
Clio's Psyche

Understanding the "Why" of Culture, Current Events, History, and Society

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Fawn M. Brodie 25-Year Retrospective

Remembering Fawn McKay Brodie (1915-1981)

**Peter Loewenberg
UCLA**

I first met Fawn McKay Brodie in 1966 when I invited her for lunch at the urging of Isser Woloch, my colleague in French Revolutionary history, who had the genial idea that we should recruit her to the UCLA History Department. She was smart, perceptive about psychoanalysis, honest, in touch with herself, engaging, and delightful. The next year she joined our department as a Lecturer. Fawn remained a colleague and we nurtured an increasingly deep friendship for the ensuing 15 years until her death in 1981.

(Continued on page 29)

Evidential Basis of Psychohistory

The Evidential Basis of Psychohistory in Group Process

**John J. Hartman, Ph.D.
University of South Florida**

The application of depth psychology to history—psychohistory—has evolved along three distinct, not always integrated or compatible paths: psychobiography, the history of childhood, and the dynamics of large group interactive processes. The purpose of this paper is to take the last approach, large group process, and review an aspect of the empirical, systematic research on small groups, which has informed our current understanding of psychohistory. It is my contention that small group empirical research may form an empirical evidential

(Continued on next page)

Freud's Leadership and Viennese Psychoanalysis

**Kenneth Fuchsman
University of Connecticut**

In his recently translated memoirs, Viennese psychoanalyst Isidor Sadger writes: "Freud was not merely the father of psychoanalysis, but also its tyrant!" (Isidor Sadger, *Recollecting Freud* [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005], p. 40). However extreme, this is political language. Others have described Freud as the leader of a "religious" group. It is worth examining Freud not only as the originator of psychoanalytic theory and technique, but also as the political leader of what he called "the psychoanalytic movement."

Through the strength of his ideas, the persua-
(Continued on page 26)

Slobodan Milošević and the Reactivation of the Serbian Chosen Trauma

**Vamık D. Volkan
University of Virginia**

Slobodan Milošević emerged in my mind as the prototype of a political leader who activates and inflames his large-group's "chosen trauma" during the mid-1990s when I was writing, *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism* (1997). A chosen trauma is the shared mental representation of an event in a large group's (i.e., an ethnic or religious group's) history in which the group has suffered a catastrophic loss, humiliation, and helplessness at the hands of enemies. When members of a victim group are unable to mourn such losses and reverse their

(Continued on page 19)

IN THIS ISSUE

Fawn Brodie Retrospective

Recollections and Analysis.....1	
<i>Robert D. Anderson</i>	<i>Herbert Barry III</i>
<i>Newell G. Bringhurst</i>	<i>Betty Glad</i>
<i>David Greenberg</i>	<i>Henry Lawton</i>
<i>Peter Loewenberg</i>	<i>Elizabeth Wirth Marvick</i>
<i>Sara M. Patterson</i>	<i>Jennifer Jensen Wallach</i>
<i>E. Victor Wolfenstein</i>	

Evidential Basis of Psychohistory

Evidential Basis of Psychohistory.....1	
<i>John J. Hartman</i>	
Responses by.....5	
<i>Rudolph Binion</i>	<i>Paul H. Elovitz</i>
<i>Richard Booth</i>	<i>Kenneth Fuchsman</i>
<i>Donald Carveth</i>	<i>Henry Lawton</i>
<i>J. Lee Shneidman</i>	
Hartman's Responses.....17	

Milošević Symposium

Milošević and Serbian Chosen Trauma.....1	
<i>Vamik Volkan</i>	
Responses by.....21	
<i>Michael Britton</i>	<i>Alenka Puhar</i>
<i>David Lotto</i>	<i>Howard Stein</i>
Freud's Leadership of Psychoanalysis.....1	
<i>Ken Fuchsman</i>	
Donald Carveth: Psychoanalytic Sociologist.....66	
<i>Paul H. Elovitz</i>	
Our Sports Idols.....74	
<i>Book Review by Dan Dervin</i>	
The Art of Psychobiography.....77	
<i>Book Review by Henry W. Lawton</i>	
Cocks and Knapp Letters to the Editor.....78	
Bulletin Board.....80	

base for this aspect of psychohistory, and I wish to demonstrate this by taking one small aspect of my own research as representative. I then wish to describe some methodological pitfalls about the implications of this research for speculations in psychohistory. The first of these caveats concerns the relation between small group psychology, large group psychology, and historical change. The second involves small and large group psychology and developmental changes and conflicts from human childhood.

I wish to begin with a reminder about the methodology of small group observation which began with the simple noting of who talked to whom in groups and how much. From this simple beginning complex-scoring systems of group interaction arose. There was Ted Mills' sign process analysis, Freed Bales' interaction process analysis, Timothy Leary's circle technique, Dick Mann's member-to-leader-scoring system, Gibbard and Hartman's process analysis scoring system, and Bales' SYMLOG system for multiple level observation of groups. Each of these systems employed a systematic scoring system of group interactions, which could then be subjected to complex statistical treatment to discover trends in individual and group performance.

Mann's system was unique because it sought

to integrate psycho-dynamically-derived categories with systematic group observation bringing an in-depth richness to what was being said and how this could be understood at multiple levels. These categories involved aspects of hostility, affection, authority relations, and ego-state distress, thus bringing also a conceptual integration of interpersonal and intrapsychic issues to the study of groups, a very current psychoanalytic approach. Mann's system focused first on the relationship with the leader of unstructured self-analytic groups which lent another psychodynamic aspect to the task as this approach very much resembled the analysis of transference in psychodynamic therapy. Gibbard and I retained the same scoring categories but allowed for both member to leader and member to member interactions to be recorded.

The number of interactions scored in each of these studies was huge. Mann studied four twenty-session groups and Gibbard and I studied two 40 session groups. Gibbard and Hartman's data consisted of forty boxes of IBM cards, each holding 2,000. This constituted 80,000 group interactive scores. We were the second largest computer user at the University of Michigan in 1969. The entire Physics Department, including researchers at the cyclotron, was first!

These large numbers of observations were reduced by methods like Factor Analysis in the case of individual role assessment and by complex graphing and moving averages in the case of group development.

Two psychohistorical principles, empirically demonstrated in this initial research are: Proposition I: groups develop in ways that can be measured as reactions to emotional distress. Proposition II: groups develop solutions to reduce distress and return the group to homeostasis in adaptive and defensive ways. These solutions involve the exercise and distribution of power, decisions about social closeness and intimacy, and the accomplishment of work to sustain the group's stated conscious mission. This model is, of course compatible with the basic propositions of the modern Freudian psychoanalytic conflict model, General Systems theory, as well as a homeostatic model in diverse fields like physiology and the history of revolutions.

I wish to focus on empirical findings to highlight the idea that the group process aspect of psycho-

history rests on an empirical evidential base. My desire is to show that the development of small groups can be demonstrated to follow a course dictated by solutions to the expressions of distress experienced and expressed by group members. Psychohistory takes the next inferential step and concludes that large groups follow a similar but not necessarily identical functional path and finally that what we call history progresses in the same way for similar reasons.

With Mann and Gibbard in 1975, I studied the development of small (25 member face-to-face) time-limited groups. Percentage profiles for each category for the sum of all speakers to all members for each session were derived from the raw data. A session was designated as above or below the median for that category (medium splits). Statistical analysis yielded four major phases in each of the two groups. Both groups taken together had three peaks of expressed distress that coincided with four phases of each group independently arrived at by another statistical treatment, factor analysis.

Quoting from our previously published work, "Briefly the first phase marks the group's reaction to a leader who does not lead in the customary manner [of a teacher in a classroom]. This reaction leads to a revolt against the authority of the leader and the structure of the course." We go on to say, "The next phase involves an attempt to create ... new values of closeness and honesty not ordinarily associated with a classroom. ... Competition, sexuality, and rivalry and emerging disappointment at the breakdown of the new order appear in the third phase." Finally, "the last phase is concerned with the end of the group and the evaluation of previous performance, as well as the sadness associated with termination. These issues were common to both groups, although the ways in which they were handled and the reactions to them were different" (Gibbard Hartman, and Mann [1975], pp. 165-66).

This kind of study demonstrates empirically what anyone who attends any kind of mass event experiences, emotions, including distress, may be shared communally. The adaptive and defensive solutions to this distress make up an important part of the history of that group. We can call these solutions shared unconscious fantasies, shared myths, group fantasies, etc. This is how groups move. Conditions, external and internal to the group, create distress and

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various adaptive and defensive, pathological and healthy, solutions are sought to deal with this distress in order to reach some kind of homeostasis. Leadership and group norms are crucially important as to what forms these reactions to distress will take. Different groups with different leaders in different eras in different cultures may have different manifest histories. But our conclusion was and is that groups produce distress, which is shared and shared solutions are found to reduce the stress of the majority of the members. Politics, the way in which power is distributed and exercised, deals with distress caused by the absence of leadership as well as causes distress by the inevitable inequalities of power. Economics, the way in which wealth is produced, distributed, and consumed causes distress in much the same way. Thus, the so-called forces associated with politics and economics can be seen easily in the psychological frame of reference demonstrated by our small group studies.

Gibbard and I took two further speculative steps, which have important but potentially problematic implications for the methodology of psychohistory. We first made an analogy between the stages of group development and the stages of revolution described by Crane Brinton (1898-1968), my former teacher. Professor Brinton had himself compared the conditions which made for revolutionary times to a fever in an infected individual and the political consequences attempts to relieve that fever (*The Anatomy of Revolution* [NY: Vintage, 1952], p. 17). This was essentially the homeostatic model we utilized in our empirical research. I meant this comparison to historical stages to be a colorful analogy. In our later work we began actively looking for historical and political solutions as analogies, which would describe the conditions we were observing in the groups studied. Thus, we characterized the phase of the group, which sought for sweetness and light without class or gender distinctions devoid of competition, *Utopian Fantasies*. Following Slater we characterized the assault on and the overthrow of the teacher's authority as Revolutionary Fantasies (Slater, 1966). In the hands of bolder and more creative psychohistorians, this list has been extended and elaborated. In the large group certainly the *Apocalyptic Fantasy* seems much more important today than in the small groups of the 60's. This type of analogizing can be seen as a hypothesis as well as a conclusion. Proposition IIIA: groups develop a shared utopian political ideology

based on a shared fantasy in order to deal with intra-group distress.

From a methodological point of view the stages of group development tied to shared fantasies is a conclusion based on a different kind of evidence than the recording of consciously stated expressions of distress. I think we demonstrated empirically that group development follows peaks and valleys of distress. The next step, the labeling of those periods of development as utopian, revolutionary, or apocalyptic based on shared fantasies calls for a different kind of methodology. This is because we have entered the realm of interpretation of meaning and have changed our level of abstraction. It may not be impossible to do this, but it is not yet a part of a systematic methodology of evidence in psychohistory any more than this kind of inference is an integral part of psychoanalysis itself. Dale Boesky and I have been interested for more than a decade in this question with regard to the evidential base of assertions within the clinical psychoanalytic situation (Dale Boesky, "Why Don't Our Institutes Teach the Methodology of Clinical Evidence?" *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*. [2002] 71:445-476). There is no such methodology for the evaluation of clinical evidence in psychoanalysis. We have taught a seminar in which we ask psychoanalytic candidates to make a self-evident psychoanalytic assertion and back that assertion up with data from clinical case material. Out of this exercise we both try to establish the actual criteria that are being used to assess the fit between the assertion and evidence as well as to evaluate the fit itself.

It is important to remind ourselves that in psychohistorical research the jump from the small group to the large group to historical change is argument by analogy. This is not bad in of itself but it is not in the same range of evidential certainty as the propositions I described earlier.

The second speculative leap we took in our later research was to relate by analogy certain aspects of group development to certain phases of childhood. This could be characterized as Proposition IIIB. Utopian fantasies in groups derive from shared pre-oedipal symbiotic merger fantasies with the "Good Mother" in individuals. Psychohistorians have followed in this path and have greatly elaborated this and other childhood analogies with historical processes. The problem with this kind of reasoning is that there is a lack of a coherent methodology of evi-

dence to assert the truth claims of what began as analogies and have increasingly taken on the aspect of causal links. I am not saying that there are not causal links, particularly when we take into consideration the historical record of childhood itself. I am saying though that there has been scant attention to the evaluation of evidence to support particularly causal claims of childhood origins of historical events. People make history. People have childhoods. Childhoods, however, do not exclusively and directly make history along an easy to see linear path.

I wish to take this example to illustrate my larger assertion. People in large groups often express ideas and fantasies, which we call paranoid. These ideas may be shared by significant numbers of group members but usually not by all. Enough people may share these paranoid fantasies to justify calling a particular group of people a paranoid group. However, the individual members of the group holding paranoid ideas under the sway of the group process, if examined by a mental health professional outside of the group, may or may not be considered clinically paranoid. Therefore, the childhood determinants of clinical paranoia cannot be held causal for the paranoid manifestations in the group. The paranoid manifest content may be the same but the latent causal determinants cannot. Other factors have to be taken into consideration which are a product of the group frame of reference—leadership, group norms, role diffusion, social trauma, threats to identity, etc. let alone “real” environmental factors of threat. Repressed homosexuality from childhood would be way down on the list of causal factors although manifestations of this may be found in certain individuals or even sub-groups.

The reason for this caveat is that when the observer of human nature moves from the one frame of reference to the next, causal links change as the complexity of the system increases. The dynamics of the individual are not exactly the same as those of the small group and those of the small group not the same as the large group, and those of the large group not exactly the same as what we call history. The fascinating thing about what psychohistory has accomplished in the last thirty years is the laying of a foundation for a possible unified general systems theory, which would show the ways in which these systems of different complexities have analogous fundamental processes as well as overlapping solutions. Unconscious fantasies of individuals can be shared

and become group fantasies. At the same time, it behooves us also to be aware that arguing by analogy eventually has its limits and that as systems become more complex, explanatory power can become markedly reduced unless our conceptual powers become as complex as what we are trying to explain. Central to this quest is a greater sophistication as to what constitutes evidence in psychohistory and a closer attention to the criteria required for such a methodology.

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Begging to Differ

**Rudolph Binion
Brandeis University**

John Hartman's is an admirably proficient formulation and exemplification of an approach to psychohistory and in particular to group process in history that I, alas, find to be flawed many times over. Hartman himself acknowledges one relatively minor problem with it: “the jump from the small group to the large group.” To go major straight off, psychohistory is not “the application of depth psychology to history” in Hartman's sense of reading clinical theories of psychology into history. Rather, it is a probing of historic behavior to uncover the mental mechanisms and motives behind it. For Hartman, “a systematic methodology of evidence in psychohistory” means a systematic alignment of psychohistory with human laboratory findings. He reserves such terms as “evidential” and “empirical” for clinical-type findings in psychology, which he thinks have informed psychohistory in the past and should inform it, albeit more advisedly, in the future. For

the psychohistorian properly so-called, however, history itself is the sole "evidential basis" for psychohistory, and research into history is "empirical research" par excellence.

Group process in psychohistory means above all not personal interactions within historic groups, but how historic groups have acted on their own for purposes independent of their individual members' aims and interests. The historical record is rich with empirical materials for inquiries in this line. As guides to historic mass movements or shared experiences, such as the barbarian migrations or the Black Death, or again to the long-term conduct of relatively stable historic groups, Hartman's small groups artificially assembled for scheduled sessions in Michigan or South Florida yesterday or today have no evidential or even suggestive value as against the records of those mass doings or happenings themselves.

Personal interactions within groups do vary historically, and that variance is a fascinating subject. However, it belongs to historical anthropology rather than to historical group process. Historic cultures have indeed been marked by differing characteristic kinds and degrees of "hostility, affection, authority relations, and ego-state distress," but also lots, lots else that can't be guessed *a priori*. These are best studied directly in their historic context, as they have been studied again and again. How they change as a function of group process certainly can't be extrapolated from scheduled observations on experimental small groups. Will such observations help us to understand, for instance, how come material acquisitiveness spread overnight in Spain with Franco's death while status-consciousness practically vanished? Conversely, certain experiences or needs of a group can engender or promote paranoid myths among its members, so that this phenomenon does rightly enter into historical group process.

Hartman's single reference to actual history in his paper is his assertion that his and Gibbard's model of behavior within small groups is "compatible with ... a homeostatic model in ... the history of revolutions." At this point of Hartman's text I wondered: would not such a model be more reliable if it were derived from a comparative historic study of revolutions rather than from a statistical analysis of personal interactions within experimental campus groups in contemporary America? And lo, the next thing I saw was that Hartman and Gibbard

had indeed based their model on just such a comparative historic study: Crane Brinton's musty classic, *The Anatomy of Revolution*. Why, then, the prescription of a model rather than of broader and deeper looks into real revolutions?

Analogies from findings about groups to-phases of child development have less than no evidential value, as Hartman indicates. But I would add that the history of childhood itself is no more a part or line of psychohistory than, say, the history of sex or the history of emotions. Historic facts about childhood, as about sex or emotions, are only raw data. Data can have their charm. But they enter into psychohistory on the individual or group level only insofar as they are shown to be causally relevant to given individual or group behavior in history.

I would answer Hartman's concluding call for "a greater sophistication as to what constitutes evidence in psychohistory" with a simple reminder that "evidence in psychohistory" must needs be historical evidence. To argue from behavior in artificial small contemporary American groups to behavior in historic groups small or large is itself to argue by analogy. More fundamentally, it is to argue beside the point of group process as behavior *by* historic groups. Psychohistory's job is to approach the motives and mechanisms involved in such behavior head-on.

Rudolph Binion, PhD, the Leff Families Professor of Modern European History at Brandeis University, is a seasoned psychohistorian and frequent contributor to Clio's Psyche on whose editorial board he serves. His most recent book is Past Imperial: Group Process in Human History (Northern Illinois University Press, 2005). Professor Binion may be reached at <binion@brandeis.edu>.

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Evidential Psychohistory in Group Process

Richard Booth
Black Hawk College

Dr. Hartman's paper immediately captured my attention for several reasons. One of the most important is that his struggle to render certain dimensions of psychohistory measurably "evidential" mirrors my own personal struggle. However, my challenge, unlike his, has been to discover ways of know-

ing that do *not* require empirical-statistical measures in order to justify them. There is a kinship of intellectual endeavor that I felt when I read him, albeit these endeavors move in opposite directions.

As a psychologist, a significant amount of my undergraduate and graduate coursework, as well as a statistically-based master's thesis and doctoral dissertation, prepared me well to understand the world in terms of "objectivity," probability statements, and confidence intervals. My thinking was, "If it cannot be shown to be statistically sustainable within an acceptably small degree of error, the hypothesis cannot be supported." Conclusion: what I *think* I see is actually not the reality. It took a long while before I was able to move beyond the assumption that only positivistic science could render scientific phenomena "factual." Once I discovered this, I was free to explore other methods of truth-finding through, for example, phenomenology and hermeneutic methodologies.

Having thus moved to a position from which I could accept findings (as truthful) based on non-statistical evidence, I began to take a great interest in narrative therapies, hypnotherapeutic stories, and the use of metaphor in understanding my patients' symptoms and human behavior in general. In the end, I concluded that one determines the method of study based upon the *unit of analysis* one is studying. If statistical verification is appropriate, use it; if not, do not. The writings of psychologist Donald E. Polkinghorne (*Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences* [Ithaca: SUNY Press, 1988]) and psychoanalytic psychologist Donald P. Spence (*The Rhetorical Voice of Psychoanalysis: Displacement of Evidence by Theory* [Boston: Harvard University Press, 1994]), among others, helped me to frame this principle more clearly: if something is *evident* to knowledgeable, reasonable people, all possible alternatives having been eliminated and all possible bias having been removed, then what remains can be considered, on some level, true. I have written about this issue in an earlier article published in *Clio's Psyche* (December, 2005 [Vol. 12, pp. 128-130]). A derivative of this perspective is supported by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson when they say: "We do not believe there is any such thing as objective truth though it has been a long-standing theme in Western culture that there is. We do believe that there are truths but think that the idea of truth need not be tied to the objectivist

view" (*Metaphors We Live By* [1994], p. 159). In this context, *objectivist* means positivistic and statistical.

It is in light of this personal history, then, that I read Dr. Hartman's paper. I had a haunting question lurking in the back of my mind while I read it: why take that which may require no positivistic evidence and subject it to "objective," statistical methodologies? Did the author not believe that human experience can be understood validly without reducing his findings to Factor Analysis and measurement protocols? Did I need to re-think what I now considered to be true, given that he has worked for so long creating an evidential basis for psychohistorical small group process? Would the research findings in the psychohistory of small groups literature be somehow more believable if they could be viewed statistically? Was this dimension of psychohistory attempting to be "scientific" in a very narrow sense of the word?

Of course, I found no answers to these questions in the Hartman paper, since his purpose was not to explain why he wished to employ positivistic methodology; rather, he intended to demonstrate that it could be done.

As I read Professor Hartman's work again and again, I came to respect the systematic, step-wise process he employed in his study of small groups, moving from the mere counting and tabulating of communication-type frequencies to a more quantitative approach, even though I did not know why he felt the need to do this. I also appreciated his use of *caveats* when he became hypothetical and theoretical. When he was unsure about specific relationships, for example, the relationship between large and small group psychology and historical change, he stated his reservations directly. I found his work intellectually honest, particularly because he openly discussed, as suggested above, the limitations of his ideas and methods.

Dr. Hartman's premise that General Systems Theory overlaps with Freudian notions of homeostasis and catharsis is well taken. I think we would agree that homeostasis is not, however, a perfectly steady state. If it were, the system would move into the condition of inertia rather than continuing to unfold and interweave. On the other hand, I have some reservations about his assertion that "the development of small groups can be demonstrated to follow a

course dictated by solutions to the expressions of distress experienced and expressed by group members.”

First, if the unit of analysis being studied is the *small group itself* and if all small groups are driven by the need to reduce distress, it follows that the importance of what the individual members are doing pales in comparison to the behavior of the system as a whole. Yet, much of Dr. Hartman's argument for an empirical basis in small group functioning is founded on the accumulation of *individual* measurements—not of the system itself, but, rather, the subunits within the larger system (i.e., the members of the group). I am not sure which he considers more important, but I am persuaded that he believes they have powerful interaction effects.

Second, in the next sentence, the author says, “Psychohistory takes the next inferential step and concludes that large groups follow a similar but not necessarily identical functional path...” The “step” taken here contradicts what we know from the field of social psychology, which is, in short, whenever a single person is added to any group, the entire dynamic of that group alters in significant ways. In other words, it is probable that large groups, such as religious groups or groups espousing a social agenda, behave differently from the way a small group of, say, three persons would act. Hartman is correct in stating that extrapolation of dynamics from small groups to large groups “is argument by analogy.” It is not an argument founded on social psychological data.

Finally, Dr. Hartman argues that, virtually by definition, “groups produce distress,” which they work to reduce. This distress is caused by “conditions, internal and external, to the group.” However, do all groups produce distress? If they do, under what specific conditions is this production most likely to occur? Are there different levels and degrees of within-group distress? Are there exceptions to this general principle?

A situation comes to mind that might shed some light on some of these questions. Recently, in our area, a significant number of residents claim to have seen a vision of the Virgin Mary near a bridge on the Illinois side of the Rock River. Every night since the initial “sighting,” people have flocked to pray to her, seeing her every night and assuming that her presence is actually there. Within the group, there appears to be no distress. Silence abounds ex-

cept for quiet recitations of the rosary, and people leaving the site describe the deep sense of peace they felt in the presence of the Virgin. Slowly, the group disperses for the night, save those who choose to engage in an overnight vigil. As far as I can tell, based upon direct observation and personal reports of attendees, there is no distress present in the group. There is no attempt to resolve the issue of whether the Virgin is there or not; it is accepted as a reality by those who are present. I would agree, however, that, if members were to begin arguing about the validity of what they believe they are perceiving, distress would arise. However, it does not appear that collective distress is driving this particular group process, which leads me to suggest the possibility that *some* groups are not about the business of solving problems, either internally or externally induced. But, Dr. Hartman's insights about shared fantasies, wishes, desires, and myths, are well taken. Further, his notion of a Utopian Fantasy connection with the Virgin Mary might very well be a function of *individual* (rather than collective) concerns about these uncertain and difficult times but, in this case, without the need for group distress resolution. In fact, Professor Hartman says, “Utopian fantasies in groups derive from shared pre-Oedipal symbiotic merger fantasies with the ‘Good Mother’ in *individuals*” (emphasis mine).

I found Dr. Hartman's paper both interesting and intriguing. He led me to re-think some of my earlier conclusions as well as to see the value of laying the foundation for a systems theory of small group process. I applaud his clarity of thought and his intellectual honesty, both of which are present throughout his work.

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experts

The Foundations of Psychohistory: Positivism, Humanism, or Both?

Donald L. Carveth

Glendon College of York University

John Hartman offers a warning to psychohistorians regarding some of the “methodological pitfalls” to which workers in this field are exposed. He argues that while it is true that “People make history” and that “People have childhoods,” it by no means follows that “Childhoods ... exclusively and directly make history along an easy to see linear path.” He reminds us that “The dynamics of the individual are not exactly the same as those of the small group and those of the small group not the same as the large group, and those of the large group not exactly the same as what we call history.” He points out that many of our hypotheses and conclusions in psychohistory rest upon creative analogies and offers the caveat that “arguing by analogy has its limits.” He urges us to pay greater attention to “what constitutes evidence in psychohistory.”

While these are certainly points worthy of our serious consideration, I think it is also important to consider the background methodological attitudes and assumptions informing Hartman's concerns, a philosophical framework reflected in the following list of phases he employs: “empirical, systematic research;” “empirical evidential base;” “complex graphing;” “moving averages;” “percentage profiles;” “empirical findings;” “raw data;” “statistical analysis;” “factor analysis;” etc. He reports that his research involved “40 boxes of IBM cards, each holding 2,000” totalling “80,000 group interactive scores,” and that his research team was “the second largest computer user at the University of Michigan in 1969,” while “The entire Physics Department, including researchers at the cyclotron, was first!”

One doesn't have to “listen with the third ear” to detect in this the kind of admiration of the natural sciences that, until fairly recently, was quite common among positivistic social scientists, especially psychologists. Rejecting the distinction made by hermeneuticists in the tradition of Dilthey and Weber between the two different types of disciplined scholarship (*wissenschaft*)—the *Naturwissenschaften*

(natural sciences) and the *Geisteswissenschaften* (humanistic or cultural studies)—positivism holds that the scientific method evolved with such success in the former is equally appropriate for the latter which require no special methods of their own. In contrast, and without rejecting the naturalism requiring science to adopt concepts and methods appropriate to the nature of its objects of study, adherents of the anti-positivist, interpretive perspective point out that whereas in the natural sciences these are, quite literally, *objects* that must be studied *objectively* from an external point of view (because atoms and molecules, like rocks, trees and animals, cannot be interviewed regarding their *subjective* experience), in the human sciences our objects of study happen to be *subjects* as well—they are *subject-objects*—and, therefore, to be faithful to the nature of our field of study we must adopt both positivistic and humanistic methods. In addition to natural science *objective* approaches, we need to employ such *subjective* methods as Weber's “understanding” (*verstehen*), Charles Horton Cooley's “sympathetic introspection” or Heinz Kohut's “empathic-introspective” approach.

Hartman points out “the group process aspect of psychohistory rests on an empirical evidential basis.” Small-group research confirms that, in leaderless groups, revolt against the leader is followed by attempts to create new values of closeness and honesty, but competition, sexuality and rivalry emerge and lead to disappointment and eventual sadness associated with termination. Hartman acknowledges “This kind of study demonstrates empirically what anyone who attends any kind of mass event experiences.” If so, were all those boxes of computer cards really necessary? Why attempt to prove what anyone who attends a group can easily observe? Hadn't the psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion (*Human Relations*, vols. I-IV, 1948-1951) already laid much of this out on the basis of participant observation, “empathic-introspection,” and the imaginative interpretation and ordering of his “experiences in groups”?

Hartman's positivist conscience leads him to describe as “speculative” and “potentially problematic” his and his colleagues' venture into the making of an analogy between the stages of group development and those of revolution as described by Crane Brinton. Did Brinton arrive at his historical stages through the use of computers, complex graphing, moving averages, etc.? Or did he come up with them

by means of an old-fashioned historical, hermeneutic method: attending to known historical facts; empathically identifying with one's historical subjects; and then working all this over with imagination? Of course, historians have traditionally recognized their discipline as an "art" and as part of the humanities, despite whatever aspirations they may occasionally have had to make it into a science. Brinton seemed to have little compunction about making an analogy between revolutionary conditions and a fever in an infected individual, but Hartman clearly feels nervous working with what he calls "colourful analogies." He is very aware that in working this way he has adopted "a different kind of methodology" relying on "a different kind of evidence," that he has entered into "the realm of interpretation of meaning," i.e., into hermeneutic as distinct from positivist science.

With respect to such psychohistorical practices as linking the peaks and valleys of distress observed in groups to shared fantasies and then labeling these as utopian, revolutionary or apocalyptic, Hartman writes: "It may not be impossible to do this, but it is not yet a part of a systematic methodology of evidence in psychohistory any more than this kind of inference is an integral part of psychoanalysis itself." I find this sentence problematic. Is Hartman suggesting that the interpretation of meaning, or linking observable emotion to underlying fantasy, is not an integral part of psychoanalysis? Or is he saying only that such interpretation remains unsupported by any systematic methodology of evidence?

Certainly, if it were the former, I would have to vigorously disagree, for the interpretation of meaning has always been integral to the psychoanalytic method, as has the interpretation of conscious and unconscious fantasy. Freud did not title the dream-book the *explanation* but rather the *interpretation* of dreams. Throughout his career he relied on analogies between psychoanalytic work and processes of linguistic translation and the decoding of arcane messages and texts. Psychoanalytic listening has always sought to uncover the latent fantasy content beneath what is manifest and, like literary interpretation, it has always been attentive to image clusters, recurring themes and, especially, to processes of condensation and displacement of meaning—processes recognized by Jacobson and Lacan as none other than metaphor and metonymy, respectively. Transference is nothing other than a type of metaphor (analogy) in which subjects turn their objects into metaphorical fathers,

mothers, sisters or brothers.

In his classic paper, "Notes on Transference: Universal Phenomenon and Hardest Part of Analysis," Brian Bird (*J.A.P.A.* 20 [1972]: 267-301) argues that transference (i.e., metaphor or analogy-making) is "one of the mind's main agencies for giving birth to new ideas, and new life to old ones" and that it represents a kind of ego function. It is an ego function that must be highly developed in anyone who seeks to practice "the talking cure" which depends on alertness to the often more or less unconscious role of such transferences or metaphors in patient's lives—just as it must be highly developed in anyone engaged in creative artistic or scientific work. Freud himself developed his discipline through the use of elaborate analogies drawn from archaeology, medicine, warfare, and other fields.

It is true that we need to remain alert to the danger of literalizing, reifying or concretizing our metaphors and, thus, mistaking the menu for the meal or the map for the territory. I have argued that psychopathology may fruitfully be viewed precisely as such literalization and analytic therapy as deliteralizing or "melting" "frozen" metaphors ("The Analyst's Metaphors: A Deconstructionist Perspective." *Psychoanalysis & Contemporary Thought* 7, 4 [1984]: 491-560). This, of course, is itself an analogy. When Hartman bemoans the fact that "there is a lack of a coherent methodology of evidence to assert the truth claims of what began as analogies and increasingly have taken on the aspect of causal links," I think he may be attempting to get at this very tendency of creative analogies to regress in our thinking into identities—in which case we lose awareness that we are comparing two different phenomena that, in our regressive thinking, have come to be thought of as one.

If in that ambiguous sentence above, instead of suggesting that interpretation of meaning is not integral to psychoanalysis, Hartman meant only that we lack a systematic methodology for the evaluation of clinical evidence, I wonder if this is more of a problem for positivism than for psychoanalysis? Certainly, if one regards psychoanalytic interpretation as an art bearing similarities to the arts of literary and historical interpretation, then one naturally expects some analysts to be more talented at its practice than others. Just as we are unlikely to seek rules of painting through the following of which anyone can become a great artist so, in this view, we are less

likely to be perturbed by our inability to reduce the art of analytic interpretation to a manual. This is not at all to devalue attempts, such as Hartman's and Boesky's, to study "the actual criteria that are being used to assess the fit between the assertion and evidence as well as to evaluate the fit itself." But this enterprise strikes me as essentially hermeneutic, though the positivistic language of "evidence" obscures this. Hermeneutic scholars, say, of Shakespeare's plays, have long been concerned with criteria by which different interpretations may be rationally ranked from unsophisticated, one-sided and misleading to more adequate, comprehensive and convincing.

I think the questions Hartman raises about psychohistorical claims positing childhood origins of historical events are well founded, especially in light of the shaky evidence supporting psychoanalytic hypotheses about childhood in general. Freud felt free to work out a developmental psychology of childhood exclusively on the basis of his work with adults and without any direct observation of children, and Klein speculated about the minds of infants on the basis of her work with older children. I have gone so far as to suggest that we ought to stick to what we really know in psychoanalysis from our direct clinical hermeneutic explorations of the psychic worlds of our patients ("Leaving Development to the Developmentalists." *Modern Psychoanalysis* 25, 1 [2000]: 43-51). I think Hartman's illustration of the pitfalls of blurring different levels of analysis by linking the paranoia in groups to that of individuals is well-taken, although his reference to the classical notion of the role of repressed homosexuality in individual paranoia is unfortunate precisely because it is itself a highly questionable generalization of the type that, in the field of psychohistory, it is in the spirit of his paper to question.

Donald Carveth's biography may be found on page 67.

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Art and Science in Psychohistory

Paul H. Elovitz

John Jacob Hartman is a talented intellectual, psychologist, and psychoanalyst who has made valuable contributions to psychohistory. In the late 1970s, when most colleagues in New York City were

focused on psychobiography and childhood, he urged us to examine groups as well. He helped influence the Institute for Psychohistory and the International Psychohistorical Association (IPA) to become self-analytic groups and to explore group fantasies. Many colleagues were intrigued by his description of the amazing predictability of the self-analytic groups he worked with at Harvard and the University of Michigan. We were soon broadening our horizons, reading the exciting work of Wilfred Bion, Graham Gibbard, Hartman, and Richard Mann.

Dr. Hartman starts with two main ideas. His "Proposition I" is that "groups develop in ways that can be measured as reactions to emotional stress." His "Proposition II" is that "groups develop solutions to reduce stress and return the group to homeostasis in adaptive and defensive ways." Both of these propositions represent the scientific paradigm this psychologist is pursuing, and they are correct. They are also very general.

Partly under the spell of the ideas he and other IPAers advocated, I experimented with using small group theory in my teaching, research, therapy, experiential dream group leadership, and psychohistorical leadership. The unevenness of the application of theories of historical group behavior left me fascinated but cautious. For six months, I drove into Manhattan with Henry Lawton to participate in a fantasy analysis seminar with several colleagues. Gradually, I came to the conclusion that groups were incredibly powerful but that they are also far more complex than they initially seemed. I originated and coordinated the Fantasy Analysis Project to test the validity of some of the applications of group ideas. Henry Lawton, George Luhrmann, and I anonymously sent out Thomas Jefferson's "Declaration of Independence" and Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars Speech" (based on the *New York Times* text) to all the people we could identify as those doing psychohistory who had any interest in group psychodynamics. The results were published in the *Journal of Psychohistory* ("The Fantasy Analysis Project," 1985). Though this article was often cited for empirical evidence for the value of fantasy analysis, I would have felt better about our findings had we been able to do research with a sample of people who had had no contact with Lloyd deMause, who had developed a detailed methodology for doing fantasy analysis, which he disseminated as an organizer, editor, and publisher of psychohistory. This, in fact, was impos-

sible. I also recognize that both of the documents which we sent out anonymously would be known at a conscious or unconscious level by many of our subjects. Most importantly, there was the question of determining just what each researcher was projecting onto his (there were very few women involved in this research) materials. I then did considerable work applying for a foundation grant that would pay three seasoned psychoanalysts skilled in understanding the unconscious and the language of fantasy to anonymously judge the conclusions of the psychohistorical group. Regrettably, this project was never funded.

Meanwhile, I learned a great deal about my own projective pattern in my personal and group analysis, as well as through groups I participated in and ran. In reflecting on the types of groups Hartman had described, I came to believe that the high levels of predictability of behavior were based upon the special quality of the teaching groups which deprived members of the anticipated leadership, causing a high level of anxiety and disturbances within the groups. My interest in theory waned as I decided that I was far more interested in running groups effectively than in doing research on them.

Periodically, Hartman returned from Michigan and, more recently, Florida to present at the IPA. His paper, originally presented at the IPA in 2005, seems to be a call for the association to bring the clear scientific standards he believes in to group process. That he got little response to his presentation, except from this editor, appeared to disappoint him. It seemed to me that using it as a basis for a symposium would be of value to our field and John Hartman agreed. I did this despite the fact that, in the last two decades, I have come to pursue a quite different paradigm.

As a historian, psychoanalyst and psychohistorian, I see myself as far more of a humanist than a scientist. To me, psychohistory is more akin to art than science, with intuition—the tapping of the unconscious—being an essential instrument of knowledge. Of course, whenever possible, I employ rigorous scientific standards to examine evidence and motivations, but I know that there is no way I can repeat experiments under laboratory conditions. Despite some common threads and patterns, our human laboratory is forever changing.

Hartman deserves credit for focusing on the evidential basis of psychohistory. To my mind, un-

dertaking group psychohistory is a much more daunting task than either psychobiography or even the history of childhood. The old adage, “fools rush in where wise men dare not tread” is especially apropos in this regard. Many who use the language of psychohistory online make a variety of ill-informed generalizations about humankind. These are often the product of individuals who know next to nothing about the methodologies of history, psychoanalysis, or psychohistory and are delighted by the opportunity to vent among a group that includes published authors and people with doctoral degrees. It can be interesting to examine the projective screen of individuals who are venting since, without ever using the word “I,” “my,” or “me,” they reveal an enormous amount about themselves.

Of course, highly accomplished scholars and therapists are also known to vent endlessly outside of their areas of expertise. This is especially evident when you approach issues of American foreign policy and the policies of whatever administration happens to be in power. As an editor, I have found myself having conversations with some learned and even brilliant colleagues along the following lines: “remember, I am asking you to rewrite your submission as ‘John Doe Psychoanalyst/Psychohistorian,’ rather than ‘John Doe—Political Activist/Advocate of Children’s Rights!’” Sometimes they groan, laugh or mutter but they get the message and usually write the type of article that we can publish with pride.

Personally, I avoid group psychohistory much of the time and engage in it much more cautiously than in psychobiography. This is because I know how incredibly difficult it is to do it in a credible way. As a historian, I am so aware of the different thought patterns and conclusions of people living in the same physical space. As a psychoanalyst and psychohistorian, I am so aware of the complexities of our minds and how our own fears, hopes and other thoughts are unconsciously projected onto whatever we are discussing.

In the end, of course, I make generalizations about vast groups like “Americans,” though usually with caution and as rhetorical questions. I notice that I do this much less than most of my academic colleagues, but they sometimes give me a puzzled look because they start from different premises. One generalization that comes to mind was when, in writing about the Clinton impeachment efforts in 1998, I told

my students that most of the public preferred to be focused on Clinton's sex life rather than the complexities of policy issues. After 9/11 this statement changed to most of the public preferred to be titillated by Clinton's adolescent type of sex life with Monica Lewinsky than with the danger from terrorists like Osama Bin Laden, despite Congressional hearings on the subject and the publication of Yossef Bondansky, *Osama Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America* (1999). I also said that America narcissistically assumed we were untouchable. Consequently, I must acknowledge doing group psychohistory, but I do this with far more caution than most.

Obviously, I do not think that group psychohistory and group process are pure projections. As I indicated in the December 2004 issue of this journal ("The Costly Group Process Experiment"), I worked extremely hard over a period of many years to raise the level of group process at the IPA, both as a learning tool and a new instrument for serving the human needs of attendees. Ultimately, I felt the endeavor was not worthwhile. Similarly, the group process analysis that I experienced at the Saturday workshops of the Institute for Psychohistory and the IPA seemed to me to be as much an instrument for "acting out" as one of group and self-knowledge.

Returning to the paper I am commenting upon, I think it far more important to do psychoanalysis and psychohistory than to spend time justifying them in terms of science. While I take my hat off to John Hartman, I do not find it necessary to attempt to emulate him. I do wish many others would take his work more seriously.

Paul Elovitz, PhD, is editor of this publication.

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Evidence and Concepts in Psychohistory

Kenneth Fuchsman
University of Connecticut

John J. Hartman's article on the evidential basis of psychohistory is quite promising. It is empirically based, conceptually sophisticated, and it shows an awareness of some of the pitfalls in his approach. Still, there are ways his model can be im-

proved.

The empirical foundation of Hartman's approach is the research he and others conducted on small group processes. He cites six studies of small groups where systematic scoring of interaction occurred. To him the findings from these studies demonstrate two psychohistorical propositions: "groups develop in ways that can be measured as reactions to emotional distress" and "groups develop solutions to reduce distress and return the group to homeostasis in adaptive and defensive ways." Hartman extends these findings to history.

In moving from psychology to psychohistory, two more propositions are added: "groups develop a shared utopian political ideology based on a shared fantasy in order to deal with intra-group distress" and utopian "fantasies in groups derive from shared pre-oedipal symbiotic merger fantasies with the 'Good Mother' in individuals."

Hartman states that "the jump from the small group to the large group to historical change is argument by analogy." This kind of argument, he writes, does not provide "the same range of evidential certainty" as do the psychological findings. He says: "as systems become more complex, explanatory power can become markedly reduced unless our conceptual powers become as complex as what we are trying to explain."

Building on Hartman's base, other psychohistorians can go beyond argument by analogy to build the more complex conceptual approach he advocates. As full of potential as Hartman's article is, there are psychological and psychohistorical issues to discuss.

His study of group interactions is systematic and detailed, but there are only six studies cited. More such studies may be necessary to give further empirical weight to his first two propositions, in particular to his conclusion that groups develop solutions to reduce stress and restore homeostasis. Not all groups may reach agreement or attempt to reduce stress. If members have not solidified identification with and loyalty to the group there may not be sufficient consensus to arrive at agreed upon solutions. It may be helpful to look at groups in distress who have not reached homeostasis or consensus to study if and how they make and maintain decisions.

In relation to psychohistory, Hartman discusses the need for a conceptually complex model

between psychology and psychohistory. What concepts would be needed to have findings derived from the study of small groups apply to events in the historical arena? Concepts and findings on the study of groups from sociology and political science might help clarify the similarities and differences between the functioning of small groups and those of larger groups, communities, nations, and relations between nations. Incorporating knowledge from these other disciplines will be helpful in moving from psychology to psychohistory.

Hartman's propositions need further clarification to realize their potential. I am not sure about the accuracy of two of his propositions: one in which he says distressed groups develop solutions to restore homeostasis and the other where he discusses group development of a shared utopian political ideology. To illustrate my concerns, I will discuss American domestic responses to two wars. Wars are stressful for combatants and those remaining at home. In World War II, the American home front was mostly supportive of the war effort, even though it lasted nearly four years and resulted in almost half a million American deaths. Patriotic feelings ran high; identification with the righteousness of the cause and loyalty to the nation were widespread.

Contrast this with the polarization that evolved in relation to the Vietnam War. Ideological divisions developed; a radical left portrayed the war as imperialistic, many liberals came to see the war as a misapplication of the containment policy, and many conservatives defended our involvement as a way to stop Communism. The solutions various groups proposed did not result in a consensus, nor were many designed to restore homeostasis. Some leaders, including Vice President Agnew, called for positive polarization. Identifications were not with the nation as a whole, but with political allies; loyalties were divided. There was not a single shared utopian political fantasy, but a variety of often competing ideological commitments.

Groups may design solutions to reduce distress, and they might agitate to further conflict. Shared political fantasies may permeate a group or nation, but just as well ideological divisions may reflect different primal fantasies. Hartman assumes too much unity in both group psychology and historical reality. His approach of moving from empirical psychology to history is solid; his application of his ap-

proach needs the further conceptual complexity for which he calls.

Hartman wants to establish an evidential basis for psychohistory—a major challenge. History is usually classified as one of the humanities, but it clearly contains a strong social science component. Psychology is a social science with roots in natural science and the humanities. Within and between these academic cultures of natural science, social science and the humanities, there are diverging standards as to what counts as evidence and how to evaluate it. Given that psychohistory has allegiance in all three academic cultures, a successful epistemological synthesis will be difficult to develop. Biologist Ernst Mayr declares: “consensus is hard to achieve” in “that disagreeing scientists adhere to different underlying ideologies, making certain theories acceptable to one group which are impossible for another group” (Ernst Mayr, *This Is Biology*, [1997], p. 103).

Historians have long lived with indeterminacy, with the reality of conflicting interpretations of the same evidence. There are various schools within psychoanalysis, yet alone the plethora of approaches to psychotherapy. Among psychohistorians, there are bound to be a plurality of concepts and standards of evidence on both the psychological and the historical sides of the discipline. Nevertheless, some things are facts and others are not. Still when it comes to developing a fact-based thesis or argument, the good psychohistorian must always ask what evidence counts for and what counts against the thesis, and continually strive to make his or her concepts clear, comprehensive and complex enough, as Hartman calls for, to explain the psychohistorical phenomena being studied.

Ken Fuchsman's biography may be found on page 29.

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The Challenge of Psychohistorical Evidence

Henry Lawton
The International Psychohistorical
Association

Ever since I began doing psychohistory some
35 years ago, I have been fascinated by the reality of

group process. In my traditional history courses the notion that groups were complex systems driven, in large measure, by shared emotion and fantasy never occurred to me or my professors. History tended to be viewed in terms of dates, wars, economics, political changes, treaties that achieved this or that, religious movements, revolutions, natural disasters, etc., etc. History just seemed to unfold itself. Maybe emotion was occasionally implied but it never came explicitly into the light of examination. Little attention was paid to questions of why; it was generally enough to be able to present narrative in an understandable manner. Certainly no one seemed aware of group process or its importance back in those days.

As my psychohistorical knowledge broadened and I began to ask why, the more I began to understand and appreciate the explanatory power of emotion and fantasy felt both on an individual and shared level. During the mid-70's we devoted a portion of each Institute for Psychohistory meeting to trying to understand what had gone on in the group and why. When the International Psychohistorical Association was started we spent part of each conference doing the same thing. We were not always successful, yet we still continue to try even though the effort is controversial and dubious in the eyes of some. Now that we have John Hartman's "The Evidential Basis of Psychohistory in Group Process," we know, more clearly, why it is absolutely essential to continue the effort on all fronts.

As Hartman reminds us, all groups, be they large or small, have a process of working that should be discernable. Process shows us the inner emotional dynamics of how and why a given group functions as it does. It seems simple and self-evident, but often times that which appears to be simple can be very hard to understand and explain. Though I have read Hartman, Bion, Anzieu, etc. and I have attempted to learn experientially, understanding still is not easy. Hartman's paper is a welcome and lucid reminder of why it is important to keep trying. Psychohistory is not an easy field.

Hartman notes "that the development of small groups can be demonstrated to follow a course dictated by solutions to the expressions of distress experienced and expressed by group members." Psychohistory goes one measure further and determines that large groups follow steps which are similar but not quite equal to those of small groups. Also, Hart-

man says history advances in this way for comparable reasons. He goes on to assert that, "the adaptive and defensive solutions to this distress make up an important part of the history of that group...groups produce distress, which is shared and shared solutions are found to reduce the stress of the majority of the members." My initial reaction to this was that it was fine as far as it went, but there have to be other reasons for groups to exist besides dealing with distress. If "groups produce distress," why do they exist?

If human beings were solitary loners, there would still be the stress of loneliness and isolation that would be intolerable for many. Maybe we need groups, stressful though they may be, partly as an antidote to being or feeling alone. Groups might also provide mutual support toward achievement of agreed upon goals (Bion's work group). Just as they may help facilitate relationships among members, groups might also provide excuses for war or conflict. But the more I have thought about it, the more I am convinced that, while it may not be so simple, Hartman is basically correct about the element of stress at work in group process.

He goes on to note the importance of analogy in psychohistorical thinking, especially by comparing aspects of group development to analogous steps of childhood. But there "is a lack of a coherent methodology of evidence to assert the truth claims of what began as analogies ... causal links change as the complexity of the system changes." It is important to keep in mind that history is made by people. Their childhoods do not follow a clear line of action, according to Hartman. Quite true, but this could also be used to justify the downplaying or ignoring the importance of childhood determinants in both individuals and groups. We need to be aware of often walking a fine line with these ideas.

Hartman ends with the admonition that a "greater sophistication as to what constitutes evidence in psychohistory and a closer attention to the criteria required for such a methodology" is needed. This is an important philosophical issue that has gotten scant attention. He is absolutely correct and merits our thanks for putting the problem on the table. It is not an easily solved problem, which is probably one reason why so little has been written on it. The stock response has been to claim that we have been too busy doing psychohistory to give thought about

questions of evidence and methodology for evaluating the validity of the material we select to support our arguments. True enough, but psychohistory has been around for a long time. Yet this paucity of interest in questions of evidence has continued to be the case among many psychohistorians with whom I am associated. Below I will raise some questions regarding this issue.

Could we be unconsciously following Freud's well-known disdain for philosophy? Could it be that we see ourselves as radical revolutionaries on the barricades that need not pay attention to such petty philosophical issues? Is there a lack of philosophical sophistication among most psychohistorians? Is a training program geared to these issues indicated? If so, would formalized training inculcate an orthodoxy that might hamper our ability and inclination to think outside the box of traditional disciplines? Certainly, thinking outside the box is a strong attraction for many of us in the field. Even so, Hartman's admonitions remain and will not go away.

Our conceptual powers must "become as complex as what we are trying to explain." Quite right, but this puts a burden on the psychohistorian because any time s/he goes outside their area of expertise considerable self-education in hitherto unknown subject matter may be needed. For example, I have been studying the religion of the Latter Day Saints (Mormons) over the last decade. In addition to learning their history and doctrine, I have to know about the psychology of religion, family systems theory, psychoanalysis of both individuals and groups and of course how to recognize and evaluate the group process that helped make the church what it is today. The Mormons were a restoration church (devoted to returning their church to the purity of the first Christians) as well as a millennial movement. Joseph Smith, Jr., was a charismatic leader who believed that ordinary laws and rules of society did not apply to him and his followers. Is the group process of such a movement different than other groups? How did the childhoods of early Mormons, in so far as they can be known, affect the overall development and group process of the Church? How do we recognize the workings of group process in a large complex group such as the Mormons or any group? Why do some groups endure even in the face of massive splits and dissent and others do not?

I hope that Hartman will continue to write on

the issues he raises in his paper. We can all benefit from his wisdom about these matters.

Henry Lawton, MA, MLS, a retired child welfare worker and productive independent, psychohistorical scholar for 30 years, is Book Review Editor of the Journal of Psychohistory, longtime Secretary of the International Psychohistorical Association, and founder/director of the Group for the Psychohistorical Study of Film. He is the author of The Psychohistorian's Handbook (1988) who has published numerous articles on film and psychohistorical subjects. His current research interests include film, historical group process, and Mormons. Lawton may be reached at <lwlipa@gmail.com>.

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Hartman Over Generalizes

**J. Lee Shneidman
Adelphi University**

Dr. Hartman has presented a judicious exploration of possible theoretical frameworks for the writing of group psychohistory. Actually, there are two distinct parts to his article. The first part I agree with and utilize. The second part I am aware of, but Hartman's caveat regarding the use of analogies prevents me from using that system.

The first section is based upon small group observations. I find his scientific study of the uncertainty and anxiety students experienced in his group process classes when the professor failed to give structure to be parallel with my unscientific observations. As a professor, I assigned all classes—including freshman—a 3,000 word paper on any topic within the parameters of the course in which they have an interest. There were always students who found this "freedom" too anxiety producing and insisted that I assign a topic.

When a society or an individual is in turmoil, there are various theoretical systems used to reestablish order. Historians of political theory or psychoanalytic theory are familiar with these solutions. Classical Greeks wrote of the humors being out of sync. They believed the conflict or anxiety remains until the humors are stabilized or are in stasis. Dr. Joseph Sandler, in his theory of safety states that a patient seeking therapy will remain in therapy until he reaches a level where he feels safe. That is a level where the problem could be lived with rather than

resolved. While neither the society nor the individual have resolved the difficulty, that difficulty has been sufficiently quieted as to be dormant.

The methodology is "universal" but the conclusion is idiosyncratic. The Greeks believed that Athens, Thebes, and Sparta would each have "time of troubles." We can say that patient A, B, and C will each have an anxiety attack. But, since each of the six will be coming from a different place, the point of stasis or safety will be different. To turn the solution of Athens on patient A into a universal procrustean bed is an error. Idiosyncratic problems require idiosyncratic solutions, even when we use similar theoretic methodology.

The second part of the article is a cautious discussion of using analogy. I eschew such methods in theory and try not to use them in practice. Individuals may have a fantasy and a group may have a fantasy, but to conclude that the two are identical has not been established: similar and identical are neither synonyms nor are they interchangeable.

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HARTMAN REPLIES:

I wish to thank the commentators, Binion, Booth, Carveth, Elovitz, Fuchsman, Lawton, and Shneidman for their thoughtful, articulate, and well-reasoned reactions to my paper. Space will not permit me to do justice to each of the complex arguments, so I will not respond directly to each commentary. Instead, I shall address some of the issues raised in the commentaries which bear on the general questions I wanted to address in the paper.

Specifically, I shall offer some thoughts about the following: 1) What constitutes the proper domain of inquiry of psychohistory (or what defines it as a discipline)? 2) What method or methods are best utilized to further the goals of the discipline of psychohistory? And 3) How do we decide between different assertions about the same historical phenomenon as to the way the assertions and evidence fit in relation to it? This last question was the main issue I wished to raise in the paper, but I believe that my example from social psychological empirical research, with its particular methodology, obscured this particular aim.

First, the domain of inquiry: I did not have the explicit intention to define what psychohistory is or ought to be. I did not mean to imply that the laboratory is the proper domain of psychohistorical inquiry. It was rather that social psychology may inform some historical questions or offer some basis for what we observe on the larger historical scale. Psychohistory is a new hybrid discipline with an ambiguous domain of inquiry which has not been explicitly agreed upon. My definition was perhaps off-hand and general, if not off-base. But the fact of the matter is that there is no agreed-upon domain of inquiry for psychohistory other than "history itself." The same problem exists in psychoanalysis, and this continues to cause a number of epistemological and other problems. The problem it seems to me is that the domain of inquiry may be very much determined by how a set of historical "facts" are contextualized and interpreted. The key contribution of psychology to an understanding of history lies, as Binion cogently observed, in the area of motivation in and between large groups. It is in this crucial area that psychohistory is only as good as the psychology contextualizing it. (Historians would say rightly that psychohistory is only as good as the history underpinning it.)

This problem leads inevitably to the question of psychohistory as science (natural or social) or as art (humanistic, cultural, hermeneutic). This same dichotomy vexes psychoanalysis, and I suspect it is an issue in some circles of historical thought as well. It is clear where my paper stood on this issue because it illustrated a methodology most appropriate to agreed-upon standards in social psychology. These standards may or may not be appropriate for psychohistory.

However, when it comes to issues involving motivation and other *whys* in history, I think aesthetic, intuitive, empathic and other "humanistic" criteria for the evaluation of interpretations are inadequate by themselves. That's my opinion because of my training and outlook both as a social psychologist and as a psychoanalyst. While I have my own idiosyncratic orientation to this question, my intended point was that the field of psychohistory would be advanced by an articulation of any criteria which makes for a convincing psychohistorical argument. We should be able to make explicit how we judge the truth claims of an argument through the fit between the assertion and the contextualized data. This is often lacking in the psychohistorical literature as it is in psychoanalysis.

Once this is accomplished, then open-minded colleagues can argue about which assertion-interpretation fits the evidence best. I thought it fascinating that the art-science dichotomy surfaced so readily. We don't necessarily have to choose between these approaches, but we might have to integrate and make explicit what our methodological assumptions are.

I suspect that historical analysis faces this same epistemological challenge that psychoanalysis does. There must be criteria for what constitutes an assertion-evidence fit in history, but I doubt that it is has been made explicit.

Two, the methods of inquiry: it naturally follows from the art-science dichotomy that the methodology employed in tackling a psychohistorical issue will differ according to one's view of art, science, or some integration of the two. My intention in the paper was to demonstrate an analogy between findings in social psychology and psychohistory, including both the possible advantages and disadvantages of such an analogy. Psychology is now part of biology (even if it began as part of philosophy) and psychoanalysis is part of psychology, and psychohistory occupies this ambiguous position between history and psychology. I believe that psychoanalysis has been led astray by Freud's aversion to systematic natural science research in psychoanalysis (despite his beginnings as a bench scientist) and by the mutual alienation of psychoanalysis from academia. I believe that the future of psychoanalysis as a discipline lies in a rapprochement with developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and brain research. None of

this is necessary for the practice of psychoanalysis with a patient. However, the basic concepts of the theory or theories which inform practice must, I feel, be informed by science utilizing natural science methods.

The most important developments in psychoanalysis are coming from confirmations and disconfirmations of psychoanalytic theory from cognitive neuroscience. It was in that spirit that I offered my research example and its possible relevance for psychohistory. One can and maybe should practice psychohistory with a different methodology from that of natural science just as the working psychoanalyst does. That is, intuition, empathy, and intersubjectivity can be used to organize, relate to, and interpret. But this methodology, too, should be made explicit along with its particular criteria for evaluation so that the general audience may have some criteria to choose between competing truth claims. Otherwise, deciding which interpretation is most useful falls to solely subjective, aesthetic, or ideological criteria. When it comes to general theories and basic concepts involving human motivation, I believe that natural and social science methods will better inform this issue than any other approach. I am making a distinction then between the application and practice of psychohistory and the validation of basic concepts which underpin it.

Three, the criteria of evidence: I have already anticipated this last and main point. My preoccupation with what constitutes evidence stems from a concern not only about wild psychohistory (of which there is quite a bit) but the more general question of validating assertions in psychohistory. Conjecture, speculation, intuition, and other processes have a place in the formulation of assertions but not in helping colleagues, let alone the intellectual community, evaluate competing truth claims. I can see my own example was problematic in a number of ways. My assertions were several, complex and, at each step, posing difficulties matching the assertion with the evidence.

The assertion that all groups change in relation to experienced distress is hard to prove on the one hand but hard to disprove on the other. What group at some point in its history has not experienced distress? The more interesting questions, it seems to me, are when, why, and what do groups do with their distress? The historical record, just as individual his-

tories, shows that they do a great many different things depending on a variety of conditions and circumstances. It is the job of both history and psychohistory to make these explicit. But even at the individual and small group level we lack ways of evaluating the interpretation of these factors. The historian's point is that causation in history is very specific to the historical group, the historical period, etc. This is true of individuals as well. Everyone, even identical twins, is unique. Psychologists, however, are looking for general propositions about human motivation amongst the unique circumstances of each individual, group, or historical period. Why can't psychohistory be both art and science, utilize a variety of research methodologies, and still seek to be explicit and systematic about how we go about evaluating the truth claims of our assertions? ▢

Volkan's Slobodan Milošević

(Continued from page 1)

humiliation and helplessness, they pass on to their offspring the images of their injured selves and psychological tasks that need to be completed. This process is known as the "transgenerational transmission of trauma." All such images and tasks contain references to the same historical event and, as decades pass, the mental representation of this event links all the individuals in the large group and emerges as a significant large-group identity marker. A chosen trauma reflects the "infection" of a large-group's mourning process, and its reactivation serves to link the members of a large group. Such reactivation can be used by political leaders to initiate and fuel entitlement ideologies and promote new massive societal movements, some of them malignant (Vamik Volkan, *Killing in the Name of Identity: A Study of Bloody Conflicts*, 2006).

I began to document how Slobodan Milošević allowed and supported the re-appearance of the Serbian chosen trauma—the mental representation of the June 28, 1389 Battle of Kosovo—with most deadly consequences. Before focusing on Milošević himself and the question of why he played the key role in the appearance of genocidal atrocities in Europe at the end of the 20th century, I will briefly tell the story of the Serbian chosen trauma and its reactivation.

On June 28, 1389, Serbian Prince Lazar

(Lazar Hrebeljanović) and his army clashed at Kosovo Polje, the Field of Blackbirds, with the army of the Ottoman Turkish sultan, Murat I. Since we have no eyewitness reports, the historical truth about the battle of Kosovo remains unknown (Thomas A. Emmert, *Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo, 1389*, 1990), but what is known is that Lazar was beheaded and Murat also lost his life. After the battle the new Turkish Sultan married Lazar's daughter and later went on to fight Tamarlane with the help of Lazar's son. But 70 years after the Battle of Kosovo, the Ottomans brought an end to Serbia. Despite the gap of 70 years between the Battle of Kosovo and the fall of Serbia, a popular belief gradually developed that equated the two events.

As Turkish rule settled over Serbia, many Serbs began migrating north. In 1690 the few remaining monks at the monastery of Ravanica (in Kosovo), where Lazar was originally buried, joined the northern migrations, taking the corpse of Lazar with them. Lazar, reburied at a location in the Fruka Gora region northwest of Belgrade, then became an "exile," and with his remains, it seems, traveled a myth about him as well as about the Battle of Kosovo. The shared mental representation of the Battle of Kosovo followed the Serbs throughout history, becoming the Serbian chosen trauma. As time passed, events and characters of this battle mingled with elements and characters of the Christian religion. According to legend, Saint Ilya, in the shape of a gray falcon, appeared before Lazar on the eve of the battle with a message from the Virgin Mary. She gave the prince two choices: he could win the battle and find a kingdom on earth, or he could find a kingdom in heaven through death and martyrdom. Lazar chose the latter and the Serbs subsequently associated his image with the image of Jesus Christ. This chosen trauma, like a "psychological DNA," passed from generation to generation.

It is beyond this brief paper to describe the many fascinating stories about the Serbian chosen trauma that emerged throughout the centuries, so I will go directly to Milošević's role in its reactivation. He was already an established political leader in 1989, the time of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo, and he and his associates were determined to bring Lazar's body out of "exile." In preparation for the coming anniversary, Lazar's remains were placed in a coffin and taken on a year-

long tour to every Serb village and town, where they were received by huge crowds of mourners dressed in black. Every night Lazar was symbolically buried and every morning he was reincarnated, and eventually he was taken back to Kosovo Polje for a final burial. This created what I call a "time collapse." This term denotes the conscious and unconscious connections between a large-group's past historical trauma and contemporary threats, threats that typically emerge when a chosen trauma is dramatically reactivated. The reactivation of shared anxieties, expectations, fantasies, and defenses associated with the chosen trauma magnifies the image of current enemies and current conflicts. If the large group is now in a powerful position, the sense of revenge may become exaggerated, even ennobled. (If the large group is in a powerless position, a current event may reanimate a shared sense of victimization.) Time collapse may lead to irrational and sadistic or masochistic decision-making by the leaders of a large group; in turn, members of the large group may become psychologically prepared for sadistic or masochistic acts and, in worst case scenarios, perpetrate monstrous cruelty against "others."

Milošević ordered a huge monument to be built on a hill overlooking the Kosovo battlefield. Made of red stone symbolizing blood, it stands a hundred feet high. The numbers "1389-1989" are clearly inscribed on this monument, etching the intended "time collapse" in stone. On June 28, 1989, the day marking the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, a helicopter brought Milošević to Kosovo Polje—a symbolic gesture representing the return of Prince Lazar/Jesus Christ to earth to create a greater Serbia. Thereafter, a sense of entitlement to kill Bosniaks and Kosovar Albanian Moslems began to spread. Since the ancestors of these people had become Moslems under the Ottoman rule, they represented the original enemy, the Ottoman Turks. (Not long before today's fundamentalist Islamic terrorists' activities there was, in Europe, an entitlement to kill Moslems in the name of a specific type of Christian religious "fundamentalism.") Everyone knows what happened in the former Yugoslavia, and the details are beyond the scope of this paper.

By reactivating the Serbian chosen trauma, did Milošević simply want to increase the cohesion of Serbian large-group identity and pride after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and secure his political power? Or, was he aware from the beginning,

at least to some extent, that his actions would lead to genocidal atrocities? What kind of person was he? Since I had no opportunity to meet him in person, I sought out people who actually had spent some time with him, and I also brought together some Croats and Serbs for unofficial dialogues after the bloody conflict between these two groups. Slowly I developed some ideas about Milošević's character traits. He emerged in my mind as an aloof, self-centered, and shrewd politician. I heard that when he was in power there was a saying in Belgrade: have pity on the person Milošević calls a friend.

When he was seven his favorite uncle, an army officer, committed suicide, as did his father and his mother. His father's suicide, after he was separated from his wife, took place when Milošević was 21. Milošević's mother, a school teacher and communist, killed herself when he was in his early 30s. I concluded that Milošević and his wife, Mirjana, his teenage sweetheart, had developed a kind of "twinning" psychology that Gabriele Ast and I write about elsewhere (*Siblings in the Unconscious and Psychopathology*, 1997). This term means that two people share certain ego functions and/or perform such functions for the other, "the twin," in order to escape internal conflicts, mostly internalized object conflicts. Like Milošević, Mirjana had a traumatic childhood. Her mother, accused of divulging information about Partisans while she was under arrest by the Nazis, was executed by the Communists after World War II. There was a widespread belief that Mirjana's maternal grandfather played a role in the execution of his daughter. In the psyches of Milošević and his wife there seemed to be basic trust problems and unfinished issues, rage and dependency, concerning people who were dead. I wondered if creating situations where many people would die in order to complete the unfinished psychological processes with those deceased people in their own lives had a significant place in Milošević and his wife's "twinning" relationship.

I became certain of one thing: the reactivation of the Serbian chosen trauma and "reincarnating," "re-killing," and "playing" with a dead person's (in reality, Prince Lazar's) remains was planned as a rationalization for atrocities. Other Serbs in power, such as the still-unapprehended Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, then used the same rationalization for their actions. In December 1994, former presi-

dent Jimmy Carter went to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the hope of stopping the bloodshed, and he met with Karadžić and Miladić. My colleague Joyce Neu, now the Executive Director of the Peace and Criminal Justice Institute at San Diego University, was present. According to Dr. Neu, instead of talking about the urgent issues at hand, Karadžić and Miladić used the meeting to speak about the 1389 Serbian chosen trauma, Serbian victimization, and their need to protect their group. Certainly, during the time Milošević was reactivating the Serbian chosen trauma, the concept of "time collapse" was palpable in Belgrade. University of Virginia graduate Hasan Aygün was the head of the Turkish embassy in Belgrade, and everywhere he went ordinary Serbs often asked him, "Why are you [Turks] planning to invade us?"

After Milošević was removed from power and extradited to The Hague, as far as I could see, the memories of the acute reactivation of the Serbian chosen trauma among the Serbs in general was repressed. A few days after the unexpected death of Milošević, a Serbian group therapist, Marina Mojovic wrote to me from Belgrade. One of her patients, upon hearing of Milošević's death, lamented the next day during a therapy session: "With his death he [Milošević] is continuing to destroy us." The patient was afraid that the repressed shame and other difficult feelings she had experienced would return.

Two issues emerge that should concern psychoanalysts and psychohistorians as they reflect upon Milošević and his reactivation of the 1389 Serbian chosen trauma: the first one concerns the failure of diplomacy and the second one refers to the need to study large-group (ethnic or religious) psychology in its own right.

When I was collecting data on Milošević, I went to Berlin and met with Horst Grabert who was the German ambassador to Belgrade when Milošević was in power and often dined with the Serbian leader. He was also given the task of stopping Milošević from spreading dangerous nationalism. One day he told Milošević a cautionary tale—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's "Der Zauberlehrling" ("The Sorcerer's Apprentice"). When his master is away, Goethe's story goes, the apprentice experiments with the sorcerer's magic and orders a broom to do his chores and carry water to fill a basin. But once the basin is filled, the apprentice does not have the magical skill to stop the broom, which continues to carry water, so

he chops it in half. No sooner does he split the enchanted broom, than both pieces spring back to life and begin the chore anew, in duplicate. Ambassador Grabert wanted to communicate to Milošević that without the old master, Marshal Tito, Milošević might not be able to stop the multiplying and spreading of malignant nationalism. The question that I wish to ask psychoanalysts and psychohistorians is this: using our psychoanalytic or psychohistorical expertise, can we foresee dangers in process such as the one Milošević and his associates began—in full view of the whole world—and can we warn diplomats to take more direct actions instead of expressing symbolic warnings?

Now a word about the need to study large-group psychology in its own right. Imagine that a serial killer such as Jack the Ripper or Ted Bundy is murdering his victims by strangling them with a red scarf. Also imagine that this serial killer is caught, tried, and put away. What happens to his murder weapon, the red scarf? It stays in a dusty box in the basement of a court or police building as evidence used during the trial. In short, in the future, no one else will use this scarf as a "tool" for murdering people. Returning to Milošević, what was Milošević's "red scarf" and what will happen to it? As I described above, one of Milošević's prominent "tools" for inciting extreme violence was his reactivation (with the help of some Serbian academicians and people from the Serbian Church) of shared symbols of the Serbian large-group identity: mental representations of loss, humiliation, the Battle of Kosovo, and the Serbian leader Prince Lazar who was killed during this battle. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was created in 1993, and this court spent \$200 million to try Milošević on charges of 66 counts of crimes against humanity, genocide in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo during the 1990s. Now the former Serbian leader is dead and can never be pronounced guilty or innocent. Let us imagine that Milošević lived, was found guilty, and was put away. His "red scarf" would not have been put away in a basement, and since this "red scarf" belongs to the large group rather than one lone individual, it is possible it could be used again in the future. We know this because Milošević was not the first person to inflame the mental representations of the Battle of Kosovo and Prince Lazar. On June 28, 1914, during an anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, a Serb named Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke

Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary (Austria-Hungary had replaced the Ottoman Empire as the "oppressor" of the Serbs) and his pregnant wife in Sarajevo, thereby beginning World War I.

The political and legal systems have no effective methods to deal with a "tool" that can be used for massive destruction when it belongs to a large group rather than just the man or woman who makes use of it. It can be better understood by the application of psychological and psychohistorical insights that illuminate large-group processes in their own right than by logical *Realpolitik* conceptualizations. Who is going to examine "red scarves" that are the property of large groups? I hold that psychoanalysts and others who study human nature are best equipped to do so if they are willing to venture beyond their offices, conduct field work, and collaborate with scholars and practitioners from other disciplines in an effort to understand collective human issues.

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Volkan Provides Valuable Tools

Michael Britton

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Vamik Volkan demonstrates that his exquisite skill is using something concrete (e.g., the red scarf) as a metaphor whereby motivational dynamics on an historical scale come to make sense to our everyday minds. His exposition of a metaphoric process gone both crazy and lethal in Serbia concisely delineates the conjunction of a traumatized leader and a

people carrying a story of trauma as their organizing myth. The analysis elegantly arrives at the challenge of catching such historical processes early on, when, hopefully, their tragic unfolding might be forestalled.

Recent neurobiological research on the effects of trauma on the brain support his concept of the collapse of time. In the face of threats to survival, there is a shutting down of activity in the medial frontal cortex where events are organized by time into past, present and future. It is harder to keep track of what happened when. This is accompanied by dramatically heightened activity in the amygdala, the survival alarm center that mobilizes terror, rage, fight and flight in the determined effort to secure survival. Critical attention to reality is shut down in what becomes essentially an instinct/emotion driven state in which any image, no matter its origins in time, becomes salient if it resonates with threat and response.

His analysis raises questions. Are some peoples more vulnerable to such collapses of time, such descents into amygdala-driven action, such losses of the counterpoising capacity for keeping experience distinctly separated by time thanks to their organizing myth? Do they keep themselves in a state where the limbic system is continually privileged at the expense of a time-savvy observing ego? If so, how is this time-collapse-already-partly-happening maintained in everyday life: in what normative family practices, preferred religious and artistic experiences, political slogans, etc.? What would it take for a society to engage itself around an organizing myth that over-identifies with threat/response (and so privileges the limbic system in everyday life) in such a way as to achieve an everyday life lived from the medial prefrontal cortex—a life less susceptible to being seduced into time collapse and the violent perversions of historic life that ensue? How do peoples transform their organizing myths in such a way that they transform everyday living—and themselves—into people who operate more from their higher capacities for foresight, critical observation of reality, awareness that the past is not the present and that metaphor is not a substitute for observation, rather than people who operate from the primitive part of the brain in which they feel for violence and threat, metaphor, and selective attention to resonant data all reinforce each other to lethal effect?

What of leaders? Milošević was an exemplar of the leader in whom personal trauma has rendered danger and response more persuasive than any other consideration, empowering his political skills with a feel for pornographically stirring exactly those themes in a susceptible people. What kind of leader is capable of looking deeply into the heart of trauma-organized life in a people and “leading” them to become people organized around the relative solidity of the more advanced capacity to have a feel for time, attending carefully to reality, and the realization that life is already safe unless we make it otherwise? How do they exercise such leadership?

In his clear delineation of a people with a myth that renders them ready to respond to terrible themes and a leader whose terrible experiences early in life render him obsessed with stirring exactly those themes, Vamik Volkan is deeply probing one of the central dynamics at issue in our globalizing age. How are we going to make this era safe, sane and workable rather than mad and violent? Volkan's thinking provides some of the tools for creating an answer.

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Bias and Moral Authority in Psychohistorical Writing

David Lotto
University of Massachusetts

Vamik Volkan is a prolific contributor to psychohistory who once again explores the details and mechanisms of one of the central ideas psychohistorians use in their understanding of large group behavior—the intergenerational transmission of trauma. Together with the concept of unconscious reenactment, it lies at the heart of how we explain much of the history of large group conflict and violence. My response will focus on an issue that applies to much psychohistorical writing about large group relations, including much of Volkan's work: the issue of bias.

In this paper Volkan illustrates two of the mechanisms he has identified in earlier publications,

the notions of “chosen trauma” and “time collapse,” by recounting some of the events in the Balkan conflict involving the Serbs and their leader Slobodan Milošević. Professor Volkan's analysis of Serbian actions is quite critical: it is that Milošević and his allies deliberately chose to reactivate the Serbian chosen trauma of their defeat at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 for his own political purposes, thereby unleashing atrocities by Serbs against their historical enemies. This criticism may well be entirely justified: however, I find it to be somewhat problematic because of the issue of bias. I have the same reaction when Americans speak about the evils of Islamic fundamentalists. I feel that there is a problem when a member of one group speaks publicly about the crimes, evil deeds, sins, and alleged psychopathology of members of another group when there is a history of enmity between the two groups.

Of course all should be free to speak about whatever they please, but I am speaking about the question of moral authority—whether one has a claim to be taken seriously or whether one's speech should more properly be discredited because of bias. In my opinion, it is just not morally legitimate to criticize an individual or group that has harmed members of your group and/or your loved ones, particularly when your group can rightly be accused of committing similar crimes, sins, or evil deeds without first acknowledging that this is the case.

I believe that this can be straightforwardly done. If you want to speak with moral authority about the crimes, sins, and so forth of others, you need to start with pointing out and acknowledging the crimes and sins of your group and what evil they have done to others. Only after this do you have the right to be listened to when speaking of *others'* faults.

The Turks, longtime enemies of the Serbs, do not have a very pristine reputation throughout their history with regard to how they treat others. Perhaps their reputation is undeserved, but they are often depicted as cruel and sadistic toward those they conquer or control (i.e. Greeks, Armenians, and Kurds). Similarly, the United States has its own history of genocide and atrocities, for example, our treatment of Native Americans, the institution and deeds of slavery, and a long history of military atrocities from our use of torture during the Philippine rebellion follow-

ing our conquest in 1898, to Mai Lai and Abu Grahib.

I think Professor Volkan's creditability would be greatly enhanced if he applied his psychohistorical analysis toward the pathology and irrationalities of Americans and Turks in addition to what he has written concerning so many other nations and groups. The same could be said for the numerous Americans who have been speaking recently about the pathology and crimes of terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists; for me, their arguments would carry more weight if they applied their critical powers toward the actions of their own nation before speaking of the sins of others.

Two other thoughts come to mind. The report of Professor Volkan's colleague who went to talk peace to the Serbs and was subjected to tales of the historical injuries the Serbs had suffered, sounds like a good illustration of what I briefly discussed in my Work-In-Progress research paper on vengeance, which I presented at the Psychohistory Forum on April 8th and which will be published in the *Journal of Psychohistory* in September. It is an example of concerns about justice trumping the desire for peace. As I argued in my paper, conflict resolution is not likely to happen as long as the parties feel that their injuries have not been fully acknowledged and that some revenge or reparation has not occurred. Until that is done, justice has not yet been served, and peace is unlikely to break out. Negotiators and mediators working for peace need to keep this in mind.

Lastly, there is the issue of the "red scarf." I applaud Professor Volkan's wish/hope that psychoanalysts and psychohistorians might be in a position to warn of the inflammatory uses to which symbols such as Prince Lazar and the Battle of Kosovo can be put; that they can ignite cruelty, violence, and atrocities. My immediate association is to the American flag. The interesting book, *Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American Flag*, argues that ". . . American patriotism is a civil religion of blood sacrifice, which periodically kills its children to keep the group together. The flag is the sacred object of this religion; its sacrificial imperative is a secret which the group keeps from itself to survive" (Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle, 1999, the quote is from the publisher's blurb). Thus it seems quite clear to me that the American flag is a prime example of a Volkanian red scarf. The psycho-

anthropologist Eli Sagan speaks of the American flag as a sacred symbol of our secular religion. Wouldn't it be something to see Dr. Vamik Volkan on television talking about how dangerous a symbol the flag is and how we should consider banning it—or at least lock it away?

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Reactions to Slobodan Milošević's Death

**Alenka Puhar
Journalist and Independent Scholar**

Upon hearing of Slobodan Milošević's sudden death, a patient of a Serbian therapist bitterly declared "with his death he [Milošević] is continuing to destroy us" (As quoted by Vamik Volkan). She perceptively captured the dominant mood in Serbia and the former Yugoslavia. The death of Slobodan Milošević on March 11 in his cell in the Hague, far away from home, while on trial for war crimes and genocide, was met with sorrow, grief and despair. Some people, mostly from Serbia and Montenegro, felt devastated—bitter and angry—because their "beloved Slobo" died or "was murdered." Other former Yugoslavs—at least the middle-aged and elderly ones—were sorry because of unfinished business. After a four year trial the famous and infamous defendant had not yet been formally found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Outside of Serbia one often heard the complaint that the unfinished legal proceedings left us "without the satisfaction of a sentence and therefore all of us seem to be equally guilty" of crimes orchestrated by Milošević.

Meanwhile, the Serbs and Montenegrins were in shock, with feelings of gloom, even despair, visible everywhere. In the month and a half following the death of Milošević, all the political cartoons on the front page of *Politika*, the leading

daily newspaper in Belgrade, focused on death. These included the dead former president's hand protruding out of his coffin and clinging to Parliament. Another had a Serb chained to the coffin. There were the apocalyptic tones of deluge and earthquake. Because *Politika* does not publish political cartoons every day, I paid attention to occasional illustrations of leading articles, all of which were charged with strong, aggressive messages. The rise of electricity prices at the end of March was accompanied with a "killing" menace: a handgun firing red electricity blasts rather than bullets. The drawing on the front page the next day was even more shocking. Its subject was domestic violence and its title, "Battered Even During Pregnancy." It reported the abusive, violent behavior of Serbian men to their families, stating that "proving one's manhood often ends in crime." The cartoon showed a fist, armored with a set of metal rings, a type of weapon often used in gang fist-fighting but not, to the best of my knowledge, considered a proper tool for wife-battering.

The fantasy content of many of the articles portrayed Europe as the embodiment of betrayal, perfidy, and evil. In Moscow, the placards of angry Russians, who love their role of Serbian big brother, proclaimed that "Milošević is a hero, the Hague lawyers are fascists." There was widespread belief that he was murdered (poisoned or mistreated into illness or a victim of assisted suicide). Carla Del Ponte of Switzerland, the chief UN War Crimes Prosecutor, was consistently depicted as a wicked witch. An interesting variation on the dominant theme of the forever victimized-Serbs was that Serbia did not really deserve Milošević: he valiantly fought for his Serbian motherland, only to be betrayed by her and sent to the Hague in chains. His elderly relatives lamented that "there is a curse on us, the Milošević clan," as they cited the story of their family's betrayals, misfortunes, suicides, and violent deaths.

Milošević's funeral and various events surrounding it resembled an Elizabethan drama, characterized by intrigue, sudden shifts, and morbid turns—it often bordered on farce. For psychohistorians, an interesting feature is the group of foreign celebrities deciding to attend. These were admirers of Milošević and his authoritarian, militaristic Serbia. Proponents of Serbian democracy

were horrified by the eulogizing of the communist functionary who used Serbian chauvinism to perpetrate genocide, just as they had been horrified by his policies.

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Chosen Trauma, Chosen Glory, and Beyond

Howard F. Stein

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Vamik Volkan's persuasive essay is a contribution to understanding the intersection between individual leader(ship) and large group process. In addition to illuminating the era of Milosovic's leadership of Serbia and the atrocities committed during that time, it also explicates for the reader many of Volkan's innovative psychopolitical/ psychohistorical concepts. In "chosen trauma" and "chosen glory," Volkan has offered two terms that have considerable explanatory value cross-culturally and historically. In this brief comment, I wish to expand the scope of this discussion.

Much attention has been given to the role of the Holocaust (*Shoah*) in post-World War II Jewish self-representation, memory, and memorialization. To Volkan, although there is intergenerational transmission of trauma from the Holocaust, it is too early to know whether it will become a "chosen trauma." It remains an emotionally "hot" issue in the *present*. Although many Jews build their core identity around the Holocaust, I personally know many other Jews who have long felt left out from public acknowledgment of their own suffering because of *their* own or their ancestral central cultural catastrophe. The brutal eastern European pogroms of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, has been overshadowed in the media, in literature, in scholarship, and in clinical work, by the Holocaust. There exists what the late John Mack called the "egoism of victimization," and what I have termed the "narcissism

of victimization," not only *between* ethnic, national, and religious groups, but *within* them as well. Those who feel that their personal and collective hurt has been neglected, protest that their suffering is as great as those whose grievance has captured public attention.

The issue is even more complex. Over the centuries, many Jews have engaged in what Volkan calls a "time collapse," not only with reference to *specific* cataclysmic events, but to the *whole* of perceived history-as-victimization. Many discrete events, separated by centuries and millennia, are all said to have occurred on the ninth day of the Jewish month of Av, beginning with the destruction of the two Temples, in 586 BCE and 70 CE, respectively. Further, for many Jews, Jewish history is itself seen as a single, unending line of persecutions, exclusions, expulsions, and annihilations. According to this view of history, peaceful times during which Jews are included and welcomed in non-Jewish societies are seen as, at best, interregna between expected disasters. The hated Amalek, supposed descendants of the Amalekites who attacked the Hebrews during the exodus from Egypt, are fused into archetypal enemies of the Jews, and are said to have pursued and sought to destroy them throughout history. Avner Falk and Jay Gonen have written much to help us to understand this experience and memorialization of cataclysmic history. My point in this example is that a notion, such as traumatic history, may be necessary to supplement the very felicitous concept of "chosen trauma"—which by definition refers to a single calamity.

Finally, the experience of time collapse may be ritualized during relatively "normal" times for a group, as well as during those large group crises about which Volkan has written extensively. Here I think of the injunction during the Passover Seder for Jews to live as if they themselves had been redeemed by God from slavery in Egypt, and not some distant ancestral Others of their group. Likewise, in the Hebrew liturgy, there are daily reminders of the destruction of the two Temples and prayers as well as hope for its restoration. Admittedly, it has yet to become so emotionally valent that it leads to the actual psychopolitical attempt to restore the Temple to its former glory. Still, there are time collapses during calm as well as explosive times. The difference (or a difference), perhaps, lies in whether members of the

group psychologically experience the event as personally real or as existing "out there" in culture or history, as the late George Devereux argued.

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[Editor's Note: Vamik Volkan wishes to thank his colleagues for their comments prompted by his Milošević's death article. However, because of the shortness of time and the demands of his position of Sigmund Freud Visiting Scholar of Psychoanalysis in Vienna until June 30, 2006, he regrets being unable to respond. Regarding the issue of his Turkish background, he did point out to me that he has written three books on the psychology of the Turks. They are The Immortal Attaturk: A Psychobiography (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984), Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict (Huntingdon, England: Eothen Press, 1994), and Cyprus: War and Adaptation (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1979). The first two were written with Professor Norman Itzkowitz.] □

Freud's Leadership

(Continued from page 1)

siveness of his lectures, and the force of his personality, Sigmund Freud drew followers to him. This began in 1902 with the Wednesday night meetings at Freud's home, which evolved into the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. As Freud's ideas spread, the International Psychoanalytic Association was formed.

Organized groups are subject to factions and rifts. In some organizations, a strong leader is able to keep the followers loyal and obedient, and in others conflicts and schisms divide the group. Freud did a great deal to bind psychoanalysts to each other and sustain the movement. Yet he was not able to keep his followers unified. During his lifetime, psychoanalysis was not free of disagreements and defec-

tions. These tensions first became evident with Freud's Viennese followers. I will discuss the emergence of discord and splits within psychoanalysis in the early days of psychoanalysis.

Initially, at the meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, there was deference to Freud's views. The seeds of disunity began with the way psychoanalysts treated each other. Sometimes the vigorous criticisms of the presentations by the Society's members would stray from issues of content to personal criticisms. In February, 1908, Society member, Isidor Sadger proposed; "Personal invectives and attacks should immediately be suppressed by the Chairman." Freud was "opposed" to this motion as he favored "candor" and the expressions of an individual's "true scientific opinion." Sadger's motion was defeated (Herman Nunberg and Ernst Federn (editors), *Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society: Volume I: 1906-1908*, [New York, International Universities Press, 1962], pp. 300-302). It is not clear what would be "scientific" and what "opinion" in these views. Without the establishment of empirical criteria to evaluate competing psychoanalytic claims, it is not surprising that disagreements in the Society took a personal turn. In opposing Sadger's motion, Freud enabled the continuance of these attacks and the prevalence of sibling rivalry, also the frequent conflicts among his followers got on his nerves.

He wrote to Ferenczi of "my aversion toward the Viennese circle" and told Jung: "I sometimes get so angry at my Viennese that I wish...I could thrash them all with one stick" (Eva Brabant, et al (editors), *The Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sandor Ferenczi, Volume 1, 1908-1914*, [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993], p. 155; William McGuire (editor), *The Freud/Jung Letters*, [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974], p. 260). In 1914, Freud wrote of his regret that he could not get the Viennese psychoanalysts to have more friendly relations with each other.

Sadger claims that Freud himself was not above the fray, as the founder of psychoanalysis "blithely disregarded" the rules "for courteous friendliness" and engaged himself in an "attack that was not purely factual" and "did so more than once" (Sadger, *Recollecting*, p. 42). Sadger could use himself as an example, because at meetings Freud spoke of his finding Sadger's presentation

"repellent" and admitting of an "antagonism" towards Sadger's work (Nunberg and Federn, *Minutes II*, pp. 225, 379). With the Viennese, Freud could act as the wise leader, an impatient Moses-like figure passing judgment on his followers and a rival among siblings.

A source of controversy was the Freud sponsored initiatives at the second international psychoanalytic conference in Nuremberg in March 1910. Without first informing his Viennese followers, Freud had Ferenczi propose that Jung be made President of the Association for life and be given veto power over psychoanalytic publications. Freud, in putting his faith in Jung as the loyal son and faithful ally, not surprisingly infuriated the disenfranchised Viennese sons. They organized a meeting to discuss Ferenczi's proposal. To prevent this "primal horde" from turning on their leader, Freud came to this meeting uninvited, pleaded for understanding, and developed a compromise where Jung would neither be president for life, nor hold dictatorial powers over publications. Freud as "primal father" had unleashed rivalry of one group of sons against another and had initially acted as one of the combatants, before beating a strategic retreat.

After the Nuremberg meeting he wrote Jung, "Fair competition between Vienna and Zurich can only benefit the cause" (*Freud/Jung*, p. 306). Freud was not aware that his alliance with Jung precluded equal competition, nor how his initiatives would boomerang on the psychoanalytic movement.

Back in Vienna, lingering resentments remained, while attention came to focus on Adler's theories. Freud, prior to Nuremberg, had called Adler's ideas "heretical" (McGuire, *Freud/Jung*, p. 301). Freud was willing to turn this primarily doctrinal dispute over Adler's views into confrontation. He described "Adler's doctrines" as "wrong and, as far as the development of psychoanalysis is concerned, dangerous" (Nunberg, *Minutes III*, p. 172). After Adler, but not all his followers withdrew from the Society and established a separate group, Freud declared that membership in both groups was "contradictory," and a motion passed declaring membership in both organizations to be "incompatible" (Nunberg, *Minutes III*, pp. 282-283). Adler's remaining adherents resigned from the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. The first schism in the psychoanalytic movement had occurred.

In the next year, the hoped for loyal son and ally, Jung, had turned into another dangerous rival, and this time the conflicts were both ideological and personal. Jung eventually resigned his presidency and went off on his own. These family conflicts within the psychoanalytic movement left deep wounds on all who were involved, including Freud. The defections of Adler and Jung also left lingering questions about the tolerance for doctrinal diversity and the willingness to settle disputes within the psychoanalytic fold.

Freud's actions as the chief psychoanalytic authority had not solidified the movement. How then can his actions as leader be understood? Freud vacillated between asserting his position and questioning himself. After Nuremberg, but before the final confrontation with Adler, Freud wrote that he is "torn" and has "fear of being regarded as an intolerant old man who holds the young men down, and this makes me feel uncomfortable" (McGuire, *Freud/Jung*, p. 376). Freud's inner divisions were captured by Otto Rank, who wrote the "founder" of psychoanalysis "is a rebellious son who defends the paternal authority, a revolutionary who, from fear of his own rebellious son-ego took refuge in the security of the father position" (Otto Rank, *Modern Education*, [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1932], pp. 191-192). Caught between being the father, the competitive brother, and the rebellious son, Freud could not consistently sustain belief in his role as father-leader. To Freud, "to excel one's father was still forbidden" and "a sense of guilt is attached to the satisfaction of having gone such a long way" (Sigmund Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII*, [London: Hogarth Press, 1936], p. 247). Unable with a clear conscience to maintain the father role, Freud reenacted father-son-sibling dramas with his followers. He alternated between these roles, and projected all three parts onto his disciples.

There was a confusion of generations within Freud's psyche. William McGrath discusses "the frequency of brother-father substitutions" in Freud's works (William McGrath, *Freud's Discovery of Psychoanalysis*, [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986], p. 61). Leonard Shengold says, "hostility toward the father" in Freud is "displaced onto brother figures" (Leonard Shengold; *The Boy Will Come to Nothing*, [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993], p. 38). Hans Sachs wrote of Freud, "Conflicts

were an intrinsic part of his life" (Hans Sachs, *Freud: Master and Friend*, [London: Imago Publishing, 1944], p. 110). Freud admitted, "My emotional life has always insisted that I should have an intimate friend and a hated enemy....it has not infrequently happened...that friend and enemy have come together in a single individual" (Freud, *Standard Edition, V*, p. 483). This friend-combatant relationship is a sibling conflict containing a displacement of the rivalry with the father.

For Freud both views himself as the father/leader and identifies with the adherent/son's quest for independence from the father. He was caught in a circle of conflicting identifications and counter-identifications. He could gather disciples, but his conduct promoted both deference and rebellion. His psychic conflicts contributed to the divisions that mark the history of psychoanalysis.

There are some additional wrinkles to this drama. As Freud did not give sibling-son rivals their legitimate place, he could not easily allow them to establish independent criteria to judge psychoanalytic claims. Without standards of evidence and evaluation, psychoanalysis could not become a true science of the unconscious. Concerns about appropriate intellectual standards for judging psychoanalysis have haunted the movement from Freud's time to the recent Freud Wars. Martin Bergmann writes, "Controversies" within "the natural sciences" are usually settled by "a crucial experiment" or as "further knowledge accumulates." In psychoanalysis, "skill of presentation" counts more than "presentation of scientific data." As "different schools grow upon a different set of postulates" psychoanalytic interpretations are not "entirely in the realm of science" (Martin Bergmann (ed.), *Understanding Dissidence and Controversy in the History of Psychoanalysis*, [New York: Other Press, 2004], p. 94-95). For, as Robert Wallerstein writes, psychoanalysis has "no systematic method for establishing the truth claims" of differing "formulations of psychoanalytic case material" (Robert Wallerstein, "Psychoanalysis as Science" in Nancy E. Miller, et al, *Psychodynamic Treatment Research*, [New York: Basic Books, 1993], p. 97).

Another irony: in the fights with his followers, Freud received intellectual stimulus that enhanced his own theoretical progress. He both identified with and against his disciples, and both rejected

and internalized their ideas. With certain notions, the once rejected views germinated within him and followed an unusual internal path. Years later, he might with modifications incorporate ideas he had vehemently opposed. Adler's once "heretical" ideas on aggression and ego psychology later became cornerstones of Freudian psychoanalysis. Wilhelm Stekel declares, "Freud later adopted some of my discoveries without mentioning my name...I had defined anxiety as the reaction of the *life instinct* against the upsurge of the *death instinct*," yet this "was not mentioned" by Freud "in his later books" (Wilhelm Stekel, *The Autobiography of Wilhelm Stekel*, [New York: Liveright, 1950], p. 138). From Charcot to Breuer, Fliess, Jung and the Viennese, Freud often developed his theories by playing off the ideas of others. Freud's creativity contained a complicated internal dialogue with the views of his former teachers, friends and followers.

There are three things to learn from this brief psychohistorical recounting. First, like the rest of us, for better and worse, Freud's interpersonal actions are rooted in his personal conflicts. In being cognizant of these personal sources, Freud is humanized rather than idealized or demonized. Second, what happened in Vienna established patterns that have periodically recurred in the history of psychoanalysis. With his Viennese colleagues, Freud enabled and even encouraged rivalry, had a limited initial tolerance for doctrinal diversity when his own views were challenged, yet years later he would sometimes adapt as his own ideas that were modified versions of what was once deemed heretical. Third, the lack of criteria to adjudicate doctrinal differences has left psychoanalysis without a firm internal epistemological foundation.

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Fawn M. Brodie Retrospective

(Loewenberg continued from page 1)



Photos: 1945 and 1974

Fawn McKay married Bernard Brodie (1910-1978), a political scientist, in 1936, on the day she received her MA in English from the University of Chicago. They had three children: Richard, Bruce, and Pamela. She co-authored a book with Bernard on the history of warfare and weaponry, entitled *From Crossbow to H-Bomb* (1962).

Fawn taught upper division United States history; Jeffersonian America, 1800-1830; and an acclaimed graduate seminar in American political biography. She was a wonderful colleague—generous, loyal, and humane. Her promotion from Lecturer to Full Professor was achieved in 1971 with a high level of acrimonious and hurtful struggle because of the integral use of psychoanalytic method in her research, her perceived infringement on others' teaching territory, and with the rationalization that her graduate degree was a master's in English rather than a doctorate in history.

Professor Brodie participated in an interdisciplinary psychoanalytic/social science study group of analysts and UCLA faculty who were interested in using psychoanalytic ideas in their research. Robert M. Dorn, who trained in England with Anna Freud, initiated the group. The social science regulars were Alexander L. George of the RAND Corporation, later of Stanford University; E. Victor Wolfenstein; A.J. Slavin; Fawn; and myself. The psychoanalysts included Gerald Aronson, Ira Carson, Alfred Goldberg, Herbert Kupper, Ernst Lewy, and Leonard Rosengarten. We heard and enjoyed discussing several of Fawn's draft chapters on Jefferson as well as her thoughts for a new edition of her biography of Joseph Smith. The study group worked together for six

years, 1965-1971, an unusually long life span for such a group.

Fawn was born on September 15, 1915 in Ogden, Utah, of patrician Mormon stock. The venerable patriarch of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, David O. McKay, was her uncle. In a charming nostalgic memoir Fawn described the family as living "in a state of genteel poverty" because of her father's struggle to pay the mortgage and avoid bankruptcy on the family farm "in perpetual need of rescue." Fawn notes the irony that the farm was saved in the 1930s by the New Deal which her father "detested." Franklin D. Roosevelt's federal farm loan re-negotiation policies halved the her father's debt, about which he felt guilty; he remained an "old guard Republican by habit, conviction, and considerable practice" ("Inflation Idyl: A Family Farm in Huntsville," *Utah Historical Quarterly*, 40:2, Spring 1972, 112-121, quotations from 115, 116, 120, and 121).

Her first book, *No Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith* (1945) was awarded the Alfred A. Knopf fellowship in biography and has gone through two editions and seven printings. Reared in the Mormon Church's first family, Fawn applied her literary talent and skill in historical research to creating an incisive psychological biography of Smith, the founder of Mormonism. Her title was taken from a funeral sermon delivered by Smith in 1844, when he startled his listeners by declaring: "You don't know me; you never knew my heart. No man knows my history. I cannot tell it." Fawn, then 29 years old, wrote:

Since that moment of candor at least three-score writers have taken up the gauntlet. Many have abused him; some have deified him; a few have tried their hands at clinical diagnosis.... It is not that documents are lacking: it is rather that they are fiercely contradictory.... The task of assembling these documents of sifting first-hand accounts from third-hand plagiarism, of fitting Mormon and non-Mormon narratives into a mosaic that makes credible history ... is not a dull one. It is exciting and enlightening to see a religion born (vii-viii).

The book was so revealing a history of the founding father of Mormonism, his fabrications and polygamy, that Fawn's punishment came soon after its publication: she was excommunicated from her Church. Fawn occasionally spoke of the pain in-

flicted by that expulsion from the community of family and believers, referring to herself as a "Jack-Mormon." Her father never read her book or spoke of it. In 1967 Fawn was named "Fellow of the Year" by the Utah State Historical Society and her reconciliation with her Mormon roots and family began. Fawn was singularly honored with the First Annual American West Lectureship sponsored by the University of Utah and the Utah State Historical Society. Her work has stood the test of time—her *No Man Knows My History* is today one of the essential biographies for those who would understand charismatic religious leaders.

Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge of the South (1959) compellingly relates the man to his ideas and political career. She develops the emotional and intellectual consequences of Stevens' clubfoot, a congenital deformity that conditioned many aspects of his life and politics. By disposition he was a Calvinist, never an Emersonian optimist: "Unlike most of his contemporary New England reformers, he never completely rejected Calvinism in favor of a sentimental belief in human perfectibility. Since he, being crippled, could never be perfect, he would not be deluded by the pleasant fantasy that the world was moving ineluctably toward sweetness and light" (21). In weaving together strands of evidence, such as that Stevens was a silent benefactor of many crippled boys; the reports of his childhood neighbors that the other boys laughed at him and "would mimic his limping walk"; the recollection of his fellow Congressman that "He seemed to feel, that every wrong inflicted upon the human race was a blow struck at himself"; that he defended persecuted minorities including African-Americans, Indians, Seventh-day Adventists, Mormons, Jews, and Chinese; and his speeches in which the words "branded," "marked," and "Cain" appear repeatedly, Fawn makes the connection between these disparate fragments of a life with the perceptive interpretation: "A lame man is a minority of one wherever he walks" (26). Here she brilliantly captures the emotional source of her subject's empathic identification with the injured and the depreciated of mankind which was to be so significant for his political stance. These, then, are not merely "interesting" anecdotes. We have a skillful and imaginative synthesis of data and concept which explain a coherent pattern of motivation where previously there had been only inconsistency, disparege-

ment, ambiguity, and paradox. Using her empathetic powers as an historian, she convincingly demonstrates how Stevens' deserting father, his mulatto housekeeper, his inability to defend himself when unjustly accused, and his relations with younger men all refract and interact with his political stance as the leader of radical Reconstruction, a vituperative opponent of President Johnson, a champion of African-Americans, and a leader who decisively altered the US Constitution with the three post-Civil War amendments.

Now to the biographer: how and why did Fawn have the special empathy and personal insight to give perspective to the complex character of Thaddeus Stevens? What in her life and personal background prepared her to be his historical interpreter? Fawn was a tall girl who grew to be an impressive woman. But in puberty and adolescence, height, body image, and self-esteem were to her painful sources of anxiety and shame. She would have some family member measure her weekly and mark her bedroom door. She grew to five feet, ten inches, much taller than any of the other girls her age. Her sister Flora recalls that as the mark "kept going higher Fawn's tears would flow. Being ... tall at puberty was a real hardship on Fawn." All the boys in her group of friends were shorter than she. "She couldn't get a boyfriend because she was taller than all the boys in Huntsville." When she slumped to make herself shorter, her father would admonish her to "Stand up! You're Beautiful!" What had been experienced as a handicap became an adaptive asset when she got a college job in the University of Chicago Hutchinson Commons. Because she was tall and had a long reach, she was assigned to pour second cups of coffee (Newell G. Bringhurst, *Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer's Life*, 1999, 28, 34, and 59 *passim*). As an adult woman Fawn could wear the kind of large knitted sweaters, neck pieces, and jewelry that would dwarf a smaller person. Fawn's ability to personally identify with the physical shame of Stevens, the crippled boy, who was a "minority of one," and Stevens' heroic overcoming through national political achievement, as well as her personal emotional knowledge of the branding humiliation of excommunication, of being the "outsider," helped her to empathize with his psychic scars and internal struggle.

The first three of Fawn's five biographical subjects were in some respect engaged with Mor-

monism. She wrote of Smith, the founder; Stevens was a defender; and Burton was a curious explorer of the Mormons. *The Devil Drives: A Life of Sir Richard Burton* (1967), which was adopted by the History Book Club in 1968, was on her only non-American subject, but he did travel to and describe Mormon country in 1860. He visited with Brigham Young, the Mormon leader, and wrote a book, *The City of the Saints* (London, 1861), describing his visit. Burton was a British explorer of East Africa who admired Islam, saying, "Being amongst Moslems ... is a kind of repose to me ... the atmosphere of Christendom demoralizes and distresses me" (321). He penetrated the Arabian holy cities Mecca and Medina, and Harar in Somaliland. He sought in vain the headwaters of the Nile River. Burton was insatiably curious about sexuality and homosexuality, harems, polygamy, clitoridectomy, and infibulation. Fawn had a special rage at Burton's Catholic wife, Isabel, who destroyed his letters and papers, and "wantonly burned" the manuscript of his translation of a book of Eastern erotica, *The Scented Garden* (329).

Prior to Fawn, the state of Thomas Jefferson scholarship was an idealized view of a man without corporeal or sexual feelings after his wife's death, leading to an ascetic moralistic conclusion. We need only look at the distaste with which the distinguished Jefferson scholar Merrill Peterson handled Jefferson's relationship with his slave and deceased wife's half-sister, Sally Hemings:

The African Venus, Sally Hemings, was apparently the mulatto offspring of John Wayles and Elizabeth Hemings, his concubine, and hence the half-sister of Jefferson's departed wife. Sally it was who had accompanied [Jefferson's younger daughter] Polly to Paris in 1787. After her return she had a number of children, all light skinned, whose paternity some wanton men ascribed to Jefferson. Like most legends, this one was not created out of the whole cloth. The evidence, highly circumstantial, is far from conclusive, however, and unless Jefferson was capable of slipping badly out of character in hidden moments at Monticello, it is difficult to imagine him caught up in a miscegenous relationship. Such a mixture of the races, such a ruthless exploitation of the master-slave relationship, revolted his whole being. It is of no historical importance, but the best guess is that Sally's children were fathered by Peter Carr (*Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography*, 1970, 707).

By contrast, Fawn's *Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate History* (1974) sets a new model for biography and historical interpretation by viewing Jefferson, not as an ascetic celibate after the early death of his wife, but as a complex and passionate man, capable of love and sacrifice, who was moved in his choices and decisions by the forces of his personal and social history as well as by the intellectual reasoning that is emphasized by previous Jefferson biographers such as Dumas Malone and Peterson. Fawn used her empathic capacity combined with subtle literary and psychological analysis. I find her close textual reading most persuasive. In discussing Jefferson's diary of his trip up the Rhine in 1788, Fawn notes: "Anyone who reads with care these twenty-five pages must find it singular that in describing the countryside ... he used the word 'mulatto' eight times." Indeed, the plains, the soil, the valley of the Rhine, the hills, the clay, are all described as "mulatto" (229). Fawn contrasts this with a-year-earlier travel diaries of France before Sally's presence in Europe, where "mulatto" only appeared once in 48 printed pages. Fawn also shows from his account books that "Jefferson began to spend a surprising amount of money on Sally Hemings' clothes" (234). By the time of the return to America, when Sally was two months pregnant, Jefferson gave explicit orders for the arrangements of the "births" [*sic!*] of his party on the voyage home so that on shipboard he would be close to Sally (243).

Fawn had a special sensibility for sexuality in her subjects and its denial in history. In October 1971 I published a little piece on Freud in the *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* (VII:4) in which I quoted an October 31, 1897 letter to Fliess in which Freud, at age 41, wrote: "Sexual excitement ... is no longer of use for someone like me" (*The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess*, Jeffrey M. Masson, ed. and trans., 1985, 275&276). Fawn immediately wrote me a generous note saying she "greatly enjoyed" the paper, but she had "one serious reservation" about what I had written of Freud's sexuality:

This is a dangerous assumption in any case, about any man, and certainly cannot be established by a single sentence in a letter—especially to Fliess! All might have been changed in the next week on one of those vacations with his sister-in-law. Here I am trying to restore Jefferson's masculinity; I won't have you doing to Freud what all Jefferson biographers have been

doing to their hero for generations (Fawn Brodie to Peter Loewenberg, Monday, October, no date, 1971, in possession of the author).

She was right! We have Freud's dream of July 8/9, 1915 when he was 59, of which he said the day residue "has to do with successful coitus Wednesday morning" (in Peter Gay, *Freud: A Life for Our Time*, 1988, 163). It is relevant that this dream "very clearly had as its content the deaths of my sons, Martin first" (Freud to Ferenczi, July 10, 1915, *Freud-Ferenczi Correspondence*, 1996, Vol. 2:64). Thus, Freud relates his virility to survival and triumph over his sons.

Professor Brodie's scholarship has a psychoanalytic thrust to it that constitutes one of the most important commentaries and correctives to American history and culture in our time. She focuses on the American need to sterilize and disembodify our national heroes, as if they had neither senses nor passions. She returns to them their sexuality, their ambivalences, and their human vitality. Despite, or perhaps because of, the controversial nature of placing sexuality in the subject, she was invited to lecture on Thomas Jefferson at the Sesquicentennial of the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. She had an entire session devoted to her work on Jefferson at the meeting of the Organization of American Historians. A recent vindication of her inferences, which Fawn was not to see, is that Jefferson's paternity of Sally's children was established by DNA testing in 1998 which matched descendants of Thomas Jefferson with those of Sally Hemings (*The New York Times*, June 29, 1997; November 1 and 8, 1998; January 27, 2000; July 14, 2003; *Los Angeles Times*, November 8, 1998). How fitting that our founder, Thomas Jefferson, America's secular saint, also fathered African-Americans!

Fawn's final work, *Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character* (1981), was published posthumously. Although she disliked Nixon's political style, particularly his smear techniques, she had a special personal hatred of Nixon after his "plumbers" broke into and rifled her analyst Dr. Lewis Fielding's Beverly Hills office, looking for information on Daniel Ellsberg. She had an informal, folksy personal style that enabled her to talk to Richard Nixon's old aunts and school teachers in the Quaker town of Whittier, California, as a trusted confidant. One of her major themes is Nixon as a liar in matters

large and small throughout his life. She contends that "Nixon lied to gain love, to store up his grandiose fantasies, to bolster his ever-wavering sense of identity. He lied in attack, hoping to win.... And always he lied, and this most aggressively, to deny that he lied.... Finally, he enjoyed lying" (25). She shows Nixon lying about such trivia as his college major and his wife's first name and birth date, as well as in his first campaign for Congress against incumbent Jerry Voorhis; about his secret slush fund in the 1952 presidential campaign; and, of course, in the Watergate cover-up. Fawn structures an argument that Nixon learned to lie in boyhood from a "myth-making mother" who denied what was uncomfortable and stretched the truth, and from a brutal, hot-tempered father who punished his boys with the strap and rod when he failed to get instant obedience, and that Richard learned to be, in his words, "pretty convincing to avoid punishment." She argues that "almost every one of Nixon's victories and political achievements save the elections to the vice-presidency had been won as a result of lying attack or the unexpected and fortuitous death of others" (507). Fawn's argument is persuasive as one reads her account of the shaping of the character of the president whose tenure of office ended so ignobly with the exposure of his lies.

When Fawn presented her work on Nixon at a UCLA Faculty Club evening dinner, I suggested in the discussion that her emphasis on the theme of Nixon, the liar from boyhood to maturity, from parental home to the White House, is essentially static and, while powerful, is unbalanced in its neglect of Nixon's many ego strengths and adaptations in a long political career. In the 1952 presidential campaign, Nixon saved his candidacy and the Republican ticket with his maudlin "Checkers" speech. General Eisenhower was ready to drop him from the GOP slate; Nixon's career appeared to be finished. We may listen to the speech today and find the emotional tone unctuous and revolting, but at that time he knew what would sell in the new media of television and he produced it. He always remained within the boundaries of the law. He had, as Fawn puts it, "the skill of a man who can profit successfully on the fringes of political graft" (280). She listened to my ego psychological critique with interest, but Bernard, her husband, was angry with me, saying, "Peter, you should look at *your* morality!"

The quality of Fawn's work is evident in her scholarship; but her humanity is evidenced by the affection of her students. Graduate students were enthusiastic about her work as a teacher. She excited and stimulated them to the complex task of writing biography. She conducted her seminars with charm and personal warmth—attributes all too rare in academia. The readers of *Clio's Psyche* will understand the pleas of Christopher Jencks and David Riesman 40 years ago and still pressing, for a human as well as a humane emotion-based ethos of graduate education:

The critical problem of graduate instruction in the social sciences and humanities is to narrow the gap between individual students' personal lives and their work. The graduate school must somehow put the student in closer touch with himself, instead of making him believe that the way to get ahead is to regress himself and become a passive instrument 'used' by his methods and his disciplinary colleagues. This is no mean task. The difficulty of the job is not, however, an excuse for the present situation, where the student's subjectivity is not even regarded as a problem (*The Academic Revolution*, 1968, 518).

Fawn filled this high charge with honesty, empathy, and informal charm. She was a wonderful intellectual iconoclast. She did not hesitate, indeed she delighted in, cutting through received myth, sham, and pretense. She opened up fresh, exciting, wonderful ground for new thought, offering creative insights as she linked fact, perceived inconsistencies, and analyzed and digested data and sorted things out to create new narratives for our time. She was a scholar who acutely and sensitively demonstrated understanding of psychological processes in biography. Her ability to explain and illustrate emotional connections without technical concepts or jargon is peerless. She combined profound knowledge of depth psychology, expertise in the areas of American history and biography that she researched, and a superb literary style.

A word about Fawn's qualities as a faculty colleague and personal friend: she was a gracious and accommodating person. She was neither contentious nor polemical. Fawn and Bernard were wonderful hosts. I recall an evening at which a noted psychoanalyst felt insulted by Bernard and left in a huff with his wife in the middle of dinner. We sat around the table in stunned silence as their car descended down the Brodies' winding driveway. It was Fawn who a

few weeks later took the initiative to heal the breach, saying, "This is not worth losing a friendship." In department meetings she demonstrated sagacity and good common sense. As a colleague she generously vetted my manuscripts, questioning details ("Who counted them?" was her reaction to a figure of witch burnings in Europe). In writing she always encouraged the use of the active, rather than the passive or subjunctive, voice.

As a personal friend Fawn was loyal, humane, and compassionate. When I found myself in the *agon* of a divorce, she was *there* for me, invited me to lunch at her home, and was self-disclosing and comforting. When she was writing she was totally immersed in her themes and their knotty problems. When you were at her table or she was at yours, and she was working on Jefferson, you would hear about Jefferson; when the project was Nixon, you heard of Nixon.

As Fawn fought her final battle with lung cancer in 1981, I visited her in St. John's Hospital in Santa Monica. She asked me to phone her analyst, Lew Fielding, and tell him of her hospitalization. The analgesic of choice for the cruel ravages of chemotherapy was cannabis, which relieved her nausea, and which was illegal. Fawn's daughter Pam, who was not a marijuana user, helped her mother by buying illegal marijuana and, as Fawn had trouble taking deep breaths, supplying a water pipe to relieve her pain (interviews with Bruce Brodie, Los Angeles, April 19, 2006, and Pamela Brodie of Homer, Alaska, April 20, 2006). As in her history, in her personal life Fawn was a pioneer ahead of her time. In November 1996, California voters passed the *Compassionate Use Act of 1996* "to ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes" (*California Health and Safety Code*, Section 11362.5), a law which would have made unnecessary the stresses and contortions she and her family suffered 15 years earlier.

The history Fawn McKay Brodie wrote makes some people uncomfortable, for by its very nature it deals with human sexuality and intense personal feelings—but that is precisely what makes her work so rich and invaluable to us, her successors.

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Fawn McKay Brodie: Inquirer into the Morality of Men

Robert D. Anderson
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In Fawn McKay Brodie's own words, it is an "exaggerated act of arrogance" to write a biography, "especially" a psychobiography that tries to explain the inner workings and motivations of an individual (Newell G. Bringhurst, *Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer's Life*, 1999, vii, hereafter *Biography*; all quotations from, except as noted). Condensing such an attempt into a brief review moves this into foolishness. This problem is compounded by a bias of admiration for this woman—who not only tolerated conflict, but charged into it—and who forced me to look at contradictory facts and helped me with them—an effect similar to psychotherapy.

Brodie spent her life exploring and explaining male sexuality and its associated immoral or conflicted behavior. She had a "preoccupation with truth and lying, and we [can] detect a pattern of love and envy, attraction and aversion, admiration for and bafflement about the public figures (all of them male, incidentally) she chose to write about." Her works resulted in "honors and acrimony in about equal measure. She came to know more notoriety than anonymity, scorned in some quarters, celebrated in others" (William Mulder in Newell G. Bringhurst, ed., *Reconsidering No Man Knows My History: Fawn M. Brodie and Joseph Smith in Retrospect*, 1996, vii, x, hereafter *Reconsidering*). In repeated cycles, Brodie was castigated and vilified, and then eventually vindicated.

Fawn McKay was born in 1915 into what

appeared to be an idyllic setting, today frequently sought by those wanting to retire or seeking a second gracious home in a small town. The town was Huntsville, about 50 miles northeast of Salt Lake City and up a canyon subjected to three months of severe winter, although the other seasons each had their distinct beauty which at times reached glory. The home reflected their superior status, one of the two largest in the town with its rock and frame walls containing 14 rooms, and white picket fence in front.

Fawn descended from patrician Mormon stock that had converted in the 1850s and 1860s in Scotland or the Eastern United States and had become the elite of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormons) headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah. Her maternal grandfather became president of Brigham Young University, but more importantly, her uncle, David O. McKay, an educator and legislator, rose through Church services and mission presidencies to become a Mormon Apostle and eventually President of the Church. His tall, white-haired, and distinguished appearance, along with eloquence in speaking, revived, by common membership usage, the term "Prophet," little used since the days of Joseph Smith, the founder of the Church. His brother, Thomas E. McKay, Fawn's father, also tall and distinguished in appearance, was an educator, businessman, farmer, commissioner for public utilities, state senator, and eventually one of the Assistants to the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles of the Church.

Fawn grew up in a devout home in a town where all worshipped together, with religious meetings throughout the week in the nearby chapel, blessings before every meal, and family prayers on knees every evening before bed. All of the religion centered on the Prophet Joseph Smith who, a century earlier, had "restored" God's only true Church to the earth by, he claimed, receiving God's authority—the "priesthood"—from visitations from Jesus and angels, following 1600 years of faulty man-made religion. One of these angels directed Smith to buried ancient scripture from pre-Columbian America, written on gold plates, which Smith miraculously translated as the *Book of Mormon*. Published in 1830, it is considered sacred scripture and a companion to the Bible by Mormon Church members. Smith was, in the words of Fawn Brodie, "the first cause—the explanation for Mormon Country—the reason in fact for one being born at all. I cannot remember the first

time I heard of his visions and his golden plates, and the shocking tale of his murder in Carthage jail. I seem always to have known him" (Fawn M. Brodie, *No Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith*, 1945, jacket cover, second edition 1971, hereafter *No Man*).

Polygamy, a poorly guarded secret since God had commanded the Church in the practice through Joseph Smith in 1843, was publicly announced by Brigham Young in 1852, and had become the most notorious characteristic of the Mormons. The McKay men did not take plural wives but in the late 19th century did help hide polygamists from the federal authorities in the "Mormon underground." Fawn Brimhall, mother of Fawn McKay, grew up amidst the tensions of a polygamist family and home. Fawn Brimhall's grandfather, George Washington Brimhall, took five wives and fathered 14 children. His oldest son, George H. Brimhall, ultimately president of Brigham Young University, married two women polygamously and fathered 15 children, including Fawn Brimhall by his second wife. Fawn Brimhall experienced the added difficulty of her mother's hiding from federal authorities in the Mormon underground until the Church formally abandoned plural marriage.

Fawn Brodie's mother met her future husband, Thomas E. McKay, while she was traveling in Europe and he was President of the Swiss-Austrian mission. She was 23 and he 36 when they married in the Salt Lake Temple in 1912 and, perhaps most importantly, the wife took an oath to obey her husband.

Fawn McKay, the second of five children, was born on September 15, 1915 into a family with unspoken seeds of tension that grew to sufficient size to create an author who would seek to solve mysteries and drive headlong into controversy her whole life. Fawn's intelligence approached or reached the genius level. She was "outspoken, inherently inquisitive, always asking questions, always curious and always wanting to learn." Fear of whooping cough led to home schooling by her mother who used advanced and encouraging techniques. Fawn was memorizing poetry by the age of three; by the age of six she was reading fourth grade books. She was rapidly promoted, showed competitiveness, and wept when she lost a spelling bee to a 12-year-old boy who was almost twice her age. She had hay fever that conveniently kept her inside with her love of books.

Through them she had her first view of an alternate world outside of Huntsville. She had childhood beliefs in her religion; and, as expected, in the Sunday testimony meeting, spoke with absolute certainty about the truth of the Mormon doctrine of restored priesthood and Joseph Smith's claims of receiving "truth" by revelations. Her first published poem in a Mormon children's periodical was about the need to be immediately obedient to her mother.

The tensions in the family had begun before the marriage. Fawn's father was the second of eight adult children, in a family of strict discipline, absolute unity, and rigid religious beliefs. To preserve family unity, Fawn's grandparents had turned the farmhouse home into a legal corporation, owned by the McKay children, but with decisions determined by a "phalanx" of four sisters and governed by the determined oldest brother, David O. McKay, who had a Church position that emphasized his "inspired" actions and decisions. He was, said Fawn later, "like a Chinese Patriarch." Fawn's father, generous and soft-spoken, spent his life avoiding confrontation. His style of never raising his voice or showing anger, and of appeasement, may have served him well in business, politics, and the Church, but led to the ease with which his siblings served their own desires and resulted in Fawn growing up in a house which had *never* been, and would *never* be, their *own* home. Fawn's mother, not a McKay by birth, had no say over the house. Her family of five children was relegated to two bedrooms out of the nine in the house. In summer, all the siblings' families would come at any time and stay for weeks to enjoy their home, bedrooms, and environs. "I don't know how my parents put up with it," recalled Fawn's sister.

Fawn commented that "It was always [father's] way to run away from trouble rather than facing up to it," and all family tensions were held in check by "the seemingly invincible discipline of Love." All fled from any genuine argument and "worked with religious intensity at preserving an atmosphere of tranquility." The farm had not been big enough when divided, and so it was taken over by Fawn's father who took out a high mortgage on the farm, with which he paid off his three brothers. While the details are unclear, the four brothers borrowed money on the land, invested it in speculative commodities, and lost everything, with the main burden on Fawn's father. This left the family in genteel poverty with the father bearing the relentless debt

over 30 years "like Atlas, without hope and without lament." They had to take in boarders, the father worked excessive hours, and the mother bought simple school dresses on credit, which on two occasions was refused.

As a result, the more affluent McKays looked down upon the Thomas E. McKays as not living up to the McKay image as family gentry. Yet no one helped install indoor plumbing and, in fierce winter, chamber pots were used, which froze and had to be thawed on the kitchen stove before being emptied in "Mrs. Grundy," the outhouse, which was a public embarrassment whenever guests had to use the toilet. In contrast to this, Fawn had seen in Salt Lake City the comfortable, even wealthy, lives of her father's siblings.

The tensions in the McKay family, partly hidden under a fraudulent façade of tranquility, were further exposed by the travails of Fawn's mother. Years later, after her mother had made a third, successful, terrible suicide attempt by fire, Fawn wrote:

I still feel that much of her suffering was unnecessary, and that she could have had some pleasant years at the end, but she was caught in a Victorian society and trapped in the patriarchal traditions of the Mormon Church.... The worst thing, I think, was that there were so few to whom she could speak honestly, and so she turned her hatreds and furies inward, and this proved in the end to be a corrupting thing.

Fawn's maternal grandfather, George H. Brimhall, was a "nominally devout" Mormon living in a day of more thinking freedom than the Church allows today. He was a "free spirit" with a fine mind, and "independent in his attitudes." It appears that, as the Church became more restrictive, these attributes forced him out of the presidency of the University. But there was some evidence of emotional instability, along with increasing painful physical disability, which increased until he "splattered" his brains by gunshot when Fawn was 16 years old. Such acts in fundamentalist churches are suspected to be the result of a lack of some degree of faith, or even viewed as a sin.

His second wife, who cared for the first wife's six children as well as her own nine, must have felt overburdened and abandoned, with a physical body worn down by deliveries and hard work.

We are told she disapproved of the doctrine of polygamy, an attitude that carried down to Fawn Brimhall. George H. Brimhall's emotional instability may have also transferred down, for Fawn's mother experienced repeated bouts of depression that contributed to her suicide.

One other quality filtered down as well: Fawn Brimhall's father's willingness to explore thought, ask questions, and tolerate varied opinion because, said Fawn's sister, "the greatest thing that mother gave us was a need for intellectual honesty" (Newell G. Bringhurst, "Fawn M. Brodie—Her Biographies as Autobiography," *Pacific Historical Review* LIX, #2, May 1990, 214). Intellectual honesty was not very compatible with the rigid religious dogma that the McKay side of the family brought to the marriage.

This whispered history probably contributed to Fawn Brimhall's inferior status within her husband's extended family. Did she feel cornered? Inferior by sex, inferior by being an in-law, burdened with debt and a husband who would not fight for her, restricted to a few rooms in their "home," blocked from open discussion of her problems, and under her temple oath to obey her husband, she became a "secret heretic," a "thorough going heretic," and, later, Fawn's secret confidante in her first major—and heretical—writing. She remained a closeted person who could not develop her full self. Her hatred turned against herself and the Mormon doctrine. She was a "social Mormon," who doubted the Mormon view of eternity and "hated the temple ceremony so bad that it was just ghastly." She wondered how the secret Mormon temple "garments [underwear] could be sacred when they're worn next to a dirty body." Fawn McKay's older sister, Flora, believed that their mother "hated sex" and defended herself in her home by sleeping in one bed with two daughters while her husband slept in another bed with a son.

When puberty came, Fawn confessed to wanting to "feel [her own] vagina." Her mother was shocked, responding that she should "never touch it. Never touch it!" Fawn responded with the self-inflicted compulsion of wiggling her big toes to keep away from her "privates."

Besides these maternal instructions and Fawn's obedience, do we have any indication of oedipal conflicts? Without further evidence, such ideas require speculation. Might Fawn's adolescent

sexual struggles (and later frigidity, discussed below) have had also to do with sensing her father's libidinal dissatisfactions and reflect the wishes from many years previously of a small daughter's wish to comfort her father? A speculation that Fawn resented her older sister Flora, who was not sexually inhibited and had a warm and close relationship with their father, is challenged by the fact that Fawn and Flora were life-long friends, without evidence of resentment.

We should not be surprised that when puberty started, Fawn saw herself as deformed. It took the displaced concern over being too tall—she reached 5'10" and slumped to diminish this aberration. The issue of inequity in the McKay home, especially of male power and privilege, is apparent. But there is another complicating layer in this home, represented by this mother who considers the female genitalia as poisonous and the body dirty. The two seem connected. It appears to me that it is *as if* the subjugation of women is enhanced because of their genitals. With Fawn, her basic deformity would not be her height, but her genitals, now with menses. The issue for Fawn is not just unfairness, but double unfairness. Had Fawn grown up in a home where there was a mother model pleased with herself, then this second layer would not have occurred. But, how often, especially in this cultural setting, would such a pleased self-view be possible?

Fawn, taller than the boys her age, received the attention of a youth, Dilworth Jensen, five years senior and in college. It was a good relationship, with common interests in books and excelling in school. Fawn "adored being with him." Despite her age, there was some talk of marriage. Even so, her family resisted because of their elite status and his Scandinavian background. She spent the next two years at the Mormon-owned Weber College and met some students from outside Utah. She took broadening courses, directing herself toward English composition and literature.

Fawn was good at public speaking, and the school sponsored debates on unemployment insurance and questions of free trade. Fawn and a partner represented the school and traveled throughout the Midwest. At the former Mormon town of Nauvoo, Illinois, she had a startling debate with a pastor from a smaller antagonistic sect of Mormons, the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (now the Community of Christ), that had not gone

west and had presidents from the progeny of Joseph Smith. From him Fawn learned for the first time that Utah Mormons believed Smith had had 27 wives. "I was dumbfounded and had to confess absolute ignorance." While she was only 15 years old, this was the first instance among many of an increasing awareness that being kept from information is a form of being deceived.

For practical reasons, she attended the University of Utah in Salt Lake City from the ages of 17 to 19. "I was devout until I went to the University of Utah," she once said. "There was nothing very spectacular about it.... It was a quiet kind of moving out into ... the larger society and learning that the center of the universe was not Salt Lake City as I had been taught as a child." The school was bigger than Weber College, and some of the faculty was antagonistic to the Mormon Church, its policies, and its leaders. Although there were relatives in the city, this was the first time Fawn became known for herself and not her family's Church positions.

Important in her developing her independent thinking was a maternal uncle, Dean R. Brimhall. He and his wife were both well educated and led two separate careers while maintaining a successful marriage. He had a doctorate in psychology from Columbia University. She had degrees from the University of Utah and the University of Southern California, and would become known as "The First Lady of the Utah Theater." Perhaps most importantly, her uncle assumed his wife's equality and encouraged her career, a contrast to Fawn's hometown environment. Her uncle, despite a Mormon background and mission, was a religious skeptic. This knowledge jarred her at first. She initially believed he lacked the strength that could only come from a "belief in revealed religion." Over time, their relationship grew and he became her closest confidante in the family.

Fawn participated in the debate team, and traveled to California, which had been described as the "fleshpots of Egypt." Instead she found that Californians could be devout in their varied beliefs, once again challenging her Mormon teachings about other religions. However, she quit debate because of her developing integrity, for she believed the participants would select documents only for the purpose of enhancing their potential win and avoid a balanced view of the need for unemployment insurance—all while there were long bread lines in the midst of the

Great Depression.

Courses in ethics and child psychology cast further doubt on her religious beliefs. For the first time she realized that the majority of anthropologists believed that early Native Americans were of Asian origin. She worked in a library, and read broadening—non-believing—books about Mormonism and Joseph Smith. Her shock was at two levels: doubt that such stories about Smith could be true and developing fury at being lied to through the censoring of information.

A cousin-in-law, Alice Smith McKay, wrote a master's thesis on a few prophecies of Joseph Smith that the Church leaders declared were "beyond the human power to discern or to calculate." Her cousin realized that at least one prominent "prophecy" concerning the future Civil War had simply come from information commonly available at the time. Her cousin believed that "in the absence of [tangible] information," Smith could not utter prophecies to his people. She further postulated that his "prophecies" were accepted when Smith's people were in need of his command for their welfare and desperate for his leadership.

Fawn's boyfriend, Dilworth Jensen, returned from his Swiss-Austrian mission, and their relationship resumed despite their religious differences "that we could not discuss." There were renewed plans to marry, and Fawn sought solace from her religious doubt, anxiety, and turmoil in her academic studies. Now we catch a rare glimpse of her inner struggles in her first and only published work of fiction, entitled "Experiment," written for a literary competition. The story, with similarities to Shaw's *Pygmalion*, concerned a doctor who claims the ability to achieve human perfectibility—all by "revolutionizing a human subject in terms of appearance, behavior and personality." Challenged by a colleague, he insists that he had already raised an "utterly commonplace girl," who lived in a small rural community known as "Hilltown," to perfection. Although important to understanding Fawn McKay, the story won no awards, and a critical teacher told her she had no talent for fiction. Her story is a curious contradiction, with female perfection achieved under the control of a man—hardly true equality—and we might wonder what changes had to occur to a woman's body to make it perfect. The fiction story suggests Fawn's

belief in the possibility that perfection can be actually achieved—and is not just a mental construct. We benefit from Fawn McKay Brodie's drive for perfection in her work, but she suffered and could not relax, and this drive intensified the sexism issue throughout her life. I think that is why she was so driven: happy only when she was working on a book that might become perfect, but never could be, so she had to keep at it.

After graduating from university with high honors in June 1934, Fawn returned to Ogden, Utah, and taught English at Weber College, teaching “rings around” many of the long-established teachers and gaining respect. Her older sister taught grade school, and between them they were able to rent a small house that was big enough to accommodate the whole McKay family in the winter months, providing them with heat and indoor plumbing.

Fawn's relationship continued with Dilworth Jensen, her devout Mormon, who had returned from his missionary work. He transferred from school to school with better programs in his field of zoology and was awarded a graduate fellowship at the University of California at Berkeley. Fawn received a similar fellowship at the same school and once more there was talk of marriage. But her parents encouraged her to attend the University of Chicago because it had a vigorous Mormon youth group; her father knew the president of the school; they were not yet prepared for her to marry; and they wanted her to avoid Berkeley and Dilworth Jensen. Despite fondness for her long-standing boyfriend, Fawn wished to be on her own, and had her own growing doubts about his strong Mormon devotion, especially in view of her declining devotion.

Entering the University of Chicago brought her an “enormously exhilarating ... sense of liberation ... the confining aspects of the Mormon religion dropped off within a few weeks.... It was like taking off a hot coat in the summertime.” Her leaving Mormonism was a quiet, gradual process, without *Sturm und Drang*. She participated pleasantly with the local congregation. Meanwhile, her university studies focused on various literary figures, including D. H. Lawrence, on whom she wrote a master's essay. This process provided her with training in historical methodology, and within a year she had her master's degree in English literature. She was 20 years old.

During that year, she had an epiphany brought on by an inquisitive roommate. When Fawn explained the “golden plates” of the *Book of Mormon*, and Joseph Smith's miraculous translation of them, the woman asked, “What happened to these golden plates?” and Fawn replied, “An angel came and took them back to heaven.” The roommate rolled her eyes, and Fawn, capable at that point of identifying with the roommate's disbelief, appreciated the absurdity of the story. All that was needed to complete her break from the Mormon faith was support in her expanded doubt and someone with insightful challenging inquiry.

After a six-week whirlwind courtship, Fawn McKay married Bernard Brodie on the same day as her graduation. She had caught his eye when she was waiting on tables in the University cafeteria. His Jewish parents had emigrated from Latvia, and he grew up in tenement housing on the West Side of Chicago. His father provided for the family as an itinerant peddler with a horse-drawn wagon. Bernard was dynamic, passionate, and intelligent, with a driven thirst for knowledge, and was quick to show his feelings and emotions. His language was eloquent, and he had a fondness for lyrical poetry, good music, and beautiful flowers. He recognized Fawn's classic beauty and intelligence.

The only member from either family who attended the wedding was Fawn's mother. Out of courtesy to her family, they married in the University of Chicago Latter-day Saint chapel. Earlier, Bernard had broken almost all contact with his family, who strongly disapproved of his marriage to Fawn. Her own family had united in trying to fight off this marriage, with anti-Semitic letters and fasting and prayer; her uncle, future LDS President David O. McKay, traveled to Chicago to try to dissuade her. Her long-standing Mormon boyfriend—they had communicated by almost daily letters—was stunned at her unexpected announcement of her intent to marry and felt she independently changed her personality to suit different environments.

By this time, Fawn had formed her disbelief, centering on the naturalistic facts that Native Americans had Mongolian features and that all evidence proposed their arrival across the Siberian land bridge five to ten thousand years earlier than *Book of Mormon* peoples, who had supposedly arrived in two pe-

riods: around 600 BCE from the land of Israel and around 2500 BCE from Mesopotamia to a land where “never man had been” (*Book of Mormon*, Ether 2:5). Her bitterness at this discovery would provide the energy for her intellectual rebellion.

The *Book of Mormon* is the prime external source of evidence for the claims of Joseph Smith and continues to be studied in weekly meetings and in the home by all members of the family. Smith claimed that, while producing the *Book of Mormon*, various angels returned to earth and, by the laying on of hands, *restored* to earth the authority of God to men. This would make the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints the only true Church of God, and its President the Prophet, Seer, and Revelator for the world. Secondly, the “priesthood” has been passed from Smith and partners down through the Mormon Church and all *male* members are expected to receive its various levels by the laying on of hands throughout life. Each male member has the right to receive revelation (or its minor form, inspiration), certifying his decisions. This priesthood of males also makes them the leaders in the family. Women are subject to their authority and are, by inference and despite argument, inferior. But what if one of the *Book of Mormon's* most basic premises—about Native Americans—was not true?

In Brodie's case, the priesthood included her uncle, Apostle, and later President, David O. McKay, and her father, elevated to be an Assistant to the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles in the early 1940s. She was raised in an unusual situation with family members who had the highest authority and, therefore, held strong claim to being “inspired” in their acts and decisions—both within and outside their families. Now she wondered if they were devoting their lives to a fraudulent institution, and, more to the point, were they also lying by covering up or re-writing history? Now she was facing her issue: men, anatomically complete—even “perfect”—were not only not perfect, but seriously flawed.

After her marriage, Fawn Brodie took entry-level jobs and then ended up in a library, which allowed her to begin quiet research. Interested and curious about the Mormon religion, her husband spurred her puzzlement. But some of the same forces driving her into inquiry and heresy were also interfering with the intimacy in their marriage. She was restricted and, perhaps, frigid with Bernard. Her sister

advised her to just “let go” in sex. Fawn replied, “How can I let go?” Fawn was raised in a culture of puritanical sex, with pre-marital relations strictly forbidden. Now she was expected to immediately reverse these strictures while shucking off the control and domination of the male world. Could she allow the overwhelming and forbidden explosion at the center of her physical being to occur with the participation of a man? Again, oedipal conflicts remain highly speculative.

She did a researched inquiry of the Church welfare system, entitled “Mormon Security,” and found misrepresentation vis-à-vis government relief programs. She published her study in the *Nation* under a pseudonym to avoid family embarrassment. She was again disillusioned by the Church's behavior, which heightened her curiosity about Joseph Smith, and, finding no scholarly biography available, decided to write one. During this period of time, her husband finished his PhD dissertation, they moved three times, and she became a mother to the first of three children.

Brodie had already come to the conclusion “that the whole *Book of Mormon* story was false” and that Joseph Smith was a “conscious fraud.”

If the *Book of Mormon* came out of his own background in western New York, which he insisted came from golden plates, then what kind of *man* was this? The whole problem of his credibility, I thought, was crying out for some explanation.... It was a piece of detective work that I found absolutely compelling. It was fantastic! I was gripped by it ... and was fascinated the whole time. I was baffled by the complexities of this man and remained somewhat baffled even after the book was finished ... [but much later with the psychiatric literature] I felt I had some more explanations.... The fraudulent nature of the *Book of Mormon* is, I think, unmistakable (Shirley E. Stephenson, “Biography of Fawn McKay Brodie,” interview, California State University Oral History Program, O.H. 1523, 1975, 7-9, hereafter “Interview”).

She never lost those views. Her son Bruce later said that she “felt an intense sense of betrayal but was working through an equally intense childhood love for [Joseph Smith] who had been vitally important [to her]” (Newell G. Bringhurst, “Fawn M. Brodie—Her Biographies as Autobiography,” *Pacific Historical Review* 59, May 1990, 215). She

could share her ideas with her maternal uncle, Dean Brimhall, who had become a non-believer as well, and wrote him that through her perusal of early 19th-century newspapers that Smith would have read—"an absolute goldmine"—she was "able to trace almost every idea in [the *Book of Mormon*] right down to Ontario Co. New York 1827 [including] the lost tribe theory, the exterminated race theory, anti-Masonry, anti-Catholicism—the whole gamut of sectarian religious controversy" ("Interview," 5; *Biography*, 72).

In addition to her uncle, two other people were critically important to her and enhanced her book greatly. The most important was her husband. She later said,

The volume would have been a harsher indictment of Joseph Smith had it not be for [Bernard's] influence. I was angered by the obvious nature of the fraud in his writing of the *Book of Mormon*.... My husband kept urging me to look at the man's genius, to explain his successes, and to make sure that the reader understood why so many people loved him, and believed in him. If there is real compassion for Joseph Smith in the book, and I believe there is, it is more the result of the influence of my husband than anyone else (Newell G. Bringhurst, "Fawn Brodie and her Quest for Independence," *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought* 22:2, Summer 1989, 89).

The second was Dale Morgan, a non-believing Mormon historian of note who became her mentor, careful critic, and personal friend until his untimely death in 1971 at age 56. He also modified her writing, telling her,

Your own point of view ... is much too hard and fast, to my way of thinking, it is too coldly logical in its conception of Joseph's mind and the development of his character. Your view of him is all hard edges, without any of those blurrings which are more difficult to cope with but which constitute a man in the round. I am particularly struck with the assumption your MS. makes that Joseph was a self-conscious imposter.

Morgan's perceptive view of Joseph Smith almost suggests he knew Object Relations theory: "Regardless of how he got started with the Mormon affair, he came to believe absolutely in what he was doing; his sincerity can hardly be challenged. I think he had an extreme capacity for fantasy, and ultimately the fantasy may have become more real to

him than reality itself, to the point that it displaced reality." How did this happen?

The responsibility [of his followers] in the mak[ing] of their prophet, in the proliferation of his legend, is not to be dismissed. Their hunger for miracle, their thirst for the marvelous, their lust for assurance that they were God's chosen people, to be preserved on the great and terrible day, made them hardly less than Joseph, the authors of his history. His questionable responsibility is the faithful image of their own (John Phillip Walker, ed., *Dale Morgan on Early Mormonism: Correspondence and a New History*, 1986, 260).

As Brodie moved forward in her research, she wanted to examine a little known 1832 diary of Joseph Smith in the Mormon archives in Salt Lake City. (She also asked about records on polygamy.) Perhaps she hoped that, if allowed to examine this particular diary, she would be allowed other searches. However, she was confronted by her uncle, David O. McKay; the discussion was acrimonious; and she was forbidden to see the diary or use the archives. Although, the next day she received a note from him authorizing her access to the archives, she knew now she could not use her family connection and she never did. The whole incident suggested to her that the hierarchy was involved in a cover-up of information.

Where were Brodie's parents in all of this? Early in her research for *No Man*, she started sharing her ideas with her mother, who had become "a thoroughgoing heretic." It was "almost as much fun to discuss the Church with her" as with her uncle, Dean Brimhall. But her father remained emotionally and intellectually unavailable. In previous discussions, he had replied, "You've got to believe." Now he refused to discuss the book with his daughter or even acknowledge its existence. Later she said,

My father never did read the Joseph Smith biography ... I always felt ... that his not reading it was an act of real hostility ... and his refusal to discuss it hurt me more, I think, than an angry argument about the contents would have done. ...we both found it impossible to communicate on the subject, as on most others.

If there was oedipal conflict in Brodie's makeup, this is perhaps the strongest evidence for such speculation. Some of her fury in her life might

have been a result of the emotional barrier—rejection—from her father.

Then, as the book was in its final stages, her father suffered a heart attack. Had her work contributed to this threat to his life? “The consequences for my own peace of mind would be simply unbearable,” she said, adding, “If I didn’t have such an affection for my father, who is the soul of kindness, perhaps I wouldn’t be so troubled.” These are unilateral conscious thoughts, and her ambivalence toward her father is hidden. Her father slowly recovered, but then she identified with his potential death and her guilt led to a fear that she might be killed in some kind of accident. She and her father continued to act as if the book did not exist, and she feared that the unpleasantness the book would create for her father. Now the denial: “I suspect some Freudian would explain my whole five-year toil on the basis of an unconscious desire to wound him.... God knows the compulsion I have been laboring under has been emotional rather than intellectual, but it doesn’t have its roots in that kind of complex.”

Well, yes, it does. At various layers, she was intent on destroying the fraud and corruption of Joseph Smith, including his abuse of women; she also was intent on exposing the cover-up and manipulation of history by the Mormon male hierarchy that continued to support Smith; and she was attacking her father who was part of that system, and who, within their home, had taken a submissive role to his McKay background, and left his wife and family in disadvantage.

Brodie’s was an attack on sexism and inequity sustained by religious dishonesty. These are social issues, but then we are left with a deeper, unanswerable question as to how she felt about being a woman. Eleven months before the book was published, she suffered a miscarriage. “I had all the pain and misery of childbirth without anything to show for it.” The physical inequity of men and women in reproduction is not social, but natural. She had every right to be furious at the social inequity, but if she was furious with the natural dissonance that leaves men relatively unencumbered, she would have been in warfare with her own being, and she was envious of men. Somehow, the work on the book had contained and balanced this struggle, but now she desired the continuity that men had in work. “Once you have raised a child to the ripe age of three and

sent him off to nursery school there isn’t anything else to turn [to] except to having another—which is of course satisfying enough in itself, but only for another three or four years. Then where are you?” She reached the “dreadful day for a woman”—her 30th birthday—three months before the book was published.

Three years later she was struggling with “inertia.” “If one wanted to discover the laws of inertia the best place to go for data [is] the female mind.... So many fathers pass their genius on to their daughters, but as a general rule the talents lie dormant and are passed on to flower in the sons.” A woman fails to live up to her intellectual potential because of the “extraordinary satisfaction a woman gets from taking care of small children. It makes ambition seem ridiculous, and shows up fame for the hollow thing it is.” Then the children grow up, and a woman’s life is “unutterably barren, and [it’s] too late to fill it up with anything.”

This first conundrum asks if, besides the sexism in her rearing, she had an inherent drive antagonistic to her gender, with intellectual ambition incompatible with motherhood. Even at that late date, American society, most especially Mormon subculture, had trouble reconciling motherhood and professional occupation. Or did the drive also come from her environment in her first year or two, and leave a residual of an impossible demand for perfection—associated with maleness—in her work. Was she never able to relax and enjoy a casual life, partly because she could never attain equality and completeness—no matter how excellent her work?

When the book was published, Brodie became a national figure. She received praise and condemnation “in about equal amounts” and mostly along religious lines. Within six months she was excommunicated by the Mormon Church, which brought tears, mostly, she emphasized, because of the effect on her parents and, we might also suspect, as public and private rationalization for how hurt she was. The book is a marvel to read, at times like a historical criminal investigation; at times with the grace of a flowing stream; at times with energy that simply propels one forward.

There was another reason the book made such waves. What the Mormons couldn’t believe was Brodie’s documentation. Up to that time, the

studies of Joseph Smith, by outsiders, were condemning and scurrilous; by insiders, they were apologetic Sunday school manuals. Yet she had a view of Smith that allowed her to perceptively evaluate the materials that she found that no one else even suspected existed. For example, in an obscure outdated religious encyclopedia, she found a report of a trial of Smith, taken from a courtroom docket book and dated four years before the *Book of Mormon*. This report had him found guilty of “disorderly conduct” and described his fraudulent behavior in simple magic trickery, deceit, and money-digging rituals. But the original source of the report had disappeared. Nevertheless, the report fit her view of Smith, and with courage she included it in her biography. As expected, devout historians accused her of creating history by using forged documents. But she had accurately measured her man: shortly after her book was published, she found another lengthy written report of this trial, and eventually three other confirmations surfaced—including an original holograph—which supported her view (*No Man*, 16, 427&428, 440&441; *Biography*, 121, 291n16).

Many of the Mormon devout have objected to Brodie’s “psychologizing” that imposed ideas into Joseph Smith’s mind. We now know that her list of wives for Joseph Smith was flawed by her ill view of the man, as we can firmly document only 33 wives, including 14-year-old girls and already married women. Some have suggested that her “fictional” writing style undermined the historical aspects of the book or that she was extreme in her view of Smith and did not explore the “broad middle ground” between fraud and prophet. Some devout historians vigorously object to any study of Smith that refuses to consider the believed valid “supernatural” elements in his life. Other, more kindly, reviews suggest it is time to move on to other issues in Mormon history.

Nonetheless, Brodie’s work, directly or indirectly, helped modify Mormonism. She embarrassed every devout Mormon historian and forced Mormon studies to a higher plane. She contributed to the muting of racism that now allows black men to hold the priesthood. The secret temple ceremonies have melted with the changing of the oath for wives from obedience to “following their husbands as their husbands follow the Lord.” Over the last 50 years, the importance of Joseph Smith has diminished in com-

parison with the emphasis on Jesus and the New Testament. Many now believe that Smith’s “translation” of the gold plates ran through his thinking and emotions, thus corrupting the translation with 19th-century American influences. These changes allow for a fudging of absolute belief in Smith as Prophet. I think Brodie would have been pleased with the slow modifications and compromises that are being made concerning Smith, but I don’t think she would have smiled. She would have viewed these adjustments as continued deceit, avoiding looking at leaders who value power more than truth, or avoiding the painful self-exploration that challenges the continued belief in improbabilities that science has turned into impossibilities.

Brodie refused to return to the “swamp” of Mormon history and do a full re-write on Joseph Smith when her book was republished 26 years later in 1971, but she added an updated supplement. She commented that she had earlier missed the “fratricide” that exists throughout the *Book of Mormon*, and that she had not had the training to delve into Smith’s identity problems. I like to think that, as some concepts crystallized in psychoanalysis, she would have recognized the destructive results of childhood leg surgery trauma in the adult Joseph Smith, which pervades the *Book of Mormon*, and that she would have actively used the concepts of narcissism, narcissistic personality disorder, and malignant narcissism in understanding his identity problems.

Here is my personal and speculative brief summary of Joseph Smith’s identity. He was raised in poverty and in a dysfunctional, unstable, and probably alcoholic family. He underwent a terrible childhood illness and a horrible traumatic leg surgery, which resulted in regressive rage that led to identity diffusion. This was followed by a false superimposed self with magical, then prophetic, powers, which was encouraged by his family. All this led to an imagination of fury and destructiveness which combined rage with versions of his surgery in a book of terror, hatred, and destruction: the *Book of Mormon*. His goal with his book and supernatural claims was to avoid any touch of helplessness by gaining power and control over others. His belief in his false self solidified with the convictions of his followers, and he became whom they wanted him to convince them that he was. He maneuvered both men and women, demanding all of their time, talent, and pos-

sessions—including, on occasion, their wives. When they were offered, Smith would be reassured briefly. (Robert D. Anderson, *Inside the Mind of Joseph Smith*, 1999, *passim*).

Brodie saw Smith's polygamy as "disguised whoredoms" and partly a result of his hypersexuality. A broader and deeper question is whether he was capable of loving himself or anyone else.

The work on her book was done, and Brodie wondered whom she would write about next. One possibility after another was tossed aside. No woman met her criteria. Most wives of US presidents were boring, and her first choice, Eleanor Roosevelt, was being done by others. But which man? "Why is it, I wonder, that I prefer someone I can tear into? Is it because until I was twenty I was such a supremely good and obedient child that I am still trying to make up for lost time?" If she was in warfare with her physical being, then some of her attack on the men in her histories was probably projection and envy. The two issues—nature's physical bias and social inequity—came together four and a half years later in another frightening miscarriage that required hospitalization as she came close to death. Some of the McKay family had indicated that the loss of the child and the near-fatal illness were "just punishment" for her "sins." She responded with a depression that took the form of "pessimism & bitterness.... If all the venom that accumulated in my soul could have been harnessed in some kind of explosive [the whole] state [of Utah] would simply have been blown to nothing." Then the struggle between writing and motherhood tipped the other way with her plans to have another baby. "This is priority number one, and everything else is going to be sacrificed to it."

It was becoming clear that writing about Joseph Smith had not fully exorcised Brodie's demons about male control and duplicity. Her father had had a second, serious heart attack four years after the book on Joseph Smith had been published. His health declined, and five years later he developed inoperable cancer of the neck. He became an enfeebled and blind invalid, but refused care from home-health care workers, and her mother was deteriorating from the burden of caring for him. Brodie was in the midst of her own psychoanalysis when her mother attempted suicide, appeared to improve, and then made another suicide attempt. She could not communicate well with her mother's psychiatrist, who

used shock treatment but little personal intervention. Brodie found another therapist for her mother, but the depression was severe.

Brodie blamed her father for her mother's condition because of all his demands on her. "My disillusionment with my Father reached the lowest possible point ... absolute bottom," she wrote to her uncle Dean Brimhall.

Maybe in years to come I can be more forgiving, but he makes any kind of detachment so difficult because of continuing pretensions to purity and saintliness. And of course I started out as a child thinking he was next to God in gallantry and goodness. Then, too, there is the factor that I have hurt him, and having hurt him I must believe the worst about him lest I suffer too much from guilt myself.

She could list many factors for her mother's depression, and one she imagined was an intolerable secret desire to have her husband dead—and, again, we must wonder about projection. Her mother improved in dramatic fashion with shock treatment, but her father continued to deteriorate, and died two years later at the age of 82. Two years after that, her mother succeeded in suicide by setting herself on fire, suffering in critical condition for several days before dying at the age of 71.

During the years of the 1950s and 1960s, Brodie's husband, Bernard, advanced in recognition for his writing on national military strategies; she co-authored *From Crossbow to H-Bomb* (1962) with him. His work required repeated relocations (Dartmouth College, Yale, the Pentagon, and the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica) but they eventually settled in Pacific Palisades in California. They raised three children successfully. Although her only degree was a master's in English, she achieved tenure as a professor of history at UCLA, but not without a bitter fight that contained some sexism and rigidity against those without PhDs in their chosen field and opposition from some who felt there was little place for psychological interpretation in history. She was a liberal Democrat, an environmentalist, and a quiet feminist who knew she was underpaid compared to her husband. Through her husband's work, they were acquaintances with the politically prominent such as Henry Kissinger, and through her own work, she began associations with the psychoanalytic institutes in Los Angeles. Her works became increas-

ingly psychological. She had entered a two-and-a-half-year psychoanalysis when she was 40 years old. In an interview 20 years later, she was effusive about the application of psychoanalytic thought in biography. She described such attempts as “treacherous” but, when done well, very rewarding (“Interview,” 18-21).

Each of Brodie's last four biographies was a variation of her work on Joseph Smith. There was a focus on a powerful man, his sexual life, and deception and cover-up. She was initially interested in Thaddeus Stevens because of the racial issues with blacks and as a continuation of the Mormon ban on blacks in the priesthood. She believed she would be dealing with a scoundrel similar to Smith, but

the more I read about Stevens, the more I felt he had been abused and vilified, that this man really had elements of greatness. So, in a way it was the reverse of Joseph Smith. Here, I was rebuilding a reputation that had been abused. With Joseph Smith, I felt this man whom I had been brought up to respect as a deity did not deserve that reputation. It was a total about face in terms of intention. It was good to be doing a positive thing rather than the destructive thing, because I had always felt guilty about the destructive nature of the Joseph Smith book (“Interview,” 14-15).

She investigated Stevens' childhood, and wondered, “what would [his clubfoot] do to a man's psyche?” and probed his “extraordinary capacity for hatred,” but still corrected the view of him as a “malignant and vindictive old man.” Her book, *Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge of the South* (1959), was commercially unsuccessful but altered the view of Southern Reconstruction (*Biography*, 116-154 passim; Bringham, “Fawn M. Brodie—Her Biographies as Autobiography,” 222-223).

Brodie was soon invited to write an introduction to a new edition of *The City of the Saints* (1861) by the explorer, eccentric scholar, linguist, and sexologist of the 19th century, Sir Richard Francis Burton. This one of his 40 books dealt with Salt Lake City and polygamy. She became “lost to this man, who was fascinating beyond belief... [It was] a fun book to write and to research.” She identified with his driven compulsivity and was fascinated by his sampling of “everything in the sexual market” in the countries he visited. *The Devil Drives: A Life of Sir Richard Burton* was published in 1967. Conflict

in Burton's life existed mostly between him and his devout Roman Catholic wife, who loved him, yet was repelled by his interest in sex. She provided the deception and cover-up when she burned his 40-year collection of manuscripts and diaries, and then wrote a sanitized biography of him (“Interview,” 16&17; *Biography*, 155-184 passim).

By the time she was 50 in 1965, Brodie had achieved national recognition as an author and biographer. Her earlier works were republished; she had articles published in distinguished journals and magazines; and the Utah State Historical Society gave her its most prestigious honor by making her a Fellow.

Brodie reached her apogee of writing ability combined with psychological insight during her seven years of work on the 600-page *Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate History* (1974), earning her broad-based acclaim, stunning publication numbers, and a degree of financial wealth. It was a Book of the Month Club selection and on *The New York Times* bestseller list for 13 weeks. She clearly loved this man and his genius, and was ready to delve into his conflicts. She had dreams of being married to him and told her son, “If I had been a man, I would have been a man like [Jefferson].” She introduced the world to Sally Hemings, his African-American slave, mistress of 28 years, and mother of seven of his children. The denial and hiding by his descendents and admirers replicated her experience with Joseph Smith and the Mormon devout. Once again, she was that “horrible Brodie woman.” Fawn acknowledged,

and here [with Jefferson] we have a deity as important to many Americans as Joseph Smith is to many Mormons.... [But] I am prepared for incomprehension as well as controversy. I am prepared for distortion and am prepared for indignation. But I still think the time is ripe for what I have written, and that in general the response will be favorable, and good. It may even be overwhelmingly enthusiastic.

Brodie was correct, for she was writing in the midst of the civil rights movement. She publicly debated Gary Wills, who said Sally Hemings was only a “healthy prostitute” instead of a real love involvement. She helped us understand Jefferson's inaction on slavery that affects us even today. As Brodie's biographer, Newell G. Bringham, summarized,

If he freed his slaves in conformity with his self-proclaimed ideals of liberty and equal-

ity, they would have been banished from the state as freedmen in accordance with Virginia law. Thus, the only way Jefferson could maintain his relationship with Sally Hemings was to keep her enslaved. This made the larger issue of slavery too complex to deal with. And so Jefferson drifted along apathetically through the remainder of his life, leaving it to later generations of Americans to contend with the slavery issue.

Once again, as with Smith, she was vindicated, this time by DNA studies, but not until many years after her death.

During the time Brodie was writing about Jefferson's secret life, she discovered that her husband had become deeply involved in a secret affair with another woman. With Fawn Brodie's lifelong preoccupation and fury about the sexual immorality and deceit of men, it is hard to imagine anything that would have been more painful for her. She was mortified, thought of divorce, but felt the marriage had had so many positive aspects through their long relationship that it survived.

Let us pause here for a speck of contemplation. While placing full responsibility for her husband's dishonesty and deceit on his shoulders, we might wonder if, in some way, her sexual struggles unconsciously set up the framework for his behavior. Did he feel her force and drive as a competition that threatened his masculinity? She was ascending in accomplishment and recognition, while his own career had leveled, perhaps even faltered. He had been jealous of his wife's involvement with Jefferson, whether or not he knew of her dreams of being married to him. "God, I'm glad that man is out of the house," he reportedly said as the book was finished. Is Bernard's infidelity and his wish for his wife to behave submissively (as I seek to establish below), both suggesting threatened masculinity, tied to another puzzle in her life concerning her focus on racism and sexism in the subjects of her biographies? In at least three of her books she attacked racism, and it is possible that she, along with other critics, provided pressure for the 1978 "revelation" to the Mormon Prophet allowing black men to hold the priesthood.

It isn't that Brodie didn't attack sexism, but this was *the* issue in her personal history, yet it seemed to get the short end of the stick in her scholarship. When asked her attitude towards feminism in

the 1975 interview, she acknowledged her quiet feminism and irritation at the pay discrepancy compared to her husband, but then she added,

I don't pay very much attention to [the feminists]; really, a lot of them are shrews. I guess I am terribly old-fashioned in that respect. I agree with my husband when he quotes, I guess it's King Lear, "Her voice was ever soft, gentle, and low, an excellent thing in a woman." And yet, I can't help but admire what they are doing. I believe that women have been abused and are still being abused.... It is just that ... I work alone ("Interview," 47).

So, besides being unfaithful, her generally supportive husband wasn't supportive in an important area. Even with a distinguished, moderate, thoughtful author, there is a place, on occasion, for "*I am woman. Hear me roar!*" Her whole life would have justified an outburst. Did she emphasize her "feminine" side as reaction formation to her wish for masculinity? In Brodie's background, anatomical masculinity was conflated with equality and privilege and led to insoluble conflict. (While she had unending unconscious conflict about it, had she had the magical choice to become a man, I don't think she would have taken it.)

By the mid-1970s, Brodie was becoming more and more alone with her writing. Her closest mentors and friends, Dale Morgan and maternal uncle, Dean Brimhall, had died. Her relationship with her husband was strained—it was "not an easy marriage"; they bickered in front of family and friends; he complained about her cooking and could be crotchety, and continued to be flirtatious.

In the midst of this, Brodie began her last book, *Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character* (1981). She despised Nixon. Her private comments included statements that he was "a plain damn liar," "a rattlesnake," and "a total obscenity." It became personal, for she believed that Nixon had authorized the break-in of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Louis Fielding, who had been Brodie's analyst as well. Nixon reminded her of Joseph Smith, but Nixon's imposture lacked charm. She tried to find evidence of homosexuality in Nixon, even if only of "latent" homosexuality.

In the midst of this, Bernard developed cancer, underwent treatment, improved, faltered, deteriorated, and died a year later, in November 1978. Her

bitterness and deep love for her husband turned her grief to depression from which she never recovered. She missed him terribly, felt helpless in her work, and dreamed of walking and eating with him.

Brodie continued to work on Nixon, but we must wonder how much of the intensity of her hatred towards him was a displacement and/or expression of the underside of her ambivalent fury stirred by her husband's infidelity, layered on top of Joseph Smith and her equally ambivalent feelings toward her father, paternal uncle David O. McKay, and many others. Was the search for Nixon's homosexuality partly a result of her own unresolved urge to masculinity? Her work on Nixon would be criticized for being too speculative and for the hostility for her subject that showed through her work.

Now, toward the end of her life, Brodie wondered why "I keep driving myself, a compulsive woman racing around frantically, tracking down trivia to build a biographical mosaic. Why do I do it? Because I am unhappy when I'm not doing it." Perhaps we can make sense out of it. All of her books were about so-called "perfect" men who, instead, were flawed. What about her own flawed, anatomically incomplete self? She could compensate for that as long as she was accomplishing excellence—"perfection"—in her work.

In September 1980, Brodie was diagnosed with cancer. Her various treatments exhausted her, and she raced to finish the Nixon volume before she died. She sent off the last revision, and the book was published eight months after her death on January 10, 1981. Her daughter, Pamela, recalled, "I never knew her to be so relaxed as she was when she was dying," and later added that it wasn't "until she ... lay dying that she learned to ... value life for the living, instead of for the working." By then, it was "rather late." Her son Bruce, a clinical psychologist, reflected that somewhere deep in his mother's psyche was the feeling that she "should have been a man."

There are elements of autobiography in all of Brodie's five books, but the most revealing is the one on Joseph Smith. Fawn Brodie compared her childhood family background with the childhood home of Smith. He came from a family that engaged in magic incantations, divining rods, mystical seer stones, animal sacrifices and digging in the ground for buried treasures—actions and beliefs that required deception

of self and others, and reached down to primitive ritualization—the antithesis of rationality. The main similarity between Smith and Brodie was rage, but from different levels of development, intensity, expression, and consequences. Smith's rage came from all stages of childhood development and was a result of his dysfunctional family, childhood illness, and leg surgery when he was about six or seven years old. These elements reappear in the *Book of Mormon* and include the destruction of two civilizations. The intensity of his rage can be measured by his documented deceit and manipulation to gain control of every one of his followers out of his aversion to helplessness. Smith's rage led to violent confrontations for his Church for many decades after his death.

In contrast, Brodie came from a family whose mother (and, later, maternal uncle, Dean R. Brimhall) emphasized intellectual honesty. Her conflicts came from a later stage of development than Smith's, and her bitterness was selective and limited: directed at her father and her father's institution of deceitful men in power that blocked or altered information, and at the results of this misinformation that led to financial strain and gross inequity in her home. This discrimination included selective superiority of one family over another (partly the result of Church hierarchy) and especially of men over women, strong enough to leave her with sexual identity conflicts. Whereas Smith's fury resulted in the use of fantastic fantasy claims to impose his will on, and control over, others, Brodie's compensation for her feminine "incompleteness" was her work of excellence. Her fury gave her drive to uncover historical truth that *might* have an influence on others—by making them aware of deceit and abuse of power, partly by highlighting the contradictions in men between their statements and their acts. Instead of playing on the fears and desperations of everyman, she offered a painful evaluation of reality without compensation, suggesting the ultimate in rationality and the highest respect for the individuality and abilities of others.

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[Author's Grateful Acknowledgement: The biographer of Fawn McKay Brodie is Newell G. Bringham, Instructor of History and Political Science at the College of the Sequoias in Visalia, California. Dr. Bringham has written extensively on Mormon history and has served as president of the Mormon History Association. He graciously supplied me with a number of papers pertaining to Fawn Brodie, and spent a number of hours in direct discussion about my summarizing her life, mostly from his biography, *Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer's Life* (1999), and his edited anthology of seven articles reviewing different aspects of her first book from different scholars, *Reconsidering No Man Knows My History: Fawn M. Brodie and Joseph Smith in Retrospect* (1996). While Dr. Bringham's biography is comprehensive, perceptive, sensitive, and fluidly written, I am responsible for the psychological interpretations in this summary.]

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“The Quicksands of Emotion”: The Friendship of Fawn McKay Brodie and Dale Morgan

Sara M. Patterson

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Dale Lowell Morgan (1914-1971), a past member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) and a historian of that same tradition, was in a fine position to understand Fawn McKay Brodie's feelings during and after the publication of her biography of Joseph Smith. Morgan and Brodie met one another in Washington, DC, in 1943, when Brodie was well into her research on the Smith biography and when Morgan had already published such works in the history of the American West as *Utah: A Guide to the State* (1941) and *The Humboldt: Highroad of the West* (1943). After their first meeting, the two formed a fast friendship. Through their correspondence, both historians provided each other with relevant source materials, thoughtful criticism, and genuine affection.

Morgan may well have anticipated Brodie's emotional and intellectual shifts as she worked her way through writing *No Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith* (1945), a biography of a man whom she had once placed on a pedestal as a prophet and hero. Members of what historians have called the “lost generation” of Mormon writers, both Morgan and Brodie wrote histories of the Mormon movement, while feeling they could no longer rationally be members of the faith. Morgan understood the kinds of sacrifices Brodie made when she chose to publish the biography as well as the emotional journey she underwent in moving from utter commitment to her faith to finding evidence that she felt proved that faith to be a lie. Because of this strong friendship, Morgan fiercely defended Brodie to her reading audience, while playing the role of understanding critic in private conversations. It is through this friendship that historians can better understand the complex personal and professional issues Brodie faced while writing the Smith biography.

To the public, Morgan admired Brodie's work as that of a cautious and thoughtful historian. In his 1945 review of her work in the *Saturday Review of Literature*, Morgan acknowledged her careful research in unearthing Smith from the “temple of belief” that shrouded him in mystery, applauded her ability to craft a commanding narrative about a man who was “infinitely complex and steadily enigmatic,” and admired her attempts to analyze Joseph Smith throughout his career. He discussed her biography, as did other professional historians of her time, as one that should be remembered for the “informed and searching objectivity of its viewpoint.” It was, he said, “the definitive treatment of its subject” and a “job well done.”

Recognizing that a historian's understandings of God would necessarily shape her/his telling of history, Morgan acknowledged that those who believed that God had a direct hand in human history would write an entirely different account of the facts than those who did not. He and Brodie, as members of that latter group, would look for any other possible explanation than the hand of God to explain history. His theory of history rested on this understanding. Morgan claimed that from his “point of view on God” he was “incapable of accepting the claims of Joseph Smith and the Mormons, be they however so convincing.” Morgan asserted that because of his basic

underlying belief that no divinity existed, he would “look everywhere for explanations except to the ONE explanation that is the position of the church.” In this, and in many other things, Morgan and Brodie were of one mind.

In private, Morgan discussed the personal issues Brodie faced in writing the biography. Unlike other historians, he knew precisely what was at stake. In a letter to Brodie on December 11, 1945 Morgan recognized the gap Brodie had created between herself and her family. He wrote, “[T]he point is, you and I don’t really want to upset the beliefs of people who have lived by those beliefs and which give value and meaning to their lives.” In fact, in terms of Brodie’s own experiences, this was an understatement. Because of her connections with the Church hierarchy through both her mother (her maternal grandfather had been president of Brigham Young University) and her father (her father and uncle were both members of the General Authority; her father was Assistant to the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles; and her uncle, David O. McKay later became President and Prophet), Brodie had been allowed into the Church archives. But, after an explosive argument with her uncle about the nature of her biography, Brodie vowed not to return.

As the biography progressed, Brodie felt that her parents might blame themselves for the fact that she had strayed from her faith. In a letter to her parents in May 1943, Brodie wrote, “[Y]ou brought us all up to revere the truth, which is the noblest ideal a parent can instill in his children, and the fact that we come out on somewhat different roads certainly is no reflection on you.” She also understood that the publication of the biography would engender much grief and embarrassment within her family. In May 1943, Brodie won a pre-publication prize from Knopf for the biography. That month, she wrote to her parents that she wished they could celebrate, “[b]ut it is only fair to you both that I tell you quite frankly and honestly in advance that the book is likely to get a good bit of hostile criticism from the authorities of the Church. Certain things which I feel should be included to tell the whole story of the man, you will feel should better have been left buried.” In attempting to avoid this potential strain on the family, Brodie even offered to publish under a pseudonym to save the family from embarrassment. Brodie’s father, however, did not see the need for her to do so, so she

went ahead with the book under her own name.

After the book’s publication, the tensions in the family were palpable. In a letter to Morgan in September 1946, Brodie recalled that: “My father never mentions the book, and we simply act as if it did not exist. My mother read the ms. at night after he had gone to bed, and was very enthusiastic. She is a remarkable woman, and has worked out an amazing adjustment to a situation which would have made me schizophrenic long ago.” As the biography made its way in the world, it caused stress within the family network that continued for many years to come.

Morgan’s understanding of her personal concerns did not mean that he pulled his punches when he analyzed Brodie’s work in private correspondence. These critiques ranged in nature from misspellings to what Morgan deemed inaccurate historical interpretations—even years after its publication Morgan would send Brodie lists of minor errata! Morgan had a vast knowledge of Mormon history, and in fact spent almost two decades writing his own account of the history of Mormonism, one that he never completed. For this reason, and because of his love for historical minutiae, Morgan was an ideal critic.

After his first read of the biography’s manuscript, Morgan provided many comments that indicated that Brodie’s anger showed in her work. Even after the publication, with its many revisions toward an objective stance, he accused her of holding on to pieces of her past faith and culture, and allowing it to affect her writing. In a letter written in January 1946, Morgan told Brodie that “I have an idea that you haven’t come full circle yet in liberating yourself from the church. You have an intellectual but not yet an emotional objectivity about Mormonism.” After the publication of *No Man Knows My History*, Morgan proposed that Brodie would not “begin to have really generous feelings [about the Mormon faith], a live-and-let-live philosophy” until she had “finished disentangling from the religion.” From Morgan’s perspective, Brodie was still in a “status of rebellion” in which she tried to remain on “an unassailable intellectual plane, [with] argument held within the limits of reason, and the quicksands of emotion fenced out.” In Morgan’s diagnosis, his friend did not “fully recognize the extent to which your book was written out of an emotional compulsion and the extent to which that compulsion persists.”

Their friendship did not go unnoticed by

those in the Church community who were angered by Brodie's publication of the controversial biography and wanted to discredit her in any way possible. Among the many rumors that sprang up out of this climate—that Fawn was not a blood relative of the future Mormon Prophet, David O. McKay, but merely an adopted family member; that her Jewish, anti-Mormon husband had convinced her to write the text; or that she had immediately recanted after the biography's publication—was one claiming that Brodie and Morgan had had a sexual affair and that he (the only qualified historian of the two, the rumor assumed) had written the text itself.

It was to Dale Morgan that Fawn Brodie wrote when she was excommunicated by the LDS Church in 1945. He was one of the few who could truly understand what this meant to her. Even though she had long since come to believe that the Mormon faith was based on false premises, she continued to have familial (and therefore emotional) ties to the tradition. In May 1945, Brodie received notification that a hearing would be held to determine her excommunication for apostasy. The reason given was “[t]hat in a book recently published by you, you assert matters as truths which deny the divine origin of the Book of Mormon, the restoration of the Priesthood and of Christ's Church through the instrumentality of the Prophet Joseph Smith, contrary to the beliefs, doctrines and teachings of the Church.” Brodie did not attend the session. She was excommunicated from the Church on June 19, 1945. Only to Morgan did Brodie confess that the notice caught her “completely off guard and upset me a good deal more than I would care to have the authorities know.” For her, it symbolized “so dramatically the fact that my bridges really are irrevocably burned. Home will never be the same again.”

In many respects, Dale Morgan was the closest Brodie had to understanding what “home” meant and accepting her seeming transgressions, regardless. He was someone who knew the origins of the Church, her journey as a historian, and the price she paid to write the biography. He was a unique friend in this regard. He knew the extent and depth of that powerful suction he called the “quicksands of emotion.”

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Fawn Brodie and Five Other Self-Punitive Rebels

Herbert Barry III
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Fawn McKay Brodie (1915-1981) shared three attributes with the five men who were the subjects of her biographies. All six individuals were extremely intelligent, were highly literate, and rebelled against or diverged from the norm for their families. Most biographies, including the five by Brodie, are about people who became famous because of great achievements. Their self-destructive and other maladaptive actions are best explained by the psychoanalytic concept of self-punitive feelings of guilt because of rebellion against or divergence from their early indoctrination.

Brodie's books on Joseph Smith, Thaddeus Stevens, Sir Richard Francis Burton, Thomas Jefferson, and Richard Nixon are conventional biographies with the addition of psychological interpretations. The author was aware of psychological and psychoanalytic theories throughout her adulthood. An asset for her psychoanalytic interpretations was her treatment for chronic mild depression and difficulties with sexuality as a patient of a psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, after she began work on Thaddeus Stevens.

The information in each book is documented by extensive endnotes or footnotes. The second book was published 14 years after the first, and the last three were each published seven or eight years after the preceding one. The long intervals are attributable partly to Brodie's concurrent fulfillment of her domestic role as a wife and mother. Much interesting information is contained in a biography of the biographer, *Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer's Life* by Newell G. Bringhurst (1999).

Brodie's first biography, *No Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith* (1945), gives convincing evidence for lies by Joseph Smith, the founder of the Mormon Church. He fraudulently attributed to God the source of his many “revelations.” He

practiced polygamy, contrary to his denials. In the second edition of the book, published 26 years later, a Supplement interprets the lies as expressions of inner conflict between what he really was and what he most desperately wanted to be. Smith blurred the distinction between fantasy and reality.

In the second psychobiography, *Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge of the South* (1959), Brodie summarizes the character of Stevens in the first chapter. His ethical ideology induced him to urge free public schools and emancipation of Negroes. Previous biographies had condemned him as a Radical Republican who advocated punitive Reconstruction following the Civil War and the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson. A clubfoot and paternal desertion suffered by Stevens contributed to his self-hatred, sympathy for enslaved Negroes, and passionate preoccupation with punishment. "Indignation served him instead of love, and a sense of injustice was his substitute for hope."

Next, Brodie wrote about Sir Richard Francis Burton in *The Devil Drives: A Life of Sir Richard Burton* (1967). The final chapter summarizes his character. Burton's childhood was mostly in France instead of his native England, with a loving but restrictive mother and a selfish, indolent father. In accordance with the book's title, *The Devil Drives*, Burton became a compulsively adventurous explorer and diligent writer of many books. He mastered many languages and assumed many different disguises and roles. After several romantic involvements and much sexual experimentation, at the age of 39 he married a woman who, like his mother, adored him but was sexually frigid. He became sexually impotent with her soon afterward. His initial craving for independence from her, expressed by prolonged absences, changed to dependence as he aged and became physically debilitated.

In the fourth psychobiography, *Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate History* (1974), the first chapter summarizes the highly complex character of Thomas Jefferson. Subsequent chapters present convincing evidence that Jefferson, while he was a widower, committed miscegenation as the father of the seven children of his slave, Sally Hemings, and adultery with an English wife, Maria Cosby. Most prior biographers denied both sexual liaisons by Jefferson. His most prominent conflict was between his advocacy of individual freedom and his ownership of many

slaves. In common with many other slave owners who desired to be dominant in their social and sexual relationships, he yielded to the temptation that his slave was the optimal sexual partner. The book also identifies influential childhood experiences: he was 14 years old when his father died and he had a hostile relationship with his mother. Jefferson's adult behavior featured leadership of and friendship with other men, intellectual and solitary interests, secrecy about himself, and financial extravagance.

Brodie summarizes the character of Richard Nixon in the first and last chapters of her fifth psychobiography, *Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character* (1981). Brodie despised Nixon and characterized him as a compulsive liar. In contrast, she liked and envied the subjects of her other psychobiographies, especially Thomas Jefferson and Sir Richard Burton. The Nixon book describes extensively his childhood and early career. He learned to conceal his bitterness in response to being abused and rejected by his father and recurrently abandoned by his mother. He apparently became sexually impotent in his marriage prior to his presidency. Brodie describes suggestive evidence for homosexual activities during his presidency with his friend Bebe Rebozo. Brodie's terminal illness forced her to curtail the account of Nixon's life after his eight years as vice president.

I believe that Richard Milhous Nixon's lies were tactics to conceal his bitter feelings and to win elections. His principal conflict was whether to imitate the Quaker pacifism and good deeds of his mother (his middle name was his mother's maiden surname) or the combative, angry behavior of his father. He mostly tried to be as unlike his father as possible. When he was elected president, he stopped using his middle name. This rejection of his mother's family name probably expressed his decision to identify with his father by being a strong and aggressive president.

I admire all five of Brodie's psychobiographies. A limitation attributable to human nature is that her insightful psychoanalytic interpretations do not sufficiently describe a conflict that the author shared with each of her five subjects. All of them were strongly indoctrinated in expected behavior during childhood. Their subsequent lives were dominated by rebellion against this expected behavior. Masochistic self-punishment was a prominent

symptom of their conflict.

Fawn McKay Brodie was raised as an obedient and well-behaved Mormon girl in Utah. An uncle, David O. McKay, became president of the Church. She and her older sister, Flora, were close companions throughout childhood. Shortly before Fawn's 21st birthday, she married Bernard Brodie, who was an atheist with Jewish parents, and on the same day she was awarded her master's degree in English literature at the University of Chicago. Soon afterward she renounced the Mormon religion. She was excommunicated by the Mormon Church following the publication of her psychobiography of Joseph Smith. Her choice of five men as subjects of her psychobiographies was influenced by her feeling that she "should have been a man" (Bringhurst, *Fawn McKay Brodie*, 269).

Fawn Brodie's self-punishment was indicated by episodes of depression throughout her adult life. "She felt 'compelled' to do research and writing, even though she found it incredibly hard to do" (Bringhurst, *Fawn McKay Brodie*, 268). She died of rapidly spreading cancer at the relatively young age of 65 years, slightly more than two years after her husband died of the same disease at the age of 68 years.

Self-punishment was also evident in Brodie's five subjects. Joseph Smith responded to persecution by identifying himself with the great martyrs and did a number of things ultimately contributing to his own martyrdom. He borrowed large sums of money and alienated several important supporters by excessively authoritarian behavior. He frightened neighbors by forming an independent religious society with a militia to defend itself, and was killed by a group of neighbors. Thaddeus Stevens was chronically angry and aggressive. His moralistic, irascible behavior prevented him from attaining his ambition of election to the United States Senate. Sir Richard Burton was a bold explorer who repeatedly risked his life. He spent money extravagantly and his financial enterprises failed. He impaired his health by heavy drinking. Thomas Jefferson had several episodes of depression and withdrawal from political activity. He injured his right wrist while with Maria Cosby. He drank expensive wine with companions in spite of his steadily mounting debts. Richard Nixon alienated many people by his excessive deceit and aggression behind a façade of piety and virtue. He injured a

knee after his nomination for president in 1960. He repeatedly became intoxicated near the end of his presidency.

Self-punishment may be a human universal. It is a special affliction of rebels against conventional or expected behavior.

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Brodie's Joseph Smith and Bringhurst's Fawn McKay Brodie

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Review essay on Newell G. Bringhurst, ed., Reconsidering No Man Knows My History: Fawn M. Brodie and Joseph Smith in Retrospect (1996) and Newell G. Bringhurst, Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer's Life (1999).

When I began studying Mormons some 10 years ago, the first book I read was Fawn McKay Brodie's biography of Joseph Smith, founder of the Mormon Church: *No Man Knows My History* (1945). She began her book with a quote from a funeral sermon that Smith preached to an audience of 20,000 people in April 1844. It was an extraordinary self-assessment that Brodie correctly saw as a challenge to *all* future biographers.

You don't know me; you never knew my heart. No man knows my history. I cannot tell it; I shall never undertake it. I don't blame anyone for not believing my history. If I had not experienced what I have, I could not have believed it myself.

Joseph Smith's words still speak to us of profound loneliness. What manner of man could make such a statement about himself? Here was a man who founded a new religion—a true charismatic leader, a man loved by his followers as a prophet of God. Yet, he was denounced by non-Mormons as a fraud and imposter, and aroused such hatred that he was killed by a mob soon after preaching the sermon. Did the *Book of Mormon* and the whole corpus of Mormon scripture and doctrine come from God or from Smith's obviously fertile imagination? Were his revelations proof that God actively intervenes in human affairs, or were they expressions of delusions that were an outgrowth of a hard and, at times, brutally traumatic life? Was Smith comfortable in the role of a prophet of God or did he long to be just an ordinary man? (He seemed to oscillate back and forth, even though he generally provided his followers with the faith and inspiration they sought). These questions are still vigorously debated by scholars of Mormon history and life.

Prior to Brodie's book, scholarship tended to be either pro or con about Joseph Smith and the Church he created. Her work was the first real effort to come to grips with the many contradictions about Joseph's life and accomplishments. It opened a door to on-going scholarly controversy that may never be resolved. On the one side there are the practitioners of what has been termed "faith-promoting" history—everything Smith said and did was divinely inspired. On the other side are the advocates of what has been termed "naturalistic" explanation—that Smith can only be understood via historical and psychological approaches. For example, he was successful because what he offered spoke to the religious needs of many people.

Brodie's book was, on the whole, positively received by the non-Mormon community while most believing Mormons were offended to the core; so much so that about a year after the book was published she was excommunicated. Since she wrote, a number of believing Mormon scholars who felt that the history of the Church could withstand the light of truth because it would strengthen faith have also been excommunicated. The Church has adopted a garrison mentality, feeling itself under siege by hostile critics both inside and outside, who are bent upon using history to compromise or destroy the faith of loyal Church members. Apologists for the Church can be

quite scathing in their critiques. They are serious scholars, such as Louis Midgley; thus, efforts to refute them can be difficult unless you are very conversant with the available literature.

Newell G. Bringhurst, ed., *Reconsidering No Man Knows My History: Fawn M. Brodie and Joseph Smith in Retrospect* (1996), is an excellent introduction to the influence of Brodie's book. This book is not an apologist tract devoted to glorification of the Church. The contributors are top scholars in Mormon history who offer fair and balanced appraisals of her legacy, pointing out positive and negative aspects of her work. Some criticize what they see as her unquestioning use of anti-Mormon sources.

For instance, Brodie explored the origins of polygamy, focusing especially on that Joseph Smith lied to keep it a secret ("lying for the Lord," he called it). That he did so suggested to her that he was seeking to hide an overactive libido. But, in *Reconsidering*, Marvin Hill correctly notes that she "failed to appreciate the degree to which the prophetic role liberated Smith from the social restraints which customarily control sexual behavior" (80). In this sense, polygamy was, in part, a kind of religious grandiosity for Smith and those who followed him. Todd Compton notes, "Brodie was a psychohistorian, interested in documenting and evaluating Joseph Smith's sexuality. Here she was path breaking, and was entirely justified in looking at her subject's sexual life" (155).

For those of us wishing to understand more about Fawn Brodie as a human being as well as groundbreaking scholar, we have Newell Bringhurst's well-crafted biography, *Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer's Life* (1999). Bringhurst states that he worked for 13 years on the biography. In wondering why he did so, he agrees with Brodie that "there is always a deep personal commitment in the writing of a biography," including "compelling inner reasons" (xiii). But he gives little personal elaboration beyond noting some similarities in their backgrounds and his considerable experience with his subject. As they grew up, both of them developed a certain disenchantment and sense of moral outrage with Mormonism. While Brodie came to the conclusion that Joseph Smith was a fraud and impostor, Bringhurst sought to understand why the Church had until 1978 denied the priesthood to blacks. Both Brodie and Bringhurst, in different ways, sought to expose what they saw as negatives about the Church

and those in charge.

Bringhurst describes many events in Brodie's life without offering explicit interpretations about Brodie's unconscious motives for writing about Joseph Smith. This is unfortunate because a biographer's motivations for writing influence source selection and the nature of the interpretations offered. Fortunately, Bringhurst gives enough information for the reader to tentatively hypothesize why she wrote. [Editor's note: See the article by Robert D. Anderson earlier in this Retrospective for details on Brodie's personal life.]

Brodie came from a large extended family. Although her paternal uncle ultimately became President of the Church and her father worked very hard and enjoyed some respect in the community, her immediate family endured a state of "genteel poverty" (16). Though Joseph Smith's father worked hard and the family started out well, his father made some bad investments from which they never recovered. The Brodie family was not as chronically poor as Smith's, but they were never really well off. Brodie grew up in an atmosphere of largely unspoken family tension—in a "carefully controlled, constricted family environment" (19). Joseph Smith also went to great lengths to avoid conflict in his family and among his followers. Indeed, the early history of the Church gives an impression of a superficially stable family writ large.

Though she never received a PhD, Brodie produced five well researched biographies over some 35 years. She was an intelligent child and did well in school (it may have been something of a refuge for her). Indeed it "became 'a habit ... to expect Fawn to be superior in everything'" (26). Interestingly, although she was quite shy, young Fawn "was the most religious of all the McKay children" (29). Joseph Smith had little in the way of formal education, but there is evidence that his mother harbored hopes that he would become a religious prophet.

It is interesting that Brodie's initial intent in writing *No Man Knows My History* was to "satisfy herself as to how the *Book of Mormon* came to be written" (71). She spent seven years on that first project and exhibited an "intense, almost obsessive interest" in all of her biographical work. She felt "compelled" to do research and writing even though it was often very hard for her. "Now you might wonder why I keep driving myself," she once

said. "Why do I do it? Because I am unhappy when I am not doing it" (268). Joseph Smith was also something of a driven person, albeit for different reasons. Brodie correctly raised the possibility that Smith wanted to establish "his own theocratic state with himself in charge" (*Reconsidering*, 199). His Church saw itself as the creator of a religious government that would be in place, ready for the return of Christ. Smith's driven quality comes from a sense of urgency to have things ready in time.

Anyone wanting to know Brodie in depth needs to read Bringhurst. Even though Bringhurst is not always explicit in psychohistorical terms, he does provide us with enough information to get a sense that Brodie's motivations for writing about Joseph Smith were complex and developed over many years. It seems clear that in trying to understand the life of Joseph Smith, she was also seeking to understand herself. She was an intelligent, sensitive woman increasingly aware of contradictions inherent in Mormon life. Although Bringhurst is not clear on how all these issues affected Brodie, it is apparent to me that they had a lot to do with her getting into biographical writing.

Brodie's work is important not because it is right or wrong, but because it stimulated many scholars to more closely explore Mormon origins and history. Even some advocates of "faith-promoting" history grudgingly concede her importance. Brodie wrote before the advent of the computer, which meant that she had to travel all over the country in search of useful source material. For me, this, as well as the complexity of Joseph Smith, gives her book a certain heroic quality. It is clear from reading the two books by Newell Bringhurst that Fawn McKay Brodie was a pioneer in psychobiographical scholarship. Those of us who have followed her example are fortunate to have such inspiration for our work.

Henry Lawton's biography is on page 16.

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Fawn Brodie and the Struggle for the Historical Memory of Thomas Jefferson

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While researching the life of Thomas Jefferson in preparation for her 1974 biography, *Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate History*, psychobiographer Fawn Brodie was engaged not only in a historical study but also in a dispute over the way Thomas Jefferson was to be remembered in the popular American imagination. The most contested memories Brodie had to untangle involved competing recollections about whether or not Thomas Jefferson had a long-standing sexual relationship with one of his slaves, Sally Hemings, which produced several children. Brodie's sensitivity towards psychoanalytic issues enabled her to navigate effectively the interpretively challenging terrain of Thomas Jefferson commemoration. Brodie was forced to grapple not only with the inner life of her biographical subject but also with the psychological makeup of both Jefferson's descendants and a group of scholars who had devoted their careers to studying Jefferson.

Brodie had to wrestle with the inherited memories—the oral histories—of the progeny of Thomas and Martha Jefferson as well as with the recollections of those who claimed descent from Jefferson and Hemings. Although oral traditions denying or substantiating the affair existed on both branches of the family tree, the descendants were often reluctant to speak on the subject. However, Brodie was undaunted by Jefferson's own silences on the subject of his relationship with Hemings or by silences in the historical record. Because the distinguished psychoanalyst Erik Erikson met with Brodie and gave her suggestions about her manuscript, it may be that Brodie was aware of Erikson's admonition to be on the lookout for "disguises and omissions ... themes bitterly repudiated, brazenly projected on others, half-heartedly joked about and clumsily avoided" (Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, 35th Anniversary Edition, 1985, 190&191).

Much to the disappointment of his defenders, Thomas Jefferson himself never directly attempted to refute rumors about the affair, and his descendants carried on the tradition of avoiding the topic. When

the issue was discussed at all, the descendants of Jefferson's eldest daughter, Martha Jefferson Randolph, "brazenly projected" blame "on others," claiming that Martha's cousins Peter and Samuel Carr fathered Hemings' children. As late as 1970, white Jefferson descendent Harold Coolidge told Brodie that he was "distressed" that that subject was the one that seemed to "interest you most."

Brodie, aware of both the psychology and the politics of memory, was not convinced by the denials of the white Jeffersons. Instead, she painstakingly compiled a great deal of "hard" historical evidence, which substantiated the relationship. For example, she analyzed testimony from one of Hemings' sons, Madison Hemings; the recollections of Israel Jefferson, a former slave at Monticello; and the writings of James Callender, a political journalist and Jefferson contemporary who wrote about the Hemings-Jefferson affair. She used the tools of the psychohistorian to flesh out the skeletal narrative provided by the historical record. Brodie used close readings of Jefferson's diaries and correspondence as evidence that Jefferson was preoccupied with Hemings. In one famous passage from *An Intimate History*, Brodie humorously juxtaposes Jefferson's description of himself as "a mere Oran-ootan" with his bizarre speculations in his book, *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1781), that an "Oran-ootan" prefers "the black woman over those of his own species."

As a result of her research, Brodie came to believe that Hemings and Jefferson's descendants had "disappeared into the 'historical silence' that was engulfing hundreds and thousands of other slave children fathered by white men." She knew that her investigation of the affair had ramifications that transcended that one particular relationship, pointing instead at the "psychosexual dilemma of the whole South." Brodie was undaunted by the historical amnesia or the false memories of the white Jeffersons, because, attuned as she was to significant historical silences, she expected nothing less.

Many of Hemings' descendants maintained strong oral traditions about the affair. Significantly, Brodie referred to these shared recollections as "oral genealogical memory." She was afraid that if ignored, these memories "may disappear." Furthermore, she empathized with black historians who represented the fact that the historical establishment had universally embraced white oral traditions at the ex-

pense of black ones. By referring to these oral traditions as "memories" and by noting the impact race has had on collective memory in the United States, Brodie anticipated contemporary discussions about "historical memory," and she enlisted herself in the struggle over the way Jefferson was to be remembered.

Brodie was also forced to grapple with the way that Jefferson had been remembered and lionized by members of the historical establishment, who were reluctant to conceive of Thomas Jefferson as a sexual being and completely unwilling to entertain the possibility that he had sexual or, perhaps even more unthinkable in their collective imagination, romantic inclinations towards one of his slaves.

Few figures in American history have been as idolized and studied as Thomas Jefferson. By the time *An Intimate History* came out, a group of white historians including Merrill Peterson, Julian Boyd, and Dumas Malone, whom Brodie labeled the "Jefferson Establishment," had already devoted the bulk of their careers to studying Jefferson's life. Among this group of distinguished scholars, the issue of the Jefferson-Hemings affair had been settled and had been decided in the negative. Peterson coolly told Brodie that, "the subject of Jefferson's alleged black progeny is not one that deeply interests me." Other Jefferson scholars were equally dismissive of Brodie's work. After *An Intimate History* appeared, Malone claimed that the book was a "mishmash of fact and fiction ... [and] not history as I understand the term." The Jefferson Establishment regarded it as a pesky myth propagated by rumormongers and by descendents of a slave who desired a biological connection with an American icon. Brodie's desire to reopen the issue struck these men as foolish, an act of intellectual hubris carried out by a woman who had not even been formally trained as a historian.

On her part, Brodie's decision to challenge the reigning historical interpretation represented an act of amazing intellectual boldness. However, her courage can be seen as an outgrowth not only of Brodie's own psychology—her willingness to take a solitary stand and her confidence in her own scholarly abilities—but also of her understanding of human psychology in general. She could not help but notice the vehemence with which the historical community denied the Jefferson-Hemings affair, noting that "The unanimity with which Jefferson male biographers

deny him even one richly intimate love affair after his wife's death suggests that something is at work here that has little to do with scholarship, especially since they are so gifted in writing about every other aspect of his life."

To Brodie's thinking, both the flippant responses and the vehement denials about the affair rang false. The staunchness of Jefferson's defenders did not convince her to disregard either the hard historical evidence or her psychoanalytic reading of Jefferson's inner life. Flummoxed by the fact that the historical community seemed determined to deny Jefferson "even one richly intimate love affair after his wife's death," Brodie accused the Jefferson Establishment of "clos[ing] their eyes to what they must not see." To explain this phenomenon, Brodie speculated that Freud's theory that biographers look for "infantile conceptions of the father" might apply to Jefferson's biographers. Jefferson, as he was imagined by his greatest admirers, would not have had a longstanding, sexual relationship with a slave. Brodie did not deign to speculate about the source of this historical blindness. However, it may have been rooted in anxiety about interracial sex as well as in a desire to protect a man who was famously ambivalent about the institution of slavery from the morally dubious implications of exploiting a slave for more than her labor power.

Brodie's radical reinterpretation of Jefferson stemmed not only from a freedom from the unconscious racism that had polluted much historical interpretation, but also from an understanding of the psychology of historical memory. She knew that descendents of Jefferson and Hemings were motivated—consciously and otherwise—to propagate particularly versions of the past. The terrain of historical memory is a contested one, and participants in that struggle may have been unaware of the fact that they were engaged a battle for control over the popular imagination.

If we interpret the Jefferson-Hemings relationship as a case of sexual exploitation, or if we speculate—as Brodie did—that it was a loving relationship, the implications of whether or not we recognize it are enormous. The fact that the author of the Declaration of Independence was intimately involved with one of his slaves is a metaphor for our national history, demonstrating not only how freedom and slavery grew up side by side but also how integral

people of African descent have been in the history of the United States. The whitewashed version of history promoted by Jefferson's defenders simply does not do justice to this complex history.

In 1998, DNA evidence, which compared the Y-chromosome of a descendent of Field Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson's paternal uncle, with a descendent of Sally Hemings, showed a conclusive match, indicating that indeed Jefferson fathered at least one of Hemings' children and offering rare scientific proof of the kind seldom seen in historiographical discussions. However, Brodie's application of psychology to the study of Jefferson's intimate life, to the oral histories of his progeny, and to the motivations of the historical establishment resulted in similar findings 24 years before hard scientific evidence closed the case.

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Fawn Brodie and Richard Nixon: The Perils of Psychobiography

David Greenberg
Rutgers University

In a career full of controversial books, Fawn M. Brodie's most provocative work may well have been *Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character*, a psychobiography published in September 1981, eight months after her death. In putting Nixon on the couch, Brodie was hardly alone; her book joined a host of psychoanalytic studies of our most psychologically intriguing leader. But Brodie possessed a stature and a facility with Freudian ideas that outstripped most of Nixon's other profilers, and her portrait was both eagerly awaited and uncommonly perceptive. Within a few years of its appearance, however, not just the book but also the very genre of psychobiography that she helped legitimize would fall from favor—its critics prevailing, perhaps temporarily, in the contest of academic fashions. Yet, ironically, Brodie and the psychobiographical project left a marked imprint on political discourse, as their analyses of Nixon, however flawed, cemented a link in the popular mind between politicians' private, inte-

rior lives and their public, exterior actions.

The psychoanalyzing of Nixon marked a convergence of man and moment. Psychoanalysis exerted its greatest influence on political science, history, and popular commentary in the late 1960s and early 1970s—precisely when the nation elected as president a man patently ripe for (not to say in need of) psychodynamic treatment. Nixon was the subject of more psychoanalytic studies than any other president. "His compulsion to put himself on the couch in public, his obviously 'psychological' character, his heavily personalized policies," wrote Bruce Mazlish, another of his more careful and responsible psychobiographers, "... convinced many otherwise skeptical people of the importance of personality in politics." It was hard not to interpret Watergate in particular as at least partly a product of Nixon's demons. Nixon's own doctor, Arnold Hutschnecker, whom the president had consulted for insomnia, stress, and other psychosomatic ailments since the 1950s, went so far as to write in *The New York Times* in 1973, "I cannot help think[ing] that if an American President had a staff psychiatrist, perhaps a case such as Watergate might not have had a chance to develop."

Still, Brodie's 1981 biography stood out as a model of its genre. To be sure, the author lacked direct, sustained access to Nixon himself—he spurned her request for an interview—and without the benefit of his confidences, disclosures, and associations, her life of him was bound to fall short of the assured, nuanced portrait that a therapist might provide of a long-term patient. Yet she took pains to compensate for this built-in hazard of the genre. Forging beyond the public record, Brodie interviewed 150 sources and mined, as no one else had, the vast Nixon oral history collection at California State University at Fullerton. She concentrated her energies on Nixon's youth and early career, the better to understand his formative experiences.

As a result, the book furnished valuable glimpses into Nixon's character. Her examination of the theme of dead brothers in Nixon's life—encompassing not only his own siblings Arthur and Harold, who died at ages 7 and 24, but also his sibling-like rivalry with the slain John F. Kennedy (and perhaps also Robert)—was revelatory. Brodie's suggestion that Nixon's success in the wake of both Kennedys' murders may have activated the same brew of satisfaction and guilt that followed Harold's

demise helps make sense of the shift in his personality some saw in the late 1960s. Then, too, Brodie focused more than her predecessors on not just Nixon's aggression but also his feral *rage*, finding traces of it in his youth, when he clobbered a playmate with a hatchet to get his jar of polliwogs. She unearthed an astonishing story of how Nixon, 47 years old, vice president, and candidate for president of the United States, repeatedly kicked the back of the car seat in which Air Force Major Don Hughes was seated. But more than any particular incidents, it was her close readings of such expressions of the unconscious as dreams, jokes, and slips—even the latent content of his public remarks—that made her book pop with insights.

Yet Brodie's *Richard Nixon* met sharp criticism. Some detractors, of course, had never accepted the validity of psychobiography—or psychoanalysis—in the first place. When the work drew sneers from an anti-intellectual Nixon loyalist such as H.R. Haldeman (“100 percent baloney”) or a professional hatchet man such as Gore Vidal (who called Brodie “a certifiable fool”), their name-calling neither required nor admitted of any reply. Knee-jerk critics of psychobiography simply refused to reckon with those numerous instances where the traditional theories for explaining political behavior failed to make sense of Nixon's actions.

If some attacks on Brodie were made from ignorance or prejudice, others had merit. Chief among these was the charge that her negative political opinion of Nixon distorted her psychological judgments. “Brodie thoroughly despised Nixon,” according to her biographer, Newell G. Bringhurst (*Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer's Life*, 1999). As early as 1973 she was writing op-ed pieces finding fault with the president, and she made no effort to hide her dislike. Her Nixon-hating had a personal dimension, too: Daniel Ellsberg, whom Nixon went after for leaking the Pentagon Papers, was a friend of Bernard Brodie's from the RAND think tank, and Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's therapist, whose office Nixon's “Plumbers” had broken into and searched before Watergate, was Brodie's analyst as well.

Brodie partly contained her hostility toward her subject in *Richard Nixon*, but it still got the better of her. Because she wrote knowing that Nixon had uttered many big, consequential lies, she made too much of trivial fibs—“unnecessary lies”—in his past,

seeing them as harbingers of his Watergate deceptions rather than routine political fudges. She made much of his statement in his 1952 “Checkers” speech that his wife was born “Patricia Ryan” on St. Patrick's Day; Brodie noted that Pat's given name was Thelma Catherine and her birthday was March 16. But like the journalist stumbling on a story that is “too good to check,” Brodie failed to seek out the full context of these facts. In fact, it was Pat's father who affectionately rewrote his daughter's history, nicknaming her “Pat” and celebrating her birth on the Irish holiday because she was born the night before. Brodie likewise followed other psychobiographers in treating a school assignment that Nixon wrote as a child, in which he pretended to be a dog, as an actual letter to his mother. Although the note's content was still fair game for analysis, the context should clearly influence how it is read.

If Brodie overemphasized the negative, she neglected the positive—what her colleague Peter Loewenberg later called “Nixon's many ego strengths and adaptations in a long political career.” Nixon's ability to recover from major defeats, his skill at reading the public temper, and his success in commanding the loyalty of disparate blocs of Americans showed that his personality profile couldn't be reduced to that of a vindictive, grandiose narcissist. Dwelling on his shortcomings, Brodie's account was likely to leave readers wondering how Nixon ever rose so high.

In these respects Brodie differed little from Nixon's other psychobiographers, who attracted similar criticisms. Given the intense emotions that Nixon aroused, it would have been remarkable if any biographer writing in the 1970s had been able to analyze him dispassionately. But if such a realization helps to contextualize Brodie's biases, it poses a challenge to the viability of psychobiography itself. Reviewing *Richard Nixon*, the journalist Godfrey Hodgson wondered if it was even possible for psychobiographers, however adept, to overcome their own antipathies and analyze a politician as they would a private patient. Although Hodgson didn't impugn Brodie's motives—indeed, he praised her book for exhibiting “neither stridency nor malice”—he suggested that the Freudian approach had limited value in public affairs because it elevated the personal over the cultural and the political. “We are in danger of having the insights of psychotherapy,” Hodgson wrote, “used as a

tool for character destruction, certainly for libel, potentially for revenge.”

Ironically, the qualities that made Nixon so well-suited for psychoanalytic treatment also made him a most unreliable subject. Polarizing, controversial, suspicious, and combative, he aroused an array of passions from different constituents. The author and editor Michael Korda once called him “the one American president of this century about whom it is absolutely impossible to be indifferent.” But if Nixon excited such strong feelings, how could any observer politically engaged enough to want to write about him avoid the pitfalls of political bias? The promise of the psychohistorical project, after all, was to provide answers for a seemingly post-ideological age—to move beyond unsatisfying readings of political behavior that reduced everything to ideology or self-interested calculation. But Nixon showed how difficult it could be to shelve political assumptions in pursuing a deeper interpretation. Some of Brodie’s critics urged that psychobiographers not tackle subjects they hated; another solution might be to avoid figures from the contemporary scene. Yet to disqualify Richard Nixon of all people from psychoanalytic inquiry was surely to call into question the worth of the very enterprise.

Soon after Brodie’s death, her style of head-on psychoanalysis of historical figures faded from academic fashion. Some analysts and historians continued to write such treatments (though only two of Nixon appeared in the next quarter century), but they never reached the wider audience that Brodie had found. Still, it would be wrong to say that their efforts failed.

To this day, it remains impossible to give a satisfying explanation for Nixon’s presidency without recourse to his character. Questions about why he was so driven to bolster his power that he broke the law or why he incriminated himself on tape—among many others—still lead inescapably into the domain of the unconscious. If straightforward works of psychohistory were often marred by undue speculation, such freewheeling conjecture was an asset for cultural creations in film or literature. Thus, a novella like Mark Maxwell’s *Nixon/Carver* (1998), which presented Nixon’s life as if recounted by short-story writer Raymond Carver, invested small, everyday acts and moments with psychological meaning. A film like Robert Altman’s 1984 “gonzo psy-

chodocudrama” *Secret Honor* (the phrase is Pauline Kael’s), in which Philip Baker Hall plays Nixon rambling through a night of free associations about his brothers’ deaths and John F. Kennedy’s, takes us inside Nixon’s emotional life without having to worry that it contained more hypothesis than fact—since the movie was overtly a work of fiction.

Psychobiography also left its mark, for better and worse, in the emphasis that the political discourse now places on “character.” After Watergate, the public feared that any politician might be hiding Nixonian-like demons and tacitly deputized an eager press corps to scour the past behavior and private lives of candidates for high office. From Jimmy Carter’s 1976 presidential bid onward, the “character” issue pervaded campaigns, as new and arbitrary elements of one’s private life—past drug use, marital infidelity, and military service—drew scrutiny. Although this tendency would yield some miscarriages of justice, notably the prosecution of Bill Clinton, no one who remembered Watergate could reject the proposition that troubled psyches can lead to troubled presidencies. But now, instead of scholars, it was unreflective pundits—and average citizens—dispensing judgment. The legacy of Fawn Brodie and like-minded scholars may be, in the end, that we are all psychobiographers now.

David Greenberg, PhD, Assistant Professor of Media Studies and History at Rutgers University, is the author of Nixon's Shadow: The History of an Image (2003), which won two major book awards. Professor Greenberg has written for scholarly and popular publications including the New Yorker, the Atlantic, the Journal of American History, and the Political Science Quarterly. His work focuses on American political culture in recent decades.

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A True Gentlewoman

E. Victor Wolfenstein
UCLA

This is a small piece of personal reminiscence, and not an intimate one. My aunt, Martha Wolfenstein, knew Fawn Brodie better than I did. They became acquainted through their husbands, Nathan Leites and Bernard Brodie, both of whom were affiliated with the RAND Corporation. By the time I joined the political science faculty at UCLA in 1965,

Martha and Nathan had divorced. Martha, who was one of the sustaining presences and major intellectual influences in my life, came to spend the summers here in Los Angeles. Through her, I met Fawn and Bernard, at about the same time that (at her suggestion) I read *No Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith* and *Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge of the South*.

Fawn was a McKay, and the McKays were, so to speak, Mormon aristocracy. Hence, she was to the manor born; whether or not for this reason, she carried herself with an almost regal composure. Tall and straight, with dark hair and a strikingly handsome face, she had an unmistakable dignity. But she was also a rebel. *No Man Knows My History* exposed Joseph Smith, the founder of the Mormon Church, as a conscious fraud, and this led to her excommunication. So I suppose one might think of her as royalty in exile; of course, that is just where she wanted to be—in exile in America. She was, more than most people I've known, deeply American, rooted in the country and its history. Taking these features in combination, one understands the focus of her work: the biography of great men, including fathers of the Republic. This includes in a certain way the biography of Nixon, whom she viewed as betraying the fiduciary responsibilities of his high office.

The Brodies lived in a beautiful, characteristically southern California house lodged high up in the Santa Monica Mountains in Pacific Palisades. Table talk at that time was largely political, shaped by racial conflict and the war in Vietnam. About the latter, I remember one moment in particular. Government propaganda was aimed at creating an Us-Them inter-group dynamic, with the North Vietnamese as Communists who must be defeated lest the dominos fall. Fawn, working her way through this ideological miasma, concluded that Ho Chi Minh was a founding father of his country and that the Vietnamese struggle was more like the American Revolution than a Communist threat to the Free World. In other words, she was not fooled by governmental misleadership; the template for her critical intelligence was the American experience.

As her published work shows, Fawn was an assiduous researcher. Most of all, however, I think she was a puzzle solver. Either in the data she collected or data that lay close to hand, she would find things that didn't fit together, or that led elsewhere,

or that called for explanation. She would communicate about her work this way, as a thought process and a puzzling out of things. Hence, in listening to her, one was led into her world and taken along as a member of her hunting party.

Fawn Brodie was perhaps the most forthright person I've known. In her, there was nothing wasted and nothing in excess.

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Two Memories of Fawn

Betty Glad

University of South Carolina

Brodie was raised a Mormon, as was I. We talked about the reasons we had left the Church at one time. She told me that after *No Man Knows My History* was published, she was excommunicated from the Church. Her father and her uncle, David O. McKay, were both high-level Mormon officials. So she had family ties to break that were very strong. But she laughed and told me of a transference problem she had with the book. When it first came out, she either wrote in the book or said something to a friend about Joseph Smith's "thin ascetic lips." Her friend got back to her shortly thereafter, noting that the photograph of Smith in her book showed a man with full, voluptuous lips. "Oh, my," she said. "It is my father who has thin ascetic lips!"

I also recall her presentation of her evidence at an OAH meeting that Jefferson had had an affair with Sally Hemings. She talked of how when Jefferson was in Paris, he talked about the "mulatto" countryside. Dumas Malone, who was a commentator on her work, exclaimed, when it came his time to talk, "How dare you soil the alabaster pure reputation of this man!" She responded that she was only showing Jefferson to be a man of some warmth, some passion. She was probably right, as subsequent DNA tests indicated.

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tional Society for Political Psychology, president of the Presidency Research Group of the APSA, and vice president of the American Political Science Association. Her books include *The Russian Transformation: Political, Sociological and Psychological Aspects* (co-editor and contributor; 1990) and *Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House* (1980). Professor Glad may be reached at glad@gwm.sc.edu.

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A Memorial Tribute to Fawn McKay Brodie

Elizabeth Wirth Marvick

[Editor's Note: The late Elizabeth Marvick delivered the following tribute to Fawn Brodie at the memorial service at UCLA, January 17, 1981, seven days after Brodie died. Marvick sent the typescript to Paul Elovitz in February 2003. It has been edited slightly for publication here with the consent of Marvick's sons.]

I will only be adding my voice to many when I say how generous, sensitive, and compassionate a friend Fawn Brodie was, how eager she was to help. On a public level, too, she was admirable. She set an example of humane and responsible citizenship. Her contribution to scholarship was remarkable. It was not only substantial, conscientious, and original; it also gave great pleasure to many because of its human interest, path-breaking scholarship, and admirable style. Fawn was an extraordinarily kind, virtuous, hard-working, and gifted woman. She lived life fully.

The world would be a better place if Fawn were still with us. It would also be better if many more could live like her. It seems right to consider, as she might do in another case, how some distinctive features of her history account for her exceptional qualities.

Fawn was, of course, a daughter. The conditions under which she grew up are surely important for the remarkable person she turned out to be. In the Mormon community, Fawn came from where men were allotted the larger share of power and authority. She used to say that in Mormon doctrine the status of blacks and of women was about the same. Everyone here is aware of her feeling of affinity with the depri-

vations of black people and her demand for justice on their behalf. Two of her major works—*Thaddeus Stevens* and *Thomas Jefferson*—show that she was especially alert to an unrecognized historical role played by black women. Both books concern powerful white men whose personal happiness—if not their public performance—was dependent on black women.

In Fawn's home community, too, women were more likely to exercise their influence covertly. Some of these women were secretly skeptical of the men's doctrine. I have heard Fawn say that she believed that one woman who was most important to her in childhood, her mother, was a closet heretic. Perhaps this was an influence on Fawn's own hatred of deception and her desire to bear public witness to the truth, as she found it out. In her first book—*No Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith*—Fawn showed herself publicly as a heretic. She presented evidence that the man who was the source of divine authority in her home community was an ordinary mortal and, in many ways, representative of his time.

Fawn did reject some of the Mormon Church's directives for conduct. But she remained appreciative of others. Bearing public witness to the truth as the individual sees it is a central ingredient in the American Protestant tradition, including the Mormon tradition. She gave the Church credit also for setting a high value on winning the free consent of its members. And, in particular, she shared the Mormons' strong demand for community and family obligations. When a young mother whom she did not know was officially expelled from the Mormon Church, Fawn put herself in sympathetic touch with her.

Fawn's personal and public legacy is not only individual; it is also the product of a partnership with her husband, Bernard. I remember her telling me of their first meeting—as students—at the University of Chicago student cafeteria. She had just taken a job serving there. He usually ate elsewhere. It was “a stroke of luck,” she told me, that he came to Hutchinson Commons that day. This was a joyful memory for her. Although for the most part Fawn's and Bernard's work resulted in separate, individual products, they did collaborate on a book on the history of military technology, *From Crossbow to H-Bomb* (1962). Few women scholars have devoted themselves to the

arts of war, and Bernard's interest in these matters sometimes led where Fawn felt herself not entirely at home. But her sensitivity and skills clearly contributed to the distinction of Bernard's work, just as his criticism and insight, from a different perspective, contributed to hers.

I didn't know Fawn as a young mother. When I met her, her youngest child, Pamela, was almost grown. I do know from talking with her after *Thaddeus Stevens* came out, that when her three children were little they were her principal occupation. If this had not been so, there might have been more books. I know that she would not have thought that exchange worthwhile. She loved her children and loved her part in their early development. Without this part, moreover, her books would have been different—lacking in some of the insights from this experience. Fawn put the highest value on continuity between generations and she knew how important was the support of the family and community that have raised you. In the last years of her own life, she loved having her children and grandchildren around her.

Fawn's firm demand for truthfulness gave direction to her development as a scholar. She became attentive to psychoanalysis when she was already mature, after coming out to California in 1951. I believe this interest was related to her dislike of deception, because psychoanalytic method is a form of inquiry through which self-deception is systematically attacked. Once she had assimilated it, she began to use it in her work. It made her sensitive, for example, to the childhood origins of patterns of deception in Richard Nixon's public behavior.

As an intellectual, she was open to a very wide range of topics. For example, I have found a passage from her work on Joseph Smith's talents as a writer:

His book lacked subjectivity, wit and style ... His characters were pale, humorless stereotypes; the prophets were always holy, and in three thousand years of history not a single harlot was made to speak. But he began the book with a first-class murder ... and piled up battles by the score. There was plenty of bloodshed and slaughter to make up for the lack of gaiety and the stuff of humanity.

Smith's style was not Fawn Brodie's. The

gaiety she brought to her own work let her treat with the stuff of humanity—with family life and childhood, with the words of harlots as well as chaste women and powerful men. Her human sympathy focused naturally not on the organization of destruction but on the hapless victims of war and politics. She was attuned to the human terror, misery, and loss portended by the failure of grand strategies.

To her friends, Fawn seemed to be free of such ordinary human failings as jealousy, spite, and envy. Those friends will remember how, during her long, slow progress on her last book, one new psychobiography of Nixon after another seemed to appear in print. She would greet each one with optimism and appraise them all generously for what they might contribute to her knowledge and insight. She was also warmly appreciative to the author of a fictionalized biography of Sally Hemings that owed a good deal to her own work on Jefferson. This welcoming behavior seemed linked to a quality of youthful receptivity to life and delight in it. It was a quality of ingenuous wonder that gave pleasure to those who were lucky enough to be her friends. It gave freshness and added interest to her work.

She was once asked if she had tried her hand at writing a novel. She replied that she had, but that she gave it up because she found she had no talent for fiction. I think perhaps, for Fawn, real life was romance enough.

Elizabeth Wirth Marvick, PhD, was a good friend of Fawn Brodie. She taught political science at UCLA between 1960 and 1990, and authored two psychobiographies, The Young Richelieu: A Psychoanalytic Approach to Leadership (1983) and Louis XIII: The Making of a King (1986). Marvick, the Featured Scholar in the June 2002 issue of Clio's Psyche, died in May 2005.

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Epilogue:
**Why I Wrote *Fawn McKay Brodie* and Her Legacy:
A Biographer's Perspective**

Newell G. Bringhurst
College of the Sequoias

Over the course of some 13 years I was involved in an intense "affair" with a woman other than my wife. My long-term affair with Fawn McKay Brodie, literary in nature, involved the research and writing of a book-length biography on the controversial psychobiographer. In what turned out to be an obsessive affair, two questions are of relevance. First, what motivated me to produce a biography of Fawn McKay Brodie? Second, what is Fawn Brodie's legacy, as it involves her impact on the craft of biography and historical inquiry in general?

My motives for researching and writing the life of Fawn McKay Brodie were complex and multifaceted. On a fundamental level I was drawn to Brodie because of my own Latter-day Saint (Mormon) background. Growing up in Utah, I was familiar with the controversy generated by her provocative, path-breaking biography of Joseph Smith, *No Man Knows My History* (1945). Most orthodox Mormons denounced her interpretation of Mormonism's founder as a "conscious fraud." Some attacked the author herself on a personal level, referring to her as "that awful Brodie woman" who had betrayed her patrician Mormon heritage. In the small Utah town where I lived, certain devout Latter-day Saints denounced the director of our local library for acquiring *No Man Knows My History* and making it available to patrons.

Despite the intense controversy surrounding the woman and her work, I did not actually get around to reading her various writings until after moving away from Utah in 1967 and entering graduate school at the University of California, Davis. At that point I had decided to write my dissertation on the history of Mormon-African-American relations, focusing on the then-controversial issue of black-priesthood denial. This decision was inspired, in part, by a 1970 pamphlet Brodie wrote on this issue, entitled "Can We Manipulate the Past?" In this work Brodie accused the Mormon Church of manipulating its own past over a period of many decades to justify

its policy of denying male African-Americans the priesthood, labeling the ensuing policy "Jim Crowism in the Mormon Church." Specifically, Mormon leaders and spokesmen deliberately "covered up" the historical fact that LDS Church founder, Joseph Smith, had allowed the priesthood ordination of black males—a practice revoked by Smith's successors, beginning with Brigham Young. After reading Brodie's pamphlet, I turned to *No Man Knows My History*, carefully reading it, finding Brodie's well-written narrative of Joseph Smith's life and career compelling, provocative, and absorbing. This in turn, stimulated my ideas and thinking in new directions relative to my dissertation topic. But up to this point my interaction with Brodie was limited to her published works.

After completing my dissertation in 1975, and commencing my college teaching career, I approached Fawn Brodie through correspondence. I wrote her a letter, seeking her advice concerning the publication potential for my just-completed dissertation. My writing Fawn Brodie was both impulsive and presumptuous. By this time, Brodie had achieved national prominence thanks to the recent publication of her *Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate History* which had appeared on *The New York Times* Bestseller List for a total of 13 weeks in 1974. Thus, I was both surprised and flattered when she not only responded but also expressed her willingness to read what I had written. She not only offered valuable editorial advice but went so far as to help me secure a publisher for my revised dissertation. Thanks, in part, to her help, my work was ultimately published under the title, *Saints, Slaves, and Blacks: The Changing Place of Black People Within Mormonism* (1981). Brodie's help and encouragement made me want to get to know both the woman and her work better. Unfortunately, I was never able to meet Fawn Brodie face-to-face. This opportunity was preempted by her tragic death from cancer in 1981.

Some six years later, in 1986, I decided to research and write a biography on Fawn Brodie, thereby seizing the opportunity to become intimately acquainted with her, albeit vicariously. Further motivating me was my academic interest in the craft and challenges of biography. I had just completed a short book-length biography entitled *Brigham Young and the Expanding American Frontier* (1986), published as part of the "Library of American Biography" se-

ries under the editorship of Harvard University historian, Oscar Handlin. Thus, I was ready to be challenged by a new biographical subject.

I was further attracted to Fawn Brodie by the simple fact that I personally identified with certain aspects of her life and career, just as Fawn Brodie clearly identified with certain aspects of the lives of the five biographical subjects on whom she focused. As Brodie herself stated, "There is always a deep personal commitment in the writing of a biography," including "compelling inner reasons." "The subject chosen," she continued, "can also tell us a lot about [the] biographer." Similar observations have been made by other writers familiar with the art of biographical writing. Leon Edel, a noted biographer who spent 20 years writing his five-volume life of Henry James, stated that "biographers are invariably drawn to the writing of biography out of some deep personal motive." James Atlas went one step further, suggesting that "the biographer's subject enacts the main themes of the biographer's own life."

There are, indeed, clear parallels between my own life and that of Fawn Brodie. Like Fawn Brodie, I am descended from stalwart Mormon pioneer stock, my ancestors migrating west under Brigham Young's direction. Like Fawn Brodie, who grew up in the small town environment of Huntsville, I was reared in a small Utah town some twelve miles south of Salt Lake City. As teenagers, both Fawn McKay and I questioned basic Mormon beliefs. Both of us married outside the Mormon faith. We both became alienated from the Church as a result of research into certain disturbing aspects of Mormonism's historical past. In Brodie's case, she developed a sense of moral outrage in determining that Joseph Smith was less than the divinely inspired prophet she had believed him to be. She labeled the Mormon leader a "conscious fraud." In my case, I questioned Mormon truth claims in examining the contradictions and tortured reasoning used to justify Mormonism's now defunct practice of denying blacks the priesthood.

As I became more deeply involved in research for the Brodie biography, I detected one other important element of identification. I was hauntingly reminded of my own late mother in examining certain aspects of Brodie's personality. My mother and Fawn were contemporaries, part of what Tom Brokaw has characterized "the Greatest Generation"—those individuals born during the 1910s through the

1920s who came of age during the Great Depression and World War II. Fawn, like my mother, was a caring, empathic individual who considered the needs of her husband and children of primary importance—despite a personal thirst for learning and a desire for self-expression through writing. In putting her family first, as expected of all married women in post-World War II America, Fawn, like my own mother, deferred a career in teaching and full-time research and writing until her three children (the same number as in my own birth family) were fully grown. Both Fawn and my mother enjoyed people, eagerly interacting with a wide variety of individuals. Both women graduated from the University of Utah with degrees in English and both with honors. Both were teachers who related well with their students. Finally, both died while relatively young; Fawn was 65 and my own mother was just 49.

The biography, ultimately published under the title *Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer's Life* (1999), took some 13 years to research and write. In completing it, I confronted certain obstacles. These included the ambivalence, and indeed opposition, from certain members of Brodie's family as well as my own. Also impeding progress was my academic position as a full-time community college instructor, compelling me to teach five classes or fifteen unit hours per semester.

Offsetting such obstacles were certain benefits. On a fundamental level, I experienced the keen excitement of discovery, that is, of finding and sorting through a myriad of written information by and about Fawn Brodie—much of it heretofore unknown. Through more than three score oral interviews that I personally conducted as an essential part of my research over a five year period, I met and became acquainted with more than 60 interesting and articulate individuals who had interacted with Brodie during the course of her life. These included immediate and extended family members, childhood friends, and former students, as well as professional acquaintances whom Fawn and Bernard Brodie knew at UCLA, RAND, and within the Los Angeles psychoanalytic community.

Of greatest benefit was becoming personally acquainted with Fawn Brodie. I developed a keen appreciation for this woman, who practiced academic and intellectual honesty in both her writing and teaching. As for her body of writings, particularly

her five biographies, I came to appreciate both the quality as well as the breadth of her subject matter. In certain instances, however, I did not agree with her analyses and interpretations, which I found at times to be overly biased and sometimes based on inadequate or questionable historical sources.

I now turn to the second fundamental question posed at the beginning of this essay. What is Fawn McKay Brodie's legacy? The impact of Brodie's body of work on historical scholarship and the craft of biography, is significant. Her first biography, that of Joseph Smith, *No Man Knows My History*, helped set the agenda for the so-called "new" Mormon history, particularly as it involved Mormon origins and developments within the early Latter-day Saint movement. In the words of Roger D. Launius, "In many ways it was a seminal study that served as a transition point" between "the old and the New Mormon history, with the 'old' generally viewed as polemical while the 'new' was considered less concerned with questions of religious truth and more interested in understanding why events unfolded the way they did." Several recently published biographies of Joseph Smith are clearly inspired or influenced by Brodie's early psychobiographical approach.

Fawn Brodie's second biography, *Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge of the South* (1959), while less controversial than *No Man Knows My History*, represents a major benchmark in the so-called revisionist view of American Reconstruction history, facilitating the movement of scholarship away from the earlier, dominant "Dunning school," which had promoted a highly unfavorable view of Reconstruction. *Thaddeus Stevens* broke ground in the way it examined not only the subject's "intimate life" but also the impact of Stevens's clubfoot, probing the critical question of what physical crippling could do to a man's psyche.

Brodie's third major work, *The Devil Drives: A Life of Sir Richard Burton* (1967), was perhaps the least controversial of all of the author's biographies, though it dealt with a subject who was highly controversial in and of himself. *The Devil Drives* continues to be acknowledged, in the words of noted Burton scholar Jim Casada, as the "best life ... to date" of the flamboyant British explorer, despite the appearance of several subsequent biographies.

Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate History

(1974), by far Brodie's most popular biography and perhaps her most controversial, sent shock waves throughout the community of Jefferson scholars, particularly within the "Jefferson Establishment" based at Monticello in Virginia. The resulting storm sparked animated debate and discussion, particularly involving the central issues of slavery, race, gender, and class. These varied issues are the primary focus of the "new social history" that has come to dominate the larger field of American history. The debate at the center of Brodie's *Thomas Jefferson*—specifically, the precise nature of Jefferson's relationship with his black slave, Sally Hemings—continues unabated to the present.

Evidence of Brodie's influence is found in the 1995 movie, *Jefferson in Paris*, with Nick Nolte in the title role. In the words of one reviewer, the filmmakers took "their lead from Fawn M. Brodie's controversial best-seller." The film, the reviewer said, did not "rake Jefferson over the coals for his racial hypocrisies"; rather, it "cast a cool objective eye on both his moral lapses and his intellectual virtues," much as Fawn Brodie had done. Nevertheless, the larger controversy continued dividing not only historians but also members of Thomas Jefferson's own family—his white descendants and the black descendants of Sally Hemings. In 1998, DNA tests confirmed a direct literal relationship between Eston Hemings, Sally's youngest son, and Thomas Jefferson, thus vindicating the assertions made by Brodie a quarter century earlier.

Brodie's fifth and final biography, *Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character*, published in September 1981—some nine months after the author's death—received mixed reviews. Those critical of her approach, questioned her motives. Given Brodie's well-known disdain for Nixon, one reviewer went so far as to accuse the author of using "psychoanalysis ... as a tool for character destruction" and "revenge." Another stated: "After finishing [Brodie's] Nixon book, I have an urge to demand that psychobiographers be barred from writing about people they dislike." Perhaps, reflecting the mixed reviews, Brodie's *Richard Nixon* was a commercial disappointment, in contrast to her *Thomas Jefferson*, which had sold briskly. *Richard Nixon* sold only some 23,000 copies—far short of its first print run.

Contributing to the disappointing sales of Brodie's *Richard Nixon* was the fact that her biogra-

phy was merely one in a deluge of books on this president published during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Brodie's harsh assessment of Nixon ran counter to the emergence in the 1980s of a "revisionist" evaluation of the former president. Despite this, Brodie's *Richard Nixon* influenced the way in which the former president is viewed by scholars and in the popular culture. Nixon scholar Roger Morris, himself a revisionist, acknowledged Brodie's work as "far and away the most impressive intellectual spadework on the subject of Nixon's childhood and youth." In addition, Brodie's vivid, detailed portrait of Richard Nixon's troubled formative years clearly influenced filmmaker Oliver Stone in writing the screenplay for his highly controversial 1995 movie, *Nixon*. Stone singled out Brodie's biography as providing "a deeper understanding of what [Nixon] was thinking and feeling, what kind of a human being he was." Stone praised Brodie for her willingness "to push into the shadow areas—into the psychiatric areas, the relationship to mother and father and siblings—in order to understand why Nixon was so tortured."

Taken together, all five of Brodie's biographies, written over a period of more than 40 years, exemplify the craft of modern biography. Each work was carefully researched in an effort to capture the varied, multifaceted aspects of the subject's life and career. Each was written in an engaging literary style, reflective of the author's inherent skills as well as her background and training in English literature. Finally—and of particular relevance to the readers of *Clio's Psyche*—Brodie drew on her experiences, training, and reading in the field of psychoanalysis, in skillfully constructing complex, psychological portraits of her varied biographical subjects.

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Quarterly, *Utah Historical Quarterly*, *Journal of Mormon History*, and *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought*. He is a past president of the Mormon History Association and is currently president of the John Whitmer Historical Association. Dr. Bringham may be contacted at newellgb@hotmail.com or 2218 E. Vassar Ave., Visalia, CA 93292. □

Donald Carveth: Psychoanalytic Sociologist

Paul H. Elovitz

Clio's Psyche and Ramapo College

On June 8, 1944 Donald Carveth was born in Toronto, Canada where he earned bachelors (with honors-1967), masters (1968) and doctoral (1977) degrees in sociology from the University of Toronto. Since 1977 he has taught at Glendon College of York University where he is currently Associate Professor of Sociology and Social and Political Thought. He also holds various psychoanalytic institute teaching appointments in Toronto where he maintains an analytic practice.

Professor Carveth has done extensive editorial work and has served on the editorial boards of several publications including *Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought*, *Free Associations*, the *Journal of Psycho-Social Studies*, and the online journal *PSYART: A Hyperlink Journal for the Psychological Study of the Arts*. He was Editor-in-Chief of the *Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis /Revue Canadienne de Psychanalyse* from January 2002 to July 2005, for which he was awarded the first Eva Lester Prize by the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society. In addition, he has written chapters in five books, most recently, "*The Passion of the Christ: Psychoanalytic and Christian Existential Perspectives*" in *Passionate Dialogues: Critical Perspectives on Mel Gibson's The Passion of the Christ* (2005) and "Psychoanalysis in Canada," an article in *The Edinburgh International Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis*. He is the author of about 30 journal articles including "Marriage at-a-Distance" for *Clio's Psyche* (Vol. 12, 4), written with his wife Jean Hantman Carveth, and the lead article in the March 2006 *Love, Distance, and Marriage Special Feature*.

Donald Carveth's work in psychoanalysis is wide-ranging. He is a graduate of the Toronto Institute of Psychoanalysis (1985) where he is a Training

and Supervising Analyst. The American Sociological Association awarded him the 1984 Theory Prize for his article "Psychoanalysis and Social Theory: The Hobbesian Problem Revisited." He is a member of eight professional organizations including the Toronto Psychoanalytic Society and the International Psychoanalytic Association. Several of the graduate courses Professor Carveth has taught over the years include Special Topics in Social Psychology, Elements of Character and Culture, and The Existentialist Critique of Freud.

Professor Carveth has made numerous appearances on Canadian television and radio and served as psychiatric consultant on the 2001 film *Don't Say a Word*. He was interviewed online in April 2006 subsequent to the editor having learned quite a lot about him at various Forum meetings. He may be contacted at <dcarveth@rogers.com>.

PHE: What brought you to psychoanalysis and psychohistory?

DLC: A disturbed childhood. A disturbed mother. A father who failed to adequately protect me, resulting in my becoming an "adultified" child with a pathological need to "cure" his mother. I find this dynamic to be present in many who become therapists. I remember John Gedo saying that he blamed his analyst for his analytic career: if his analyst had helped free him from his unconscious need to cure his mother he would have escaped becoming an analyst and become what he felt he should have become: a professor of art history. Hopefully some of us become conscious of this unconscious quest and still find reasons to be therapists, and no longer find our depressed mothers in every patient. Otherwise every therapeutic failure repeats the failure to cure mother, a dynamic that can drive a person out of the field.

My father was a busy doctor and a frustrated intellectual: his bedside light stayed on late, after a busy day with patients, as he read Alfred North Whitehead, Einstein, Teilhard de Chardin, Freud and others. He enjoyed an ongoing debate with the Anglican minister of the church that abutted our backyard. Father sent the priest patients he felt needed spiritual guidance and the priest sent my father people who needed a physician's care. The priest continually tried to convert my agnostic father by giving him books in which scientists find God through the telescope or microscope. I wanted to be closer to my busy father so, quite early on, I tried to read those

books in hopes that he and I could talk about them. They were way over my head but I persisted. I think I picked up his unconscious valuation of intellect over medical practice: he was not unhappy when I abandoned medicine and got a doctorate in sociology. When I achieved tenure at the university he was delighted and proud. There was also, of course, an oedipal struggle in all this. He was a very successful doctor: it would have been hard to compete there. But I soon had the intellectual edge and could dance circles around the old man in verbal and intellectual debate. Although my parents were not religious and only attended church on occasions when I was singing a solo or some other such event, they always sent me. I experienced the order and seeming normality of the church as appealing, given the unhappiness I experienced at home due to my mother's alcoholism. But around age 12, I found Bertrand Russell's *Why I Am Not a Christian* in my father's library. That, combined with adolescent hormones, ended my early religious phase. Although I eventually chose not to follow my father into medicine, I did identify for many years with his atheism. While our parish priest didn't succeed in converting my father, his work paid off eventually, one generation removed, when, around the time of my father's death, I returned to the fold weeping like a prodigal son.

PHE: What is your primary affiliation?

DLC: I think I'm an academic intellectual, a professor first, psychoanalyst second. My primary values are truth values, not "help" values. I think in this I'm like Freud, whose values were more those of the scientist than those of the practitioner. I don't mean to say there is necessarily a conflict between these value orientations, for there are schools of psychoanalytic thought, such as the Freudian and Kleinian, that are also committed to truth values. Bion even thought that the mind needs truth as its fundamental nutrient. Patients who are fundamentally into falsehood are people I don't work with well. Robert Langs distinguished "truth therapy" from "lie therapy"—a distinction I find useful. There are patients who can't bear truth therapy, but I'm not interested in being the one to provide the lie therapy they require.

As an intellectual I identify more with social theory, or social and political thought, than with sociology in a narrow sense. Although I very much value the intellectual training I received from studying Durkheim, Weber, Marx and other major social theo-

rists of the sociological tradition, as well as what C. Wright Mills called “the sociological imagination.” My orientation has always been interdisciplinary: I’ve always been as interested in philosophy, especially 19th and 20th century continental philosophy (existential philosophy in particular) and theology as much as in social science. Of course, there is also my deep interest in everything psychoanalytic—an interest that formed in my teens when I first read Freud and that informed my doctoral dissertation on sociology and psychoanalysis. Fortunately, my orientation has been valued and supported: I was hired by a university that chose early on to distinguish itself from the other major university in this city by its commitment to interdisciplinarity. Furthermore, the sociology department at Glendon College was founded by a humanistic sociologist interested in social theory and historical sociology. She formed a small department of like-minded young sociologists (we always struggled to find a number-crunching part-timer to teach the obligatory research methods course), so I have always felt intellectually at home in my department. As many of my colleagues had experienced therapy or analysis, even my interests in this field were accepted. Within psychoanalysis my work has been both theoretical and applied. I have found over the years that the sociological and psychohistorical dimensions of my work have come more and more to the forefront as I have become increasingly interested in the problem of guilt and guilt-evasion in our culture of narcissism.

PHE: What special training was most helpful in your doing psychohistorical work?

DLC: I guess it was my general sociological education combined with increasing psychoanalytic self-understanding (through personal analysis, life experience, and clinical experience) and deeper understanding of my patients, as I came increasingly to understand the role of self-torment as a defense against guilt. Much of the modern Kleinian work is along the same lines. Freud reported that he would first see something in his patients, and only then see it in himself. I relate to that. I find also that, once I see it in myself and my patients, my sociological imagination kicks in and I start wondering what’s going on in the society at large.

PHE: Have you published, or do you plan to publish, an autobiography or any autobiographical writings?

DLC: No. This interview is my first foray into this

territory. Who knows what may come of it?

PHE: What training should a person entering psychohistory today pursue?

DLC: I think a background in history and sociology would be ideal, supplemented with personal analysis and education in psychoanalytic theory. Ideally the psychohistorian should receive full clinical psychoanalytic training, as it is difficult to use psychoanalytic theory properly without understanding its grounding in the clinic.

PHE: In the US there has been a graying of psychoanalysis and psychohistory. Is it also true in Canada where you live, practice, and teach as well as in England, where you are affiliated with the Centre for Psycho-Social Studies, University of West England?

DLC: I can’t speak of psychohistory *per se* in Canada as this field is not well represented or organized and conscious of itself here (which is not to say there aren’t Canadians working in the field), but I can speak about psychoanalysis more broadly. Certainly the biological turn in psychiatry has radically changed the situation here as it has in the US for psychiatric residents who, up until the late 1970s, would have seen psychoanalytic training as almost a necessity for advancement in their careers. Few analysts remain as teachers of residents in psychiatric training programs, so fewer young psychiatrists seek this career path, but demand still remains from this quarter. More and more of our candidates are non-medical and include many more women than in the past. There is enough demand that ten years ago a group of psychologists here were encouraged by Steven Mitchell to establish a non-International Psychoanalytic Association Institute which has thrived in addition to the older, more “kosher” institute, which has suffered from the competition. Analytic training seems to be a growing concern in Montreal, in both French and English, as well as in smaller institutes in Ottawa, Quebec City, London Ontario, and Vancouver. There is considerable interest in applied psychoanalysis in most of these Canadian centers. Most of them run “psychoanalysis and cinema” programs. In Toronto we have our Annual Day in Applied Psychoanalysis which has focused on themes such as the psychoanalysis of literature, music, humor, terrorism and other topics. All this borders on psychohistory. I have the impression that the situation in England is much better. There are university centers for psycho-

analytic studies, chairs in psychoanalysis, and so on. There seems, over the past few decades, to have been fruitful attempts to promote the psychoanalytic study of society. I'm thinking of Robert Maxwell Young's journal *Free Associations*.

PHE: How can we bring younger people into these fields?

DLC: Speaking from a Canadian perspective, the most obvious way to do this would be to acquaint younger people with the existence of the field of psychohistory through courses and even centers focused on this discipline. This presents a challenge in the university. The psychology departments in Canada, for some reason that I do not fathom, are even more hostile to psychoanalysis than they are in the US, so they will certainly not support psychohistorical work. Though I personally know of a couple, I think not many historians in Canada are interested at all in psychoanalysis. Regrettably, the graduate students in sociology and social and political thought, if they are interested in psychoanalysis at all, are inclined to embrace Lacanism and related "postmodern" discourses, which I think deprives them of any acquaintance with the mainstream of psychoanalytic thought which informs psychohistory. Ultimately, I think the way to attract people to psychohistory is to produce impressive, sound, insightful psychohistorical scholarship that is illuminating and non-reductive and that will impress serious scholars with what the field can offer.

PHE: How effective is the online work that you do in bringing applied psychoanalysis to younger people? How valuable is it in general?

DLC: I don't really do any such online work. For seven or eight years I participated actively in online psychoanalytic e-mail forums discussing all sorts of theoretical and applied psychoanalytic topics. I was aware that although only a few of us were posting, many were "lurking" and listening, and I've heard from enough of the "lurkers" to know they appreciated tuning in to our discussions. I haven't explored the potential of online work in any systematic way so it's hard to say how valuable it might be.

PHE: What is the overall impact of modern communications, electronics, and transportation on our modern life and psychology?

DLC: Globalization is a reality. I'm not sure whether McLuhan's idea of the "global village" ex-

actly applies. I've written in *Clio's Psyche* about my long-distance marriage that arose out of and has been maintained by such communication and transportation, so I guess I'm a living example of its impact.

PHE: Ramapo College, where I teach in New Jersey, just inaugurated a Canadian as its president, which brings to mind the state of higher education in Canada and why people leave your country.

DLC: Lots of us don't leave and find perfectly good academic careers here, both as professors and academic administrators. Some people leave because of job opportunities, just as lots of people leave the US to take jobs in Canada. About half of my colleagues at Glendon were Americans who came to Canada either to work, or to dodge the draft, or both. I do think that, although I think this is changing now, Canadians have in the past been unduly impressed by both Britain and the US. "A prophet is not honored in his own land." If a Canadian gets recognition by the Brits or the Yanks, his fellow Canadians start to take him seriously. I experienced this myself: I couldn't get my thesis proposal on sociology and psychoanalysis accepted at the University of Toronto until I published two papers in major US journals. Suddenly the graduate faculty were delighted to accept my proposal, asking me essentially to add an introduction and a conclusion to the two published papers, and *Voila!* This is a colonial mentality that we are outgrowing. Canadian higher education is not in any more trouble than is US higher education, we're not doing that badly.

PHE: How do you see applied psychoanalysis and psychohistory developing in the next decade?

DLC: As long as there are psychoanalytic societies and institutes there will be interest in applied psychoanalysis. As for psychohistory, I think it needs to find a home in the university in the form of programs or centers for psychohistory to which scholars from different disciplines might be cross-appointed.

PHE: What do we need to do to strengthen our work?

DLC: We need examples of insightful and non-reductive psychohistorical scholarship that explode the negative stereotypes that traditional historians and other scholars often have regarding this field. These stereotypes, I fear, have sometimes been justified by the psychological reductionism that, in its enthusiasm

for psychology, has sometimes tended to underplay material, economic, political and other forces.

PHE: What was your experience like as Assistant Editor (1993-2002) and then Editor-in-Chief (2002-2005) of the *Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis* and what sorts of things did you learn as an editor?

DLC: My experience was that of being deluged with papers to read and edit, reviewers to find and commission, secretaries who sometimes were more disorganized and absent-minded even than me, colleagues who became resentful when their work was rejected, or when there were excessive delays in getting a decision, or even when their papers somehow got lost—I could go on in this negative vein. On the positive side, it opened a window on some of the latest thinking in psychoanalysis and on what people were preoccupied with in my own country. It brought me into contact with my French-speaking colleagues in Quebec (the *CJRP* is a bilingual journal).

PHE: As someone who has taught in both the university and the analytic institute, please explain some of the differences to our readers who have never experienced both.

DLC: I think the main difference is that, to the credit of the university, operative there for the most part is a culture that understands and tolerates a variety of perspectives, that understands that we teach what Sir Karl Popper called “approximations” to the truth, not the truth *per se*. We teach the Marxist vision, the Freudian vision, the Christian vision—and though we have and inevitably convey our biases, we care more that our students know what Marx, or Freud, or Christianity claim, than that they become Marxists, Freudians or Christians. I tell my undergraduate students I’m not terribly interested in what they think (though they can tell me if they must), I only want to know whether they know with some accuracy what the thinkers we have studied thought. Now I find that this attitude has not tended to characterize teaching in psychoanalytic institutes, at least not until fairly recently. I’m happy to say that I think it is appearing more and more there nowadays.

Regrettably, in the past, the Freudians would tell the candidates the Truth as revealed in the volumes by Freud and his orthodox followers and all other views were deemed either irrelevant or heretical. Then the self psychologists would come in and dismiss all that as old and outmoded and introduce the candidates to the new Kohutian truth. To me, this

approach has more in common with an old-fashioned, bad training for the priesthood than with anything aspiring to be a scholarly discipline. Fortunately, a lot of institutes have gotten interested in comparative psychoanalysis, looking at clinical material from multiple perspectives: this is how a Freudian might conceive the case, but a Kohutian might see it this way, and a Kleinian this other way, etc. This is not the same thing as relativism. I consider myself a Kleinian, and I’m a Kleinian because I think this perspective has grasped psychological truth more deeply and comprehensively than other perspectives, but I’m committed to teach it as one among many points of view. As Chair of our Institute Curriculum Committee my goal is to promote this style of teaching. Today to indoctrinate candidates in one school of analytic thought is unacceptable.

PHE: What is the importance of childhood to psychohistory?

DLC: What is now the importance of childhood to psychoanalysis? Certainly in my own self-understanding childhood events and trauma are central. I do think self-knowledge requires understanding of the early forces that have shaped us and to which we may still be unconsciously reacting. On the other hand, analysts have sometimes become so focused upon childhood origins that they have paid insufficient attention to the structure and workings of the present psyche that has evolved. We need to know how we operate, consciously, preconsciously and unconsciously *now*. Then we can form hypotheses about origins. For example, I’m more interested in the nature, structure and operation of George Bush’s psyche *now*, than I am in how it got that way. Not that the latter is not an interesting question. It also needs to be acknowledged that, until quite recently, psychoanalytic developmental theories were based on very flimsy evidence: Freud produced a whole psychology of infancy and childhood without any systematic observation of infants and children, and Klein speculated about the infant mind from work with children over age two. This is not a sound basis for psychohistorical work on childhood origins.

PHE: Some Forum researchers have been struggling with the issue of identification with a particular parent and achievement. If you would like to comment on this, it would be helpful to them.

DLC: I certainly identified with my father’s “phallic-

narcissistic” character, his energy and drive, his combativeness. I think all this stood me in pretty good stead professionally. He was a successful, “self-made” man and he expected great things from me and told me so. Certainly at times he was pretty castrating, as fathers of his generation sometimes tended to be, but overall he displayed some impressive strengths that have been very useful to me through identification. I think I almost consciously disidentified from my mother whose depression and alcoholism I hated. Inevitably, however, there were unconscious identifications here too: I developed a somewhat “hypomaniac” style precisely to ward off threatening depression (which would mean being “dead” like her), a depression grounded in a child’s wish to be close to a depressed mother by “joining” her in her depression. Fortunately, I did not inherit her problems with alcohol, though as a hippie in the 1960s I certainly got into trouble enough with other drugs.

I think that it was through identification with my father’s reality-orientation and practical determination that I was able to put all that behind me when it was time to grow up. Certainly my need to not be “just an academic,” my need to be a clinician and have a practice, was grounded in my need to undo the disidentification with my father that occurred when I decided against medical school. Becoming a clinical psychoanalyst was becoming, finally, a doctor like my Dad—a motivation my father never really understood or sympathized with. He was pretty unhappy with the way the medical profession had developed by the later years of his practice and he was happy and proud that I had chosen another path. But that meant nothing to my unconscious. My father was a doctor who saw patients in a home office. I eventually became a “doctor” who saw patients in a home office—not that far, really, from where my Dad had done so for many years. Like my father, I have fathered only one child, a son.

PHE: In your experience and life, are high-achievers more identified with their fathers?

DLC: While this is true in my own case, I don’t have a wide enough sample of high-achievers to support or refute the generalization. I’m skeptical. I have high-achieving colleagues who had weak or absent fathers and strong mothers. I just today saw the new Sam Shepard/Wim Wenders film *Don’t Come Knocking* which, like everything Shepard does, is concerned

with an absentee father. Shepard has written about his own “fatherlessness.” But it seems Sam Shepard (rock musician, psychoanalyst, playwright, movie star) has managed to become a father and a high achiever.

PHE: Why do you think that psychoanalysts and psychohistorians have been so inclined to downplay the importance and impact of religion on society?

DLC: Because, like Freud, his followers have had a terribly one-sided understanding of religion as wishful illusion and have held it in contempt as something any sane and mature person has to outgrow. It’s hard to take seriously the importance and impact on society of something you regard as primitive that ought to be outgrown, the sooner the better. (Actually, Freud did acknowledge the role of religion in taming antisocial passions and reconciling people to civilization in various, essentially illusory, ways.) Freud had the odd idea that religion denied the dark side of life and the evil in human nature which Enlightenment rationalism had had the courage to face. He seems to have confused religion with *Das Kapital*. The Bible is full of insight into the inevitably fallen and sinful nature of man, into the transient nature of life and the inevitability of death—and the Enlightenment, while it illuminated human injustice, failed to diagnose its deepest roots, which lie not in our biology (the drives of the id), nor in private property or other social ills, but in our uniquely human *existenz* as self-conscious and free beings-unto-death. So Freud had this one-sided view of religion as a lullaby, a wishful illusion—which it certainly has been in its fundamentalist forms. At the same time he failed to see that psychoanalysis itself could become fundamentalist. He failed to apply his own basic premise of epigenesis and distinguish different varieties of religion on different psychic levels. Similarly he failed to do an epigenetic analysis of irreligion—oral atheism (“I can’t swallow that”), anal atheism (“I say *no* to that religious crap!”), phallic-oedipal atheism (“I don’t bend the knee to anyone;” “no way are you putting holes in my hands, feet and side, old man!”; “*My* will be done, not *thine*”), etc. In short, the reason psychoanalysts and psychohistorians have been so inclined to downplay the importance and impact of religion on society is that they themselves have been so fundamentally captured by the ideology of atheism and secular humanism that they haven’t appreciated that they are themselves fundamentalists, adherents of an

ideology that doesn't recognize itself as such.

PHE: Of which of your works are you most proud?

DLC: My early work on analysis as the deconstruction of literalized metaphor was good, as was my essay on "Christianity: A Kleinian View," but I think my work on self-torment, the unconscious need for punishment, as not an expression but an evasion of guilt—my work on guilt-evasion—will likely prove to be the most significant.

PHE: What are you working on now? What is its importance and when do you expect to have it published?

DLC: I'm continuing to work on guilt-evasion. The analysis of Guntrip is merely a case illustration. Freud thought civilization led to a build-up of guilt that represents a threat to civilized life. The problem is quite the reverse: civilization leads to a build-up of self-torment, not guilt--self-torment that defends against guilt. The way out of self-destruction is through more guilt: facing it and learning how to bear it. I will continue to write papers that might eventually get collected as chapters in a work on guilt-evasion. Currently I'm thinking there are really only two main types of human beings: those who can accept that they are flawed and have faults, and those who can't bear to face this. It is not easy to help the latter develop a capacity for the former.

PHE: Your CV reveals that you are involved with an enormous number of editorial, psychoanalytic, scholarly, and teaching activities and that you have published a great deal. However, you have not published a book. Is this something you ever plan to do and, if so, on what subject?

DLC: So far my creativity has taken the form of writing papers, not books. Colleagues have told me that some of my papers might easily have been expanded into books. I have not had the interest or energy to do that expanding. My, perhaps self-indulgent, pattern has been that once I have figured something out and said it to my satisfaction, I've moved on to the next thing. But I see a trend: it seems to have been leading up to something. Maybe there will be a book. Or maybe it will only be a collection. Retirement from the university is only three years away. I wouldn't be surprised if a book emerges sometime after that. It will be about guilt-evasion.

PHE: How do you explain the growth and psychol-

ogy of fundamentalism?

DLC: Erich Fromm wrote of the "fear of freedom." In addition to fearing freedom we fear death. In defense against these anxieties we make fetishes or idols and engage in magical thinking. We don't want to think our, say, psychoanalytic theory is just a theory, a perspective or a "take" on truth, we want to think it *is* the truth. We want to collapse the gap, hole, bar ... that separates the theory or the metaphor from the domain it seeks to map. So we end up mistaking the map for the territory and the menu for the meal. This is PS (paranoid-schizoid) religion and irreligion. The more anxiety there is to cope with, the more this regressive pattern emerges. The pace and complexity of social change, the clash of previously insulated cultures, the scope and scale of economic and environmental problems—all this generates anxiety and anxiety drives fundamentalism and makes growth into D (the so-called depressive position where holes and gaps and wounds and guilt and separateness can come to be tolerated) more difficult to achieve. Then there is the role of destructive envy. Injustice breeds envy which breeds resentment and violence. People driven by these forces don't want to be confused by complexity.

PHE: What are your thoughts on the psychology and psychodynamics of violence in our world?

DLC: I think the psychology and psychodynamics of scapegoating are central. After 9/11 it may well have made sense to attack the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but Iraq? I'm reminded of the story Freud told about the town in which the butcher was found guilty of murder and a tailor was hung—because the town had three tailors but only one butcher. (The fact that Saddam was a butcher is not relevant for the purposes of this analogy!) I think people who feel persecuted frequently induce others to feel persecuted and to retaliate in persecutory ways that confirm the initial paranoia. The only way to break this cycle is to contain the induced persecutory anxiety and not re-project it—to learn how to sit still in the face of provocation: non-retaliation, non-violence. Call it "turning the cheek" if you will. It means containing the impulse for revenge. How to do that? Have faith that evil-doers will always be punished and will suffer for their sins, as we all do. No one gets away with anything. The unconscious superego sees and knows all and punishes all—either with guilt to be borne or, if guilt is evaded, then

through the torments of the damned—that is, through painful symptomatology. Knowing that “what goes around comes around” means that I don’t have to take revenge. If I can, in that knowledge, contain my impulse to retaliate, the cycle of violence may be broken and my persecutor will feel persecuted by his failure to make me so persecuted that I have to react by persecuting him.

PHE: How do you understand the psychology of terrorism?

DLC: I think fundamentalist religious belief combined with deep hatred of a powerful enemy makes this possible. Unlike depressive position or mature religion, paranoid-schizoid religion is characterized by splitting (God vs. the Devil, etc.). The terrorist operates on this “borderline” or paranoid-schizoid level and is in a state of grandiose fusion with the all-good object (which he views as “God”). He sees himself as doing God’s will, an act for which he will be rewarded in the next life through continued and complete fusion with the all-good object. His hatred is channeled toward what he views as an all-bad object. Another way to put it is that he identifies with an omnipotent superego and projects all his badness onto the all-bad object that must be punished.

PHE: How can psychologically-oriented scholars have more impact in academia and on society in general?

DLC: By producing good work that is well-written and accessible and by taking advantage where possible of modern media (film, TV, radio, Internet).

PHE: What is the impact of psychohistory on your area of expertise?

DLC: I don’t think psychohistory has had much impact on sociology, as most sociologists have been virtually trained to think anti-psychologically, the field having been defined by Durkheim as not-psychology.

PHE: I have been struck by the relative decline of sociology in academia in the US. Is the same true in Canada, and if so, why?

DLC: I think the situation is similar in Canada. I think there are two main factors. During the 60’s and early 70’s, the hope and interest in major social change through political action grounded in an essentially Marxist critique of society was still active. The rise of neo-conservatism and the decline of Marxism

marginalized sociology to some extent. Disillusioned with the dominance of “reaction” on the social level, there was a turn away from the social to the individual and the psychological. One of the problems of psychohistory, it seems to me, is its tendency (at times) to downplay the role of external, societal, structural and economic forces in favor of a one-sided emphasis on psychological factors, instead of focusing on how these factors interact.

Another reason for the relative decline of sociology has been the splitting off from sociology of such fields as criminology, women’s studies, black and native studies, as these fields, formerly sub-fields of sociology, sought to become separate disciplines.

PHE: How can we recruit new people to applied psychoanalysis and psychohistory?

DLC: By producing good psychohistorical scholarship and demonstrating its power.

PHE: What books were important to your development?

DLC: Erich Fromm’s *Escape From Freedom*; Erik Erikson’s *Childhood and Society* and all his other works; Ernest Becker’s *The Denial of Death*; Christopher Lasch’s *The Culture of Narcissism*; Leo Rangell’s *The Mind of Watergate*; William Barrett’s *Irrational Man*; Norman O. Brown’s *Life Against Death*; Herbert Marcuse’s *Eros and Civilization*.

PHE: Who was important to your development as a student of psychosocial phenomena? Did Erik Erikson have an impact on you?

DLC: Certainly Erikson was important in helping me see the flaws in what he called Freud’s “centaur model of man” and this helped make me receptive to the Kleinian development of Freud’s ideas.

PHE: Are there any mentors who come to mind?

DLC: Early on I was influenced by Lewis Feuer’s work on “The Conflict of Generations.” Professor Dennis H. Wrong, a fellow Canadian who taught for many years at NYU, served as external examiner of my doctoral dissertation which concerned his work. He and I subsequently became friends. Wrong’s “The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology” (1963) formed the basis of my dissertation which extended his critique to later developments in sociological theory. Dennis was one of the earliest of the very few sociologists to call for the

integration of psychoanalytic insights into sociology.

PHE: What is your psychoanalytic/psychotherapeutic experience and what is its influence on you as a psychohistorian? How has it changed your vision of the world?

DLC: I have had four different analysts. My first analysis began in the mid-1970s when, like many disillusioned student radicals and hippies, I turned inward, from society to self. Having explored all the trendy new therapies of the time and found them empty, I eventually found my way to psychoanalysis and, for me, it worked. A few days after being promoted and receiving tenure at the university, I applied for analytic training. Both personal analysis and psychotherapeutic and psychoanalytic practice (which necessarily involve continuing self-analysis) have certainly furthered and deepened the changes in my vision of the world that had already begun before my analysis and that had led me to it in the first place. I had become disillusioned with a neo-Marxist and sociological vision that was blind to the irrational depths of human psychic and emotional life and I had turned, intellectually, toward psychoanalysis before undertaking personal analysis. The problem of how to do justice to both the interior and the exterior worlds in psychohistorical analysis is critical: material, structural and environmental factors in the real world must not be ignored or minimized if we are to avoid the fallacy of psychological reductionism. We cannot, for example, work with the Kleinian concept of envy without acknowledging the real inequities that stimulate it.

PHE: How do you define psychohistory?

DLC: The scholarly study of the role of psychological forces, conscious and unconscious, that interacting with other factors (material, economic, political, etc.) shape historical events and the actions of the individuals and groups that make history.

PHE: Please list the five people who you think have made the greatest contribution to psychohistory in order of their contribution.

DLC: Sigmund Freud, Erik Erikson, Erich Fromm, Christopher Lasch, and Leo Rangell.

PHE: Thank you for an interesting interview. ◻



Book Reviews

Understanding Our Sports Idols

Daniel Dervin
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Book Review of Stanley H. Teitelbaum, Sports Heroes, Fallen Idols: How Star Athletes Pursue Self-Destructive Paths & Jeopardize Their Careers. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005. 283 pages. Index. ISBN 080324445, \$29.95.

While preparing this review, I read in the sports pages that four Minnesota Vikings players were being charged with various misdemeanors. Allegedly, they hired two cruise ships and brought in strippers for a party that involved 30 other players and up to 90 guests. Besides inappropriate behavior with the lap dancers during this bacchanal, players had sex with the women in public areas of the boats, and crew members reported feeling threatened (*Washington Post* 16 Dec 05). Stanley Teitelbaum's study of sports heroes could hardly be timelier.

His thoroughly documented and richly illustrated account develops intertwined themes: the first is the rise and fall of the athlete-hero, which follows a tragic trajectory of flawed character, overreaching through drugs, gambling, violence, or promiscuity, and the inevitable fall from grace; the second stems from a "hero-hungry public" that craves connections with sports icons, aided and abetted by a media which help create "larger than life" figures who are "expected to be perfect." Along with the media, fans perform as enablers who send messages that the athletes "have a free pass to do whatever they want" (p. xi).

Here a psychohistorical note is sounded when Teitelbaum observes, "we tend to anoint our sports heroes as gods because we need the feelings of specialness we get from affiliating with outstanding athletes." Although many future stars "come from dysfunctional or traumatic backgrounds," and are thus ill-equipped to handle this kind of stress, "we need for our 'invented supermen' not to disillusion us" (pp.xi-xii).

In our interdisciplinary field geared to analyz-

ing the dynamics of political leadership, most of us use the shorthand term “group-fantasy” for the public’s displaced desires onto a leader who then functions as “delegate” for their realization. Thus similarities between athletes and politicians come readily to mind. Both engage in adversarial contests with guaranteed winners and losers; their conduct is governed by rules and guidelines to ensure fairness (replays, recounts), while the high standards and ideals they aspire to are not always met.

But although athletes and politicians alike are viewed as potential role-models and exemplars of virtue, they also reveal differences. Political leaders in office who fall short of their hype and slip in the polls, embark on a quest for scapegoats, foreign or domestic, to take the heat lest they themselves be sacrificed. Fallen sports idols, like O.J. Simpson and Pete Rose, may be targets for a while of bitter re-cremations, but they ultimately fade away because the fans and media have already found other delegates.

However, like the politician, the sports-hero serves to regulate the group’s self-esteem, to ward off feelings of depression, and to “cushion the sadness of what is missing in our lives or compensate for lost glory” (p. 8). For both types, a toxic nexus of entitlements comes into play. As in the Abramoff scandal, lobbyists flagrantly cater to the politician’s greed and vanity, but the athlete’s liabilities stem from a different history. From early on, he has usually been singled out for his potential skills and been taught to feel special ever after. He is encouraged to expect the best of everything and takes for granted the undying love and gratitude of his public. While his talents are being nourished, he is overdosing narcissistic supplies. Spectators, however, by dint of investing time and money for “herculean feats,” feel their vested interests empower them to broker their heroes’ fame. When the stars stumble or burn out, spectators do not recognize their complicity. They are blinded and driven by their shared fantasy—much like the political process—and are just as ambivalent, though their frustrations are alleviated by other options or moderated by team-loyalty, so that the process perpetuates itself.

The athlete’s Achilles heel, as exposed by Stanley Teitelbaum, is that the enormous love and esteem bestowed on him is never unconditional but rather linked to his performance and therefore both

conditional and contingent. The athlete-hero’s failure to accept this limitation lurches from the disastrous to the farcical. Some blunder into other public arenas, e.g., Jimmy Connors’ fantasy about becoming a singer, John McEnroe’s foray into talk-TV (as well as Magic Johnson’s, if memory serves). A few enter midlevel politics, but more typically, athletes envision an afterlife in the reflected spotlight of coaches or sportscasters, reporting on their successors’ feats and flaws while awaiting an eventual embalming into the Hall of Fame. Thus, as athletes’ careers last but a few years—most are finished by their 30s—retirement can be traumatic. Expect a loss of self, increased antisocial behavior, and a sort of premature death (pp. 29-30).

It would be interesting to hear more on narcissistic issues from Teitelbaum, who has had clinical experience with sports figures, but he tends to apply the term in a general way as self-centeredness, i.e., as “self-absorption, an exaggerated sense of self-importance and entitlement, and an insensitivity to the needs and feelings of others” (p. 26). When their superlative feats gratify their adoring fans, one wonders if this transitory merger experience is ever transformative or just pathological in its illusory realization of grandiosity. Of course it depends on the individual, but Teitelbaum tilts toward the latter. In seeking a more rigorous psychoanalytic-basis, one is tempted to revisit the 1980s turf wars between the two superstars, Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg, who staked out opposing narcissistic paradigms. Certainly, Kohut’s binary of grandiose self/idealized other, with significant others being rendered into insignificance (as self-objects) is promising; while Kernberg’s emphasis on later Oedipal-stage functioning always being present to some degree is also pertinent.

Invoking celebrity analysts reminds us of features athletes and politicians share with other popular celebrities, which is all the more pertinent as we become dominated by celebrity culture. The careers of Ronald Reagan and Arnold Schwarzenegger show how all three categories can mischievously overlap and blur perceptions. In the political sphere, both men enhanced their image from other areas. Reagan had been a lifeguard as well as a sportscaster, and when he struggled for re-election he evoked his movie-persona as Notre Dame’s immortal Knute Rockne, bidding the electorate to deliver “one more

for the Gipper.” Arnold’s macho past as a body-builder was parlayed into the on-screen Terminator and then into the hyper-masculine governor who cast scorn on the legislature’s “girly men.” (Hubris kicks in here also, as his vaunted package of initiatives failed in the fall of 2005.)

However, a psychohistorical contrast shows up in the pure celebrity group. While it’s true that fans worship their stars—may even feel they own a piece of them—and also true that together they may enjoy merger experiences, movie-idols and other entertainers do not offer magical opportunities for rebirth and renewal proffered by political leaders and athletes, nor, on the downside, do depressive affects accrue from their flops and decline. This may be explained by the stage, the field, and the forum each having distinct histories. The Olympic games were tied into seasonal renewal: the victors draped with garlands of flowers, crowned with laurel wreathes, and honored with fruitful cornucopias from the goddess. Political contests in the US are waged in the fall during the dying year and, when the embodiment of the old year is banished at the precincts, the new year’s god is inaugurated in early January, the month for the State of the Union and the Super Bowl—correlative rituals of renewal. The Oscar ceremonies in March are indeed an orgy of narcissism but otherwise anti-climactic, and the awards lead more frequently to oblivion (anyone remember Helen Hunt?) than to group or individual renewal. No doubt the adversarial aspect of games, political or athletic, retains archaic notions of seasonal sacrifice and renewal. Whereas actors only play tragic characters, Teitelbaum’s *Sports-hero/Fallen-idol* figures actually become real-life tragic characters.

The author thus inscribes his athlete-heroes’ trajectory after classical tragedy—relying on a moralizing diction of flaw, hubris, overreaching, downfall—all consistent with the male-model of a tragic hero. This connection seems so obvious that when the generic terms athletes/heroes (e.g., the media “create heroes,” we “anoint our sports heroes as gods,” or the implied masculine gender in “we often invent supermen”) are used, readers reflexively factor in the exclusion of women athletes and spectators. Is this composition style a problem? It depends. No one would expect *Sports Illustrated* to be called *Men’s Sports Illustrated*, yet after flipping through a dozen recent covers, I found only Alpha-males splashed garishly over every issue. A few covers

must be reserved for the token women who excel in tennis or soccer, but the focus is not on the disciplined bodies of female athletes but on the slender curves of the models posing for the swimsuit issue—heroes being entitled to their trophies. Conceivably, there may be the rare woman who peruses the magazine or even subscribes, but a male demographic is overwhelmingly serviced. Add in the peripheral phenomena of sports bars, tailgate parties, betting parlors, Monday morning buzz at the construction site or around the water-cooler, and you have a pretty exclusive male domain. Women are not welcome, and gatekeepers man their positions. One recalls Andy Rooney’s tirade on *60 Minutes* about the presence of women reporters along the NFL sidelines, which he insisted he did not mind if only they knew what they were talking about—as though Howard Cosell were an expert—but, hey, he’s one of the guys. All of this touches on the extensive realm of male-bonding, discussed extensively by cultural theorists and first named “homosocial” by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick—a fascinating interface between hetero- and homo-erotic. Though the more severe academics might construe the text as replicating, however critically, these male-centered discourses, one need not succumb to political correctness to wish the author were more attuned to them. Still, he deftly explores the deeper implications of this androcentric world with candor and insight.

At the end of the chapter on “Self-Destructive Athletes,” a few pages are devoted to whether female athletes “also have self-destructive tendencies.” If so, he rightly surmises these are expressed differently from men. Studies show female athletes displaying a higher incidence of “eating disorders, amenorrhea, and osteoporosis than the general population” (p. 134). There have been a few instances of steroids and other performance enhancing drugs in women’s track-and-field. Jennifer Capriati is touted for having overcome her drug problems and for making an impressive, if short lived, comeback in women’s tennis; the wildcat figure-skater Tanya Harding is seen as a rare case of female “acting-out” (p. 136). None of this coheres into a pattern for female athletes, and so the likelihood of their displaying a different dynamic must await separate study. Meanwhile, it is no small achievement that, by putting male sports-heroes in their place, Stanley Teitelbaum has serendipitously cleared a space for women.

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The Art of Psychobiography

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Review of Handbook of Psychohistory, ed. William Todd Schultz. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2005, hardcover, ISBN 0-19-516827-5, xi, 380 pp., \$67.50.

Schultz' *Handbook* has helped broaden my perspectives on how to approach psychobiography. I had always viewed the psychological study of biography as focusing on questions of "why" and utilizing various aspects of psychoanalytic theory to answer the vital question of motivation. This book helped me realize that there is indeed more to non-psychoanalytic approaches than I had realized. Despite my preference for psychoanalytic theory, these authors convincingly show that there are a wide variety of other psychological approaches one can use. Much depends on the nature of your topic and what you are focusing upon.

Though there can be no universally applicable way to decide on a topic or an approach, the *Handbook* offers a number of common-sense guidelines (contained primarily in the first eight chapters) that can be useful for student or advanced practitioner. One key principle is that you *never* bend your data to fit a preconceived theory. If what you are finding does not support the theory you like, change or modify your theory. Schultz' collection offers useful advice on how to effectively deal with such questions, some of which will be listed below.

When writing psychobiography, try to frame a clear, specific question or set of questions. If not enough evidence is available, consider switching your subject: "the more data supporting an interpretation, and the more various its sources, the better" (p. 7). Thus in-depth research is essential, especially when you are dealing with someone who is the object of intense feeling and conflicting opinion. My work on Joseph Smith, Jr. has proven a classic example of this. "Everything we do is over determined...No single reason suffices, or it does so only very rarely...It's always better to let conclusions follow naturally from

an array of data: Give the reader the evidence, then suggest its meanings, and let the chips fall where they may" (pp. 6-7). In accordance with this principle, undue reliance on diagnosis is generally unsound because it can easily degenerate into inappropriate negativism about your subject. How much does reducing your person to a set of diagnostic categories really tell us? Clinical classification should not and cannot be a *substitute* for hard information about your subject. Nevertheless, I have always been of the opinion that diagnostic discussion can still be a useful adjunct with some subjects.

The problem of reductionism is something psychohistorians often have to contend with in the course of our work. Such concerns may be valid or may be leveled in service of resistance to psychological insight. This book defines reductionism as effort made to *exclusively* define an adult person *solely* in terms of their childhood experience. "Childhood can be key. We should never neglect it entirely...It might even be the most formative time period in any one subject's life...Childhood is almost always a factor; it isn't ever the only fact" (pp. 11-12). From this we might surmise that Schultz and at least some of his contributors tend to favor non-psychoanalytic approaches, because the common perception is that analytic theory tends to be obsessed with trying to link everything to childhood experience. But if you accept the notion that we evolve from the past into the present on our way to the future, how can you ignore or downplay the importance of childhood experiences? Of course later experiences play a role in any life, but we should not forget that the ways people deal with adult situations are often learned/developed during childhood. Using theory that pays little or no attention to such concerns is, in my view, unsound. I will grant, though, that how narrowly you define your questions(s) would certainly influence any decision on appropriate theory.

The remaining three parts of the book (five chapters each) deal with psychobiographies of artists, psychologists, and political figures. The introductions to each section clearly define the differences in approach needed for each group of subjects examined. With political figures, issues of transference toward your subject can be crucial. If the life of your subject resonates with aspects of your own personal life, or that of your family of origin, this will inevitably influence how you approach your project as well

as the nature and fairness of your interpretations. I was surprised that Schultz and his contributors seem to pay little attention to such issues, because they are universally applicable in *all* psychobiographical work. In the section on psychologists there is good discussion of how various theories are often influenced by the personal life experiences of the theorist—the chapter on S.S. Stevens is an excellent example.

Naturally, as a seasoned psychohistorical scholar, I have minor complaints about this volume. I would have preferred that there be more emphasis on the subjective aspect in doing psychobiography. This element is admirably presented in Atwood and Stolorow's, *Faces in a Cloud* (1993), which merits more attention than this book gives it. Even though all the contributions to this volume are well written, I wish Schultz had included an annotated bibliography of the best psychobiographical theory and practice. I would have also liked to see stronger discussion of the place of psychoanalysis and psychohistory in psychobiographical work. Regrettably, Schultz and his contributors tend to distance themselves from psychohistory. This probably contributes to the emphasis on psychobiography as an independent field. Also, at \$67.50, this volume may be too expensive for scholars on a limited budget.

In conclusion, the problems with Schultz' compendium are minor. All academic libraries worth their name should immediately add it to their collection. It is a useful text for both student and advanced practitioner. Anyone doing psychobiographical work should have the *Handbook* close by at all times—it is that good.

Henry Lawton is the author of The Psychohistorian's Handbook (1988). His biography may be found on page 16. □

Letters to the Editor

Geoffrey Cocks Responds to Henry Lawton

Unfortunately, Henry Lawton's review of my book, *The Wolf at the Door: Stanley Kubrick, History, and the Holocaust* (March 2006), lives up to its title. That is, it consists of assertion rather than argument. This is both surprising and disappointing, since Lawton's approach is the correct one: to challenge the

specific evidence for my chief argument, to wit, that in *The Shining* there is a subtext relating to the Holocaust. But instead of following the logic and strength of his approach by offering examples of my "reaching way beyond [the] evidence," Lawton contents himself with mere repetition of the assertion that my arguments are invalid.

Lawton also asserts that I admit "having virtually nothing to work with." I do not say this. The last three chapters of the book in particular offer extensive evidence of patterns of cinematic reference that—arguably—can be interpreted as reflecting a lifelong approach-avoidance syndrome on Kubrick's part with regard to the Holocaust. What I do say is that some of my interpretations of specific features of *The Shining* are more speculative than others, but it is especially those others—in the patterns they form in that film and in connection with patterns of symbolism and reference in other Kubrick films—which, I argue, constitute rich, subtle evidence for my thesis. I find it especially curious that a psychohistorian would not be attentive to my approach, which relies heavily on Freud's dream theory, where of course small things in the dreamwork reveal powerful—and thereby distorted, denied, and repressed—important things in the mind and life of the dreamer. This approach is especially apropos here, since, as I also extensively document, Kubrick himself was well schooled in Freud and consciously constructed his films as dreams, using depth of field to invest all sorts of objects in the frame with meaning and reference. You won't read it in Lawton's review, but this is one of the reasons why, along with many other things, the number "42," a German typewriter, and musical compositions by Bartók and Penderecki written under the impact of the Nazis and the Holocaust are important parts of a pattern of visual and aural expression that constitutes powerful historical reference.

I do not know what to make of another assertion by Lawton, that I leave unanswered the question of why Kubrick would adopt such an indirect approach—principally in *The Shining*—in dealing with the Holocaust. Apart from the fact that Lawton himself quotes me on the reasons in general why Kubrick adopted such an indirect approach, he has apparently forgotten about the extensive sections of the book (pp. 6-10, 14-17, 28-32, and much or most of chapters 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11) devoted to answering precisely this question. The short answer in this small space is this: the Holocaust was worse than anything, even the end-of-the-world craziness of *Dr. Strangelove*. (And even *Dr. Strangelove*, which contains its own oblique reference to the Holo-

caust, was rendered a black comedy partly because Kubrick could not endure a dramatic iteration.) Lawton—or anyone—might find my answer inadequate or even wrong, but I do ask the question and I do offer an answer.

I agree with Lawton that Oedipal dynamics played a role in Kubrick's life and work and he is right that the story in *The Shining* is strongly Oedipal. But these dynamics do not displace others; both the historical and the Oedipal were powerful influences on Kubrickian cinema. No life can be understood by reference to a single theory, which is another argument I make (in Chapter 1) that goes unmentioned by Lawton. It is particularly surprising as well as disappointing that a psychohistorian like Lawton also does not critique the several chapters I devote to putting Kubrick's Oedipal complex in its own historical context. Kubrick, born in New York City in 1928, grew up a descendant of a Jewish family from Poland in a world dominated by the harshest of patriarchs, in particular Germans preaching and then practicing unprecedented exterminatory racism and anti-Semitism. In addition, Kubrick's own interests and affections carried him deeply into realms of the cinema world which was importantly shaped and peopled by Germans.

I regret to have to say that anyone wishing to know what I argue in *The Wolf at the Door* will learn nothing from Lawton's review. It is of course self-serving for me to say it, but you will have to read the book to judge the accuracy of this statement.

Geoffrey Campbell Cocks, PhD, is Julian S. Rammelkamp Professor of History at Albion College in Michigan and the author of various publications including Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: The Göring Institute (1985, 1997) and Treating Mind and Body: Essays in the History of Science, Professions, and Society Under Extreme Conditions (1998). He may be reached at < Gcocks@albion.edu >. □

John Knapp Responds to Gustavo Guerra

I read with great interest Gustavo Guerra's very kind review of Ken Womack's and my *Reading the Family Dance: Family Systems Therapy and Literary Study*, (U. Of Delaware Press, 2003) in your March 2006 (12. 4) issue (pp. 230-232). In the interests of full disclosure, Gustavo was a doctoral student at Northern Illinois University some years ago and did his dissertation under my friend and my former Chair

James Mellard, who had a gentile but decade-long disagreement with me about the relative merits of Lacanian and neo-Freudian psychoanalysis vs. (in want of a better term) versions of empirical psychology for use in literary criticism. We have never really resolved these debates, and so I am not too surprised that Dr. Guerra has picked up his pen and continued the conversation. While I profoundly disagree with some of his assessments, I must say that his review was cogent and useful for me, because I now have a chance to respond not only to his review but to others who may be thinking along the same lines. Before one can nudge a dominating paradigm in any discipline to make room for some new and different thinking, one must first define how the new ideas are different from the old while, at the same time, expressing in some detail what it is that is new.

First, I would direct Gustavo to my essay in *Mosaic* 37.1 (March 2004): 149-166, titled "Family Systems Psychotherapy and Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism: A Comparative Critique." In that essay, I detail answers, I believe, to almost all the issues he raises. Briefly, Family Systems Therapy (FST) was founded, in part, by psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who became disenchanted with what I have called classical Freud, and so developed the theories and therapeutic practices that I discuss at some length in my Introduction to *Reading*. No wonder some of the language looks familiar, but it is so primarily in a nominal sense, just as Chomsky's linguistics still uses words like subject, predicate, and object. But, language commonalities aside, Family Systems Therapy does *not*, as Gustavo suggests, depend on "some of the same Freudian principles [we] denigrate" as it tries to make a place for itself in literary criticism as the new kid on the block; my *Mosaic* essay makes that clear. Among the biggest differences: this system posits the sense of a family as a co-evolutionary eco-system, based metaphorically on such cybernetic principles as homeostasis vs. morphogenesis, and expressed in transactional communication patterns among all members of the system.

Second, I am speaking of the classical Freud and his acolyte, Jacques Lacan, who are employed almost exclusively in the humanities; for humanists, 90 percent of their attention remains on one person or one character at a time. Many in the humanities have come late to interpersonal or inter-relational psychoanalysis and when they have, like Paula Marantz Cohen (1991), their theories tend to be influenced by variations (mother-infant; father-daughter) of early Object Relations. By contrast, most working psychoanalysts today are, with a few exceptions, eclectic and will borrow

from almost anything that works. W. R.D. Fairbairn's Object Relations theories, for example, were indeed the grandfathers and grandmothers for some early thinkers in Family Systems Therapy like James Framo and Samuel Slipp, but they and other Family Systems theorists and clinicians soon developed practices that went beyond the mother-child focus of early Object Relations, and then *they* (or therapists) responded by borrowing back, as it were, from their offspring. Indeed, to the extent that clinical psychoanalysts ignored Freud's rejection of regular interaction between the rest of psychology and his own work, the clinical practices of both psychoanalysis and Family Systems Therapy became significantly enriched. That change has tended to be true everywhere but in literary criticism—until recently. Our book was one attempt of several to bring to the humanities what has long been true in actual clinical practice.

Again, I would like to thank Gustavo Guerra for a thoughtful and kindly review and I hope we can continue the debate in some other forum in the future.

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Bulletin Board

The next **Psychohistory Forum Work-In-Progress Saturday Seminar** will be on **September 30, 2006** when **Peter Petschauer** (Appalachian State University) and others will present "**Autobiography and the Search for the Father.**" **CONFERENCES:** The 17th Annual International Federation for Psychoanalytic Education Conference will be held in Pasadena on November 3-5, 2006 with the theme of "How We Learn/ When We Learn/ Why We Learn/ What Constitutes Psychoanalytic Knowledge. A reminder the 29th Annual International Psychohistorical Association (IPA) meetings will be at Fordham University in Manhattan on June 7-9, 2006 and the 29th annual meetings of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP) is in Barcelona on July 12-16, 2006. **NOTES ON MEMBERS:** **Judith Harris'** book, *The Bad Secret: Poems*, was published by Louisiana State University Press. **Peter Loewenberg** gave the lecture "Freud's Birthday" at the New Center for Psychoanalysis in Los Angeles on May 6th, while in across the country on May 4th **John Hartman** honored Freud's birthday with the lecture, "Freud and Art," at the Tampa Museum of Art. Fair-

leigh Dickinson University Press Editor **Harry Keyishian** reports that his press now has a website at www.fdu.edu/newspubs/fdupress.html. **Nancy Unger** has been named book review editor for *The Journal of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era*. **Montague Ullman** held a Leadership Training Experiential Dream Group Leadership Workshop on March 31-April 2, 2006 in Ardsley, New York. At a History Club banquet in his honor on May 9, 2006, **Paul Elovitz** was officially named History Club Advisor Emeritus for his 20 years of service in founding and guiding the award-winning History Club at Ramapo College of New Jersey. **Flora Hogman** helped organize a UN workshop on "Child Soldiers in Africa: Psychosocial Issues and Rehabilitation." The NAAP has established a weekly e-mail newsletter. The NAAP's "Seven Deadly Sins Lecture Series," including a talk by **Charles Strozier** on anger, was quite successful. **Welcome to New Member: Jean Hantman.** **OUR THANKS:** To our members and subscribers for the support that makes Clio's Psyche possible. To Benefactors Herbert Barry and Ralph Colp; Patrons David Beisel, Andrew Brink, Mary Lambert, Peter Loewenberg, David Lotto, Peter Petschauer, and Shirley Stewart; Sustaining Member Jacques Szaluta; and Members Dick Booth, Don Carveth, Jean Hantman, Bob Lentz, Richard Morrock, Vivian Rosenberg, Howard Stein, Charles Strozier, and Nancy Unger. Our appreciation to Forum hosts Ralph Colp, Mary Lambert, and Connalee and Lee Shneidman. Our thanks for thought-provoking materials to Robert Anderson, Herbert Barry, Rudolph Binion, Dick Booth, Newell Bringhurst, Michael Britton, Don Carveth, Geoffrey Cocks, Dan Dervin, Paul Elovitz, Kenneth Fuchsman, Betty Glad, David Greenberg, John Jacob Hartman, John Knapp, Henry Lawton, Peter Loewenberg, David Lotto, Elizabeth Wirth Marvick, Sara Patterson, Alenka Puhar, Lee Shneidman, Howard Stein, Vamik Volkan, Jennifer Jensen Wallach, and E. Victor Wolfenstein. Our appreciation to Bob Lentz for serving as guest editor for the Brodie Retrospective and to Herbert Barry and Nancy Unger for selective editing. Also, to Theresa Graziano for proofing/editing/*Publisher 2003* software application and Dana Potts for proofreading. In addition, thanks to David Beisel and Richard Connolly for working to improve the format and layout of Clio's Psyche. We wish to thank our numerous referees, who must remain anonymous. □