
Clio's Psyche

Understanding the "Why" of Culture, Current Events, History, and Society

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The Intertwined Lives and Psyches of Richard Nixon and Alger Hiss

David Greenberg
Rutgers University

Richard Nixon and Alger Hiss barely knew each other. Yet they led intertwined and in some ways parallel lives. Both men were relatively unknown until 1948 when Nixon, as a young congressman from California, led the House Un-American Activities Committee's (HUAC) inquiry into Hiss's Communist past. That episode, as is well known, led Hiss—at the time a respected Washington foreign policy expert—down a corridor of darkness: exposure of his secret past; charges of espionage; a perjury conviction; prison time; and a lifelong war to salvage his reputation. For Nixon, in contrast, the encounter opened the door to a bright path: a Senate

(Continued on page 11)

The Psychohistory of Atrocity in Guerilla and Civil Wars

Ken Fuchsman
University of Connecticut

In the midst of the carnage of World War I, Freud declared: "If you want to endure life, prepare yourself for death" (Sigmund Freud, "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death," *Standard Edition, XIV* [London: Hogarth Press, 1915], p. 300). The end of life comes in a variety of ways. Some expire asleep in their beds, others are dismembered in battle. The aspect of death this essay will explore is atrocity in war. Understanding combat in an extreme form may reveal something about the place of death in life. Atrocities are deadly violence inflicted in wartime on civilians, prisoners or others perceived as the enemy. As a Vietnam veteran and historian these are issues

(Continued on the next page)

Jefferson Without Idealization

Paul H. Elovitz
The Psychohistory Forum

President John F. Kennedy welcomed the most famous American intellectuals to a White House dinner with the words, "I think this is the most extraordinary collection of talent, of human knowledge, that has ever been gathered at the White House - with the possible exception of when Thomas Jefferson dined *alone*." JFK, perhaps the last American president to be able to get the leading American minds to break bread with him, reflecting the extraordinary esteem in which Jefferson (1743-1826) has been held. It is easy to put the builder of democracy, authorship of the "Declaration of Inde-

(Continued on page 20)

James M. Glass: Listener, Teacher, and Scholar of Psychosis

C. Fred Alford
University of Maryland

James M. Glass was born on May 1, 1940 in Los Angeles, California, where his father was in the jewelry business while his mother kept house. He has an older half-brother and half-sister, now deceased, from his mother's previous marriage. He was a

(Continued on page 14)

Turn to the next page for
IN THIS ISSUE

IN THIS ISSUE

The Psychohistory of Atrocity in Civil Wars1 <i>Kenneth Fuchsman</i>	Organizing International Psychohistory..... 28 <i>Paul H. Elovitz</i>
Reflections on Fuchsman's Discussion of Atrocity.....7 <i>David Lotto</i>	Burston on Erikson's Impact and Heroic Myth.....31 <i>Book Review by Leon Rappoport</i>
The Psychological Roots of Bush's Iraq Obstinacy.....8 <i>Philip Langer and Bob Pois</i>	Letter to the Editor on the Holocaust.....33 <i>Flora Hogman</i>
James M. Glass: Listener, Teacher, and Scholar.....1 <i>C. Fred Alford</i>	In Memorial: Isaac Ziemann, Survivor and Peacemaker..33 <i>Eva Fogelman and Paul Elovitz</i>
Jefferson Without Idealization.....1 <i>Paul H. Elovitz</i>	Call for Papers on the Art and Psychology of Aging.....36
Probing the Don Imus Media Event.....24 <i>Dan Dervin</i>	Call for Papers on the Psychology of Elections.....37
Thirty Years of the IPA.....25 <i>David R. Beisel</i>	Call for Papers on the Psychology of Facing Death and Dying.....39
	Bulletin Board.....38

of vital concern to me.

The problem of wartime atrocity goes beyond the rage filled action of soldiers in the field. More civilian casualties are produced by policies originating with presidents and generals than by outbursts of privates and lieutenants. This paper will discuss the psychology of war as experienced by ground soldiers in a guerilla conflict in Vietnam and a civil war in Iraq; in another paper I will examine leaders approving policies that target civilians.

Atrocities in combat are generally group activities that usually follow a military command. To explain the brutal wasting of non-combatants it helps to comprehend the trauma of a combat zone, the military command structure, the brotherhood of soldiers, and the psychology of separation, grief and revenge.

In conventional warfare, there is often a sharp distinction between enemy and friendly territory. Not so in many guerilla and civil conflicts. Those who present themselves as an ally often turn out to be the enemy. South Vietnamese urchins might get next to an American soldier ask for candy; then suddenly pull the pin on the soldier's grenade to blow him up. The residents of a Vietnamese village might be hospitable to Americans in the daylight, and attack them when darkness falls. Stepping on a land mine or booby trap in the jungle could terminate life in a flash. "Only three to four percent of American casualties in World War II and Korea," writes psychiatrist Jonathan Shay, "were from booby traps, while 11

percent of the deaths and 17 percent of the injuries in Vietnam were from these lowest-echelon attacks of surprise and deception" (*Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* [NY: Scribner, 1994], p. 34).

With no safe haven, endangerment for combat soldiers is ever present, and life is lived on the edge. In these dire circumstances, military men traditionally bond with the members of their unit in symbiotic interdependency. As noted by Jonathan Shay, "Combat calls forth a passion of care among men who fight beside each other that is comparable to the earliest and most deeply felt family relationships" (p. 39). "It's a closeness you never had before," says one Vietnam veteran to Shay. "It's closer than your mother and father.... We needed each other to survive" (p. 40). Another Vietnam veteran wrote: "there's a love relationship that is nurtured in combat" to "the man next to you" for you depend "on him for...your life, and if he lets you down you're either maimed or killed....this bond is stronger than almost anything, with the exception of parent and child" (quoted in Dave Grossman, *On Killing* [NY: Little, Brown and Company, 1996], p. 90).

This group bonding is reminiscent of the infant's attachment to the mother. Newborns often depend on their mother for survival; separation from mother arouses, as John Bowlby reminds us, anxiety and anger; loss of the mother brings sadness and depression (*Attachment; Separation: Anxiety and An-*

ger; *Loss: Sadness and Depression* [NY: Basic Books, 1969, 1973, 1980]). "Across all human cultures and even some primate species," psychologist Jeffrey Simpson writes, "young and vulnerable infants" immediately after separation from the mother "often protest vehemently, crying, screaming and throwing temper tantrums as they search for their caregivers" (Jeffrey Simpson, "Attachment Theory in Modern Evolutionary Perspective," in Jude Cassidy and Phillip Shaver, eds., *Handbook of Attachment* [NY: The Guilford Press, 1999], p. 115). Separation can bring feelings of helplessness and endangerment to infants, so they seek reunion with their mother.

Similarly, many soldiers cling to each other for emotional sustenance especially after witnessing the violent death of their comrades. Vietnam veteran R. B. Anderson writes of "the deep fraternity of the brotherhood of war...and the terrible bitterness of losing a friend who is closer to you than your own family" (quoted in Grossman, *On Killing*, p. 236). In a World War II survey of American enlisted soldiers in the Pacific, when the going got tough 61 percent

kept going because they did not want to let their mates down, compared to 38 percent motivated by hatred of the enemy (In Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing* [NY: Basic Books, 1999], p. 146).

The grief and anger that follows the death of a squad member is often what motivates killing in war. "Most men," writes Joanna Bourke, "only became willing to take another human life after seeing their wartime companions slaughtered" (p. 215). A Marine veteran of Vietnam told Jonathan Shay, "EVERY TIME YOU LOST A FRIEND IT SEEMED LIKE PART OF YOU WAS GONE." To get even he began to kill and "couldn't get enough. For every one that I killed I felt better. Made some of the hurt went away" (Quoted in *Achilles*, p. 78). Bourke writes that the "slaughter of comrades" is "rendered significant" by retaliating against the enemy. "In this way, grief was converted into rage" (pp. 215-216). There can be fury that the condition of being human too often includes loss and death of loved ones. Sometimes the rage is directed at specific enemies and at other times civilian substitutes would satisfy the need for revenge. In civilian life, rage filled violent responses to grief are usually socially prohibited. In combat, such actions are often encouraged and rewarded. War brings with it the "luxuriant release of explosive hatred" (Randolph Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," in *The Radical Will* [NY: Urizen Books, 1917], p. 337).

Connectedness to others, to existence, to an inner core of self sustains us. Separation, fear of loss and death may unsettle and even undermine us; particularly when in combat death appears with a brutal gruesomeness. The cords that give humans sustenance can be frayed. There is no adequate preparation for this sudden encounter with violent mortality. The grief, disillusionment and fury that may result from these emotionally wrenching losses may push some to retaliatory rages of killing. For some, these rampages are liberating, it gives them the ultimate power over others, that of life and death. For others, the killing haunts them; it destroys the moral order, the sense of self-validity.

Atrocities are one sign of the moral disorder occurring in the midst of combat. "In one study of Vietnam veterans," Judith Lewis Herman reports, "about 20 percent of the men admitted to having witnessed atrocities during their tour of duty in Vietnam, and another nine percent acknowledged personally

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627 Dakota Trail, Franklin Lakes, NJ 07417

Telephone: (201) 891-7486

e-mail: pelovitz@aol.com

Cliospsyche.org

Editor: Paul H. Elovitz, PhD

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committing atrocities" (*Trauma and Recovery* [NY: Basic Books, 1992], p. 54). A Defense Department task force from the 1970s, the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group, confirmed 320 atrocities committed by American soldiers on ordinary Vietnamese, including seven massacres where at least 137 civilians were killed. There were hundreds of other attacks on Vietnamese in their homes or in rice paddies (Nick Turse and Deborah Nelson, "Civilian Killings Went Unpunished," *Los Angeles Times*, August 6, 2006). What could prompt the killing of innocent non-combatants? The anger following grief is a precondition for more organized slaughter. To get from fury to mass killing requires an additional sanction. That sanction comes from an authority, a superego figure who implicitly says murder of non-combatants is not only justified, but there is a direct order to waste (kill) these people.

The military is a hierarchical order which stresses the privileges of command and the obedience of underlings to their superiors. In the military, soldiers are trained to obey whatever commands are given to them by their superiors and be fearful of the retaliation that can follow disobedience. Within the umbrella of the military, and the extreme stress of warfare, for some the sanction of a direct order enables them to act out their outrage on others, as during the Vietnam War. Others with different ego ideals resist directives of commanders.

At My Lai in Vietnam on March 16, 1968, 502 non-combatant Vietnamese, many women and children, were massacred by American soldiers. A directive to kill these Vietnamese may or may not have been given by the company captain, but the killings were definitely ordered by Charlie Company platoon leader Lieutenant William Calley and committed by him and his men. In the three months prior to the massacre, Charlie Company had lost 25 percent of their men to sniper fire, mines and booby traps (Bourke, *History*, p. 192). On February 25, 1968, six men from Charlie Company were killed in a minefield. One of the company's men, Herbert Carter, told Seymour Hersh: "The VC were blowing us up with mines – sending little kids with grenades. It was getting ridiculous" (Seymour Hersh, *My Lai 4* [NY: Random House, 1970], p. 34). As with most units, the loss of their buddies was hard. "Charlie Company...depended on each other for their lives. A strong sense of comradeship grew up and later a number of them said the company was like a fam-

ily" (Jonathan Glover, *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*, [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999], p. 59). The death of their comrades and orders from their commander justified indiscriminately striking out at non-combatants. Charlie Company member, James Bergthold, according to Hersh, "directed his anger at the Vietnamese: 'Why shouldn't I? They were the enemy'" (p. 25). Civilians killed were often counted as enemy kills. The saying among American soldiers in the region, Hersh says, was "Anything that's dead and isn't white is a VC" (p. 13). This familiar projection of enemy status onto the South Vietnamese provided an outlet for their discontent.

Some of Charlie Company wanted to retaliate for the damage done to them. Sergeant Gregory Olson of Charlie Company said: "the attitude of all the men, the majority, I would say was a revengeful attitude, they all felt because we lost a number of buddies prior to My Lai. Everybody was 'psyched up'" (In Bourke, *History*, p. 192). Not surprisingly even prior to March 16th, this rage was taken out on some Vietnamese civilians. Calley himself killed at least one Vietnamese old man in cold blood. According to Charlie Company member, Michael Bernhardt, a few soldiers came across a woman working in a field in a friendly area and "they raped her and killed her...I guess they killed her baby, too." One soldier photographed the rape and murders while they were happening (Hersh, *My Lai 4*, pp. 31-35). Standards were loose; and human life cheap.

After coming into the village on the morning of the 16th, a verbal directive came from Calley for the villagers to be killed, even though there was no sign they were the enemy. Village residents were pushed into a ditch, where many were slaughtered. They enacted their fury on the women and children of this little Vietnamese village. "And revenge," Jonathan Glover writes, "clearly coloured the psychology of the soldiers as they killed" (p. 61). One soldier said: "you have a need to explode" (p. 61). There were shouts during the massacre of "VC bastards, you dirty VC bastards, That's for Bill Weber," and "Cry, you dirty gook bastards, cry like you made us cry" (Robert Jay Lifton, *Home From the War* [NY: Simon and Schuster, 1973], p. 53). Varnardo Simpson admitted to murdering twenty-five people at My Lai. This went, he said, from "shooting them, to cutting their throats, scalping them, to cutting off their hands and cutting out their tongue" (Glover,

Humanity, p. 61). Twenty Vietnamese girls and women were raped in My Lai that day; nineteen of those raped were either shot or died from their wounds (James Olson and Randy Roberts, *My Lai: A Brief History With Documents* [Boston: Bedford/St Martin's, 1998], pp. 99-102).

Not all the members of Charlie Company were eager participants in the My Lai massacre. Even though all had endured the deaths and injuries to their fellow soldiers for some neither obedience nor rage led to the desire to kill innocent civilians. Calley had specifically ordered a reluctant enlisted man in his unit, Paul Meadlo, to kill some of the villagers. When Meadlo did not, Calley returned and ordered him again to waste them. Meadlo carried out the directive, but later in the day was observed in tears, upset that he was forced to kill innocent people. Not long afterwards Meadlo said to Calley: "God will punish you for what you made me do" (Hersh, *My Lai 4*, p. 84). Despite the horrors they endure, some soldiers retain enough of their own values to be troubled by brutality, resist it, find ways to get around the order, and even try to stop the killing. One enlisted man resisted the order by shooting animals. Others, according to their own account, just ignored the order. Harry Stanley later said: "ordering me to shoot down innocent people, that's not an order, that's craziness to me....I don't feel like I have to obey that" (In Bourke, *History*, p. 197). Then there was the 25 year old helicopter pilot, Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, who was not under Calley's command. The killings at My Lai reminded him of Nazi exterminations. He tried to stop the killing, and reported the massacre at My Lai to his commanding officer. Not surprisingly, little came of Thompson's attempt to inform the proper authorities of a war crime. It took much effort by others, including the media, before this massacre was dealt with by the military and came before the public.

Allegations of atrocities are present in many wars, including America's current engagement in the Persian Gulf. There are some parallels between the Vietnamese guerilla war and the civil war in Iraq. In Vietnam some soldiers acknowledged their use of excessive force against civilians. A 2006 report by the Mental Health Advisory Team of American soldiers in Iraq showed that 10 percent of those surveyed admitted to mistreating noncombatants. In Iraq 62 percent of soldiers and 66 percent of Marines

knew someone seriously injured or killed or a member of their unit had become a casualty. Army Major General Gale Pollock said that the troops in Iraq saw their friends killed and injured and anger is a normal reaction. The report found that more than one third of all soldiers and Marines approved torture to save lives of the American military. Less than fifty percent of these troops would report someone on their team for behaving unethically (Sara Wood, "Defense Department Releases Findings of Mental Health Assessment," *Armed Forces Press Service*, May 4, 2007, http://www.newsbull.com/forum/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=44818).

In this familiar setting, where anger and rage follow the death of a unit member, some soldiers and their superiors may not be able to control their desire to retaliate. On the morning of November 19, 2005, in the Iraqi town of Haditha a roadside bomb killed a young American marine, Lance Corporal Miguel Terrazas of Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment. The death of a member of a combat unit can awaken the dread and fury an infant feels when separated from mother. According to a *Washington Post* report, after a period of time one of the Marines took charge and he directed others into a house fifty yards away from the blast, again the role of a leader in these aggressive actions are crucial. Over the next several hours, U.S. Marines from Kilo Company went into three homes killing civilian inhabitants and also shot four Iraqi college students in a taxi (Ellen Knickmeyer, "In Haditha, Memories of a Massacre," *Washington Post*, May 27, 2006, p. A01).

A total of twenty-four Iraqi civilians were killed, about ten of whom were children. Tim McGirk of *Time* magazine reports that eyewitnesses accused the Marines of a going on a rampage, and human rights activists says that if the accusations are true this would be "the worst case of deliberate killing of Iraqi civilians by U.S. service members since the war began" (Tim McGirk, "Collateral Damage or Civilian Massacre in Haditha?" *Time*, March 19, 2006). Carolyn Marshall reports that Haditha "has conjured disturbing memories of the My Lai massacre in Vietnam for former marines" ("On a Marine Base, Disbelief Over Charges," *New York Times*, May 30, 2006).

The next day, a Marine communiqué reported the Iraqis at Haditha were killed by shrapnel from a roadside bomb and an exchange of gunfire. A physi-

cian director of the Haditha hospital where the bodies were dropped off contested this. He told *Time*: "it was obvious...there were no organs slashed by shrapnel...Most of the victims were shot in the chest and head—from close range" (McGirk, "Collateral Damage,"). According to his death certificate as reported in the *Washington Post*, a seventy-six year old Iraqi man "took nine rounds in the chest and abdomen, leaving his intestines spilling out of the exit wounds in his back" (Knickmeyer, "In Haditha").

Through attorneys, the Marines involved claim they followed the rules of combat. They said they received gunfire from a house, went in, noticed people gathered in a room, kicked in the door, dropped a fragmentation grenade, followed by gunfire, killing several people (Josh White, "Wuterich Says Rules Followed in Haditha," *Hartford Courant*, June 11, 2006, p. A13). In the house were an elderly couple, four middle aged adults, four children and no weapons. At best, it can be said, feeling attacked, these Marines shot first without asking questions. From other accounts, the victims had beseeched the marines not to kill them, and were shot at close range. Whether Haditha was an atrocity or Marines taking no chances, Iraqi civilians (including many women and children) were killed.

John Pike, director of Global.security.org told the Associated Press: "Anybody who contemplates a decision to use force, anybody who contemplates putting boots on the ground has to understand that part of what they're assuming responsibility for is stressed-out soldiers [who] are going to massacre civilians. It just comes with the territory" (Robert Tanner, "Experts: Troop Allegations Signal a Critical New Point in Iraq War," *Hartford Courant*, June 24, 2006, p. A6). This so-called collateral damage of civilian deaths is exacerbated in guerilla warfare where those attacking the armed forces easily blend in with the civilian population. But the distinction between civilians and the military has been eroded in the age of total war. Writing on a related subject, Herbert Kelman observed: "The use of torture in war situations – often directed at civilians...has become more probable as war has moved from the classical clash between organized armed forces to a clash between whole populations, in which civilian groups are often specifically targeted" (Herbert Kelman, "The Policy Context of Torture: A Social Psychological Analysis" in Richard Falk, Irene Gendzier,

and Robert Jay Lifton, eds., *Crimes of War: Iraq* [NY: Nation Books, 2006], p. 374).

In the age of total war, there are both accords designed to keep war within bounds and wartime practices that make combat more terrifying than before. What distinguishes the rage of ground soldiers who rape and murder a woman working in a field from the fire bombing of Dresden? In "the twentieth century," writes social psychologist James Waller, "well over a 100 million persons...met a violent death at the hands of their fellow human beings." In the "four decades after the end of World War II," there were "150 wars and only 26 days of world peace" (James Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing* [NY: Oxford University Press, 2002], p. x.). As humans become more technologically advanced, we more frequently find organized ways of blowing each other to bits. We dread and embrace death. Preparing for death may no longer be the sole prescription for enduring life, recognizing death's hold on humanity may be an important element in understanding civilization.

Whether it is the horror of ground combat where soldiers act out primal emotions or political leaders targeting civilians, modern war is often fatal for non-combatants. Atrocities such as My Lai and ethnic cleansing of Bosnia reveal the dark side of the human experience. What are we to learn from war that teaches us about enduring life? In Akira Kurosawa's bloody film masterpiece, *Ran*, there is a powerful, if one sided answer: "human beings...believe their survival depends on killing others...Human beings seek sorrow, not happiness, and prefer suffering to peace...people are fighting for sorrow and suffering, reveling in murder and bloodshed" (Akira Kurosawa, Hideo Oguni, Ide Masato, *Ran* [Boston: Shambala, 1986], p. 99). Despite the extraordinary inventiveness of humanity, dread and anxiety, fear and trembling, sadism and masochism intermix in our loftiest and lowest endeavors, both promoting discovery and perpetuating destruction. The rage present in humans since infancy finds an authorized outlet in the brutality of combat. John Keegan reminds us: "All civilizations owe their origin to the warrior;" and "the facts of war...burn with the heat of the fires of hell" (Keegan, *Warfare*, pp. xvi, 6). Humans too often seek sorrow, revel in bloodshed, celebrate combat, and murder others in protest at the losses and

grief inherent in the human condition.

Kenneth Fuchsman, EdD, is a historian who teaches interdisciplinary studies courses online at the University of Connecticut, where he has been in a variety of capacities for thirty years. Dr. Fuchsman writes on the history of psychoanalysis and is currently exploring the dynamics of oedipality in single parent and blended families. He may be contacted at ken.fuchsman@uconn.edu. □

Reflections on Ken Fuchsman's Discussion of Atrocity

David Lotto
Psychologist/Psychoanalyst
in Private Practice

Dr. Fuchsman's paper is extremely well done and I have no major disagreements with his analysis and conclusions about the group and individual dynamics operating in soldiers during wartime; particularly in, to use Robert Jay Lifton's term, "atrocity-producing situations." Specifically, I thoroughly agree with the thesis that ordinary people are quite capable of engaging in atrocities when the circumstances encourage it. It is a lesson we have learned both from observing what happens in war as well as absorbing the findings of the research studies of social psychologists such as Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo.

Professor Fuchsman, along with Lifton, stresses the importance of the loss of comrades from enemy actions in wartime as an important stimulus in generating grief, which can lead to rage, and then to the taking of revenge on the enemy or any suitable substitute – such as civilians who happened to be in the area. I would just want to add that others, such as Vamik Volkan, would refer to this situation as an inability to grieve or mourn where the rageful revenge becomes a substitute or replacement for experiencing grief. The Italian psychoanalyst Franco Fornari calls this push toward vengeful violence, instead of experiencing grieving, "the paranoid elaboration of mourning."

I would like to add an alternate perspective based on my experience during the war in Vietnam. In contrast to Fuchsman, I am not a Vietnam veteran.

I chose to leave this country for Canada rather than join or support in any manner a morally unacceptable, aggressive, and unjust war. Unlike Kenneth Fuchsman and Jonathan Shay, I did not have the experience of being part of a military unit engaging in combat, however, I suspect they are correct in saying that it taps into old and deep sources of bonding, attachment, and family ties. At the time I felt, and I feel the same way to this day, that had I been somehow plunked down in Vietnam and forced to choose a side to be on, I would have fought with the Viet Cong.

If you find this statement shocking think of the 1984 cult film "Red Dawn" where the Americans are the guerrillas fighting and killing the occupying Russian and Cuban invaders; or our views of the noble revolutionary war era Minutemen, who are seen as heroes who killed the enemy "redcoats" while hiding behind trees and rocks. We don't pay much attention to the feelings of the occupying troops who have lost their buddies as the results of these guerrilla actions. It's primarily a question of with whom one identifies.

Several months ago I watched a documentary film about the 82nd Airborne's campaign in Iraq to win the hearts and minds of the people of Fallujah. The film introduces you to the men of one platoon, ordinary likable enough young American boys. One day a platoon member gets shot while they are on patrol and the film captures the transformation of the ordinary boys into vicious killers bent on revenge.

Next I want to share some thoughts on the connections between guerrilla wars and atrocity. Many of the accounts cited by Shay, Fuchsman, Hersh, and Lifton in the paper emphasized the exacerbation of the loss and grief that occur when it results from a "guerrilla" attack – a mine, or a booby-trap, or a child with a grenade – along with the added confusion of not knowing who is the enemy and who isn't.

This is sometimes described as an additional provocation, increasing the likelihood of atrocity. For example, the quote from Seymour Hersh's book: "the VC were blowing us up with mines – sending little kids with grenades. It was getting ridiculous." Or Robert Jay Lifton's account concerning the events at My Lai which were preceded by significant losses resulting from "guerrilla" tactics. "There were shouts during the massacre of 'VC bastards, you dirty VC

bastards, that's for Bill Weber,' and 'Cry, you dirty gook bastards, cry like you made us cry.'"

In my view, what was "ridiculous," was the presence of armed American soldiers on the soil of a foreign country, where they didn't belong. I have no problem with understanding the feelings and reactions of these soldiers. However, I find it hard to be sympathetic toward the soldiers who are first shocked and then enraged that the enemy – those who are natives to the land they are invading and whose countrymen and family members have been killed or wounded by the soldiers – should have the audacity to fight back and do harm to their beloved buddies. To be angered that it is "guerrilla" rather than "conventional" military tactics being used by the enemy strikes me as a strange. For the Viet Cong to use "conventional" tactics against American troops with their massively superior land and air firepower would have been suicidally stupid. For American soldiers to expect the enemy to fight in a "conventional" manner which is to the advantage of the Americans and then to be outraged when this doesn't happen seems bizarrely narcissistic.

On reading this paper I was strongly reminded of Chaim Shatan's paper "Bogus Manhood, Bogus Honor: Surrender and Transfiguration in the United States Marine Corps." In this classic 1977 paper, Shatan (1924–2001), a longtime member of the Psychohistory Forum, describes the quite deliberately designed training procedures used by the United States Marines to create both the comradely bonding and the sanction to commit atrocities that are among the crucial antecedents to creating an atrocity-producing situation.

Also, I am very much in agreement with Professor Fuchsman's opening statement that "The problem of wartime atrocity goes beyond the rage-filled actions of soldiers in the field. More civilian casualties are produced by policies originating with presidents and generals than by outbursts of privates and lieutenants." Consequently, I am very much looking forward to his second paper in which he says he will explore the psychohistory of leaders who are responsible for policies that target civilians.

I agree that if one is addressing the issue of atrocities during wartime the subject of leaders, politicians and generals and the structures that support, encourage, and enable them needs to be explored. As

Dr. Fuchsman says, decisions made by our "leaders" have been responsible for many more atrocities than the transgressions of individuals or small groups. The danger of focusing on the actions of individuals or small groups is that it can easily lead to the labeling of those involved as pathological deviants who are different from us, thereby avoiding examining the responsibility for the events in question on the part of those in positions of leadership. When we take into consideration that these leaders have been given power by us and are acting as delegates for our wishes, we cannot escape from sharing in the blame for the atrocities they have perpetrated.

Putting it another way, Henry Kissinger, Curtis LeMay, Harry Truman, or even FDR (if we take Richard Stennett and George Victor seriously regarding Roosevelt's responsibility for Pearl Harbor), are far bigger war criminals than Captain Medina, Lieutenant Calley, the Marines who raped and murdered at Haditha, or the interrogators who torture at Abu Grahیب.

David Lotto, PhD, is a psychoanalyst, psychologist, and a psychohistorian from Pittsfield, Massachusetts who is a research associate of the Psychohistory Forum and a frequent contributor to these pages as well as those of the Journal of Psychohistory. Dr Lotto, who has a lifelong commitment to the struggle against militarism and injustice, is treasurer and chair of the professional affairs committee of the Western Massachusetts and Albany area Association of Psychoanalytic Psychologists. He may be contacted at dlotto@nycap.rr.com. □

The Psychological Roots of Bush's Iraq War Obstinacy

Philip Langer with Robert Pois
University of Colorado

President Bush's behavior regarding his war in Iraq has become a prime source of psychological speculation. A large number of authors and military experts have focused on his purportedly continuous denial of the importance of significant negative events. We believe that the denial in this instance might be properly seen as an effect rather than a cause, and as not following the usual assumptions regarding its use as a defense mechanism.

This analysis requires us to examine two psychological processes: groupthink and cognitive dissonance. Many writers have argued that the origins of the Iraqi conflict could be assigned to a small coterie of individuals within the administration, including Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and some lower level neo-conservative officials. This created a powerfully placed group of individuals with established and collectively fixed objectives. New and critical information, which was inconsistent with the earlier rationale, might require a shift in thinking but not policy. But this was done without acknowledging that the later objectives might be inconsistent with earlier pronouncements. Hence the initial cause for the invasion of Iraq moved from the danger of an impending threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), to overthrowing Hussein, to a war on terrorism, to establishing democracy in Iraq, to an obligation to the Iraqi people, to achieving stability, and to combinations thereof. What is important is that while the stated objectives could be changed, the basic premises underlying the invasion were not challenged. This group could still believe they have not erred. "Staying the course" took on the role of a mantra.

This phenomenon is called *groupthink*. Basically the members of a group assume that their thinking and decisions cannot be wrong, and information to the contrary can be ignored (Robert A. Baron and Don Byrne, *Social Psychology*, 9th ed., 2000, pp. 516-517). Under the spell of groupthink the atmosphere of incontrovertibility may lead not only to ignoring those who disagree, but even savagely castigating those critics who have dared challenge their assumptions. Thus in the Bush administration's defense of the Iraq war, "cut and run" became almost an epithet.

This is not to argue that the underlying reasons for each of the individuals are identical. For example, arguments have been made that Bush's underlying motive reflected an oedipal conflict. That is, he was going to finish what his father should have done. Others have suggested his braggadocio ("bring 'em on") reflected an attempt to prove his machismo after he avoided serving in Vietnam. The net effect of all this was that in concert with others, the decision to invade was inevitable.

The development of a second critical psychological process concerns the issue of denial. Al-

though used by writers in a myriad ways, the major theme has been that Bush was not facing reality. Our argument will be that Bush never lost sight of reality, but was very selective in determining the contributions of specific events to his fixed belief system.

Denial, as a defense mechanism, traditionally substitutes wish fulfillment for reality (Leland E. Hinsie and Robert J. Campbell, *Psychiatric Dictionary*, 1960, p. 197). Instead we propose that Bush's behavior is better explained by Festinger's work on cognitive dissonance (Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, 1959). Dissonance, or a state of tension, exists when an individual perceives there is an underlying conflict among beliefs relating to one's self, behavior, or environment (Festinger, p. 3). Individuals strive for consistency, and these tensions must be reduced.

A simple example might be when you purchase a car you cannot afford. Somehow you have to convince yourself that the money you spent was worth it. A common recourse might be to read in *Consumer Reports* how the car you purchased is much better than the car you could afford. Another approach might be to tell yourself that the car you purchased will last so much longer, and if you amortize the extra money over the life of the car, it is not that much more expensive.

The tipping point for Bush may well have been that not long after the "Mission Accomplished" banner was hung on the carrier, things started to fall apart. From his perspective the U.S. had won fair and square and it was time to celebrate. Although no Weapons of Mass Destruction had been found, Hussein was on the run. However, as conditions in Iraq began to really deteriorate, he could not completely ignore or distort the reality of the situation.

As the magnitude of the downward spiral in Iraq grew, so did dissonance within his thinking. It became imperative to find elements in the situation, which supported the initial decision (Festinger, pp. 18-20). Hence, there were arguments for the media to find and extol positive elements such as reconstruction efforts and the capture of Hussein. In fact, a company was employed to embed such positive elements in news reports. To Bush these events served to maintain his purpose; other bad reports, while part of the deteriorating situation, did not justify a change of course. They were really not equal: elections su-

perseded suicide bombings; signs of reconstruction were better to his way of thinking than the carping of critics. Thus in the example of the car purchase, one may well avoid ads extolling the virtues of cars considered but not purchased (Festinger, p. 154). Above all else, the inner group provided a mutually self-supporting society (Festinger, p. 191). That is undoubtedly one reason Bush kept Rumsfeld on in spite of mounting criticism and allowed Cheney free rein in denouncing those questioning the administration's position.

Bush believed (and appears to still believe) that he had no reason to change his core beliefs. He was the president, the Republicans controlled the Congress, and for quite a while the active military did not want to risk facing the same fate as General Shinseki, who was forced to end his active military career in 2003 when as Army Chief of Staff he suggested more troops were needed to pacify Iraq. The 2006 midterm elections, which undermined much of the President's congressional support as well as the obvious spiraling into civil war (what the Administration called "sectarian strife"), did force some changes, at least in his verbal behavior. Prior to the election, the President began to allude to difficult times. Things were not going well, but his initial decision was still the right one. The bad news was dealt with by a "this too shall pass" attitude. He was assisted in changes in tone, but not the policy, by the "staying the course" comments of some retired commanders. Still, he faced the ever increasing concerns of the active commanders about the course of events in Iraq. The day after the elections he dismissed Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. While pundit incline to view this as an admission of defeat for his policies, the President's Press Secretary suggested it was an indication of his being open-minded. However, this may not be the case since Rumsfeld was talking about significant strategy changes: thus the Defense Secretary had committed the cardinal sin of questioning the group-think coterie.

Given the fact that the Democrats now controlled Congress, Bush knew he had to make at least some changes, although they could not imperil his original decision. Paradoxically, however, in spite of increased opposition, it did not necessarily mean he had to change his core beliefs or strategy. In fact, with the increased pressure upon him, he began digging in his heels. What he was doing was changing the magnitude of the conflict between him and oth-

ers, without surrendering his basic beliefs. Festinger argued that the more pressure placed on the individual, the less likely they would be to give up their central beliefs (Festinger, pp. 189-192). This meant that Bush has to convince himself that any appearances of changes in strategy still reflect his basic premise of victory in Iraq. If Congress openly rebels in the fall, he can always console himself with the belief, he did not jump: he was pushed. But forcing Bush to succumb to pressure to truly change his policy will not be an easy task.

After the Democrats won control of Congress in November of last year and the Iraq Study Group Report was made public in the following month, Bush resisted suggestions calling for withdrawal as measured by specific benchmarks. Instead, he ordered an increase in troop strength – the "surge." He could not afford to recognize that, after all these years and casualties, it had been a mistake. He may yet wind up endorsing some kind of slow withdrawal, which he could then interpret as still maintaining the needed, open-ended American presence in Iraq. In this case he might argue that victory meant achieving stability, without yielding to the demands for a set of specific timetables to accomplish this, or, for that matter, even defining stability. He has begun the process of accepting Iraq's meeting with its neighbors Iran and Syria, thereby avoiding further criticism for his oft-stated refusal for the U.S. to meet with their leaders. But under no circumstances will he give up the core belief that he was right all along. In fact, in the end he may well accomplish staying true to his belief in his struggle to avoid cognitive dissonance: even if the result is his political martyrdom.

Philip Langer, PhD, is Professor of Educational Psychological Studies at the University of Colorado. Robert Pois, PhD, was Professor of History at the University of Colorado, until his untimely death on January 18, 2004. His obituary is published in the March 2004 (Vol. 10, No. 4) issue of this journal. This article reflects some of the numerous and relevant contributions he made to their joint book, Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership (2004) and their analysis of the current war in Iraq. Prof. Langer may be contacted at Philip.Langer@Colorado.edu. □

Greenberg on Nixon and Hiss

(Continued from page 1)

seat, the vice presidency, and eventually the presidency. But after Watergate he too lived out his days fighting to rehabilitate his name in the history books. That both men shared this final fate of battling in vain to shape history's judgment is telling, for they shared during their lives an overweening concern with image and reputation as well as a risky willingness to cover up past deeds, at great cost. These shared qualities help account for another feature common to both men: their enduring role as symbols of the Cold War era.

With Hiss and Nixon alike, the question of reputation is inescapable. Most historians these days agree that Hiss lied about his past in the Communist Party. But it is Nixon's name, not Hiss's, that is most closely associated with villainy throughout our political universe. That association existed, moreover, long before Watergate. Widespread hatred of Nixon—hatred that went beyond the typical dislike for a political opponent—predated his term as president. Even when he held what was then the inconsequential office of vice president, Nixon had, as the journalist Stewart Alsop wrote, “probably more enemies than any other American” (“The Mystery of Richard Nixon,” *Saturday Evening Post*, July 12, 1958, p. 29).

On the very first page of his first memoir, *Six Crises* (1962), Nixon wrote that after 1948 “my name, my reputation, and my career” became tied up with his aggressive pursuit of Hiss. He also insisted that the animus toward him stemmed from his lead role in the case. But this judgment was mistaken, and it reflects Nixon's tendency toward self-pitying self-justification. In fact, Nixon-hating didn't emerge as a national phenomenon until his smearing of Helen Gahagan Douglas as the “pink lady” in his 1950 Senate race—or even perhaps until his infamous slush fund scandal and “Checkers Speech” of 1952. As it turns out, during the Hiss case liberal opinion was divided. Many liberals were skeptical of Hiss's claims. Arthur Schlesinger, James Wechsler, and William Shannon, for example, all thought Hiss was guilty. Wechsler actually received a thank-you note from Nixon for defending Whittaker Chambers (Kevin Mattson, *When America Was Great: The Fighting Faith of Postwar Liberalism*, 2004, p. 54).

Shannon, in a 1955 profile of Nixon for the *New York Post* wrote, “The prestige of his participation in the unmasking of Alger Hiss for example is untarnished and not in dispute, but he cannot live on that forever” (“What Makes Nixon Run?” Article I, October 17, 1955, p. 1). Even periodicals such as *The Nation* and the *Washington Post* that had originally believed Hiss over Chambers, changed their tune after the disclosure of the Pumpkin Papers. “It is now apparent that this politics-ridden committee has broken one of the most sensational spy cases in American history,” wrote *The Nation* (in Sam Tanenhaus, *Whittaker Chambers: A Biography*, 1997, p. 325). But because Nixon chose to remember himself as unfairly maligned during the Hiss case—seeing it as an instance where he was right and his critics were wrong—he could tell himself that the liberals' dislike of him was groundless.

It's certainly true that the Hiss case crystallized a public image of Nixon as a fervent crusader against Communists. Once Nixon materialized as the liberals' bête noire in the 1950s, his critics went back and retrospectively traced a leitmotif of dishonest Red-baiting in his career. Then, in the years that followed, as McCarthy-style anti-Communism fell into increasing disrepute, Nixon's past conduct—such as in his 1946 congressional campaign against Jerry Voorhis, the Hiss case, the Douglas campaign, and other political episodes of the Red Scare years—came to be seen as forming a pattern of shameful behavior. By the end of the decade, Nixon's reputation for indiscriminately charging rivals with being red or pink had come to plague him. Indeed, this image of the immature demagogue became the foil for the so-called “New Nixon” that he sought to create for himself as he planned his presidential run in 1960. For the rest of his career, Nixon would be torn between wanting to project the persona of a dignified statesman and wanting to give in to his instinct for the jugular.

If Nixon's reputation evolved partly in response to how society viewed his anti-Communism, popular judgments of Hiss varied partly in response to views of Nixon. Hiss enjoyed his most favorable spells of attention precisely when Nixon's standing was plummeting. For example, after Nixon lost his race for governor of California in 1962, ABC News interviewed Hiss for its half-hour news special entitled, “The Political Obituary of Richard Nixon.” On the show, Hiss said, quite accurately, that Nixon was

“motivated by ambition, by personal self-serving” (in Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 1978, p. 246). Later, during the time of Watergate and of the exposure of lawlessness at J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, Hiss even became something of a hero to a younger, left-leaning generation that had come to view McCarthyite tactics as synonymous with anti-Communism. As Edward White has written, the scenario of Nixon having conspired with Chambers and the FBI to frame Hiss was “no more implausible, in post-Watergate America, than the Nixon White House enlisting the FBI in persecutions of its political opponents” (G. Edward White, *Alger Hiss’s Looking-Glass Wars: The Covert Life of a Soviet Spy*, 2004, p. 145). In short, Hiss was admired for having been victimized. He had chosen to seek vindication in what he called, in the title of his memoir, “the Court of Public Opinion” (Alger Hiss, *In the Court of Public Opinion*, 1957), and he benefited from the evolving views of the Red Scare, the Cold War, and of Nixon. “Mr. Nixon is sort of a press agent for me,” Alger told Tony Hiss. “I now have a chance to state my own position simply because of the fact that Nixon was one of my initial tormentors” (in White, *Looking-Glass Wars*, p. 152).

In addition to Hiss and Nixon’s shared concern with reputation was their common impulse to cover up. The life of a Communist spy is inherently a double life, divided between public and private personae. Nixon, likewise, was always covering up—his feelings, his secret diplomacy, and of course his illegal political activities. In addition, both men undertook their cover ups knowing the potential risks. Hiss’s concern with his image led him to seek to cover up his past Communist activities even to the point of committing perjury. As commentators have noted, this was a tragic mistake. If he had chosen a more truthful strategy of disclosure, he wouldn’t have gone to jail, since the statute of limitations on espionage had expired by the time Whittaker Chambers appeared before HUAC. It is fine for us to fault the millions of Americans who indulged in the anti-Communist mania of the early Cold War years for not appreciating the difference between being a Communist and compromising the nation’s security, but Hiss brought it on himself. Sending him to jail for perjury was hardly necessary, but his own initiation of the cover-up is what doomed him.

So, as fate would have it, it was from the Hiss case that Nixon learned the lesson, as he said often,

“It isn’t the crime, it’s the cover-up.” On his secret White House tapes—those wonderful documents that revealed the gulf between the public and the private Nixons—the president can often be heard making the following and similar statements: “If you cover up, you’re going to get caught” (as he told his aide John Ehrlichman just a month after the Watergate cover-up had itself begun, quoted in Stanley I. Kutler, *Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes*, 1997, p. 93).

Nixon professed to have taken this lesson from the Hiss case to heart. As the Watergate scandal unraveled, he regularly instructed his aides to go back and read the chapter in his memoir, *Six Crises*, about the episode. He reveled in recounting his own devious leaking of information to the press to force the Truman Justice Department—which had been inclined not to prosecute Hiss—to pursue criminal charges. But during Watergate Nixon was unable to heed his own advice. As with Hiss, his cover up turned out to be far more damaging than even the impeachable offenses they were designed to conceal. Did he unconsciously identify with Hiss? In *Six Crises* Nixon had written of the “letdown” and the “shock and sadness” he felt on seeing Hiss exposed. “I imagined myself in his place.... It is not a pleasant picture to see a whole brilliant career destroyed before your eyes. I realized that Hiss stood before us completely unmasked” (p. 37). The term “unmasked” is especially revealing, since Nixon himself was accused his whole career of wearing a mask—to the point where the Nixon mask became a recurring trope in American popular culture. (On the Nixon mask, see my *Nixon’s Shadow: The History of an Image*, 2003, xv-xvii.)

In their concern with surface images and their concealment of personal secrets, Hiss and Nixon embody an anxiety that was central to American postwar politics. It was an almost existential worry that politics had changed from *representative* government to what might be called *representational* government: leadership by men who proffered not honest words and ideas to match the needs of their constituents but misleading and flickering images designed to hoodwink their constituents.

There were two main reasons for this anxiety. One was the Cold War. The ideology of an existential struggle against a fearsome ideology bent on global conquest taught Americans to accept and even welcome a degree of official deception as a necessary

tool in winning the war for hearts and minds around the world. The culture celebrated spies—our spies, at least—and demonized those for the other side. It encouraged deference to authority, a habit of not asking too many questions of leaders.

The second reason for this anxiety over surfaces and secrets, I think, was nothing less than the full flowering of mass society—a favorite subject of social critics in those years. Intellectuals from David Riesman to William Whyte to Erving Goffman to Daniel Boorstin noted the trends. Face-to-face interactions seemed to be receding in importance next to impressions gleaned from mass media. This shift induced a worry that traditional values were eroding and that the deep, solid, enduring set of human attributes known as character seemed to be yielding to a more superficial, manipulable, evanescent constellation of traits called personality. Public relations, television, and sophisticated methods of molding public opinion heightened the concern. In politics, it was feared, unprincipled operators could use new technologies to misrepresent themselves and hoodwink voters.

Nixon shared this concern. For him, Hiss embodied this new type of soulless man. In *RN*, he called Hiss “too clever by half.” Hiss was, he said, “too suave, too smooth, and too self-confident to be an entirely trustworthy witness” (p. 55). Nixon of course had ambivalent feelings toward such suavity. Part of him admired Hiss’s skill in presenting the false façade, and there was a perverse kind of integrity, as if among gangsters, in Hiss’s willingness not to crack. “The great thing about Hiss—I’ve got to say this for Hiss,” Nixon said, again on the tapes. “He never ratted on anybody else. Never. He never ratted” (in Kutler, *Abuse of Power*, p. 18). Yet there was also clearly a deep hatred for Hiss’s knowing, all-encompassing lies. “If the American people understood the real character of Alger Hiss,” Nixon said to Chambers in 1948, “they would boil him in oil” (Whittaker Chambers, *Witness*, 1952, p. 793n). Nixon was convinced that Hiss’s dapper, poised exterior concealed a furtive, shameful nature. He even believed and spread the baseless rumor that Hiss and Chambers had been lovers.

If to Nixon, Hiss was the soulless modern man, to liberals like Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., the epitome of this type was none other than Nixon himself. As Schlesinger wrote:

Nixon is in many respects a good example of midcentury man, obsessed with appearances rather than the reality of things, obsessed above all with his own appearance, his own image, seeking reassurance through winning, but never knowing why he is so mad to win or what he will do with his victory. Issues for him are secondary and subordinate, to be maneuvered and manipulated. What matters is stance, not substance; what matters is a felt righteousness of motive, a sentence of humility on the lips, a look of dedication on the face (*Kennedy or Nixon: Does It Make Any Difference?* [1960], p. 18).

Schlesinger’s description of Nixon shouldn’t be taken uncritically. It reflects as much on Schlesinger’s disdain for Nixon’s petty strivings as it does on Nixon’s character. It short changes certain commitments that Nixon held, such as his belief in diplomacy in pursuit of peace. But it does beautifully capture a lot about Nixon’s nature. Most importantly, it identifies the ease with which Nixon’s concern with image slid into political opportunism and then into amorality.

Most Americans are capable of holding their ground on that slippery slope. We can understand the obsession with image that moved Nixon and Hiss, even if we don’t possess it in quite the same measure. We recognize the necessity of opportunism in politics, which is the art of the possible, although we’re quick to pounce when opportunism seems to short-change principle, and we become indignant as soon as it bleeds into criminality.

So Nixon and Hiss are not us. Yet, in a culture that vaunts the elusive quality of authenticity, of being true to oneself, these men’s ready assumption of public guises reminds us of our own playing of roles, even perhaps of the mild deceptions of which we partake. (On Nixon and this phenomenon, see Leo Rangell, *The Mind of Watergate: An Exploration of the Compromise of Integrity*, 1980.) The seemingly vast gulfs between the public and private Nixon and the public and private Hiss continue to trouble and fascinate us not only because they imply that our political leaders aren’t who they claim, but also because they tap into the nagging, gnawing anxiety that our own public selves aren’t exactly the same as our private selves either.

David Greenberg, PhD, Assistant Professor of Media Studies, Journalism, and History at Rutgers

University, is best known as the author of *Nixon's Shadow: The History of an Image* (2003), which won two major book awards. Recently he published *Calvin Coolidge* (2006) and wrote the text and introduction for *Presidential Doodles: Two Centuries of Scribbles, Scratches, Squiggles & Scrawls from the Oval Office* (2006). Professor Greenberg has written for scholarly and popular publications including the *New Yorker*, the *Atlantic Monthly*, the *Journal of American History*, the *Political Science Quarterly*, and *Slate*, the online magazine. His work focuses primarily on American political culture in recent decades. □

Alford Interview of Glass

(Continued from page 1)

reformed Jew who grew up in Beverly Hills at a time when it was considered a middle class suburb. He "escaped" Los Angeles by attending the University of California, Berkeley and received his BA in 1961. After a year attending the London School of Economics and hitchhiking around Europe, and then an unenthusiastic year at Stanford Law School, he returned to Berkeley in 1963 where he wanted to study political philosophy in the Department of Political Science. In 1964 he earned his MA and in 1970 his PhD from the University of California at Berkeley. In 1970 after some teaching in Berkeley, Professor Glass moved to the East Coast where he has since taught at the University of Maryland, College Park. There he is a Distinguished Scholar-Teacher and was recently awarded its Kerwin Prize for Outstanding Teaching – granted yearly to only one faculty member. In 2004 Glass was named Outstanding Faculty Member of the Year by the State of Maryland.

As a scholar James Glass has been quite prolific, publishing nine book chapters, thirty-six articles, ten review essays, and eighteen book reviews. He is the author of six books, the first four stemming from his almost twenty-year-long research project at the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, interviewing patients and then writing about their internal worlds. These are *Delusion: Internal Dimensions of Political Life* (University of Chicago Press, 1985), *Private Terror/Public Space: Psychosis and the Politics of Community* (Cornell University Press, 1989), *Shattered Selves: Multiple Personality in a Post-Modern World* (Cornell University Press, 1993), *Psychosis and Power: Threats to Democracy in the Self and the*

Group (Cornell University Press, 1995), *Life Unworthy of Life: Race Phobia and Mass Murder in Hitler's Germany* (Basic Books, 1997), and *Jewish Resistance During the Holocaust: Moral Uses of Violence and Will* (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004).

C. Fred Alford (CFA) interviewed James Glass (JMG) in the spring. Together they edit the *Psychoanalysis and Social Theory* series of Cornell University Press, which thus far has published six books. Professor Glass may be contacted at jglass@gvpt.umd.edu. He lives in Maryland with his wife Cyndi, a social worker in private practice; they have two teenaged sons.

CFA: What brought you to political psychology?

JMG: I had a long-standing interest in the psychological dimensions of political and social theory. In 1977, I established a research relationship with the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Baltimore, interviewing patients and then writing about their internal worlds in relation to political and theoretical issues at the heart of the Western tradition of political philosophy. I studied madness, its languages and symbolizations, and wrote about the relation of madness in individuals to madness in political societies and groups. That work preoccupied me for well over a decade. I studied various psychotic and borderline conditions in patients and then interpreted the data (language) in the context of moral, political, and philosophical issues central to the canon of political philosophy.

CFA: Of which of your works are you most proud?

JMG: That's hard to say. I have been enormously influenced by my work at Sheppard Pratt, an experience that I wrote about in my books about the hospital and its patients. But I also was profoundly moved by my research into the Holocaust, and the interviews with survivors, including those in the resistance, whose stories and narratives affected me deeply.

CFA: What are you working on now; what is its importance; and when do you expect to have it published?

JMG: Now I'm looking at different ways of interpreting the civil society of mass murder, with particular reference to the Holocaust. I find the kind of research and values developed in civil society to be as critical in forging the state of mind behind the "final solution" as the Nazi party and apparatus of state. In fact, it seems to me that often civil society led the

party and the state into the commitment to mass murder. Science, medicine, and psychiatry had a huge role in the thinking behind mass murder. In addition, this most recent project takes a critical look at the central interpretive pillars regarding genocide and the Holocaust: Hannah Arendt's theory of "totalitarianism" and mass society; Theodor Adorno's concept of the authoritarian personality and the rise of fascism; and Stanley Milgram's experiments in obedience to authority. Each of these theoretical approaches needs to be modified and rethought in light of recent research into the role of civil society in Nazi Germany and group theoretical concepts stemming from the work of Wilfred Bion. I expect the project to be finished within the next couple of years.

CFA: What is your primary affiliation?

JMG: My primary affiliation is with political science and political philosophy. At the University of Maryland, political psychology is a subfield of government and politics.

CFA: What special training turned out to be most helpful to you?

JMG: I can honestly say that the training I received in listening to patients and staff (psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, nurses, and mental health workers) at Sheppard Pratt Hospital was vital in informing my work. It was like an extended post doctorate resembling nothing of what I experienced in graduate school. At Sheppard I was fortunate to be around tolerant, open-minded, and curious staff, who found listening to patients as important, if not more important, than medicating them. The psychological study of psychosis (which I would argue underlay residency training under Clarence Schulz and informed many of the formal and informal discussions about patients) focused on the self, its internality, and the varied forms of linguistic expression.

One of the greatest tragedies of the modern treatment of psychosis is the loss of that attention to language and its symbolizations along with its informal study in the mental hospital. My work was much different than that of Erving Goffman, Alfred Stanton, and Morris Schwartz in the 1950s, than even that of Michel Foucault when he spent time in a mental hospital researching his dissertation. Foucault went in and out while I hung around for years and began to make some headway in understanding message systems and epistemologies that many psychia-

trists tend to dismiss as "word salad," or as lunatic ravings. I found in many of these expressions of the internal world, complex theories of knowledge, self-referential and hermetic, but very real and critical to the patients/persons articulating them.

CFA: What led you to do your most important work of listening, really listening, to patients at the Sheppard and Pratt Hospital?

JMG: I will explain, giving some more background. I became involved in clinical research at Sheppard Pratt around 1977, right after receiving tenure at Maryland. For years I had been influenced by the theories of Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and R.D. Laing, particularly their views toward transgressive states of mind, and moving beyond "normal" reality into madness. For these philosophers madness becomes a form of communication, a refraction of contradictions in the so-called "normal" world of politics and values. Furthermore, in the 1960s at Berkeley, where I completed my graduate degrees in political science, the inclination to explore psychological and aesthetic states that moved against conventional or conforming reality was a powerful social and cultural dynamic. The common intellectual currency included the poetry of Rimbaud, Beaudelaire, and Artaud; the Expressionist painters of the 20th century; the fiction of Kafka; and art that broke reality into fragments, requiring a powerful emotional identification. With the almost surrealistic politics of protest in Berkeley, the idea that it was a "good" to see beyond the normal, what might be called the psychedelics of knowledge – philosophers like Nietzsche and Foucault, poets like Artaud, filmmakers like Ingmar Bergman and later James Toback – raised important questions about madness, its language, and its transformative experiential dimension.

By the late 1970s, after writing in a variety of forums about these ideas, it seemed to me I could go no further. If I was to continue exploring the nature of madness, I needed to speak with people who society designated as "mad." It was almost as if I wanted to empirically "test" the hypotheses of Nietzsche, Foucault, and Laing in the clinical setting. Otherwise, I had to leave the topic; since I had reached my intellectual dead end in thinking about madness; now it was essential to listen to it or I should just leave the topic altogether.

At the time Sheppard Pratt had an extraordinary reputation for the psychotherapeutic treatment

of schizophrenia; in addition, it was situated in an environment in Towson that, at least on my initial reaction to the hospital, gave some credence to the idea that indeed if one were "ill," the hospital environment, the grounds, could or might indeed provide something akin to the classical concept of "asylum," an escape or retreat from the prevailing forms of psychological pain found in society and the family. Laing wrote a great deal about the concept of asylum as a psychological escape and it certainly had an impact on some of his work with Joseph Berke in London on the treatment of madness.

In a letter to Sheppard's Director of Research I explained what I wanted to do: to interview schizophrenics and use the language and imagery as clinical data for a project examining the concept of madness, as it had been articulated by philosophers in the history of political philosophy. Philosophers like Plato and Thomas Hobbes had spent a great deal of intellectual energy in conjuring up the horrors of madness and the dangers that madness presented to the public space. What could the actual language of psychosis tell us about the relation between madness and the public space, the powerful disintegrative forces that rip apart political structure and social values?

A few days later I received a phone call from the Director, Jerry Whitmarsh, inviting me up for an interview. I was obviously thrilled; in the past, it had been sociologists studying mental hospitals and their structures (for example Goffman, Stantam, and Schwartz) that constituted the approach of non-clinical professionals in doing research in mental hospitals. Never before had a political theorist or someone trained in political philosophy made such a request – at least not at Sheppard Pratt and I don't think anywhere else. As far as I knew, the only philosopher to have had clinical contact with madness was Foucault; it was a central part of his doctoral dissertation he later published, several years before *Madness and Civilization*, as a short book called *Mental Illness and Psychology*. For the clinicians at the Hospital, my presence was something of a first, and I imagine they were curious as to how I would react to the unpredictable and unsettling world of psychosis.

The interview went terribly. I'll never forget Clarence Schulz and Gerald Whitmarsh sat with me for an hour, while I went through my Nietzsche, Laing, and Foucault dance, only on every point to be

reminded by both of them that the clinical world was very much different from these theories. In their view what I argued about the philosophers, particularly Laing, could not be substantiated in the clinical universe. After leaving that interview, I thought to myself, "Wow, I flunked this one; they'll never approve the project." A couple of days later, I received a call saying that it was fine to speak with patients, all I needed to do was receive their consent and the consent of their therapists. That began what for me was an extraordinary collaboration with the Hospital and its staff for the next sixteen years. I should add that during the 1970s and 1980s Sheppard managed to attract a number of talented residents, interested not only in medical psychiatry but also in the phenomenology of their patients and the meaning inherent in their language. To elaborate, it was like graduate school all over again; the "professors" were the staff psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers – many of whom spent hours with me. The graduate students were the psychiatric residents, a colorful and talented bunch of persons who sought out Sheppard because of its reputation for speaking with patients and listening.

Understanding how to listen was an important element in staff meetings, in addition to seeing the links between linguistic and behavioral forms of expression. This included the role of listening to art and dance therapy. I attended a couple of dance therapy sessions with schizophrenic patients as a member of their class. In subsequent discussions with the dance therapist I learned a great deal about the nature of movement itself and its connection to images and symbols preoccupying the schizophrenic mind. The patients' art and drawings expressed complex states of mind that told powerful stories in compressed and often distorted images and vivid, jarring colors. But it was the staff meetings, attended by all the different therapeutic modalities, that had an enormous impact on how I approached listening and how I heard the way others "listened" to this often confounding language. The staff at Sheppard continuously reflected on the inner world of psychosis as a complex synthesis of language, affect, and symbol; and under the guidance of Clarence Schulz and Roger Lewin I received what amounted to a postdoctoral education. I write about this in various places in my books about the Hospital and its patients. It was vital to the staff to try to understand the patients' sense of self, and the power of language in reaching inside, in discover-

ing the alternative realities and epistemologies patients used to orient themselves to the world as they saw it.

Unfortunately, presently that kind of clinical experience, much less the institutional space to explore, is all but gone. For example, psychiatric residents when I first started had to complete two years on the long-term units; when I wrapped up the project in 1993, the resident requirement on what few were left of the long-term units was less than six months.

After *Delusion* (1980), which explored the clinical reality of psychosis in the context of political philosophy and some of its central preoccupations, my second book studied the nature of asylum itself in *Private Terror/Public Life* (1989). I looked at how this worked in Gheel in Belgium with a centuries-long history of sheltering the mad in the town itself; in Israel on the Kibbutzim; at a therapeutic community in Vermont called Spring Lake Ranch; and at Sheppard Pratt. The third book, *Shattered Selves* (1993), looked at what was then called Multiple Personality Disorder, now generally understood as Dissociative Disorder. I was curious about the postmodern notion of the multiple self and the way postmodern philosophers like Baudrillard and Foucault celebrated and valorized this notion of psychological fragmentation. I wanted to see how it actually played out in a clinical setting; so I interviewed a number of women at the hospital with that diagnosis and wrote about it in the context of the postmodern notion of multiplicity and its central role in postmodern philosophy. The fourth and final book growing out of my experience at Sheppard, *Psychosis and Power* (1995), looked more generally at the concept of psychosis and its association with concepts of political power. In that study I examined how the languages of madness appear in modern political and group life, and what it means to think about political life from the point of view of psychotic unraveling.

It's hard to convey the excitement of discovery that was the atmosphere at Sheppard Pratt "back in the day." If there ever was a golden age for thinking about the phenomenology of psychosis, for exploring the condition as a profound disorder of meaning and logic, for an extraordinary collaboration into its cause, epistemology, and expression from a variety of psychological, medical, and social perspectives, and for an open atmosphere where no one held

the "right" answer, where all points of view were welcomed in the efforts to treat seriously disturbed human beings, it was at Sheppard Pratt.

CFA: Do you plan to publish an autobiography?

JMG: I would have a very difficult time writing an autobiography; I think I'm too self-conscious and awkward about talking about myself, although this interview has pushed me to seriously consider it.

CFA: What special training do you think would be most helpful for someone entering the field of psychohistory and political psychology?

JMG: That's a tough question because qualitative and quantitative political psychology each has its place. I would like to see students become aware of the psychoanalytic tradition, Freud, and modern psychoanalytic theory; to spend some time, if possible, in a clinical setting; and to read as much political philosophy as possible.

CFA: How do you see political psychology developing over the next decade?

JMG: I see political psychology developing in the next decade in ways that will strike a balance between the neurosciences (that now seem all the rage) and more traditional approaches based on an understanding of the self and the group. Specifically I hope that psychoanalytically informed analysis of both individuals and groups is not lost in the de rigueur methodologies of the day. I fear we are in a period where scientizing the self, and more specifically consciousness, seems to be on the rise, so eventually all that will be of importance to political psychology is what is "rational" or what can be counted. If that happens, it will be a significant loss, since the major philosophers in the history of political philosophy assumed a self that was extremely complicated both in terms of affect and language. It should be kept in mind that Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, among others, were terrific psychologists, long before philosophy and psychology developed into radically different disciplines. Language seems to be disappearing from the modern forms of cognitive science; or rather, the language of affect, the concept of the unconscious, possess little reality for a scientific approach that almost does away with the notion of "self."

CFA: What could we do as political psychologists and psychohistorians to strengthen our work?

JMG: I would want to see political psychologists become more familiar with and aware of psychoanalytic developments, but the institutes themselves don't generally do a good job at outreach. In America, they have been quite insular; nothing of the impact of the French institutes and psychoanalytic teaching in academia has happened in American universities. Psychoanalytic institutes might want to partner up with the universities to offer courses that would strengthen political psychology.

CFA: Do you have any specific ideas for implementing your call for bringing psychoanalytic institutes and academia together?

JMG: It may be too late for that; the initiative had to come from the institutes, and with very few exceptions that has not happened. It certainly hasn't happened, as far as I know, in the Baltimore/Washington region. Part of the problem lies in the organization of university departments and in the training focus of the institutes. For this to come from the university there would have to be something akin to a large research grant because faculties are not going to offer a tenure track line based solely on psychoanalytic training and insight. The impetus then would have to be on the adjunct level; possibly the institutes could offer to fund a line and a department could hire a person on that basis. Or a group of departmental faculty could make a proposal to the department that so-and-so be offered adjunct status to teach psychoanalytic or applied psychoanalytic theory in some given semester. That would certainly be a feasible avenue of participation; but given the specific ideologies now pervading departments of psychology and political science it would be highly unlikely that one could hire a tenure track faculty with some specialty in psychoanalytic theory. It would be far more likely to happen in departments of comparative literature.

CFA: What is the importance of childhood in your work?

JMG: While I regard childhood as critical in understanding psychoanalytic issues, I do not use it in my work. Rather I rely mostly on narrative and historical sources, although the history of self is a vital aspect of what history means – at least in a psychoanalytic sense. In my book on Jewish resistance during the Holocaust, however, many of the resistance survivors I interviewed spoke at great length about their childhoods – but these were “childhoods” of horrifying trauma and dislocation.

CFA: In your experience in life, are high achievers more identified with their fathers?

JMG: I don't have much to say about high achievement and identification with the father. I'm not sure there is a correlation and besides, I would not want to speculate absent empirical data.

CFA: Following up on an issue raised by Freud, what is the impact of parental loss on your level of achievement and those of subjects you have studied?

JMG: I wouldn't say the issue of parental loss is significant in my work; it rarely came up in my discussions with patients at Sheppard Pratt, and if it did, it did not figure in their diagnoses or in the narrative reality they were describing. It was of course significant with the Holocaust survivors I interviewed and with the resistance fighters. The rage and sorrow of losing their parents or having witnessed the death of one or both parents played a significant role in the intensity of violence with which they waged resistance and in their initial decisions to join resistance groups.

CFA: How old were you, Jim, when your father and mother died?

JMG: I was fifty when my father died and fifty-six when my mother died.

CFA: What are your thoughts on the psychology and psychodynamics of violence in our world?

JMG: It depends on the context, the environment, and both public and private issues that play into any significant political conflict. Violence, aggression, hate, rage: all the passions Freud studied play into political forms of violence. There are some pretty good group psychoanalytic theorists that may help explain the nature of public forms of political violence: Bion, Anzieu, Volkan, Claudio Neri, Eigen, Ogden, and others. I think it's difficult to draw too literal a connection between a violent leader and the willingness of the masses to follow. That Freudian model (see *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*) I think has been overemphasized, especially in political science, in the sense that proponents of this theory overlook the fact that often it is the audience that propels the leadership. I tend to follow Bion: the group writes the script unconsciously and then “chooses” someone who will enact it. That certainly was the case in Nazi Germany where civil society – notably the sectors of medicine, science, the social sciences, the universities, and scientific institutes –

were instrumental players in developing the state of mind propelling the genocide. Germany's euthanasia program, which preceded the Holocaust, had as much to do with the forces in civil society, in groups within society, as it did with party leadership. There's an interesting study of the Gestapo that repeatedly argues that because of the willingness of the German population to be rid of their Jews, the Gestapo had to devote few resources to policing the German population. Consistently when the Gestapo came to round up Jews, there was no resistance from neighbors or friends. Jan Gross speaks about this in his book *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (2001).

CFA: How do you understand the psychology of terrorism?

JMG: Terrorism involves both politics and psychology; the willingness to die for a cause involves not so much an alienated, unhappy individual, but a person who firmly believes in principles and ideas. To me, terrorism is a belief-driven or ideologically defined activity, and to argue that terrorists are simply sick individuals misses the intricate connection between politics and psychology. In the documentary *Jesus Camp*, a twelve-year-old is speaking about how he would consider it an honor to "die for Jesus." The kid is not crazy or demented or alienated – he believes. However, we tend to dismiss as aberrant the complex psychological factors that push individuals into radical action.

CFA: How can psychologically oriented scholars have a greater impact on academia and society generally?

JMG: That's a tough question because generally academic departments like psychology and political science have little interest in psychoanalytically informed conceptual methods. Psychoanalysis has had an enormous impact in literature and English departments, in comparative literature. But there is little payoff or reward in political science or psychology for consistently maintaining a psychoanalytic position. The journals in political science and, I imagine, psychology are simply not sympathetic to psychoanalytically informed interpretation or analysis. There are of course a few; but if you're a young political scientist striving for tenure, there is utterly no incentive to publish in psychoanalytic journals. How can this be changed? I think the psychoanalytic institutes have to step up, maybe fund a chair or a professor-

ship, do something to have more of an impact in academic environments.

CFA: What is the impact of psychohistory on your area of expertise?

JMG: Psychohistory has little relevance to what I do, although I admire the study and have long held great respect for the work of Lloyd deMause.

CFA: How can we recruit new people to political psychology and psychohistory?

JMG: I'm not sure how to recruit new people to political psychology. I try to work with graduate students and to encourage them to think about the world psychologically. We need to be out there at conferences in political science. Presently, at the American Political Science Meetings there is very little interest in psychological, particularly psychoanalytic, papers and panels. Attendance is generally quite low on those few panels.

CFA: What books were important to your development?

JMG: I would speak more of individual philosophers, social theorists, and historians. Certainly the philosophers in the tradition of political philosophy – Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Marx, and Freud – were critical to my thinking as was the psychoanalytic tradition. These include Klein and modern psychoanalytic theorists like Bion, Winnicott, Anzieu, Ogden, and Neri. Also, historians like Christopher Browning, Robert Jay Lifton (a psychiatrist with a strong interest in history, politics and psychoanalysis), and Daniel Goldhagen – although professionally he is a political scientist. Nietzsche and Foucault have been central to my intellectual development; Hegel I feel is a neglected but important philosopher of consciousness. Max Weber, Karl Marx, Georges Sorel, Henri Bergson, William James, and Frantz Fanon were significant intellectual mentors.

CFA: Who was important in your development as a student of psychosocial development? Did Erik Erikson have an impact on you?

JMG: At one time Erikson had a big impact on my thinking but not so much anymore. Clarence Schulz at Sheppard Pratt was instrumental in my intellectual and professional development – a terrific and subtle teacher. I learned more from him in the years that I spent at Sheppard Pratt than from any other teacher. He was truly a mentor, an intellectual, and had an

extraordinary way of examining and speaking with critically ill mental patients. His interviews with patients were works of art. Roger Lewin, also at Sheppard Pratt, guided my thinking about patients and how to listen and interpret. Also my conversations with Fred Alford over the years have been instrumental in developing my thought. When I was in graduate school Sheldon Wolin and Norman Jacobson were very important to my intellectual development, as was Judith Shklar in the few times I had the opportunity to speak with her at conferences and meetings.

CFA: How do you define political psychology or psychohistory?

JMG: I find it impossible to define political psychology. If I were to try to it might look like this: the study of the relation between internal psychodynamic process, both in the individual and the group, and the public or public world. It is of course much more than this; but since my frame of reference is psychodynamic, this is how I see it.

CFA: Jim, you're likely the most honored teacher at the University of Maryland. What is the relationship between your teaching and research?

JMG: I find them interrelated. In teaching, particularly with graduate students, the back and forth quality of seminars and exchanges leads to developing and refining ideas that later become central to research projects and the perceptions informing the research. It would be very difficult for me to conduct research without the critical mirror teaching provides. The classroom, intellectually, is a totally free space for the generation of ideas and for feedback and interpretation. From time to time, in my undergraduate classes, students will ask questions that push me into thinking differently about a particular theorist or set of ideas and arguments. Without this mirror I would lose a certain sense of boundary that audience provides. Often I think we underestimate the importance of the concept of audience and its role in figuring out what's important and how to think about issues. For example, one of the reasons that led me to write the book on Jewish resistance were the persistent questions raised by students concerning the extent and nature of Jewish resistance. Most questions assumed or presumed the lack of resistance; I set out to demonstrate in my book how that assumption overlooked some vital historical facts and stories.

CFA: Thanks for a valuable interview. □

Elovitz Meeting Report on Jefferson

(Continued from page 1)

pendence," founding the Library of Congress and the University of Virginia, authorizing the Louisiana Purchase, keeping the U.S. out of the Napoleonic Wars during his presidency, his intellect and inventiveness, and for simply being one of the Founding Fathers. Yet, such idealization robs him of his humanity as a man of flesh and blood. As psychohistorians we note but resist such impulses as we keep a close eye on our countertransference to our subjects. This essay is a meeting report which has been enlarged to deepen our knowledge.

As members of the Psychohistory Forum's Research Group on Psychoanalytic Autobiography and Biography on March 3, 2007 Thomas Cassilly (Montclair State University, political science), Ralph Colp (Columbia University, psychiatry), David Felix (CUNY Graduate Center, history), Mary Lambert (private practice, psychoanalysis) and this author (Ramapo College, history and psychoanalysis) gathered at Lee Shneidman's home on West 86th Street in Manhattan to discuss this Founding Father from the perspective of Fawn Brodie's *Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate History*. When W.W. Norton published her book in 1974 it was extraordinarily controversial because it argued that the tall Virginian remained sexual after the death of his beloved wife when he was thirty-nine years old and that he had sex with and fathered children by his slave mulatto mistress Sally Hemings. Brodie wrote about the resistance to accepting historical evidence in "Jefferson Biographers and the Psychology of Canonization," in *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (1971). Though DNA studies have added further evidence in support of her argument that Sally Hemings was his mistress and that he was the father of her slave children, Brodie has never received the credit she deserves for her path breaking study of the third U.S. president, partly because of resistance to her psychoanalytic approach.

J. Lee Shneidman (Adelphi University) took the lead in the discussion because, although he is mostly known as a historian of early modern Spanish history, he is also the author of articles on Aaron Burr and Alexander Hamilton as well of the just completed book, *Leading from Weakness: Jefferson's Overt and Covert Foreign Policy: 1801-1807*. Professor Shneidman did a quick survey of the literature,

starting with Dumas Malone's six volume *Jefferson and His Times* (1948-81), which is a wonderful study of our third president but is completely devoid of psychology. More recently, Joseph Ellis' *The American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson* (1998) has provided good, more-up-to-date materials for psychological analysis, but again, this book is without insight into the psychodynamics, despite its claim to focus on character. Amidst the numerous books on the most intellectual of our Founders, Brodie's *Intimate History* stands out as a beacon of psychological insight. In recognition of her contributions, a special "Fawn M. Brodie 25 Year Retrospective," with articles by eleven scholars, was done in these pages last year (Vol. 13, No. 1 [June 2006], pp. 1, 29-66).

Beyond all the problems caused by his veneration, a major difficulty in studying Jefferson is that it is easy to take divergent positions regarding him. He not only held many contradictory positions, but he also covered his tracks as he sought to be viewed in the most favorable manner possible by his contemporaries and history. Yet, the copies he kept of all of his letters make it possible for the historian to trace the difference between his public and private positions on many issues.

When your view is not clouded by canonization it is easy to point out a large number of contradictions and limitations in Jefferson's thinking and life. Here are some examples. This famous advocate of the democracy of the citizen farmer was himself an aristocratic planter. He could celebrate the farmer as the chosen of God while he employed slaves in his nail factory. He opposed urban manufacturing in the new country, but his plantation economy nail factory was an economic failure. (It lost money at least in part due to his poor management.) The "Sage of Monticello" loved Paris, where he felt quite a home, but despised New York, the most cosmopolitan of the colonial cities. He disliked the North, especially Connecticut which was the home of Yale University and the Congregationalists he as a deist so disdained; yet in the end he sought Northern support to become president. Despite his opposition to war he favored an imperialistic, and often devious, foreign policy. For example, he sent Lewis and Clark into the North-western lands (owned by native Americans and claimed by both Spain and England) to expand the new country to the Pacific so it would become a continental power at the expense of its neighbors.

The following examples will illustrate that Jefferson was opposed to a strong executive in theory, but favored it in practice when it served his purposes. In 1798 he secretly wrote the Kentucky Resolutions in opposition to an executive so strong that it could suspend due process for aliens, yet as president he doubled the size of the country when his officials made the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 without specific Senatorial consent or even consulting him about exceeding their mandate to buy more than New Orleans and West Florida (they did not get West Florida).

Thomas Jefferson, the advocate of the rights of man, proud author of the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom and the lawyer who first publicly spoke up for human rights in legal defense of a slave he argued should be free under the laws of Virginia, lived as an aristocrat as a consequence of the labor of his slaves. He authored the Kentucky Resolutions in opposition to the very same Sedition Act he used against Tapping Reeves of Connecticut for speaking against slavery. He wrote with great force and eloquence, as in the "Declaration of Independence," yet spoke so softly that he had to send rather than deliver his State of the Union Speech to Congress so that his words would be heard. The third president wrote that every generation should make its own revolution, which could easily have destroyed the new republic, yet he kept a tight rein on his own slaves lest they rebel.

There were many issues of which Thomas Jefferson clearly had little understanding and awareness of the needs of the new republic, such as of the nature and dangers of the revolutionary violence in France. He hoped to eliminate the Bank of the United States and the Supreme Court (or at least render it powerless), as he had the Navy—all of which were mistakes. After a letter he sent to a friend was opened and made public by a postal official, he never trusted the United States Post Office that Ben Franklin had started.

At our meeting considerable time was spent on Jefferson's complex and contradictory relationship to slavery. He thought slavery deplorable and wanted to free his slaves, but he was perpetually in debt and in need of income from them. In fact, he even felt compelled to sell some of his own slave children. Furthermore, he lived in a society discouraging manumission, insisting that freed slaves must

leave Virginia. While he was in revolutionary France, his slave Sally Hemings and her brother James, who was his chef and valet, were legally free and did not want to return to slavery in Virginia. This created a problem since Thomas was both quite possessive and emotionally dependent on Sally: he talked her into returning with him with mostly unfulfilled promises of freedom for Sally's children at age twenty-one. James, who was told he would gain freedom after teaching French cooking to another slave at Monticello, was freed after seven years (Brodie, pp. 235, 243). Jefferson left a will freeing five of his slaves (two were apparently his sons). Sally Hemings was freed two years later by special arrangement with his white daughter who inherited Sally. The delay in manumission was apparently aimed at lessening gossip about Jefferson's slave mistress at the time of his death (Brodie, pp. 466-467). By contrast George Washington, who never spoke out against Negro slavery and was not perpetually in debt, left a will freeing all of his slaves upon the death of his wife.

As well as the many contradictions within his belief system and behavior, our discussion focused mostly on the childhood, emotional life, and personality of the president from Monticello. His father Peter (1708-57) was a very large, enormously powerful, robust, and successful planter/land surveyor who married Jane Randolph (1720-76). Thomas was the third of ten children born to their union. However, his childhood and development would be greatly influenced by an arrangement Peter made with his wife's kinsman William Randolph. Concerned for the well-being of their families in a period of high mortality, each agreed to care for the other's family should one die. After the much richer Randolph died, the elder Jefferson built a house on his kinsman's estates in the shape of an H with the three orphaned Randolph children in one wing and his own in the other. Though Thomas was the eldest son of his parents, he was bullied by the three older Randolph children within the household, which interfered with his development of self-confidence.

When Peter died suddenly in an epidemic at age forty-nine, freckle-faced, gangly, fourteen-year-old "tall Tom" became head of the household, but in fact he had familial responsibility without power, since he did not inherit slaves, property, or money until age twenty-one. Until then the power lay with the executors of his father's estate and his mother.

After being privately tutored he went to William and Mary College for two years and was admitted to the bar at age twenty-two. Most of his life was spent in Virginia.

At age twenty-eight Jefferson married the widow Matilda Wayles Skelton (1748-82) who brought her half sister Sally Hemings (1773-1835), a nine-year-old light-skinned slave with the same father. The future president was so emotionally connected to and solicitous of his wife that he frustrated George Washington and his revolutionary colleagues by his refusal to leave her to serve their common cause, especially when she was pregnant or ill, which was much of the time. Matilda died following childbirth leaving a distraught thirty-nine-year-old husband. Despite the disclaimers of those who idealized the third American president to the point of denying his sexuality, eventually Sally became Jefferson's lover, and all her descendents carried Jeffersonian DNA. (Though the DNA match is not proof-positive of Thomas Jefferson's personal relationship with Sally Hemings, it is supported by a variety of other evidence, including contemporary white Jeffersonians accepting the descendents of Sally Hemings at a family reunion.) This master/slave sexual arrangement, all too common in Virginia, was general knowledge in Monticello and vicinity. It became the cause of a scandal publicized by James Callender, to the delight of many of Jefferson's political enemies, while being vociferously denied by his white daughters. Regardless of the political and social cost, with Sally, he was at peace.

From his correspondence we know a fair amount about Jefferson's attitudes to women. With his mother, whose political sympathies were always with the British crown, his letters reflect an emotional coldness. He usually viewed women as fragile. His letters to his daughter Mary encourage her to be feminine rather than intellectual and to give in to her husband when they disagreed. Over a period of forty years beginning in his time in Paris as American envoy, he exchanged a romantic correspondence with Maria Cosway, wife of a well-known English painter (John P. Kaminski, *Jefferson in Love: The Love Letters Between Thomas Jefferson and Maria Cosway* [1999]). (It is worth noting that he married a widow who already had a child [who had died], had a lengthy relationship with a married woman almost entirely through correspondence, and had a long-term relationship with his slave-mistress-sister-in-law, but

never simply married a young woman coming directly from her parents' home.) Jefferson's written words reveal nothing about his special relationship with Sally Hemings.

As noted by Lee Shneidman, compartmentalization was an extremely strong tendency in the third American president. He often acted as if his heart told him one thing and his head something else. Ralph Colp suggested that it is rare to find an individual who does not compartmentalize different elements of life. Mary Lambert argued that hysterics have problems keeping things separate and that women are much less inclined to compartmentalize than are men.

At one point in our discussion, Ralph Colp asked Mary Lambert to summarize her view of the Thomas Jefferson's psychodynamics, resulting in the following sketch of a father-centered son.

Peter Jefferson was truly a frontier man, off on forays looking for virgin land to survey and acquire. His father loomed large in Thomas' life, especially because he was never able to develop a close relationship with this formidable giant of a man, whose great physical powers he could never attain. Had Peter not died when his eldest son was too young to assess his virtues and limitations, he might have been able to accept the normal ambivalence that older children feel toward their parents. Without going into too much detail, Tom, in order to establish some equilibrium of character, used compartmentalization (splitting in psychoanalytic terms) as a defense against his rage. He was not able to establish his position as the first-born son with all its privileges until his twenties because of the family moving to the much larger Randolph plantation after the death of William Randolph when he was two years old. There he was bullied by older children who made him feel their superior class position. On the other hand, Peter, acting as surrogate father for the orphaned Randolphs made little distinction among the children, which left Tom to fend for himself because his mother was usually pregnant and otherwise engaged. Furthermore, his father on principal did not believe in the rights of the eldest son and therefore did not provide Thomas with a sense of his own importance. When his father died suddenly and left him at age fourteen responsible for his sisters and younger brother and running of the plantation, without giving him effective power, he was ill prepared to take over.

Many of his obsessional characteristics were probably developed at that time. In addition, as Brodie notes, this experience left him quite ambivalent about power, which he craved, but then backed away from, much to the distress of his friends and political supporters.

To summarize, the death of his larger-than-life father when he was fourteen-years-old left Thomas focused on father issues throughout his life. Even as Secretary of State he competed rather unsuccessfully with Alexander Hamilton for the favor and support, as measured by attention and staff members he could hire, of the "father of the country"—George Washington. It should be remembered that Washington, who had no children of his own, referred to his junior officers and cabinet officials as his "family." Jefferson was ambivalent about his pro-British mother—upon her death in 1776 he had an incapacitating migraine headache for two weeks keeping him from his revolutionary commitments. He preferred his women to be weak and dependent. Albert Gallatin's (Secretary of the Treasury) suggestion that Jefferson appoint a woman to a high position was met with the response that that neither the country nor he was ready for this (Lee Shneidman is my source). Yet, Jefferson needed a woman desperately. It would have been most unusual if someone so responsive to women would not have entered into close relationships with a successor to his wife. His being a great charmer, a great talker on a one-to-one basis, does not lessen this overwhelming emotional need.

To David Felix, a biographer of Keynes, Marx, and Rathenau, accounts of Jefferson's life provide a classic case of denial by both the public and most biographers. The facts lay near the surface, but the pious stubbornly and counterfactually denied Jefferson's humanity. To him, the Jefferson case also emphasizes the amount of denial in all biography and history. As in the Jefferson story, believers persist in denying flaws in their heroes and heroic historic episodes when the facts are similarly easily available—the examples of this are almost endless. The need is for what Professor Felix called "the denial of denial."

The group's attitude to Brodie's *Jefferson* was mixed. First and foremost, there was appreciation for her pioneering psychobiography presenting our third president as a complex human being rather than the epitome of the Enlightenment in action. Investigation of his childhood and emotional needs en-

abled us to better understand his public actions and contradictory beliefs. However, there was also frustration at her tendency to add psychoanalytic explanations to fill in gaps where she really does not have adequate explanations. Mary Lambert, strongly supported by Lee Shneidman and this author, was most vocal in stating this viewpoint, partly on the grounds that this inclination to fill in the gaps with theory keeps readers and researchers from digging more deeply for early childhood and other materials.

Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, editor of this publication, is Co-director with Herbert Barry of the University of Pittsburgh of the Psychohistory Forum's Research Group on the Childhood, Personality, and Psychology of Presidents and Presidential Candidates. As a twentieth century psychohistorical presidential historian, he has been researching presidential candidates and presidents since 1976 and teaching about them in New Jersey. He may be contacted at pelovitz@aol.com. □

Probing the Don Imus Media Event

Dan Dervin
Mary Washington University

"Shock-jock" Don Imus's slur on the Rutgers women's basketball team as "nappy-headed hos (prostitutes)" has generated media narratives ranging from free-speech issues to gender and racial stereotyping. Some have evoked the specter of political correctness, while others have pointed to his many celebrity guests as enablers. *New York Times* columnist Frank Rich, portrays Imus as an equal-opportunity bigot who "both kissed up to Dick Cheney and called him a war criminal" ("Everybody Hates Don Imus" *New York Times*, 15 April 07). But there is another very different perspective to take on this media event. This is the paradoxical way a white majority culture appropriates a minority culture's modes. It might be called perverse empowerment and it is my focus as a psychohistorical student of popular culture.

The process extends at least back to minstrel or "darkie" shows at the turn of the last century. Broadway shows like *Showboat* and *Porgy and Bess* were authenticated by African-American im-

agery, and in the 1950s, Elvis Presley transformed the traditional Blues style for a white audience. Another cultural dimension appeared in Norman Mailer's 1957 essay, "The White Negro." The hipster Mailer was defining arises from a fusion of the bohemian, the juvenile delinquent, and the Negro. The latter brought to this equation a sense of danger and risk, of living outside society's laws and conventions, and of pursuing peak experiences through drugs and sex. In effect, Mailer's hipster grafts on to himself the Negro's perceived sexual prowess as his "urban adventurers" pursue ever-greater orgasms (*Dissent*, Summer, 1957, and reprinted in all editions of *Advertisements for Myself*).

Eldridge Cleaver took this construct of a Black *ubermensch* to political extremes when he construed his own progression from raping black to white women as an "insurrectionary act" of symbolic revenge against white oppression (*Soul on Ice*, 1968, p. 14). Acquiescence to these views among white liberals cast a spell that was not broken until Susan Brownmiller's *Against Our Will* (1975). The continuing reticence across cultural and racial lines to speak out against the homophobia and sexism in rap and hip-hop is further testimony to this toxic mix of naiveté and complicity. But among other things the Imus episode exposes that what is accepted in the Black community is much more problematic coming from a white person. These are evidently cultural-linguistic encodings.

With more impunity, today's white suburban teenagers adopt "ghetto" fashions in order to "look cool." But the stage was set long before in 1940s zoot-suits and in the "pimp style" which Tom Wolfe described in 1970. On the street the pimp who thrived by not working was "king" of the job-scarce ghetto. Wolfe cites Thorsten Veblen's "spurious aristocracy" as a "leisure class of bottom dogs devoted to luxury and aristocratic poses" (*Radical Chic and Mau-Mauing the Flak Catchers* [1970], pp. 130-2). Thus the "pimp-style" does not reference pimps per se but the "aristocrats of street hustle." The street hustlers were recognized by their attire and accessories, just as the Black Panthers were by theirs along with their violent street talk of "pigs," "m-fers," and so forth, that were adopted by white radicals (Wolfe, pp. 23-4). Wolfe is not unique in reading encoded cultural trade-offs through fashion and language, but his own hyped-up—indeed hipster—prose

style admirably captured the spirit of the times.

Traces of these bewildering racial exchanges continue to crop up in John Travolta's character in *Saturday Night Fever* (1977), in Warren Beatty's political figure in *Bulworth* (1998) incorporating rap and hip-hop into his campaign rhetoric, and in Clinton's being anointed as the first Black president. There were apparently coded messages in his eating and sexual habits.

Various explanations and rationalizations have been put forth to account for Imus's self-destruction, but a pair of these, no less significant for their being elusive, are admiration and envy. In some warped sense the freedom of Black entertainers to diss (disrespect) gays and women with impunity is an enviable power. White shock jocks would never aspire to become Black or dress Black or pass as Black, but they do want to access the perceived potency of Black entertainers and to don their aggressive verbal style. As the adoption of Black slang is still a way of being hip, cool, and sexy, it is no doubt intended both as a token of macho credentials and an oblique tribute. Imus initially dismissed his lapse as merely "rapping," but the ensuing brouhaha amounted to a kind of racial outing (Imus quoted in Randy Kennedy, "Hey, That's (Not) Funny," *New York Times*, 15 April 07).

When he rapped on "hos," it was understood he meant whores, but "nappy-headed" is more ambiguous. The dictionary associates nappy with nap, i.e., downy or kinky hair, but also includes the English term for diaper. This stirs post 9/11 associations with a southern congressman's disparagingly label of turbans as diapers. From TV clips, I don't recall the Rutgers team as wearing headbands, so the epithet would be purely racial, though at least one player was white. At most, there may have been some carry-over of collective anxiety about Islamic terrorists. It is also true that the country has been reeling from an epidemic of apologies coming from people like Paul Wolfowitz and Alberto Gonzales. But Don Imus was the first to suffer consequences, perhaps as the delegated scapegoat for the group in the face of an intense media feeding frenzy.

These reflections on the place of the Imus affair in the 2007 emotional life of America are intended to encourage additional psychohistorical discussion of popular culture.

Daniel Dervin, PhD, writes prolifically on a variety of psychohistorical subjects from literature to popular culture. His books include Enactments, Matricentric Narratives, and Father Bosetti in America. He is a professor emeritus of literature at Mary Washington University and a Research Associate of the Psychohistory Forum who may be contacted at ddervin@umw.edu. □

Thirty Years of the International Psychohistorical Association

David R. Beisel
SUNY – RCC

In 1978 at the "First Annual Convention" of the International Psychohistorical Association (IPA) there were skeptics who thought the "annual" might be premature. They wondered if after the delivery of the backlog of the psychologically oriented papers if there would be a need for a second conference. Thirty years later the IPA continues its work with its annual meetings in Manhattan.

As chair of the First Convention's I was too busy to think much about the prospect of failure. I organized things as in a jazz improvisation, underestimating the hurdles to be overcome and what an overwhelming amount of work was involved. Fortunately, I had the help and support of many energetic, enthusiastic, and talented colleagues. In addition, I was encouraged by pioneering psychohistory panels and papers I had witnessed at the American Historical Association meetings since 1970 and at the first-ever psychohistory conference held in the fall of 1976 outside of Atlantic City at Stockton State College, followed by Adelphi University psychohistory meetings a year later.

As an academic I was familiar with annual meetings of the American Historical Association and other professional groups. Knowing they'd always met at one hotel or another, I thought along similar lines, retaining The Holiday Inn on Manhattan's West 57th Street as the least expensive option. The convention fee – \$25 as I recall – was just enough to cover expenses.

Like traditional scholarly conferences we had rigid schedules, wore professional attire – ties and suits for men, pants suits or dresses for women. Our

founder, Lloyd deMause, insisted on "strict time limits of twenty minutes per presenter" and I deferred to his judgment. Toward the end of each presentation, students I recruited held up large signs reading: "Five minutes," "Two minutes," and "Time!" Group discussion was also restricted. Howard Stein's "Judaism As a Group Fantasy," an extremely controversial and energizing paper, created a furor and colleagues were frustrated by our time restraints.

The rigid restrictions had multiple functions. Beyond keeping us on schedule they contained some very powerful feelings. The convention's Our Group Process Analysts – John Hartman and Alice Eichholz – suggested at the final Group Process session on the last day that our collective fantasy was of the "Bar-Mitzvah-Boy-in-a-Suit" on his very best behavior.

Hartman's "Bar-Mitzvah-Boy" image was quite apt since some felt and acted as if we were in a race to achieve respectability. My essay for *The Journal of Psychohistory's* "Special IPA Convention Issue" – distributed to participants – was called "From History to Psychohistory: A Personal Journey." It detailed my own struggles with accepting the premises and approaches of psychohistory and offered a path for others to do the same, as related to me by various colleagues through the years.

Not only was our work beginning to encounter opposition from historians in general, the IPA in particular was being criticized by the newly formed "rival," American-Historical-Association affiliated Group for the Use of Psychology in History (GUPH), which was engaged in its own quest for respectability, part of which took the form of defining itself as the "responsible" psychohistorians as against the IPA. Although a few of us joined GUPH and maintained simultaneous membership in both organizations, many on "our side" seemed to be acting out an interpretation of our own, one advanced and endorsed by IPA's influentials, that "All groups split" and that we were therefore powerless to do anything about it. (The argument was often couched in terms of the psychohistory of early psychoanalysis.) Whatever the many reasons for our tendency to reject the valid criticisms from non-psychological historians and GUPH alike – that is, to give in to our anger and other impulses and abandon mature bridge building – we seemed all too ready to reenact one of psychoanalysis's most self-defeating early traumas, some-

how "validating" ourselves in a similar if awkward and self-defeating way.

Through the years I have been to all the IPA convention except when I have had to take time off for heart and gall bladder surgeries. This gives me more perspective than most participants. Reflecting on thirty years of a group's life means paying attention to what is forgotten, known, and suppressed. It is a time to illuminate and celebrate, as we pursue our goal of teasing out the realities amidst the fantasies.

Nothing's perfect under the sun of course, and some of us hoped for far too much from, and for, the IPA, so like all groups, it was bound to let us down. Predictably, each convention heard us making the same self-castigating complaints: "We're doing something wrong." "Why aren't there more women in attendance?" "Why aren't there more black members?" "Where is Mary, Jay, or Alice? They were here last year, why not this year?" We'd periodically emerge from that collective trance when somebody would step forward (it was often Mel Kalfus) to remind us that the IPA was the only organization they knew which expected perfect attendance year-on-year.

Several other tensions emerged, waxing and waning in importance, under the surface, unresolved. They included tensions between the more inclusive Big Tent psychohistorians and the more limiting Little Tent psychohistorians, with a few "Lean To" psychohistorians thrown in, some of great influence, who'd listen attentively and then announce that the only real psychohistory was the kind they were doing.

A second tension existed between those who stressed critically analyzed well-researched papers of detailed scholarship based on authenticated sources and those whose papers tended to be less laden with redundant proofs, more theoretical, creative, and freewheeling, prone (as some saw it) to leaps of untenable logic. Big Tent psychohistorians struggled to make room for them all. What made that a little more possible was the return of "Bar-Mitzvah-Boy-in-a-Suit" when Bernard Flicker moved our Third Convention to City University of New York's Lehman College. Virtually every convention since has been held at an institution of higher learning such as the CUNY Graduate Center, Fordham Law School, and New York University.

Early on we found ways of driving people away, then wondered why the size of the IPA always remained about the same despite our regularly attracting new members. Ignoring the fact that stasis is something of a normal process for all groups (one million people take up golf every year, one million abandon it) it must be said that our complicit silences and rationalizations allowed acting out in ways that offended many good people. At one convention two so-called group analysts, for example, met the moderate criticisms and suggestions offered by well meaning people by repeatedly saying to them, "You want to be fed!" (Five or six founding members along with an unknown number of first time attendees left after that one.) Claiming, for example, that we're student-friendly then scheduling student panels in such a way as to ensure that not a single person would show up for them. (The students never returned.) Humiliating conference participants in public by telling them they needed psychotherapy. Or repeating or implying the mantra that non-psychological historians, and other scholars, are stupid or inadequate. (Why would any of them come back?)

Still, most conventions saw most people enjoying good papers and good fellowship most of the time, and the examples I've given, while accurate, may be considered unfortunate if isolated anecdotes. Yet, over the long haul and taken together I think they've exacted their toll. Merely dismissing them with the phrase, "All groups are imperfect" cannot erase their consequences nor should they be ignored as a real part of the IPA narrative.

Some of my continuing journey from history to psychohistory has been a fascinating lesson in the ways psychological insight can be used to avoid psychological insight. Whenever someone wanted to get to the bottom of what was happening, the question was often dismissed with the rationalization that psychohistory automatically produces adverse affects in others, and that it isn't for everyone – particularly academics – and that the academic scholars who reject us have always rejected us, and that we don't need those who don't want us.

A glance at the affiliations of almost all first-year convention attendees shows instead an overwhelming connection to colleges and universities. It raises the issue of who's been doing the rejecting, and despite the continuing criticism, skepticism, and

unfair open hostility that psychological history still sometimes provokes; successful bridge building is still possible.

It seems to me that our organization has also been living some interesting fictions, neither mentioned nor critically examined. One is the word "International." Our many valued international members have made excellent contributions over the years, but we need to ask how "international" is a society that in thirty years has never met abroad and only once outside the safety of New York City?

A second fiction is that everyone fully understands that the IPA and the Institute for Psychohistory exist as separate entities. Despite all the energy spent in pointing this out, people still conflate the two, often calling IPA "deMause's group." This is partly because the organization was originally his idea and partly because of his prominence in it. Yet Lloyd deMause has rightly insisted from the beginning that the Institute be kept scrupulously separate from the IPA and has always resisted the call that IPA membership, like most other professional organizations, carry with it a subscription to a scholarly publication, namely *The Journal of Psychohistory*. His position is reasonable considering his journal is part of his Institute, not the IPA. Why both remain synonymous in many people's minds then, or how the notion continues to be erroneously promoted, have never been looked into, yet from the IPA's standpoint it's important to do so. The fantasy that Institute and IPA are one, and the fiction that everyone fully understands they are not, may be counterproductive given the realities that there's more to psychohistory than the Institute, more even than the IPA, and that claims made for the Institute's far-flung network of international branches, which, some feel exist mostly on paper, may tend to work against the IPA's best interests.

A third fiction is that all the provisions of the IPA Constitution continue to be respected and carried out. I remember with great admiration Henry Lawton's prodigious efforts in constructing and writing our constitution and the many hours founding members spent in discussing its form and substance. It's distressing to see parts of it so often abrogated, misused, and casually forgotten without causing so much as a ripple of concern.

In the end these faults and peculiarities may not matter much. The Association has provided a

sense of belonging for many isolated scholars and, importantly, a venue for those of like mind to meet regularly to present their findings. Our convention – our centerpiece – has become something of an institution, we expect it to magically appear and reappear this year and the next.

In thinking about our past accomplishments, it's clear that what's never been said or what's been dismissed, what's consciously and unconsciously forgotten, along with the pretenses we've been living with all, need mentioning since we claim to be in the reality business. Calling things by their real name and acknowledging some of what's gone wrong means nothing less than trying to write an intellectually and emotionally honest IPA narrative. If it's mundane to say that our self-defeating ways need to be examined if they're ever to be remedied, it's no less true. Maybe they deserve to be discussed elsewhere in a variety of places including the next International Psychohistorical conference.

David Beisel, PhD, is Professor of Social Sciences at SUNY—Rockland Community College where he has taught psychohistory to over 6,000 students. Former editor of the Journal of Psychohistory and twice president on the International Psychohistorical Association, he is also a Contributing Editor to Clio's Psyche. His book The Suicidal Embrace: Hitler, the Allies, and the Second World War has just gone into its second printing. Professor Beisel may be contacted at dbeise@sunyrockland.edu. □

Organizing International Psychohistory

Paul H. Elovitz
Clio's Psyche

On the eighth of June in 1978, there was extraordinary excitement at the first International Psychohistorical Association (IPA) convention held at Manhattan's Coliseum Holiday Inn. There was a sense of history in the making as a mostly youthful group of scholars met to apply psychoanalysis and other varieties of psychology to history and society. My recollection is that Harvard professor emeritus William Langer, who had called for psychohistory in his 1957 American Historical Association Presidential Address, wrote to give his blessing to our en-

deavor. Some attendees were veteran psychohistorians but most were fairly new to the field.

My own introduction to psychoanalysis and psychohistory had occurred while I was a faculty member at Temple University in 1968 even before I finished my doctoral degree. I felt close to the planners of the conference as a Contributing Editor of the *Journal of Psychohistory* and Co-chair of the Saturday Workshop Program of the Institute for Psychohistory.

Lloyd deMause, chairman of the organizing committee, inaugurated our first meeting early in the morning. His credentials to be the founding IPA president were impressive: he was a veteran psychohistorian who had authored the path-breaking essay, "The Evolution of Childhood," and founded the Institute for Psychohistory, the Psychohistory Press, and the *Journal of Psychohistory*. Many listened with rapt attention to his every word and welcomed his ideas, such as the IPA becoming a self-analytic group.

The idea of Group Process Analytic sessions at the end of each day seemed brilliant and worked quite well at the inaugural meetings of our group. It was in the hands of John Hartman, a most serious scholar of group processes. He had already published on the subject and had taught group process at Harvard and then the University of Michigan. As co-leader he wisely chose Alice Eichholz for reasons beyond two heads being better than one: amidst female conversation in the ladies' room and elsewhere Alice could pick up seemingly throw-away comments expressing fantasies and feelings. (It is noteworthy that women were only two of the 35 listed presenters.)

In those early years of my own psychoanalytic training and personal and group analysis, I was learning about the difference between my conscious thoughts and my unconscious fantasies and feelings. At the Institute for Psychohistory we had carefully read Bion, *et al.*, learning that there is plenty of craziness within groups and that groups often choose their most disturbed member as leader. Yet, in those first meetings, I saw little evidence of this. Overwhelmingly, we were just so happy to be there, soaking up psychohistorical knowledge and comradeship. At the time I was learning new things in almost every session, as well as finding lots to disagree with—further enlarging my knowledge. (I assiduously took notes

so that I could bring new knowledge back to my classroom since I had been teaching psychohistory courses since 1972.)

David Beisel, with some of his students from SUNY as helpers, organized the conference with great efficiency and energy. At the final Group Process session John Hartman's analysis was that the colleagues at the first IPA were behaving in the manner of a "Bar-Mitzvah-Boy" dressed in his best holiday clothes with his motorcycle jacket hidden in the closet. Participants were so appreciative of wonderful new materials and exciting people they were encountering that there seemed no reason to act otherwise. Even Howard Stein's thought provoking and controversial presentation, "Judaism as a Group Fantasy," was accepted without the outcry it produced when it was published in the *Journal of Psychohistory* (Volume 6, Number 2) when some colleagues dropped out of the IPA and had their names removed as Contributing Editors of the *Journal*.

The "Bar-Mitzvah-Boy" analogy and the focus on Stein's presentation on Judaism brings up the issue of the question of psychohistory's relationship to Jews and Judaism. Though the IPA's founding president, convention chair, and one out of two group process analysts were Christians, Jewish issues were on the minds of some attendees, many of whom were Jewish. This was partly because the model of Freud's establishment of psychoanalysis concerned various planners and participants. In an intensely anti-Semitic world Sigmund Freud had to struggle with the resistance to psychoanalysis as a "Jewish science." On the other hand, respect for the intellectual contributions of Jews was so intense that at least one early leader wondered if his ideas would be taken more seriously if he were Jewish.

The IPA presenters overwhelmingly came from universities in North America or abroad. Though the largest number came from East Coast (NY-7, PA-3, CT-2, NJ-2, MA-2, M-1, and MD-1), they also came from the Midwest (OH-2, MI-2, MN-1, WI-1), FL, KS, Texas, California (3), and abroad (Germany-2, Israel, and New Zealand). (Note that the geography of one presenter could not be established.) There were far more women among the audience than among the presenters. Since approximately ten of the presenters did not attend after the first year, this is one indication that the positive feelings were not universally held. For example, Law-

rence J. Friedman, who became an outstanding psychobiographer of Karl Menninger and Erik Erikson, was among those not returning. (Robert Coles, the famous scholar of childhood, was briefly present at an early IPA meeting, never to return.) My realization of a growing sense of "us" versus "them" occurred the week after our convention when I attended, also in Manhattan, the inaugural International Society for Political Psychology (ISPP) meetings at a large hotel. There I felt I was somehow being disloyal to our IPA and Institute group, and left after an hour or so. In subsequent years I have enjoyed the ISPP meetings, especially because they were reasons to travel around the country and the world (Amsterdam; Barcelona; Copenhagen; Tel Aviv, Toronto) and see colleagues who, for whatever reason, had dropped out of the IPA. Fortunately, I have been able to get several to return. A further reason for appreciating this group, as well as the Association for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, is that my expectations of these groups were much less, thus I was subject to far fewer disappointments.

One of my regrets regarding the IPA is that our national and international standing has been limited by virtue of our being a New York City centered group. While it is true that my two-year presidency began in the nation's capital in 1988, this was our only excursion outside of the nation's most populous city. Without success I tried to change the geography of our group by sponsoring an amendment to our constitution requiring alternate year meetings in another location. My proposal was accepted, with a clause vitiating its meeting by adding something along the lines of "when practical." My personal schedule has certainly benefited from this arrangement since I have been able to attend all thirty of our meetings while still teaching summer school, seeing patients, and sleeping in my own bed rather than that of an expensive hotel. In fact, those few colleagues who have never missed a convention are all residents of metropolitan New York.

Despite the enormous pride I feel in the IPA achievements of the last 30 years, as I reflect back on why the IPA did not achieve its full potential several reasons predominate. Many talented psychosocial colleagues were resistant or ambivalent, as was Erik Erikson, to the use of the term psychohistory and even the very idea of psychohistorical associations. Rivalries were already developing between those as-

sociated with GUPH and the *Psychohistory Review* and those associated with the Institute for Psychohistory, the IPA, and the *Journal of Psychohistory*. The IPA became associated with the scientific study of society and fantasy analysis, which were anathema to most historians and psychoanalysts. Indeed, even Lloyd deMause has often spoken about the resistance within the IPA to these ideas. This internal resistance is part of the reason why after six of the first seven IPA presidents had doctoral degrees in history, the subsequent presidents have come from other fields.

Next, there is the issue of Group Process sessions. Though for the first dozen years I keenly advocated and even led the Group Process Analysis sessions, I increasingly came to view them as destructive to the group. At them newcomers from afar often felt that their needs were ignored, they were walking into old family fights, or that they were in the middle of a group therapy session where there were no rules or safeguards for the participants. Consequently, some never returned. (For the pros and cons of group process read the articles by David Beisel, Lloyd deMause, John Hartman, Henry Lawton, and me in the "IPA Group Process Symposium" in *Clio's Psyche* Vol. 11, No. 3 [December 2004], pp. 77-87).

In reading these reasons explaining the failure of our group to grow, the reader should not lose sight of its enormous accomplishments and value. The International Psychohistorical Convention empowered many colleagues. In our minds, and to a lesser extent in reality, it transformed psychohistory from a regional East and West Coast movement to a national and international movement. It created a vital network of colleagues with common interests. Personally, it helped me withstand the assaults on psychohistory that I faced within academia, including at my college, which was designed to be interdisciplinary but where combining psychoanalysis with history was (and is) suspect in the eyes of many. (My reaction to Ramapo's partial retreat from interdisciplinarity was not to flow with the disciplinary tide, but rather in 2002 to proudly have my title changed to "Associate Professor of History, Psychohistory, and Interdisciplinary Studies" and to continue to write *Pioneers of Insight: The Makers and Making of Psychohistory*.)

In the 1970s psychohistory created two international organizations (the ISPP and the IPA), and two smaller organizations: the Group for the Use of

Psychology in History (GUPH) within the American Historical Association and the Institute for Psychohistory. It also had and has the Wellfleet Group still meeting at Robert Jay Lifton's summer home on Cape Cod as an invitation-only organization. For publication it had the Psychohistory Press and four publications: *The History of Childhood Quarterly* (now *The Journal of Psychohistory*), *Psychohistory Review*, and *Psychohistory* (formerly *The Newsletter of the IPA* and now *Psychohistory News*) (which I once co-edited with Henry Lawton), and *Political Psychology*. These and other scholarly journals and organizations have empowered many to enrich the psychohistorical paradigm. Helping to grow this field has been a mind-altering experience.

Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, editor of this publication, welcomes reminiscences for his book, Pioneers of Insight: The Makers and Making of Psychohistory, and may be contacted at pelovitz@aol.com. □

*[Editor's Note: In anticipation of the thirtieth annual meeting of the International Psychohistorical Association, I suggested that there be a session devoted to reminiscences of our inaugural gathering with discussion of the future prospects of psychohistory. It turned out to be difficult to locate colleagues who were at the initial meeting in 1978 and, regrettably, those who were not regular IPAers that I could make contact with had conflicting obligations. In the end those present were Lloyd deMause, Henry Lawton, and me. (David Beisel was scheduled to attend but an unanticipated medical issue, from which he is completely recovered, prevented his attendance. His full-length article was distributed at the meeting.) Soon after the announcement of the session, Bill Hewitt, the editor of Psychohistory News: The Quarterly Newsletter of the IPA, invited us to write on the issue which we did, along with Howard Stein who this year could not make the trip from Oklahoma (Volume 25, Issue 4 [Winter 2007], pp. 7-9). However, space restrictions necessitated that he cut down the two long articles to approximately 500 words each. Though Hewitt generously was willing to have David Beisel and I reprint the third of our articles published earlier this year under his auspices, in keeping with the policy of this journal we rewrote those sections. We encourage letters to the editor and articles on these subjects by additional colleagues. Also, reminiscences of the *Psychohistory Forum* would also be of interest.] □*

Book Review

The Heroic Myth and Impact of Erik Erikson

Leon Rappoport
Kansas State University

Review of Daniel Burston, Erik Erikson and the American Psyche: Ego, Ethics, and Evolution, New York: Jason Aronson, 2005, paperback, ISBN-13: 978-0-7657-0495-5, 244 pages, \$29.95, hardcover, \$79.95.

One of the things I found most surprising and instructive about this excellent account of Erikson's (1902-1994) life and work is how often it reminded me of Joseph Campbell's (1904-1987) archetypal "myth of the hero." Thus, in accord with the first phase of Campbell's scenario, Erikson had an unusual childhood. He was born out of wedlock in 1902 in Germany and raised as a Jew by his mother and stepfather, Theodore Homberger. Erik suffered the standard anti-Semitic taunts of his schoolmates, while at the same time his blond, blue-eyed Viking appearance led some Jews to label him a "goy" (a Christian). Upon graduating from Gymnasium, the bright, sensitive, artistically inclined youth fulfilled the mythic exploratory phase by wandering around Europe until a chance encounter in his mid-twenties put him in touch with a power figure that defined his future life path. That person was Anna Freud, who took him on to assist in her work with troubled children. In Campbell's third phase, the hero "finds himself." Erikson gained self-affirming success by becoming a full-fledged analyst certified by the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute. He married the attractive young Canadian-American love of his life, and in that ominous year of 1933, moved to the New World that would be the site of his creative contributions to the understanding of human behavior. I might even push the hero myth a bit further by suggesting that he brought with him to the inhabitants of the New World some fire (psychoanalytic theory) from a God of the Old World, and in the 1960s was celebrated by them for adjusting the theory to their needs. But hold! As psychohistorians have often demonstrated,

heroes run a substantial risk of becoming sacrificial objects, and Erikson was not immune. By the mid-seventies his work was being criticized as implicitly sexist, Eurocentric, and conservative, and he was accused of concealing his Jewish background by changing his name from Homberger to Erikson.

Daniel Burston has examined Erikson's life story in a remarkably fine book. At first glance, it could be dismissed as "psychobiography light," because although it provides a useful biographical narrative, there is very little about his relations with his wife and children, not much about how he got along with friends and students, except that they all liked him, nothing about his sex life, and one can't even tell if he drank, smoked, or liked to go to the movies. However, for such material Burston generously refers readers to Lawrence Friedman's detailed biography of Erikson, as well as works by Paul Roazen and others.

By contrast, as indicated by his book title, Burston has gone after bigger, and in many ways, more interesting game. His book offers something like a psychohistorically informed, anthropological study of Erikson's central role in adding a cornucopia of neo-Freudian perspectives to American culture. These include not only widely accepted concepts like adolescent identity crisis and psychosocial stages of development, but also a set of adaptive ego qualities defining healthy progress through the life cycle. And there is hardly any work accomplished in the area of psychohistory and psychobiography that has not directly or indirectly benefited from his studies of Martin Luther and Gandhi. Indeed, it is partly due to these studies that many traditionally trained historians now recognize the importance of considering psychosocial factors in their research, even if some of them refuse to admit it. In general, Burston correctly notes that neo-Freudian ideas about relationships between culture, personality and historical events were promulgated in America by a number of other theorists, particularly Erich Fromm, but none of them had the impact of Erikson's 1950 book *Childhood and Society*. It is arguable that this book, along with Adorno's *The Authoritarian Personality*, also published in 1950, probably contributed more to what has been called "the Americanization of psychoanalysis" than anything else. Anna Freud must have seen the signs of immanent theoretical disloyalty in Erikson's book because she claimed not to understand it.

Her attitude was shared by most of those in the orthodox psychoanalytic establishment, and in a particularly noteworthy discussion, Burston explains that Erikson was able to remain in good standing with them by frequently proclaiming his loyalty to Freud while arguing that if he were still alive, he would surely accept the necessity of expanding his theory. Consequently, unlike R.D. Laing, Erich Fromm, and others who openly challenged or criticized the Freudian corpus, Erikson appeared conciliatory even while undermining and/or de-emphasizing such cherished Freudian concepts as childhood sexuality, the neurotic nature of dreams, and the maladaptive quality of most instinctive behaviors— notions that were among the most difficult for Americans to accept. In this connection, Burston makes it clear that Erikson differed from many émigré European intellectuals because he genuinely liked American society and was enthusiastic about the fundamental value it placed on redemptive individual change, as well as cultural change. His theory of the life cycle, for example, suggested that unresolved problems at a given stage of development could be dealt with effectively in one or more later stages. Although Erikson recognized the significance of the past, this typically American present and future orientation also shows up in his psychobiographies of Luther and Gandhi.

Burston's concise, insightful and convincing discourse about these issues and how they relate to the complex history of psychoanalysis in America is admirable. Having written four prior books and a number of articles on this topic, his mastery of the subject matter is not surprising, but readers will also appreciate that he writes about it in a lively, jargon free fashion. These qualities are manifest throughout the book, and they show up to particular advantage in a final ten-page chapter titled "Erikson's Erasure." But although it might well pass muster as a stylish *New Yorker* article, it seems to me that in contrast to the prior chapters, most of the views confidently expressed in this one are problematic and, in certain respects, distressingly superficial. The general conclusion asserted here is that Erikson's major theoretical and scholarly achievements—the mapping of the life cycle, the contributions to neo-Freudian theory, and the promulgation of psychobiography and psychohistory—were all at their height in the sixties and early seventies, but are now largely forgotten or seen as irrelevant, because our present socio-cultural milieu is so different from what it was then.

The milieu is certainly different, yet based on my recent teaching experience, it is my impression that most college courses in developmental psychology today are still implicitly or explicitly organized along the lines of Erikson's life cycle framework. Furthermore, college students aiming for careers in the helping professions can hardly avoid exposure to one or another variation of Erikson's developmental schema. Even though Burston is correct to cite changes in the norms and technologies associated with childrearing, and family life in general, I would argue that Erikson is still directly relevant to contemporary bio-psychosocial descriptions of the life cycle.

Burston's claim that Erikson's contributions to neo-Freudian theory are irrelevant today seems largely based on his view "that the influence of psychoanalysis as a whole on American culture has declined dramatically." True enough, but I think it is arguable that since much of Erikson's work was critical of traditional psychoanalytic theory and practice, he deserves some credit for its decline. Furthermore, his emphasis on the important role of historical and cultural factors in the formation and growth of the ego appears directly relevant to contemporary clinical and theoretical concerns with development of "the self." In short, if one looks beneath the semantics to the conceptual substance of present day psychology and psychiatry, one can see a good many of Erikson's neo-Freudian ideas.

Finally, Burston suggests that because psychohistory has not lived up to its earlier promise of becoming a robust, independent discipline, Erikson's path breaking work in the field is not widely known or appreciated today. The only problem I have with this bit of conventional wisdom is that it is too conventional. That is, it fails to discuss the extent to which psychohistorical and biographical perspectives have migrated into mainstream history, political science, and social psychology, a development that Erikson encouraged, and secondly, the fact that while psychohistory has not thrived as a separate scholarly discipline, it has certainly persisted and has steadily gained recognition as a significant field of study.

But none of my remarks are meant to imply that Burston wishes to throw the Eriksonian baby out with the psychoanalytic and psychohistorical bathwater. On the contrary, his treatment of Erikson throughout the book, as well as in this erasure chapter, is always sympathetic; I just wish he had in-

cluded more discussion of the points noted above. Oddly enough, despite his conclusions about the reduced status of psychohistory, I believe his book deserves high praise for providing a valuable psychohistorical account of the recent history of both psychoanalysis and psychohistory.

Leon Rappoport, PhD, took his doctoral degree in psychology at the University of Colorado in 1963, had a National Science Foundation postdoctoral fellowship for study at Oslo University, and then joined the faculty at Kansas State University where he was named Professor Emeritus upon his retirement in 2003. Author of numerous research papers in social psychology and psychohistory, his books include: *Personality Development* (1972), *The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behavior* (1980; 1994) co-authored with George Kren, *How We Eat: Appetite, Culture, and the Psychology of Food* (2003), and *Punchlines: the Case for Racial, Ethnic and Gender Humor* (2005). Rappoport may be contacted at rappo@ksu.edu. □

Letter to the Editor

Dear Editor,

It was good to see my essay, "Forging My New Identity As a Holocaust Researcher" published in the March 2007 issue of Clio's Psyche, but I thoroughly regret the omission of the programs *Facing History and Ourselves: Holocaust and Human Behavior* and *Action Reconciliation / Service for Peace*. This was to be my tribute to these groups I have been associated with and greatly admire. *Facing History* has extensive programs in the US to help teachers promote tolerance and civic responsibility in children. *Action Reconciliation* is one of various alternatives to military service available to young Germans who have a national service obligation. It allows them to work with Holocaust survivors.

Best regards,

Flora Hogman

Flora Hogman, PhD, a hidden child during the Holocaust, is a psychologist in private practice in New York City. She may be contacted at florahl1@verizon.net.

[Editor's Note: We regret that this omission came to our attention at a point when we would have had to delay our issue for a week and incur considerable additional expense to restore this material.] □

In Memoriam: Isaac Ziemán

**Eva Fogelman
Psychologist and Psychoanalyst
and Paul Elovitz
Psychohistory Forum Director**

On April 2 the retired psychoanalyst Isaac Zelig Ziemán (1920-2007) died at home with his wife by his side, after an extraordinary battle for life in the face of major heart disease, severe anemia, and a diagnosis of pancreatic cancer made in the previous June. His will to live to carry on his work of the reconciliation of Germans and Jews, Palestinians and Israelis, and others who would turn their own suffering into murderous, genocidal hatreds, kept him alive well after his body had long since past the normal point of human endurance. Indeed, his January 27th presentation, "Jewish and Universal Lessons from the Holocaust," to the Psychohistory Forum was but an intermission from a hospitalization caused especially by his body's failure to absorb nutrients. Ziemán had previously survived near-death situations in his native Latvia under the Nazis, as a Soviet soldier sent to the Battle of Stalingrad, through starvation as a forced laborer in the Soviet gulag, and in traveling under assumed identities in Stalinist Russia later in World War II. Even this skilled survivor's will to live to carry out his mission of making this a better world could go on for only so long.

On May 6, 1920 Isaac Zelig was born as first of four children to the Ziemán family in the *shtetl* (small, tradition Jewish community) of Livani in Latvia. His middle class, Yiddish-speaking orthodox Jewish family owned a small grocery store. As a ten-year-old Isaac joined Gordonia, a Zionist-socialist youth group with its plans for European Jews to move to Palestine to create a modern Hebrew-speaking Jewish homeland. This commitment created tension with his family. His dreams of creating a just, secular state in the Biblical land of "milk and honey" would be a major motivation in his life.

Fate was not kind to the 93,000 Latvian Jews. The Russians invaded and occupied their country in 1940 and the Germans invaded it a year later. Upon the later invasion Isaac joined a group of anti-Hitler partisans, which soon collapsed. He then fled to the part of Russia that was not yet occupied and enlisted

in the Soviet Army. His fleeing Latvia would in the end save his life since it kept him out of the reach of the Nazis genocidal machine—though it should be kept in mind that ultimately more people died at the hands of Stalin than Hitler. The World War II date of May 13, 1942, when Stalin decreed that people born in “capitalist” (noncommunist) countries could no longer fight in the Red Army, changed his life. He was transferred from Stalingrad to forced labor in a Siberian coal mine. This decree may have saved his life, as he was about to fight in the battle for Stalingrad where the victorious Soviet Army suffered over a million casualties.

Conditions in the Soviet forced labor camp were horrendous. When due to meager rations he was on the verge of exhaustion and starvation, Isaac was sent to the infirmary where his food provisions were cut: he begged for food to stay alive. After a few months authorities in Moscow gave permission for him to travel to Kyrgyzstan, a Central Asian Soviet Republic, where he worked in a variety of jobs including laboring on a small collective farm. When he became depressed and went to a Soviet psychiatrist, he was encouraged to find a direction in life, a goal. His secret plan was to escape the Soviet Union and establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

After he was mobilized to work in a military factory, at night he studied Polish from a book. Again, he volunteered for the Soviet Army which he subsequently deserted, devising a purely fictional story of being a Pole on the way to Poland. After numerous interrogations by the Soviet police he was referred to a group of Poles heading to their homeland to join the Polish army. In all he assumed five different identities to help him navigate through the murderously troubled waters of the Second World War. In the Polish army he taught soldiers how to operate a tank and rose to the rank of sergeant. (For someone who never in his life even had a driver's license, this was quite a feat.) After the collapse of Nazi Germany he went west, working for the Gordonia organization in displaced persons (DP) camps in Austria and Germany to assist other Holocaust survivors to prepare to emigrate to Palestine. He felt destined to join them and live on a Kibbutz growing oranges until he discovered that his entire family was murdered, prompting a severe depression. After a year, and being unable to work, he again reached out for professional help. (At different points in his life he would struggle with depression, which he com-

bated with “love and a hundred years of psychotherapy.”)

When Zieman fully realized the usefulness of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis he changed his path and life's mission. He studied psychoanalysis in Munich and in 1955 married for the second time – he had a brief earlier marriage. The couple immigrated to the United States where they had a son and daughter.

Zieman had plunged into the depth of despair when he realized the extent of his losses, yet he refused to continue living his life feeling like a victim. He channeled his survivor experiences, guilt, and skills into a meaningful and constructive life. His drive to help his downtrodden fellow human beings manifested itself in his activism in the American Civil Rights Movement and other causes. In the early 1960s Isaac met Ruth Cohn, a prominent Berlin-born psychoanalyst in New York City, who had developed “Theme-Centered-Interacton” (TCI) as a psychological method for encouraging communication in groups. After participating in a yearlong workshop led by Cohn, to test the practicability of the this method, during many summers he conducted TCI training and reconciliation workshops in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Israel. He saw this method of communication as assisting in personal growth, maturation, and respect for others in a manner that encouraged democracy and combated the seduction of totalitarianism. In adapting it to work with Jews and Arabs he fought for Palestinian rights alongside the rights of Jews in Israel.

Isaac was a visionary who was working towards reconciliation between children of Nazis and Holocaust survivors, including the second generation. During one of his workshops in Germany, he met his third wife Ingeborg (Inge) leading to their marriage in 1981. At the memorial service held at the Plaza Chapel on Amsterdam Avenue in Manhattan – attended by 250 mourners – Dr. Flora Hogman noted how Zieman integrated his past into his current life in a positive rather than shameful manner. Holocaust survivors and other individuals traumatized by the horrors of history can respond progressively rather than regressively to their horrific past if they do not get stuck in the early stages of mourning. When one reaches the final phase of mourning, a “search for meaning” starts to emerge and then the possibilities for repairing the world (*tikkun olam* in Hebrew) are

endless. Isaac Ziemán is a role model for resilience despite adversity. His energy, vision, sense of humor, and humanity have inspired others to carry on his work of reconciliation.

Appreciations, connections, beginnings, and endings were enormously important to Isaac. No matter how brief the time he had to speak at meetings, he always expressed his heartfelt appreciation to the people who came. Perhaps people's presence had so much meaning to him as a legacy of the abrupt losses and changes in his life. He also greatly valued the many groups in which he participated. These included the American Academy of Psychotherapists, American Group Psychotherapy Association, Association for Psychoanalytic Self-psychology, the Dialogue Project, The Generation After and Holocaust Survivors Association, Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace, National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, National Institute for the Psychotherapies, Psychohistory Forum, Friends of Yiddish, and the Workshop Institute for Living Learning. Joining and building groups to strengthen that which he valued was a way of combating the sense of loneliness and despair he felt upon learning of the destruction of his immediate and extended family, as well as of the entire Jewish community of Latvia. Humming and singing Yiddish tunes from his childhood and supporting the survival of Yiddish in a world in which most Yiddish speakers were murdered, would serve the same function.

Wherever he went, Isaac was establishing connections and building "community." When he told Flora Hogman, a hidden child of the Holocaust who had lost her entire immediate family, that she reminded him of his sister Tzila, she felt a restored sense of family especially as she shared Passover Seders at his home. Even in his many recent hospitalizations, as he came out of anesthesia, he would groggily chat with the Filipino nurse whose name and life story he had learned and who he introduced to his family. Similarly, according to his son Josh, he seemed to know all the cab drivers and waiters in Manhattan's West Side, as he connected with them in his own tactful, humorous manner. He would not even die without saying goodbye to the members of his men's group who met in his living room a week before his death. These friends of many years were struck by his need to focus on what was happening in their lives even in this process of final leave-taking.

Dr. Herbert Rabin, speaking for the group, remembers Isaac as an "unusually perceptive and compassionate man" who could "confront" the most "delicate of issues" in "a kindly" manner and declaring, "the world needs more Isaac Ziemans."

As a community builder Isaac Ziemán was part of the Reconstructionist movement in New York City, first at the Society for Advancement of Judaism and later at the West End Synagogue. During the memorial service on Yom Kippur he would always sing. His Passover table included strangers who needed a place to celebrate the movement from oppression to liberation – it was the festival that symbolizes his own life.

Isaac Ziemán was such a determined survivor that disappointments did not readily deter him. For example, shortly after joining the Psychohistory Forum about a decade ago, he stated his appreciation for its intellectual work as well as his strong desire to present in our Saturday Work-In-Progress Seminar Program, only to be faced with the reality that he would need to write an original article in English to serve as the work in progress paper to be discussed at the meeting. Clearly, he was disappointed, but it was not easy for him to write about himself. When last fall it became obvious that he was approaching the final stage of life, the Forum made the offer of transcribing if he spoke about what he wanted written. He declined politely and several weeks later sent his "Lessons from the Holocaust" article, which was published in our March issue, which had a special feature with ten articles on the Holocaust prompted by his work.

Though he spoke seven languages (English, German, Hebrew, Latvian, Polish, Russian, and Yiddish – with varying levels of fluency), Isaac Ziemán was not a prolific writer. Fortunately, his almost completed memoir, *From Victim to Peace Builder*, is greatly valued by his family who are working to prepare it for posthumous publication. He touched many lives across several continents in his private practice as a psychotherapist/psychoanalyst, in conducting workshops (and groups) for group leadership skills, personal growth, and reconciliation, and most of all with his frequently shared ideas to build a more peaceful world.

The drive to create a new and better world that propelled Ziemán from the age of ten and for the

next three quarters of a century fits into a Jewish altruistic and millennial tradition. The Jews of Europe were caught amidst conflicting forces including religious anti-Semitism and Nazi racial anti-Semitism, capitalism and socialism (including its communist form), customary beliefs and science, modernity and tradition, and nationalism and internationalism. A powerful response to these forces in the modern era has been the impulse of some Jews to altruistically save others – the world – when Jews themselves have so often desperately needed to be saved. A reflection of this impulse is in Isaac's often saying that "the division of labor in his household was clear, Inge took care of the home and he took care of the world." Incidentally, Ingeborg, who was born a German Christian, last year converted to Judaism and they had remarried in April 2006 in a Jewish ceremony.

We at the Psychohistory Forum would like to express our condolences to Isaac's widow Ingeborg, his children Josh and Mimi, his grandchildren Ari, Noa, Jake, Maya, and Emma, and the innumerable people whose lives he enriched. We would also like to thank Inge, Herb Rabin, and others who helped with the research and writing of this memorial. Isaac Zelig Ziemann will be missed, but his work will be carried on by his co-workers and others he inspired.

Eva Fogelman, PhD, born in a displaced person's camp as the daughter of survivors, is a social psychologist and psychotherapist in private practice in Manhattan. She is co-director of Psychotherapy with Generations of the Holocaust and Related Traumas and Child Development Research. Dr. Fogelman's publications include Conscience and Courage: Rescuers of Jews During the Holocaust (1994) and Children During the Nazi Reign: Psychological Perspectives on the Interview Process (co-editor with Judith Kestenberg, 1994). Dr. Fogelman may be contacted at evafogelman@aol.com. Paul Elovitz, PhD, editor of this publication, teaches a course on the Holocaust, publishes articles and book chapters on this important subject, and has made professional presentations on its pedagogy. He may be contacted at pelovitz@aol.com. □

Articles
are only accepted for publication by
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by experts

Call for Papers

The Psychology, Experience, and the Art of Aging

(Due October 10, 2007)

Some possible approaches include:

- Fantasies and realities of the "golden years"
- Changing self-image, body image, and identity
- Coping with disease, dependency, mental and physical decline: the fear of Alzheimer's
- The search for eternal youth
- The humor of old age and retirement
- Facing narcissistic blows and loss
- Marginalization and infantilization
- Case studies of the aging of famous people
- Intergenerational connections in aging
- Case studies from hospice workers, therapists, and thanatologists
- The impact of small families and geographic dispersion
- Facing the prospect of death

Articles of 500-1500 words (and one long piece) are welcome. Go to our website for a detailed Call for Papers.

Cliospsyche.org

Write pelovitz@aol.com

Clio's Psyche Call for Papers

Presidential Candidates 2008

Papers to be submitted by October 10th for the December 2007 issue

Dear Colleague,

With the 2008 presidential race wide open for both Democrats and Republicans there is a very large field of candidates and an extraordinary amount of interest in the election. This attention is compounded by intense feelings about the war in Iraq and the move to an early selection of the nominees by moving up the primaries to February in major states such as California and New York. The "money race" is so intense that Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack Hussein Obama together raised over 50 million dollars by the beginning of April 2007. Right now the media is focusing on them as well as John Edwards, Rudy Giuliani, John McCain, and Mitt Romney – and maybe-candidates, Al Gore and Fred Thompson. Ethnicity, gender, race, and religion are some of the unusual variety of issues in the primaries. Internet fundraising and the blogosphere are newer, unpredictable influences on the election.

We would like to invite you and other colleagues to probe the subject for the December 2007 issue of *Clio's Psyche: Understanding the 'Why' of Culture, Current Events, History, and Society*. We welcome different types of submissions, including case studies, with psychological insights on a variety of aspects of the election such as:

- Psychobiographical sketches of Clinton, Edwards, Giuliani, Gore, McCain, Obama, Richardson, Romney, and Thompson
- The narcissism of minor differences: hopes and fears for a woman or a racially or ethnically different presidential candidate
- The relationship between the leader and the led in the 2008 election
- Comparing the impacts of Vietnam and Iraq on presidential politics
- Politics as a family/father-son affair: Bushes, Clintons, Gores, and Romneys
- "Half" perhaps more acceptable than whole?—Obama: black father and white mother; Richardson: Mexican mother and American father
- Religion in the campaign: Romney (Mormon), Huckabee (Baptist minister)
- Which candidate(s) can break through political denial on issues such as Iraq, civil liberty abuses, debt, social security, health care, dependence on oil, and global warming
- Life imitating entertainment "art"? —on "West Wing," a Hispanic president; on "Commander in Chief," a woman; and on "24," two African Americans
- Nostalgia for Bill Clinton and his relationship with Hillary
- Perils of verbal (and non-verbal) slips along the campaign trail – for example, George Romney's 1968 "brainwashing" on Vietnam comment; why the media forgives some but not others
- Cycles in American politics
- The mood of the voters—the energized and the stay-at-home non-voters
- Psychobiographical insights from candidates' books and autobiographies

We are seeking articles from 500-1500 words—including your brief biography—by October 10 for our December issue. **Expressions of interest** and preferably an **abstract or outline prior to September 20** are requested to be sent to our Guest Editor for this Special Issue, Bob Lentz, at lentz@telusplanet.net. Articles should be e-mailed as attached Microsoft *Word* documents or rich text format (*.rtf) files. Submissions the editors deem suitable are anonymously refereed. Visit our Web site at www.cliospsyche.org.

Sincerely yours,



Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, Historian, Psychoanalyst, Professor, and Editor, *Clio's Psyche*

BULLETIN BOARD

CONFERENCES: The next **Psychohistory Forum Work-In-Progress Saturday Seminar** will be on **September 29, 2007** when **Paul Elovitz** will present "**Presidential Responses to National Trauma: Bush, Carter, and Nixon.**" The International Federation for Psychoanalytic Education (**IFPE**) will hold its interdisciplinary conference, "The Reach of the Mind," at the Toronto Renaissance Hotel Downtown on October 19-21. The 31st Annual **International Psychohistorical Association (IPA)** will be held in Manhattan in early June, 2008. The 30th Annual IPA meetings was held in Manhattan on June 6-8, 2007 with **Ken Fuchsman** and Paul Elovitz presenting at the Forum sponsored panel, "Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Trauma and Postwar Decision Making." The 2008 **International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP)** conference will be held on July 9-12, 2008 at the **Sciences Po in Paris**. Following that the 2009 conference will be in Dublin at **Trinity College** and the 2010 at the Mark Hopkins Hospital in San Francisco. The 30th annual meetings of ISPP was held in Portland Oregon on July 3-6, 2007 with **David Beisel**, Paul Elovitz, and Ken Fuchsman presented in a Forum sponsored session on trauma, as did **Aubrey Immelman** in another panel. The conference, "Humanistic Psychotherapies for the 21st Century," cosponsored by the Saybrook Graduate School was held on August 14-16, 2007 at the San Francisco Airport Marriott. **PUBLICATIONS:** Congratulations to **Jacques Szaluta** on the republication of his enlarged March 2006 Clio's Psyche teaching article in the Spring 2007 issue of the widely distributed *Kings Pointer* as "Methods and Challenges in Teaching Psychohistory." To **Sophia Richman** on the publication of a Greek translation of her 2002 memoir, *A Wolf in the Attic: The Legacy of a Hidden Child of the Holocaust*. To purchase **Peter Petschauer's** *Der Vater und die SS (The Father and the SS)* e-mail info@weger.net. **NOTES:** **Daniel Burshtein's** *Erik Erikson and the American Psyche: Ego, Ethics and Evolution* (Jason Aronson, 2007) has been nominated for the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis' 11th Annual Gradiva Award for best book in the "History and Theory of Psychoanalysis" category. The winner will be announced in October. On June 4-7 **Herbert Barry** was in Boston celebrating the 55th anniversary of his graduation from Harvard in 1952. **Anna Geifman** has received the Lady Davis Fellowship in Israel and

will be a visiting professor at Hebrew University and will be working on a new conceptual book on the psychology of modern terrorism. She will also be teaching a course on the psychohistory of the Russian Revolution in the first semester and in the second hopes also to lecture at the University of Bar Ilan. **DEATHS:** **Ben Brody**, a psychologist/psychoanalyst and long time member of the Psychohistory Forum died at age 87 on June 17th after a struggle with cancer. David Felix will be writing a memorial for these pages. **Isaac Zieman** died at age 86 on April 2. His obituary may be found on page 33. **OUR THANKS:** To our members and subscribers for the support that makes Clio's Psyche possible. To Benefactors Herbert Barry and Ralph Colp; Patrons David Beisel, Andrew Brink, Mary Lambert, Peter Loewenberg, David Lotto, and Lee (and the late Connalee) Shneidman; Sustaining Members Andrew Brink, Peter Petschauer, and Jacques Szaluta; Supporting Members Fred Alford, Dick Booth, Gilbert Frederick, Rudolph Binion, David Felix, Dominic and Mena Potts, Edryce Reynolds, and Lee Solomon; and Members Ted Goertzel, Irene Javors, Bob Lentz, Richard Morrock, Doris Pfeiffer, Vivian Rosenberg, Howard Stein, Chuck Strozier, and Nancy Unger. Our appreciation to Forum hosts Mary Lambert and Lee Shneidman. Our special thanks for thought provoking materials to Fred Alford, Dan Dervin, Paul Elovitz, Eva Fogelman, Ken Fuchsman, Jim Glass, David Greenberg, Flora Hogman, Philip Langer, David Lotto, Bob Pois, and Leon Rappoport. To Colonial historians Karen O'Brien and Martin Quitt for consulting on Thomas Jefferson. To Cathryn Davis for proofing/editing/Publisher 2003 software application. We wish to thank our numerous referees, who must remain anonymous. □

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Call for Papers

The Psychology and Experience of Facing Death and Dying

(Due January 15, 2008)

Some possible approaches include:

- What constitutes a "good death?"
- The denial of death
- How people prepare to die
- Stages in the process of dying
- The humor of death and dying
- Responses to the death of a loved one
- The treatment of death by the family, professionals, and society
- Intergenerational psychodynamics in facing death and dying and its aftermath
- Death in the cinema -- the films of Ingmar Bergman and others
- Case studies of the death of famous people such as Churchill, Freud, and Jefferson
- The deification in death of Princess Diana, Elvis Presley, *et al.*
- Responses to the death of the hero or tyrant
- Psychological insights on death in literature
- Suicide and assisted suicide
- Suicide in war and terrorism
- Cross cultural approaches to death and dying
- How victims of the Holocaust and other genocides deal with death in their lives
- Case studies from hospice workers, therapists, and thanatologists
- The body after death: autopsy, burial, cremation, and various death rituals
- Reviews of books on death by Nuland, *et al.*

Articles of 500-1500 words (and one long piece) are welcome. Go to our website for a detailed Call for Papers.

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