early days, my gender had not seemed an issue. Perhaps it was a tad

odd that I was more interested in reading dinosaur books or playing in my sand pile with my rather impressive collection of Tonka trucks than in dressing up Barbie and Ken, but it did not strike me as reason for concern.

With puberty came the realization that perhaps I had outgrown my desire to dig up bones for a living, but my love of science had not waned in the slightest. Understanding the universe had become my new *raison d'être*, especially black holes and the Big Bang. My individualistic personality had only become more so with the passing of years, and although my peers wondered why I seemed to insist on being the “class individualist,” there was certainly no ulterior motive involved. I was who I was, had the force of personality to pull it off, and the demonstrated scholastic achievement to demand respect from my teachers, despite the “heavy metal” exterior.

Despite the warnings from my mother and stepfather that they could not afford to send me to a private university, I applied to astronomy programs at Yale, Cornell, and Wesleyan, and was summarily passed over by all three. Thus it was that I found myself at Central Connecticut University, 10 miles from home, a physics major (due to the lack of an astronomy program), and a member of the first class of the university's Honors Program. It was at college that gender first became a noticeable issue, specifically in my physics and math classes. In my undergraduate University Physics 2 class I was one of only two women, and the male students treated us with disdain until after the first exam, when it was announced that we were the only two students to pass!

In the upper level courses, the physics majors became a tight-knit group, and although there were only three women in our midst, this was the largest number of simultaneous female physics majors the program had had up until that time. The faculty treated us all with equal respect, and although I did not have any female faculty mentors, I certainly did not feel as though I lacked guidance and encouragement. It was in college that I learned to “play the game” and to exchange “leather for lace,” as it were, and I dressed more professionally when working in the planetarium with the general public.

With graduation approaching, I had mailed out dozens of those postcards advertising graduate programs which lined the walls of our physics study room. One Sunday morning, I received a phone call

at home, from a faculty member from a physics graduate program from below the Mason-Dixon Line. Before he could get a word in edgewise, I excitedly babbled on about my GPA, experience working with a planetarium and observatory, and achievement in the Honors Program. When I stopped to take a breath, he admitted that the only reason his institution was interested in me was because I was a woman and from a Northern state. After making a hasty and polite end to the phone call, I seethed in righteous anger. I had worked too hard and achieved too much to become a mere “token.” I certainly could not tolerate being pandered to because of my gender. Fortunately, about that time I attended a physics seminar given by Ron, and based on his obvious brilliance, sparkling personality, and fascinating research, I decided to attend UCONN's graduate program in physics.

This was the road which had brought me to that first day of graduate school. Eager to make a good impression, I had decided to dress up, and thus it was that I was sitting in a classroom of approximately a dozen white males, wearing a lavender dress and heels. After a few moments of whispers and surreptitious stares, one of the young men had come over to me and, naturally assuming that this young blonde was decidedly lost, did his best to rectify the situation. I still remember watching the male students slink in their skins when Ron entered the room, beamed a broad smile at me, and we called each other by first names.

Afterwards, I recounted the exchange with Ron, and he was horrified. I was slightly amused with it all, as I had become used to being a “different face” in physics classes, and with the exception of that singular phone call from the misguided Southern professor, had taken it all in stride. As an African-American, Ron was also painfully familiar with the problems of being a minority in physics. He himself had once been confused with the janitor, and had taken to dressing impeccably to accentuate his authority role as a professor. As a short, blonde, 21-year-old woman who could easily fit into the bimbo stereotype — at least externally — I learned from Ron's example. Although I quickly fell into my usual college garb of jeans and concert t-shirts on most days, I became the only teaching assistant in the department to dress up on days I taught lab (my “pantyhose days”). It was a natural (and necessary) way to differentiate myself from the students I taught

(some of whom were a year or two older). As for those quantum mechanics students who had initially questioned my presence in their class, Ron decided that in order to “teach them some respect,” I would proctor all their exams for the semester.

Over the next five years, Ron and I attended a large number of conferences and seminars together, always impeccably and conservatively dressed. Many times we were the only islands of difference in a sea of similar white male faces. Upon entering a room, I would commonly see some of the middle-aged, pocket-protector-wearing physicists nearly sprain their necks trying to get a look at Ron and me, something I would recount later as similar to the head-spinning scene in *The Exorcist*. At a conference in New York City, Ron and I were introduced by name (but not titles) to an elderly Nobel Prize winning physicist, and the man stared at me with a puzzled look, apparently trying to ascertain whether I was Ron's secretary, wife, or student until I introduced myself further. At another conference in Maryland, I patiently waited my turn with a small group of people at the end of a question and answer period held by another famous physicist (who incidentally now holds a Nobel Prize). After one particularly long-winded exchange, the speaker turned and began gathering his things, apparently ready to leave. Not being a shrinking violet, I piped up with, “Excuse me.” He turned and looked at me with a quizzical expression and then said, apologetically, “Sorry, I thought you were with him,” referring to the object of his last conversation. In a rare display of my pent-up disgust at the obviously ingrained stereotypes I had found in the professional circles of physics, I replied non-too-gently, “No, I'm a graduate student, and I have a technical question for you....”

In an open display of the power of karma, I was offered two teaching positions in astronomy in 1989, a year before I finished my dissertation, thus fulfilling my life goal. The position I took, without hesitation, was at my alma mater, Central Connecticut State University. At 41, I have been a full professor for two years, direct the Honors Program in which I was once a student, look younger than my age, and when it is not one of my “panty hose days” am sometimes still mistaken for a student. I am widely known as an excellent and exuberant teacher, and a dedicated advisor and mentor to all my students, regardless of gender. I find great satisfaction in their achievements. My individualistic streak has

certainly waxed and waned over the years since college but has never disappeared. The tattoos collected since my mid-30s are in places which can be easily covered when the occasion dictates, but the eyebrow piercing remains my most obvious sign of overt rebellion against “the Establishment.” Childish, perhaps, but I have never felt the need to explain my personal choices to those who didn't understand.

In March 2004 I presented a talk at the annual meeting of the American Physical Society (APS) in Montreal. It had been 10 years since my last attendance at that perennially huge conference, but it saddened me to see how little had changed. The faces were predominantly middle-aged, male, and “pale”; the attitudes aloof; and I still garnered considerable stares as I threaded my way through the crowded halls. In a reception held by the Committee on the Status of Women in Physics, the only way to know it was the 2004 meeting rather than the 1994 one was the slight change in fashions. The same concerns and outright complaints were heard as were voiced a decade before. Although the number of women in attendance (especially among the graduate students and post-docs) was statistically higher, it did not appear to be significantly so.

Women have yet to reach a critical mass in physics when we can effectively bring about a change of attitude. We are still the “other.” Although I have made a successful and satisfying career out of being an individualistic personality, as I looked around that room in Montreal, I could not help but wonder how many of those young, enthusiastic faces would still remain in the field to return to the 2014 meeting of the APS. How many of them had the single-minded, internal driving force which had sustained me in my career? Unless significant changes are made in the culture of physics, my fear is the answer will be “very few.”

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The "Jewish Mother" in Myth and Society: A Psychoanalytic Approach

(Continued from front page)

traits such as dominance, aggression, nurturance, and low social recognition and affiliation. The stereotype of the Jewish mother traditionally described her childrearing practices as over-nurturing, nagging, meddling, manipulating, domineering, and controlling through guilt.

Analysis of the "Jewish Mother" issue first emerged in the late 1950s and continued into the 1980s. It was conducted by the second generation of Jews in the U.S., the sons and daughters of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe. When searching for their independence as young yet mature individuals, they started to question their own personality and behavior, level of socialization, and degree of achievements. When evaluating their childhood and comparing it to that of their American peers, their self-examination brought up neurotic or aggressive tendencies they might have had and as a result painted the picture of what was commonly referred to as a typical "Jewish Mother." (See, for example: M. Wolfenstein, "Two Types of Jewish Mothers," in M. Sklare, (Ed.), *Jews, Social Patterns of an American Group*, 1958, and S.F. Kriger and W.H. Kroes, "Child Rearing Attitudes of Chinese, Jewish, and Protestant Mothers," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 86, 1972, pp. 205-210.)

The most significant work of the "Jewish Mother" myth is *Portnoy's Complaint* (1969) by Philip Roth. Roth describes the type of mother who keeps her children dependent upon her through manipulation and a melodramatic style. The maternal psychological difficulty in this context is the unbearable burden of her children's own identity and their need to separate from the nuclear family. The explanations suggested to date for this maternal overriding of her children have been mainly sociological, attempting to see the conflict in the generation of sons and daughters. According to these explanations, the second generation felt a conflict between familial expectation to conform with Jewish tradition and their own quest for upward mobility through success in the American free society (M.K. Slater, "My Son the Doctor: Aspects of Mobility among American Jews," *American Sociological Review*, 34, 1969; T.

Pelleg-Sani, "*Personality Traits of the 'Jewish Mother': Realities behind the Myth.*" Dissertation, United States International University, 1984). Yet, an alternative explanation is that there may have been *psychological forces of conflict in the Jewish mother herself* as a result of her traditional positioning in the family and in the Jewish community during the previous centuries.

The "Jewish Mother" Seen through the Prism of the Hebrew Language and Myth

Written Jewish tradition encompasses many diverse views, and yet as wide-ranging as it is, it reflects no more than a one-sided perspective, since it was stated, written, read, preserved, and studied by men alone. As described by R. Elior ("A Beautiful Girl without Eyes: Women in Language, Religion, and Jewish Culture," in D.Y. Ariel, M. Leibovits, and R. Mazar, (Eds.), *Blessed Be He for Making Me a Woman?*, 1999), the language leaves no doubt as to the essence of these positions: A woman is a female (*nekeva*), derived from the root word *nekev*, denoting a hole or space. Coitus is termed *tashmish*, stemming from the word *shimush* (usage). The plural form of women, *nashim*, is related to the term *nosheh* — a creditor who comes to collect his loan. *Erva* (nakedness) is associated with shame and disgrace, connoting unrestrained sex. Above all, there is the concept of *nida* — a menstruating woman — stemming from the word *nidui*, meaning excommunication and banishment. An examination of these commonly used words in spoken Hebrew up to the present time casts light on the patterns of Jewish women's physical and social presence throughout history, and the underlying causes for their cultural nonexistence and their absence from the spiritual dialogue and the world of creativity in Jewish tradition.

As opposed to a man's, a woman's honor was contingent on her absence from the public domain, regarding which it is stated, "All honor of a king's daughter is directed inward" (Psalms 45:14). A woman typically led a sequestered life within the confines of her home, living under the dominion of her father or her husband, her very autonomy and existence controlled by these two figures. Traditionally, a woman was perceived as a physical entity that must be disciplined, while a man was seen as an entity that has contact with that which is holy and sacred, and thus is placed in charge of the social order. In the past, a woman was associated with nature's

cyclical, unbridled, eruptive, and, hence, unclean forces, which must be purified and domesticated. This view is predicated on identifying a woman's honor with modesty, reticence, and obedience.

A somewhat different view was proposed by the Jewish myth of Lilith. This story spawned the legendary images of the independent, rebellious, licentious, and destructive Lilith, who engaged in luring and killing. The contention was that the protections designed to maintain a woman's reticence and obedience benefit her in that they shield her and accord her dignity, but in effect they only serve to perpetuate the balance of power that determines a woman's positioning in nature, necessitating control and keeping women out of centers of power as well as preventing their involvement in matters of culture. A woman was stripped of her dignity as an autonomous individual entitled to conduct life as she sees fit based on liberty, freedom of movement and access, equal rights, and freedom of choice. Her value and standing were determined largely by reproduction and fertility aspects. She was seen as contributing to the succession of generations and the continuity of life, defined within a physical-sexual context controlled by men.

The "Jewish Mother" in Biblical Law

Biblical law portrays a woman as a man's property, a view manifested mainly by marriage and divorce. The man initiates the relationship, while the woman plays a passive role: "When a man taketh a wife..." (Deuteronomy 24). Moreover, the man is the one who can annul the marriage: "Then it cometh to pass, if she find no favor in his eyes ... that he writeth her a bill of divorcement, and giveth it in her hand, and sendeth her out of his house" (Deuteronomy 24). Another expression of this conception is to be found in the law that regards the rape of a young girl as a transgression for which the penalty is a fine, however, this fine is paid to the father (Deuteronomy 22). A woman is also dependent on a man economically; she does not inherit and does not own property, and cannot exist without the livelihood a man provides. This is evidenced by the great concern shown by Biblical law for the widow and by its call to assist her through gifts and charity. Family purity laws reveal the conception that a woman is impure for significant periods in her life, resulting in numerous restrictions in her contacts with others and in her relations with her environment.

This brief summary conjures up the image of a very limited woman, lacking economic and personal autonomy, perceived as a danger to the community's purity (N. Shashar-Aton, "Jewish Woman, Who Will Know Your Life?: A Brief Historical Review," in Ariel, Leibovits, and Mazor, (Eds.), *Blessed Be He?*). Biblical stories of women — among them prophets, warrior women, and manipulative and cunning mothers — give no impression whatsoever that the community respected the lives and independence of women. Such accounts were more like a depiction of the potential embodied all the years in the female gender, which would come to light during a time of distress for a father, warrior, prophet, or king, in the form of a woman who dared. Evidence from the Mishnah and Talmud literature, and from literature of the period following the fall of the Roman Empire and from throughout the second millennium, do not enable one to conclude that the Jewish community let women get involved in social, intellectual, or spiritual centers of power.

Developmental Guilt, Children, and Adult Guilt Feelings — A Psychoanalytic Explanation

In effect, a Jewish woman is caught between two males: her father and husband. In her article "Feminine Guilt and the Oedipus Complex" from 1990 (in C. Zanardi, (Ed.), *Essential Papers on the Psychology of Women*), Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel writes that the girl at the Oedipus complex stage admires the father's powers and abilities, a sentiment that emerges amid the disappointment experienced during development with regard to the primary love figure — the mother. The girl comes to see the fact that the father is endowed with a phallus, which both she and her mother lack, as something representing power. The internalization of the paternal power which the girl entertains in her fantasy engenders guilt feelings that are eventually resolved with the developmental understanding that when she grows up she will be able to do things like her father, and she returns to loving her mother as a figure to identify with. A woman who is not able to admire her father in childhood, because he was too authoritative, resulting in the impairment of the father's behavior in the girl's fantasy, remains with a guilt feeling regarding her fantasy intentions towards her father, despite her being unaware of the connection when reaching maturity. This guilt feeling is the basis for the neurotic inhibitions in the area of creativity and actions, according to this writer.

I postulate that the Jewish woman found it difficult to admire her father and his exclusive functions in the family as well as the authoritativeness that came with fatherhood according to the Jewish tradition. Hence, she was left with guilt feelings regarding her greatness fantasies and, consequently, also with a social impotence. She returned to identifying with her nonautonomous mother, ultimately grasping that her function in this world would be limited and remain within the family domain. But so that this function should not be so limited, the Jewish woman saw in her family and children the "be all and end all," hoping that the children would turn into her source of power in the absence of sources of power outside the family, within the community. The guilt she felt was projected onto her relations with her children, through manipulations that eventually generated guilt feelings toward her with respect to their desire to distance themselves and move away.

It is proposed here that the mother projected her ancient and unconscious guilt through projective identification and created guilt feelings in her children to defend her ego from the conflict between the grandiose fantasies of power and the traditional demands. Guilt and grandiose fantasies are adequate emotional responses in the advanced Oedipus complex at toddlerhood. However, as the complex is being purely resolved due to the presence of an authoritarian father, who blocks the opportunity of normal resolution, these emotional responses remain the property of the young girl's self with neurotic vicissitudes at older ages. Grandiose fantasies over power that was not internalized during childhood persist during adulthood as a counter-reaction to inferiority in real life.

In American society of the 20th century there were new opportunities for freedom and independence. Therefore, it might have been the case that as the guilt over her grandiose fantasies was (apparently) developing during centuries in the presence of real inferiority, the Jewish mother in the 20th century was trying to turn over the power relations in the family and succeeded in weakening the husband, while becoming the strongest figure in the family. This was a rebellion for all the centuries of dependence and shame. The maternal conflict between the inter-generational guilt and the traditional tendencies assumed the characteristics of American society and culture, since it evoked the fantasy that anyone could succeed. The Jewish mother wanted to succeed in

her own fashion, by influencing her children and planning their lives, while keeping them close to her. The children, on the other hand, sought to succeed without her, because of their embarrassment at being immigrants and their embarrassment at the impotence of her "Jewish Mother" image in social life and at work. On the other hand, the children felt guilty towards her for abandoning her, and for the fact that American society, rather than the nuclear family, was the source of their own grandiose fantasies. Such conflicting sentiments gave rise to neurotic tendencies.

Revelation of the widely accepted "Jewish Mother" concept from the 1950s shed light on the proclivity of the mother in Jewish society to create dependence and bonding with her children as a source of alternative power, in the absence for centuries of any ability to influence outside the family sphere. This explanation places the source of the conflict squarely on the mother and not the children, who strove, as guided by their developmental instincts and urges, to separate and individuate. American society came to be regarded as a generalized father figure possessed of many opportunities and great influence, whereas the father in the Jewish family was gradually diminishing in influence compared to the dominant mother. The overt manifestation of this in American society came in the 1950s, when tradition was rapidly losing ground to American liberalism, with the father's power increasingly measured in terms of the livelihood he could provide rather than by his ability to study bible. Jewish mothers, also influenced by American liberalism, rebelled as they had never done in previous generations in Europe. However, this rebellion was accomplished by harnessing the guilt they felt regarding their grandiose fantasies, for which the conflict had not been properly resolved in childhood, and by using the children who were their main occupation. This explanation goes a long way to making clear that *a nonegalitarian population that discriminates against its women will surely pay a price in its children's development*. This elucidation differs from previous explanations in that it focuses on the individual and on the intrapsychic conflicts caused by the milieu in which one lives. Accordingly, unlike earlier explanations, this one sees the root of the problem in the mother's conflict and not the children's. The Jewish mother was prepared to release her children to lead their independent lives only with a change in the prevailing attitude

toward her in U.S. Jewish society and the new Israeli society.

Changes within American Jewish Religious Communities in Their Attitude toward the Woman

In the U.S. in recent decades, Jewish women have increasingly been allowed to assume religious functions in the synagogue and community previously restricted to men. The Reform Movement categorically rejected the Talmud notion maintaining that "He who teaches his daughter Torah, it is as if he has taught her lechery" and issued an instruction to teach Judaism in co-ed frameworks. The Movement also refused to reconcile itself to the inequality in the marriage ceremony and decided to change this. Toward the end of the century, a handful of congregations allowed women to become members independently of their husbands, thereby enabling their participation in decision-making. Although many women opposed spiritual leadership by women, in the 1970s women began to be ordained as rabbis. In the wake of changes by the Reform Movement, the Conservative Movement struck from the prayerbook those statements offensive to women's honor, such as "Blessed be He for not making me a woman." According to M. Meyer, about two dozen female physicians serve today as circumcisers in U.S. Jewish congregations ("God of Abraham and Sarah: The Status of the Woman in the Jewish non-Orthodox Society," in Ariel, Leibovits, and Mazor, (Eds.), *Blessed Be He?*, pp. 179-188).

The Social Changes in Israel and the Prevailing Attitude toward the Jewish Mother

The partnership between men and women in founding the Jewish nation brought about a change in the nuclear family, and, in turn, also in the Israeli mother's attitude to her children. However, these things happened gradually from the start of Jewish settlement in Palestine. The Zionist revolution focused on masculinity. A delineation of the new woman's characteristics depicts one with a dual image: on the one hand, a new image embodying the yearning for equality, and on the other, the traditional image of feminine commitment to husband and children. The first, liberal image opened the gates of instruction to women, although within the emerging community women were kept out of public life.

According to Margalit Shiloh, the first lesson of the second wave of immigration during the 19th

century was akin to a revolution in Jewish settlement life ("The New Hebrew Woman," in Ariel, Leibovits, and Mazor, (Eds.), *Blessed Be He?*, pp. 227-252). Theodor Herzl's national vision greatly influenced many spheres of activity. The spirit of Zionism was joined by the spirits of liberalism, secularization and socialism. The period provided fertile ground for the emergence of a new feminine figure — that of a woman undergoing emancipation. It was in the shadow of the hardships and frustration during the second *aliya* that the new woman's image began to take shape — one with self-awareness, fighting for her standing and advancement. The egalitarian education at the Hebrew Gymnasium founded in Jaffa in 1905 sought to impart to young girls the same attributes it wished to instill in its young boys. The school gave rise to the new Israeli intelligentsia and even realized the vision of the new Hebrew woman. Favoring the public's needs over those of the home and family was just one facet of the revolution the young girls aspired to carry out.

During the British Mandate period, the concept of friendship supplanted the notion of the extended family, with friends forming the basis for group reference. The revolution during those years was characterized by the worship of body, youth, nature, and secularism. However, the quest for a new feminine model swung between women's internalization of masculine values and the internalization of men's demands of them. The model of a self-emancipating woman primarily suited single women and mothers caring for their children on their own. This changed during the 1948 War of Independence, when war was perceived by women as a defense of the home, leading them to fight alongside the men. The men, for their part, felt that an army unit without women was not a true home. The involvement of women in the defense forces was further evidence that a new society had been formed in Israel. In the nascent state's initial years, both medicine and young parents were influenced by American trends, and with the admission of fathers into the delivery room during childbirth arose a keen desire to participate and help in childrearing. In addition, women increasingly entered the world of work outside the family. The model of two working parents who are equal partners in bringing up the children has been the prevalent model in recent years within the secular sector.

A Mother and Her Daughter in the New Israeli Literature

The story "Apples from the Desert" by Savyon Liebrecht, an Israeli woman writer, (*Apples from the Desert*, 1998 (first English-language edition), pp. 65-72), is one example of many in modern Israeli literature of the emotional resolution of the female self. The story tells of Victoria, an ultra-Orthodox mother from Jerusalem, who travels out to visit her daughter, Rivka, who has left home in favor of life with a reserve army officer on a secular kibbutz. En route, the mother plans different ways of bringing her daughter back home. But when she arrives, a conversation (translated from the original Hebrew by this author) develops with her daughter, who is not yet certain she wants to marry the officer. The conversation sparks a metamorphosis in the religious mother. Victoria says, "You didn't love your father and your father didn't love you." Rivka ignores her remark, but then, following a brief silence, responds, "At home ... I wasn't worth much." "And here?" asks Victoria in a whisper. "Here, more." Later, when the conversation gets underway again, Rivka insists on knowing, "Why did it take you six months to come here?" "Your father didn't want me to come." "And you have no will of your own?" – for which the mother has no answer. On returning home, Victoria confides to her sister, "Sarika, we have spent our lives alone, you and I, with our marriage ceremony. My youngest daughter taught me something. Remember how we thought she was a bit retarded, God forbid? How I would cry over her? No charm, no splendor, no wisdom, no talent, tall as a giant. We wanted to wed her to Yekutiel, and they had the nerve yet to do us a favor, as if Abarbanel's daughter wasn't good enough for them. And look at her today ... milk and honey. And smart, too. And laughs all the time. And perhaps, with the help of God, she'll even cause us satisfaction."

The daughter Rivka in the story symbolizes the metamorphosis undergone by the modern Jewish woman. She is not dependent on her man or on her father. The metamorphosis undergone by the mother symbolizes the change in the mother's dependence on her children. The mother accepts her daughter despite the separating distance, and does not manipulate her to bring her back to her and to her former lifestyle, although that was her plan.

The Resolution of the Guilt

The termination of the Oedipus conflict is marked by an end to guilt feelings and the understanding that the girl will have influence and power just like her father when she grows up. From a psychoanalytic perspective, the Jewish mother no longer needs her children to feel sources of power in relation to her husband and does not feel guilty about her fantasies of a grandiose self in which she receives her man on an equal basis. From the moment she attains equal power with her husband in the family system, as well as social status, she can release the children from her manipulateness aimed at not losing them as sources of power. The concept of the "Jewish Mother" was apparently based on mothers stifled by an all-consuming fantasy trying to attain a position of power, to survive in a nonegalitarian society. The liberation of the woman in this sense was the liberation of her children and the safeguarding of their normal and non-neurotic development.

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Being a Feminist in Israel

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A committee of five men reviewed my doctoral dissertation proposal five years ago. They did not understand what was so unique about my topic,

"Women's Service in the Israeli Army 1948-1967." "Everything is known," they said. Is it really? No one has ever written the history of the Women's Force, so how can everything be known?

Was I surprised by this attitude? No, not at all. Being a native-born Israeli enables me to reflect on Israeli society with both love and pain. In the eyes of the world Israel always seemed as fighting for and implementing gender equality. The story of the first settlements (*kibbutzim*) where women worked with men shoulder to shoulder and the world-famous pictures of women soldiers carrying arms might give the impression that Israel has achieved what very few other nations have: a society of gender equality. But the truth is that Israel has always been a very "macho" society. By "macho" I mean that in Israel militarism has overlapped onto civilian life. A militarized society is a male-oriented society, and issues concerning the lives of women are therefore secondary: equal opportunities at work (salary, promotion, fringe benefits), marital laws (marriage, divorce, inheritance), violence against women, welfare (for poor women, single mothers, and older women), and better integration and participation in politics.

Israel was and is a society torn because of a precarious military situation as well as political rifts between Left and Right, clerical and secular, women and men, Ashkenazi (European) population and Mizrahi (Middle Eastern). We are still so far from achieving so many of the goals that are the basis for an equal opportunity society, one of which is equal rights for women. Men never saw equal opportunities as a topic on their political agenda; the problem is that neither did most of the women.

Israeli women have struggled from the beginning of the 20th century for their right to be included in all spheres of life: politics, the economy, and education as well as the military. It was a fight that was never really won – there were just small victories from time to time. An example is the story of the Women's Union for Equality in Eretz Israel, founded in 1919 by an American woman, Dr. Rose Walt Strauss. This political party took upon itself to integrate women into the political life of the Jewish population in Palestine. It participated in several elections in the 1920s and 1930s with immense success. Unfortunately, the achievement was not to be repeated. The party disbanded when the State of Israel was founded in 1948. Contemporary Israelis

never heard about this party and its achievements until 1977 when a group of us decided to establish the Women's Party. One of our members found a small dusty book about the Women's Union in a corner of the library of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. We published the book again and now all the school-books tell the story of the first women's party.

The years after the State of Israel was established were stormy. The image one gets from the media and other sources is that a woman's main role was to be a good daughter and then a good wife and mother. A woman was penalized if she stepped out of that role and rewarded if she stayed "in line." She could even be called "a whore" if she did not comply with the rules. But if women felt any discontent, they did not express it. When a group of Israeli and American women assembled at the beginning of the 1970s with the idea of forming a feminist group, it was a curiosity but not yet a threat. When more women joined, the press started to be a bit hostile: "bra-burners," we were called. Whenever I entered a room, fingers were pointed at me: "Here comes the feminist!" But we had a mission: to make women see their subservient situation. It was a very difficult task because most Israeli women would not listen. They were nearly as hostile as the men — we were rocking their boat.

The Feminist Movement of the 1970s was a small but radical movement that was pressuring the nearly all-male hegemony in Israeli politics. The devastating war of 1973 and the absolute helplessness of women then, raised for the first time critical questions about the insignificant role women played in times of war. Some articles were written and the discontent was heard. In the elections of 1974, one of the parties offered a seat in parliament to one of the leaders of the Feminist Movement. The Prime Minister consented in 1976 to establish a committee to look into the status of women in Israel, a first step toward a change in a society with conservative values. In 1977 a part of the feminist group founded a political party that ran in the elections with a radical platform. We did not win, but we received a lot of positive publicity and reached people we could not reach until then.

Among the issues the feminist movement did not deal with was an issue we never really argued about: the issue of women serving in the army. We felt that women cannot demand equal opportunities if

they do not fulfill their military service obligation. Compulsory conscription for men and women is a law and not serving in the army, we thought, might damage the status of women in Israel. On the other hand, in a country engaged in so many wars, where fathers, brothers, and sons fought and died, many women felt that it was wrong to talk about equality — there never was any. I think that after 56 years that is not a relevant excuse anymore. In the last 20 years, the issues of Israel's security and the fate of the settlements in the occupied territories forced more women into the streets to demonstrate than ever did any feminist issue. An example is the formation of the first anti-war movement in Israel, organized totally by women in 1982, which called for the withdrawal of Israeli soldiers from Lebanon. Most of these women were mainstream middle-class women, who had university degrees and had served in the army but did not declare themselves as feminists. They felt they had something to say about war and security as women and mothers. Many men felt threatened by this new phenomenon of Israeli women protesting against a war. They said that women do not understand security matters. This argument does not deter women today. They protest and demonstrate on various political issues but not, unfortunately, feminist issues that are not considered "important enough."

I served in the army and so did most of my friends. We felt proud to fulfill this national duty. When I talk to other women about their army service, I hear mixed feelings. Many fondly remember their service but usually tell of tedious, boring, and unrewarding jobs. Men and women were assigned to different roles: women got genderized roles that were set for women from the beginning when a list of 12 jobs was published. Most were clerical, teaching, and nursing roles — not fighting like the men — there was no feeling of achievement, no heroics. Even women officers either had administrative jobs or were in charge of women soldiers, looking after their welfare. A professional military career was not possible because there were no advancement possibilities — you could not become a high-ranking officer without field experience (combat training and commanding). However, now women have many more roles open to them, even some combat roles like pilots and trainers of combat soldiers.

In Israeli society today there is a backlash to the achievements that we feminists worked so hard

for. The only TV program dedicated to women's issues from the feminist point of view and chaired by a feminist-oriented woman for half an hour once a week was recently reformatted after five years. Now it's a joint venture of a feminist and a cynical male journalist. In 2001 the army abolished the post of Woman Commanding Officer of the Women's Force and made the top woman's position a consulting role to the Chief of Staff. Recently there was an attempt to eliminate even this post, but women's organizations protested and the position remains, for now.

The press in Israel claims we are in the "post-feminist era," which I doubt, though the picture is mixed. The feminist movement as such disbanded in the early 1980s, but many other feminist organizations emerged. Women realized that being nice is not enough, that much more had to be done to have equal opportunities. More women joined the work force: in 2003, 69 percent of women aged 15-54 worked. Many women have earned university degrees and developed careers. But they still have many children, 2.73 total fertility rate per woman, the highest rate among Western countries. (This might prove that family is still the center of women's lives in Israel.) Young women are still asked when applying for a job, "How many children do you plan to have?", even though it is illegal, and many women risk being fired from their jobs during pregnancy, even though employers need to get permission from the Ministry of Work and Welfare. There are sexual harassment laws and trials and heavier punishment than formerly, but wife-beating and murdering have increased. Women are a large percentage of the poor in our country. Women are still blamed: if poor single mothers, it's because they live on welfare and do not work; if sexually harassed or raped, "she asked for it" or she used her complaint to get even with some man.

Did we 1970s feminists make a difference? Yes, I believe we did. Saying "I am a feminist" today in Israel is socially accepted, unlike 30 years ago. We brought the feminist agenda onto the social and political agendas. Many issues were raised by us and other women's organizations which followed us. An example is of the feminist member of parliament, who in 1976 declared that there were hundreds of beaten wives in Israel. The parliament roared with laughter, but the first shelter for beaten wives was opened in 1977. Today this issue is no laughing matter. We gave lectures all over Israel in schools, universities and other institutions. We attracted media

attention to feminist issues. Considering how few we were, it's amazing to look back on the past 30 years and see the changes in Israeli society, mostly among the younger generation of women which takes our hard-won achievements for granted. But I am sure they feel, like we "veterans," that the way to full gender equality is still a long, arduous journey.

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Remembering My Mother

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Before my mother died at 79, she had lost her memory in a postmodern game of scrabble. She seemed to look at things as if they were suddenly there for the first and the last time. Alzheimer's, a complication of her Parkinson's disease, had seized pieces of her memory as if cut out of a cardboard background, which she could switch around like letters of the alphabet, spelling out new combinations for words. This fact enabled her to recognize some people who were familiar, but her reference points were becoming increasingly blurred. She could no longer perpetuate memories and so the past became simultaneous with the present in which all perspectives are flattened and equidistant and finally shown in the same instant and the same special terrains. She was searching amidst the rubble of objects and ideas already broken, trying to piece together some order and some clarity. My mother lived in her mind like a contemporary archeologist picnicking on the Roman ruins. More tragically, she stared out straight ahead for most hours of the day, as if she had lost all of her interest in what surrounded her.

In that last year, however, her self-consciousness about not remembering abated, and she seemed happier even when she was delusional; she liked making up her stories and only became reticent when someone pointed out the illogic. My fa-

ther always stayed to one side of her and translated for her. She looked to him the way the early pagans must have looked to the heavens for some sign of divination. When she was moved to the Hebrew Nursing Home, no one wanted to tell me. I would call the apartment and my father made excuses for why she couldn't come to the telephone. He did not want to admit his defeat; that he could no longer take care of her, or tolerate her falling down or inject her with insulin. Slowly, it dawned on me that she was either dead or missing. I confronted him with the question of what exactly had happened to my mother. He had taken her, after a couple of visits to the psychiatric ward of the county hospital, to the Home, which had a special unit for the patients suffering from dementia or Alzheimer's. I did not want to go there to see her — knowing I would have to see her in the condition that had warranted her being there — I did not want to see the nurses sniffing around her like she was an old casserole — or the cheerless cheerfulness with which the female residents who were parked in the social parlor on Saturday afternoons, some still replete with evening dresses and swishy oyster pearls.

But I got used to it, just as she did. When my father took the cell phone on his daily visits, he would call me and put the phone to her ear. There was always a baffling sound of crackling hair and short breaths as she tried to figure out which ear to put it to, and how to say something into the receiver. She opened the conversation with a little phrase that she used when I was young and had wandered into her room or the kitchen, "What's cookin'?" She asked that as if she were hungry. I remembered a little notepad she kept by the telephone with the insignia of a pot belly stove and the script squiggled out of smoke, that asked precisely the same question, "What's cookin'?" In the last six months of her life, the only thing she seemed to remember about me was that I wrote poetry. She had forgotten everything else spoonful by spoonful: that I was married, that I had a daughter, that I was separable from my sister whose name she often mistook for mine or mine for my sister's.

During that last year, I had to come to terms with the possibility of losing my mother and realized that I had been losing her most of my life; indeed she was a faint but glamorous presence who understood her part in motherhood but also liked the idea of having her own career. When I was five years old, she

declared she was going to work. She had skills as a stenographer and typist, and wanted to make use of them. So, unlike the other mothers in the neighborhood who stayed home, she suddenly dispatched her maternal duties to a babysitter. As a result, I became an intensely dependent and desperate child, constantly testing her faithfulness, her maternal instincts, and her devout but missing sympathies. Now, losing her all over again in her late stages of dementia, I tried to adapt to her fragmented world, to the vacant spaces she disappeared into and reappeared from, the way I had to when she left each fall morning, in her high heels and reversible raincoat, to catch the bus to downtown. I would stand a long time by the window, watching her make her way down the street until she turned the corner. Now I resented her silence as if it meant she was deliberately abandoning me.

I had always counted on my mother to be at least reassuring, even when I knew she was unsteady in her thoughts. Somehow I thought the fact that she was my mother might transcend her uncertainty. Even if she was uncertain about the weather or which way to hold a phone or a water glass, I still wanted her to treat me with the deference a daughter deserves. But my mother was no longer reassuring because she had no sense of what to reassure me about. She calculated absence — the occasions my father wouldn't show up at the Home — and she chastised him for it, but she didn't understand, or appreciate, his presence as much. In lucid moments, she talked about her frustration that there was no cure for Parkinson's and this belied her poignant faith in doctors and researchers. She lived in a dark, hoarding, and howling place, from one rationed pill of dopamine to the next.

I have tried to think what it would be like to forget the past the way my mother had. It is an impossible exercise. It doesn't matter if it was a good or bad past; it is there as the essential foundation for understanding where one is now, and why. My mother's parents were immigrants who never learned English. I don't know if that was insolence or impatience on their parts. Her father had come to this country as a stowaway in the belly of a Russian passenger ship. He was a fur maker who was often unemployed through the Depression years. They were unapologetically poor. My mother did everything American: kept her hair blonde, wore perfume, did not make chicken stock from a bone, and had her own mink coat. There was much friction between

my mother and her mother — perhaps because her mother favored her brothers and wanted her to give up her rights to everything because she was a girl. When my grandmother died, my mother insisted that they raise the lid of the coffin, even if it was sacrilege, so that she could see the old gray face. She said if she didn't see her she wouldn't believe her mother was really dead because she was so ingrained in my mother's consciousness. She was moored there, like a small and empty boat. She could not differentiate her moods and dreams from what her mother's were and she feared that she would forget who she was without her. My grandmother had deprived my mother of affection and so my mother had to learn how to give it to her own children, which she did with all of the hesitation involved in uncovering a lost language. I tried to express her feelings for her, which she had held in. Did I know as a child that my grandmother's influence had made its way into my mother's psyche too?

My mother's condition left her seemingly unable to emote, to love, to even animate herself. She appeared blank. My sister always warned me before we saw her: "She isn't in there anymore." It wasn't that she failed to remember, rather, that she could not construct a memory that would place us within the realm of her nearby awareness. She saw me both as the child who was always standing outside her own omnipotence and as the competent adult who flitted in and out of consciousness, upon whom she could depend to get her robe off or her button buttoned. I was aware of the fact that my mother could no longer recognize her own image in the mirror, let alone mine.

Unfortunately, I tried to identify with her illness and see myself as impaired and unable to perform tasks I had done just a year ago. It was a means of both feeling close to her and compensating for the possibility I might surpass her. If my mother was degenerating, I felt I must be crumbling somewhere, too. "Are you writing?" she'd ask. I know that my mother had no idea what I wrote but that she had observed a kind of noisy thinking in me, some process that magically gets results but remains out of sight: like the contraptions that press and wrap up dry cleaning and send the bodiless clothes around their moveable cables. It was my inner space to which she had no access, just as I had no access to hers. Yet if we couldn't read each other's thoughts we still could intuit them, finding more or less a kind of familial

resemblance, like the trait of worrying too much, or being allergic to fake gold, or starting mystery books with the last chapter.

"Do not touch the face of an angel; the flesh is so fragile it will rub off on your hands." I remember my mother bringing out an album of old black and white photographs. She called it her family album and kept it in the nightstand of her bedroom. By the time she died, most of the photographs had disappeared from the black pages, perhaps dislodged by various moves.

In Roland Barthes' *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* (1982), the author searches for his own identity through family photographs dating from before he was born. He remembers a kind of stupefaction in seeing someone familiar being dressed differently. He focuses in on a single photograph of his mother standing with her brother in a winter garden. Bridging the gap between his five-year-old mother and his own mourning her, he realizes the only material traces of an irrecoverable past, and how these traces derive their power and their cultural role from what they have embedded in family life. But more important, the photograph is a memorial. As Barthes concludes, "By giving me the absolute past of the pose, within the family, the photograph tells me death in the future. What pricks me is the discovery of the equivalence" (p. 60).

I am obsessed with seeking out pictures in the album. I keep looking at the pages in order to fit together her life — to give her a past — and to breathe myself into it, to mother her again so that I know I am the child. I see her in front of doors, waving a hello or goodbye. Here's a snapshot of her in the park in the midst of autumn, a baby buggy parked under the leaves. I think she has just turned halfway around to hear a human cry.

What pricks me is the equivalence. Even in seeing my mother's photographs from when she was three years old to when she took her trip to Israel in 1999, I know that the eyes that look out are the same eyes that greeted me as a child, the same eyes that stared expressionlessly at me when I visited her just a year ago. My parents believed in taking photographs. They believed in the world of the photograph as a memorial season. Of course, in any familial four-cornered world there is always someone missing: someone who is snapping the picture, someone who is guiding the gaze.

Strangely, I have always had an aversion to family photographs as well as a secret attraction. I could gaze for a long time at each frame, each context of my mother's former life in which I so desperately sought an image of my own cohesion. I wanted to see her in remnants of happier times in which I was not present.

Along with the album, I then drew out her old high school yearbook and studied the little tiles of faces of unknown, anonymous teenagers as if they could tell me something more meaningful. These are the boys who will go to war and don't know it. These are the girls who will wave flags on Armistice Day. There were overworked quotations underneath their names and club memberships in italics: "Class clown," "Will see her name in lights," or "Most likely to succeed." My mother's photograph shows her large teeth and impeccable smile, her democratic good will and her skeletal feminism still forming. My mother's class suggested she would become a member of congress; but instead she worked to put her brothers through law school and did not begrudge them too much. My mother was such a broad-cheeked Slavic girl with cornflower blue eyes. I look at the slogans under each school portrait like epitaphs — doomed as the early magnolias that put out their blossoms as the first sacrificial stars of spring.

Judith Harris, PhD, teaches at Catholic University of America and George Mason University. She is the author of Atonement: Poems (2000) and Signifying Pain: Constructing and Healing the Self through Writing (2003) (see the review in this issue on page 156). Dr. Harris' new book of poems, The Bad Secret, is forthcoming in early 2006. She dedicates this essay to Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, "who has written so beautifully on motherhood and psychoanalysis." Dr. Harris may be contacted at jlha@gwu.edu. □

Nancy J. Chodorow: Psychoanalyst and Gender Theorist

(Continued from front page)

Our Distinguished Scholar is the author of The Reproduction of Mothering (1978; 2nd Edition, Updated with a New Preface, 1999); Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory (1989b); Femininities, Masculinities, Sexualities: Freud and Beyond (1994); and The Power of Feelings: Personal Meaning in Psy-

choanalysis, Gender, and Culture (1999) (see Works Cited for full citations), as well as numerous articles, chapters, presentations, reviews, and interviews. Of particular interest in terms of her intellectual and personal biography are "Born into a World at War: Listening for Affect and Personal Meaning" (2002a), "Psychoanalysis and Women: A Personal Thirty-Five-Year Retrospect" (2004c), and "The Sociological Eye and the Psychoanalytic Ear" (2004d). Since her last book, she has written several articles on gender: "Glass Ceilings, Sticky Floors, and Concrete Walls: Internal and External Barriers to Women's Work and Achievement" (2002b), "Too Late: Ambivalence about Motherhood, Choice, and Time" (2003c), "Hate, Humiliation, and Masculinity" (2003e), and "Beyond Sexual Difference: Clinical Individuality and Same-Sex Cross-Generation Relations in the Creation of Feminine and Masculine" (2004b); on sexuality: a new Foreword to Freud's *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (2000) and "Homosexualities as Compromise Formations" (2003b); and on psychoanalytic theory, history, and practice: "From Behind the Couch: Uncertainty and Indeterminacy in Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice" (2003a), "The Psychoanalytic Vision of Hans Loewald" (2003d), and "The American Independent Tradition: Loewald, Erikson, and the (Possible) Rise of Intersubjective Ego Psychology" (2004a).

Dr. Chodorow's book honors include the Bryce Boyer Prize of the Society for Psychological Anthropology in 2000 for *The Power of Feelings* and the Jessie Bernard Award of the American Sociological Association in 1979 for *The Reproduction of Mothering*, which was also named by *Contemporary Sociology* in 1996 as one of "Ten Most Influential Books of the Past Twenty-five Years." Recent honors include the Liebert Lecturer at the Columbia Psychoanalytic Institute and Association for Psychoanalytic Medicine (Fall 2004), Honoree of the Committee on Special Research and Training (CORST) at the Meetings of the American Psychoanalytic Association (June 2004), and the Award for Distinguished Contribution to Women and Psychoanalysis of the Section on Women and Psychoanalysis, Division 39 (2000).

Dr. Chodorow is the Book Review Editor for North America of the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* and a Founding Associate Editor of *Studies in Gender and Sexuality*. She is on several

committees of the American Psychoanalytic Association, where she also participates frequently on panels, and is active at the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute. Dr. Chodorow (NJC) was interviewed by e-mail and phone in February by Bob Lentz and Paul Elovitz for Clio's Psyche (CP). She may be reached by e-mail at chodorow@berkeley.edu.

CP: Dr. Chodorow, for 30 years you've been a pre-eminent scholar of individuality, gender, sexuality, culture, and society. Your parents were Marvin Chodorow, a professor of physics, applied physics, and electrical engineering at Stanford, and Leah (Turitz) Chodorow, a social worker before she had a family and, afterwards, a community leader and well-known volunteer. Born in New York City in 1944, in 1947 you moved with your family to Stanford, which was "traditionally Western, semi-rural, ... emphatically not-Jewish" (2004c). How have your early life and your parents influenced you?

NJC: I believe what I call my clear-eyed thinking — my capacity to see the logic of an argument and put all the parts together — comes from my father, who, as he told me, could see widely disparate theories in physics as having particular relationships in terms of designing particular instruments or tubes. Perhaps being on the margin, or cusp, or in-between, as I always see myself (an intersubjective ego psychologist; a psychoanalyst-social scientist interested in where inner meets outer, or self meets world, as I say in the Introduction to *The Power of Feelings* (1999)), comes from my move to California and being Jewish in such a non-Jewish world, even today with one part of my identity in New York City and the other very much in the outdoors of California. So, being somewhat of an outsider-insider gave me a capacity to see structure and logic in what I read and to put things together.

My maternal lineage is familial and cultural as well as personal. My mother is of the 1890s-1920s cohort that had more education and professional participation than women before or after them. Five of my six aunts were professionals, social workers or music teachers. All the women in the community in which I grew up in had had careers before they became mothers — teacher, social worker, librarian, scientist — and they were mainly strong descendents of pioneers and farmers. They were housewives and homemakers but not what you would call "stay-at-home mothers." When you go hiking now

on the San Francisco Peninsula, most of the land preserves and trails originate in the volunteer work of those women. My mother took her social work training to a very undeveloped San Francisco Peninsula — it is hard for anyone who has been to Palo Alto or Silicon Valley in the last 30 years to have any idea what it was like there in the late 1940s and early 1950s — and she founded a school for autistic children, served on symphony and concert boards, raised money for schools, and was a fundraiser for the Stanford Institute for Research on Women and Gender.

CP: In *The Reproduction of Mothering* (1978), you call for “equal parenting” (p. 218). Would you still issue that call today as you did then? How real is equal parenting in modern society? What can be done to more fully achieve it?

NJC: Well, I think you put it exactly right: “issuing a call.” It was a naïve call, though I know that many people feel grateful to me for having suggested it. As I have said in the 1999 preface to the second edition of *The Reproduction of Mothering* (1978), it is a sort of social engineering call that is really undermined by the heart of the book itself, which is about the development of maternal desires, subjectivity, and capacities, and the importance of the mother-child relationship for both mother and child. The entire argument of the book implies that fathers are not mothers and, as I have done clinical work, and myself become a mother, I know that more strongly than before. The call for “equal” parenting comes from two sources. As I note in “Born into a World at War” (2002a), I am of the generation of war babies who were the subjects of all the “father-absence” studies — fathers were off at war or doing war work, and, after the war, working hard in the beginning of a boom economy, while women were “returning” to the home. But the wish for more father involvement is not the same as a call for equal parenting. I translated this cohort experience into a political call, but you don’t need equal parenting to have men participate in child care. This call is characteristic of my political generation — an absolutist claim for how society ought to be transformed, without a lot of attention to the subjectivities, feelings, and wishes of the people themselves whose causes we were advocating. The implication, that there are no differences between mothers and fathers, has also been used against women by fathers’ rights movements, and, as I describe in “Too Late” (2003c), it is used by my patients and students, in what I call a cul-

tural trope that obscures intrapsychic conflict about becoming mothers.

I believe that what I should have advocated as a result of the book’s argument were the kinds of social programs that would foster mothering and maternal as well as child well-being — parenting leaves with guaranteed job security (that are really, 90 percent of the time, as they should be, for mothers), family supports, job sharing, and other social policies, of the sort that we find in Scandinavia especially, that foster mothering and then end up making it much easier for fathers to spend more time with children as well. I think the fact that educated women were able to use that “call” is beside the point: the fathers of their children should have been willing to help without the need of a manifesto about how to overthrow male dominance.

CP: What has being Jewish meant for your thought, work, and life?

NJC: You know, it’s interesting and a bit surprising to read your questions, since they presume that one can summarize these things, like what does it mean to be Jewish, or a woman, or the child of particular parents, in one or two sentences. But of course, you as psychobiographers know, and I as a clinician know, that you can’t answer those questions in such short form: they are years of analysis and self-analysis, or 500 pages of psychobiography or autobiography. When you do answer them in short form, those answers are what we could call surface, probably obscuring as much as they reveal, or revealing not what it means to be Jewish, or Western, or a woman but some other affective meaning.

CP: Your undergraduate mentors at Radcliffe College were Beatrice and John Whiting in culture and personality anthropology, and your graduate mentor at Brandeis was Philip Slater (*Glory of Hera*, 1968) in psychoanalytic sociology. Were there others who significantly influenced your scholarly development?

NJC: Philip Slater was a great influence in terms of the kind of work that he did. I am forever grateful to him for when, after reading “Being and Doing” (1972), my first graduate student paper, he told me that I could never understand socialization and development if I didn’t read psychoanalysis. But he actually was disengaging from academia during most of my graduate career. I continued during my graduate work to be in contact with the Whitings, and

I was in touch with Bea Whiting until a couple of years ago and saw her just a few months before she died. I could see that my going off into psychoanalysis, even though she and John were such behaviorist child observers, fulfilled a latent identity for her: in her introduction to a special issue of *Ethos* in her honor, she called her contribution, "Freud in the Field." While at Brandeis I also took several courses from and was influenced by a Harvard Senior Lecturer, George Goethals. George introduced me to object-relations theory — Winnicott, Fairbairn, Guntrip, Balint — which was so influential in my early work.

My other influence, who perhaps helped me most in how I think, though not in what I necessarily think about, was my thesis advisor, Egon Bittner. Egon was an extremely careful theoretical thinker, who taught his students how to read a text carefully, how to think about it, how to unpack it from within. That has really been the skill that I've been able to bring to whatever I work on. So, when I went to work on psychoanalytic theory, the early writings on women, when I tried to bring together all those diverse writings, and also to bring in anthropology, cross-cultural studies, and social theory — a Durkheimian perspective on the social and individual, Parsons, Marxian critical theory — it was because of Egon Bittner that I could do this. Egon's own field, ethnomethodology, focused on pretheoretical assumptions that underlay everyday life and social thought, and my writing has almost always begun from noticing pretheoretical taken-for-granted — women's mothering; heterosexuality; the idea that meaning comes from without rather than from within.

CP: You took your doctoral degree in sociology from Brandeis, an institution that has been quite open to and productive of psychoanalysis and the psychosocial. Would you elaborate on Brandeis as a cradle of these fields?

NJC: I can't talk about Brandeis today. Then, the Brandeis Sociology Department, unlike most departments, had several people interested in psychoanalysis. There was also a connection to the History of Ideas program, which was a center for Freud-Marx-Frankfurt School theory. But in my time, the late 1960s and early 1970s, you had to make your own way. Many of the faculty were more involved in anti-war politics or in counter-cultural psychology movements than in academia. The very

large exception were the social theory faculty, mainly Jewish refugee intellectuals, who, I think, believed that intellectual work and disciplined reflection were especially important in politically troubled times. So, I did participate in some serious coursework in psychoanalysis, but other courses thought you should learn psychoanalysis through encounter groups or through talking about how you felt about the theory rather than understanding what the theory *said*. Those classes sometimes left me (and others) in tears, and that countercultural ethos led me to seek out my subsequent psychoanalytic learning either at Harvard or from the wonderful courses offered for graduate students by the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute (BPSI). There, Bennett Simon was one of my teachers, and after the two-year sequence was finished, I was given a dissertation mentor, Malkah Notman, who read through all the draft chapters of the dissertation that became *The Reproduction of Mothering* (1978) with the experienced clinical eye that I, of course, did not have. Both Bennett and Malkah continue to be close colleagues and friends. The other debt I owe to that BPSI course is that they assigned Loewald's "Separation, Internalization, Mourning, and the Superego," which began my lifelong passion for Loewaldian thinking and writing.

CP: How do you assess Freud?

NJC: How can I answer that in a sentence? I'm teaching a three-week overview on Freud starting next week, at the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California (PINC). In my syllabus for that course, I say, "Freud is not only the founding thinker and practitioner of psychoanalysis; he is one of the few most influential thinkers of the 20th century ... There have, of course, been many developments and changes in psychoanalytic theory and practice since Freud, and our field has operated between the temptation to preserve and adulate every word he wrote and the assumption that almost 75 years of post-Freudian developments have made him obsolete. What can be said, I think, is that there is nothing that Freud wrote that is not interesting, even when it is wrong, and that even if we each have one favorite exception, there has never been a rhetorical stylist in our field like Freud. It is worth investigating Freud's writings in themselves, and it is impossible that doing so will fail to enrich your own work."

CP: About the profession of psychoanalysis, you wrote in a note to *Feminism and Psychoanalytic*

Theory (1989b), "...the current decline in the profession – its fall from grace within psychiatry, its marginalized and minor relation to other psychotherapies, the continuing controversies about its founder. ..." (p. 222, Note 20). How do you view the current status of and prospects for the profession?

NJC: There is psychoanalysis in the academy and clinical psychoanalysis. We all know that clinical psychoanalysis now lives in a field with many other therapies and approaches, but I think it can be said that most of them incorporate dynamic thinking. The institutes themselves continue to attract candidates, including many psychiatrists who want the dynamic skills that they did not learn in residency, but of course it will probably never have the hegemony it had in the United States in the 1950s. In terms of substance, it is very exciting to be an analyst today – there is so much ferment, so many rich writings (many of which I see as the Book Review Editor of the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*), such exciting synthetic theoretical thinking. Analysts, I feel, are so committed to their practices, to thinking about their patients with colleagues, so deeply devoted to understanding and helping them, it's not really only a question of numbers. In the academy, I am more pessimistic. Although psychoanalytic thinking is influential in the humanities, this tends to be non-clinically based, even anti-clinical, to go for the high – Lacanian, especially. Except for a small but vibrant psychoanalytic anthropology, there's nothing in the social sciences, which means that this important science of the individual, which could counter social determinism, is ignored.

CP: In the 1980s you researched, interviewed, and wrote about second and third generation women psychoanalysts in "Varieties of Leadership among Early Women Psychoanalysts" (1986), the classic "Seventies Questions for Thirties Women: Gender and Generation in a Study of Early Women Psychoanalysts" (1989a), and "Where Have All the Eminent Women Psychoanalysts Gone? Like the Bubbles in Champagne, They Rose to the Top and Disappeared" (1991). In "Psychoanalysis and Women" (2004c, Note 7) you remark "how radical and generative ... not only for her time but for ours" was Judith Kestenberg. What is the status of women psychoanalysts in America today?

NJC: That was such a wonderful project to do, because I got to meet with so many of those pow-

erful professional mothers (I have called this project my "professional reproduction of mothering"). As I describe in recent writing, after the decline of numbers and prominence of women analysts in the United States in the 1950s-1980s, until non-medical analysts could train, there are today many women, who play roles in every arena. I think all of those early women analysts were radical in one way or another – some politically, some culturally, some by becoming professionals, some by combining work and motherhood, but my particular tribute to Kestenberg was because she did really important theorizing about female (and male) development, and this work was pretty much ignored or misunderstood (by me among others).

CP: You've recently written about Erik Erikson in "The American Independent Tradition" (2004a). Did you know Erikson personally or study with him?

NJC: I think that Erikson is an extremely important thinker, in his keeping in mind psyche, culture, society, history, all at the same time, both in his early clinical papers and of course in his later founding psychobiographies. Reading *Childhood and Society* (1950), right after my freshman year at Radcliffe, first got me into psychoanalysis, and the psychosocial and the psychocultural. It addressed me exactly where my intellect and affect met. I am really sorry that I did not take Erikson's "Life Cycle" course when I was an undergraduate. I was mainly taking graduate anthropology courses, and I had a sort of snobbish idea that if 500 undergraduates wanted to take it, it was too popular. As a graduate student, I was able to participate in the small seminar on "Ritualization" that he gave along with his Harvard Norton lectures, and I interviewed him and Joan a couple of times for my women analysts project.

CP: In "Psychoanalysis and Women" (2004c), you write, "In trying to articulate a theoretical and technical identity that fits diversity and individuality ... I have invented the term, and in some contexts consider myself, an *intersubjective ego psychologist*..." Would you please explain intersubjective ego psychology for our readers?

NJC: That's the hybrid term I coined for what I call the "Loewaldian" school – except that Loewald did not found, and did not want to found, a school. I am trying to capture something that is neither, in terms of the contemporary terrain, relational,

nor traditionally ego psychological, with ego psychology's focus on close process or compromise formations coming from the individual. I worry that the relational focus, with its insistence on everything being co-constructed, and everything expressed by the patient coming from the here-and-now situation with the analyst, does not give enough theoretical recognition – though of course, when you listen to relational analysts they do this – to, really, what the patient brings, what's there from their earliest development, and their deepest, immutable, intractable, unique subjectivity. As someone who comes also from the social sciences, in which everything comes from the sociocultural, I worry that relational theory can lead to too much extrapsychic determinism. I want to take — as is not surprising, given my training, from the great strengths of classical ego psychology and classical Freud — the attention to individuality, to conflict and unconscious fantasy and how it shapes everything. But I also want to see the analytic encounter as created by two equally complex subjectivities, not as an encounter in which an analyst is the objective interpreter and describer of the patient's reality. Intersubjective ego psychology is the best I can do to express this hybrid.

I think among that generation of Americans, Loewald is the person who most fully holds both this “one-person” ego psychological view that he gets from Ernest Hartmann and from his deep rooting in Freud, and the complex understanding of the “two-person” transference-countertransference, of the analyst's role as transference and real object rolled into one, and new object as well, of how this all begins early, when the ego creates itself along with its reality, its drives along with its objects, in which development happens intrapsychically but also happens in the mother-child matrix. I tried to elaborate these ideas in my “The Psychoanalytic Vision of Hans Loewald” (2003d), and I tried to compare this hybridness with the British Independent tradition in “The American Independent Tradition” (2004a).

When I think of intersubjective ego psychologists, I have in mind analysts like Dale Boesky, Judith Chused, Theodore Jacobs, James McLaughlin, and Warren Poland, who are all ego-psychologically trained, but who have all worked in this middle terrain, of how to hold in mind patient and analyst as unique selves but also uniquely related, resistance as necessary in both patient and analyst for analysis to progress, transference-countertransference, the pa-

tient's reality taking primacy over the analyst's reality, countertransference enactment and analysis of the self but using this self analysis for the analyst's own thinking, not for putting it forth for discussion between patient and analyst, as is more the relational tradition. I see intersubjective ego psychology as a not “more-than-the-sum-of-the parts” two-person psychology — there are very much two separate people, with two separate histories and psyches, in the room — as opposed to the relational folks, whom I consider to hold a “more-than-the-sum-of-the-parts” two-person psychology. Things like “co-construction,” or the “analytic third,” or the “potential space” are more in this latter camp.

I think of intersubjective ego psychology as a sort of American equivalent of the British Independent tradition, with people like Winnicott, Fairbairn, and Balint, who tried to find a middle place between Klein and Anna Freud. It is not surprising, I think, that some of the contemporary British Independents, like Michael Parsons, also draw from Loewald. I also take Winnicott very seriously, and a lot of the British Independents, like Nina Coltart, Marion Milner, Parsons, and Christopher Bollas, who are right in there with the unfolding of the true self in the potential space of the analysis.

Now, as I make these fine-tuned distinctions, I should probably say that I'm doing violence to just about everyone — the contrasts I'm making are mainly between ideal types of ego psychologists and relational psychoanalysts. You no sooner make these kinds of distinctions than someone whom you're describing does something that undermines the distinction.

CP: You trained at the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute from 1985 to 1993, have taught at that institute since 1994, and were certified in Adult Psychoanalysis by the American Psychoanalytic Association in 2000. Will you share with us when you were in personal analysis? How might your thought and work in the 1970s have been different if you had had psychoanalytic training earlier?

NJC: I think it's kind of a miracle that in my mid- to late-20s — I was in graduate school from 25 to 30 — I was able to write my *The Reproduction of Mothering* dissertation without analytic training and without being a mother. But I did have a personal analysis at that time, so I think I had some feeling-sense, as opposed to thought-sense, of what these

analytic categories and ways of thinking were about. But I did think, when I finished that book, that I could not go further in understanding the psyche without psychoanalytic training, and I still think I was right: training has been absolutely essential to all the further psychoanalytic scholarship I have been able to do.

CP: Though your writing about the reproduction of mothering at such a young age without parenting experience or psychoanalytic training was remarkable, I (Paul Elovitz) think it is important to explicitly make the following point: having a personal analysis is the most important single step in encountering psychoanalysis. Taking psychoanalytic courses, seeing patients, and case supervision are enormously beneficial yet secondary to the analytic experience as a patient. Though I greatly value my own training as a historian, and its value as an academic union card, all of these parts of psychoanalytic training are far more valuable than the typical process of getting a typical doctoral degree in academia. What are your thoughts about my assessment?

NJC: Well, I don't agree with you that the personal analysis alone can do it, which is what I think you are implying. I think you are minimizing what it means for your understanding to actually work with patients. I do agree with you, however, that analytic training may be more necessary to understanding people analytically than, perhaps, academic post-graduate training is to being able to do academic-like work: there are plenty of independent scholars around who do splendid research and writing in history, or sociology, or biography, based on no more than an undergraduate degree. You can't be self-taught as an analyst or analytic thinker about people's minds in the same way.

CP: I do not mean to be implying that personal analysis alone is enough nor to minimize the enormous value of seeing patients which deepens one's own understanding. Of which of your works are you most proud? What projects are you working on now?

NJC: The "big books" are *The Reproduction of Mothering* (1978) and *The Power of Feelings* (1999). I think those are both, in their own way and, as Erikson would say, for my own developmental stage, major achievements. For the time being, my focus is thinking about patients and private practice; I am not engaged in academic writing.

CP: You're now emerita in Sociology at Berkeley. Your master's and doctorate were in sociology, and you taught it for 30 years (1974-2004). Have you now left it behind? Sociology was a growing field when I (Paul Elovitz) was an undergraduate, but its importance in academia has appeared to decline. How do you explain this and what is its current state?

NJC: It needs to be stressed that I was never, in any conventional sense, a "sociologist." I have a sociology PhD, I've taught in sociology departments, and I'm a knowledgeable and original social theorist. But I've never been interested, other than as a citizen, in "the social." I'm interested in "the individual," and there are no departments of individuality, or "individualology," in the academy. So I've gone from one formal training to another, staying centered on the individual, in all her internal complexity and all the complexity of how she interacts with the sociocultural surround. One of the main arguments of *The Power of Feelings* (1999) concerns problems with socioculturally determinist fields, like sociology and feminism, and I've written about this as well in "The Sociological Eye and the Psychoanalytic Ear" (2004d). Of course, when I turn my attention to psychoanalysis, I am also critical of psychoanalysis for ignoring the social and the social sciences, a point I developed in my Liebert Lecture, "The Question of a *Weltanschauung*: Ethnographic Observations Seventy Years Later" (2004e).

CP: You theorize and are a theorist. What are the most important elements to theorizing about the psychosocial? In Fall 2004 you taught a course on your work, "Chodorow on Chodorow: Theorizing and Theory." What was it like to do this and how did students respond?

NJC: That course was my final course in academia, and it was a privilege to teach and to have wonderful students. I had the opportunity to reread my work cover to cover, and to articulate for the students how theory works. I was able to give them a first hand sense of my dead ends and my emotionally driven patches as well as of my breakthroughs and theoretical mind. It demystified "theory" for them.

CP: On the book jacket to *The Power of Feelings* (1999), you talk about how, in the middle of the last century, scholars like Erik Erikson, Norman O. Brown, Herbert Marcuse, Lionel Trilling, Philip Reiff, and Paul Goodman suggested that psycho-

analysis is really a grand theory about human possibility. Can you elaborate?

NJC: That's what the power of feelings and the "doubled vision" of Hans Loewald are all about. Psychoanalysis is the only major theory we have about individuality, the only science of the individual. Its practice addresses all elements in the individual human, and uses general theory to allow an individual to understand and integrate himself, to put together personal meaning and feeling, drives, passions, conflicts, and a deep relationship to another. The practice of analysis itself models intersubjectivity.

CP: You wrote about and expressed your indebtedness to American psychoanalyst Hans W. Loewald (1906-1993) in the Introduction to *Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory* (1989b, p. 12). You've more recently written articles about him in "The Psychoanalytic Vision of Hans Loewald" (2003d) and "The American Independent Tradition" (2004a). In "Psychoanalysis and Women" (2004c) you write that "Loewald is the single theorist who best enables us to address clinical individuality...." Regrettably, Loewald is not mentioned once in the index to my (Bob Lentz's) daughter's university introductory psychology textbook. What has his legacy been and why has he been at the margin of psychoanalysis? Did you know, work with Loewald personally? Would Loewald the man, the person be an interesting subject for a biography?

NJC: I only met Loewald once, in the early 1980s, so the influence is entirely through his works. But can I use this opportunity to take a little stand here about psychobiography? Like everyone else, I find psychobiography very interesting to read, but I think it can sometimes substitute for thinking about a person's work itself. I think if you look at Freud's life, to take a well-known example, the biographies are so fascinating, but there has been also such a misuse of biography, where the man has been thought more important than his work, or it has been thought that his life can be used to judge his work. So, I would turn the question back to you, and wonder, why would this be one of the first questions that occurs, rather than thinking about how important it might be, for example, for *Clio's Psyche* to do a special issue on Loewald's writings?

Loewald is not marginal. He didn't found a school or engage in schisms, like Klein, or Kohut, or

Winnicott, or go off on his own, like Erikson. He is widely respected, and there is a growing literature on him and increasing references to him in the journals. Loewald was a committed practicing clinician, who was also a deep thinker, and wrote about what he thought. He was a central figure, teacher, and supervisor in Western New England. He was just not a public figure of claim and counterclaim.

What is so important about Loewald is his capacity to take everything into account and his wonderful attention to the analytic encounter, the transference-countertransference, the way that the analyst is just at the edge of what the patient can absorb and helps the patient to absorb this. He begins, like the ego psychologists, from the surface, but he interprets, like the Winnicottians or the Kleinians, the unconscious rather than the resistances. In Loewald what I have called a complete subjectivism, in which the individual creates ego and reality, self and object, drives and object, at the same time, meets a complete intersubjectivism, where no one develops as a child, or analytically, outside of an intersubjective matrix and surround. Loewald describes both the great complexities of intrapsychic development and experience, and at the same time he is a foundational thinker about the analytic encounter, therapeutic action, the analyst's role, transference-countertransference, and so forth.

CP: You have written about violence in "The Enemy Outside" (1998) and "Hate, Humiliation, and Masculinity" (2003e). How do you understand the psychology of political terrorism?

NJC: In those works, I ask why it is almost entirely men who are violent – terrorists, suicide bombers, committers of vicious acts of ethnic cleansing. I suggest that there are two "faultlines of masculinity" – tectonic plates that shift threateningly, or the crystalline structure we find when the crystal shatters. These are the need to be not-a-woman, that I had elaborated in the *Reproduction of Mothering* (1978), and the need to be not-a-subordinate-male in relation to a superordinate male — the humiliation and shame dynamic between men. This latter, the superordinate-subordinate humiliation dynamic, is, I think, key to geopolitics, war, power struggles — whether Bush's invading Iraq or Serbian ethnocide in Bosnia or Kosovo — and to the cultural-political humiliations that seem to justify terrorism. I hope that analysts will look much more closely at this male-

male superordinate-subordinate dynamic. Ken Corbett's marvelous article, "Faggot = Loser" (*Studies in Gender and Sexuality*, January 15, 2001 2(1), pp. 3-28) is one of the best accounts of this. Much of Ethel Person's writing addresses the male vulnerability to shame and humiliation as well.

CP: You're in private practice and have written about it recently in "From Behind the Couch" (2003a). You say that you have "a predilection for listening to" the patient (p. 478). Would you please elaborate?

NJC: I divide analytic writers and presenters into two groups, and analytic work into two necessarily interacting phases. I call these "listening to" and "listening for." Any good analyst does both, but I think we can see tendencies in clinical presentations and in the literature. Those who "listen for" are more theory-driven — I'm thinking of the Kleinians, the Kohutians, the Lacanians, the close-process ego psychologists. As you read them or hear them present, there's often the sense that they know, are even looking for, what they're going to find. Their theory guides what they hear. Much of Freud, and the early analytic writings, of course, are like that, too, especially where they talk about getting the person to see their Oedipus complex or penis envy.

Then there are those who "listen to," who, although they have theory in mind, seem to range more freely across theories and to focus with a more open ear and mind on the particularity of the particular patient, and perhaps that the patient at different times can be best understood by different theories. Of course, I put the eminently synthetic Loewald in this camp because he so focused on listening to the patient and since you can find elements of Freud, Klein, Kohut, Winnicott, Erikson, and Mahler in Loewaldian thought. Along with the Loewaldian intersubjective ego psychologists. Also in this group are the British Independents, not so much when they're looking for or insisting on the analytic third, or potential space, but when they're really focused on the unique unfolding of the true self, as in Milner, Coltart, or Winnicott. Evelyn Schwaber really opened the territory, with her insistence on the patient's, as opposed to the analyst's, reality being primary, and Haydee Faimberg, who invented the term "listening to listening." She argues that you don't know what you said to a particular patient at a particular time until they tell you what they heard. I

think as a listening-to analyst in terms of what I call, in that paper, "curiosity as an undertheorized technique" or surprise as an important experience for the analyst, as Henry Smith puts it. Or I think about listening to the patient as a unique other, in Poland's terms.

By the way, I think this distinction between listening to and listening for also holds in many academic fields as well, certainly in terms of how one listens as a sociological or anthropological interviewer or observes as an ethnographer, and I imagine as one does historical research as well.

CP: In reading "Psychoanalysis and Women" (2004c), we sense that you've evolved over the decades from a researcher/teacher to a clinician, from somewhat of a radical feminist into more of a mainstream psychoanalyst. How do you understand your intellectual journey? What will be Nancy J. Chodorow's legacy?

NJC: I was a political feminist, but not, in the terms of that time, a "radical feminist." I came to psychoanalysis to understand women and male dominance, and I now am interested, as I put it in the "Preface" to *Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory* (1989b), in psychoanalysis for its own sake. But I was never intuitively a 1960s person; it was more that I followed a psychocultural tide. It was really always the internal individual that moved me. I think you only get a legacy as a clinician if you begin in the ranks in your 20s or 30s, and that is certainly not the case for me. My legacy will definitely be as a theorist. I would like to think it will be as theorist of the intertwining of the intrapsychic and the extrapsychic, because I feel that understanding those interconnections is so important, but as a sociologist of knowledge and cultural observer, I would have to assume that my legacy will always be in terms of my gender theories.

CP: Thank you for an interesting interview.

Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, is Editor, and Bob Lentz is former Associate Editor and Guest Co-editor for this special issue, of Clio's Psyche.

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*(These nine articles are in the course reader for "Chodorow on Chodorow: Theorizing and Theory," available as *Soc 202B Fall 2004 Chodorow* from Copy Central in Berkeley, (510) 848-8649, for \$29.28 incl. shipping and tax. Bob Lentz, lentz@telusplanet.net, has a copy he will start circulating upon request.) □

Women's Changing Social Roles and the Gender Gap in Voting

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The gender gap in which women vote for Democratic candidates to a significantly greater extent than men do became a permanent feature of the political landscape in the United States during the last two decades of the 20th century. This difference in voting of approximately eight-to-ten percentage points first appeared in the 1980 presidential election when Jimmy Carter was supported by 45 percent of women but only 36 percent of men, creating a gender

gap of nine percentage points. Subsequently, it has marked all presidential contests since then, with the largest gaps of 11 and 12 percentage points occurring in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, respectively. In 2004, the gender gap in presidential voting narrowed somewhat to seven percentage points, probably because of the changing effects of security issues on women's voting after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Before 1980, in sharp contrast, there was little systematic difference in how women and men voted. The few significant gender gaps that did occur (for example, for Dwight Eisenhower) were based on women's greater support for Republicans.

This gender gap in voting can be traced to the dramatic changes in women's economic and social roles that occurred over the second half of the 20th century. Women's new social position, in turn, set off important psychological dynamics that culminated in women becoming more liberal than men in their political attitudes and voting patterns. The 1950s and 1960s witnessed momentous social and economic change affecting the status of women: women's rising levels of education, greater participation in the labor force, increased control over fertility, and higher divorce rates. As a result of these socioeconomic changes, women became more independent both economically and psychologically from men, leading them to become more active and independent politically as well. This represents what Diane Fowlkes has termed *countersocialization* ("Developing a Theory of Countersocialization: Gender, Race, and Politics in the Lives of Women Activists," *Micropolitics* 3, 1983, pp. 181-225). That is, women's changed social positions and roles created challenges and opportunities that changed the underlying psychology and values of many of them. Previously, in contrast, they responded fairly similarly to men to the socioeconomic and political contexts that they faced.

Many scholars, especially feminists, view the Feminist Movement, which began in the late 1960s, as the principal agent of the changes in women's gender *consciousness* that ultimately gave rise to the gender gap in political attitudes and voting (Ethel Klein, *Gender Politics*, 1984). From this perspective, the gender gap resulted from the growing gender consciousness among women as the Feminist Movement became increasingly successful in articulating new social and political norms to which, over time, more and more women subscribed. The Feminist Move-

ment, in short, drew on the more educated, independent, and mobile women who had been created by socioeconomic change to challenge the constraints of America's patriarchal culture and to articulate a truly autonomous political agenda for women. This vision, then, created a second level of explicitly intellectual countersocialization on which women in the broader population could draw.

Another psychological perspective links the gender gap to the assumption that women have significantly differently values from men's (Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice*, 1982). According to this theory, women, compared to men, place more emphasis upon "connectiveness" in personal and community relations rather than abstract rights and power considerations, and upon personal collaboration and issue resolution rather than competition and confrontation. While the broader psychological foundation of Gilligan's theory has been strongly challenged, its implications for women's political attitudes seem less controversial. That is, women should have significantly more *compassion* than men, making them relatively liberal on issues affecting the less fortunate in society. Consciousness and compassion are at least indirectly related, moreover, since as women became more involved in politics, they began to realize that their basic, family-derived values applied to a broader range of issues, such as helping the less fortunate, supporting racial equality, protecting the environment, and, most especially, demanding equal rights for women. The sudden emergence of the gender gap in 1980, therefore, can at least be partially explained by the preceding success of the Feminist Movement in raising the "consciousness" of women about the political relevance and implications of their "compassion."

Finally, social change in the postwar United States was far from entirely benign for women. In fact, such factors as the rising divorce rates (which exposed many more women to the adverse economic consequences of divorce under the American legal system), when coupled with the falling welfare expenditures of the Reagan era, created what has been called the "feminization of poverty." This cost-bearing, consequently, gave many women an additional "self-interest" in being liberal on social welfare issues, thereby contributing to the aggregate gender gap.

This change in voting patterns since 1980

reflects a complex sequence in which women's changing social roles created countersocialization that led to changed attitudes. These new perspectives helped stimulate the rise of gender "consciousness" associated with the Feminist Movement which, in turn, led an increasing number of women to realize the political relevance of their values of "compassion" and of the "cost-bearing" entailed by the feminization of poverty.

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Martha Stewart: Dual Gender Roles

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Martha Stewart combines traditional ideas of femininity and masculinity, two seemingly contradictory roles, in a powerful way that challenges many different ideas about gender roles. By incorporating these two very different gender roles, Stewart has jumped headfirst into an experiment in contemporary feminism by error and trial. She has emerged from this unintentional experiment as a figure more powerful than some elements of our society can tolerate. Achieving success while presenting home in the context of work, or female in the context of male, she has challenged the unwritten list of what types of work can bring women fulfillment and dignity. It would be interesting to probe her childhood and motivations sufficiently to come up with a psychobiographical explanation for her behavior. Since a comprehensive psychobiography is not yet possible, I will attempt an overview with what resources I have available and hopefully prepare the way for a more in-depth study.

As if guiding you through setting up a greenhouse in your basement to sprout next summer's tomato plants isn't enough, Martha Stewart has also helped reinvent the way we see gender roles. Stewart is clearly a unique businesswoman in today's society because she expresses two traditional gender roles simultaneously: one female, embodied by her cooking and decorating tasks, and one male, as we see in her positions as former CEO of her own multi-million dollar company, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.; former member of the board of directors of the New York Stock Exchange; and centerpiece of the 2002 corporate financial scandal investigations. Her female role has been widely emphasized by the media through creative nicknames like "diva of the kitchen" in *The New York Times* and "celebrity homemaker" on the Associated Press, though none of these names can capture the essence of this intriguing ex-stock broker.

I initially began to wonder why Stewart possesses two traditional gender roles because of my personal experiences growing up with a stay-at-home stepfather who liked to make his own pizza dough. Hugo owned a bookstore until I was about 11 years old, after which he worked part-time as a caterer. His office was at home, so he was able to prepare all of the meals for my mother (the principal breadwinner) and me, drive me to my various after-school activities, and help me fish my retainer out of the trash at school on one of the many occasions when I had thrown it out with my lunch tray. Though stay-at-home fathers are usually stereotyped as being feminine, subservient, disinterested in traditionally masculine activities, and wearing aprons around the house, such is not the case with Hugo. He is very interested in traditional male activities and shows many stereotypically male characteristics in his activities outside of work, such as driving a large SUV, watching sports, and repairing things around the house. In his work, however, Hugo is traditionally feminine: he is very artistic and spends much of his time cooking, decorating, and shopping.

Hugo and Martha Stewart both exhibit dual, though inverse, gender roles. Stewart is traditionally feminine in the aspects of her work in the home, which she advertises, and traditionally masculine in those character traits that helped her to become a success in business. Both Hugo and Stewart are counterstereotypical and important during a time in which businesswomen with androgynous personality traits

and communication styles are successful and women who speak politely and are seen as exhibiting "appeasing gestures" are frequently left behind at promotion time.

Androgyny is nowhere apparent in Stewart's image, however. Because she reaches a mass audience, she has rejuvenated the art and craft of the most "feminine" work of the last century – homemaking – and restored its validity and importance. During the post-World War II era, as Betty Friedan pointed out in *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), housework was glamorized mostly to draw women out of "men's jobs." Stewart has worked hard promoting traditional female tasks to become the authority on gracious living. Her magazine, television show, books, and image have become wildly popular during a time in American history when there exist many upwardly-mobile Americans who are susceptible to the lifestyle and decoration industry upon which companies like Williams-Sonoma, Pottery Barn, and Crate & Barrel have prospered. (Interestingly, the CEOs of all of those companies are men.) Stewart's success and unique personality style are apparent, but the question remains of how she developed both of her gender roles.

There is a common misperception that Stewart was born into a wealthy New England family. In fact, Martha Kostyra was born on August 3, 1941, in Jersey City to a Polish-American family and grew up from the age of three in a working-class neighborhood in Nutley, New Jersey. At an early age her father taught her to garden and she was trained in the domestic arts throughout her childhood. Martha, with the help of her mother, even sewed her own wedding dress when she was 20. These hints from her background begin to suggest the foundations of her ability and desire to compete in the world of men. Stewart's father was temperamental and demanding, while her mother was cold and unhappy. As the eldest girl and second oldest of six children, she was instilled with a strong sense of independence and competitiveness, especially since resources were scarce when she was a child. From a young age, Stewart was a voracious reader, with strong aspirations for knowledge as a path to empowerment, as well as a means to experience worlds beyond her own. She has always exhibited a great desire for and need to exercise control (Christopher Byron, *Martha Inc.: The Incredible Story of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia*, 2002). All of these influences have

shaped the modern Stewart: an independent, power-seeking, competitive person skilled in the domestic arts and driven by unflagging aspirations for success. Recently, the greed that encouraged her insider trading led her from the classy lifestyle she worked to promote to a jail cell.

The media attention she received for this transgression only made clearer the complexity of her character. In my research of the investigation and trial of Stewart, I found a number of photos in *Newsweek* and *The Economist* that showed more of her body than did similar photographs of other, male CEOs being investigated for wrongdoing. Through calculating a numerical value (length of face in millimeters divided by length of face+body), I found that more attention was drawn to Stewart's gender than to the gender of the other CEOs. This observation points out the conflict that Stewart's dual gender roles present for the media and the public. Certainly many people hope a successful woman will fail; the media took advantage of Stewart's gender and celebrity status to feed that need. The fall of Martha Stewart certainly made good press.

I also found surprising differences in the fluctuations of her company's stock value and that of the other companies investigated. Stewart's company, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc., suffered great losses after allegations on June 7, 2002 that Stewart received insider information from her broker, falling 16% from \$19.01/share to \$15.96/share in the two days after the announcement. It is logical that the value of her company's stock would fall with the announcement of a scandal involving the chief executive officer, but, surprisingly, two other companies with similar scandals during the same period did not experience proportionate drops in their stock values. When Tyco International was announced to be under investigation for an accounting scandal on February 17, 2002 their stock price actually increased by \$0.20/share, or 0.7%. When the Securities and Exchange Commission announced its inquiry into accounting procedures at Qwest Communications International on March 11, 2002 Qwest's stock price dropped by \$0.76/share, or 7.8%, during the next two days. Thus, the drop in Stewart's stock seems disproportionate, especially given the disparity in the other executives' transgressions: Stewart's wrongdoing saved her only \$57,000, while Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski's involved \$600 million. This may be partly a result of Stewart's company being heavily

based on her image, but it also suggests that because she is a woman, Stewart received unequal, gender-biased, media attention.

Martha Stewart's combination of femininity and masculinity challenges many prevailing ideas about gender roles because she has emerged victorious in her headfirst style of contemporary feminism. Yet while Stewart herself has profited by her "masculine" business sense, is it possible that the "feminine" homemaking advice and skills that she has brought to her audiences have not alleviated the pressure on women to choose between a feminine focus on the home and a masculine, aggressive pursuit of workplace success? That is, do the high standards for housekeeping that Stewart has set in her pursuit of individual success hold women back even more? At any rate, the whole of Stewart's being appears to be greater than the sum of her two roles: Martha Stewart became more powerful than some elements of our society could tolerate. Whether consciously or unconsciously, she has perceived a way to garner power by presenting home in the context of work and vice versa – female in the context of male and vice versa – thereby challenging the stereotype of the successful woman.

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Feminist Battles on the Home Repair Front

Tim Myers
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I don't know squat about mechanical things, but my wife has an affinity for the supposedly male realm of "do it yourself." This is "feminism in the streets," believe me — because when we go to a hardware store or home-supply warehouse, it never fails: the guy behind the counter always tries to talk exclusively to me.

The American world of home repair traditionally inclines to a strict separation of the sexes, and even to the "purification" of the male sex — I've got-

ten many a contemptuous look from clerks who clearly deemed my ignorance about carpentry and wiring as unmasculine. Employees of the various suppliers, it seems, tend to split the world into the domains of women and of men. Then they deny reality to hold onto their preconceived notions. The following experiences illustrate this tendency.

My wife will say, "I need weather stripping..." and the clerk will nod, then swing toward me like a baby bird looking for dinner. "What do you need it for?" he'll ask. Since I didn't even realize we needed weather stripping to begin with, I can't contribute much. But he just looks at me, waiting for an answer.

I've tried several strategies. The first seemed obvious. "I don't know anything about this stuff!" I'd say cheerfully. "You'll have to talk to her." Sometimes I'd even have to point directly at my spouse.

"Ah," the guy'd say, turning to her and repeating, "What do you need it for?" (Some, I swear, even say it a little slower).

"I want to seal my garage doors, to keep the rain out..." she'd say. But like iron to magnet, sunflower to sun, he turns again to me. "So we're talking weather stripping..." Right back where we started.

Then I tried standing there without saying anything. But this was just too hard on the guy. As I waited out the awkward silence, he'd *try* to look at her — but his head kept snapping back to me, as if his neck was rigged with a big rubber band. Sometimes I almost felt sorry for him — he acted confused, like a dog when he sees another dog on TV.

At times I'd even do that old comedy bit, nodding my head surreptitiously in my wife's direction, rolling my eyes toward her, maybe even pointing behind my other hand... But no. So my strategies evolved. I'd pretend to look at other things in the store — but then I seemed like an expert checking out the merchandise, so I was still the one to address. For a while I'd actually walk up to the counter and turn my back once my wife began to speak. But as she told me later, he just kept looking desperately at the back of my head.

More than once I was ready to grab a shirt-front and growl, "Talk—to—her!" Or scream out, "Didn't anybody see Marisa Tomei in *My Cousin*

Vinny?!” My wife fantasized about taking hold of the man’s jaw and actually turning his face toward her — or chanting the kindergarten teacher’s rhyme, “One, two, three — eyes on me!”

So our basic strategy has evolved even further. These days I tend to remove myself from the whole situation. When we walk into one of those places, my wife says to me — sometimes a bit curtly — “You just go look around!” But I don’t mind; I’m above the macho stuff.

So I idly inspect hammers and drill bits, and then wait for her near the registers. Last time there was another guy waiting too. “What’d you come for?” he asked pleasantly. Another Tim Allen fan? Or might he be a secret know-nothing like me?

I couldn’t take that chance. “Weather stripping,” I said in a knowing voice. “You know — seal those garage doors...”

I wanted this article to make a serious point. But when a term is bandied about as often as “sexism” is these days, it sometimes loses its force. So, as a writer will, I looked for some alternate form of expression in order to re-invigorate the idea — in this case, humor.

Not that there isn’t some natural humor here. I grew up with an absent father and a mother who’d just sit down and take the toaster apart when it was on the fritz. It never occurred to me that I had any responsibilities in that area, and it soon became clear I didn’t have any talent either. My wife is just like my mother, so my dependence on female fix-it artists has continued unabated.

I see humor here to begin with because, though I have a lot of traditional male qualities — I was a very successful football player, for example — my ineptitude as a handy man flies so completely in the face of gender expectations. I suppose the blatant if unconscious sexism my wife keeps running into at Home Depot and elsewhere will always strike me as both funny and serious. Serious because I’ve seen the terrible costs sexism has exacted from us all, and continues to. But funny as well, because the truth of male-female equality is something sexism simply can’t cancel out. Those male clerks incapable of imagining my wife as a fix-it person remind me of the dog whose master has just pretended to throw the Frisbee. The dog looks around in confusion; he simply doesn’t understand. His intellectual limits make

us laugh.

Of course it’s somewhat easier for me to find humor in this than for my wife to. Her response to the clerks’ behavior is a bitterly enunciated “Maddening!” And yet, when she read my article, she laughed. I think it’s because we share the belief that things are getting better — however slowly. At the car dealer’s a few days ago, the sales guy looked at me once or twice, saw I was looking away, saw that my wife had all the information, realized she was leading the delegation, and from that point focused his attention on her.

My wife and I find deep joy in the idea that millions of women, by their very presence in the working world and their expanded definitions of themselves, are already pulling American society toward a better future. So we can laugh — because we know it’s just a matter of time.

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The Beauty Myth: Young Women and the Culture of Appearance

**Nancy C. Unger
Santa Clara University**

Despite the innumerable ways feminism has liberated me, because I was born in 1956 I will always carry at my core some of the scars inflicted by living in an overtly sexist society during my formative years. It was for that reason that I was especially eager to offer, beginning in 1992, the history course, “Women in American Society.” I looked forward to learning from my young undergraduates what it’s like to grow up in a society free from many of the gender stereotypes imposed upon me as a girl. From that first offering at San Francisco State University to the present, at Santa Clara University, the students in my classes, primarily female, have been young,

bright, and beautiful, bursting with enthusiasm and a confidence I attribute to feminism in general and, in particular, to *Title IX*, the 1972 Civil Rights amendment that prohibits discrimination based on sex in any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. What I have learned from them, however, is that many of the old gender stereotypes that plagued me have been replaced with new cultural imperatives that are just as damaging, if not more so.

My students dutifully read the required materials: primary documents and scholarly articles on pre-Columbian Native American women, early European settlers, enslaved women, etc. They slog through women's contributions to various early wars and social movements. When we get to Victorian sexuality, their body language changes to reflect their increasing interest. They sit up straight, they lean forward. They become increasingly engaged as we move through the 20th century. Then we discuss Naomi Wolf's *The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used Against Women* and the class explodes.

Published in 1991, *The Beauty Myth* asserts that the many successes women enjoyed in the 1970s as a result of the burgeoning feminist movement were effectively countered in the 1980s by the growing dictate that women must endlessly obsess over their personal appearance. In essence, Wolf argues that since women can no longer be legally barred from the boardroom, courtroom, and classroom, their effectiveness can be damaged and their inferior status maintained if they are distracted from the business at hand by an infinite, expensive, and time-consuming quest for impossible physical beauty.

While my male students look puzzled, my female students present endless examples of how this beauty myth consumes their lives. Students who've never contributed to class discussions raise their hands and, invariably, begin their comment with, "The first time I was hospitalized for anorexia..." My female students detail the self-loathing that comes because they haven't the discipline to endure the extreme diet, exercise, and beauty regimes they feel compelled to undertake. When I once asked if this was experienced universally, a lesbian student said to me with some exasperation, "Just because I'm out and overweight, do you think I *don't* say to my partner, 'Does this make me look fat?'"

My students are ashamed of their obsessions

with their appearance. They know they shouldn't starve themselves, shouldn't exercise to the detriment of their health and their studies, and shouldn't berate themselves for not looking like the airbrushed models in the magazines they read so voraciously. The men in the class point out how the myth damages romantic and sexual relationships. "How come," more than one has asked the class, "if beauty is the goal, my girlfriend gets mad at me when I tell her she's beautiful?" "Because," comes the group answer, "everything in society is screaming at her that you're lying."

My students are extraordinarily excited by the liberating notion that they have succumbed to the Beauty Myth not because they are weak individuals, but because, like the generations of women and men before them, they are the targets of powerful social prescriptions. Evidence of the internalization of Victorian sexuality, for example, suddenly makes more sense. History becomes potentially empowering. They leave class committed to throwing off these oppressive behaviors and poisonous thoughts. They return, shaken and perplexed.

They have said to their female housemates, "Let's not do this anymore. Let's not spend hours bemoaning our faults and striving to reach an impossible ideal. Think of the time and money and energy we'll save that we can put to other uses!" Their horrified housemates have rejected such heresy outright. Young women's culture is so bound to the Beauty Myth that most don't know how to proceed without it. Complimenting each other's appearance while bemoaning their own is the currency of my female students' culture. In this self-deprecating exchange, each is established as generous and kind to others, but never stuck up or self-satisfied. They strive to help each other "improve." A tall, thin, exceedingly and undeniably gorgeous blond once explained that even she found her place in this culture by constantly complaining that she is flat-chested while admiring her larger-breasted sisters. The Beauty Myth provides a shared value system that allows for an almost immediate and visceral sisterhood that transcends barriers of race, socioeconomic class, and sexual orientation.

A few years ago, a student about my age expressed his anger when he first saw *The Beauty Myth* on the syllabus. "At the end of a course like this you should be empowering these young women with

readings about reproductive rights and issues, rape and sexual harassment, about any number of key issues, and you've got them reading some pop psychology on beauty!" I asked him when the course was over if he still thought my decision to include it was a mistake. Like me, he was horrified by how completely the women in the class had identified with the book, and was struck by how it had opened the floodgates of frustration, but also released the potential power of understanding.

The students' response to *The Beauty Myth* never varies; if anything, its intensity has increased since 1992. My initial impression of my female students as strong and confident was not completely false, however. My students tell me that growing up immersed in feminist rhetoric and enjoying equal access to education and other opportunities guaranteed by *Title IX* makes them aware of their many strengths and abilities. In particular, equal access to sports has made a real difference in their lives. The camaraderie, strength, and accomplishments provided by athletics have proven to be among the very few tools sufficiently strong to challenge the power of the Beauty Myth.

I am learning a great deal about the gender-based battles and challenges of this generation compared to those of my own. On the whole, it was easier to be victorious in the battle for equal rights than it is in the one ongoing for the power inherent in genuine self-acceptance. But my female students are fighting their generation's battle, and fighting it hard. They try to talk with their peers about things other than appearance. They recommend my class to others. They quit blaming themselves for their obsessions, and recognize the ads and fads in popular culture that are the most destructive to their self-esteem. However, for the generation that should be benefiting the most from the decline of various forms of gender discrimination, the culture of impossible female beauty — the Beauty Myth — remains powerful.

See author credit on page 116. □

**The Next Forum Work-In-Progress Seminar
is on March 12, 2005 when Ken Fuchsman discusses
"Freud's Discovery of the Oedipus Complex."**

Some Concluding Thoughts from the Perspective of a Male Psychohistorian

Paul H. Elovitz

Ramapo College and the Psychohistory Forum

Sigmund Freud, who practiced psychoanalysis primarily with women patients, thought that the great unanswered question was "What does the woman want?" Elsewhere he declared that "anatomy is destiny" and that the "life of adult women is a 'dark continent' for psychology." Despite his bewilderment over the motivation of women, the founder of the psychoanalytic method went well beyond the frustrations of most men since he worked hard to listen to women because his work expresses openness to different explanations. Women, and men who are quite attuned to women, have been explorers into this "dark continent" of the female psyche.

While welcoming all contributors, and anonymously sending their papers to our referees, we especially sought women authors for this issue. Indeed, I felt rather ambivalent when asked to write a concluding essay for this special issue: shouldn't a woman be writing it? Perhaps. But there are things that need to be said from a historical, personal, and psychoanalytic perspective, and each reader can decide the value of this man's comments.

Our authors have done a fine job providing information on and analysis of the life experience of women. There is the historical perspective in the Introduction by Nancy Unger, who uses the wonderful example of Belle Case La Follette, a woman whose consciousness is transformed from holding the ego-ideal of total service to men and finding her place in the world through her husband and children, to becoming, within a few years' time, a feminist advocate of women finding their own way in the world. Included are the stories of an earlier generation of women like Edryce Reynolds and Jean Cottam, who made their way as professional women — perhaps it's no accident that divorce was a part of their journeys in the course of pursuing their goals in a world of men.

Kristine Larsen has felt like something of an outsider in the world of physics yet her career has progressed notably and she maintains a strong sense of her own femininity and individuality even if she

keeps her tattoos but not her pierced eyebrow hidden from the professional world. Her article helps answer the question of why there are not more women in science. On January 14, 2005 Harvard President Lawrence H. Summers suggested innate, biological differences as he tried to goad women into pursuing math and science — at least that's how he justified his "foot-in-mouth" difficulties. However, there is no need to search for genetic differences between the sexes when there are such obvious attitudinal and behavioral reasons: Larsen describes the "culture of physics" as inhospitable to women.

Role reversals cause considerable confusion in society while offering new options for it. They also take some pressure off men to be the sole family provider, protector, and home repair expert. Tim Myers provides some humor in his description of the reactions of traditional males to his wife's handling of home repair needs. House husbanding may be much more common now than it was in the world of our parents where the stay at home husband was seen as a failure, but it still can be very hard on the egos of those involved. For example, when I recently met the husband of a younger colleague who had just joined our faculty after getting her doctoral degree in California, he said he "just" stayed home with the three children. Conversation revealed that he was also working nights as a watchman to help support the family economy. To me this had the same ring as the comments from the large number of women I have met through the years who have informed me that they did not work. As mundane as this may sound, further inquiry made it clear that they raised children, ran households, provided essential support systems for husbands, organized school and community activities, cared for sick relatives, and usually had part-time jobs. Despite their lack of self-confidence, the experience of these women usually made them wonderful workers. Their male counterparts now face a similar struggle to establish a sense of self-worth.

Despite Nancy Unger's valuable references to the issue of women as superwomen, the dilemma of the modern woman who is told she can achieve everything in contradictory roles is otherwise not sufficiently covered in our issue. I understand the excitement occasioned by new possibilities being opened to women, but from observing and listening to them — women and gays seem most interested in gender courses — I am also aware of the cost. In teaching

"Childhood and Youth in History," "Sex Roles in Society," "Leaders, Passion, and Success," and "Manhood," I sometimes feel sad for young women who want to "have it all" and "do it all" without realizing the price involved. For most, there are not enough hours in the day or enough physical, mental, and emotional energy to achieve these things, especially if they pursue goals that usually require dichotomous attributes, values, and ways of thinking and acting. To be "superwoman" — perfect professional, perfect wife, perfect mother and daughter, to have all of the wonderful attributes of women while succeeding in the world of men, which is governed by very different attributes — is an impossibility even for most high-achieving women. Indeed, I know some talented high-achieving career women who have dropped out of the "rat race" to spend time with their children because they found more satisfaction in this than in focusing on their professions.

First Lady Laura Bush, with her new mission to help young men and boys at risk do as well as women in school and work, while avoiding addictions and gangs, is doing a worthwhile thing. But it should be noted that she is very much in the pattern of the woman who stands behind a man, that of woman-as-enabler. Nineteenth-century authors such as Samuel Smiles (1812-1904), who revelled in writing about high-achieving men, often gave credit to the woman behind the man. Like St. Augustine, Smiles believed that it was the mother who made the man. In the great, 20th-century age of the male-dominated corporatization of industry, in which women were relegated to the roles of wife, mistress, secretary, schoolteacher, nurse, daughter, sister, factory worker, maid, or prostitute, it was women who literally enabled men to look good: men could concentrate on pursuing success in the world of business because they had women buying their clothes, dressing them, and caring for their personal appearance, as well as managing their social lives and maintaining connections essential to upward professional mobility. The value of a wife as a "support system" making great success possible is what some high-achieving, successful professional women later came to realize and talk about when they said what they needed most was a "wife." Of course, successful female professionals also face the envy — and sometimes the sabotage — of secretaries and wives, who see them as a threat rather than an inspiration.

Only when American women and men are

willing to accept women as capable chief executives in their own right, rather than as wives of presidents who are content to pursue such crusades as literacy, will the U.S. be ready for the first woman president. Much of the country could not tolerate the Clintons' notion of a co-presidency. Similarly, in the 2004 election, Teresa Heinz Kerry was not well received as a strong, outspoken woman who refused to speak in a politically correct fashion or to abandon the name of her deceased first husband. It has long been my conviction that the first woman "allowed" to be president will be tougher than any of her male predecessors. (See my "America's Second Woman President" in the September 2000 issue, 7(2): 69-70.) It seems to be necessary to society that the first generation of women who run countries must be tested by war to prove that they are tougher than their male allies and political rivals, as were Golda Meir and Margaret Thatcher, two women who made it to the top without the benefit of being the daughter or wife of a political leader. The relationship between women and war is an important subject. In the long run, the female "dark continent" is inclined to be less violent than the male "dark continent" because women are more prone to talk than to fight. Some of them may remember the birth pangs they suffered bringing into the world the lives lost in warfare.

Historically, men have not had much interest in young children or the early years of life. Males have taken pride at the sight of the newborn and briefly held it before handing it over to a wife, nanny, or wet nurse until it reached an age of interest to the male psyche — typically at puberty, though historically sometimes as young as six or seven years of age (the beginning of latency). By the late 1930s some psychoanalysts had begun to get past Freud's focus on the Oedipus complex to deal with the reality of the pre-Oedipal world, in which men are controlled by women more so than at any other time in their lives. This change in perspective was brought about in part by a number of brilliant women psychoanalysts, such as Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, Freda Fromm-Reichmann, and Helene Deutsch.

In practicing child and adolescent therapy for a number of years, I found that it was taken as a given that boys had a harder time growing up than girls. Girls could identify with their mothers, who normally have been a fairly consistent presence within the home, while boys had to identify with fathers who mysteriously went off to some unimagin-

able office, foundry, or other job that the boy could not readily visualize. This was in sharp contrast to the usual historical situation of boys seeing their fathers go off to the fields close by the home and joining them to assist in the harvest as soon as they were able. Carol Gilligan (see our March 2004 issue, 10 (4): 121-131) has written, rather brilliantly, on issues of male, and especially female, identification, and, in the case of boys, dis-identification.

In the past, young children were often kept within the woman's section(s) of the home, or harem, until they reached the age of about five. Though in England and America there may not have been harems, a holdover of men's lack of interest in young children is revealed in early 20th-century photos that show boys as old as four or five in dresses as a reflection of their being within the domain of their mothers as well as the ease of toilet training in these clothes. Men often spend the rest of their lives demonstrating that they do not need the women who gave them life and nurtured them long enough to be prepared for the world of men outside of the home. The male inclination to say "We don't need women" is a denial of ever having been small and weak, and of the desire to return to the joys of being cared for.

In my experience as a historian, man, and psychoanalyst, the basis of much male denigration of women is the need to deny the dependency, weakness, and female domination of the early years of life. A well-educated and often generous, yet "rough around the edges" man comes to mind. Along with many men of his era, he demeaned women in general, saying that they were "just holes [vaginas], if you turn them upside down they are all the same." With other men, he shook hands hard to demonstrate that he was stronger than they were; he sometimes hugged women until it hurt: squeezing an outspoken older cousin of his wife so hard that he literally broke several of her ribs. He married a sheltered woman a decade younger than he was and kept her "pregnant and down on the farm [the suburbs]" while he worked quite long and hard building a business. He left for work before dawn. When he returned home, he said hello to his wife and children, ate dinner, and fell asleep immediately in front of the television set, only awakening long enough to go to bed. Meanwhile, his wife began to feel restive as she developed a sense of herself as a separate person. The response of this powerful man, who claimed women were interchangeable, when she brought up the idea of di-

voiced, was to collapse with all of the symptoms of a heart attack. He had to be rushed to the emergency room because, unconsciously, the threatened loss of attachment to a woman "broke his heart." This happened several times before he "hardened his heart," accepted divorce, and cut his former wife out of his life. His tough, "hard as nails" demeanor concealed a desperate need for a woman. With his second wife, he appears to have dropped his superior, denigrating manner and paid some more attention to her needs. He has a more stable marriage with a woman who appears to be more realistic about the man she married than his first wife had been.

In addition to the denial of the need for women on an individual level, all-male societies of boys' clubs, sports teams, armies, and so forth, are further "proof" to men that women aren't necessary. Of course, the locker room talk in these groups focuses on sexual triumph over women — men do love being on top in the struggle of the sexes. In most societies the "dark continent" of man's desire to subordinate, dominate, impregnate, use, rape, and defile women is protected from exploration by a common wall of denial. An important element of the Islamic fundamentalist revulsion toward the West is based not simply on satellite television images of scantily clad women drinking Coca-Cola and eating fast food. Rather, the threat of women becoming men's equals and bosses revives fears of male dependency on women. Western presentations of men and women as equals in society — even in images as seemingly innocuous as that of a woman driving a car — serve to dangerously blur the distinctions between gender roles. Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an intellectual father of the modern Islamic fundamentalist movement, was an Egyptian who came to America in the late 1940s. In a town in Colorado, he had no problem attending a Christian church service. Though to his mind the minister was not properly enlightened as to how to worship God, Qutb remembered that Muhammad had told his flock to tolerate the two other monotheistic religions. However, Sayyid Qutb could not tolerate the church dance that followed, in which men and women held each other in their arms. This violated a fundamental tenet of Islamic puritanism and his sense of the appropriate relationship between the sexes. Incidentally, Muhammad himself seemed quite comfortable with women, and far more concern for women's rights is expressed in the Qur'an than in either the Old or New Testament (Subbush Inamdar,

Muhammad and the Rise of Islam: The Rise of Group Identity, 2001).

Mohamed Atta (1968-2001) is a good example of a Muslim who lived in the Western world, where he was quite uncomfortable with the relationship of the sexes. In his last will and testament, this leader of the September 11 suicide attacks on Manhattan specified that his body, in being prepared for burial, should not be touched (and therefore "defiled") by the hands of a woman. Beyond the fantasy that there would be enough body left to be defiled by a woman's hands after the fuel-laden plane crashed into the World Trade Center, is the reality of Atta's unconscious desire to be cared for by a woman. Despite the protests of his father, a Cairo doctor who despises Americans and the West, Mohamed, until he went to college, would sit upon his mother's lap. To me, Atta is an example of male counter-dependency impulses being manifested in hypermasculinity and its subordination of women.

Western men like to denigrate their Arab counterparts for keeping women under the veil or having them walk steps behind them. Arranged marriages, honor killings, economic dependence, and restrictions on education and public appearance outside of the family are concepts that the West has, for the most part, left behind. Yet the same desire to keep women subservient exists in Western society. However much "modern," educated Western men like to denounce others for their subservient treatment of women, they share the same impulses, though they carry them out in different ways. For example, in the hierarchies of power and status women are typically paid less money and kept in roles making them subservient to men. Rita Ransohoff (1916-2003), a longstanding psychoanalyst/psychologist member of our intellectual group, wrote about this cross-cultural phenomenon in her last book, *Fear and Envy: Why Men Need to Control and Dominate Women* (2001).

Women's liberation is a process involving not simply equal employment opportunities and pay, property rights, equal educational opportunities, and laws prohibiting discrimination, but also transformation within the minds of women, so that they are willing — and able — to question that which they have observed, been taught, and been rewarded for while growing up.

Lauren Gargani, a student at Ramapo Col-

lege, has noted that despite outward efforts to steer girls and young women toward leadership roles and the self-esteem necessary for aggressive competition in the workplace, there remains an abundance of poor role models for girls, and gender stereotypes still prevail in the playroom. She cites the ever-popular Disney "princess" films as prime examples of overwhelmingly passive female "heroines," whose greatest lesson to girls is that beauty is worth more than independence or intelligence. Nancy Unger, in her essay "The Beauty Myth," does a good job of bringing this to our attention, and points out (in personal correspondence) that in the popular *Shrek* series, intelligence and independence take precedence to beauty, though she acknowledges that this might be "the exception which proves the rule." The collective standard of perfection for female appearance is not merely time-consuming; it inhibits women from becoming involved in the rough-and-tumble competitive world. Men, in contrast, are much more concerned with pushing to victory rather than looking good, which turns out to be invaluable training for success in business and politics.

The female inclination to defer to men is reflected in a variety of ways, even in those who have moved beyond the home to the competitive workplace environment. Why do women feel so much pressure to be caring, nurturing, and considerate of others as their less talented male counterparts often walk briskly past them to the top positions in society? I'm reminded of a brilliant young colleague, who did some editing for this publication. After realizing how beautifully she wrote and edited, I asked if she might want to help out. She said "yes" and amazed me with her talent and ability. Though I greatly appreciated and was delighted to have the help, before long I "looked a gift horse in the mouth." Was she doing this because she genuinely wanted to do it, or was she having trouble saying "no" to an older colleague? After I got past her polite "glad to help you," I soon came to the not surprising conclusion that she indeed preferred doing her own publications, though she seemed to need my "permission" to say that. The Texas-born, traditional female secretary we had at our college years ago, who referred to her boss as "my office husband," was a marvelous facilitator for the work of her superiors. Though she loved her job and would have preferred staying in New Jersey where her adult children and grandchildren lived, when her husband, whom she did not seem to espe-

cially like, retired and decided he wanted to move to Oregon, she dutifully and tearfully said her "goodbyes."

It does not seem easy to be a woman. Is it because in part they have had to live with the results — namely, loss of virginity, and consequent pregnancy and childbirth — of sexual experimentation, as well as the threat of ostracism from society as a result of sexual behavior? For men, sexual activity has been proof of masculinity, and the likelihood of negative consequences has historically been far less than for women. Women limit their intake of liquids, and food for that matter, in ways that would be onerous to most men and struggle with body image to an extent that is unimaginable to most men (for the latter see Joan Brumberg, *The Body Project: An Intimate History of American Girls*, 1998).

According to the Old Testament, "the Lord sayeth, be fruitful and multiply." My former suburban students certainly are not listening. I am reminded of a massive volume called *The Fear of Being a Woman: A Theory of Maternal Destructiveness* (1964), in which Joseph C. Rheingold describes an enormous number of clinical cases involving women struggling with, and far too often overcome by, the fear of replicating their mothers' role when bringing a child into the world. I have sometimes observed this painful phenomenon in the struggles of women in my own psychoanalytic practice caseload. For example, a vivacious 38-year-old mother of three dreamt the night before the birth of her first child that her precious baby was in a cottage with her mother and she was locked out. Her manic bouts would result in hospitalizations during which her children would be left with her mother and she was locked out of their lives for periods of time — just as her dream foretold. Is the unconscious fear of stepping into the role of their mother by becoming a mother one of the factors in why our current generation of well-educated, prosperous, suburban women are having so few children?

Woman's liberation is both an internal and an external process. The internal process is about the intrapsychic process of a woman freeing herself from what she saw and was usually taught about the role of women. This internal liberation involves a girl or woman deciding what she wants. It means filtering through the impulses, messages, and social programming she had previously accepted as a given. Liber-

ating herself from the constraints of her first and primary role model is not an easy process. In "Remembering My Mother," Judith Harris provides valuable insights on intergenerational grandmother-mother-daughter transmissions and the common lack of clear boundaries between mothers and daughters and the lifelong force of these messages in the psyche. Indeed, part of the struggle results from the fact that liberation from early prohibitions appears to be a betrayal of the teachings of she who gave life itself. (The equivalent experience in a man is often the repulsion he feels at the thought of his country — to many emotionally experienced as the "motherland" — being attacked and betrayed.) The second, external process of liberation involves breaking loose from the constraints of society: the laws that treated women as property, rather than as potential owners of property, that enslaved women to their fathers, brothers, and husbands, and made them subjects, rather than citizens. This involves breaking down barriers to the education and employment open to men. Such external liberation often means going counter to the forces of family, spouse, and society. The price people have to pay is great. The external and internal processes of liberation are not easy.

Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) is a wonderful example of a woman who was an important change agent because of her own personality as well as because of the new ideas and opportunities available to her. Diane Jacobs in *Her Own Woman: The Life of Mary Wollstonecraft* (2001) provides valuable data for the psychohistorical understanding of this feminist pioneer. As the second child and oldest daughter of a middle-class family with a doting, alcoholic father who was gradually losing the family fortune, she deeply resented that her elder brother was breast-fed and she was not, that her elder brother was formally educated while she had to rely primarily on informal and self-education, that he had property rights and she did not, that upon the death of their father he was the head of the family by virtue of his gender and she was not despite her greater capabilities, concern, and competence, and that he had a career while the only careers open to her as a genteel woman were companion to an older woman, or as a governess, or as a teacher of girls. She tried each occupation. Each paid poorly, and was seen as temporary — preparatory to marriage.

Mary was the type of girl, and then woman, who had no choice but to speak out — she could not

keep her mouth shut. As a teenager and young woman, she stood in front of her mother's door, blocking her drunken father — who would not hit his beloved daughter — thus preventing him from physically abusing his wife. When a married younger sister had a psychotic episode during a postpartum depression and found her spouse (a good husband by the standards of the time) to be totally repulsive and impossible to live with, Mary stood by her sister. She could make a home for her sister and fight for the right for the mother to have possession of her child, but could not change the laws and customs leaving the child in the custody of the father — the baby soon died from the lack of a mother's care. Similarly, Mary Wollstonecraft suffered grievously at the death of her best friend as a result of childbirth — a fate she herself would suffer. In her early books she wrote about the situation of women and the upbringing of children in a manner that reflected the mindset of an Enlightenment woman who had not yet questioned the basic assumptions of her era. Her way of viewing the world would soon change dramatically.

The French Revolution (1789-1799) was the thunderbolt to the consciousness of many, including Mary. When Edmund Burke denounced the Revolution and then Thomas Paine's *The Rights of Man*, she answered with her own *Vindication of the Rights of Man* (1790). She went to Paris as a revolutionary fellow-travelling journalist, eager to throw off the bonds of oppression on humankind. While standing up for the rights of man she also insisted on the rights of women, however much "liberated men" did not want to hear this. Mary came to see marriage as a form of legal prostitution and enslavement. In Paris, she fell madly in love with the Revolution and an American by whom she became pregnant: for her free love meant the equivalent of a totally devoted marriage without the bonds of legal marital "servitude." As her lover traveled more and pulled away from this strong woman whom he seems to have experienced as somewhat engulfing, Mary's response came in the form of two suicide attempts. On one occasion as he literally walked away without looking back at her, she threw herself into London's icy Thames River, from which she was unhappily saved by some boatmen. The disconnect between Mary's dreams of true equality and sharing between the sexes and the reality of her own desperate emotional needs and the standards of her times was enor-

mous. Fortunately, in the radical thinker William Godwin, she found a man with whom she shared not passion but a like-minded devotion to equality for men and women alike. Her early death left the world with the book *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792), an older daughter who committed suicide upon learning that Godwin was not her biological father, and an unhappy younger daughter who struggled with an unloving stepmother and pined at her birth mother's gravesite, dreaming of becoming as great a writer as the mother she never knew.

The death of Mary Wollstonecraft in childbirth was no accident. This path-breaking feminist was killed by an avoidable infection following the birth of her second child: childbirth fever was caused by the unwashed hands of a doctor who removed the afterbirth. This was a monstrous, pervasive, yet avoidable cause of women's death until the later 19th-century in Western society. It was only when doctors started consistently washing their hands and women stopped giving birth on an almost yearly basis, as well as being worked to death in child- and husband care, that Western women stopped dying before their male counterparts. It is no accident that girls, from birth, are more durable than boys and develop earlier in life. This had to be, in order for women to pass through the Darwinian type of struggle that the conditions of their lives inflicted upon them.

Among the reasons that enabled the teenage Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley (1797-1851) to literally dream up and write *Frankenstein, or, The Modern Prometheus* (1818) were her experiences of childbirth, childcare, the death of an unnamed infant child, and the dream that her dead baby had come back to life. The creation of life without the birth process which killed her mother and brought pain and uncertainty to her own life was something far more likely to be on her mind than in the consciousness of her brilliant male literary companions Lord Byron and Percy Shelley in the contest as to who could come up with the best ghost story during a rainy June on a Swiss lake (see my "Nightmare, Dreams, and Creativity," in Paul Elovitz, ed., *Historical and Psychological Inquiry*, 1990, pp. 362-369).

The transformation of sex roles in America in my lifetime has been enormous. The unchallenged male chauvinism of my post-WW II childhood, just like the legal racial segregation of the same period,

has been confronted and is in retreat. Women are a part of society as never before. They have far more doors open to them, far more pressures on them, and far less certainty as to what they will do with their lives. The French may say *vive la différence*, yet throughout the globe, America represents a confusion of sex roles. This causes widespread bafflement, especially in certain areas of the Islamic world controlled by men devoted to the male subordination of women. To increase their options in whatever part of the world they live, women must undergo an intrapsychic transformation and their societies must allow economic, legal, and social changes. I wish them well in creating a world different and better than the one into which they were born.

In my essay I have endeavored to bring historical, personal, and psychohistorical perspectives to the understanding of the preceding essays. I want to conclude with a personal note. I marvel at the transformation in sex roles and rights in my own family and lifetime. How did we change from the world of arranged marriages and women-as-subservient-to-men to the present ideals of our educated elite? From the world of my grandmother, who was born in Eastern Europe and was married prior to World War I by arrangement to a man she saw as well below her social class because she was considered an "old maid" as she approached her mid-20s? She may never have liked her husband, and, in fact, did not share her bed with him for the last 35 years of their lives, but she remained a loyal wife because no other option appeared open to her; she had crossed an ocean to America in emigrating, but she was unwilling to cross the intra-psychic ocean which divorce would have required. Grandma may not have provided "spousal privileges," but she otherwise was a wifely caretaker and her spouse reflected his attachment to her by dying just months after she did.

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**Work-In-Progress Paper
Proposals Are Welcome**

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Book Review

Healing Pain through Writing

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Review of Judith Harris, Signifying Pain: Constructing and Healing the Self through Writing. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003. Paperback ISBN 0791456846, xv, 304 pages, \$27.95. This book is part of the SUNY Series in Psychoanalysis and Culture, edited by Henry Sussman.

For decades I have carried out my own writing to heal, journal writing, in times of angst when I needed not a confidante but a reflective catharsis. This personal writing has yielded a record that has, with re-reading, alerted me to painful cycles that were in need of change. As I approached Judith Harris' *Signifying Pain: Constructing and Healing the Self through Writing*, I was already one of the converted. Needing no particular convincing, I took up the book while vacationing on the Amalfi coast. I was buoyed by heart-stopping views of the Bay of Salerno and the surrounding mountains, a garden elegant with roses and calla lilies, visits from a curious cat, and the distant notes of a flute. In this healing atmosphere, I began to read about Plath, Gilman, Keats, Kenyon and others, and their poetic journeys through pain.

Harris' premise is that poetry writing is like psychoanalysis in that it can facilitate both healing and a way of constructing a self. The written word is the material and the act of writing is akin to the process of psychotherapy that involves uncovering unconscious material as well as resistance to that process. Dr. Harris has assembled a series of essays into chapters that consist of "literary representations of psychic pain" and discussions of "pedagogical ramifications of using and teaching personal writing in academic classes." Harris says she did not intend to link the chapters but explains that the authors she cites are linked by "their willingness to expose themselves to the disorder of everyday life to make from it some meaningful order in a calculated art form" (p. xi). The book embraces two tensions: the academic in relation to the personal world and Harris' own journey — both academic and personal — through psy-

choanalysis.

Harris says that "(T)o heal, the poet or patient must learn to be present to the painful material she would ordinarily avoid" (p. 181). She challenges herself to do the same by including a chapter and afterword that describe her personal struggles with pain. About the process, she says, "Writers who write about states of mind, as well as being, do not avoid their own pain, but seek to signify it for others, as they do for themselves, and survive it" (p. 36).

Harris' personal story is very important to the book and to her work with students writing about pain. She is a woman and writer who has experienced her own journey through mental illness and who has fought breast cancer. Still, it seems she had difficulty exposing herself because, when in Chapter 13 she reveals some of her history of pain, she asks the reader not to consider the story of her mental illness to be confessional writing but rather a frank discussion of depressive anxiety. She defines confessional writing as a type of talking cure and a way of clearing repressed or traumatic material. I sense her struggle as she exempts her writing from that sphere, even as she discloses pain-filled parts of her life.

Harris has organized her book into three sections. Part I, titled "Speaking Pain: Women, Psycho-

Call for Book Reviews

Avner Falk, *Fratricide in the Holy Land: A Psychoanalytic View of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Madison: Terrace Books of the University of Wisconsin Press, 2004. ISBN 0-299-20250-X, pp. i-vii, 271, cloth, \$35.00

Jay Y. Gonen, *Yahweh Versus Yahweh: The Enigma of Jewish History*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005. ISBN 0-299-20330-1, pp. i-xii, 183, cloth, \$29.95

Jerome A. Winer, James William Anderson, and Christine C. Kieffer, eds., *The Annual of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 32: Psychoanalysis and Women*. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, www.analyticpress.com/books/421-2.html, 2004. 286 pages.

Reviews of 500-1500 words
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analysis, and Writing," includes essays on the healing effects of writing about pain in which she focusses on some women's resistance to psychoanalysis as it embodies patriarchal, oppressive figures. Harris says that the authors she discusses have "used writing as a therapeutic outlet, although that may not have been their intention." Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Sylvia Plath, who are featured in Chapters 2 and 4, were attempting to get out from under the shadow of patriarchal figures in their lives. Harris says that Plath was determined to "mine the quarry of her unconscious and get to the root of her anguish." As Harris noted, "not all personal writing is healing or assimilating for the psyche" (p. 12). It seems that this was true for Plath who, despite knowing well how to signify pain, and despite her attempts to heal through both psychoanalysis and writing, succumbed to suicide. Yet in her attempts to heal herself, she left behind a rich validating legacy for her readers.

As for Gilman, her health improved when she broke free of the isolation of her bedroom, to which she had been assigned as a cure for her depression. But was it the content of her writing or the act of freeing herself to do what she needed to do, that relieved the depression? Harris says that Gilman "was forthcoming about the therapeutic effects of her writing 'The Yellow Wallpaper'" (p. 8) and was one of the first to consider her writing to be therapeutic. Gilman's resolve to break free of her bedroom was probably galvanized through her writing.

Harris also writes about the case of Freud's patient, Dora, whom some say Freud pressured into accepting his interpretation. In discussing Dora, Gilman, and Plath, Harris is sensitive to the criticisms about psychoanalysis from the women themselves and from contemporary writers.

She proceeds with her analyses through the lenses of Freudian and Lacanian theory into Part II, "Soul-Making: Conflict and the Construction of Identity." This is an exploration of aspects of the construction of the self. Harris discusses the use of language as mask to give voice to something the poet could not express as herself and the notion of a mirror image as a model for self-identity. She discusses John Keats' adaptation of the myth of Cupid and Psyche and the cultural issues evident in the poetry of Michael Harper. She delves into the poetry of Jane Kenyon wherein Kenyon expresses her belief in the comforting presence of God as death approaches.

She explores the dimensions and layering of Kenyon's poetic voice as the poet grapples with the falling light of her own life.

In Part III, Harris switches her focus to her work as a teacher of creative writing and explores the theory and practice of this work. She says that her guiding principle for collecting the essays has been personal, not theoretical. She wants to discover what it is that links her isolated experience to that of others and she wants to reconcile her "history as a former patient with my [sic] work as a reader of Freud." She says she used her study of psychoanalytic theory to rise above her own condition. She notes her changing relationship to psychoanalysis over time, defending psychoanalysis in the end, saying that despite errors along the way it has opened dialogue for examining cultural and political issues. She says, "Social problems have psychological roots and all intervention begins with examining those roots" (p. 251). Her linking of social aspects with psychological trauma is essential, since trauma is the product of a social world that supports and promotes notions of power of a few over many.

Dr. Harris is a thoughtful and insightful scholar of literature and psychoanalysis, and relates her thoughts on the intersection of them with eloquence. She also has a personal story to tell that supports and furthers her thesis with an immediacy that academic writing, alone, cannot always accomplish.

Evelyn Sommers, PhD, is a psychologist in private practice in Toronto, Canada. She is the author of Voices From Within: Women Who Have Broken the Law (1995) and The Tyranny of Niceness: Unmasking the Need for Approval (Spring 2005). She may be reached at eks@passport.ca. □

Bulletin Board

The next **Psychohistory Forum WORK-IN-PROGRESS SATURDAY SEMINAR** will be on **March 12, 2005** when **Ken Fuchsman** (University of Connecticut) will present "**Freud's Discovery of the Oedipus Complex.**" On **April 2, 2005** **Anna Geifman** (Boston University) will present "**Profile of the Modern Terrorist,**" from her forthcoming book, *Death will be Their God*. **FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES:** Florian Galler has advised us that the **German Society for Psychohistorical Research** convention on "Fundamentalism in Politics, Econ-

omy, and Religion" will be March 11-13, 2005 in Zurich, Switzerland. Among the presenters will be Arno Gruen, Joe Berghold, Ludwig Janus, Peter Juengst, Winfried Kurth, and Juha Siltala. The convention language will be German. For further information visit www.switzerland.net/Pw106775/programm.pdf. The **International Psychohistorical Association (IPA)** meets at Fordham University on June 8-10, 2005 and the **International Society for Political Psychology (ISPP)**, in Toronto, Canada, on July 3-6, 2005. At the ISPP, **David Beisel, Donald Carveth, Paul Elovitz, Ken Fuchsman, Anna Geifman, Bill Myers, Jerry Piven, and Jacques Szaluta** will be among the presenters on the two specifically psychohistorical panels. **CONGRATULATIONS AND NOTES OF INTEREST: Geoffrey Cocks' *The Wolf at the Door: Stanley Kubrick, History, and the Holocaust* (2004) was named an International Book of the Year in the December *Times Literary Supplement* (TLS). See the September 2004, Vol. 11 No. 2, interview, "Geoffrey Cocks: Historian of Film and Nazi Germany," for information on the author and the book. In May, Professor Cocks will be in Poland directing Albion College's Holocaust Studies Service-Learning Project in Wroclaw, which is helping to restore the New (1905) Jewish Cemetery there. **Flora Hogman** will be offering the course, "The Holocaust: An Evolving Memory," in the New York University Program in the Humanities. **Professor Jui-Sung Yang** of the Department of History at Chengchi National University in Taiwan has ordered all the back issues of *Clio's Psyche* in preparation for integrating psychohistory into some of his graduate courses. He has a strong interest in the issue of victimhood in the formation of national identity. **Nancy Unger** has accepted an invitation to speak in the Wisconsin capitol building at the celebration of Bob La Follette's 150th birthday. Our appreciation to our Forum meeting hosts **Mary Lambert**, as well as **Connalee and Lee Shneidman**. **OUR THANKS:** To our members and subscribers for the support that makes *Clio's Psyche* possible. To Benefactors Herbert Barry, Ralph Colp, and Mary Lambert; Patrons David Beisel, Peter Loewenberg, Peter Petschauer, H. John Rogers, and Jacques Szaluta; Sustaining Members C. Frederick (Fred) Alford and David Lotto; Supporting Members Connalee/Lee Shneidman, and Hanna Turken; and Members Michael Britton, Alberto Fergusson, and Richard Harrison. Our appreciation for this special issue to Guest Co-editors **Bob Lentz** and **Nancy Unger**, and to Advisors **Nancy Kobrin** and **Margery Quackenbush**. Our**

thanks for thought-provoking materials to Nancy Chodorow, Cal and Janet Clark, Jean Cottam, Paul Elovitz, Amanda Eron, Sari Goldstein Ferber, Nurit Gillath, Judith Harris, Kristine Larsen, Ruth Dale Meyer, Tim Myers, Edryce Reynold, Evelyn Sommers, and Nancy Unger. To Jim Anderson, David Beisel, Mark Bracher, Lauren Gargani, and Peter Loewenberg for their assistance with this issue, and to Anna Lentz for proofreading. □

Call for Papers
Teaching Psychohistory,
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Some possible approaches to this topic include:

- Your Experience Teaching Psychohistory/ Psychobiography/Political Psychology/ or a Psychohistorical Component in a Course
- Teaching Case Studies and Theory
- The Dynamics of Online Pedagogy
- Resistances in Learning Psychohistory
- The Psychology of Home Schooling
- Interviews on Teaching with Professor/ Authors on Pedagogy: Beisel, Eichholz, Elovitz, Illick, Loewenberg, Renshon, Strozier, et al
- An Analysis and Survey of Current and Past Psychohistory Teaching
- Teaching Psychohistory in Around the World
- Covering Controversial Issues
- Adult Education/Elderhostel Instruction
- Your Experience with Psychological Insight into Subjects Such as Death and Dying, the Holocaust and German History, Trauma, War and Peace, and Women's Studies
- Teaching the Life Cycle in the Tradition of Erik Erikson
- A Pedagogical Bibliography
- A Collection of Syllabi

Articles of 500-1500 words, due October 1

These and Longer Articles May be Used in a Possible Book on the Subject

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