Crime, Punishment and Incarceration

Fantasies and Realities of Crime, Courts, and Prison

Paul H. Elovitz
Ramapo College and the Psychohistory Forum

Americans are fascinated, and often obsessed, by crime, punishment, and violence.

The local news on television emphasizes murder, child abuse, kidnappings, pedophilia, criminal court cases, and other activities feeding
the viewers’ voyeuristic desire to catch a glimpse of mayhem and to punish those responsible. Network television programs on crime proliferate enormously. Even suspected crimes grab our attention. In the spring and summer of 2001 there has been a national obsession and media circus revolving around the disappearance of Washington intern Chandra Levy. This is despite the absence of any evidence that Congressman Gary Condit or anyone else has committed a crime.

Activities not previously seen as criminal are increasingly brought within the scope of criminality. An example of this was President Clinton’s being charged by the Senate with “high crimes and misdemeanors” for lying about his private sexual life with an intern. In early August the U.S. House of Representatives passed Bill 265-162 banning both private and public human cloning for any purpose whatsoever. Penalties included are a 10-year prison term and a one million dollar fine. (Gia Fenoglio, “Human Cloning: Is it Inevitable?” The Bergen [New Jersey] Record, Aug. 12, 2001, pp. RO 1 & 4)

While statistics showed a consistent decrease in major crime in the 1990s, Americans act as if crime is increasing, pouring more and more resources into the “fight against crime.” Furthermore, they act as if they stand a greater chance of being murdered by some anonymous criminal than of killing themselves while the reality is that suicide is the seventh greatest cause of death compared to tenth for homicide. (In 1998 there were 293,000 suicides compared to 174,000 homicides.) It is noteworthy that disease and accidents are the most significant killers of Americans. (The Statistical Abstract of the United States 2000, pp. 90 & 92)

Greed and passion are the prime motivations of fictional television criminals who tend to be extraordinarily one dimensional in their personalities and motivations. In cases of premeditated murder, there is no sense as to the real psychological obstacles that must be overcome for most people to kill another human being, often a friend or loved one. (Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Costs of Learning to Kill in War and Society, 1995)

The voyeuristic pleasures involved in watching television crime and punishment are enormous. Sitting at home in the comfort of a living room the viewer can simultaneously have the pleasure and “pain” of identifying with the criminal, the victim, the police, the detective, the prose- cutor, the defense attorney, the jury, and the judge.

This issue of Clio’s Psyche is devoted to the psychohistorical and historical understanding of crime, punishment and incarceration. As a psychohistorian I start with the difference between appearance and reality. In appearance, Americans are opposed to the very existence of crime, but the reality is that we are fascinated by crime and focus on it enormously. In theory we want to do everything to decrease crime, while in reality we increase the number of activities deemed to be criminal, thus increasing “crime.” We also send large numbers of young men to prison, where they incline to form a criminal identity and to focus on crime for the next 20 or 30 years of their lives -- thus the revolving door of recidivism.

As psychohistorians we look to the fantasies and emotions that people have about crime. The United States has vast multi-billion dollar industries within the worlds of cinema, print, and television, which thrive by serving our fantasies about crime. Some common crime fantasies we share are of:

- Catching the cunning but deranged killer who threatens our lives and tranquility
- The master detective who outsmarts the criminals
- The hard-bitten private detective who somehow catches the criminals, often despite his client
- The lawyer who defends the innocent and points the finger at the guilty
- The innocent who somehow gets caught up in the middle of crime
- International crime and espionage, including the international mastermind
- The traitor within

As psychohistorians, we follow emotion, especially changes in feelings and their focus. Consciously, Americans seek a safe environment and world. We diet, exercise, get more medical care, have safer sex, spend fortunes on alarm systems, and wear car seat belts and bicycle helmets -- all to live safer and longer lives. Suburban children are sent to all the right places and driven there because we dare not let them walk far in the dangerous world. While building a wall of safety around our loved ones and selves, indeed even living in gated, guarded communities (“Violence in Our Midst,” Clio’s Psyche, June, 1995, pp. 15-17), our fantasies proliferate. Our emotions are focused on dangerous and violent pursuits. For example, NASCAR auto racing, once a southern pursuit, has re-
cently become popular even in the New York metropolitan region. Video games are so violent that they are rated like movies, with children clamoring to play the forbidden ones. "Tough Enough" and "The Ultimate Fighting Championship" on cable television are quite brutal. There have been a number of deaths lately of children killed while they were re-enacting what they viewed on the screen. Television is the great medium for feeding our violent fantasies because it reaches into our homes and our lives more than any other instrument of the imagination and communication. Within the safety of our homes we want to enjoy all sorts of violence. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left us without a credible enemy in the larger world, causing us to look for danger within.

A historical perspective helps us to understand the processes of criminalization and decriminalization that is continuous in society. As someone who was born and raised in the state of Connecticut at a time when there were numerous "blue laws," I am especially aware of this process. For example, it was illegal to have sexual relations with anyone but your spouse. Furthermore, no birth control could be legally used and the "missionary position" (genital sex with the male on top) was the only way to stay within the law. Naturally, these laws were not enforced, except occasionally against vocal advocates of birth control and homosexuals. This selective enforcement of the law is one of the great dangers of the proliferation of criminal activities -- by decree -- in our society. The abysmal failure of Prohibition (of alcohol from 1920-1933) serves as a reminder that it is governments that make and enforce laws. Also, it is governments and not individuals that are the terrible killers in modern history. See R.J. Rummel, *Death by Government* (2000), should you have any doubt as to this reality.

There are times when the public cannot seem to get enough of crime, criminology, and the courts. "COPS," "C.I.E.," "Diagnosis Murder," "The Division," "Law and Order Special Victims Unit," "Miami Vice," "Mystery," "Nero Wolf Mysteries," "NYPD Blue," and "Walker, Texas Ranger" are but some of the television programs filling this need for criminals, police, detectives, and forensic detectives. Famous trials are often the headliners of newspapers. In recent history the print medium mostly has been pre-empted by televised crime and trials. Much of the nation watched the O.J. Simpson trial on "Court TV." The every-day demand for court and trial drama is fed not only by programs such as "Attorney," "Divorce Court," "Family Court," "Judging Amy," "L.A. Law," "Law and Order," "Night Court," and "Moral Court," but also real courts that are designed for television audiences such as "Judge Joe Brown," "Judge Judy," "Judge Mathis," and "The People's Court" (Judge Milian). My comments below are based mostly on the last program.

Overt signs of a judicial temperament are a disqualification for becoming a television judge. People bring disputes of the type that would qualify for small claims court, there is a $3,000 limit on "The People's Court," with the understanding that they must abide by the decision of the judge who hears the case on television and makes the decision during the commercial break. Judge Mathis, Judge Judy, and Judge Milian are in fact judges in the
states of Illinois, California, and New York, whose decisions are binding. The usual format is for the plaintiffs’ claims to be spelled out by an announcer and then stated to a judge notorious for a bullying attitude. Bystanders on the street, watching “The People’s Court” proceedings on a monitor, are encouraged to pass their judgment on the merits of the case. After the judicial decision is rendered, again based upon the judge’s “contemplation” during the commercial break, the winner and loser are interviewed on camera. The amazing thing is that people volunteer to subject themselves to this system and that this travesty of justice is legal. Yet, it does make for bemusing entertainment in this age of reality television where the distinction between fantasy and reality is blurred. Today’s cases included a mother suing her adult son for $872.50 in telephone bills he incurred on her cell phone. She won. Next a tenant sued her former landlord for a larger share of her security deposit and he won. What is amazing is how many of the rather ordinary people who come before these judges do not bother seeking to get proof. It is as if they think their own fantasies and the fantasy world of television have come together and all they must do is to show up. Yet even a television judge must pay some attention to the facts before s/he rules.

A former colleague at Temple University liked to quote the motto of a crime writer’s association, “crime does not pay -- enough!” This is accurate. From a monetary perspective, crime is normally a very poorly remunerated enterprise. The bank robber who pats himself on the back for making $5,000 dollars for an afternoon’s work is not so happy when he has to pay his legal bills and spend the next five years of his life in jail. Most real life criminals, unlike the romanticized versions provided by Hollywood and television, are individuals with limited economic prospects, who have trouble with impulse control. Kevin McCamant, a well-respected psychologist who works in the prison system in Maryland, informs me that many also have psychological problems.

Our current theme issue is a natural outgrowth of this past June’s Psychology and the Law Special Issue. America’s obsession with law results not simply in the proliferation of attorneys and policemen, but also in the creation of a multi-billion dollar prison industry. While people in cities try to get rid of their criminals, rural towns compete to have prisons built in their communities, overcoming local opposition by arguing that this growth industry is virtually recession-proof because there will always be crime. If we Americans took a purely economic, dollars-and-cents-oriented approach to crime and measured this prison industry by what it produced rather than by its prospectus -- after all, we are the stockholders of our country -- we would find the results to be contradictory and shocking. The contradiction stems from two factors. First, prisons definitely take people off the streets, most of whom we would not like to meet in the course of our day. Second, prisons are places that do a remarkable job of schooling young miscreants into criminals for the next 20 or 30 years of their life rather than returning them to society as productive citizens. While this may be quite good for the business of warehousing those who have broken certain laws, it certainly is a very poor investment for the U.S. Were the same money spent on sending young people to college the results would be much better for society. It is true that Harvard and Yale cost more per capita than a year in prison, but state colleges and universities can compete nicely in terms of cost with state and federal penitentiaries. The statistically-proven result of a college education is a productive, tax-paying citizen and of a penitentiary is a person the state will likely be supporting for the next 20 or 30 years. When, in July, I heard a news item that Portugal will not jail anyone for the violation of drug laws, beyond major dealers in drugs, I felt that Portugal will probably end up in a better place vis-à-vis drug enforcement than the United States, with its endless failed “wars on drugs” and tens of thousands jailed as users and minor dealers.

Our call for papers resulted in submissions from Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cyprus, the Netherlands, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere. It is interesting that the primary focus of the articles we received was on punishment and incarceration rather than upon crime. The partial exception is Junia Vilhena’s “Reflections on Police Violence in Brazil.” Yet even this article focuses primarily on the police's dehumanized treatment of the poor and the dark-skinned lower classes of their society, from which they are drawn, which leads to the underprivileged being seen as fitting targets for police assault, extortion, illegal search and seizure, rape, and theft. As a proud Brazilian, Dr. Vilhena is not comfortable exposing the underside for society, however, as a psychoanalyst, psychologist, and educator, she knows that this is a prerequisite for reform involving the police humanization of the “dangerous classes.” Her usage of the term dangerous classes reminds me that as a historian I have read this phrase in the literature of France and England in
that between 1930 and 1999, 2,201 African-Americans have been executed compared to 1,971 white men. (Statistical Abstract, p. 223) Texas has led the way in executions in recent years. In Texas on August 15, a black man was scheduled to be executed until an appeals court postponed the case because of the issue of the legal incompetency of the defense attorney. He was one of three teenage killers of the father of a Texas judge whose Mercedes Benz automobile they were stealing. The case has been in the news extensively for several reasons. One, three U.S. Supreme Court justices recused themselves from an appeal because of personal connections with the family. Two, because it involves the possible execution of a 25-year-old man who was only 17 at the time of the crime, this would be in violation of an international agreement not to execute anyone who was under 18 when the crime was committed. Three, the fact that the jury was all white, and that at least one juror was so racist that he said, “That nigger got what he deserved.” Four, the inequality of the justice meted out for the same crime in the same community at close to the same time. For example, three young white men, known for their prejudices and “Hitler fetish,” randomly killed a homeless black man of the same age as the judge’s father. It occurred in the same East Texas city, two years after the previous crime, but the murderers will probably be out of jail in less than 20 years. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor acknowledged that “serious questions are being raised about whether the death penalty is being fairly administered in this country.” (<www.amnesty.org>)

The issue of suicidal impulses among murderers is brought to the fore in both these cases. The young black man (Napoleon Beazley), who still faces the prospect of being strapped to a gurney and injected with lethal chemicals, was so remorseful after the murder of the judge’s father that his partners had to prevent him from committing suicide. Prior to the crime, he had no criminal record. The 23-year-old murderer of the African-American told the court the year after the crime that when he mentioned to his two friends that he was contemplating suicide, they said that instead he should “just kill a nigger!” Armed with a new shotgun, they drove down the street until they found the homeless black man. All laughed when the initial news reports indicated the killers were three Hispanic men. Although there are legal differences in these two cases, they do illustrate the close link among some between murder and suicidal thoughts, as well as the tendency to find lower
class brown and black men to be more dangerous and worthy of more severe punishment. (<www.amnesty.org>)

Imprisonment is another major area of concern for the authors of our special issue, as well it should be given the numbers involved. At the end of the second millennium, the United States had 2,071,686 people in federal and state prisons, local jails, and juvenile “detention” centers. On a per capita basis the U.S. has a higher incarceration rate than China. Though some experts are finding encouragement in the fact that in the last half of 2000 there was a 0.5 percent decline (6,200 inmates) in the state prison population, the total numbers jailed are still enormous: a total of 1.3 million, up from 200,000 in 1972. For the 50 years prior to that there had been a stable prison population. (Fox Butterfield, “Number of People in State Prisons Declines Slightly,” The New York Times, August 13, 2001, pp. A1 & A14) The other industrialized countries and Amnesty International consider the number of people in American prisons to be a national disgrace -- an opinion with which I concur. Of course, Americans can find some perverse solace in looking at the horrendous conditions in some jails elsewhere in the world. For example, Fernando Salla of the Center for the Study of Violence of São Paulo University in Brazil privately communicated the horror of prison murders, with mutilations committed in the São Paulo prison.

Fred Alford of the University of Maryland and Clio’s Psyche's Editorial Board presented Stanley Milgram's obedience-to-authority experiments to prisoners who, unlike non-incarcerated populations, saw it as being about sadism. Kevin McCamant of Maryland’s Patuxent Institution (prison) describes sadomasochistic dynamics inside the walls of modern penal colonies. Attorney John Rogers of West Virginia reflects back to his youthful job as a prison guard, to raise the issue of coerced sex and prison rape in “The Prison Band.” Psychologists McCamant and Salla provide valuable insights on the problems of prison rape. It is encouraging to learn that Brazil’s program of sexual visitation for prisoners is quite successful in reducing prison rape and coerced sex. This is in a prison system well known for its poor conditions. Though conditions in prisons in the United States are clearly better than in Brazil and many other developing countries, the quality of life of prisoners is still quite poor. Their lives are totally regulated by authorities that, at best, view them as dangerous people, and, at worst, as subhuman. To a

disturbing extent many authorities turn a blind eye to prisoner-to-prisoner brutality including rape (sometimes involving HIV), assault, and even murder. Though I generally decry the expansion of lawsuits into new areas, I am quite pleased by the current legal efforts to force prison officials to confront the issue of violence and rape within their walls.

Though we had no articles on women in prison or what psychological issues led them to follow a path traditionally taken almost entirely by men, the subject is important. In the 1990s there was a substantial increase in the number of women prisoners. Evelyn Sommers, Voices From Within: Women Who Have Broken the Law (1995), described online some of the psychology of many women ending up behind bars. They lacked empowering and nurturing connections in their lives. They subjectively experienced this as anger, emotional disconnection, fear, pain, and a psychological and financial neediness. Their needs led them to seek control of their own lives in anti-social, short-lived, questionable ways as they sought the “illusion of power.”

The urge to educate prisoners with the goal of averting recidivism is reflected in the work of two other college-professor authors. Edryce Reynolds teaches computers in Washington State while Ed de St. Aubin of Marquette University uses myth as part of a crime reduction program. Psychologist Alan Jacobs of Chicago describes a valuable but regrettably discontinued program aimed at getting convicts to face up to their antisocial behavior and change their life scripts. The student proofreading this paper reports that a college friend of his, currently serving a ten-year prison term for assaulting a man with his bare hands and (sneakered) feet, is benefiting from educational opportunities available to him. However, because New Jersey law mandates serving a minimum of 85 percent of a sentence when a violent crime is committed, it is hard to know how well this 22-year-old will be doing after six or seven years among hardened convicts. Returning to the general issue, there are many people committed to rehabilitation rather than the mere warehousing of inmates, but prison leadership, politicians, and much of the public are not very interested in reforming convicts.

Not all people held against their will are in institutions labeled as prisons. Inpatient psychiatric treatment can represent imprisonment even if a person is self-admitted. When I read in The New York Times about manacled inmates without doc-
tors or psychiatric care I could not imagine a more torturous form of imprisonment. (Barry Barak, “25 Inmates Die, Tied to Poles, in Fire in India, in Mental Home,” August 7, 2001, p. A4) It brings to mind the Communist use in the 1960s and 1970s of psychiatric imprisonment as a substitute for the Siberian Gulag. When I spent a year in the 1970s doing a part-time internship at the Rockland Psychiatric Hospital, working in a locked ward for short-term patients, I realized how imprisoned these people felt. Some staff made a point of jingling the keys that represented freedom to those “under lock and key.” I discovered just how indifferent or sadistic the staff could be as they jingled the keys that represented the freedom to go to breakfast or to see a visitor while the patients, who often felt very much like inmates, impatiently waited. Though I taped my own keys to avoid the jingling sounds, this did not change the situation of these troubled people.

Prisons appear to be a much more serious about incarceration today than they were in the late 1940s when the 12 and 13-year-old boys of my class, walked -- unattended by a teacher -- past the county lock-up on the way to shop class in another school. The prison compound in Bridgeport, Connecticut, took up a square block that was mostly devoted to raising crops. I was amazed when one of my classmates yelled, “Hi, Unk!”, jumped over the wall, ran to his uncle who was hoeing beans, "bummed" a cigarette, and climbed over another high wall to rejoin his classmates. Clearly confinement was a semi-voluntary affair.

Though it seems hard to believe in the light of the harsh conditions of contemporary confinement, prisons were a great humanitarian breakthrough. Prior to imprisonment, offenders were enslaved, branded, mutilated, impaled, burned at the stake, hanged, broken on the rack, and otherwise encouraged to not break the rules of society and of those in authority. As a historian I can vouch that one century’s humanitarian reform is another century’s human horror. It is only with the development of modern society that prisons become a prominent part of the system of achieving conformity. When the Bastille was stormed on July 14, 1789, the literal handful of prisoners released were the wayward sons of aristocrats and the very wealthy. Ordinary people were subject to much harsher punishments. My students are always dumbfounded by the notions of debtors’ prisons in early 19th-century England, because it seems illogical to them to lock someone up for non-payment since when jailed they cannot earn money. They are not versed enough in history to know that the real issues are of making an example for others and of putting pressure on the families and friends of the insolvent to come to their rescue.

The prison industry has grown enormously, as pointed out by Alan Jacobs, and is a major source of employment for a large number of people, especially in certain rural communities. Imprisonment, especially for a population of Americans so geared to change and movement, is a horrible thought. Though freedom is our ideal, there are some who come to terms with incarceration, and are at a loss in a free society where there is no “Concrete Mama” to organize their lives.

We hope that the reader, like this editor, will come away from this special issue with a better sense of the problems of crime, punishment and incarceration. America’s fascination and preoccupation with violence, law enforcement, and justice grows despite the decline of most crime. It is clear that U.S. prisons, while taking some dangerous people off the streets, also house hundreds of thousands who are not a threat to society. The courts, punishments, and prisons need to be re-evaluated in terms of the best interests of America. Readers will find that history and psychohistory are useful tools for understanding and helping to solve some of these difficult problems of modern society.

Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, is Editor of this publication. [Author’s Note: Thanks to Alan Jacobs, Despina Kyprianou, Henry Lawton, Kevin McCamant, and Evelyn Sommers for providing some background information for this introductory essay.]

In the Penal Colony:
Sadomasochistic Dynamics
Inside the Walls

Kevin J. McCamant
Patuxent Institution, Maryland

In at least two ways, Kafka’s gruesome tale, In the Penal Colony (1919), from which this paper takes its title, provides an apt, if somewhat extreme, metaphor for the history and current state of criminal punishment in America. First, it metaphorically expresses how, despite conscious efforts at reform, an absurd harshness has been retained. Second, it is also a metaphor for the way in which the roles of the punisher and punished may consti-
tute a shifting configuration within an individual's psyche, derived from part-object representations [emotionally polarized mental representations of aspects of real or fantasized early caregiving relationships] existing in dynamic relation to one another. In a brief and simplified form, this article will consider these aspects of the history of criminal punishment from the perspective of sadomasochism in the context of individual and group psychodynamics.

In The Oxford History of the Prison (Norval Morris and David J. Rothman, eds., 1996), it is noted that incarceration is currently the dominant mode of collective retribution employed in Western industrialized nations for the purpose of criminal punishment. However, this has been so only since the 19th century. Previously, fines, whipping, branding, mutilation, and vehicles of public humiliation -- such as letter-wearing, the pillory, and the stocks -- and execution by hanging were the most prevalent sanctions.

At least two humanitarian sentiments appear to have contributed to the emergence of the 19th-century prison. First was a growing public revulsion with hangings, mutilations, and public humiliation. Second was public dissatisfaction with the fetid, chaotic conditions in the jails that did exist to hold criminals while awaiting trial or punishment.

Underpinning these dissatisfactions was a popular belief that criminals were not innately depraved. Rather, their criminality was viewed as symptomatic of failures in socialization by family, church, and other social institutions. Consequently, they needed neither the punishment of squalid sequester or physical suffering, but a structured environment, free of corruption. Thus, incarceration became the punishment of choice for offenders, and beginning with the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia in 1790, the penitentiary became the prevalent model of imprisonment with the aim of bringing about the moral and spiritual reform of inmates.

The period 1870 to 1950 was one of special enthusiasm for prison reform. Ideas such as indeterminate sentencing and parole and probation were introduced with the intent to give inmates motivated to change the chance to redeem themselves. However, the inherently flawed implementation of such reforms and innovations has led to a situation in which threat of incarceration appears not to deter commission of crimes, and doing time appears not to lessen recidivism. With credibility stripped from deterrence and rehabilitation, containment or "incapacitation" of criminals has become the dominant justification for incarceration. Thus, the less effective prisons become at preventing or reducing crime, the greater the demand for more imprisonment. In this way, the emphasis on rehabilitation, born of humane impulses to replace squalor and brutality, appears to have deteriorated over the past 50 years into a tense, dull, repetitive, routine of life behind bars. A routine, it might be hard to argue, that is less humane than the physical punishments of the 18th century and before.

The forces that have thwarted efforts at prison reform and serious attempts to forge a rehabilitation model are special instances of common dynamics that are constantly at work in all individuals and groups. In particular they involve regression to the paranoid-schizoid position [a psychological state of pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others combined with social isolation and emotional constraint]. In the throes of such regression, good and nurturant self and object representations are split from bad and persecutory self and object representations, and then the bad is projected into other individuals/groups that efforts are made then to withdraw from and/or control or destroy. Elizabeth Howell describes special aspects of these dynamics in her paper, "Dissociation in Masochism and Psychopathic Sadism," Contemporary Psychoanalysis, Vol. 32, No. 3, (1996).

In her discussion of sadomasochistic dynamics, Howell posits a new tripartite division of the individual psyche: victim self-state (masochist), perpetrator self-state (psychopathic sadist), and the self-observer/narrator (bystander). She suggests that although these states propel interpersonal relations, they can also characterize larger social systems, and relations among larger social systems. She argues that dissociation [separation of thoughts, emotions, sensations, or even knowledge of the event from some aspect of a human experience] is an ubiquitous defense that is central to the functioning of sadomasochistic dynamics. Both in individuals and in the greater society, stress or trauma causes individual, intragroup, or intergroup dynamics to fragment. Howell, like Freud, Bion, and others, views group membership as able to mobilize regressive and dissociative defenses in individuals resulting in disavowal of personal authority, deindividuation, and the activation of victim, perpetrator, and bystander self-states. Thus, individuals, social subgroups, or even entire societies may experience themselves as one or another of
these states, or may be internally divided into configurations of the states in relations with one another.

Larry Strasburger, “The Treatment of Antisocial Syndromes: The Therapist’s Feelings” (William H. Ried, Darwin Dorr, John I. Walker, and Jack W. Bonner III, eds., Unmasking the Psychopath, 1986), notes the split that arises between the punitive philosophy of prisons and empathic caring and respect for others within the walls. On the one hand, there is the possibility of identifying with the “sadism” of the punitive setting. On the other hand, anger at the cruelty inmates may suffer can also promote a masochistic identification with inmates’ “victimization.”

These dynamics were demonstrated par excellence in Philip Zimbardo’s Prison Experiment at Stanford University in 1971. In this study, male college students who had been psychologically evaluated to exclude personality pathology were randomly assigned to prisoner and guard conditions in a "prison" setting that had been constructed in the basement of the Stanford University psychology building. The experiment, which had been scheduled to run for two weeks, had to be discontinued after six days due to the increasing sadism of the "guards" and the increasing depression/distress of the "prisoners."

The results of the Zimbardo study, which have been used to advocate for prison reform, have been taken as evidence of the power of roles and situations. However, they can be better understood as stemming from dissociative reactions to the stresses of membership in the particular unconscious "group" that was constituted by the experiment. In effect, personal authority and responsibility were disavowed by subjects and projected onto the experimenters, empathy was withdrawn from subjects, and victim and perpetrator self-states were activated in participants, as bystander self-states were activated in experimenters.

It should be noted that a consistently underappreciated implication of this study’s results is that, because of the assessed normality of the subjects involved, their sadistic and masochistic responses to the situation must be seen not only latent in them, but in us all. To emphasize the aspects of the situation that pulled for this behavior to the exclusion of that which was internal and evoked, is to risk creating another disavowal of responsibility for recognizing and managing the perpetrator and the victim potential internal to us all.

The same processes described by Howell and Strasburger, and that are evident in the Zimbardo prison experiment, are at work on larger scales, and have contributed significantly to the undermining of prison reform and inmate rehabilitation efforts within society as a whole. The affective responses to threats of crime and recidivism constitute formidable social stressors that promote paranoid-schizoid regression and splitting on a mass scale. The result is the creation of a situation in which one segment of the society (“the community”) fosters an illusion of its own goodness and security by identifying another segment as bad (criminals) and then containing it by incarceration. A tension then arises between the segment of “the community” that wants to be “tough on crime” (identification of the punitive function of the institution/perpetrator self-state) and to “lock ‘em up and throw away the key,” and that which views depravity as related to deprivation (victim self-state), and wish to respond with some kind of gesture to promote moral redemption. Such social schisms tend to perpetuate social and political functioning in a paranoid pendulum state in which there are periodic swings between more conservative and more liberal attitudes regarding probation, conditional release, and provision of psychotherapeutic, educational, and vocational services to inmates. What tends to remain constant due to the fight-flight basic assumption nature of this situation, is the lack of effective implementation of a rehabilitation philosophy. The practical result of this is the above-mentioned conundrum in which incapacitation for the purposes of incapacitation and containment, rather than rehabilitation, ends up justifying its own unlimited expansion.

All this is not to minimize the real threat that crime and criminals pose. Crimes, by their very nature, violate physical and psychological boundaries, evoking strong affective reactions. Thus, by the trauma they induce, individuals who commit such acts engender splitting and make convenient and inviting recipients for the projection of badness. Nevertheless, they may not be wholly evil and unredeemable any more than other people are wholly pristine and incorruptible. In this regard it is interesting to note who has constituted the bulk of the inmate population at various historical points. In the mid- to late-19th century, immigrant groups, especially the Irish, constituted the larger percentage of inmates. After the Irish became “us” instead of “them,” African-Americans have predominated. This strongly suggests that splitting and projective mechanisms on a societal level work
in a criminogenic way on segments of the population already deemed “other” for different reasons.

By recognizing these processes, and striving to integrate such splits within individuals and between social subgroups, society may become less prone to divisiveness, and to anger and vindictiveness toward criminals. It may also be better able to develop more tolerance for anxiety regarding risk and ambivalence related to balancing the demand for collective retribution with the collective hope for redemption.

Where prisons are concerned this could benefit by allowing a kind of political discourse and policy formation, which might facilitate the development of both preventative programs and prisons that exert the firm authority combined with clear communication and empathy that have been shown to foster moral development. In this way, the ghost of the sadistic apparatus of Kafka’s story might be exorcised from our own penal system.

Kevin J. McCamant, PhD, is Chief of Psychology Services at Patuxent Institution, Maryland’s psychotherapy-oriented maximum-security prison. He is also Director of the Special Offender’s Clinic, a joint project of the University of Maryland Medical School Division of Psychiatry and the Division of Parole and Probation of the Maryland State Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. (The views expressed here are his own and are not a reflection of the views of Patuxent Institution, the Maryland State Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, or the University of Maryland Medical School Department of Psychiatry.) Dr. McCamant may be contacted at <KMcCamant@dpscs.state.md.us>.

Prisoners: Milgram Experiments Are About Sadism

C. Fred Alford
University of Maryland, College Park

As part of a research project on evil, I spent three hours once a week for about 15 months with a group of prisoners at a maximum security prison in Patuxent, Maryland, with a small psychological remediation program. The program combined moderately intense group therapy with a chance to earn early release. Though not strictly psychoanalytic, an analytic ethos prevailed in the program.

Most of the prisoners in the program had killed or raped a relative or loved one. I report in detail on my research in What Evil Means to Us (1997).

Prisoners are like the rest of us, only more so. They are more adrift -- morally, psychologically, personally. If you listen to their stories long enough, you will be struck by their lack of place in the world. Marriage, family, school, work, and military -- only a minority of prisoners have made a go at any one of these, let alone more than one. Prison is the only place many fit. “Concrete Mama” some call it: it’s cold and it’s hard, but it’s always there, and always ready to take you back.

What’s the difference between prisoners and the rest of us as far as evil is concerned? That was my research question, one I’m not sure I ever fully answered. In trying to answer it, I asked the prisoners to comment on a number of stories, experiments, and studies. In one session, I had them read a short summary of the famous Stanley Milgram experiments on obedience to authority conducted at Yale University in 1961-1962. (See Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, 1974.) The summary was titled “If Hitler Asked You to Electrocute a Stranger, Would You? Probably.” (Philip Meyer, in J. Henslin, ed., Down to Earth Sociology, 1993, pp. 165-171) Then we talked about it.

In the series of experiments, subjects, called "teachers," who are ordinary residents of New Haven, Connecticut, believe they are delivering electrical shocks to a "learner," who is actually an associate of Milgram. The learner is always the same man, a mild-mannered, vulnerable-looking, middle-aged fellow with a heart condition. Or so he tells each teacher. The learner is to receive the shocks when he fails to memorize word pairs. The shocks are administered from a shock generator that runs from 15 to 450 volts, the higher levels labeled in big letters “Strong Shock,” “Very Strong Shock,” “Intense Shock,” “Extreme Intensity Shock,” “Danger Severe Shock,” and “XXX.” Each teacher gets a sample shock of 45 volts, so he knows it’s real. Each time the learner gets a word pair wrong (often), the teacher is told to increase the shock level. In reality, the learner actually receives no shocks, but the teacher doesn’t know that.

Strapped into his chair with thick leather straps, electrodes attached to his wrist, the learner is ready to learn. As the shocks increase, the teacher can hear the learner scream, yell, kick the door, demand to be let out, complain of chest pain,
and finally fall silent. Before Milgram began his experiment, he asked some psychiatrists to predict the percentage of teachers who would actually deliver the complete sequence of 33 shocks, including three at 450 volts. A tiny percentage, the psychiatrists replied -- no more than a few sadistic individuals. In fact, 65 percent delivered the full battery of shocks.

Milgram argues that the experiment has nothing to do with sadism and everything to do with submission. The teachers don’t want to deliver the shocks; appear to not enjoy it; frequently ask, even plead, not to administer them; and when it’s over, some talk as if they refused, even though they didn’t. It is, says Milgram, obedience that is being displayed, man’s potential for slavish obedience. Pleasure in hurting has nothing to do with it.

Almost all free [non-prisoner] informants interpret the experiment as Milgram does. “People are naturally weak, but they are not naturally sadistic,” is how one puts it. Hardly any of the prisoners in my study interpret the experiment this way.

Consider the response of the prisoner whom I will call Mr. Acorn. Mr. Acorn is covered with tattoos, some quite artistic, though not to my taste: a flaming Death’s Head; a voluptuous woman with a skull between her legs; a swastika; and a rifle encircled with the words “white power.” He wears a Confederate flag as a bandana. A biker, he wants to open a little tattoo shop when he gets out. One might argue that all this disqualifies him from understanding the Milgram experiment. Consider the possibility that it eminently qualifies him. Mr. Acorn, like most prisoners, lives close to the edge, especially the hard edge of violence. About some things this makes him obtuse. About violence he is a savant:

Man, people love violence. Television and movie companies make millions on it. People love to watch violence, and they love to do violence. They just don’t want to admit it. So, here this dude tells them to do it, and they must love it, man, a fantasy come true, a chance to do their violence and pretend it’s all in a good cause.

The other prisoners nod. One calls Mr. Acorn “Caveman.” It’s a term of affection; it means he speaks the primitive, brutal truth -- in this case, not just about the prisoners' own potential for violence but that of others also. Mr. Acorn continues with his story:

Society likes violence. It just likes to be able to control it. Imagine that a guy built an electric chair in his basement, plugged it in, and then went out into the street and kidnapped people, dragging them into his basement, where he put them in his homemade electric chair and electrocuted them. You know what would happen? After he did this a few times (the state’s not too swift, it takes them awhile to catch on), they’d catch him and throw him in jail. Then they’d put him in an electric chair and throw the switch, and his eyeballs would pop out of his head. And we’d call that "justice."

The state’s executioner follows public procedures to exact revenge; the man with the electric chair in his basement is a freelance predator. One subjects his sadism to the requirements of the state; the other takes his sadism freelance. It is the difference between the subjects in the Milgram experiment and the criminal. It is the difference between "civilization" and chaos. But it is not the difference between sadism and obedience. Nor is it necessarily a difference in basic psychology.

It was not my experience that the prisoners in my group (not a random sample) were more aggressive and sadistic than the free informants I spoke with. But the sadism of some inmates is more visible, more likely to be freelance, less bound to institutional forms. Indeed, this is virtually the definition of criminal behavior -- not its violence, for who is more violent than the state? Nation states kill millions. It is the freelance quality of criminal violence that makes that violence intolerable to a civilized society. This freelance violence must be contained, and prison is the right place to do so. But we should not confuse ourselves about the fundamental psychological difference between prisoners and the rest of us. Knowing this might even lead those of us on the outside to be more generous toward those on the inside.

C. Fred Alford, PhD, is Professor of Government at the University of Maryland, College Park. He is the author of a dozen books on moral psychology, the most recent of which is Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power (2001). He is on the Editorial Board of Clio’s Psyche and may be contacted at <falford@gvpt.umd.edu>.
The Rational Irrationality of Punishment – A Terror Management Perspective

Joel D. Lieberman
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
and
Jeff Greenberg
University of Arizona

The punishment of criminal offenders is intended to serve a variety of purposes including removal from society, deterrence, and rehabilitation. The accomplishment of such punishment goals may prevent offenders from committing future crimes. However, it is very important that punishment of criminal defendants also assuages the sense of moral outrage society feels when crimes are committed.

Indeed, the need to deliver a punishment that expresses moral outrage may be the goal of paramount importance from a societal perspective. For example, approximately two-thirds of Americans support the death penalty (only 27 percent oppose it), and in certain specific crimes of exceptional moral reprehensibility that figure is even higher. From a rational perspective, such strong support for the death penalty is puzzling for a number of reasons. First, the death penalty has been repeatedly shown to be an ineffective deterrent to crime. Second, it creates the paradoxical and illogical situation of teaching a person (and society) that an act is wrong and will not be tolerated by having the state commit the act itself. Although legally accurate, it is ironic that on Timothy McVeigh’s death certificate, the manner of death was listed as homicide. The motivations underlying this apparently powerful desire to severely punish law-breakers can be explained by Terror Management Theory.

The theory is based largely on the work of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker. According to this perspective, humans possess advanced cognitive abilities that allow them to think abstractly, temporally, and symbolically. Although these abilities have helped humans adapt and thrive throughout the world, they have also led to a unique capacity for humans to be aware of the fragility of existence and the inevitability of their own mortality. No matter how hard we try to protect ourselves and avoid various menacing hazards throughout our lives, we know that ultimately we will succumb to certain death. However, humans (like other animals) also possess a natural instinct for self-preservation. The awareness of unavoidable mortality in a creature driven to survive creates an ever-present potential for existential terror. To manage this intense anxiety, people develop, invest in, and identify with a “cultural worldview.”

Cultural worldviews are social constructions that imbue reality with a sense of meaning, order, and permanence. In turn, they provide hope for individuals to overcome the threat of a fleeting existence and transcend their mortality by living up to standards of value of the worldview. Thus we live in a world of clocks and calendars, with professional titles and national identifications. Achieving a sense of immortality can occur literally if one subscribes to certain religious worldviews (e.g., religious promise of an afterlife), or symbolically, even if one does not (e.g., by doing heroic deeds which are remembered by others, being memorialized, creating art, writing books or identifying with enduring groups or causes).

In short, to manage the existential anxiety, individuals must feel that they are significant contributors to a meaningful reality. Of course, the standards by which we can obtain this sense of self-worth vary greatly from culture to culture. Further, cultural worldviews are fragile social constructions that must constantly be validated through the approval of others. As a result, it imperative that individuals surround themselves with others who will support and reinforce their belief and values.

Over the last 15 years, terror management theory has been supported in over 100 empirical studies. The basic hypothesis that has been tested in this work is that if people’s cultural worldviews protect them from their fears regarding mortality, then a reminder of their mortality should amplify people’s desires to bolster and defend the values of their worldview. The typical finding has been that after participants have been reminded of their mortality, which is known as “mortality salience”, they exhibit enhanced positive reactions to anyone who supports their beliefs and increased negative reactions to anyone who threatens them. For example, individuals who have been asked to reflect upon their own death (compared to those asked to contemplate other topics) have devalued the work of, and attributed negative traits to, people with different beliefs, and have attempted to physically harm such worldview threatening others.

There is a strong relationship between cultural values and laws. Generally, outlawed activi-
ties are those considered immoral by a society. Because an augmented sense of mortality creates a need to uphold cultural morals and punish those who threaten them, it should also motivate individuals to enforce legal standards and punish lawbreakers. Several terror management studies have examined this possibility.

In the very first terror management study, municipal court judges from Tucson, Arizona, either had their sense of mortality increased or not and were asked to make a bail recommendation for a hypothetical case involving a woman accused of prostitution. Individuals were provided with information typically available to judges when making bail decisions (e.g., community ties, prior record information, prior failures to appear in court, etc.). On average, control condition judges recommended bail in the amount of $50, but judges with an enlarged sense of mortality recommended that bail be set at $455! Of course, such reactions assume that the study’s participants possess negative attitudes toward prostitution, and less punitive reactions would be expected from individuals who believe that prostitution should be decriminalized. A second study supported this point and along with further research, established that these punitive reactions result from the intensified concern with upholding the worldview activated by thoughts of mortality.

Although reminders of mortality generally increase punitive reactions to moral transgressors, it may also motivate leniency if the defendant supports the judge or jury’s worldview. For example, one study found that when individuals are made more mortality aware and asked about their support for hate crime legislation in general, they are more in favor of hate crime laws than control participants. However, in a second study, instead of asking participants about their general beliefs regarding hate crimes, we presented them with a vignette describing an attack committed against either a neutral victim or a victim who posed a worldview threat (e.g., a victim with a different religious or sexual orientation than the participant). Consistent with previous research, participants with an amplified sense of mortality were more punitive than control participants toward individuals who attacked “neutral” victims. In contrast, when the victim was a worldview violator, mortality augmented participants were actually less punitive toward the attacker. Thus, although “mortality salient” individuals expressed strong support for hate crime legislation when it was described in abstract terms, they were more lenient to hate crime offenders when attacks were committed against victims who threatened the values of their worldview.

Similar results occurred when we examined reactions of white Americans to targets espousing white racist beliefs. In the past decade, the United States has seen a rise in neo-Nazi and other white supremacist groups. It is unlikely that in general, whites would overtly endorse such racist groups. Indeed, an initial study found that without enlarging mortality awareness, if a white or a black expresses racial pride, the white is viewed as more racist.

However, in two subsequent studies, mortality awareness aroused sympathetic reactions to white targets who espoused white racist beliefs. In addition, when participants were informed that the target’s racist views had led them to engage in employment discrimination, mortality augmented participants recommended less severe punishment for the racist. Thus, even when the defendant’s actions are viewed as reprehensible in general, if they also serve the individual’s worldview, an increased awareness of mortality encourages leniency toward the transgressor.

Taken together, the work described in this paper paints a clear picture of how psychological needs affect legal decisions. Augmented awareness of mortality creates a need to invest in and defend subjective cultural worldviews. Moral, ethical, and legal standards are components of these worldviews. The activation of death-related thoughts generally leads to more punitive reactions to individuals who commit crimes, but more lenient reactions when the defendant is viewed as upholding the prevailing worldview. These tendencies may play a role in racial bias in judgments and sentencing, leading to both harsher sentences for blacks by white juries, and more lenient judgments for same race defendants, as in the O.J. Simpson and original Rodney King trials. Ultimately, then, this body of work suggests that the psychological need people have to strengthen the faith in their worldviews contributes a host of irrational and harmful biases into the criminal justice system.

Joel D. Lieberman, PhD, is Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. His research focuses on jury decision making, prejudice, aggression, and other psychological factors associated with legal issues. Professor Lieberman may be reached at <jdl@nevada.edu>. Jeff Greenberg, PhD, is Professor of Psychology at the University of
Arizona. His research is primarily focused on the role of existential concerns about mortality in prejudice, social justice, and mental health. Professor Greenberg may be reached at <jeff@u.arizona.edu>.

Reflections on Police Violence in Brazil

Junia Vilhena with Maria Helena Zamora
Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Brazilian police are infamous throughout the world for their violence and corruption. Yet, how do the Brazilian police view the brutality and dishonesty within their force? Probing the answer to this question was a vital part of a research project we conducted at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, together with the police force of the city of Rio de Janeiro, which is currently undergoing reorganization. The research goal was to understand the conflicting ideals, identities, and realities that are present in the police force and in Brazilian society.

Until recently, the public, the media, and the government largely ignored the infamous criminal behavior of those charged with maintaining law and order. This changed in 1992-1993 with the wanton murders by the police of seven street children, some while still sleeping, in front of a well known church in downtown Rio, and of 21 working people, all without criminal records. The media, the public, and even, to a lesser degree, the government were awakened to a perversion of justice: according to official data, more than 60 percent of the kidnappings in the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area involved policemen and ex-law enforcement officials. The Rio de Janeiro Institute of Criminology reports homicide, illegal search, extortion, smuggling, theft, rape, abuse of power, and perjury to be the most common crimes perpetrated by the police.

Our research project defined violence as the willful desire to cause damage to other people’s lives, inflicting unnecessary suffering through the abuse of power, in blatant disrespect of human rights. It is essential to distinguish between unwarranted violence and actions where force is necessary. We recognize that measured force is sometimes required by the very nature of police work. Consequently, we distinguish between an act of force, which may very well protect the lawful public or the life of an officer, and the cruelty involved in acts performed to cause humiliation, pain, and suffering to another human being. Not withstanding the recent tendency to find biological causes for human behavior, violence is not an instinct, it is learned and often represents displaced aggression. Regrettably, violence is frequently trivialized in our society. The banality of evil, so well depicted by Hannah Arendt and Primo Levi, is a grave threat to society, because the acceptance of violent behavior is an ally of its perpetuation.

Victims of violence experience humiliation, pain, and feelings of futility. Violence disrupts their sense of well-being, their psychic homeostasis needed for mental well being. The experience of pain and degradation is associated in the psyche with the feelings linked to death and destruction. Frequently, the trauma caused by aggressive or sadistic acts leads to rigidity in the psychic functioning of the victims as they try to reestablish their psychic equilibrium. In this article, however, we focus on perpetrators of this inhumanity rather than victims.

In cases of police brutality and the murder of innocent civilians, the police view their victim as the Other rather than as an equal or even a human being. There is no identifying with the Other, who is seen as worthy only of being discarded as garbage. This dehumanization appears again and again in the interviews. An officer said, "If it's a faggot, a queer [gay], I knock him over ... it's personal" and "If you see a little nigger running, you can be sure he is a thief." (In the U.S. I believe this would be called "hate speech.") A 12-year-old girl, who lives on the street, asked us a haunting question, "Why do the police take so much pleasure in kicking pregnant girls?" These shocking words and actions are commonplace among the 60,000 civil and military police in our city of 13 million people.

Encountering the brutality, crime, corruption, hatred, humiliation, and violence perpetrated against the people by those who were supposed to be defending them, often left us wondering whether it was possible to establish a dialogue with people who live by such different ethical, psychological, and social codes. While still relying on psychoanalytic theory to understand violence in individual human beings, we also turned to sociology, anthropology, and political science to enlighten our analysis of the phenomenon of illegal violence within the police force and its implications for Brazilian society.

The social contract, the law, is broken by
the police because they distinguish between "first-class citizens" and the "deviant majority" of what is considered the "dangerous classes." There is a type of segregation -- a virtual apartheid. Our first-class citizens are a white, rich, and powerful elite who are protected from most forms of violence including police cruelty. When, three or four years ago, there was a series of kidnappings of the wealthy, this activity was soon eliminated by determined law enforcement. Our rights, persons, and property, are well protected. Our suffering is respected. By contrast, those who are lower class, poor, and dark are virtually without rights. They are treated as mere objects to be used for the dirty work of society or feared as the “dangerous classes.” Any atrocity perpetrated against them is normally a matter of indifference to Brazilian society. In fact, the police mirror the attitudes of Brazilian society but take them further than most members of the polite upper classes themselves would. The elite has a powerful vested interest in the present system.

It frequently appears to us that the elite gets the law enforcement it wants. Brazilians have a saying, “To our friends, everything; to our enemies, the law.” The police are grossly underpaid and therefore quite bribable. For example, traffic rules are frequently ignored, because drivers know they can usually bribe the police officer. In federal and state prisons, there are seldom inmates from the middle or upper classes because they can afford lawyers who postpone their trials indefinitely until they find loopholes in the law. The well-off sometimes literally "get away with murder"!

We will now return to some of the data from our interviews. A policewoman said, "The solution for those fuckers ... is to kill [them]." My response was, "How do you imagine their mothers react when they lose a son?" Her response, without hesitation, was, "Look, I take care of mine, if they don't [care for their sons] it's because they couldn't care less.... Besides, they are different -- those sluts." My query, "Different how?", evoked, "I don't know -- I don't think they feel the same way [we feel]."

It is striking that the police quotations in this article come from a black police officer and from a policewoman who are both residents of the low income area where the people they hate live. How can we understand that? Women who cannot identify with other women, blacks who despise "niggers," police officers who do not identify with other working men and women? This situation brings more questions than answers to mind. What can be said about police identification with the values of the white, male, bourgeois and upper-class elite, and contempt for their neighbors? Could it be based upon identification with the aggressor rather than their own people? Have the police internalized (introjected) ideals of another class rather than their own? Is their way of surviving based upon giving up their own identity, their own history, and their own past to embrace other people’s ideals? To the extent that this is the case, the split in Brazilian society between the elite and the “dangerous classes” is enlarged rather than healed.

To do their part in healing this breach within Brazilian society, the police will need to repudiate treating the poor, the lower class, and the black as second-class citizens. Instead, they will need to be able to have a feeling of solidarity with them. Brazilian society and the police themselves are beginning to take some steps in this direction. Let us hope that those charged with law enforcement can take the most important step of accepting the humanity of the less well-off masses of Brazilians from which they themselves come.

Junia Vilhena, PhD, a psychoanalyst, is a psychology professor at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Director of its psychology clinic, and Research Coordinator of the Psychoanalysis, Social Exclusion and the Production of Subjectivity project. Dr. Vilhena may be reached at <vilhenaj@iis.com.br>. Maria Helena Zamora, PhD, a professor of psychology at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, was research assistant on the project.

The Psychology of Videotaped Interrogations and Confessions

G. Daniel Lassiter
Ohio University

As of April 2001, the Death Penalty Information Center had documented 95 cases in which death-row inmates (from 22 states) were exonerated -- some only days prior to their scheduled executions -- because of newly discovered evidence. Reacting to these startling figures, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a long-time supporter of the death penalty, recently acknowledged, "If statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed." (quoted in The New York Times, July 5, 2001)
Many mistakes in the judicial process that lead to wrongful convictions occur during the interrogation phase of criminal investigations where coerced or false confessions are sometimes extracted from detained crime suspects. Numerous legal scholars, criminal justice practitioners, political leaders, and social scientists have called for the videotaping of all police interrogations as a "quick fix" for the problem of some innocent people being induced to incriminate themselves when confronted by standard police interrogation tactics. Those who advocate videotaping interrogations argue that the presence of the camera will deter the use of coercive methods to induce confessions and will provide a complete and objective record of the interrogation so that judges and jurors can evaluate thoroughly and accurately the voluntariness and veracity of any confession. I am aware of at least one proponent who is so sure of the soundness of the videotaping procedure, that he has gone as far as to argue that legally required Miranda warnings to suspects concerning their rights to silence and counsel can be dispensed with if interrogations are routinely videotaped.

Under certain circumstances I have no doubt that more accurate assessments of the voluntariness and reliability of confessions can be obtained via the videotape method. Certainly, if interrogators use obviously assaultive coercion, any reasonable observer will recognize the illegitimacy of the confession. However, such third-degree intimidation has been replaced by non-assaultive psychological manipulation that is not always recognized as coercive but, as research has shown, can nonetheless lead to false admissions of guilt.

For example, in the case of Peter Reilly, police interrogators lied about the evidence they possessed that linked the 18-year-old Reilly to the murder of his mother. They followed this up with repeated suggestions to Reilly that he could have committed the crime without remembering it. Finally, they impressed upon the youth that his actions were in fact justifiable given his mother's constant antagonisms. After 16 hours of interrogation, Reilly formally confessed. His signed statement closely followed the scenario laid out by his interrogators -- a scenario Reilly had been manipulated into believing was accurate, yet later was demonstrated to be completely without merit. Although eventually exonerated, Reilly spent two years of his young life as a wrongfully convicted man on account of a police-induced false confession.

In this age of psychologically oriented interrogation approaches, videotaping interrogations and confessions may not be a surefire preventive against convicting the truly innocent. In the United States and in many other countries (such as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom) videotaped interrogations and confessions are customarily recorded with the camera lens zeroed in on the suspect. One reason for this particular positioning of the camera is likely the belief that a careful examination of not only suspects' statements, but also their less conspicuous actions or expressions, will ultimately reveal the truth of the matter.

The empirical validity of such beliefs aside, I have found in my research that focusing the video camera primarily on the suspect in an interrogation has the effect of impressing upon viewers the notion that his or her statements are more likely freely and intentionally given and not the result of some form of coercion. Moreover, a comparison of judgments derived from suspect-focus videotapes with judgments based on "control" media -- transcripts and audiotapes -- leads to the conclusion that the greater perception of voluntariness associated with suspect-focus videotapes is an unmistakable bias of the most serious kind -- one that runs contrary to the cornerstone of our system of justice, the presumption of innocence. The camera may "never blink," but that doesn't mean what it "sees" can be considered an unadulterated view of reality. As the celebrated communications theorist Marshall McLuhan (Understanding Media, 1964) maintained, the information being conveyed is not entirely independent of the method of conveyance.

Am I thus recommending that videotaped interrogation and confession evidence not be used at all in courts of law? No, because my data indicate that when the camera perspective allows for the suspect and interrogator to be viewed equally well, there appears to be no discernible bias associated with the videotaping procedure. Interestingly, this very approach to preventing the point-of-view bias in videotaped confessions has already been established in one country. New Zealand made it a national policy that police interrogations be videotaped from an equal-focus perspective based on the first study conducted in our research program. With the greater wealth of data that we now have on this topic, I do not hesitate to recommend that a similar policy be adopted in the United States as well as in the other aforementioned countries.
However, those who must make policy decisions regarding the implementation of the videotape method should not rule out the possibility of directing the camera primarily at the interrogator(s) whom a detained suspect must face. This camera perspective would allow those charged with evaluating the voluntary status of a confession the maximum opportunity to spot coercive influences should they be at work. Although most criminal justice practitioners, and even the average person on the street might condemn this approach as cock-eyed, its logic is borne out in the psychological literature. Having the opportunity to literally "put yourself in another's place" enables one to better appreciate the external forces experienced by that person because those forces are now more "exposed" and thus more likely to be detected.

A real-life case that centers on a disputed videotaped confession was recently brought to my attention. A woman involved in an effort to suppress a coerced "confession" given by her son noted that when her son first viewed the videotape (which focused only on him), he remarked that it did not accurately convey the tension in the room or the demeanor of the interrogator. The woman communicated to me that it is her hope that psychological research "will be instrumental in abolishing the suspect-focus videotaping that currently seems to be the standard." I couldn't agree more.

G. Daniel Lassiter, PhD, is Professor of Psychology at Ohio University. In addition to research on videotaped confessions, his scholarly interests lie in the area of social perception, especially the way in which people segment ongoing behavior into meaningful actions. He may be contacted at <lassiter@ohio.edu>.

Women Victims' Emotion in The Courtroom

Julie Anne Blackwell Young
University of Leicester, United Kingdom

This paper looks at how the emotions of women victims in the courtroom are perceived and how this perception is used to perpetuate stereotypes of female victims within the legal system. Female victims giving evidence who are very emotional in court may be perceived as not credible, hysterical, and possibly lying. Those who are unemotional are portrayed as unaffected by what happened and, possibly lying. Although giving evidence in the courtroom is a stressful experience, both displaying emotion and restraining emotion may be used against women victims.

Historically female witnesses were often treated with suspicion. Even as late as 1971, Bailey and Rothblatt, Successful Techniques for Criminal Trials, state:

Women are contrary witnesses..... Women, like children, are prone to exaggeration; they generally have poor memories as to previous fabrications and exaggerations. They are also stubborn. (pp. 190-191)

Feminism brought forth the ideal that women are to be treated no differently than men. Regrettably, the courtroom remains a male-dominated arena. Researchers such as Gregory Matoesian (see, for example, Reproducing Rape: Domination through Talk in the Courtroom, 1993) argue that the court system and its expectation of witnesses reinforces the patriarchal nature of society by making female victim witnesses comply to male-oriented stereotypes of victim behavior.

In order to come across to the jury as credible, witnesses should be calm and composed, and able to give their evidence in a rational manner. For example, in Britain, police courtroom training emphasizes how police officers should not become ruffled or angry by questioning, especially by insinuations put forward by the defense. The advice is also given to expert witnesses and in court preparation courses for witnesses verifying facts.

However, a female victim of crime faces a conflict about how she should credibly present herself in court. If she takes the stand in a calm, collected manner, without emotion, she appears less credible because she is not acting in accordance with stereotypes of how a victim should behave. The alleged crime cannot have been that bad as it is not affecting her in an emotional way; it even may not have occurred. Thus, in order for a female victim to appear credible in the courtroom she must display emotion. This is borne out by research conducted by Amanda Konradi. In "Prosecutors’ Pre-court Preparation of Rape Survivors," (Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 22, 1987) she states:

…rape survivors were told that tears or other visible indications of fear or pain would reinforce their credibility. A flat affect, while usually associated with rationality, was open to the interpretation that the alleged assault was not serious enough to affect the witness.... (p. 30)
Therefore, in order to fulfill the stereotype, female victims must stray from the usual behaviours in which other witnesses are instructed to engage.

I found this to be true while I was dealing with a housing dispute. I was attempting to move out of my apartment because the behaviour of my flat mates was causing me to fear for my safety and so I was suffering severe stress that was making me physically ill and unable to study. As calmly and rationally as possible, I sought to present myself as a victim of unfair treatment by the other tenants and the warden of the apartment complex. This was the strategy that my advisers (all male) advocated. They insisted that if I showed any emotion, then I would be considered a hysterical woman and my case would not be treated seriously. However, my case was actually not taken seriously by the male arbitrator until I became emotional. Then I was perceived as a real victim.

However, while some emotion enhances credibility, if a female victim is too emotional then she is considered hysterical -- prone to emotional outbursts, capable of lying, and possibly mentally unstable. Sue Lees, *Carnal Knowledge* (1997), cites examples in the courtroom where women are emotional are considered manipulative as well as irrational, and unreliable. (pp. 125,143, see also pp. 119-126) Thus, while some emotion is necessary to be considered a credible witness, too much emotion is detrimental to the witness’ reliability. It is a fine line between just enough and too much emotion.

Female witnesses are forced by the mostly-male legal system to act as stereotypically emotional victims. Any deviation from this role is punished by being considered less credible. This is perpetuated through the legal system with lawyers observing that they tend to win cases where the female victims are emotional. They then encourage other women victims to be emotional. Therefore, the primary female victim behaviour that the court is exposed to is that which perpetuates the stereotype of non-credible, hysterical, and possibly lying women victims. As a woman I find this to be offensive. I hope that by bringing it to the consciousness of people in and out of the judicial system that I may help to eliminate it.

**The Dangers of Invalid "Scientific" Evidence**

Michael Brock
Counseling and Evaluation Services

A few months ago I received a call from a defense attorney that I had done court-related psychological and/or custody evaluations for in the past. This time the case was different. He told me,

My clients, a husband and wife, have been charged with abusing their newborn child by fracturing her ribs. The prosecution has three doctors who are going to testify that the breaks happened in the parents’ care. The prosecution is not going for termination of parental rights (taking the child away from the parents), only a finding of abuse. Such a finding requires only a preponderance of evidence. I expect that with the doctors’ testimony they will prevail. I would like you to evaluate my clients so that we can present them in the best light in the penalty phase. Hopefully, with some parenting and/or anger management classes, they will get their child back.

At the time of the psychological evaluation of the parents the child was in the care of the grandparents. I accepted the case with some reluctance, as I was not sure I wanted to help parents regain custody of a child they had abused severely enough for her to have broken ribs. However, I have handled enough allegations of child abuse to know that many are false, and that there is a tendency on the part of prosecutors to pursue these cases even when they have no merit. This is due in part to the prevailing witch-hunt atmosphere regarding abuse cases, and in part to the personal ambitions of the district attorneys, who are rewarded for getting convictions, not for discovering the truth. Nonetheless, broken ribs are broken ribs. The testimony of three doctors and the absence of any medical testimony for the defense made this case look like an easy win for the prosecution.

There was, however, more to the story. When I interviewed the couple they proclaimed their innocence. They tested stable on a widely respected psychological test. (It should be noted that it would be unwise to place too much empha-
I searched the Web for confirmatory evidence differentiating abuse from other medical problems. Several articles talked about the various stages of healing fractures. I read the American Medical Association’s (AMA) paper on expert testimony, available on the Truth In Justice Web site, which referenced a paper citing a case virtually identical to ours in some important respects yet significantly different in others. This paper stated unequivocally that it is impossible to accurately date broken bones in a five-week-old infant.

The child in our case was six weeks at the time of diagnosis. The child in the cited case had died of shaken baby syndrome at five weeks. The child in our case had none of the symptoms of shaken baby syndrome except broken ribs. This was odd considering that the pediatrician testified that the child had been squeezed with enough force to approximate a fall from a three-storied building. Squeezed with that much force, but not shaken? How probable is that?

On the witness stand their radiologist recanted when confronted with our evidence. He stated that probably the first break had occurred in the hospital intensive care unit. Their pediatrician’s testimony was then invalidated, as it was based entirely on the radiologist’s report.

Still, we had a problem. Even according to our radiologist, breaks had occurred at two separate times. We could not explain the second occurrence of broken ribs, which apparently had taken place in the custody of the parents. Researching possible explanations for this phenomenon, I did not understand the medical explanations I read of metabolic- or steroid-induced fragility in the bones of infants. I made a point of being a real source of irritation to defense counsel, who no doubt wondered why he had hired me. He finally retained a neonatal specialist who gave a thorough medical explanation to the court of what had happened to the child. The court accepted her explanation and our clients were exonerated.

Nevertheless, this matter is still very troubling to me. The prosecution had three medical doctors who were willing to give testimony that was incomplete and misleading. The lawyers’ willingness to accept this testimony suggests that legal professionals do not understand the most central rule of health care practice in our present, highly litigious society -- only the paranoid survive. What health care practitioners have to worry about if they perform a wrong procedure or fail to perform a needed procedure induces paranoia: audits by managed care companies who will take money

As every psychologist, lawyer, and law enforcement officer knows, the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior. These people were clean; not even a traffic infraction. Theirs was an intact first marriage of nine years for both parents. They had a healthy, happy five-year-old who was examined and found to have no history of abuse. They had stable employment records. Of great importance is the fact that neither had any history of substance abuse problems. All of the forensic (court-related scientific) literature cites substance abuse as a major factor in child abuse. The Harvard Mental Health Letter quoted a study reporting an 80 percent correlation between substance abuse and child abuse. My own professional experience, including seven years as a substance abuse counselor, confirms this very high relationship.

After I had interviewed and tested the couple, I had a keen sense that they were innocent. I have handled too many abuse cases not to recognize the signs and they just weren’t there. Moreover, these people insisted on a trial; they were not going to make any deals. They did not contradict each other or attempt to blame the other. They had not tried to cover up the child’s injuries, but had taken her back to the same pediatrician three times, stating that the child was in discomfort and that the mother had heard a strange popping sound when she picked up the child.

The pediatrician finally had X-rays taken, which revealed the broken ribs. She then testified on the basis of the radiologist’s findings that the breaks had occurred in the parents’ care. A test done for brittle bone disease was negative. However, the child had been born with lungs full of fluid and was flown by helicopter to a neonatal intensive care unit where she remained for nine days. She underwent many extraordinary procedures, which ultimately saved her life. (Only 17 percent of children born with these complications survive.) My suspicion was that the treatment that saved the child’s life had also compromised the integrity of her bones.

This was going to be a hard sell. Even the attorney who hired me was inclined to believe the medical experts over my unconfirmed suspicions. I searched the Web for confirmatory evidence differentiating abuse from other medical problems. Several articles talked about the various stages of healing fractures. I read the American Medical Association’s (AMA) paper on expert testimony, available on the Truth In Justice Web site, which referenced a paper citing a case virtually identical to ours in some important respects yet significantly different in others. This paper stated unequivocally that it is impossible to accurately date broken bones in a five-week-old infant.

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back if they believe they performed an unnecessary procedure as well as possible civil and/or criminal litigation and/or license suspension if they fail to spot and report suspected abuse. It is also a fundamental truth, as noted application-of-science-in-the-courtroom researcher Stephen Ceci pointed out in an interview with "Frontline," that when one side or the other hires us we want to be “part of the team.” Even when we are trying to be objective, our evidence is filtered through the eyes of the "experts" who are providing information.

Medical and/or other scientific evidence decides an increasing number of legal cases, especially abuse cases in which the children are not old enough to testify themselves. It seems unlikely, however, that the state will follow the AMA recommendation that every effort be made to hire objective experts, preferably having them selected by the court. To do so is not the customary method of proceeding in our adversarial system. Moreover, it takes power out of the hands of the attorneys on both sides of the case to influence the outcome. Judges, who are lawyers also, are unlikely to make a decision that they would perceive as limiting the ability of attorneys to present their case.

It is, however, very difficult for even a well-educated and capable judiciary to determine the validity of scientific evidence. Most courts are not even very familiar with proper forensic procedures, though this problem could be corrected. Educating the courts regarding these procedures is a part of any forensic professional’s job, but it must be done tactfully, and the courts must recognize how important this education is to making just decisions. The success of attorney and professor of law Barry Scheck’s Innocence Project, freeing dozens of innocent people from death row through his understanding of the importance of DNA evidence, is proof enough of the need for all legal professionals to acquire at least a rudimentary understanding of forensic procedures.

It is also very troubling to me that in this case the prosecution/attorney general’s office was seeking only a finding of abuse, not a criminal conviction. Such a finding requires only a preponderance of evidence, not even clear and convincing evidence, and definitely not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. One judge suggested to me that a preponderance of evidence in such a case is significantly less than 51 percent. In other words, the burden of proof is on the accused.

There is no doubt that such a finding in this case would have resulted in the defendants being deprived of something more dear to most people than life, liberty, or property -- their own flesh and blood; their children. Furthermore, this was to be done with flawed testimony, a very low standard of proof, and with the burden of proof on the accused. Can this possibly be justice by due process of law?

**Michael G. Brock, MA, LLP, CSW, is a forensic psychologist in private practice at Counseling and Evaluation Services in Wyandotte, Michigan. He has worked in the mental health field since 1974, and has been in full-time private practice since 1985. The majority of his practice in recent years relates to custody issues and allegations of child abuse. He has published in the Michigan Lawyer Weekly, on the Truth in Justice Web site, and has a monthly column in the Detroit Legal News. Brock may be contacted at <michaelgbrock@bignet.net>.

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**When Emotion Takes Control Of Jury Verdicts**

**David A. Bright**

University of New South Wales, Australia

**and**

**Kipling D. Williams**

Macquarie University, Australia

Some crimes are so notorious for their sheer heinousness that they reach mythic proportions. Various instances of serial murders, torture, and unprovoked killing of children elicit feelings of incredulity, hatred, and a rageful desire to bring the perpetrator to justice. As we write this, a trial in the Australian state of South Australia is about to take place that involves the torture and murder of eight people whose bodies were found in barrels of acid. The cry for justice heard at the moment is not that which requires jurors to consider only the evidence presented in trial, weighted properly, and to convict the accused only when the prosecution has "proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt." Rather, it is justice as the vindication of the victims' deaths and the placating of a fearful, vilifying public. This paper is concerned with the impact that odious crimes have on 12 jurors faced with uncensored "blood and guts" evidence in criminal trials.

The legal system maintains the myth that juries are rational decision-makers fueled only by facts and logic, and uncontaminated by passion and emotion. In closing instructions the trial judge will
inform the jury that they are to render a verdict based on the "facts" as established by the evidence presented in the trial. The Australian Law Reform Commission has stated that unfair prejudice could result if the fact finder used evidence to "make a decision on an improper, perhaps emotional basis, i.e., on a basis logically unconnected with the issues in the case." (Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No. 26, Evidence, Vol. 1, Para. 957) However, to suggest that juries remain emotionally unaffected by the proceedings of a criminal trial or that this emotional reaction does not influence decision-making, is to deny that juries are comprised of thinking and feeling human beings. This emotional influence is expected to be most pronounced when the trial involves particularly horrible, grotesque, or sickening details. In parts of the United States these types of crimes are referred to as "heinous" crimes and have been described as "wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman, in that it involves torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery on the victim" (Criminal Code, Georgia). Various factors could contribute to the perception of a crime as "heinous": 1) characteristics of the crime (e.g., post-mortem mutilation, systematic torture); 2) victim characteristics (e.g., very young, vulnerable); and 3) defendant characteristics (e.g., lack of remorse, cold, calculating). When jurors are exposed to these factors or combinations of these factors, they may perceive the crime to be heinous. In the U.S., heinousness is an "aggravating factor" that legally facilitates the death penalty.

The critical point argued in this article is that whereas the heinousness of a crime is rationally expected to influence jury decisions about penalty after the defendant has been found guilty, we believe that the shocking quality of the crime, irrespective of the weight of the evidence, biases jurors to render a guilty verdict in the first place. There are several studies that provide initial support for our argument.

In one study, mock jurors were more likely to deliver guilty verdicts under mandatory death penalty conditions when the crime was more odious. (R.K. Hester and R.E. Smith, "Effects of a Mandatory Death Penalty on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors as a Function of Heinousness of the Crime," Journal of Criminal Justice, 1, 1973, pp. 319-326) The authors suggested that "in the heinous crime condition," feelings of outrage and anger toward the defendant dampened tendencies normally operating on jurors that inhibit them from finding a defendant guilty when the death penalty is the mandatory sentence. Furthermore, lack of confidence in their verdicts did not prevent mock jurors from convicting the defendant when the crime was atrocious.

There is also evidence that when mock jurors are exposed to visually graphic material, they perceive the crime to be more violent and graphic and set significantly lower standards of proof for conviction. (S.M. Kassin and A.A. Garfield, "Blood and Guts: General and Trial Specific Effects of Videotaped Crime Scenes on Mock Jurors," Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 21, 1991, pp. 1456-1472) Mock jurors who saw autopsy photographs were more emotionally affected and more likely to convict. (K.S. Douglas, D.R. Lyon, and J.R.P. Ogloff, "The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors' Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial," Law and Human Behavior, 21, 1997, pp. 485-501) As the emotional distress of mock jurors increased, so did their belief that the defendant was guilty. This research also demonstrated that mock jurors were unable or unwilling to admit the influence of the photographs on their decisions, nor were they able to set aside this bias when directed to do so in judges' instructions.

Recent mock-jury studies in our laboratories at the University of New South Wales compared jury verdicts in a case which included very gruesome details of murder-mutilation, with jury verdicts in a case which involved less gruesome details of murder without mutilation of the victim. We found that regardless of strength of the evidence, there were more guilty verdicts for those seen as highly heinousness compared to those that were less shocking. (J. Chew and K.D. Williams, "The Effectiveness of Crime Heinousness on Juror Decision Making: A Case of Jury Vilification," Presented at the Society for Australasian Social Psychology, Fremantle, Australia, April, 2000). We interpret the results of our studies as suggesting that mock jurors' decisions occur via a non-rational, emotion-based process.

Typical rational-logical models of jury decision-making suggest that the jury listens to conflicting evidence from multiple sources and integrates this information into a decision. Presumably, each juror arrives at a subjective likelihood that the defendant is guilty and then compares it with some threshold of reasonable doubt, for example, beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases. These traditional models, however, do not allow for the influ-
ence of emotional or non-rational influences. When a crime is perceived to be dreadful, jurors may use their emotional state like a decision "short-cut," leading to either 1) increased subjective likelihood of guilt which is independent of the strength of the prosecution evidence or 2) an increase in the amount of doubt which is considered reasonable. Either route makes conviction a more likely outcome. It is also possible that a cognitive process is bypassed altogether by a strong desire to convict, simply to provide the family of the victims with some sort of satisfaction, and to relieve society’s distress and fear. We refer to any of these paths toward indiscriminate guilty verdicts as "heinousness-vilification."

Our current research seeks to test this "heinousness-vilification" effect. If our hunches are supported, it will challenge traditional legal notions of an unemotional jury that derives its conclusions based on logic and reason, and will enhance current models of jury decision-making. Critically, the heinousness-vilification process describes a predictable mechanism by which innocent persons may be found guilty. Convictions that result through this heinousness-vilification route are not based purely on logic and fact, but are colored by emotion. A fearful, vilifying public, represented by the jury, do not demand conviction based only upon logic and rational decision processes. They demand that someone be held accountable for brutal and inhumane crimes, to vindicate the victims' deaths and to restore a sense of justice.

David A. Bright is currently a student at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia, where he is enrolled in the combined Master of Psychology (Forensic)/PhD program. His main research interests are in the factors that influence legal decision-making and trial tactics. He may be reached at <David.Bright@psy.unsw.edu.au>.

Kipling D. Williams, PhD, is Professor of Psychology at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. He is interested in many issues related to psychology and law, including the biasing influence of judges’ instructions, problems with eyewitness memory and testimony, and tactics used in the courtroom. He may be reached at <kip@psy.mq.edu.au>.

The Execution of Timothy McVeigh: Psychohistorical Clues Amidst Cultural Mystification

Howard F. Stein
University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center

In many respects, the execution by lethal injection of Timothy McVeigh at the federal prison in Terre Haute, Indiana, on June 11, 2001, was simultaneously an Oklahoma City, an Oklahoma, an United States, and a world event. His death was the first federal execution in 38 years. It marked the final official act in the cultural drama that publicly began on April 19, 1995, when his truckbomb blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. It killed 168 people, injured over 600 people, damaged or destroyed dozens of buildings in a wide radius of downtown Oklahoma City, and shattered the mythic invulnerability of the American “Heartland.” I shall argue that McVeigh's execution is both a product of American fantasy interacting with his own fantasies, and grist for the production of further fantasy and historical action.

This paper explores what the execution might “mean” and “feel like” at many psychohistorical levels. It further explores many themes in McVeigh's life and how they coalesce into his later identity. It contrasts psychohistorical efforts to understand, with cultural efforts to mystify -- together with the cultural proscription against allowing a villain to be human. In particular, it explores the unconscious link between McVeigh and the national group -- and the reciprocal conscious disavowal of any connection. More implicitly than explicitly, it explores the relation between units we often label as “culture” and “personality,” “group fantasy” and “individual psychology.” At best, this study will be incomplete -- and perhaps incompletable. Still, one must go on such clues as one can find.

Public officials, media professionals, and
McVeigh had died "unrepentant," "unremorseful." If McVeigh’s deed was itself dastardly enough, his calling the death of the children in the day care center "collateral damage" worsened its hurt. His impassive emotion and “defiant glare” during the execution were incomprehensible. There was mostly revulsion at so “monstrous” a being and relief that “he is no longer on this earth and can’t hurt anyone else.” There was little effort to further understand his action. I sensed that it was no longer a person being killed, but a vile “thing” being snuffed out -- a very deviant, bizarre, alien thing. Nowhere did I hear the word “killed” used. The language was that of clinical and legal “procedure.” With his death, there is widespread demand for “closure” -- the term that was also widely used for an ending to rumination, anxiety, and grief several months after the bombing. The quest for defensive finality often makes impossible the ability to learn from experience.

Throughout the trial, the sentencing, the life on death row, and the execution, Timothy McVeigh projected the demeanor of a soldier caught by enemy forces, tried, and condemned to death. From the time of the 1991 Gulf War to the moment of his death, his personal identity of soldier-patriot is essential to comprehending his public actions. At the same time, the public and media image of his identity is one of progression from "All American Boy" to "All American Monster," from a “friendly small town boy” (in Pendleton, upstate New York) into a “mass murderer,” and from a “happy-go-lucky teen-ager” and “model soldier” to a “disillusioned veteran.” The "soldier"-persona who bombed the Murrah Building is part of the monstrosity. The two identities, and their discourses, collided. (See Brandon M. Stickney, All-American Monster: The Unauthorized Biography of Timothy McVeigh, 1996.) Part of the “collision” is an utter separation, within American cultural ideology, between “individual” psychology and “group” psychology -- as a result of which any link between McVeigh and the national group is disavowed.

Recollected facts of Timothy McVeigh’s childhood and youth blur into cultural legend, one virtually identical with that of the assailants at the Columbine, Colorado, high school, in April, 1999. (See my paper, “Disposable Youth,” in the Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, Fall 2000.) McVeigh was variously described as nice, happy, shy, talkative, and an ordinary kid. Psychohistory would need to become a stimulus-response enterprise if one were inclined to attempt to extrapolate from military targets. McVeigh later appropriated the term for his own purposes, suggesting an identification with the very aggressor he had come to hate.

During the Gulf War, he was already reading and recommending -- the Turner Diaries, a novel depicting revolution against the federal government and bombing of its buildings. Despite his misgivings, McVeigh still continued to fuse the images of fighting for his country with fighting for his government. At the same time, “there seemed to be two Tim McVeighs: The disciplined, super-efficient soldier … and the budding survivalist who believed some of doomsday was on the way and rented a storage locker to stockpile supplies.” (Sharon Cohen, “America’s Home Grown Terrorist,” <multihome.www.opus1com/ian/PRIVATE/2001/05/05/2001050519380274.html>) Soon, the army identity and the soldier identity parted ways. Defense of country increasingly merged with survivalism.

McVeigh regularly attended weekend gun shows, at which conspiracy theories abounded. One may infer that splitting, projection, and rationalization came to dominate his mental organization

With the FBI siege of and assault on the Branch Davidian compound outside Waco, Texas, on April 19, 1993, McVeigh’s soldier-identity completed a radical ideological transformation -- one akin to the kind of moral conversion that we commonly associate with religious fervor. What Erik Erikson called a “totalistic” identity emerged. At least consciously, McVeigh could not comprehend how women and children in the compound could be endangered by their own government. He gave little thought to the risk that was created within the compound by the religious leader. To his death, McVeigh continued to regard himself as a patriot, but now one engaged in fighting for his country by waging war against his government. Perhaps political reality came to match his growing paranoia, one now formulated into a personal ideology. There occurred a radical split between country and government.

The date of April 19 took on double symbolic significance for McVeigh: it was not only the date of the destruction of the Branch Davidian compound, but it was the anniversary of the beginning of the Battle of Lexington and Concord, which launched the American Revolutionary War in 1775. He had hoped that his assault on the Oklahoma City federal building would spark a second American Revolution. The Waco calamity became for McVeigh what Vamik Volkan (Blood Lines, 1997) terms a “chosen trauma,” that is, a public event that continues to reverberate with personal, often group, unconscious, symbolic significance for years if not for centuries. However, in this case, personal symbol did not serve as, or become, group symbol. There was, to be sure, widespread free-floating rage throughout American society, as can be evidenced by the numerous school and workplace shootings. There was not, however, the kind of focused group fantasy and rage such as had characterized the Cold War.

Public discourse has focused on the Oklahoma City bombing as revenge for the Waco attack. One may speculate that McVeigh unconsciously identified with Waco-as-victim, and government-as-aggressor, even as he consciously identified with the avenging soldier-patriot. Ultimately, as a soldier he not only wished to fight for his country, but -- in his own way -- to die for his country as well, even if at the hands of his own government. The identities of soldier-as-victim and soldier-as-martyr for his fantasized country help to explain much of McVeigh’s later actions, including those at his death. At least part of his inept escape plan can speculatively be ascribed to his need to provoke his own victimhood. With so little to go on about the interior of his childhood and of his unconscious in adulthood, one may nonetheless further speculate that the national outrage against him enacted the literal realization of his internal bad objects. His need to punish was inseparable from the need to be punished.

From his surrender to the police in Perry, Oklahoma, on the day of the bombing to his execution, he submitted utterly to the government he despised. He enlisted the government in his act of self-destruction. One may be forgiven for speculating that beneath the identity of patriot-martyr is that of masochist. Columnist Arthur Spiegelman writes that:

McVeigh had described his execution as a state-assisted suicide and he was a willing partner. He was cordial when prison Warden Harley Lappin spent a half-hour with him describing how he would die. He was cooperative when guards strapped him to a gurney and wrapped him so tight that he looked like a mummy. (http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010611/ts/mcveigh_leadall_dc_dc_27.html)

For his final statement, McVeigh wrote out and recited the 1875 poem, “Invictus” (“Undefeated”) by the crippled poet William Ernest Henley. The quotation -- and the identification with Henley that underlies it -- is significant in understanding McVeigh. Henley had been crippled in childhood by tuberculosis; one foot was later amputated; and he had a lengthy hospitalization at the end of his life. Henley’s lines, “I am the master of my fate: / I am the captain of my soul,” make a clarion call for resolve in the face of great suffering. For McVeigh, final mastery is through death. It is as if in death he believes that he will still not be defeated, that he will not really die. He appeals, I think, to core American attitudes and values, but now used for idiosyncratic delusional purposes. His choice of poem and poet is a personal testimony. While he consciously identifies with mastery, he once again unconsciously identifies with passive victimhood.

His final, “defiant glare” from the gurney may derive from the same source: to see, to stare,
while being watched -- to die. One must wonder about the place occupied by the struggle between seeing and being seen in his early life, and in the dialectic between calmly observing chaos and inducing it in others. The quest to turn passive into active for himself, and active into passive for others, may be a life theme, not only one at the time of his death.

A letter from Dr. David Levine (June 25, 2001, quoted with permission) may shed further light on McVeigh's seeming contradictions. McVeigh's claim to master his fate seems more like McVeigh's "wished for than actual self, more like the self he has lost than the one he has." He had, after all, spent much of his adult life in total institutions such as the military and prison. Forces outside himself controlled him, forces he later may have internalized. The conflict between controlling one's destiny and being controlled by others is a central theme in McVeigh's identity and in his later life. In doing the bombing, "McVeigh attempts to, and succeeds in, transferring his own feelings of loss, deprivation, and associated rage, onto the families of the victims of the bombing."

In the drama of the bombing, the trial, and the execution, everyone feels lost and out of control, and tries to diminish the anxiety and rage it unleashes. A prevailing means of doing this is to induce those same feelings in the others. Each will do anything to try to escape the experience, feelings, and role of victim. The self that McVeigh lost and laments is the "master" and "captain" he wishes he could still be. His lament is also a protest, via magical thinking, that this self can be reclaimed in his hour of death. One could claim that McVeigh's, the survivors', and Americans' anxieties converged if not coalesced around the issue of control.

McVeigh's self-ideal could not have been more at odds with his final reality. Hence the quality of lament to his resolute protest -- an attempt to reverse what was all too real. There is yet another level of significance to the poem: if the active pursuit of martyrdom in fact characterized much of his later life, then in his execution he may well have been the master (or at least provocateur) of his fate. Such are the complexities of unconscious overdeterminism.

So many questions remain, among them: What early family life and unconscious structure prefigured his adolescent wandering in search of identity, and found it in that of the soldier -- and later, the bomber? Of all the catastrophes that occur, “natural” and “social,” what underlay the psychological specificity in his choice of the Waco assault as core personal symbol? Are there echoes of his childhood in the betrayal and rage he felt at the federal raid on the Waco compound? What is the psychohistorical meaning of the utter disavowal and revulsion so many Americans have for McVeigh? Is reaction formation, and unconscious identification, in part at work? What can and will Americans learn from the bombing, the trial, and the execution of Timothy McVeigh? How will the survivalists, and the larger American society, use McVeigh’s death in the future? What will be the group cultural consequences of having destroyed potential new knowledge in the killing of McVeigh? That is, what will we do from having renounced wanting to know and to feel?

Permit me some speculation. We are clearly in a mood to act rather than to think, feel, or reflect. In refusing to try to understand McVeigh, we are via displacement also refusing to examine painful parts of ourselves. There have been increasing numbers of executions for heinous crimes. One may expect that, in times of increasing crossing and blurring of boundaries -- including the equivocal 2000 Presidential election results -- there will be increased persecutory anxiety and border vigilance. When a distinctive "other" (a "them") can be found, the "us" are both vindictive and vindicated. In that sense, McVeigh is victim of the group fantasy he helped to unleash upon himself. One may conjecture that both government spokesmen and McVeigh used the term "collateral damage" to emotionally distance themselves from the deaths of those they had not consciously intended to kill -- for instance, to diminish a sense of guilt. Even the word "kill" was virtually taboo in official accounts of the Gulf War, in McVeigh's own discourse about the bombing, and in the procedural-clinical language of his execution. One may expect similar intellectualizations and rationalizations to help justify violent actions in the future. For instance, when adversaries engage in the same type of act, what "we" do will be called "good" and "right," while what "they" do will be called "evil" and "wrong" -- and will in turn be invoked to legitimate further action.

To great profit, psychohistorians and others have explored the lives and movements of successful leaders. Psychobiography and group psychohistory has examined the psychological fit between leaders and followers. With the life and death of Timothy McVeigh we encounter the phenomenon
of what Weston La Barre termed the "failed prophet" (*The Ghost Dance*, 1972), that is, one whose message and redemptive plan failed to correspond to widely shared wish conveyed in symbolically acceptable guise or form. Far from sparking a new American Revolution, McVeigh succeeded in marshalling unforgiving retaliation -- official and popular -- upon a person who wrongly presumed to speak for his national group. Sgt. Timothy McVeigh gave his life for a country that could not recognize him as its devoted soldier.

*Howard F. Stein, PhD, a psychoanalytic anthropologist and psychohistorian, is Professor in the Department of Family and Preventive Medicine at the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center. He is a prolific author who has written widely on American cultural topics, including the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. His most recent book, a study of workplace organizations, is titled *Nothing Personal, Just Business: A Guided Journey into Organizational Darkness* (2001). Address electronic correspondence to <howard-stein@ouhsc.edu>.*

### The Prison Band

**H. John Rogers**  
Attorney-at-Law

In 1963, I worked as a guard at the old West Virginia Penitentiary in Moundsville for about nine months. I learned that to deter homosexual conduct, the administration required prisoners caught *flagrante delicto* to wear pants with a yellow stripe sewed down the outside of their pants legs.

One interesting nuance of prison sex life is that it is the passive male ("punk") who is considered to be homosexual and not the person who initiates the contact. This is true even though the "punk" may be an involuntary participant, while the aggressor ("jocker") has been surveying the new arrivals for months looking for a sex partner.

An inmate at Moundsville told me, "It may come down to whether you want to be gang-raped everyday or whether you get yourself a 'daddy'," and conditions do not appear to have changed much over the intervening decades. In the large prisons with a high proportion of the inmates doing long sentences, predators stalk the new arrivals in much the same fashion that wolves or hyenas do their prey, i.e., they wait for someone who is separated from the herd and then attack. A sanitized version of this scenario was presented in *The Shawshank Redemption*.

E. Michael McCann, the Milwaukee County (Wisconsin) District Attorney, points out in the *ABA Journal* that "death-before-dishonor thinking may literally lead to that result. He tells about a recent case where a young inmate fought to the death rather than submit to rape. There were four men in the cell and "Everyone slept through it," McCann said. "It is extremely difficult to prove," tacitly acknowledging that no serious prosecution followed this brutal murder.

A complaint to prison authorities -- if it's not shrugged off or ignored -- can well provoke a "broken-bones" assault from the pack. Private retaliation is a chancy proposition against a band of hardcore "jockers," so a new inmate's options in dealing with persistent suitors are rather limited.

Although there are few, if any, people involved with prisons who deny the fact of prison rape, the decided tendency is to dismiss it as "voluntary," minimize it, or look upon sexual assault as just part of incarceration, like bad food or inadequate medical care. The mother of a prison rape victim in Illinois who formed Mothers Against Prison Rape says in a recent article in *National Review* that rape serves as a prison management tool: "They [the administrators] know they'll [the inmates] be in an uproar if they don't get something to release their sex drive, and usually it's young, nonviolent inmates of a different race [who are their victims]." In the same article, the author cites a study using extrapolated figures (there are no accurate statistics on the subject) to the effect that "over 240,000 men get raped in prison every year." This is in contrast to U.S. Department of Justice figures in 1999 that state that 141,000 women were victims of rape. (None of the women were raped continuously over the course of the year as some of the males may have been.)

Donna Brorbythe, lead counsel in a Texas prison reform case, explained in a *New York Times* story how prison rape complaints are viewed in the Lone Star state: "In the Texas prison system, where I spent months interviewing prisoners, the policy, of course not written, is to leave it up to each prisoner to defend himself, and to consider people who don't fight off their attackers to be consenting." In the same story, Willis Sargeant, a prison warden in Arkansas, is quoted as testifying that prisoners bear the responsibility for resisting sexual advances by letting others know that they are "not going to put
up with that."

Sargeant is a defendant in a suit brought by an Arkansas prisoner who was serving time on a fraudulent check conviction. The prisoner claimed that he was raped by more than 20 different inmates in one year and contracted AIDS as a result of the assaults. "Safe sex" is not very high on the list of priorities of prison rapists. A guard at the old Moundsville penitentiary whom I knew socially told me shortly before the prison closed in 1995 of a highly promiscuous inmate ("slut") who was HIV-positive but who was daily available for anal intercourse in the New Wall section of the prison. According to the guard, even though this man's medical status was common knowledge, he had no lack of suitors. Consequently, a young inmate serving a short sentence could easily become infected, receiving at the hands of the legal system an extra-legal death sentence.

A federal civil rights suit filed by former inmate Eddie Dillard is set for trial in January in Fresno, California. He alleges that prison officials put him in a cell with the "Booty Bandit," a 6'3", 230-pound convicted murderer, as punishment for kicking a female correctional officer. Dillard, a 120-pound first offender, says that he was repeatedly beaten and raped over the next two days by the "Booty Bandit." (The "Booty Bandit" and a former prison guard are among Dillard's witnesses.) The New York Times quotes a Human Rights Watch spokesperson as saying, "This is about as strong a case as there is. If Dillard loses this one, it will be hard to avoid the conclusion that there's no point taking these cases to court." In the ABA Journal, Dillard's lawyer is even more blunt: "If Eddie Dillard can't get justice for what he's been through, then we need to ask ourselves, 'Is the system just?'"

Recently, I conducted an informal survey of inmates that I knew at several West Virginia state prisons and regional jails. Inmate rape does seem to be a major problem. The "classic" victim of the sexual predators, one inmate says, is the new "fish," someone who's "22 going on 15. He looks so very young and tender. Sometimes he is." Another inmate sets out the basic scenario:

When "Joey" enters the prison he will immediately become the object of much attention. Some will literally be willing to kill each other for the rights to control this young flesh. Joey is more than a little intimidated by his surroundings, having heard all the horror stories of prison prior to coming. He knows that there is a big soul brother waiting for him to become his new wife. Joey will be visited by suitors of all shapes and colors. He'll be assured that he will be given complete protection from all others and never have to spend a dime at the prison store. In West Virginia, if an [inmate] adamantly refuses to submit and fights every attempt to become ensnared, he'll soon be left alone. But if he shows any weakness, the next line of predators, and these are much tougher than the first, will pounce on him. And from them there, will be no escape. Joey will be beaten into submission.

Incarceration seems to work for a psychological regression back to the level of the grade school playground. However, the bully who for some reason (or no reason) is out to get someone else, is now larger, stronger, and much more lethal than his youthful counterpart. Further, the adults on this playground afford little or no protection from the bully. There's always some comer that's out of sight -- the showers are legendary -- where the bully can confront his intended alone.

Many of the early feminists argued that heterosexual rape is a violent act and not a sexual one. Violence and intentional humiliation definitely are major elements in prison rape, too, especially with the predators. "When Bubba comes after you, it's not because he likes you," an inmate said. "He just wants to see the look on your face." We send people to prison to punish them for their crimes. We should not convert them into involuntary "boy-toys" to help hard-core "jockers" pass the time. The West Virginia Code does not say that the punishment for, say, manslaughter, includes involuntary sodomy or fellatio.

Some inmates develop monogamous relationships, which for the "punk" almost becomes a caricature of a heterosexual marriage. The "punk" may remove his body hair and otherwise feminize himself. His domestic duties may include keeping the cell clean, doing laundry, and occasionally providing sexual services for his "daddy's" friends and associates. The "daddy's" life isn't all bliss, however. He has to be prepared to fight for his "punk" and must be continually on guard against rivals. For the most part, this is what sociologists refer to as "situational homosexuality," i.e., people who because of the absence of heterosexual opportunity become same-sex oriented. Of course, in prison life, as is suggested above, the decision to become a "punk" may be more predicated on vi et armis
[literally, by force and arms] than one's wish to come out of the closet. It is hard to quantify the psychological damage resulting from being forced into several years of "situational homosexuality." Some may be scathed, some may suffer no lasting damage.

On an afternoon in the old North Hall at Moundsville, I had a conversation with a young inmate about the yellow stripes on his pantlegs. "Nah, it doesn't bother me," he said. "Everybody knows that I'm so-and-so's 'punk'." But what about when his family comes to visit? "Oh, I just tell 'em that I'm in the prison band.'"

H. John Rogers, Esq., worked as a prison guard prior to graduating from Harvard University. This West Virginia attorney has some psychoanalytic training and a strong interest in politics. Recently, he became a Protestant minister.

Comments in Response to “The Prison Band”
Kevin J. McCamant Patuxent Institution, Maryland

I would like to respond to two specific issues raised in “The Prison Band.” The first has to do with the phenomenon of rape in relation to “normative” prison sexuality. The second has to do with administrative and societal attitudes about prison rape. Specifically, that denial of the very existence of rape in prison, or its acceptance and rationalization as part of prison’s harshness, may be acting out of unconscious (or perhaps even conscious) sadism on the part of administrators and society.

Sex is a powerful human desire that is hardly extinguished by incarceration. In prison it surfaces in complex and various forms. These run the gamut from homemade *faux* vaginas called “fi fi’s” used for masturbation by male inmates, through contact between opposite-sex staff and inmates, contact between opposite-sex inmates (when they are housed in the same compound), and contact between same-sex inmates that is either incidental or occurs in the context of some sort of longer term relationship.

Attachment and power appear to be ubiquitous forces in relationships. For most people it appears that attachment is the fundamental force that connects them to others and power is at play within that fundamental context. However, for others, including some prison staff and inmates who have significant antisocial components in their personality structures, the power gradient or place in the hierarchy appears to be the fundamental force that drives their mode of relating, attachment being a secondary consideration, and sometimes not a consideration at all.

Sex for most people tends to occur within the context of an attachment relationship. However, the picture may be different for people involved in the “street life” and in prison. A woman in the “street life,” devalued as property and as a sex object, has a lower position in the power hierarchy. A man in prison who is relegated to the role of “bitch” or “punk” is feminized and thus devalued within the framework of the prison worldview. It makes no difference if he arrived at this state as a consensual homosexual or by the more common route of caving into intimidation or to coercion.

Rape in prison, like rape outside of prison, may in some cases serve the purpose of gratifying sexual desire, but certainly involves issues of power, control, and aggression. Significantly, typologies of rapists developed by clinicians working with sexual assailants commonly differentiate meanings of aggression and of sexuality within the greater phenomenon of rape.

For some rapists the aim of aggression is primarily to obtain compliance of a partner (victim) for the purpose of sexual gratification, and only so much force as is necessary to achieve compliance will be employed. The sexual behavior may often be an expression of a romanticized sexual fantasy, or it may be an impulsive, situationally determined predatory act. For other rapists, sex appears to be the exquisite vehicle for hurting and humiliating the victim, for expressing anger or rage or sexually sadistic fantasies. In “The Prison Band,” there is allusion to some if not all of these categories of rapists.

With regard to societal and administrative attitudes toward rape in prison, people in society view homosexual rape as a particularly terrifying and humiliating aspect of the “mythology” of the prison experience at large. Yet, as the author of “The Prison Band” points out, prison rape is statistically underrepresented, and to the extent that it is acknowledged, it seems to be accepted and rationalized as part of the harshness of prison life.

I would interpret this as acting out toward inmates, and as having meaning analogous to that which is the case when the rape by one inmate
against another is expressive of sexually sadistic fantasies. Other unsavory aspects of prison life such as crowding, minimal medical care, unsanitary living conditions, and bad food may also be aspects of conscious and unconscious sadism toward inmates. However, in a society that tends to be homophobic and to view sex as dirty, tacit complicity in sexual assault becomes an especial form of exquisite humiliation and punishment.

My commentary on these two issues raised by “The Prison Band” is a gross oversimplification. This is true not only for the issue of rape in the context of prison sexuality and the prison power hierarchy. It is also true of the way in which society and prison administration may act toward inmates as some inmates act toward each other in order to obtain the gratification of control and humiliation. Nevertheless, I hope it may stimulate consideration of how we relate to these issues within ourselves. My belief is that, if we can identify, acknowledge, and work with our own issues around these matters, it will lessen the impetus to act them out institutionally. This, in turn might contribute to more humane prisons, which might have a better chance of reclaiming the lives of some of the incarcerated.

See profile of the author on page 58.

Sexual Visitation Reduces Prison Rape in Brazil

Fernando Salla
Center for the Study of Violence of São Paulo University, Brazil

Prison rape is an extremely violent, damaging aspect of prison life, yet researchers and prison staff do not have good data on it, nor has there been consistent analysis of it. The number of cases is underestimated because victims are ashamed and fearful of retaliation from the rapists and their friends. Nor do they believe their custodians are willing and able to effectively deal with the problem. Frequently, guards and administrators consider the sexual victimization of vulnerable prisoners to be inevitable. Prison staff uses rape, or the threat of rape, to control inmates: manage gangs, contain aggressive inmates, and recruit informers.

Rarely does public opinion focus on this violent practice. Prisoners are seen as deserving the bad food, repugnant odors, and violence associated with incarceration. Rape is perceived as part of the prison subculture and tolerated by the majority of society. The government is embarrassed by the rape of prisoners in their custody. Indeed, prison assaults, rapes, and homicides are gross human rights violations. The prison administrators know that potential victims are usually young, non-violent, first-time offenders from the middle class (without gang affiliations), but almost nothing is done to protect these likely victims from the aggressors.

A partial solution to prison rape was introduced in the late 1980s in the State of São Paulo, Brazil. In this program, adult male prisoners are allowed to have sexual relations with female visitors. The prison staff only register and search the women visitors who are wives, mistresses, and girlfriends. It is the responsibility of prisoners to prepare cells for the weekly sexual visits. Visits are regulated by severe rules created by the prisoners: there is harsh punishment for any lapse, such as annoying a woman or staring at a fellow inmate’s wife or girlfriend.

At the time of its initiation, sexual visitation was strongly criticized by prison staff and conservative groups. Predictably, the results are much more positive than negative. Firstly, prison rape has decreased enormously. Secondly, some prisoners are maintaining family ties and intimate relationships, alleviating the tensions of incarceration. Naturally, general prison violence has not stopped: homicide, assault, and stabbing remain commonplace in Brazilian prisons. Yet rape has been reduced in prisons where prisoners are allowed to have sexual relations with female visitors.

The House of Detention of São Paulo is one of the largest and most violent prisons in South America, with an average of 7,000 prisoners who are detained, awaiting trial, or sentenced. In a survey published in 1991, 90 percent of the prisoners interviewed thought that sexual visits reduced sexual violence among prisoners. Although 64 percent of the prisoners interviewed didn’t have any sexual visits and only 25 percent had sexual visits weekly, this impressive majority judged that these visits had positive effects on prison life. The warden concurred that sexual visitation had reduced prison rape.

Fernando Salla, PhD, is a sociologist and Senior Researcher at the Center for the Study of Violence of São Paulo University in Brazil. He is author of the book, As Prisões em São Paulo: 1822-1940. He may be reached at <fersalla@usp.br>.
America's Prisons: Corrections or Rehabilitation?

Alan Jacobs

IDEA and H-Genocide

Any observer of the current state of criminal imprisonment in the United States can easily conclude that the system is desperately in need of reform. Many prisoners, perhaps even hundreds of thousands, can be rehabilitated and become law-abiding citizens. As a former consultant to an extremely successful rehabilitation program, I participated in its successes. And I witnessed the ultimate rejection of the program by a prison system leaning heavily toward punishment and warehousing of criminal offenders.

This article is an attempt to convince the reader that effective rehabilitation is possible, albeit not easy -- therapeutically, socially or politically. It describes briefly some of the climate in the prison system and then a successful rehabilitation program -- its treatment philosophy and successes, and its political and social failures.

It is no secret that in the past 20 years, the U.S. prison system has grown from about 400,000 incarcerated individuals to 1.8 million in 1998. (National Center for Policy Analysis Idea House, www.ncpa.org/pi/crime/pd031599d.html) Between 1990 and midyear 1999, the incarcerated population grew an average 5.7 percent per year. State and federal prison authorities had under their jurisdiction 1,366,721 inmates at year-end in 1999 and 1,284,894 were physically in their custody. (U.S. Dept of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Corrections Statistics <www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/correct.htm#findings>) In addition, 4.5 million adult men and women were on probation or parole. (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Statistics <www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pandp.htm>)

This author is not, what could be termed by advocates of hard punishment for criminals, "a do-gooder liberal who would set rapists, murderers, and child molesters loose on the streets." There are many people in prison I would not want anywhere near my family or friends, or the family and friends of anyone else. There are people in prison who would squash you like one swats an annoying mosquito, or with the same relish that small boys set fire to ant hills or torture cats. Nor am I naive about the difficulties of rehabilitating criminals. I have been a psychological consultant at the toughest prison in the United States, the Federal Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, the prison that was built to, and did, replace Alcatraz and that was known as "the end of the line." I have also consulted at several other federal and state prisons.

From my experience, I would estimate that about 20 percent of the men and women in prison could be rehabilitated long-term. Unfortunately, many of them resume lives of crime upon their release because of the paucity of rehabilitation programs in prisons. Part of the problem, it is said, is that it is too expensive and time consuming to rehabilitate criminals and that the amount of return on the investment is not large enough. In other words, a lot of money has to be spent to rehabilitate only a small percentage of prisoners. This was and is true, and it does present a realistic problem.

It is my observation that the recent problem of emphasizing sentencing to incarceration rather than rehabilitating developed in the 1970s under then Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Norman Carlson (Director, 1970-1987), an advocate of corrections even at the expense of functioning, successful rehabilitation programs. At that time, large though varying percentages of the public, the press, and corrections professionals supported Carlson's position of emphasizing corrections over rehabilitation. Supporters of corrections are concerned mostly with punishment and warehousing of prisoners, what is now known as a "get tough policy." Rehabilitation supporters advocate returning inmates to society as functioning, working, law-abiding citizens.

Twenty-five years ago there were extremely promising possibilities and even results that by now might have been expanded to include many more prisoners and create many types of creative programs. There had been a chance to find out much more about the criminal mind and what it took to change it, and to return prisoners to society as effective adults. One of the most hopeful approaches of its time, 1969-1978 was the Asklepieion Therapeutic Community program started at U.S. Penitentiary (USP) Marion by Martin Groder, MD, a young psychiatrist doing alternative service with the U.S. Public Health Service during the Vietnam War. Dr. Groder had been influenced by the early work of Dr. Eric Berne's transactional analysis, and by the technique used by the early Synanon Program for heroin addicts called "the Game" in which participants could say whatever
they wanted. These influences occurred before the former became co-opted as an "I'm OK, You're OK" pop-psychology or the latter became an oppressive, violent cult.

A Game could be called by anyone at any time and the whole community, regardless of their job in the general prison population, or where they were, had to report to the group room. There an "indictment" or confrontation would be presented. The confronted person was required to answer it. It could be over the slightest infraction, for example, say failure to mop a floor correctly or to make one's bunk, or for more serious offenses like threatening someone or stealing. Everyone was enjoined to stay in their seat and violence was forbidden. Videotaping was used to help prisoners reflect on their behavior. At USP Marion, the Game was used to reveal deeper insight and awareness, thus forming the basis for catharsis, reflection, and decisions about changing behavior and leading a different kind of life.

Another important aspect of the Asklepieion program was psychodrama, which helped prisoners re-experience early life trauma by re-enacting early incidents, leading to emotional catharsis and developing new forms of behavior. Asklepieion also recognized that a therapeutic system in a prison setting is ultimately doomed to failure, as the prisoners will co-opt it socially, psychologically, and politically -- adapt it to prison culture. To counteract this, Asklepieion shifted therapeutic approaches at a moment's notice, and from time to time introduced different forms of therapy. The only consistent factor was the Game.

Of the 500 inmates at Marion, only about 40 were in the program at any one time. Many who applied were refused admission; those accepted had to be sincere and genuine about wanting to change their lives. During a 10-year period, about 250 men were graduated to the street with just less than 12 percent recidivism over that period of time, far below the national averages. Of 108,580 persons released from prisons in 11 states in 1983, an estimated 62.5 percent were rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor within 3 years, 46.8 percent were reconvicted, and 41.4 percent were returned to prison or jail. (U.S. Dept of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Offenders Statistics <www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#recidivism>) (As the records were lost when the Bureau of Prisons closed the Asklepieion program, we have no way of knowing what the recidivism was long-term.)

Dr. Groder was appointed warden at the then planned federal maximum-security facility at Butner, North Carolina. He was to be the first psychiatrist-warden in the history of the Federal Bureau of Prisons; no small achievement. Alas, it was not to be. After a rather florid disagreement about the primacy of corrections or rehabilitation at Butner with Director Carlson, he was reassigned to the Federal Prison Hospital at Springfield, Missouri. Dr. Groder resigned from the system, thus beginning the demise of several Asklepieion programs in the nation. Dr. Groder never returned to prison work, becoming a professor of psychiatry at Duke University Medical School and establishing a private psychiatric practice.

The attitude of focusing on corrections, not only over rehabilitation but also in lieu of it, persists in the federal and state prisons today. The resulting lack of funding and institutional support for effective rehabilitation programs certainly contributes to their overall low success rates. Yet we should also be mindful that some responsibility lies with the programs themselves.

All organizations develop a culture, with accepted attitudes, beliefs, value systems, behaviors, and allowable roles. ("Three C's," p.139) Most prisons are formed around a persecutor, victim, and rescuer triangle. (S. Karpman, "Fairy Tales and Script Drama Analysis," Transactional Analysis Bulletin 7, No. 26, pp 39-43; "Three C's," p.139) In the prison there are inmates, guards, and counseling/social work/psychological staff. One's membership in one of these groups defines the way these three roles are perceived. For example, an inmate will see himself as the victim of circum-
stances and the guards, the guards as persecutors, and the counseling staff generally as rescuers. The guards see themselves as rescuers of society from criminals, society as victims of crime, and the inmates as persecutors though their actions; they see the counseling staff as sometimes on their side and sometimes on the side of the inmates. The counselors define themselves as rescuers, the guards as persecutors, and the inmates as victims.

Each person is required by institutional and peer pressure to behave and think within these roles. This keeps inmates in criminal mentality, guards in persecutor mentality, and counseling staff in rescuer mentality. Although each group mistrusts the other, what is trusted is that each will stay in its assigned and prescribed role. What Asklepieion attempted to do was to withdraw from this triangle, step outside the prison culture game, and establish an effective treatment environment. It did succeed in this for quite a while. Prisoners were doing deep psychological work, resolving early life trauma (often severe child abuse), and deciding on new ways of thinking and feeling. Once they changed their behavior many were released from the razor wire [barbed wire], bars, and gun towers.

As should be expected, this attempt to free a program from this locked triumvirate of psychological and behavioral game roles was, of course, met with resistance. All three of the other groups became persecutors with Asklepieion as victim, who then looked to the International Transactional Analysis Association and the press to fill the rescuer role. So the triangular melodrama continued, on an expanded scale. This was totally overlooked by an otherwise effective treatment program and led to its ultimate demise.

The Asklepieion staff and even many outside consultants, failed to enlist the support of the other groups, especially the guards, generally characterizing them as sadists and losers who could not get other kinds of work. There was no effort to socialize outside the prison, go to their holiday cookouts, and do various recreational things together. Asklepieion staff also manifested guard-like attitudes toward the majority of inmates who remained resistant to the Asklepieion program. They also saw the prison staff counselors as ineffective and generally looked down on them. In short, they came to feel superior and arrogant which hurt the cause of the program they served. Then, it was just a matter of time before the program collapsed. Time -- inexorable, immutable time, not money -- is the currency in the prison system.

Among the enormous population of prisoners in the United States, there are about a quarter million who might be rehabilitated and returned to society as useful and law-abiding citizens. Asklepieion is an example of a program that helped prisoners confront their feelings and the anti-social behavior patterns that caused their incarceration. It greatly reduced recidivism. However, in the face of problems with an incarceration-minded Federal Bureau of Prisons and the failure of the reformers to build alliances within the prison system, this valuable program failed.

Nevertheless, rehabilitation should be favored over the warehousing of prisoners. Asklepieion worked because it treated prisoners as equal human beings and was very confrontational. It started with an excellent professional staff and utilized many talented outside consultants. Of great importance was its use of in-depth psychotherapy with prisoner-patients -- teaching them to be therapists themselves and to become role models for others. A program of this kind is not easy -- financially, socially, politically, or organizationally. But with support from all members of the prison system, we will learn to do it more effectively and more economically. It is our best hope for reform.

Alan Jacobs is retired from private practice as a psychotherapist, and has shifted his professional direction to comparative genocide studies and issues of the misuse and abuse of power. Currently he is Editor of IDEA, A Journal Of Social Issues, Editor of Transactional Analysis Journal Internet, and Editor of H-Genocide and a member of the Editorial Board of H- Holocaust (H-NET academic electronic mailing lists). He served as a consultant to Asklepieion Therapeutic Communities in prisons at Marion, Illinois; Oxford, Wisconsin; St. Cloud, Minnesota; El Reno, Oklahoma; and James River, Virginia. In 1996 he received the Eric Berne Memorial Award for Transactional Analysis and Social Applications. Jacobs can be contacted at <ajacobs@bravenewweb.com>.

The Effects of Education on Recidivism

Edryce Reynolds
Pierre College at McNeil Island
Corrections Center
Education can make a difference in the life of prisoners and greatly reduce recidivism. I will describe some of this process based upon my own recent experiences. In 1994, seeking to make a difference as an educator, I began a new career teaching prison inmates about computers. As an instructor for Pierce College in Tacoma, Washington, my assignment is to teach male inmates incarcerated at McNeil Island Corrections Center. For 25-30 hours per week, I teach and supervise inmates who range in age from 18 to over 60 years. Usually there are 16 students (each at his own computer), two inmate teaching assistants, and three inmate tutors. These inmate helpers are the most loyal staff I have ever worked with.

Though the formal content of my curriculum is “computer applications,” the informal content is human development. Our learning environment is cheerful and looks like a college classroom. Inmates are not allowed on the Internet, but I often look things up for them and give them the printouts for various projects. I spend considerable time with the prisoners. Classes run for 10 weeks, starting at 8:00 a.m. and finishing at 9:00 p.m. Over six years in this position has provided me with many opportunities to see that I have indeed made a difference in some inmates’ lives. I also have met the families of a few inmates and observed their determined efforts to keep their families together. Over 90 percent of the prisoners I work with will go back into the community, so it is important for us to help them rebuild their lives.

Prior to taking this position, I knew nothing about prisoners or prisons. (Though I feel that in a sense we are all imprisoned by our prejudices, our blind spots, our belief systems, and our dark side.) Within the corrections center, I have found the prisoners to be cooperative and I have almost always felt safe. I have had one or two vague threats, but after growing up with an angry mother, I am not intimidated by anyone. A number of inmates assured me that should there ever be “trouble” in the institution, that I would be protected.

As I began my new job, I wanted to know if achieving a college education in prison lessened recidivism rates. Several months of research revealed that education does reduce recidivism, though scholars differ on the details. Steven Duguid’s 1996 research in Canadian prisons clearly demonstrated that the higher the education attained while in prison, the lower the recidivism rate. Those who were able to obtain a master’s degree had zero recidivism! Fortified with such encouraging information, I plunged into developing my curriculum and looking for grant money. ("Using Recidivism to Evaluate Effectiveness in Prison Education Programs," Journal of Correctional Education, 1996, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 74-85)

Soon I discovered that grant money is all but nonexistent to support prison education projects. Moreover, despite the literature showing the negative correlation between prison education and recidivism, departments of corrections all over the U.S. refuse to accept the results, declaring the research to be “inconclusive.” Furthermore, anytime there is a budget shortfall, prison education is cut. My attempt to educate Washington State legislators and the leaders of the Department of Corrections about the research were fruitless. Neither group was open to encouraging education. However, they find new sources of revenue to increase security even at our minimum-security prison. Clearly, education and mental health services for inmates are the orphans of the system.

At a Corrections Education Association conference in 1999, a European speaker pointed out that in several European countries, prisoners take courses in life-enriching subjects such as art, philosophy, and music with outstanding success. Ironically, the idea for this approach came from an innovative U.S. warden. In Prisoners Are People (1952), Kenyon Judson Scudder wrote about his California experiment with minimum- and medium-security inmates housed without barbed wire or cellblocks. The prisoners organized themselves into work groups that kept the prison managed effectively and efficiently. It was a great success, generating a movement to apply Scudder’s ideas elsewhere, but World War II intervened and now the California prison that housed his model for reform is just another institution focused on warehousing prisoners.

In coming to understand the problem of incarceration, I have reached the following conclusion: prisons do not rehabilitate, rather they encourage brutality and create more criminals. Departments of Corrections keep increasing staff and facilities, and more inmates come to prison every year -- and the problem grows worse. Though historically the U. S. has been a leader in prison reform, in 2001 we have the highest incarceration rate in the world, recently passing both Russia and China. The U.S. is the only developed nation to have the death penalty. (China does execute more people, but China’s population is about four and one half times that of the U.S.)
The Washington State Department of Corrections' mission statement is "Working Together for Safe Communities." Regrettably, this laudable goal does not include rehabilitation. We need to rethink the idea of prison as merely a short-term way of maintaining community safety and look to the long-term betterment of society and the prisoners. Education continues to be the least expensive approach for helping offenders to rehabilitate themselves. When an inmate begins to learn and discovers he has a good mind, his life begins to change. He also discovers that he is in charge of the process. Many inmates express their gratitude to me for helping them learn.

Two cases stand out in my mind. I remember a 20-year-old black man I will call "Ben," who received one of the last associate's degrees we were allowed to grant before the legislature prohibited this in 1996. In one of my classes he told his story: After dropping out of high school to help support his family, Ben had sold drugs and was arrested. Before the prison education program, he had not known he was smart, but now, equipped with a newfound confidence in his inability to learn, an associate's degree, and renewed self-respect, he was sure he would not go back to his old lifestyle. Besides, he said, he was going to live with his grandmother and she would not allow it! Ben's story inspired all who heard it.

Another inmate, who I will call "John," told of keeping a dream journal, though he did not use that term. Deeply depressed upon entering prison, his dreams started speaking to him, so he began to write them in notebooks. When he made his presentation, he had about 15 notebooks. His face glowed with pride as he spoke to us of his self-expression. Without ever hearing of Freud or Jung, he understood the power of dreams.

There are many more individual stories like those of Ben and John. In the course of my work, I have watched minds awaken, reawaken, and get energized so often that I need no additional research to sustain my belief that education helps some inmates change their lives. Since housing and feeding one inmate for one year costs around $30,000, if only one released prisoner a year fails to return, my work pays for itself. Other prison teachers and I are trying to find ways to do some solid research to fortify our case with the public and the officials who have the power to expand prison education.

Unfortunately, it is precisely the process of awakening minds that the corrections system seems to resist. Rehabilitation gets lip service only, resulting in an increasing prison population. The motivation for this seems deeper than simple job security. It is my sense that society may be projecting our unacknowledged guilt, shame, and negative feelings onto prisoners, using them as scapegoats. This would help explain why after a century of "reform" there is no real progress. But prisoners are people just like us. Hope for the future lies in our awakening to the value of searching within ourselves to find our humanity, of connecting with the feared and despised other we lock behind bars, in supportive ways. I have hope for that future.

Edryce Reynolds, EdD, obtained a doctorate in counseling psychology after working in the computer field for many years. In her prison job as an instructor for Pierre College at McNeil Island Corrections Center, she combines the two disciplines for a fulfilling teaching experience. Dr. Reynolds may be reached at <edryce@yahoo.com>.

Using the Reality of Myth to Reduce Recidivism

Ed de St. Aubin
Marquette University

I remember how frightened I was that night -- walking into a maximum-security prison with the intention of telling the myth of Jason and the Golden Fleece to a group of 40 inmates. It was neither the prison context nor the inmates that agitated me. I had been talking to similar prison groups for the past four years as part of a non-profit crime desistance program, Self-Help of Wisconsin. Nor was I nervous about facilitating a discussion based on the use of myth narratives for self-enlightenment. As a professor, I had led several such discussions in the classroom. My apprehension was that the inmates would reject such an esoteric topic as useless and, by extension, begin to see me as the sheltered intellectual who played in the realm of ideas and neglected the harsh facts of the real world. What could an archaic myth possibly have to reveal about the lives of these inmates? I failed to recognize it at the time, but my anxiety at the beginning of that night stemmed from a fear of rejection -- that I would be dismissed as a nerdy and unmanly professor out of touch with the realities that these men had faced in their lives.

The meetings often focused on more pragmatic issues such as conflict resolution or job inter-
viewing skills. But my experiences with the myth meetings (I had also discussed the Persephone and Demeter myth and the Coyote Parables from the Hopi tribe) have further convinced me that myths capture universal aspects of the human condition and thus speak to the particular unfoldings of each life course in profound ways. Once I tell the myth, we break up into small groups for discussion. Then I try to end by demonstrating that the evening resulted in both increased insight into the vicissitudes of one’s own life and a deeper understanding of how the particular life experiences of each prisoner relate to those of the others in the room. Both this self-insight and the feeling of connectedness to others that is engendered by this process helps to foster genuine rehabilitation.

The classic myth of Jason and the Golden Fleece will serve as our example. Though there are many versions of the story, the basic components and plot are as follows:

King Pelias of Lolcos is told by a prophet that a man wearing one sandal will one day do him harm. When the virtuous youth Jason arrives in town wearing one sandal, the king asks Jason what he would do were he to be confronted with the man that would eventually harm him. Jason responds that he would send the man to retrieve the Golden Fleece which was protected by a vicious dragon that never slept. Pelias tells Jason that the kingdom will be his if he retrieves the Golden Fleece. Jason accepts the mission and assembles a group of the 50 gods and talented humans (Autolycus the master thief, Atlanta the great huntress, Orpheus the musician, etc.) now known as the Argonauts. This band of heroes faces several death-defying challenges on their voyage, including the successful passage through the Symplegades -- clashing islands of rock that had crushed all previous ships in their waters. Upon arrival, King Æetes of Colchis demands that Jason accomplish a series of near impossible tasks before being told where the Golden Fleece is located. The king’s enchanting daughter, Medea, seduces Jason by offering to help him complete these tasks. Indeed, Medea is something of a sorceress, and with her trickery she and Jason accomplish the challenges and steal the Golden Fleece by deceiving the dragon. In order to escape the wrath of King Æetes as he chases the Argonauts in a ship of warriors, Medea cuts off parts of her younger brother and scatters them in the water, knowing that her father will stop and retrieve each piece in order to provide a proper burial for his son. The Argonauts escape and return to King Pelias with the Golden Fleece. Dismayed by this feat, Pelias refuses to relinquish the kingdom to Jason. Medea then murders Pelias by using her sorcery to trick him. The murder forces Medea and Jason to flee to Corinth where they settle down and have two sons. Jason eventually leaves Medea in order to marry another woman. Medea gets revenge for Jason's desertion by killing their two sons as well as Jason’s new bride. Jason wanders the land as a grief-stricken beggar and is killed years later when he is struck on the head by a falling piece of timber that was once a piece of the ship used to retrieve the Golden Fleece.

Not a particularly uplifting story, but one rife with richness and meaning. It also proved to be a story that spoke to the lives of the inmates in our crime desistance program. I hoped that the story would incite some discussion about several particular aspects of these men’s lives -- people who had provided strength like the Argonauts did for Jason, challenges faced, rewards sought, trust misplaced, unknowingly initiating one’s own journey, experiences with bereavement, or youthful occurrences that had come back to cause harm.

I recall Teshawn (pseudonyms are used throughout this article), an African-American in his early 30s, commenting that his ship of Argonauts had sailed him right into prison. The gangbangers [members of a street gang] he had affiliated with were each known for a particular skill. But unlike Jason’s Argonauts, his would deceive and exploit him at every opportunity. Teshawn went on to explain that he was like Jason in that he sought gold and was once willing to do anything to obtain it. This lead to a discussion concerning objects of desire -- things once wanted so badly (money, respect in the form of fear, or drugs) that seemed to matter less as we aged.

In a different group, an older inmate talked about having had a life filled with Argonauts but never realizing it until he was incarcerated. This became a critical reflection as it caused the men of that group to think about who might have served as Argonauts if only provided the opportunity: family elders who were shunned, potential role models who had been mocked and scorned.

At one point, I noticed George was being unusually quiet. I know George quite well. George has been attending similar meetings consistently for over 15 years. He is serving three consecutive life sentences and has no hope of ever being released from prison. In his late 50s, he is a powerful, built man (I once heard another inmate refer...
to him as "a rectangle with a head") whose patience and sagacity has earned him the respect of other inmates. During a pause in the dialogue I asked George to share his thoughts. He looked up with a sorrowful face and said, "Every time I ran away from responsibility or tried to escape with stolen stuff, just like that ship of folks in the story, I left pieces of my brothers in the water -- I've been killing off my brothers with my selfishness." While the myth says nothing of race, it helped George to reflect on the impact that his actions had on the progress of African-Americans. He directly tied the murders he had committed to holding his people back. Racism continues to exist, George told the group, because men like him do the types of things he has done. He had literally killed his black brothers, just as Medea had killed her brother, but his crimes had also eviscerated black progress.

While I thought this might lead to a discussion on racism, a recurrent topic in these meetings, others in the group picked up on George's notion of a ripple effect -- how our actions affect people not immediately present. Jason hooks up with Medea for selfish and instrumental purposes -- so that he can secure the Golden Fleece and attain the kingdom from Pelias. Little did he know it at the time, but that selfish act would later end in the deaths of Medea's brother, King Pelias, Jason's two sons, and his new wife. An inmate who had struggled with substance abuse his entire life told the group the story of the ambulance that crashed into a van of children as it rushed to his house in response to an overdose call. A child he had never met was killed and others were severely wounded - all due to his selfish need to get stoned on heroin.

Many of the other men also focused on the Medea character in the myth. She evokes such powerful images: seductive beauty, trickery, unmitigated viciousness, and untrustworthiness. Juan captured much of this when he spoke about misplaced trust in his life. (This was Juan's first time at one of our meetings so I was glad to see him participate. Talking openly and honestly about one's life goes against so many of the tacit rules of prison life -- keep to yourself, stay hard, don't try to make friends, tell no one anything.) Juan talked about the fact that he had too often befriended people on the streets based on what they could do for him (like Medea promising Jason the Golden Fleece). He said that as a younger man he would have also fallen for Medea's deception but that now he was a better judge of character. The fact that she planned on "tricking" the dragon marked her as one devoid of virtue. It is not what someone can do for us that matters in terms of trusting them, it is more important to ascertain who one is. Juan's words were, "It says she's a witch and that rhymes with bitch -- I'd stay away from anyone promising me gold by tricking people."

The lives of the inmates were obviously not direct analogs to the Jason myth and each prisoner spoke of unique experiences not shared by the others. But the story was quite effective in stirring self-reflection and discussion about the patterns in life that had led these men to prison. It spoke in profound ways to the lives these men had led. Each participant gained insights into one's own life. Further, the experience of discussing the story with others made obvious to these men that others had lived through similar experiences and had made some of the same poor choices. This connectedness to others is the basis for the feeling of being truly understood -- and this is a foundational component of the rehabilitation process. The beginning of the transformation from criminal to honorable adult is feeling like someone else knows what it is like to be you. Fellow prisoners serve the function of the Argonauts, helping these men and women face the incredible challenges of surviving prison and then desisting from crime.

Ed de St. Aubin, PhD, is Assistant Professor of Psychology at Marquette University. His scholarship in personality and developmental psychology has focused on personal ideology (one's philosophy of life), generativity, psychobiography, narrative psychology, and the integration of qualitative and quantitative approaches to understanding the person. Professor de St. Aubin is the author of several empirical journal articles and two co-edited books, including the forthcoming The Generative Society (with Dan McAdams and Tae-Chang Kim). He is President of Self-Help of Wisconsin, the non-profit organization discussed in this essay and may be contacted at <ed.destaubin@marquette.edu>. (The author wishes to thank Katherine Girratano for work on the desistance program as a student as well as Cathy Coppolillo and Mary Wandrei for helpful comments regarding a first draft of this essay.)

Law in America
To the Editor,

As a professor in Ramapo College's Law and Society program, a social worker, an advocate
for women, and an attorney, I have had many thoughts on the role of law in American society. We're the most litigious culture in the world and in history. Why is law so overarchingly important and powerful in today's society? I recollect someone saying that if you compare law and social work, or law and therapy, or law and psychology, law is like a rock and all those other fields are like glass. All the other fields are quite fragile and they have relatively much less power. If a lawyer and a social worker or doctor or psychologist go into conflict, most of the time it's the lawyer who does the controlling.

Sociologically, control is the function of law. Law is only needed in large complex societies. In simple societies you have local customs, rituals (like shunning), and religious prohibitions. In complex societies there is intricate, universalized law. Its goal is the reason for its being: to control people's behavior. The reason it's so powerful is because that's why it was created.

Why has the U.S. become so litigious? Why do we have a hundred more lawyers per capita than England and a thousand more, than Japan? For a rich country like the U.S., there are lots of theories. I think that the dominant theory is that we are the most individualistic, most materialistic, and the most rights-oriented society in the history of the world. This is for all of the obvious reasons like the settlement of America and the opening of its frontier. The people who didn't get along in Europe came here rather than compromise. Once here, they didn't have to get along with each other, they just kept moving west.

Harvard President Emeritus Derek Bok and a lot of other social critics think litigation is greatly overdone. This includes the English who gave us our body of laws and notion of rights. They think we are crazy.

Margaret McLaughlin

Margaret McLaughlin, JD, MSW, is a professor of Social Work, Law, and Gerontology at Ramapo College where she teaches in the Law and Society program.

A Conversation with Charles B. Strozier on Heinz Kohut

(Continued from front page)
this project through all the 18 dark years [1981-1999] it took me to complete it. In the period from about 1985 to 1995, I encountered some stiff opposition from the Kohut family and colleagues, was the topic of what I felt was rather malicious gossip, and had no access to papers. With enough time and an acceptance of me as biographer, things turned around and I could do my work.

CP: What issues of countertransference did you have to deal with in researching and writing Kohut?

CS: My relationship to Kohut changed decidedly over the years. I began writing about the man I knew as "Heinz" but ended up thinking of him as "Kohut." The book is better for the distance. The change reflects, in part, the simple passage of time, but also, and more importantly, some of the remarkable things I discovered about him and, perhaps, my own maturing. I never came to dislike Kohut. On the contrary, I find his own confusions and contradictions -- about his identity, his sexuality, his illness -- paradigmatic of the postmodern self. He lived out his ideas, or, as I put it in the book, he had to change the theory to find a place in it for himself.

I would not say that anyone who lives within contradictions is fully aware of what they are all about. At the same time, consciousness is not a black and white issue (as Freud would have it). It is always a question of degree. Kohut was a very self-aware man and yet seemed to fool himself about some things. That is really not that surprising. I deal with that tension in great detail in the book. My main point here, however, is that the issues of his confusion have larger relevance for the contemporary self. He is a man of the age, I think, as Freud was of the 19th century.


CS: He was a huge rebel while being a very conservative thinker at the same time. I draw a parallel in the book between him in his struggle to remake psychoanalytic theory and the young Freud's passionate attempts to use the language of neurology to explain his emerging insights (as Erikson wrote about). Kohut, like Freud, pushed the old language and ideas to their breaking point. In Kohut's case, he showed the absurd assumptions about human nature that are at the basis of Freudian drive theory.

CP: In the Preface, you write, "It is a curious fact of Kohut's creativity, that his major theoretical work [The Analysis of the Self, 1971] came in the second half of his sixth decade." How do you explain his creativity, his major work, occurring when it did and not before?

CS: That is why it is curious -- it is hard to explain. Certainly, most important thinkers don't create their œuvre that late. Kohut needed lots of time to store up impressions before he burst forth like a comet. At that very moment, he got cancer and spent his last decade dying, which lent urgency to his project and gave it something of a transcendent purpose.

CP: The New York Times Book Review reviewer concludes by saying that your "book is an exemplary study of a psychoanalyst who threw himself into the task of transforming a major tradition [psychoanalysis]." If it is true that Kohut did this, what was his motivation?

CS: That was the best sentence in the review. I don't think Kohut set out to achieve such an ambitious goal. It grew on him, as these things do, and one thing led to another. At a certain point, however, I would say about 1973 when he turned 60, he raised his sights and consciously set about shaping a theory and a movement to replace Freud. He saw himself not as a dissident (which is why he refused to let his disciples break away from Chicago after a big fight in 1977) but as the new voice of psychoanalysis. I think he was right.

CP: You write that when you went to Chicago in the 1970s, you "began to read Kohut closely and was soon transfixed. Here, I felt, were ideas that solved all the troublesome issues about Freud that had been gnawing away at me." What were the issues? How did Kohut solve them?

CS: I did not understand Freud until I read Kohut. Drive theory in all its subtle permutations is at the heart of Freud's schema. Some of the assumptions -- that idealization, for example, is bad and narcissism even worse; that aggression is biologically based; and that childhood sexuality is of paramount importance -- simply don't stand up anymore and this has important clinical ramifications. Freud makes the self the victim of the drives and his version of self experience (the tripartite model) is a weirdly fragmented depiction of the soul.

CP: Is it fair to call Kohut the "founder of
American psychoanalysis”?

CS: Kohut created the first authentically American psychoanalytic theory and movement. In saying that, I note the irony of his own Viennese origins. Self psychology, for one thing, is hopeful and has none of Freud's dark pessimism. It is also pragmatic in its clinical focus on empathy and the primary goal of entering the experience of the patient. It is a psychology of second chances, and nothing, finally, could be more quintessentially American.

Kohut's life was a confused but very human struggle to demarcate his own loose boundaries, to live within his protean world of desire, and to find meaning in his relationship with others (including their symbolized meanings). His life extended into his theory; indeed, one might say he sacrificed his life to his creativity. Kohut gave up much in his relationships, in his social life, and in his deeper commitments to pursue the implications of his ideas. He knew he was onto something and was willing to give over everything in his soul to find meaning in his relationship with others to make his system of ideas coherent and meaningful. His creativity became the point of his life; it became consuming. There is a sacrificial quality in that kind of devotion to ideas.

Self psychology is a theory about empathy and the self. It is holistic by definition. The self-object defines experience. It is of the moment yet imbedded in the past. I think the American self reflects those notions.

CP: What did Kohut think and write about history and psychoanalysis?

CS: Kohut always said, only half-jokingly, that if he had another life to lead he would have been a historian. He saw the project of history as directly parallel to that of the psychoanalyst working with an individual patient (though of course the two differ in terms of method). What needs exploring in the past are the goals and ambitions of a culture as they get expressed in the individual. Trauma often intervenes. His particular interest was Nazi Germany (about which he wrote some very interesting things), but his general point is that historical trauma disrupts self experience in ways we can gain a lot of understanding of from self psychology. He was also very interested in rage, both at the individual level (as with Hitler) and the collective, what it means and where it comes from.

CP: Please explain Kohut's denial of and ambivalence regarding his Jewish origins?

CS: There is no question that Kohut obfuscated his Jewishness. In part, that reflected his experience in emigration, but such an explanation is much too simple. He certainly identified with his mother's negotiation of the spiritual boundaries between Judaism and Catholicism -- even as she remained completely Jewish in Vienna. At the gymnasium [secondary school] between 1924 and 1932, Kohut came to identity passionately with European (Christian) culture as it emerged out of the ancient world. Even in medical school in the 1930s he presented as non-Jewish, though he also never directly lied about who he was.

In emigration, then, Kohut slowly moved away from his Jewishness to make it in America, having come perilously close to dying in the Holocaust. People who knew him in Chicago for decades, I discovered, always assumed he was not Jewish. He didn't quite deny his identity if asked, though at times he actually lied about being only half-Jewish. He talked about Jesus, went to the Unitarian Church (a good cover), and read Christian Century.

I detail all this at some length, but I am most interested in the way he turned his confusions into creative thought. Kohut was a spiritual man. In the margins of established religions, he found a place for himself that had larger meanings. Religion (and I mean all religions) after the Holocaust and in the nuclear age is in a state of utter confusion, either fundamentalist or without much integrity. Creative souls struggle for meaning. Kohut's contradictions, if they don't quite light the way for others to emulate, may at least define one all-too-human way of finding God and self in a dark time.

CP: When I [Paul Elovitz] was in psychoanalytic training in the 1970s in the New York area, at my institute the candidates and many instructors felt that it was either Otto F. Kernberg or Kohut. Kernberg was the choice that was made by almost everyone because Kohut's ideas about narcissism were rejected out of hand. At Chicago did you find that Kernberg was seen as the main critic of Kohut?

CS: Kernberg, who gave a very generous blurb for my book ["A thoughtful, scholarly, penetrating biography...."] is the other main theorist of narcissism. If you read their cases, it is clear they were treating similar patients. Their explanations for what was going on, on the other hand, could not have been more different. Kernberg is a Kleinian in the tradition of drive theory, which looks backward to the 19th century, and seemed...
then safe, respectable, secure. Kohut's is a different paradigm. That is what my book is all about.

**CP:** As a biographer of leaders, do you find, as I [Paul Elovitz] do, that it is not helpful to necessarily think of narcissism as pathological?

**CS:** Kohut at first distinguished between good and bad narcissism, as he wanted to rescue the self from being pathologized. We wrestle with that all the time in history. In time, however, Kohut came to feel that it was foolish to talk about "good narcissism" (not to mention something of a conceptual contradiction) and that his concern was really with the self. Around 1973 he thus stopped talking altogether about narcissism. His theory is that of "self psychology."

**CP:** The somewhat narcissistic analysts I have known have had blind spots with patients and more limited empathetic abilities than most analysts. Is a man as narcissistic as Kohut able to really listen to his patients?

**CS:** Absolutely. He was a truly gifted therapist. I would not doubt your generalization, but such things always have exceptions. Heinz Kohut was an unusual guy and a mix of many things. Few people are as complex as he was, as gifted, as full of contradictions, as interesting, indeed, as exciting and charismatic, and worth studying.

**CP:** What effect did Kohut have on the role of the Oedipus complex?

**CS:** It was a slow and sometimes tortured process for him, but in the end Kohut rejected the idea that the Oedipus complex is at the center of childhood experience. People want to fuck and kill, he once told me in an interview, but that is not to say the self forms out of drive derivatives. I personally feel it is quite anachronistic for historians to think at all in oedipal terms.

**CP:** What was Kohut's theory about idealization?

**CS:** Idealization is at the heart of self experience. We need idealized figures and their symbolized alternatives into whose greatness we can merge to feel whole and cohesive. That begins with the very large and enveloping mother. Idealization forms the core of cultural selfobject needs. It is our task as historians to describe those ideals, where they come from, and the psychological consequences of having such ideals altered, distorted, corrupted.

**CP:** In our 1997 interview ("A Conversation with Charles B. Strozier," Clio’s Psyche, March, 1997, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 97, 119-125), you referred to "his [Kohut's] reinterpretation of sexuality -- that is, sexuality as opposed to sexual drive, the instinct." (p. 123) What was his reinterpretation? Was Kohut sexually ambivalent? If so, how did this affect his thinking about sexuality?

**CS:** Sexuality, for all its importance and peremptory quality, can be seriously over-estimated. There is also much in behavior that can be disguised as sex, which Kohut called "sexualization." Most so-called perversions, for example, are attempts at union with the archaic selfobject and have little to do with desire. Historians could learn a great deal from that.

**CP:** Do you see Kohut's sexual ambivalence as opening him up to new possibilities? How did he respond to the gay rights movement and the successful struggle within psychoanalysis to cease to see homosexuality as a pathological state?

**CS:** It was not his ambivalence but his experience that opened him up to new ways of seeing in psychoanalysis. His first sexualized love relationship in life was with another man [Ernst Morawetz, his tutor], and there may have been other men later (though I don't know that). He had no response, as far as I could tell, to the gay rights movement, but he did talk with selected people openly (like Bert Cohler, then a candidate at the Institute with me and now a distinguished professor at the University of Chicago, and a professed homosexual) about how narrow-minded psychoanalysis had been on this issue.

**CP:** If it happened today, we would see Morawetz' sexual activity with young Heinz as child abuse. Is Heinz' lifelong favorable view of Morawetz a reflection of a desperate need to idealize a man who was there for him?

**CS:** I wouldn't say his idealization of Morawetz was "desperate." It was quite authentic. Morawetz was the first love of his life. From that experience, in part, he moved toward a much more open and interesting understanding of the place of sexuality in life and theory. Now, he may have been deluded about Morawetz in his victimization, but I suspect we may have made this issue too ideological and fail, in some cases, to grasp the possibility of love in deeply unequal relationships.

**CP:** You describe Kohut as "truly charismatic." How did Kohut view charisma?

**CS:** He was ambivalent about his charismatic power over his followers, while at the same time doing everything possible to nurture it. In that
subjective experience lay much of his extremely important insight into historical leadership, the paranoid qualities of the leaders who usually emerge in times of crisis after collective trauma, and the nature of the fragmented selves of the followers.

**CP:** I've read elsewhere that Kohut's criteria of human self-cohesiveness were humor, creativeness, and wisdom. How does Kohut rate by his own standards?

**CS:** Very well, except perhaps for the humor. You forgot the most important of the criteria for what he called "transformed narcissism" -- empathy. He was a master of empathy -- a gifted therapist -- and his whole theory, in a sense, is about empathy.

**CP:** What was Kohut's humor like? Did he use humor as one way of helping him face cancer and death?

**CS:** He could be very funny, loved to laugh at humorous stories, and had a delicious sense of irony. However, he was basically a very serious guy and quite focused. It was not basically humor that helped him face cancer and death.

**CP:** In the self psychological community, who else has seen the analysis of "Mr. Z." as being Kohut's disguised autobiography? How do people who knew Kohut well react to this formulation?

**CS:** There is little doubt Kohut is "Mr. Z.," and I have an entire chapter that goes over the evidence. At this point, I don't know of anyone who basically disagrees, even if they are uncomfortable with the idea and accept the knowledge with various degrees of dissociation and disavowal.

**CP:** How do you feel your book will be received within the self psychology community? Do you think self psychologists are ready to relinquish some of the inevitable idealization of the Founding Father of the field and accept Kohut with all of his human blemishes and complexities?

**CS:** It is hard to say. So far, the Chicago people have been extremely enthusiastic, albeit with jaw-dropping astonishment at what this man they knew and loved was all about. I am sure there will be some nit picking, but so far I am pleased that most people feel the book is sufficiently complex at least to be worthy of the man.

**CP:** How large is the self psychological community?

**CS:** There are about 700 people who attend the annual conferences of the International Council of Self Psychology and at least as many more on the fringes of the movement. The ripple effect beyond that is enormous, though sometimes disguised because grandiose figures like to take existing ideas, change a word or two, and pretend they are the original thinkers.

**CP:** How do you evaluate Kohut among all psychoanalysts?

**CS:** Among the greatest and without a doubt the most important clinical psychoanalyst after Freud. We will have long forgotten Klein, Kernberg, Rank, and the rest when Kohut is still on the shelves.

**Part II -- On Doing Psychobiography**

**CP:** Your *Lincoln's Quest for Union* (1982, new and revised edition in 2001) was more a collection of essays or, as you said in the 1997 Clio's Psyche interview, "reflections on his [Lincoln's] 'House Divided' speech" (p. 121) than a traditional narrative biography. How do you view doing biography now that you've written a more traditional narrative (but also analytic) biography?

**CS:** It is exhausting, because you so thoroughly immerse yourself in someone else's life. I have come to think of it as vicarious autobiography, which suggests how much I feel it challenges one's own psychological experience.

**CP:** How do you define psychobiography?

**CS:** It is biography sensitive to psychological themes and meanings in your subject's life. Conventional biography mentions childhood but only in a narrative way and for the most part makes only salacious use out of personal data. In psychobiography all aspects of a person's experience are open to scrutiny, as long as they are relevant for understanding the total self.

**CP:** How would the Kohut biography have been different if you had completed it before your clinical practice?

**CS:** I have no doubt this is a better book because I became a clinician. Having that experience vastly deepened my grasp of the theory. My wife says it also made me a better person.

**CP:** You write, "The story of the [Kohut] family's relationship to this book, however, is more complicated. It has ranged from enthusiastic support to guarded caution to outright opposition -- and sometimes all three attitudes in the same person at different time." What advice about working with a subject's family would you give to other psychobiographers?
you have completed the ten-year-project on the "Ultimate Threats" in the late 1990s and your Kohut biography recently?

**CS:** I am toying with a historical examination of the intersection of the religious and political right in America, which is to say, the making of George W. Bush. I was going to write about him, but I detest him too much as boring and a puppet, and therefore would not be able to sustain my own empathy, so will instead stick with larger themes.

**CP:** Is there any possibility that, now in the second half of your sixth decade (born in 1944), you will throw yourself into the task of revitalizing psychohistory?

**CS:** You make me sound so old! I doubt I could take on such a grandiose task as revitalizing psychohistory, but I certainly believe in it, take pains to present myself always in that light (which gives encouragement and support to younger and more vulnerable people), and hope it will find a more secure place in the academic world in decades to come. The research-oriented Center on Violence and Human Survival that Lifton created in 1985, that we worked on together from 1986 until this summer, and which I now run, has always been psychohistorical. Perhaps it will help build the infrastructure we so need.

**Bob Lentz is Associate Editor and Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, is Editor of Clio’s Psyche. ▼**

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**Strozier’s Kohut**

**Maria T. Miliora**  
**Suffolk University and Private Practice**


Charles Strozier takes the personality of Heinz Kohut (1913-1981) out from behind the shadows of rumor and myth and brings scholarship and cogent argument to illumine the psychoanalytic pioneer’s life, aspects of which he interweaves with Kohut’s theory of the psychology of the self.

As a candidate at the Training and Research Institute of Self Psychology (TRISP) during 1989-1993, I was a student of Strozier and the recipient of his rich stories about Kohut and the evolution of his theories. In self psychology conferences, I was aware of the extreme idealization of
Kohut who, it seemed to me, had been draped with the mantle of sainthood. In 

*Heinz Kohut: The Making of a Psychoanalyst*, without devaluing Kohut’s contributions to psychoanalysis, Strozier exposes the imperfections of the charismatic leader. This is a courageous undertaking, particularly for one within the self psychology “family.”

Professor Strozier combines his gifts as a historian and a psychoanalyst in separating fact from fiction and evolving judicious inferences. He interviewed people who were close to Kohut and studied letters and papers that had been protected from public view for a number of years. Moreover, in the 1970s Strozier was a candidate at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis and, in gaining a place in an outer ring of Kohut’s group, he observed the working of his charisma.

The book is divided into five parts. Strozier not only chronicles Kohut’s life from birth to death but also presents detailed expositions of Kohut’s books -- *The Analysis of the Self* (1971), *The Restoration of the Self* (1977), and the posthumously published *How Does Analysis Cure?* (1984) -- as well as of a number of his papers on empathy, narcissism, narcissistic rage, charisma, and other topics, some of which were included in *Self Psychology and the Humanities* (1985), edited and with an introduction by Strozier.

In Part One, 1913-1939, Strozier reviews the history of Kohut’s parents and grandparents and of Heinz’s early life and adolescence in Vienna. Describing him as one “raised in an assimilated Jewish family imbued with European high culture” (p. ix), Strozier characterizes Heinz’s first year as positive, with mirroring provided by his loving parents, Felix and Else. However, Heinz lost access to his father for the next four years as Felix left home to fight in World War I. This traumatic loss changed Kohut’s life forever.

Strozier reconstructs Kohut’s childhood from material contained in “The Two Analyses of Mr. Z.” Kohut wrote the paper in 1977 presumably as a case study of his patient, “Mr. Z.” According to Kohut, the first analysis was conducted when he was still a classical analyst, adhering to Freudian constructs and techniques. Another analysis was undertaken, however, because the patient needed more treatment. In the second analysis, Kohut, who had been evolving the psychology of the self, was thinking differently about the implications of narcissistic transferences. Unlike the first analysis, the second effected a “cure,” and this paper was presented by Kohut as indicative of the efficacy of self psychology. Strozier offers considerable data to substantiate his belief that this paper is autobiographical, that is, that “Mr. Z.” is Heinz Kohut.

Inferences about the pathology of Kohut’s mother, Else, and her toxic influence on Kohut’s personality is derived from the “Mr. Z.” paper. A flavor of Strozier’s approach and thinking can be gleaned from the following narrative:

… that the most powerful and enduring influence in his life was Else… She was a corrosive presence in his own sense of self. … It took a huge effort for him to establish his separateness from her, to escape from the long shadow cast, to find his own true center of authenticity. The father, in turn, was first absent and then no substitute in the crucial years; just when Heinz truly connected with him as a young man, he died. It is all there in "Mr. Z.,” just as it was in his life. The struggle is imbedded. (p. 18)

During childhood, as each of his parents went his and her own way, satisfying their personal needs and, in effect, abandoning their son, Heinz had a close relationship with a tutor named Ernst Morawetz. In addition to sharing cultural and intellectual pursuits, Heinz and Ernst engaged in homosexual activities over a two-year period. Heinz was 10 or 11 at the time; Morawetz, a university student, was between 19 and 23. We are told that this tie, although sexualized, provided the lonely Heinz with the emotional connection that he needed and craved.

Strozier takes care to note that today we would term his attachment as involving childhood sexual abuse, but he bows to Kohut’s interpretation that the relationship was primarily an “affectionate” one in which sex was incidental. In addition, it claimed that Heinz’s connection to the tutor contributed to the boy’s well-being as well as to Kohut’s later theories about empathy and the self. Years later, as Strozier informs us, Kohut’s first application for psychoanalytic training was rejected presumably because of his “fluid sexual boundaries.” (p. 80) Moreover, Kohut is described as having had close relationships with male friends, but as having been “asexual” with women. Kohut did marry, and he fathered a son. We are left to wonder if Kohut’s having been sexually abused contributed to his problems with boundaries and whether he was conscious about the matter.

Strozier establishes the undeniable fact that
Kohut was a Jew and yet for most of his adult life Kohut behaved as though he were a Christian. No explanation is offered for Kohut’s obfuscating his Jewish identity, except that Strozier characterizes him as having a “deeply conflicted and split-off attitude toward his own identity…. His psychological style … was highly dissociated.” (p. 39)

Part One concludes with Kohut, having been awarded the MD from the University of Vienna, departing from the Nazi-occupied city after the Anschluss. His leaving followed soon after Freud’s.

Parts Two (1939-1965) and Three (1965-1970) focus on Kohut’s becoming a psychoanalyst, originally as a Freudian and then, later, beginning to formulate his own theories; forming a self psychology group in Chicago; and writing his first book, *The Analysis of the Self*. The author presents a cogent analysis of Kohut’s early theories, explains how these compare with those of Freud, and he includes the analysts in Kohut’s circle and the well-known theorists of the period in his extensive historical survey of the world of psychoanalysis.

In Part Four, 1971-1977, which covers the period when Kohut learned that he had cancer, Strozier shows that Kohut tried to hide his terminal illness, presumably a blow to his fantasy of his invincibility, and opines that knowing that he had a limited life span spurred Kohut’s efforts to elucidate his ideas. During this period, there was confirmation of Else’s psychosis and this seemed to play a role in unlocking Kohut’s creativity. Else died in 1972.

In Part Five, 1977-1981, Strozier covers a variety of topics including the subject of heroes and gurus, the facts and suppositions surrounding the paper, “The Two Analyses of Mr. Z.”, Kohut’s ideas about God and religion, and some insightful thoughts on the healing of psychoanalysis.

The author makes clear that although Kohut had a remarkable capacity for empathy as a clinician, he was grossly narcissistic. Eschewing idealization, Strozier describes Kohut’s narcissistically-disturbed personality, indicated by his self-centeredness, arrogance, demand for attention that sometimes bordered on the obnoxious, never apologizing for his rage, and his need to dominate and control.

The extent of Kohut’s narcissistic disturbances raises a question about his awareness of his personality issues. Strozier does not address this question. However, he does not disappoint in elucidating how Kohut’s early experiences and personal psychology influenced his theories. He argues that extrapolation from his own experience led Kohut to “insights about empathy, narcissism, the selfobject, grandiosity, idealization, sexuality, self-state dreams, and many other constructs” and states that “To know the actual Else deepens one’s understanding of Kohut’s explanation for the development of splits in the self as a result of failures of mirroring.” (p. 260) In addition, Strozier shows that Kohut’s self-reference included gendered schema in which men and women act roles from his own private script” (p. 262), “Kohut’s mothers … have the quality of an evil archetype” (p. 264), and he “makes homosexual [in acts, real or imagined] family dynamics paradigmatic of the culture” (p. 265).

This is a thought-provoking book. The implications of a narcissistically-disturbed and dissociative Kohut -- particularly with regard to his “protean sexuality” and “identity confusion” -- left me with unpleasant feelings, even doubts about some of his clinical observations. I wonder, for example, if Kohut’s attitude about childhood sexual abuse fell within the realm of material that was dissociated, its meaning disavowed. If so, how this emotional blindness might have affected his clinical judgment about abuse.

Because Strozier’s book invites questions and inspires truth-seeking, it warrants recognition as a ground-breaking work. Hopefully, these revelations will spur more thought not only about how Kohut’s psychopathology may have influenced and, perhaps, skewed his clinical observations and theories but, also, how he evolved his theories in spite of his psychology. The self psychology movement has matured sufficiently, I believe, that we can tolerate the questions.

Maria T. Miliora, PhD, MSW, is Professor of Chemistry and Lecturer in Psychology at Suffolk University in Boston, Massachusetts, and a psychoanalytic self psychologist in private practice. She is a member of the Senior Faculty at the Training and Research Institute of Self Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting
Saturday, September 29, 2001
Britton, Felder, and Freund
"Freud, Architecture, and Urban Planning"
The Creativity of Anthony Storr (1920 - 2001)

Andrew Brink
Psychology Forum Research Associate

The late English psychoanalyst and writer Anthony Storr would have preferred being a musician or composer. Storr wrote, “All my ambitions outside psychiatry were concerned with music, and I still regret that I was not gifted enough to pursue music professionally.” (“Psychotherapy,” Perspective Series, Bulletin of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, Vol. 10, June, 1986, p. 143) Accomplished with piano and viola, Storr had the largest collection of classical recordings I have ever seen. At that time, Anthony and his second wife Catherine Peters lived in the Vale of Health, Hampstead, a village now part of London. Later they moved to Oxford, where their house was equally welcoming and filled with music.

Mozart and Handel are appreciated in his first book, The Integrity of the Personality (1960), the creativity of composers is prominent in The Dynamics of Creation (1972), and his Music and the Mind (1992) is a full enquiry into the nature and meaning of music. To Storr, music was the highest and most healing of the arts:

We are all deprived; we are all disappointed; and therefore we are all, in some sense idealists. The need to link the real and the ideal is a perpetual tension, never resolved so long as life persists, but always productive of new, attempted solutions. The pattern of tension followed by resolution is perhaps best discerned in music. (Dynamics, p. 237)

This statement linking creativity with psychological healing is the essence of what Storr had to say about the arts, but it was not very agreeable to scholars and critics. I remember contacting, for an interview, on Anthony’s behalf, an eminent biographer of Franz Liszt or Robert Schumann only to be told in effect, “Psychoanalysis has nothing to say about musical genius.”

There was something of the inscrutable psychoanalyst about Storr and, while warmly attentive to others, he didn’t talk much about himself. His father was Vernon Faithful Storr, Sub-Dean of Westminster Abbey in London. Anthony was 20 when his father died, leaving the family unable to pay for continuation at Christ’s College, Cambridge, where Anthony had gone in 1939 following a classical preparation at Winchester College. His tutor at Christ’s was the physicist and novelist C.P. Snow, who seems to have taken over as surrogate father. “I had to go to Snow to seek permission to attend my father’s funeral.” Snow saw merit in the “diffident and insecure young man,” finding college funds to help Storr on his way. (His father’s friends found further funding for medical school, where Anthony followed an elder brother.) When he remarked to Snow that he thought he might like to be a psychiatrist, the reply, “I think you’d be very good at it,” shaped his entire future. (Storr, “C.P. Snow,” Churchill’s Black Dog, Kafka’s Mice, and Other Phenomena of the Human Mind, 1988, p. 105; “Psychotherapy,” p. 142) Reflecting on Christ’s College, Storr says, “It was a marvelously exhilarating and different atmosphere from the Victorian, clerical household in which I had been reared.” (Churchill’s, p. 106)

Storr’s personal analysis was Jungian, and he remained loyal to Jung, although moving away from the fractious politics of London Jungians. A remark of Storr’s on Jung applies equally to himself: “Jung ... discovered, in childhood, that he could no longer subscribe to the orthodox Protestant faith in which he had been reared by his father, who was a pastor in the Swiss Reformed Church. It might be alleged that the whole of Jung’s later work represents his attempt to find a substitute for the faith which he had lost.” (The School of Genius, 1988, p. 192, published as Solitude: Return to the Self in the U.S.) For someone schooled in Latin and Greek, and whose English heritage was ancient Norse (Storr means “big”), the tug of Jungian mythology must have been great. Jung’s ideas of the psyche as self-regulating, of “individuation” as the self’s life task, and especially of the possibility of creative “active imagination” as a way of preventing mental illness, are found throughout Storr’s own writings.

Yet Jung’s obscurity as a writer, his failure to say much about the childhood origins of emotional disorder, and his “deep distrust of women”, beginning with his mother, made Storr wary. (Storr, Jung, 1973, p. 8) In The Integrity of the Personality, Storr explained that while he had been
trained “in the school of Jung.” “It has long seemed to me probable that the analytical attitude to the patient is far more important than the school to which the analyst belongs....” (p. 20) The intellectual freedom of Cambridge and the empiricism of medical training set up critical habits of mind. Had Jung written more positively about music, Storr might have been less skeptical over all. Instead of entering the great cathedral of Jungian mythography, Storr set out to consider fairly every possible version of psychodynamic theory that might bear on his profession of psychotherapist -- and illuminate his lifelong questioning about creativity.

Storr’s contribution to the psychobiography of creative persons is substantial, yet he never wrote a full-scale biography of any creative person. Unlike Erik Erikson on Luther and Gandhi, or John Bowlby on Darwin, Storr shied away from full-scale biographical inquiry into any of the figures who fascinated him. One would have expected a biography of, say, the composer Robert Schumann, whose bipolar affective disorder had been misunderstood. Instead, Storr offered psychobiographical vignettes to support his argument about creativity as attempted psychological integration. Many capsule biographies are stunningly insightful and stay in the reader’s mind better than the general discussions. Memorable, for example, is Storr’s estimate in The Dynamics of Creation of the novelist Balzac’s bipolar disorder driving his work, or the strange saga of Ian Fleming, who grew up without a father to become the creator of the hypermasculine James Bond character.

Deftly constructed psychobiographical sketches abound in Storr’s books. In his acclaimed The School of Genius (or, Solitude), there are more-or-less developed glimpses of the historian Edward Gibbon, the explorer Admiral Byrd, the painter Goya, the Baptist preacher John Bunyan, the writers Dostoevsky and Kafka, the children’s writer Beatrix Potter, and many others. The effect is enriching yet frustrating, as many of the psychological insights deserve expansion and documentation. But Storr was writing for an educated general readership, not for the specialist, and compromises were necessary. He was feeding the huge appetite for what psychoanalysis had to say when applied to topics of general cultural interest. To be fair, Churchill’s Black Dog, Kafka’s Mice, and Other Phenomena of the Human Mind contains three more extended studies: of Winston Churchill’s creative management of his depression (interesting, both Churchill and Hitler were skilled painters); Franz Kafka’s struggle, through writing fiction, with his sense of victimhood; and physicist Isaac Newton’s schizoid detachment and compensatory refuge in the realm of numbers. Admirable for changing the educated layperson’s perspective on these political and cultural heroes, Storr’s psychobiographical essays were probably not developed enough to be given the serious consideration they deserve. The mini-biography method was used again in evaluating the lives and works of prophets (ranging from Ignatius of Loyola to Freud, Jung, Gurdjieff, and Rajneesh) in Feet of Clay: A Study of Gurus (1996).

Storr probably did not realize that such brevity, however clinically exacting, would not persuade professional biographers to learn from psychoanalysis and psychiatry. While his wife Catherine Peters wrote outstanding literary biographies of William Thackeray and Victorian writer Wilkie Collins, Storr stayed with the psychobiographical vignette in the service of theory, because it was how he thought. I remember being at dinner in London’s Saville Club with Anthony Storr and his friend, the analyst Charles Rycroft. Almost forgetting my presence, they fell to discussing a patient, only to realize that he was probably recognizable. Having recently read the novels of William Golding, I had recognized him but said nothing. Their exchange was in brief, cryptic statements, undeveloped and without much context, focusing on psychopathology. Later Storr wrote about Golding’s fiction in “Intimations of Mystery”, but he had said much more that evening about the seriousness of the author’s disorder. (Churchill’s, Chapter 8)

My relationship with Anthony Storr began when I contacted him shortly after the publication of his Dynamics of Creation in 1972. It was exactly the book I wanted and needed for my own understanding of creativity, the major area of my research. Not long after, while my wife and I were on sabbatical in London, we met and remained in touch ever after. When back in the UK, we found Anthony and Catherine in Oxford and sometimes met in London; otherwise the relationship was by correspondence. When I had difficulties in the Bertrand Russell Editorial Project at McMaster University, Anthony was a great help to me as a listener. He always liked and upheld my writings, working to help me find a larger audience. I tried, without success, to bring Anthony to McMaster as a visiting professor of psychiatry. Anthony sup-
ported my decision to take the Toronto offer to Co-
ordinate the Humanities and Psychoanalytic
Thought Programme and eventually he came there
and lectured my students on Freud. He would have
accepted other invitations had his health allowed.

Storr made repeated efforts to think and
write psychohistorically, but with debatable results.
It will be said that he missed the essence of psy-
chohistory in the changing modes of childrearing,
and that he underestimated the decisive role of
child abuse and trauma in producing adult destruc-
tiveness. Although aware of Lloyd deMause's writ-
ings, he made no attempt to engage with them di-
rectly. Nonetheless, in his own way, Storr ad-
dressed the same questions that occupy psychohis-
torians. World War II had jolted Storr into asking
why violence became rampant after the comparati-
tively tranquil post-World War I England of his
youth. As he explains, "My history of asthma pre-
cluded my being 'called up' to serve in the Forces;
but I saw something of one aspect of war by being
in London for some of the worst air-raids." Al-
though finding fire-watching on the roof of West-
minster Hospital exhilarating, "My adolescent
pacifism inclined me toward a profession which
demanded that I should repair and heal rather than
maim and kill." (Churchill's, p. 142) From 1941 to
1944 he therefore remained in medical school, pre-
paring to be a psychiatrist.

His writings on healing and "repair" are
undoubtedly better developed than those on con-
flict and violence, but Human Destructiveness, first
published in 1972 and updated for re-publication in
1991, still deserves consideration. As he says at the
outset:

the original newsreels of Belsen and the
other concentration camps constituted the
most shocking experience to which [I] had
ever been exposed; even more shocking than
the photographs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Those concentration camp pictures
profondly altered my view of so-called
civilized human nature. (p. 4f.; see also
"Why Human Beings Become Violent,"
Churchill's, Chapter 13)

Since so many men and women were needed to run
concentration and extermination camps, it seemed
unlikely that all were psychopathic. How could
Germany, a cultured nation, perform such barbaric
cruelty against its Jewish citizens, let alone start a
world war?

Admitting to "squeamishness," Storr nev-
Freudian psychodynamic theory of Ronald Fairbairn, and he wrote with sympathetic lucidity about both Jung and Freud, from whose differing ideas of human nature dissent became rife. That “Neither Jung nor the psychoanalysts consider the possibility that man’s inner world of myth and fantastic image may be both a residue of infancy and also adaptive in the biological sense....” was a view Storr expanded in his writings on creativity and therapy. (Jung, p.74) Freud also missed the primacy of developmental adaptations of children to parents or caregivers. “With Freud, sex comes first, attachment afterwards. With John Bowlby, now established as the most important of the object-relations theorists, secure attachment comes first, sex afterwards.” (Freud, 1989, p. 112) Storr repeatedly paid tribute to Bowlby’s redirection of psychodynamic theory, noting how the research he inspired is giving “a much better idea of how far early environmental stresses or deficits are really responsible for later psychiatric problems.” (Churchill’s, p. 144) Bowlby is further commended in The School of Genius (pp. 8-11, etc.), and when Bowlby died in 1990, Storr wrote a fine appreciation, concluding, “Posterity will recognize that John Bowlby’s contributions to psychiatric knowledge and to the care of children mark him as one of the three or four most important psychiatrists of the twentieth century.” (“John Bowlby” typescript for “Munk’s Roll,” p. 2)

Yet no more than Freud or Jung could Bowlby satisfy Storr’s requirements for cultural nourishment. As a rigorous scientist setting out to prove the power of “attachment” to explain normal and abnormal development, Bowlby slighted its linguistic and symbolic dimension. Bowlby does “less than justice to the importance of work, to the emotional significance of what goes on in the mind of the individual when he is alone, and, more especially, to the central place occupied by imagination in those who are capable of creative achievement.” (School, p. 15) Storr wrote about the implications of early parental loss for later creativity and did his best to follow attachment research as reported by Mary Main and others, but differential potentialities for creativity in different anxious attachment styles (ambivalent, avoidant and dismissing) are not mentioned, leaving the field open for further study of creativity as an adaptive response to anxiety. Instead, Storr followed the lead of D.W. Winnicott’s paper on “The Capacity to Be Alone” (1958) to recommend reflective solitude, in which aesthetic contemplation is enhanced, over excessive concern with good relationships and sexuality. The book resonated with those wearied by the “permissive society” but unwilling to affirm right-wing dogmatism about return to a repressive sexual morality and traditional roles in the family. In his later years, Storr saw a place for contemplative enrichment, which didn’t exclude other people but recognized their need for similar disengaged experiences.

Storr’s challenge to the Humanities has been largely disregarded. Literary and art critics, together with biographers, are disinclined to reimport questions of personality formation and creativity back into the arts, whence they were banished long ago. Not being trained in modern literary or art historical studies, Storr probably did not realize the strength of the ban on states of mind or emotion. From T. S. Eliot who argued that the creative state-of-mind is separable from the poem itself; to The Personal Heresy: A Controversy, a debate in 1939 between literary critics C.S. Lewis and E.M.W. Tillyard; to Northrop Frye’s literature as an ever differentiating “order of words”; and to Michel Foucault’s and Roland Barthes’ finally proclaiming “the death of the author,” the trend has been away from psychology of literary creation. Backed by psychoanalysis, Storr argued just the reverse and, when affirming attachment theory, he accepted the “personal heresy” without realizing his “error.” Had his theory of artistic creativity as the artist’s attempted self-integration by symbolic means been put in terms familiar to academics, he might have been received more warmly. To assert that “the motive power of much creative activity is emotional tension of one kind or another,” that is, tension in the creating personality, runs counter to what is acceptable in the profession where “texts” are sovereign. (Dynamics, p. 191) When Freudian criticism faded in literary criticism, it was replaced by the arcane theories of Freudian interpreter Jacques Lacan, whose doctrine that the “unconscious is structured like a language” suited literary critics far better than psychobiography could. The flight in the Humanities from affect became so determined and pervasive that Storr’s unprofessional protestations were easily evaded. The criticism of David Holbrook in England and Louise De Salvo in the United States illustrates what Storr was after, but it is a rare exception to the recent reign of “theory,” with its depersonalization of art.

Anthony Storr was a “wounded healer” whose life was imperiled by severe asthma. He was well aware of psychogenic theories of asthma,
such as D.W. Winnicott’s of an infant’s “dangerous breathing,” or bronchial spasm, being linked to anxiety about the mother. (D.W. Winnicott, “The Observation of Infants in a Set Situation,” 1941, Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis, 1975, pp. 59 and 63) Undoubtedly, the ramifications of asthma took Storr into analysis. In 1978 Storr published “Asthma as a Personal Experience” in Asthma: The Facts. The disorder brought him close to death on several occasions, forcing him to come to terms with its inevitability from whatever cause. In “The Fear of Death” he wrote:

A few years ago I came close to death during a very severe attack of asthma. As I was panting away, the thought suddenly came to me that, if the attack went on, I might actually die, as I knew that I was not getting enough oxygen to maintain vital functions. For a minute or two, I could hardly believe it: then, realizing that it was true, I became quite calm and detached. In fact, I became less distressed than before I had realized that death was a real possibility: and watched my own heaving chest as it were from a distance, wondering how much longer I could last. When, in the event, my doctor saved me, I knew that I should never fear dying again. (Realities, August, 1973, No. 273, pp. 32-34 and 74)

Surely Storr’s meditative practice of listening to music helped him to the detached relaxation needed to survive this asthma attack.

When in 1993 I wrote in concern about his health, the reply was:

You need not be distressed about my health. I shall be 73 in May. I have already outlived my father, my brother, and all my uncles. I have had a great deal of illness in my life, and have been close to death on at least four occasions. If it were not for modern medicine and the expertise of my doctors I should not be alive today, and count myself lucky to be so. (Personal letter, January 14, 1993)

I found this straightforward statement deeply moving and hope to remember its note of gratitude for life, no matter the conditions.

Anthony Storr was a psychoanalytic educator without peer, whose basic impulse was to investigate and evaluate every claim to new insight. He remained free to think and write, despite appointments as Clinical Lecturer in Psychiatry, Oxford University (1979-1984) and Fellow of Green College, Oxford (1979f). His independent habit of mind had been reinforced in the private practice of psychotherapy in London from 1950 to 1974. He was honest to a fault, always ready to listen and reserve judgment until he had thoroughly considered what was said or written. Having doubts about the Church of England, he moved out boundaries, beyond overly optimistic liberal humanism into psychological realism about human prospects. He was tough and resilient, as successful analysts must be, but he never lost benign concern for individual suffering, or that which 20th-century politics produced on such a staggering scale. Storr did not retreat into an aesthetic mysticism induced by music, instead using it to revive and reconfigure his sense of meaning. If art was to serve integrative therapy, it had to reverberate much beyond immediate pleasures. Storr’s best essays, such as “The Concept of Cure” are far richer than a medical training alone would allow; they are the products of cultural enrichments of many origins. (Charles Rycroft, ed., Psychoanalysis Observed, 1966) It is easy to be critical of shortcomings in Storr’s ambitious books but, on reflection, it is better to show gratitude for all he attempted. I hope that there was music to ease his passing.

Andrew Brink, PhD, a scholar who has worked in many genres, has made his greatest contributions as a student of creativity. He devoted most of his career to literature at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, before heading the Humanities and Social Thought Programme (now the Psychoanalytic Thought Programme) at the University of Toronto. Presently, he devotes his energies to research and publication on a full-time basis. His current historical research on the New Netherlands settlements has resulted in the book, Invading Paradise: Esopus Settlers at War with the Natives, 1659-1663. Professor Brink may be reached at <brink@netinc.ca>.

Drinking in Russia: One for the Soul

Caroline Scielzo
Montclair State University and Private Practice

In the 10th century, Rus Prince Vladimir proclaimed “drink is the joy of the Russians.” This seemed a reasonable enough excuse to reject conversion to sober Islam in the selection of a unifying
national religion. In 988, Prince Vladimir introduced Byzantine Christianity (which did allow alcohol) to Russia.

I just returned from my annual visit to Moscow more convinced than ever that while politics, economics, and street names may have changed, depression and alcoholism remain dominant self-defeating attributes of Russian society. “Drink” still claims a reverential hold on Russia’s subjects, but I see little of the early medieval “joy” mentioned by Vladimir. What I do see from the time of my morning coffee in a café to my evening return home are the inebriated bearers of a bottle of beer, the glassy-eyed victims of that last gulp of vodka to empty the bottle. Anyone who has spent a day (or night) in Moscow might well agree that Russian men are drinking themselves into oblivion. Alcohol is the leading factor in the recent precipitous plunge in Russian life expectancy rates which show a mere 58.83 years “average” for a Russian man compared to 72.95 years for his American peer. Statistics also verify the increasingly high levels of crime and other debilitating social consequences of alcohol abuse rampant within Russian society. Although drug use is on the rise, narcotics are too expensive and hard to come by for the population at large. Vodka and the ubiquitous bottle of beer still remain the unconquerable tyrants and levelers of Russian society.

Ten centuries of Russian history testify to a reality that has been soul-brutalizing, and in Russia one still drinks “for the soul.” Contemporary campaigns such as those initiated by Gorbachev to curtail alcohol consumption have been abysmal failures. The Russians remain hard and defiant drinkers. A single drink or cocktail does not count. The soul, apparently, is not experienced with a mere glass of wine but by drinking in excess, to maudlin outpouring of emotion, to the inebriated state of no control. Only a vodka-sodden evening together means that trust has been established, that an appreciation of mutual suffering and unconditional acceptance has occurred, and that a stranger has gained intimate pronoun status.

Sharing a meal together, the breaking of bread, does not promote the same intimacy. In fact, Mother Russia has never been a nourishing imago. Soothing milk and sweet honey are not her style. On the contrary, Russian cuisine rather uniquely tends towards tastes that are sour and foods that are pickled, marinated, or fermented, breaking down energy rich carbohydrates into alcohol components. Stale bread, dark and sour-smelling, is an indispensable ingredient of many traditional recipes. Food is not the attraction of Russian feasting but the accompaniment and encouragement for serious drinking. A properly set banquet table impresses with a display of stemware and glasses with various bottles of beer, vodka, cognac, and champagne forming the centerpiece. The national cuisine is celebrated for its appetizers (zakuski), its finger food, its caviar and canapés -- all to increase and justify participation in the lavish offerings of alcoholic beverages. A nourishing main course seems an afterthought and is usually undistinguished, heavy and dull. Mother Russia’s food for the soul is often non-nourishing and bitter, her drinks poisonously intoxicating, -- and her oral frustrations legion.

Life has been and continues to be hard for most Russians. Alcohol promises to blot out the reality of cold dark winters, cruel poverty, and cramped living arrangements that deny privacy and dignity -- all sources of unconscious anger turned inward. All too many Russian men seem lost in the self-defeating promise of an alcoholic escape. Life is bleak and tedious for the women, too, but one sees few women drunk and dazed on city streets. Of course, there are female alcoholics and prostitutes, but more so are there emotional ties among the women and bonds to families and children that seem to sustain them. Statistics verify the preponderance of male alcoholics in the society.

I began to question anew why Russian men have been so unable to break infantile and infantilizing bonds to the bottle. Why have their defense mechanisms remained so self-destructive? What attributes has the culture assigned to them that encourages a passive and avoidant personality structure? This line of thinking took me back to the early covenant between Slavic mother and son developed in folklore and fairy tales.

Sleep and drunkenness were interchangeable postures for traditional Russian heroes of legends. Dormant, slumbering, and inebriated youngest sons were usually found on the stove of the peasant hut. They preferred the warmth of the domestic hearth and the security of the maternal home to active adventures. The archetypal Ivan Durak (Ivan the Fool) had no intention of developing beyond womb-warmth. He was not a bad character, not ungifted -- just loath to separate from his mother. Russian legends in general did not offer the romantic pairing of young lovers that we see in Western fantasies but focused instead on the relationship between mother and son. The folkloric
Russian Mother has no romantic or sexual partner; her son, no visible father with whom to identify or emulate or fear. The mother’s whole existence is apparently satisfied by tending to her undifferentiated and drunken son. The bonds between the two stifle as did the swaddling rags that confined body and soul with young muscles ill-prepared for sporadic bursts of freedom. Life was deprivation and then excess, all tolerated and maintained by inebriated passivity. Mother’s milk was 80 proof and attempts at personal liberation a betrayal.

A fairy tale you say? Yet a significant cultural stereotype of the Russian Everyman still drinks to oblivion. Any number of contemporary writings continue to focus on drunks, drinking rituals, and life experienced through an alcoholic haze. Venichka, the tragic hero of Victor Erofeev’s Moscow To the End of the Line (Moskva-Petushki, written 1968, published 1987) is seriously drunk from the first to last pages of the novel. He wanders the streets of Moscow, detached from reality and a Kremlin he claims never to have seen. In a fruitless search for his joyous “trollop” and a son waiting for him at “the end of the line” he downs sherry, port, vodka, and beer, accepting even the alcoholic pittance of Freshen-Up eau de cologne. Food is the occasional sandwich he needs to forestall nausea.

What Ivan Durak and Erofeev’s Venichka hold in common over all the centuries is a reluctance to let go of that false promise of alcoholic joy that the early sons of Russia embraced. Vodka has brought Russia only grief. I am sorry for the harsh actuarial statistics and the physical pain, but no less tragic is the emotional suffering that results from this brutalizing legacy. Contemporary political and economic developments are to be lauded, but no change will be as significant for the national well being as emotional growth that weans Russia from its poisonous bottle of alcohol would, indeed, be “one for the soul.”

Caroline Scielzo, PhD, is Professor and Coordinator of Russian Area Studies at Montclair State University. She is a graduate of the Center for Modern Psychoanalytic Studies in New York. Her research and publications are directed towards a psychoanalytic exploration of Russian culture and society. She may be contacted at <scielzoc@mail.Montclair.edu>.

In Search of Butterflies

Jay Sherry
Psychohistory News


Jerry Kroth is Associate Professor in the Graduate Counseling Psychology program at Santa Clara University, where he teaches psychotherapy, personality theory, dreamwork, and research methods. With Psychology Underground, Professor Kroth has written a provocative book in which he challenges many orthodoxies prevalent in the field of psychology. He convincingly demonstrates how the leftist orientation of most psychologists has biased their “scientific” agendas. “It is very hard to decide often where science ends and ideology begins…” (p. 124) For example, American psychologists have preferred learning theory (“nurture”) to innate patterns of behavior (“nature”), which has either been ignored or labeled (often with some validity) “reactionary.”

Several of the chapters were presented at
recent International Psychohistorical Association (IPA) conventions, and all of them contribute to a jargon-free debate about such issues as love, maleness, the media, and parapsychology. Kroth writes with passion, animating his arguments with personal reflections as well as a wealth of data conveyed in the book’s many clear and informative graphics. The cover photo is of a man silhouetted at the mouth of a cavern with a bright light shining from the far end. It looks like a depiction of a near-death experience. The message is that illumination is to be found “underground.”

Ever since Wilhelm Wundt established his laboratory at the University of Leipzig in 1879, psychologists have been preoccupied with the scientific status of their field and have generally been reluctant to express any interest in topics that might compromise their respectability. The most odious term in their vocabulary and the one they most sought to distance themselves from was the soul. While its long association with Christian theology made it unacceptable in academic circles, it found refuge in the neurotic symptoms of everyday men and women. At the turn of the 20th century, a group of medical doctors led by Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung sought to understand the role of the unconscious in the lives of their patients. Today the issue is still whether the unconscious is “concept” or “reality.” The author sides with the latter position: “There is room here not merely for rigid empirical recitations of fact, but for speculating and dreaming, wondering out loud about matters of the heart, the soul, and the eternal.” (p. 8) He clearly favors Jung’s mythopoetic approach to psyche, derived from the Greek word for butterfly.

In the “Media” chapter, Kroth explores the collective fantasies associated with the advertising industry. At the same time that ad men were perfecting their talent for manufacturing desire, Hollywood was beginning to bring these fantasies to the silver screen. Together these industries created a media empire that now dominates our mental landscape. Its most ubiquitous representative, and the author’s favorite target, is television.

Looking at several decades of research on the effects of television, the author repeatedly skewers afternoon talk shows and the six o’clock news for deliberately exploiting the habit of imitation found among young people who mimic the mind-set that is purveyed hour after relentless hour. The pandering and idiocy that characterize so much of it certainly factors into the troubling statistics about teenagers: high levels of illiteracy, passivity, and obesity. Kroth makes a strong case to identify television as a form of child abuse.

As someone who has been teaching in New York City public high schools for over 15 years, I can say that his critique is compelling. Those who would minimize the role of the popular media in youth violence miss the essential point: although a movie or video game may not “cause” a school shooting, it certainly contributes to the culture of insensitivity that is a necessary prerequisite for it. Too many of our children have been raised in a media cocoon their entire life and so have had their emotional, intellectual, and physical lives stunted as a result. The "Play" chapter functions as an elegy for these hapless victims whose development has been arrested by the media Moloch -- a god to whom children are sacrificed.

I found the chapter “Maleness” especially insightful since its discussion of primate behavior connected to so much of what I saw this year while teaching ninth grade for the first time ever. Our society has designated that grade, the first year of high school, as a crucial moment in a person’s “coming of age.” I noticed that the testosterone-laced quest for social status among the boys led to much acting out and fighting. The focus of the "Maleness" chapter was on those aggressive traits that are the product of evolutionary biology. In particular, Kroth uses Nikolaas Tinbergen’s theory of Innate Releasing Mechanisms and correctly connects them to Jung’s theory of archetypes. Jung himself was moving in this direction in his last model of the psyche. In it he tried to balance his emphasis on image by incorporating data from Karl von Frisch’s bee studies that had conclusively demonstrated the genetic basis for ritual patterns of behavior.

The chapter “Mystery” goes beyond gendered boundaries to explore psychology’s outer limits, parapsychology. Kroth cites statistics that indicate psychologists are more resistant than other professionals to the possibility of paranormal phenomena. Early psychologists adopted Newtonian physics as the model for their new science. Ironically, their successors have maintained that allegiance long after it has been abandoned by theoretical physicists who focus on theories of relativity and indeterminacy associated with Einstein and Werner Heisenberg. The main result of this intellectual bias is that the paranormal field is mostly dismissed out of hand and conceded to New Age carnival barkers who hawk their books and courses on angels, channeling, and miracles. The author
urges psychologists to admit that experimental parapsychology and theoretical physics now provide an adequate scientific basis for new breakthroughs. He relies on Jung’s theory of synchronicity, shaped by the thinking of the Nobel prize-winning physicist Wolfgang Pauli.

*Psychology Underground* exudes a spirit of adventure that the reader is encouraged to share. Kroth’s topics and style put him in the company of a writer popular with the 1960s counterculture, Norman O. Brown. He is quoted several times and the chapter titles of *Psychology Underground* evoke those found in Brown’s classic, *Love’s Body* (1966). Kroth and Brown share a blunt iconoclasm that is matched by an equally bold affirmation of the power of the imagination. Both definitely prefer chasing butterflies to experimenting with lab rats.

*Jay Sherry*, Editor of *Psychohistory News*, is currently writing a book about Jung and the Swiss-German conservative tradition. He may be contacted at <jaysherry@earthlink.net>.

**Keyword for Spielberg’s A.I.: Artificial**

Jerry Kroth  
Santa Cruz University

The futuristic fairy tale film, *A.I.: Artificial Intelligence*, is a disappointment psychologically and at the box office. Writer and Director Steven Spielberg has created an adult fairy tale unsupported by any archetypal congruence. In addition, it’s blasphemous to Freudians, as I will show later. By contrast, the character of Luke Skywalker in *Star Wars* was based on sound psychology developing from George Lucas’ close consultation with the great scholar of myth, Joseph Campbell. The metapsychology for the hero archetype was fully expressed, and the success of the film echoed this important Jungian consistency. Below I will describe A.I. and explain why it is substandard.

*A.I.’s* story begins in the future with a couple whose child has been injured and is suspended in a cryogenic coma. They adopt a state-of-the-art mechanical boy as a full-sized toy child. If the parents like him enough to want to keep him they need only speak seven words to properly initialize him. After some angst, the lonely mother implements this irreversible computer program causing the robot-child to form a deeply bonded attachment to her, and a strong -- if not pathological -- need for her love. His weak bonding to the father is reflected in the film in the artificial boy's only calling his father by his first name.

“Family” life goes well until the couple’s biological son is cured and returns home to find himself in a mechanically induced sibling rivalry. When the toy-boy (“David” in the film) inadvertently injures their biological son, the parents decide the cyber-surrogate is not worth the risk. The normal course of events would be to see him returned to his maker and destroyed. However, "Mommy" has grown too attached to send him to be decommissioned into spare parts. She leaves him in a forest to fend for himself. What she doesn't realize is that he is programmed to seek his mother's love at all costs, and that his system folder refuses to entertain any other human developmental tasks, *a la* Erik Erikson. Spielberg’s film is a triumph for attachment theory!

The toy-boy's life's mission is to become a real boy so Mommy will love him as she loves her real son. He can only become real the way Pinocchio did, by finding the Blue Fairy who will transform him. His one friend and mentor in his quest is Gigolo Joe who is also on the run from the scrap heap, having been set up by a jealous husband as the "fall guy" for the murder of his wife. The presence of this sexual pleasuring machine is suggestive of what it means to be a real man.

One adventure after another leads him into the accidental discovery of the Blue Fairy who is unfortunately incapable of wish-fulfilling miracles. The toy-boy pleads with the Blue Fairy to make him real, but she just looks back at him, unable to perform any magic. He remains fixed in a frozen trance with the Blue Fairy for 2000 years until aliens discover him.

They ask him what his greatest wish would be. We already know that it is to resurrect Mommy so he can live with her forever. The alien enablers grant neurotic wishes, but to not overindulge, they inform him that Mommy can be resurrected for only one day -- that is the condition. So begins one gloriously oedipal day spent bathing, being pampered by Mommy, playing with her, being dressed by her, and finally slipping under the covers with her. She will never wake up again, he knows, and so he closes his eyes, too, hands clasped as they both fall into unconscious bliss in a final embrace.

Fairy tales touch upon issues of maturation and psychological development. They involve struggles out of childhood toward maturity, not
regressive thumb-sucking returns to infantile bliss. Hansel and Gretel return home, after having been abandoned by their parents, as mature adults capable of caring for their parents better than their parents cared for them, not to crawl back into bed to resume infancy.

Even Jack of the beanstalk ultimately triumphs over his castrating, grind-your-bones-to-make-my-bread ogre-father. But for his reward, does he return home to infantile bliss with Mommy? No. He cuts down his magical beanstalk, becomes a man, and cares for his mother just like his fellow fairy tale characters Hansel and Gretel are doing.

A.I. is a Freudian affront because it resolves the oedipal crisis in the most regressive way imaginable. It is even more ridiculous to a Jungian. After starting with the symbolic consistency of moving from the real mother to the idealized mother in the icon of the Blue Fairy, it is sheer pathology to shatter the icon and break up the image into a million I-hate-the-Virgin-Mary pieces for the regressive real mother with whom one is to be forever fused. It would not have been so unacceptable if at least the toy-boy could have transferred his feelings to a new love object, perhaps even a toy-girl. Instead, Spielberg keeps him fixated for 2000 years ruminating over the same incestuous agenda!

The toy-boy of A.I. does not resonate in the unconscious of the audience, as did heroic Luke Skywalker of Star Wars. There is an incongruent, perverse, and distasteful element in this script: the hero’s intractable oedipal fixation makes him a figure with whom neither adults nor children can identify.

Jack grew up to care for his mother, and Hansel and Gretel helped their parents out, too. But just down the street the toy-boy is still sleeping in Mommy’s bed with only one wish -- to stay there, held in her embrace, for eternity. Maybe that’s what makes Spielberg’s A.I.: Artificial Intelli-


gence seem so long.

Jerry Kroth, PhD, is Associate Professor in the Graduate Division, Department of Counseling Psychology, at Santa Clara University and the author of six books. His latest work, Psychology Underground: From Politically Correct Orthodoxies to a New Century of Inquiry, was released in March and is reviewed in this issue on page 99. Kroth may be reached at <anya@sj.znet.com>. □

In Memoriam: Chaim F. Shatan (1924-2001)

Paul H. Elovitz
Ramapo College

Chaim Shatan died of heart problems on August 17, 2001. This psychiatrist, teacher, psychohistorian, and advocate for Vietnam veterans, is being mourned by colleagues in the Psychohistory Forum as well as many other people whose lives he touched. He was born on September 1, 1924, in the town of Wolcławek, Poland, and was brought to Toronto, Canada, as a two-year-old, later moving to Montreal. An honor student, he took his undergraduate and medical degrees at McGill University in Montreal, before coming to New York City in 1950 to begin his six-year training program at the William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis. He held academic appointments at Columbia, McGill, New York University, and a variety of other institutions. Despite his numerous health problems forcing a temporary retirement in 1953-1954, Shatan practiced psychotherapy as recently as last April. Though his career was devoted primarily to the private practice of individual therapy, he also did group therapy as well as hypnosis with patients suffering from phobias, obesity, and addiction to cigarettes.

“Hi” Shatan had a great thirst for knowledge which led him into many fields including psychohistory where I met him a quarter of a century ago at an Institute for Psychohistory meeting. He was justifiably proud of his work in helping Vietnam War veterans deal with what he helped to label as "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder" (PTSD). Disillusioned veterans were angry, self-destructive, and aversive to the idea of therapy. Dr. Shatan formed “rap groups” for free and frank discussion involving as many as 40 volunteer New York psychoanalysts including Robert J. Lifton. His July, 1972, New York Times op-ed article, "The Grief of
Soldiers',' helped spark a nationwide Vietnam veterans self-help movement with over 1,000 rap groups established in Operation Outreach. Norma Shatan, his wife of 46 years, reports a moving incident in Utah. There was such affection for Chaim at a session mostly comprised of veterans he was training to run self-help groups in storefront meeting centers, that a huge ex-marine picked him up on his broad shoulders and carried him around the room triumphantly, while the trainees applauded.

His efforts on veterans' behalf included working to include PTSD in The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III, 1980), testifying before a congressional committee on PTSD, and speaking at the Pentagon, law schools, courts-martial, and international congresses. He saw himself as a multidisciplinary student of combat and war neuroses, giving worldwide presentations on bogus manhood and honor, combat neurotics, PTSD, grief in soldiers, the sexualization of combat, addiction to war, and genocide. As a founding member in 1985 of the Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (now the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies) Professor Shatan worked with a large variety of groups suffering from stress disorders. As recently as July of last year in Madrid, he gave the keynote address at the founding of the Spanish Society of Traumatic Stress Studies, whose primary focus is on the psychic trauma flowing from Basque separatist terrorism.

A central thread of his clinical work since 1970 had been to heal those suffering from the massive man-made catastrophes of his lifetime. It was his contention that Vietnam veterans, Holocaust survivors, and other victims of PTSD could be treated within the same groups. In 1999-2000, at Mt. Sinai Medical School, he lectured on how to help the children of Holocaust survivors deal with intergenerationally transmitted trauma. In recent years he turned increasingly to the psychology of the need for enemies, which we often focus on at the Forum.

Chaim Shatan lectured far more than he wrote. For example, in 1974 he was selected for the First Annual Holocaust Memorial Award for his paper “Bogus Manhood, Bogus Honor: Surrender and Transfiguration in the U.S. Marine Corps.” (Psychoanalytic Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, 1977)

People who met Chaim Shatan only in the years after his traumatic 1993-1994 health problems, saw a short, slightly hard-of-hearing, stooped man, dependent on a cane as a result of a back operation that left him with some paralysis. His vigor surprised those who first met him but not colleagues who knew him well. They saw a man who was determined to keep moving and learning.

Chaim Shatan was unembarrassed in his quest to know. He learned some Albanian from the immigrant staff of his Central Park West apartment building and biography from the Psychohistory Forum’s Biography Research Group. Even if he sometimes had to arrive a half-hour late because of his slow perambulation, he asked questions and made his points, rather than sit quietly in the back of any room.

He was a lifelong socialist who always had compassion for the underdogs of society and liked to say, “I love an uphill battle.” Regrettably, just surviving amidst multiple health problems was making life too much of an uphill battle. His heart gave out on August 17.

We wish to extend our condolences to his four children, six grandchildren, and his wife Norma, who was kind enough to help with this obituary during this time of terrible loss. Colleagues wishing to send their personal condolences may contact her at <normshatan@aol.com>.

Bulletin Board

The next PSYCHOHISTORY FORUM WORK-IN-PROGRESS SATURDAY SEMINAR is on September 29, 2001 (note the date change) when Michael Britton (Private Practice, Psychotherapy), Paul Felder (Architect), and Carol Freund (Psychotherapist) will present “Freud, Architecture, & Urban Planning.” On or about November 10 the Forum is planning a panel session of artistic and creative psychoanalysts discussing the nature and process of creativity in conjunction with the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (NAAP). Details will follow. CONFERENCES: The annual conference of the International Federation for Psychoanalytic Education (IFPE) is on November 2-4, 2001, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Paul Roazen is giving the keynote address and Patrick Kavanaugh is one of the many presenters. See <www.ifpe.org>. The International Society for Political Psychology (ISPP) announced the locations and dates of its next two annual meetings as July 16-19, 2002, in Berlin, Germany, and July 6-9, 2003, in Boston, Massachusetts. Next year’s
ternational Psychohistory Association (IPA) meeting is in New York City on June 5-7, 2002. 

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES: Congratulations to Jacques Szaluta on giving the Distinguished Academic Lecture, “Spielberg’s Creativity and the American Unconscious,” at the IPA meetings on June 6-8 in New York City. Ted Goertzel, Herbert Barry, and Paul Elovitz of the Psychohistory Forum’s Research Group on the Childhood, Personality, and Psychology of Presidents and Presidential Candidates gave separate papers in the panel, “Electoral Deadlock and Ambivalence: The Prospects for the Bush Administration.” Sander Breiner, Lloyd deMause, Dan Dervin, Richard Harrison, Jerry Kroth, Henry Lawton, David Lee, Richard Morrock, Geraldine Pauling, H. John Rogers, Vivian Rosenberg, Robert Rousselle, Norman Simms, and George Victor were other Forum members or Clio’s Psyche subscribers among the IPA presenters. Congratulations to Howard Stein on the recent publication of Nothing Personal, Just Business: A Guided Journey into Organizational Darkness. His organizational play, Irv, or the Consultant, was performed at the Second International Conference on Critical Management Studies, at the University of Manchester, United Kingdom, on July 13. Lawrence Friedman of Indiana University has been named to the Fulbright Distinguished Chair to Germany in American Studies for the academic year 2001-2002. One of his assignments is at Humboldt University in Berlin. Last April on Holocaust Memorial Day, Flora Hogman was the guest of honor who spoke to the New York State Supreme Court on rescuers in the Holocaust. On August 16-19 Norman Simms chaired a program of the Waikato Jewish Studies Seminar at Waikato University in New Zealand. EMERITUS STATUS: Herbert Barry has been named Professor Emeritus upon retirement after 38 years at the University of Pittsburgh, has been named Professor Emeritus. At the July 15-18 ISPP convention in Cuernavaca, Mexico, Professor Barry presented the paper, "Customs of Communities Where Violence Is Infrequent." Robert Jay Lifton moved to Cambridge, Massachusetts, upon being named Director Emeritus of the Center on Violence and Human Survival at John Jay College of CUNY that he founded after leaving Yale. J. Lee Shneidman was named Professor Emeritus upon retiring in August from Adelphi University where he will continue as an adjunct professor. At the Columbia University Seminars he will carry on as Director of the History of Legal and Political Thought and Institutions Seminar. OUR THANKS: To our members and subscribers for the support that makes Clio’s Psyche possible. To Benefactors Herbert Barry III, Andrew Brink, Ralph Colp, and Mary Lambert; Patrons Mary Coleman/Jay Gonen, Peter Petschauer, and H. John Rogers; Sustaining Member Mel Kalifus; Supporting Members Rudolph Binion and David Felix; and Members Suzanne Adrion, Michael Britton, Flora Hogman, Geraldine Pauling, Anne Marie Plane, Rita Ransohoff, Vivian Rosenberg, Roberta Rubin, Lee Shneidman, Richard Weiss, and Isaac Zieman. Our thanks for thought-provoking materials to C. Fred Alford, David Bright, Michael Brock, Ed de St. Aubin, Jeff Greenberg, Alan Jacobs, Jerry Kroth, Daniel Lassiter, Joel Lieberman, Kevin McCamnan, Margaret McLaughlin, Maria Miliora, Edryce Reynolds, H. John Rogers, Fernando Salla, Caroline Scielzo, Norma Shatan, Jay Sherry, Howard Stein, Charles Strozier, Junia Vilhena, Kipling Williams, Julie Anne Blackwell Young, and Maria Helena Zamora. Thanks to Tim Hamilton, Katie Moore, and Rebecca Elwood for assisting with proofreading, editing, and doing research. Finally, our thanks to Geri Kirschner Elovitz and Anna Lentz for their assistance, support, and understanding over an eight-year period.

Call for Papers

Psychobiography

Special Theme Issue
December, 2001

Some possible approaches include:
- Original psychobiographical vignettes
- Symposium of the pros and cons of Erikson's Young Man Luther
- Your experience with psychobiography
- Recent developments in the field
- Issues in doing psychobiography:
  - pathology and creativity
  - the use of empathy
  - evidence and interpretation, reconstruction, and reductionism
  - countertransference
  - assessing childhood's influence
  - interpreting dreams
  - assessing living individuals
  - alternative approaches
- Reviews / review essays
- Woman's (or Feminist) psychobiography
- Oral history as psychobiography

500-1500 words, due October 15

Contact Bob Lentz, Associate Editor
<lentz@telusplanet.net>
as we turned Clio’s Psyche from an eight-page newsletter into a well-respected 48-60 page academic quarterly.

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- Psychobiography-focused mini-interview with distinguished psychobiographers such as George, Mack, McAdams, Solomon, Strouse, and Tucker
- Symposium on Erikson's *Young Man Luther*
- Your experience in researching, writing, and publishing psychobiography
- Developments in psychobiography in the last 15 years
- Issues in doing psychobiography:
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  - assessing childhood's influence
  - interpreting dreams
  - assessing living individuals
  - alternative approaches
- Reviews / review essays of psychobiographies by others
- Woman's (or Feminist) psychobiography
- Your choice(s) for exemplary psychobiography(ies)
- Oral history as psychobiography
- Film and docudrama psychobiographies
- Anecdotes and legends about historical figures and the group fantasies they reveal

500-1500 words, due October 15

Contact Bob Lentz, Associate Editor

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Each teacher gets a sample shock of 45 volts, so he is told to increase the shock level. In reality, the learner actually receives no shocks, but the teacher doesn’t know that.

Strapped into his chair with thick leather straps, electrodes attached to his wrist, the learner is ready to learn. As the shocks increase, the teacher can hear the learner scream, yell, kick the door, demand to be let out, complain of chest pain, and finally fall silent. Before Milgram began his experiment, he asked some psychiatrists to predict the percentage of teachers who would actually deliver the complete sequence of 33 shocks, including three at 450 volts. A tiny percentage, the psychiatrists replied -- no more than a few sadistic individuals. In fact, 65 per cent delivered the full battery of shocks.

Milgram argues that the experiment has nothing to do with sadism and everything to do with submission. The teachers don’t want to deliver the shocks; appear to not enjoy it; frequently ask, even plead, not to administer them; and when it’s over, some talk as if they refused, even though they didn’t. It is, says Milgram, obedience that is being displayed, man’s potential for slavish obedience. Pleasure in hurting has nothing to do with it.

Almost all free [non-prisoner] informants interpret the experiment as Milgram does. “People are naturally weak, but they are not naturally sadistic,” is how one puts it. Hardly any of the prisoners in my study interpret the experiment this way.

Consider the response of the prisoner whom I will call Mr. Acorn. Mr. Acorn is covered with tattoos, some quite artistic, though not to my taste: a flaming Death’s Head; a voluptuous woman with a skull between her legs; a swastika; and a rifle encircled with the words “white power.” He wears a Confederate flag as a bandana. A biker, he wants to open a little tattoo shop when he gets out. One might argue that all this disqualifies him from understanding the Milgram experiment. Consider the possibility that it eminently qualifies him. Mr. Acorn, like most prisoners, lives close to the edge, especially the hard edge of violence. About some things this makes him obtuse. About violence he is a savant:

Man, people love violence. Television and movie companies make millions on it. People love to watch violence, and they love to do violence. They just don’t want to admit it. So, here this dude tells them to do
As part of a research project on evil, I spent three hours once a week for about 15 months with a group of prisoners at a maximum security prison in Patuxent, Maryland, with a small psychological remediation program. The program combined moderately intense group therapy with a chance to earn early release. Though not strictly psychoanalytic, an analytic ethos prevailed in the program. Most of the prisoners in the program had killed or raped a relative or loved one. I report in detail on my research in What Evil Means to Us (1997).

Prisoners are like the rest of us, only more so. They are more adrift -- morally, psychologically, personally. If you listen to their stories long enough, you will be struck by their lack of place in the world. Marriage, family, school, work, and military -- only a minority of prisoners have made a go at any one of these, let alone more than one. Prison is the only place many fit. "Concrete Mama" some call it: it's cold and it's hard, but it's always there, and always ready to take you back.

What's the difference between prisoners and the rest of us as far as evil is concerned? That was my research question, one I'm not sure I ever fully answered. In trying to answer it, I asked the prisoners to comment on a number of stories, experiments, and studies. In one session, I had them read a short summary of the famous Stanley Milgram experiments on obedience to authority conducted at Yale University in 1961-1962. (See Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, 1974.) The summary was titled "If Hitler Asked You to Electrocute a Stranger, Would You? Probably." (Philip Meyer, in J. Henslin (ed.), Down to Earth Sociology, 1993, pp. 165-171) Then we talked about it.

In the series of experiments, subjects, called "teachers," who are ordinary residents of New Haven, Connecticut, believe they are delivering electrical shocks to a "learner," who is actually an associate of Milgram. The learner is always the same man, a mild-mannered, vulnerable-looking, middle-aged fellow with a heart condition. Or so he tells each teacher. The learner is to receive the shocks when he fails to memorize word pairs. The shocks are administered from a shock generator that runs from 15 to 450 volts, the higher levels labeled in big letters "Strong Shock," "Very Strong Shock," "Intense Shock," "Extreme Intensity Shock," "Danger Severe Shock," and "XXX." Each teacher gets a sample shock of 45 volts, so he knows it's real. Each time the learner gets a word pair wrong (often), the teacher is told to increase the shock level. In reality, the learner actually receives no shocks, but the teacher doesn't know that.

Strapped into his chair with thick leather straps, electrodes attached to his wrist, the learner is ready to learn. As the shocks increase, the teacher can hear the learner scream, yell, kick the door, demand to be let out, complain of chest pain, and finally fall silent. Before Milgram began his experiment, he asked some psychiatrists to predict the percentage of teachers who would actually deliver the complete sequence of 33 shocks, including three at 450 volts. A tiny percentage, the psychiatrists replied -- no more than a few sadistic individuals. In fact, 65 per cent delivered the full battery of shocks.

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Man, people love violence. Television and movie companies make millions on it. People love to watch violence, and they love to do violence. They just don't want to admit it. So, here this dude tells them to do it, and they must love it, man, a fantasy come true,
As part of a research project on evil, I spent three hours once a week for about 15 months with a group of prisoners at a maximum security prison in Patuxent, Maryland, with a small psychological remediation program. The program combined moderately intense group therapy with a chance to earn early release. Though not strictly psychoanalytic, an analytic ethos prevailed in the program. Most of the prisoners in the program had killed or raped a relative or loved one. I report in detail on my research in What Evil Means to Us (1997).

Prisoners are like the rest of us, only more so. They are more adrift -- morally, psychologically, personally. If you listen to their stories long enough, you will be struck by their lack of place in the world. Marriage, family, school, work, and military -- only a minority of prisoners have made a go at any one of these, let alone more than one. Prison is the only place many fit. “Concrete Mama” some call it: it’s cold and it’s hard, but it’s always there, and always ready to take you back.

What’s the difference between prisoners and the rest of us as far as evil is concerned? That was my research question, one I’m not sure I ever fully answered. In trying to answer it, I asked the prisoners to comment on a number of stories, experiments, and studies. In one sessions, I had them read a short summary of the famous Stanley Milgram experiments on obedience to authority conducted at Yale University in 1961-1962. (See Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, 1974.) The summary was titled “If Hitler Asked You to Electrocute a Stranger, Would You? Probably.” (Philip Meyer, in J. Henslin (ed.), Down to Earth Sociology, 1993, pp. 165-171) Then we talked about it.

In the series of experiments, subjects, called "teachers," who are ordinary residents of New Haven, Connecticut, believe they are delivering electrical shocks to a "learner," who is actually an associate of Milgram. The learner is always the same man, a mild-mannered, vulnerable-looking, middle-aged fellow with a heart condition. Or so he tells each teacher. The learner is to receive the shocks when he fails to memorize word pairs. The shocks are administered from a shock generator that runs from 15 to 450 volts, the higher levels labeled in big letters “Strong Shock,” “Very Strong Shock,” “Intense Shock,” “Extreme Intensity Shock,” “Danger Severe Shock,” and “XXX.” Each teacher gets a sample shock of 45 volts, so he knows it’s real. Each time the learner gets a word pair wrong (often), the teacher is told to increase the shock level. In reality, the learner actually receives no shocks, but the teacher doesn’t know that.

Strapped into his chair with thick leather straps, electrodes attached to his wrist, the learner is ready to learn. As the shocks increase, the teacher can hear the learner scream, yell, kick the door, demand to be let out, complain of chest pain, and finally fall silent. Before Milgram began his experiment, he asked some psychiatrists to predict the percentage of teachers who would actually deliver the complete sequence of 33 shocks, including three at 450 volts. A tiny percentage, the psychiatrists replied -- no more than a few sadistic individuals. In fact, 65 per cent delivered the full battery of shocks.

Milgram argues that the experiment has nothing to do with sadism and everything to do with submission. The teachers don’t want to deliver the shocks; appear to not enjoy it; frequently ask, even plead, not to administer them; and when it’s over, some talk as if they refused, even though they didn’t. It is, says Milgram, obedience that is being displayed, man’s potential for slavish obedience. Pleasure in hurting has nothing to do with it.

Almost all free [non-prisoner] informants interpret the experiment as Milgram does. “People are naturally weak, but they are not naturally sadistic,” is how one puts it. Hardly any of the prisoners in my study interpret the experiment this way.

Consider the response of the prisoner whom I will call Mr. Acorn. Mr. Acorn is covered with tattoos, some quite artistic, though not to my taste: a flaming Death’s Head; a voluptuous woman with a skull between her legs; a swastika; and a rifle encircled with the words “white power.” He wears a Confederate flag as a bandana. A biker, he wants to open a little tattoo shop when he gets out. One might argue that all this disqualifies him from understanding the Milgram experiment. Consider the possibility that it eminently qualifies him. Mr. Acorn, like most prisoners, lives close to the edge, especially the hard edge of violence. About some things this makes him obtuse. About violence he is a savant:

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Call for Papers

PsychoGeography
Special Theme Issue
March, 2001

"PsychoGeography is the study of human projections upon geographic space and the psychic interaction between people and geography" (Elovitz). It investigates "how issues, experiences, and processes that result from growing up in a male or female body become symbolized and played out in the wider social and natural worlds" (Stein and Niederland).

Some possible approaches:
- The gender of geography (e.g., "motherlands" and "fatherlands")
- Psychogeography of rivers, islands, mountains, etc.
- Borders and borderland symbolism
- Cities, states, and countries as symbols of

Call for Nominations
Halpern Award
for the
Best Psychohistorical Idea
in a
Book, Article, or Internet Site
Contact Paul H. Elovitz, <pelovitz@aol.com>.

Invitation to Join
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Call for Papers

Psychological Uses of Law
Special Theme Issue
June, 2001

Possible approaches:
- The diffusion of law into every aspect of life (i.e., "the legalization of life")
- Emotional uses of law (e.g., legal expression of anger, law as intimidation)
- Jury psychology
- Law as a system of gridlock

Group psychohistory Symposium

- Insanity and the law
- Dysfunctional family courts

Call for Papers

PsychoBiography
of Ralph Nader
Special Theme Issue
March, 2001

Possible approaches:
- Psychodynamics and childhood
- Nader's appeal to intellectuals and Inde-
Call for CORST Grant Applications

The Committee on Research and Special Training (CORST) of the American Psychoanalytic Association announces an American Psychoanalytic Foundation research training grant of $10,000 for CORST candidates (full-time academic scholar-teachers) who have been accepted or are currently in training in an American Psychoanalytic Association Institute. The purpose of the grant is to help defray the costs of psychoanalytic training. Payments will be made over three years of training in installments of $3500, $3500, and $3000 directly to the candidate.

The application is: a) A brief statement of 1000 words about the research proposed, b) A letter from a scholar in the field (e.g., department chair, colleague, or dissertation advisor) attesting to the validity and significance of the research, c) A letter of endorsement by the Education Director of the institute certifying the candidate is in, or has been accepted for, full clinical psychoanalytic training at an institute of the American Psychoanalytic Association, and d) An up-to-date Curriculum Vitae.

Applications are to be submitted in three (3) copies by April 1, 2001, to Professor Paul Schwaber, 258 Bradley Street, New Haven, CT 06511.
Call for Papers
The Psychology of Crime, Punishment, and Incarceration
Special Theme Issue
September, 2001
Some possible approaches include:
• Emotion in the courtroom
• Jury psychology
• Children and women in prison
• Immigrants and the INS
• The crime of punishment
• Comparative international studies
• Case studies
• Crime and punishment on TV
• How cameras change the courtroom dynamics

500-1500 words, due July 10
Contact Paul Elovitz, Editor
<pelowitz@aol.com>

The Best of Clio's Psyche
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Call for Papers
Our Litigious Society
Special Theme Issue
March, 2001
Possible approaches:
• Psychodynamics

The Makers-of-Psychohistory Research Project
To write the history of psychohistory, the Forum is interviewing the founders of our field to create a record of their challenges and accomplishments. It welcomes participants who will help identify, interview, and publish accounts of the founding of psychohistory. Contact Paul H. Elovitz, <pelovitz@aol.com>.

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting
Saturday, September 15, 2001
Britton, Felder, and

Saturday, November 10, 2001
Psychohistory Forum Meeting
Psychoanalysts Confront the Creative Process
Clio's Psyche of
Psychohistory
Call for Papers

- Violence in Mass Murd-cide
- The Future the Third 2000
- Assessing Millennial-2000
- Psycho-
- Election biographies Gore, et al
- The Psy-
- Legalizing Society
- Psychobiog-
- Manias and nomics and
- The Role of server in
- Psychohis-

Volkan Honored

In honor of the retirement of Vanik Volkan and the work of the Center he created, the University of Virginia Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI) conducted a major conference entitled "Identity, Mourning and Psychopolitical Processes" on May 25-26. The featured presentations and discussions were on the human processes that lead to ethnic tension, conflict resolution, and the healing process. The speakers came from several disciplines -- psychoanalysis, psychiatry, psychology, political science, history, and anthropology -- and hail from the U.S and abroad. Peter Loewenberg of UCLA presented "The Psychodynamics of a Creative Institution: The Bauhaus, Weimar, Dessau, Berlin, 1919-1933" and Howard Stein of the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center, "Mourning and Society: A Study in the History and Philosophy of Science."

Volkan, who will retire later this year after 38 years on the University of Virginia staff, is currently the director of the CSMHI and a former president of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP). Volkan founded CSMHI in 1987 as an interdisciplinary center to specialize in conflict resolution and peace work, primarily in Eastern Europe and subsequently the newly independent countries from the former Soviet Union. He has developed theories for caring for severely traumatized populations in the wake of ethnic tension. "At the Center, we study preventive medicine for ethnic issues. In that sense, the Center is very unique," Volkan said. "When large groups are in conflict, people die, they become refugees, they lose homes and their loved ones, and so they have to mourn. Without mourning, they cannot adjust. Ethnic identity is related to mourning. When people do not mourn, their identity is different." The Center is on the forefront of studies in large-group dynamics and applies a growing theoretical and field-proven base of knowledge of issues such as ethnic tension, racism, national identity, terrorism, societal trauma, leader-follower relationships and other aspects of national and international conflict.

For further information on Dr. Volkan and the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction, visit the Web site, <http://hsc.virginia.edu/csmhi/>.

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Grant Applications

Volkan Honored

American Life and
nder as Disguised Sai-
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Millennium (June,
Apocalypticism and
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Geography
2000: Psycho-
of Bradley, Bush,
McCain, Buchanan,
chology of Incarcera-

Clio’s Psyche

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Forum

Grant Applica-

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announces an Ameri-
Foundation research
for CORST candidates

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are currently in train-
psychoanalytic Associa-
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psychoanalytic train-
made over three years
ments of $3500,
Clio's Psyche of the Psychohistory Forum

Call for Papers

- Violence in American Life and Mass Murder as Disguised Suicide
- Assessing Apocalypticism and Millennialism Around the Year 2000
- PsychoGeography
- The Psychology of Incarceration and Crime
- Legalizing Life: Our Litigious Society
- Psychobiography
- Manias and Depressions in Economics and Society
- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a Model for Healing
- The Processes of Peacemaking and Peacekeeping
- The Psychology of America as the World’s Policeman
- Entertainment News

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting

Michael Britton
"Countertransference: Royal Road Into the Psychology of the Cold War"
Saturday, September 23, 2000
Contact Paul Elovitz, Editor
See page 51

Call for Papers

The Psychohistory of Conspiracy Theories

Special Theme Issue
December, 2000

Possible approaches:

- Psychodynamics and childhood roots of conspiracy theories
- Case studies of conspiracy theories in American history
- Survey of the psychohistorical and psychological literature on conspiracy theories
- Film and television treatment of conspiracy theories

Contact Bob Lentz, Associate Editor
boblentz@cliospsyche.com

The Best of Clio's Psyche

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Contact the Editor (see page three).
Letter to the Editor

Dreamwork Resources

The Historical Dreamwork Method is available to help the biographer better understand the dreams of the subject and other aspects of psychobiography. Clio's Psyche welcomes papers on historical dreamwork for publication and for presentation at Psychohistory Forum meetings. Contact Paul H. Elovitz (see page 51).

Book Reviews

Life: Our Litigious Society
Contact the Editor (see page 3)

Editorial Policies

Call for Papers
- Group Psychohistory (December, 2000)
- Conspiracy Theories (December, 2000) (See page 100)
- PsychoGeography (March, 2001)
- Legalizing Life: Our Litigious Society (2001)
- The Psychology of Incarceration and Crime (2001)
- Television as Object Relations
Contact Paul Elovitz, Editor
See page 51

Call for Papers on
The Psychology of Incarceration and Crime
Contact the Editor (see page 3)

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Letters to the Editor

Nader, Political Nightmares, and Leaders' Morality

Psychohistorians probe the "Why" of culture, current events, history, and society.

Howard F. Stein
(Editor's Note: We welcome scanned pic-
Letters to the Editor

The History of Psychohistory

Clio's Psyche's interviews of outstanding psychohistorians (see "An American in Amsterdam: Arthur Mitzman," page 146) have grown into a full-fledged study of the pioneers and history of our field. Psychohistory as an organized field is less than 25 years old, so most of the innovators are available to tell their stories and give their insights. Last March, the Forum formally launched the Makers of the Psychohistorical Paradigm Research Project to systematically gather material to write the history of psychohistory. We welcome memoirs, letters, and manuscripts as well as volunteers to help with the interviewing. People interested in participating should write, call, or e-mail Paul H. Elovitz (see page 119).

Awards and Honors

CORST Essay Prize • Professor Janice M. Coco, Art History, University of California-Davis, winner of the First Annual American Psychoanalytic Association Committee on Research and Special Training (CORST) $1,000 essay prize, will present her paper, "Exploring the Frontier from the Inside Out in John Sloan's Nude Studies," at a free public lecture at 12 noon, Saturday, December 20, Jade Room, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City.

Sidney Halpern Award for the Best Psychohistorical Idea • The Psychohistory Forum is granting an award of $200 to Michael Hirohama of San Francisco for starting and maintaining the Psychohistory electronic mailing list (see page 98).

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting
Saturday, January 30, 1999
Charles Strozier

Call for Papers
Special Theme Issues 1999 and 2000

- The Relationship of Academia, Psychohistory, and Psychoanalysis (March, 1999)
- The Psychology of Legalizing Life [What is this??]
- Psychogeography
- Meeting the Millenium

Free Subscription
For every paid library subscription ($40), the person donating or arranging it will receive a year’s subscription to Clio’s Psyche free. Help

Call for Nominations
Halpern Award for the Best Psychohistorical Idea in a Book, Article, or Computer Site
This Award may be granted at the level of Distinguished Scholar, Graduate, or Undergraduate.
Contact Paul H. Elovitz, Editor -- see p.
The Psychohistory Forum is pleased to announce

The Young Psychohistorian 1998/99 Membership Awards

John Fanton recently received his medical degree and is doing his five year residency in Providence, Rhode Island. Currently, he is at the Children’s Hospital, Women and Infants Hospital, and the Butler Psychiatric Hospital. His goal is to become a child maltreatment expert working in the area of Preventive Psychiatry. At the IPA in 1997 he won the Lorenz Award for his paper on improving parenting in Colorado.

Albert Schmidt is a doctoral candidate in modern European history at Brandeis University who plans to defend his dissertation in April when his advisor, Rudolph Binion, will return from Europe for the occasion. Rather than do a biography of SS General Reinhard Heydrich as originally intended, he is writing on the German protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia under Heydrich’s dominance. In the last four years this talented young scholar has been awarded nine fellowships, grants, or scholarships.

Dreamwork Resources
The Historical Dreamwork Method is available to help the biographer better understand the dreams of the subject and other aspects of psychobiography. Clio’s Psyche welcomes papers on historical dreamwork for publication and for presentation at Psychohistory Forum meetings. Contact Paul H. Elovitz (see page 43).

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Call for Papers
Special Theme Issues
1999 and 2000

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• Our Litigious Society
• PsychoGeography
• Meeting the Millennium
• Manias and Depressions in Economics and Society

Contact the Editor at

Letters to the Editor

Next Psychohistory Forum Meeting
Saturday, October 2, 1999
Charles Strozier
"Putting the Psychoanalyst on the Couch: A Biography of Heinz Kohut"
Clio's Psyche of the Psychohistory Forum

Call for Papers

- Future of Psychohistory and Psychoanalysis in the Light of the Demise of the Psychohistory

The Best of Clio's Psyche

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Call for Nominations

By July 1, please list your favorite articles, interviews, and Special Issues (no more than three in each category) and send the information to the Editor (see page 3) for the August publication.

Forthcoming in the June Issue

- Interview with a Distinguished Featured Psychohistorian
- "The Insane Author of the Oxford English Dictionary"
- "Jews in Europe After World War II"
- "A Psychohistorian's Mother and Her Legacy"

Hayman Fellowships

The University of California Interdisciplinary Psychoanalytic Consortium announces two $5,000 annual fellowships to aid psychoanalytically informed research on the literary, cultural, and humanistic expressions of genocide, racism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, inter-ethnic violence, and the Holocaust.

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- Legalizing Life: Our Litigious Society
- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a Model for Healing
- The Processes of Peacemaking and Peacekeeping
- The Psychology of America as the World’s

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