
Clio's Psyche

Examining the "Why" of History

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Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

Paul H. Elovitz

The theme of this issue is nationalism, ethnic conflict and the need for enemies. The survival of our world depends on our controlling these powerful forces. We start with an unsolicited article by Lee Shneidman which prompted me to consider putting together an issue devoted to the subject. Next, Joseph Held, author of many books on Eastern Europe including *The Dictionary of Eastern European History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), writes about changes in the nationalism of the former Soviet-bloc countries. Then we have an article by Peter Loewenberg on the transcendence of nationalism using two middle-

European examples. Finally, Leyla, a young Azerbaijani student currently in the USA, gives a first-hand account of her experience with national hatred in wartime.

We had hoped to include an article by Professor Vamik Volkan, but we discovered he was traveling abroad and completely occupied with his prior commitments including a biography of the American President who kept a list of his enemies, Richard Milhous Nixon. However, he graciously agreed to allow us to quote from his important book, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relations* (Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson, 1988). He makes essential points including that the existence of enemies becomes the "opponent's necessity because although constituting a threat, it is also instrumental in the shaping of the opposing groups' affective nature" (p. 94). As usual, we turn to the poets for special insights to our **psychodynamic** work. Volkan aptly cites W. H. Auden's "Sea and the Mirror", writing "if we didn't have a hated 'them' to turn *against* there could be no loving 'us' to turn *to*" (p. 83). Vital work that Volkan has been accomplishing at the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction in Virginia includes bringing together longstanding enemies from different parts of the world and traveling abroad to achieve the same ends. His activities inspire me to want to emulate them at my college and at the Forum.

As these words go to press I will be lecturing to my students on Nixon's need for enemies and to the Forum on the roots of his need to hate, mostly as revealed in the *Haldemann Diaries*. Doing this forced me to confront my own need to hate Richard Nixon since hatred is incompatible with the type of psychobiography I have devoted myself to writing. I have shared this motivation with my Forum colleagues. I am also analyzing the November 8th American election that revealed the anger of much of the electorate with Clinton, Democrats, incumbents and the rhetoric of

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political compassion. I wonder if some of this anger might be a reaction to the loss of our Cold War enemy - "the evil empire" of European Communism? Though the collapse was in 1989 and 1990 the reaction may have been delayed by George Bush's "little wars" in Panama and Iraq which mobilized many of the same emotions. The fervor with which this year's political attacks were launched in a period of an improving economy is puzzling. The incredible emphasis on crime in the election, after several years of decreasing crime, further raises suspicions of our need to find "enemies within" as those "enemies without" fade away.

The Non-Rational Aspect of Nationalism

J. Lee Shneidman
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Nationalism is a feeling, based in part on projections and defense mechanisms. In many respects it is also an excuse. Examine it, and it metamorphoses. In the face of this powerful emotion logic, reason, facts, and observable reality are smothered, overwhelmed and made irrelevant. Argue human rights and suddenly the argument turns to the battle of Kosovo in 1389; discuss economic reality and you face the deeds of Slovak "King" Svatopulk (870-894); discuss political rights and the Cortes of 1283 enters the picture. In nationalistic fervor time is meaningless. The Albigensian Crusade, Masada, the Ulster plantation, the assassination of Ali, the Partitions of Poland and the forced conversions by the Mogul emperors happened this morning - catch the details on the 6 O'Clock News.

Some historians view nationalism as a modern phenomenon. They are wrong. Nationalism, or the lack of it, destroyed the Western Empire but allowed the Eastern portion to exist for another millennium; it destroyed Innocent's Christendom; it destroyed both the Spanish and the Austrian Hapsburgs; it destroyed the Abbassids and the Ottomans; it destroyed the Tzars and the Soviets. But it held the Basques, Catalans, Irish, Scots, Poles and Serbs together; it created a Germany and an Italy.

To understand nationalism one must understand the feelings of people and come to grips with the reality of identity. Each of us has an individual identity, but we also carry an identity which is part of a collective, and nationalism is part of this, collective identity. There are also supranational identities which we carry: Christian, Muslim, Jew, Socialist, etc. The supranational identities have, in the past, been rent by the national. To understand the dynamics of nationalism one must eschew the standard methodology of history, political science, sociology and enter the realm of fantasy.

In 1882 Ernst Renan, after examining all the logical positions in *What Is A Nation?*, concluded: "A nation is a spirit...a great unity created by a feeling for the sacrifices one has already made and for those one is prepared to make in the future. It implies a past but expresses itself in the present."

Let me suggest that nationalism is a defense mechanism used to protect our identity in times of adversity. Slogans are inculcated, past events are simplified or distorted to give us pride and prove that we are better than our opponents. "Don't shoot till you see the whites of their eyes" cried the losers. "I regret that I have but one life to give to my country," said the inept spy. "Remember the Alamo," said those who wanted to push slavery westward. "Remember the Maine," said those who covered-up the stupidity of the ship's captain. "Remember Pearl Harbor," said the sleepy chiefs of staff. We could afford to cover up and exploit the debacles because we won the wars,

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but the point is that past defeats gave hope for present and future victories. In *Fiddler on the Roof*, Tevy gives a list of past persecutors, then asks "Where are they? Here we are!" Displaced by the latest pogrom, he and his fellow *shtetl* dwellers hope to triumph in the future.

When you strip away the logic and the distorted scientific rationales, even the most aggressive nationalism is a defense. It cloaks fear and perhaps a feeling of inferiority. Nationalism requires denigrating and even exterminating the opponent - the threat. Claiming that God gave us the right to dominate from sea to shining sea, or the right to interfere in foreign governments, or the right to civilize peoples by annexing their land, or that the only good Indian is a dead Indian, is non-rational. But of course, nationalism is a feeling and feelings are non-rational.

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A "New Type of Nationalism" in Eastern Europe

Joseph Held
Rutgers University

Amidst all the carnage and inhumanity perpetrated in the name of ethnicity (a substitute for nationalism) in the former Yugoslavia today, it may sound strange to argue that the old-style nationalism is being replaced by something new in East Central Europe. The indications are all around if one is willing to raise one's sight from the horrors of Sarajevo. Czechs and Slovaks parted, if not amicably, at least in peace; Romanian army officers communicate freely with their Hungarian counterparts; Albanians in Kosovo have not gone on a *jihad* against the Serbs; and, at long last, Serbia cut off supplies to its warring ethnics in Bosnia.

Does this mean that Balkan-style intolerant, chauvinistic nationalism is a thing of the past? Not necessarily; there is still plenty of it around in East Central Europe. But the new indications mean that a different kind of nationalism is being formed, one that will

resemble the nationalism of the French, the British, and, lately, of the Germans, and that in time it will replace the old.

The signs were there already in 1956. In that fateful year that had seen two revolutions (one in Poland and one in Hungary) in the Soviet colonial empire, the Polish revolutionaries did not demand the return of Poland's eastern lands attached to the Soviet Union in 1945. The Hungarians refrained from proclaiming themselves the elite of the region, as had been their custom in the past. Neither Poles nor Hungarians reached for the old standby of nationalism, anti-Semitism. The Soviet rulers did not recognize the change and they treated both Polish and Hungarian moderate nationalisms as hostile forces. They continued talking of "proletarian internationalism" when every man on the street knew that it was a metaphor for Soviet great-power chauvinism.

When the communist system collapsed in the East Central European countries, one could expect the revival of Balkan-style intolerant nationalism as a reaction to its suppression by the great colonial power. In certain instances this did happen. In Hungary, for example, the populist version of the 1930s reemerged with demands for the revision of the borders of the region, with its proclamation of Hungary's need for *Lebensraum* and, of course, with its ardent anti-Semitism. However, in spite of the loud propaganda of its adherents, this sort of nationalism collapsed in the elections of 1994. The party of the populists received barely 1.4 percent of the total vote, showing that Hungarian society matured and wanted nothing to do with old-style nationalism. In Slovakia, old-style nationalism also became prominent after the liberation. The indications were similar to those in Hungary. But Slovaks soon realized that it led them nowhere; in consequence, the spokesman of this ideology, Meciar, was eventually removed from office in 1993. The most striking evidence of the change occurred in Hungarian-Romanian relations. When the Romanians overthrew the Ceausescu clan in a short, bloody revolution, a flood of Hungarians volunteered to deliver food and medicine to their neighbors. After the euphoria of the revolution passed, relations somewhat deteriorated. But Hungary proclaimed several times that it does not want the return of Transylvania. It only wants the Hungarian minority to be able to

exercise its human rights and have access to its national culture. Since then, military relations between the two countries have tremendously improved.

Recently, Ferenc Glatz, the head of the Hungarian Academy's Historical Institute, published a lengthy study on the need to eliminate old-style nationalism from the region. He proposed a code of conduct for the governments of East Central Europe which was translated into five languages. He suggested that minority rights, minority cultures, and civil rights be guaranteed in a somewhat similar way as the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference guaranteed Europe's existing borders. Glatz's work deserves closer scrutiny (which cannot be accomplished here because of lack of space). It is another hopeful sign in the changing atmosphere in which cooperation among the region's states containing large minority populations replaces the old-style nationalistic competition.

It is, of course, too early to tell which version of nationalism will survive into the twenty-first century. It is interesting to observe, however, that in countries where the former communist *apparat* survived in power, old-style nationalism has a greater chance than where they did not. The *bon mot* in the region is that "the last stage of communism is nationalism," a statement mocking the Leninist notion of the "last stage of capitalism." This is certainly the case in the former Yugoslavia. But as the communist ideology failed to survive into the 1990s (except in leftist intellectual circles in Britain and the United States), it is likely that its final demise will open the way to the new nationalism.

For want of a better term, I would like to call this new nationalism the Mazzini-type, after the great Italian hero of 1848. In essence, it recognizes each nation's right to exist in independence, undisturbed by its neighbors. It stresses cooperation instead of competition. The new version will also consider national borders as only symbolic, not a means to stop cross-border exchanges of cultures. This is the only way East Central Europeans can enter the new century. In my opinion, though I am no psychohistorian, these changes have occurred because the common experience of Soviet Russian Nationalism in the region has

demonstrated the futility of old-style nationalism. Unless the Russian influence reoccurs, the old nationalism will not become influential in the region.

Joseph Held is a Hungarian-born scholar of Eastern Europe and Professor of History at Rutgers University, who left his homeland in the course of the 1956 uprising.

The State, National Hatred, and Its Transcendence

Peter Loewenberg
UCLA

There are a few important ethno-national conflicts in the world where the most virulent forms of nationalism have been institutionally contained and transcended. I think it worthwhile to look at these to see what instrumental lessons we may derive for curbing destructive nationalism.

The institutions of government, such as military service, education, fiscal policy, marital and family law, the establishment of religion, taxation, business and professions codes, and building restrictions, have a direct effect on the formation of character and national identity and are relevant in building the content and dynamics of nationalism. As Walter Metzger points out: "With respect to character-formation there is nothing 'simple' about government nothing moderate about its 'jurisdiction'."~ For example, governmental and historical institutions have created different German-speaking national characters and civic cultures on the two sides of the German-Swiss border because of the character-forming agency of the respective states, educational socialization, and historical experiences.

Anglo-Americans should be open to

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possibility that there are other forms of democratic polity than the "Westminster" model where the winner by one vote takes all. An alternative model, called *consociationalism*, builds a policy input for structural minorities at all levels of the political system. Under this approach the various interests in society, be they religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, or ethnic, are guaranteed proportionality in representation at every level of political decision-making, including civil service appointments and the allocation of public funds.²

The first of two cases I wish to take up has its roots in wrestling with forces of nationalism in the final three decades of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a multinational, polyglot, multi-ethnic and multi-religious dynastic monarchy. The most creative thinkers on nationalities questions were the Austromarxists, especially Karl Renner (1870-1950) and Otto Bauer (1881-1938). The essence of their proposals is the personality principle (*Personalitätsprinzip*), which is to detach national identity from territory. Under this idea, nationality should not be determined by birth or residence, but by personal choice which would be recorded in a national register. Cultural and educational life, including taxation to support these, would be determined by the various autonomous groups who could thus occupy the same territory and share economic, governmental, and transport facilities.

Karl Renner was the President of Austria from 1945 to 1950 when Italy and Austria negotiated the Paris Agreement, known as the Gruber-de Gasperi Agreement, of 5 September 1946, which set the outline for a long-term settlement of the ethno-linguistic issues in the South Tyrol.⁴ This agreement provided for Italian sovereignty and cultural autonomy for the German-speaking majority. A noteworthy fea-

² See Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

³ Synopticus (Renner pseudonym), *Zur österreichischen Nationalitätenfrage* (Vienna, 1899); *Staat and Nation* (Vienna, 1899); *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat* (Vienna, 1902). Peter Loewenberg, "Karl Renner and the Politics of Accommodation: Moderation Versus Revenge," in *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 22 (1991), pp. 35-56.

Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage and die Sozialdemokratie* (1907), *Werkausgabe* (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1975), I. Peter Loewenberg, "Austro-Marxism and Revolution: Otto Bauer, Freud's 'Dora' Case, and the Crisis of the First Austrian Republic" in *Decoding the Past: The Psychohistorical Approach* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 161-204.

ture of Austro-Italian diplomacy over the past fifty years is a gradualistic structure, including a "Package" of 137 sections negotiated in 1969 and a "Calendar of Operations" for their implementation. These measures include the use of the German language in place names; judicial, police, and other administrative procedures; regional finances; water courses; forestry; education textbooks and teacher credentialing; and agreements worked out in bilateral commissions. In 1992 all 137 sections of the Austro-Italian Autonomy Package for the South Tyrol were declared fulfilled, an impressive and under-recognized achievement in the history of international conflict resolution. The points for our conceptual understanding are that: 1) cultural autonomy can be successfully separated from sovereignty and 2) not all issues can be settled in one adjudication. As in psycho-therapy, the processes of creating new structures over time itself constitutes a healing function.

The second case I will put is directly *contra* to the "personality principle" - it is the "territorial principle." The exemplary case is the Swiss "cellular" formula for resolving historical, ethnic, religious, and linguistic conflicts. The territorial principle, which is as old as the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 and the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, is that ethnoreligious identity follows the prince or the jurisdiction of the territory.

The grievances of the Swiss French Catholic population of the northern Jura, in canton Bern, propelled the creation of a new canton of Jura in 1978. How this was done provides a case worth studying and considering in other areas of national conflict. The Swiss model is to circumscribe conflict by precisely focusing differences in plebiscites, and then recognizing and satisfying these by creating new and smaller territorial units. The political mode of handling the Jura conflict was to hold a series of referenda, in the entire Swiss federation, in the canton of Bern, and repeatedly in the districts involved, to give full and precise ex-

For an anthropological perspective on the cultural differences and conflicts between these two peoples, see John W. Cole and Eric R. Wolf, *The Hidden Frontier: Ecology and Ethnicity in an Alpine Valley* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); and Eric R. Wolf, "Cultural Dissonance in the Italian Alps," *Comparative Studies in Society and History: An International Quarterly*, 5 (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962-63), pp. 1-14.

pression to the popular will down to the local village level.

The Swiss national identity is grounded in the value of preserving the smallest ethnic, linguistic, and cultural units. The aim of childhood family and school socialization is to inculcate the attitude that although people from other cantons may have another culture, religion, or language, "they are Swiss." As a demonstration of this willingness to allow those who wish a separate politico-cultural unit to have it, we may look at the results of the national referendum of 24 September 1978 to amend the Federal Constitution to add the canton of Jura: 82 percent of the voters in the federation voted to accept the new canton. In no single canton was the positive vote to create the new Jurassien canton less than 69 percent. The Swiss civic culture allows for a toleration of ethnic, linguistic, confessional, and cultural pluralism in the definition of a national identity of what it means to be a Swiss. As Jonathan Steinberg felicitously put it about the Swiss, the most important characteristic of Swissness is "The equality of all human communities before the bar of history."⁵ This is a fitting formula for the world as we enter the twenty-first century.

Individuals are made up of many different psychodynamic introjects, identifications, partial identifications, and inner objects which may be in conflict. This knowledge becomes crucial for understanding the role of various group and regional identifications in national conflict or the equally complex problem of national cohesion.

What importantly distinguishes the Austro-Italian and the Swiss cases from the tragedy of national conflict and "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia or in the Caucasus, where wars of ethnic expulsion or extermination take place, is the presence of religious and social class cross-cutting - by **which** I mean that the divisions, "fissures" or "cleavages" of a society, such as sectionalism, ethnic, cultural, class, linguistic, or religious, differences do not neatly overlap for most of the population. In cases where a national identity is maintained any two individuals may be mem-

bers of the same occupational status, as in a common observation in dining establishments in my own part of the country, the American Southwest: "English in the restaurant, Spanish in the kitchen," or the White Anglo day-time occupants of high-rise office buildings and the night-time custodial cleaning personnel. This fissure between owner and client on the one hand, and culinary or custodial employees on the other, is likely to include not only language, but citizenship as well as religion, culture, and ethnicity.

Religion and language are especially important cleavages. The situation in Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, Cyprus, the Israeli West Bank, and Quebec, to name just a few of the world's current national clashes, is distinguished in being subject to no significant cross-cutting. All categories of ethno-linguistic-religious cleavage are congruent and therefore bipolar and subject to intolerant total black and white judgments. All Quebecois are Francophone and Roman Catholic; Anglophone Canadians are overwhelmingly Protestant. All culturally Turkish Cypriots speak **Turkish** and are Moslem; all Greek Cypriots speak the Hellenic tongue and are Greek Orthodox. All Armenians speak Armenian and are Christians; all Azerbaijanis speak Azeri and are Moslems. In the former Yugoslavia all Croats are Roman Catholic and all Serbs are Serbian Orthodox. During the Partisan War of 1941-1945 and in the current fighting in Bosnia, it sufficed to ask a child how she makes her cross to distinguish Croat from Serb and to decide to kill or let live.

By contrast, in Switzerland the core cantons of "Inner Switzerland" are German-speaking and Roman Catholic while other important German-speaking areas such as Zurich, Basel, and Bern are Protestant. The Francophone area also has predominantly Protestant cantons, such as Geneva, the birthplace of the Calvinist Reformation, but Catholic cantons as well. Thus in Switzerland the religious division, instead of being congruent with cultural-linguistic cleavages, cuts across them. In the Italian Alto Adige-South Tyrol both the Germanic and the Italian population are Roman Catholic. Because any individual is subject to cross-pressures of various identifications and allegiances, cross-cutting encourages conciliation. Moderate attitudes and actions are fostered and often

⁵ Jonathan Steinberg, *Why Switzerland?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 72.

prevail by mobilizing like introjects and common inner objects.

Hostility and aggression in the politico-social world are created through murderous rage, persecutions and foulness, in the conscious and unconscious inner fantasies of the perpetrators. A moment's reflection will convince us that we are only able to postulate a characteristic or trait in another because it has been to some degree known to us in fantasy. Peoples and nations find in their minorities and in their neighbors an available and vulnerable target on whom to project their bad internal objects - their hatred and urge to kill as well as their depreciated sense of inferiority, of being despised as slovenly parasites, cheats, and unscrupulous characters. In the passion of nationalism the enemy within becomes the enemy without.

Peter Loewenberg is a Professor of History at UCLA, a Training and Supervising Analyst of the Southern California Psychoanalytic Institute and a co-founder of the University of California Interdisciplinary Psychanalytic Consortium.

My Experience with Ethnic Conflict

Leyla

Six years of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict have changed the way the people of these two nations feel about each other. The word "hatred" can't adequately describe the present feelings. That crystallized for me at the funeral of the Azerbaijani soldier who was tortured to death after the failed defense of his village against Armenians.

At the funeral a few weeks later there were many good words said about the heroism and bravery of the twenty-year-old soldier. After all, he was defending his Motherland from invaders. The phrase I remember the most was from his mother: "no human could have done that (meaning tortured him by putting red-hot rods into his flesh until he died) to my son." At first, I didn't pay much attention to "no human could have" but unconsciously I kept rethinking this phrase in my mind. I didn't realize what

most troubled me about her words. Any mother whose son's life was ended in such a terrible way has every right to condemn his murderers. But the enormous sadness and anger this phrase aroused in me meant that there was more to it than just a condemnation of the enemies.

It bothered me for several days until I realized that the words "no human beings" implied that Armenians in general and Armenian soldiers fighting in this war in specific were not humans. Human beings could not have done what they did to the son of this poor woman.

How dared she to generalize so? How dared she call all the Armenians I have known inhuman? Was my high school teacher who taught us folk dances of various peoples inhuman? Was the Armenian family my parents were friends with and who celebrated all the holidays with us inhuman? Was my classmate who was constantly sent to detention because he always made fun of the teachers inhuman?

Armenians and Azerbaijanis have shared joy and sorrow, laughter and tears. People of the two nations have attended each others' wedding ceremonies and funerals. They were friends and neighbors, teachers and students, co-workers and partners. But how would one explain all of this to the woman whose twenty-year-old son was tortured to death? Amidst the sadness and anger I hoped the other people at that funeral felt the same uneasiness I did and remembered the time when Azerbaijanis and Armenians were friends.

Leyla is an Azerbaijani student currently attending an American college.

The Courage of Rudolph Binion

Bob Lentz

Born in 1927 in New York City, Rudolph "Rudy" Binion earned his PhD from Columbia University in 1958. Previously, he lived in Paris for six years, obtaining a Diplome from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques and working as Statistical Assistant for UNESCO. He taught at Rutgers, MIT and Columbia before

being appointed Leff Families Professor of Modern European History at Brandeis University in 1967. Rudy's main course is Modern European Thought and Culture One (Montaigne to Mill) and Two (Darwin to date). His one-semester psychohistory course features a reading list that's "a mixed bag of good and bad samples of our black art." He also teaches a graduate seminar on national character in comparative historical perspective. Rudy's **psychobiographical/psychohistorical** books in English are *Frau Lou, Nietzsche's Wayward Disciple* (1968); *Hitler among the Germans* (1976); and *Soundings Psychohistorical and Psycholiterary* (1981). Clio's Psyche is proud to recognize Rudy's courageous "plunging in" to mass consciousness early on. Currently, he is "deserting psychohistory for literary analysis" in his current book-in-progress, working title: *Text and Subtext*. Rudy talked with us from his home in Brookline, Massachusetts.

CP: How did you come from demographic and political history to psychoanalytic **psychobiography** and psychohistory?

RB: I found myself a psychobiographer in spite of myself. I had taken up Freud only incidentally to be obliging to some student who requested a readings course on Freud. Then the student switched to Rilke for the second semester. I came across Lou Andreas-Salome behind both these figures and ended up writing *Frau Lou*, my book about her. I got involved in trying to explain her short stories and novels with reference to her actual life experiences, some of very recent vintage. The deeper I immersed myself in those experiences, the more contradictions I stumbled upon between her own self-versions and what I could reconstruct of the facts about her from documents of the times, such as exchanges of letters and others' diaries. How her memories had been distorted over the years! Why were they distorted? I had originally taken psychoanalysis as the orthodox straight approach to understanding a human life and assumed that her major experiences had been with her father in her childhood and then with the preacher who took the place of her father in her heart, and that the later men in her life, especially the overpowering father figures beginning with Nietzsche, had been Freudianly experienced by her. But little by little the childhood material behind her fiction seemed dragged in, forced, only marginally relevant.

More and more I came to see that what was happening in her adult life, especially her Nietzsche experience, dominated at least her fiction unconsciously. I put into my conclusion that my whole method was wrong - the material simply redounded against it - and found myself a revisionist Freudian psychobiographer. I did a couple of other psychobiographical studies but drew connections from biography to large-scale history only tenuously. Finally I had to make the transition from psychobiography to what was going on in groups or masses or nations. That's how I got into the Hitler business: because I **thought** I could go from the individual charismatic leader to what was passing unconsciously between him and his following.

I've got to throw in something. In my conclusion to *Frau Lou* I remember speculating on how memories might fade, disintegrate, and recombine, saying that the Freudian models of the topography of the mind were just inadequate but that lots of other thoroughgoing studies like the one I had just done were needed before any new conclusions could be reached. The other day in my dentist's waiting room I saw a story in *Time* or *Newsweek* on a neurological conception of how memory works, or doesn't work when it doesn't, from a book called *The Myth of Repressed Memory*. It was about the memories or pseudomemories of child abuse that ex-patients, or patients, are coming up with against their parents. I saw that what I had then dimly envisioned with *Frau Lou* as a kind of reconsideration of how memory works is now pretty much what, though with some differences obviously, neurophysiologists and psychologists are coming to, though on other grounds than mine. I was quite amused.

CP: Did you pick up any formal psychoanalytic or psychological training?

RB: No, I not only did not but I'm sort of glad that I didn't. I don't believe in applied psychoanalysis - I think that's a big mistake. I share Lloyd deMause's early view of the independence of psychohistory, specifically from psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is the starting point in historic fact, with the concept of an unconscious and its psychodynamics. But psychoanalysis in its practice has been essentially limited to consulting rooms and clinics, and the experience with individuals that

provides. The historic record is much richer in independent information. It deals primarily with masses and groups, and that's what psychohistory should be concerned with. I think that how the unconscious works, how it works historically, historic memory, should be studied without preconceptions derived from psychoanalytic experience. Psychoanalysis was the childhood of psychohistory - a Sunday-psychoanalyzing of historical figures by shrinks or ex-patients or on-going patients. While psychohistory has much in common with psychoanalysis, it must not look to psychoanalysis for authority or for clues or hints.

I'm up against this problem whenever I teach a seminar in psychohistory. I hesitate about whether to give the students some psychoanalytical background. I do now give them one week of reading on the ground that this is where psychohistory came from, so it's important to know it historically. But I'm always afraid that they'll look at it the way some psychohistorians used to look to Erikson and others for models, that they'll then read it into the evidence or organize their historic facts around it in trying to understand or make sense of historic events, and that this will be an exercise in futility - that it would stack the cards or vitiate the evidence in advance. One should just plunge in and ask, "Why is this happening? What's going on here unconsciously?" The "why?" question is the first one a psychohistorian should ask - without any models, especially since the psychoanalytical paradigms just don't apply to history if you're dealing with large-scale events.

CP: How does a psychohistorian "plunge in"?

RB: The closest I can find to a fine expression of what I do is Bergson's in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*. He says that you exhaust the intellectual knowledge of the subject, you move around it, look at it from every known angle. Suddenly you plunge in, suddenly you feel it from the inside. At that point everything's clear, everything falls into place, everything makes sense. You get breakthroughs, discovery of documentary material that you didn't even know existed. It's all confirmatory. You know you're on the right track. Internally you get the sense that this is

the way it was lived. You're way ahead of other historical explainers because you add the internal fit, the internal understanding, to the usual evidential, external exactness of your interpretation. Take the very human experience of the fall in marital fertility in the European family at the time of the contraceptive revolution in the late nineteenth century which I looked at it in a recent article. If you use just external things like statistical correlations - degrees of industrialization, rural-urban, Protestant-Catholic, young-old - to explain it, it's extrinsic. But if you start asking, "Why did marital fertility suddenly fall? Why was family planning suddenly adopted in all walks of life and all nations of Europe, and Europe only, when it was? What's going on here collectively?" and put yourself in the place of the population that's undergoing this transformation at the time, it's something else. Both the outside story and the inside story must check with whatever answers you find: both must make sense. If you look only to the outside picture and try to make sense of it in a positivistic way, then you're missing the whole point of it.

CP: Your most famous psychohistorical work is, of course, *Hitler among the Germans*. Now, almost twenty years after its publication, do you have any further thoughts and feelings on Hitler and the Germans?

RB: It's hard to get that book behind me in Germany or Austria. It's terrible. I once told Andreas Hillgruber, a great researcher and friend of mine, "I'm done with Hitler." He replied, "You're never done with Hitler!" No, I've never had occasion either to want to change anything in that book or to add anything. Not that I think it was well written - *that* it was not. It's very difficult to write psychohistory because it is so complex. It's so difficult to make it intelligible and to present it methodically so that people don't lose the thread. In every line you want to add a hundred things that go off on tangents right and left, that associate in one way or another, because psychohistory is complexes that work on different levels of awareness and are all so difficult to retrace.

CP: How do you view the state of psychohistory in Europe today?

RB: I know it perhaps better than most because I lecture in German, French and Italian. So I'm the privileged psychohistorian as far as European invitations go. It seems I spent most of last year flying back and forth to Vienna, where I suddenly had a strangely good press and they wanted to hear me on this, that, and the other thing. England I don't know well, though I lectured at Oxford once or twice. I think the English are, in their national character at some level, incompatible with psychohistory - they just can't understand it. The French have their *mentalites*, sort of unthinking, unreflective, uncritical attitudes. Still, France is open, hospitable to the unconscious, but on the psychoanalytical side. They're all broken up into fiercely factional Lacanian cliques; therefore, anyone who does psychohistory is instantly attacked, assailed. The French are also exceedingly difficult because they're so intellectually polemical-minded, they love to scrap and fight. Now, the Italians are responsive to everything foreign. In Italy I've enjoyed front-page covers, many triumphant moments, that were soon forgotten. I think they translate more books from abroad than any other people, though maybe the Japanese are in close competition. But I wonder who buys the books, who reads them all. They'll recycle history like anything else - it's superficial.

The Germans had, because of Hitlerism itself, a kind of hiatus, or gap, in their national education and missed the whole Freudian period. So, when it came to post-Freudian developments, including psychohistory, they had to plug in very late along. I find them prejudiced in the first instance, receptive after that. Initially they're all wary of what they call monocausal explanations, anything that smacks of reductionism, perhaps because of the Hitler experience. It is immediately spattered with mud and rejected out of hand. But if you say this is *one* of the reasons, the psychological reason, and there are many other causes, they'll listen sympathetically and soon be quite responsive. There isn't that kind of factionalism that in the French experience derives from psychoanalysis itself. In Germany my own Hitler work was and still is exceedingly controversial because it had very much to do with the political sense of my reading of the records that Germany as a mass followed Hitler. This was not welcome in some quarters because the original postwar adjustment to the Hitler

period had been to consider that Hitlerism was an aberration, a conspiracy of a bunch of political gangsters who pulled wool over German eyes, and now that the wool was off their eyes they were back to the democratic path that was theirs by a natural vocation for freedom and brotherly equality and justice throughout the world. Indeed, they are now very democratic-minded, and Hitlerism is pretty much out of their system as a nation. But the record is the record.

CP: Any suggestions how North American and European psychohistorians might work more closely? Collaborating on the Berlin conference in two years?

RB: In general I'm a little sceptical of what conferences do. They don't really promote much awareness. They're usually just free rides for the participants who know what the other guy's going to say anyway. The media coverage, if any, is here today, gone tomorrow. The level on which fruitful interchange takes place is reading each other's books and following through. If the interest is there, nowadays you get a book fast. I don't know that there's any need to drum things up.

CP: You've written in German a lot this past year. Could you give us a synopsis of your critique of Freud's theory of aggression?

RB: What I criticized primarily was Freud's late theory of a certain quantity of aggression which, if it isn't discharged outwardly, is discharged inwardly, in which case it is self-destructive. One would expect that, if discharging aggression outwardly were a precondition for the individual surviving longer, when there was virtually no warfare in Europe for the century after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 longevity would be less; in fact, never did life expectancy increase so greatly. You would expect that women, who tend to be, in Freudian terms, more masochistic in discharging their aggression inwardly, would die younger. But they live longer. You would expect that the hardened killer would live forever if he weren't caught and executed. The theory just doesn't check - it just does not work.

CP: And another paper about Freud as a *fin-de-siecle* character?

RB: I tweaked his beard by saying how, first, he prided himself on blazing new trails, not being influenced by others. But a full-fledged theory of a death instinct is already implicit in Thomas Mann's *Death in Venice* of 1912, among other works of that time. Mann's implicit theory corresponds strangely to Sabina Spielrein's conception that was aired in Freud's own Wednesday evening circle in 1912 and that Freud evidently misunderstood, misheard, judging by his replies and responses to the paper that she presented. He picked up a lot from Ferenczi and others. He was very late when he came out with his death theory after World War I - after all the cultural elites had dropped it long since in Europe. Anyway, there were loads of lines that I took, having fun as it were with what was obviously just a theoretical blind alley and blunder on Freud's part. The reason was not that I wanted to shake a finger at him - it was the 25th anniversary of the museum set up in his house in Vienna, and the theme of the year in Vienna was aggression and death in Freud's thinking. My guest lecture in the Town Hall was to be monitored and questions fielded by the directress of the Freud museum. Hence reverence was in order, but dammit, I just couldn't - I just found that the theory was a huge mistake. Freud was a brilliant, brilliant, brilliant theorist and researcher, but when he settled for that late-life device to undercut all the other instincts by love and death drives, he just screwed up hopelessly.

CP: Is there anything about psycho-history today that troubles you?

RB: The innumerable footnotes to psychoanalytical theorists in psychohistorical articles. A couple of the editors of things I wrote asked for psychoanalytical references to substantiate what I was affirming, which drove me up the wall. Early along I focused, because the material forced me, on the mechanism of traumatic reliving. Then, with a ten- to twenty-year lag, it established itself in psychiatry independently. But, at the time, way back, a bunch of wise-guy psychoanalytical-type historians said there was nothing in the clinical literature to bear me out. But it was my own research experience that spoke through my findings.

Also, a number of people honor me by sending me their drafts and asking for

comments and I love that. But I find that when they're verging on new insights they sort of guard themselves and hold back for fear of breaking new ground, or of losing the bulwark of the established, received wisdom.

CP: Where would you like to see psychohistory go in the future?

RB: Well, I can think of so many things. How does mass unconscious process work? This is the most difficult thing. There are approaches to it that some of us have taken, but we still look upon it as a kind of unexplored territory for the most part. We're just beginning to carve out paths in it. All the works exploring mass consciousness so far are tentative. You're bound to be breaking new ground because shrinks don't put nations or continents, group identities, on the couch. Almost anything one has the courage to do will be rewarding.

Psychodemography, or psychodemographic history, can be very fruitfully explored. Demography has tended to be positivistic, quanto-historical with loads of information. You name it: breastfeeding, mass traumas, plagues - all sorts of human experiences that people are collectively reliving, abreacting, and that have never been explored psycho-historically.

I remember a student coming to me asking for some mass psychological topic in Weimar Germany. Though I don't like to suggest topics, I couldn't resist after a while and said, "Why don't you try the German runaway inflation in the early 1920s, which was a state of mind? Just explore the psychological, the psychohistorical aspects of it." At first, she seemed to rise to the challenge but then got so uptight. This was going away from the received - with a student it's more difficult, they're more sensitive to this - the received, accredited, established, recognized, canonical modes of procedure and problem-posing. She wound up violently hostile to me for ever having suggested it, as if I had forced the topic on her. People are afraid to do anything new in psychohistory. They're afraid to do psychohistory if they've got a professional career in the balance, but to do anything *new* in psychohistory puts them in double jeopardy.

CP: In your 1977 article "Doing

Psychohistory", you wrote that "the aspirant **psychohistorian** is best advised to pick a biographic subject." Would you still give that advice? What other?

RB: I don't know that I'd give it still. I guess it was in part projective. I myself had done a psychobiography [*Frau Lou*] first off. That is certainly how I came to the workings of history psychologically understood, and, therefore, maybe it wasn't a bad course to follow. But, no, I'd rather not give advice. If someone wants to plunge right in on a group level, so much the better. It's like the old line about the faith: each must come in his or her own way to a method or practice or approach.

Psychohistorical Origin of Dream Consciousness

Mena Potts
Forum Foundation

In human history when and how did dreaming consciousness and the ability to metaphorize (or "image-make") originate? This question has been the subject of extensive research by MacKenzie (1965), Mumford (1966), and Langer (1972). Mumford (1966) concluded that proto-human consciousness was initially comprised of dream-like consciousness which gradually evolved into waking consciousness, in response to outer demands. Langer (1972) suggests that imagination was probably involuntary in early human existence and dominated waking and dream consciousness. During the primitive hominoid stage of human development studies indicate, dreaming and waking consciousness were not clearly differentiated. Out of this diffuse state of consciousness, human beings developed the ability to image-make. This ability to differentiate image from fact and to metaphorize (or "image-make") is basic to our understanding of dreams, as well as to human, social and cultural evolution. Primitive and ancient cultures attributed dream consciousness to spirits and Gods. The historical influence of dream metaphors is recorded in the dream accounts of artists, inventors, statesmen, religious leaders, philosophers and scientists. Alexander the Great, for example, developed certain military strategies as a result of his

dream metaphors. Beethoven and Wagner both dreamed of metaphorical musical compositions which they recorded upon awakening. Throughout history, human beings have utilized dream metaphors in a variety of forms in order to create meaning in their life experiences.

Mena Potts of Wintersville, Ohio, is Director of the Forum Foundation and has her doctorate in dreamwork.

Forrest Gump: A Smorgasbord of Feuilletons

Mel Goldstein

Proposition: What the five highest-grossing movies have in common (*Jurassic Park*, *E.T.*, *Jaws*, *Star Wars/Aladdin*, and now *Forrest Gump*) is the infantile fantasy that we are able to overcome our fears of annihilation by remembering that we are omnipotent. Dinosaurs are scary, but we know they're dead. We need not be afraid of extra-terrestrial beings: they are sweet, gentle and friendly. Sharks are a real menace, but they are only physically stronger than we are; we can outsmart them with our cunning. An adolescent-like Luke Skywalker can find his manhood by shooting his bullets down a channel to explode in orgasm if he has the courage, the "force," behind him. If only we all had a magic genie (also spelled jinni). Wish fulfillments all, but only in our dreams.

From the first scene on, when we see a white feather drifting gently from the sky to land near Forrest's feet, and the young black woman nurse, we are led to anticipate that the film has structured its narrative on a frisson of symbols. But this is and is not the case. Rather, we are presented with a confusing assortment of appetizers, and an entree which is chocolates. "Life," says Mrs. Gump, Forrest's mommy, "is like a box of chocolates. You never know what you're gonna get." This is said to me, a kid who grew up on Whitman's chocolates, the box cover designed to tell you exactly what you're gonna get. There is no question of destiny with Whitman's. But destiny, a leitmotif in the film, is a mixed bag. "I don't know if it was my destiny for you to be my son, Forrest," says Mommy. Lt. Taylor

screams that Forrest has robbed him of his destiny to die in action in the field. Forrest does not listen; Forrest is a butinsky (an interferer) and saves Taylor who loses his legs, becomes an alcoholic and then Forrest's shipmate on a shrimpboat, and later is fianced to an Asian woman. Lt. Taylor thanks Forrest for saving his life. What is the message behind this fairy tale?

I am already confused, since Forrest as agent for inter-racial harmony would likely have gotten these liberal notions from his mother. But would this perfect mommy of infinite humanistic view name her son after Nathan Bedford Forrest who founded the KKK? Not unless she was ill-informed or simple. And is it necessary for this perfect mommy to explain complex matters simply, to blatantly lie to Forrest? How are we to respond to the snippet of *The Birth of a Nation*? Why are all of the friends but one of Forrest's black? Mommy tells Forrest, "You're no different from anybody else." When asked by Forrest, "Where is my Father?" Mommy answers, "On vacation,... That means when you go away and never come back." Worse yet, she brings home the principal of the school she wants Forrest admitted to, and Forrest hears the man's grunts and groans, which he imitates as the principal leaves. Forrest may be simple but his response to being in on "the primal scene," and his sense that his "mother sure wants to get you into school," that is, whored herself for him, stunts Forrest's sexual development. His first view of Jenny's breasts has him gagging and about to vomit during her first attempt to seduce him. It is only mommy's "my time has come, Forrest," and she dies that Forrest becomes amenable to Jenny's seduction, and unknowingly impregnates her. Now as he lies in bed he does not have to say, "I sure miss mommy and Jenny." He can forget about mommy.

What is one to make of all this? What we have in this film are pallets (20 definitions in the unabridged) of apperceptive ink blots, round, square, oval, of the last 40 years of our American history to which people young, older, and oldest bring their experiences.

I am offended by the film. To me, the film insults both whites and blacks. Message: only a mildly retarded person can be friendly with black men and women: only blacks are able to accept a low-I.Q. man. Bubba, Forrest's

closest army buddy cum business partner, has an I.Q. of about 50. The film lies. No man with an I.Q. of 75 puts together a rifle in record time like Forrest does. It is insulting to college athletes who graduate from universities. In trying to be clever the film outwits itself. Gump means simple and stupid; a simple word association is gumption which means shrewd with common sense. Jay Sherry writes that Forrest is similar to a "figure known in fairy tale studies a 'the Dummling,' the simple minded fellow whose simplicity and good fortune leads to undreamed of success." I am mildly amused because I did not know of the figure, but I do know that dummy, which Forrest is also called, is a false nipple. Unintentionally funny? to whom?

The film mocks those who are heroic, patriotic, and makes fun of war itself, which it defines as a series of special effects. My grandchildren were not upset about the horrible war scenes not the ones in the hospital. They had read all about the special effects in the movie weeks before they saw it.

Debbie Tanzer reminds me that those of us in middle-age see before our eyes some awful truths we experienced these past 40 years: drugs, alcohol, and a virus called AIDS; the embarrassing vulgarities of President Lyndon Johnson who offered-up his gall-bladder scar to the nation on TV; our Camelot President, John F. Kennedy, who turned the White House into a Whore House; of the smiling *non compos mentis* president who made millionaires and billionaires and increased an underclass centuple-fold while destroying a middle-class. Forrest's "I gotta pee," to Kennedy, and his showing his wounded buttocks to Johnson appalled me. An adult critic called the scene hilarious.

I keep viewing the film on at least two levels, the literal and the psychoanalytic. On the former, I quickly understand why I am never worried about Forrest. Like Tarzan in his ten feuilleton series Forrest may get wounded but he will never die. (In conversation between Forrest and Jenny I often expect Forrest to say, "Me Tarzan, you Jane." Or was it the other way around? And what was Tarzan's I.Q.?) (When Forrest says, "I may not be the smartest person in the world but I know what love is," I half-expect Jenny to lip-sync Ilona Massey

singing, "You don't know what love is until....") On a literary level I attempt to put Forrest in a tradition of Spenser's Red Cross Knight in his 16th century epic, *The Fairy Queen*. He is all Magnanimity, all virtues together in one person. But he is too intelligent to be allied to Forrest. I think of I. B. Singer's *Gimpel the Fool*, whose first line is "I am Gimpel the fool, but I am not a fool." (The translation is not felicitous. Important is the mistranslation of the Hebrew word *tam* which means straightforward, direct.) That is, Gimpel knows what's going on as Forrest never does. Of course, as we think of other archetypes the best is Melville's *Billy Budd* or a Christ-like figure in literature. Billy hangs, blessing Captain Vere, and the white feather floats upward at the end of the film signaling to us that when Forrest and his son die they will ascend to heaven.

Psychoanalytically, we realize what this pasticcio of bits of our culture adds up to is so little that we rush to films that take us away on the wings of our deepest fantasy. We can stay "innocent" forever. Forrest never grows up. To do so Forrest has to learn to lie and to have secrets, two necessary requisites to separate from the mother. But he is not taught the difference by his mother who does both lie and keep secrets from him. Jenny is crippled, abandoned by her mother, and sexually abused by her father; she looks for affection anywhere she can get it and becomes a heroin addict who dies from AIDS. Forrest has an unconditionally-loving mother but no father. But then we need to remember that Forrest, for all his worldly shortcomings is not human. He, like Jesus, is "Perfect Man." Thus, for all of his experiences he remains unchanged and not any more grown up at the end of the movie than he is at the beginning. His favorite book is a child's favorite, *Curious George*, about a mischievous monkey whose curiosity gets him into trouble but he always ends up safe back home. And this is what he passes on to his little son, who goes off to school with it as Forrest did.

The idealising of a fool or a saint gets us into equal amounts of trouble. It gives us permission to never grow up. We can remain monkeys. God provides miracles and takes care of us.

Mel Goldstein is a psychoanalyst in

private practice and Professor Emeritus, Psychoanalytic Studies of Literature and Film, University of Hartford. Margot Goldstein, an alternate scholar, provided indispensable assistance.

Psychohistory, Predictions, and the Millennium

Can psychohistory predict the future? At the September 17 meeting of the Psychohistory Forum, Ted Goertzel reviewed several theories of cycles in political consciousness and encouraged group members to speculate about the year 2000. Lloyd deMause, one of the key theorists reviewed, was present at the meeting and offered his observations on the current scene. DeMause, however, doubted that long range forecasting could be relied upon.

At times the discussion was heated. Goertzel defended positivist scientific methods as used in his recent statistical test of some of deMause's ideas (which has been published in *Political Psychology*, Vol 14, No 4, 1993). deMause agreed that a statistical interpretation can be made, but thought that Goertzel's statistical basis was too small. The meeting ended in good cheer, and members jotted down their predictions for the year 2000. There was no time to discuss these predictions at the meeting, but a summary is offered here in the hope of stimulating further discussion and possible newsletter contributions.

Some of the most interesting predictions concerned the *Zeitgeist*, the general climate of the times. Members offered the following sometimes contradictory ideas:

- there will be a thirst for a new creed, something to believe in
- there will be an increase in social mindedness, less emphasis on self, more on future development
- the younger generation will veer away from reality into computer games and virtual reality
- there will be an increase in utopian/-dystopian themes in movies and TV
- there will be an increase in multiculturalism,

a decline of English language dominance, and increased third-world immigration

Group members did not emphasize economic or technological futurism. One member thought that there would be an increase in conflict due to increases in economic inequality, while another thought that the trend would be for more equality due to the growth of the computer society. Technological and scientific factors mentioned were AIDS decimating Africa, the increasing dominance of TV and some success in the war on cancer.

Politically, several members thought that there would be an increase in right-wing, religious movements, perhaps emphasis on moral purity, anti-crime, anti-violence, anti-radical feminism, pro-family beliefs. Several expected the growth of sectarian movements, some with beliefs focusing on the millennium. One predicted that Ross Perot would take over the Republican Party, another stressed the emergence of a charismatic leader of some sort. In his opening remarks, Ted Goertzel offered a more specific political prediction: Al Gore would be nominated by the Democrats, but lose to a more charismatic Republican candidate. He also offered the prediction that President Clinton would involve the U.S. in a war similar in magnitude to the Gulf War shortly before the election, and that the communitarian ideology as espoused by Amitai Etzioni would become hegemonic.

Perhaps the most interesting were predictions concerning the future of psychohistory itself. Several members predicted that there would be increased interest and acceptance of psychohistorical ideas by the year 2000. One member suggested that there would be enough agreement on psychohistorical principles to allow progress in four key fronts: improving child-rearing, reducing the risks of war, recognizing sacrificial tendencies in society and increasing tolerance for ambiguity.

Bulletin Board

NOTES ON MEMBERS AND THEIR RESEARCH: **Congratulations** to **Norman Simms** (University of Waikato, New Zealand) on the forthcoming publication of *My Cow*

Comes to Haunt Me: European Explorers, Travelers and Novelists Constructing Textual Selves and Imagining the Unthinkable in Lands and Islands beyond the Sea, from Christopher Columbus to Alexander von Humboldt (Pace University Press); to David Felix (C.U.N.Y.-Retired) on the publication of *Biography of an Idea: John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory* (Transaction Books); to Marvin Goldwert of New York Institute of Technology who recently published "Poets, Painters, and the Art of History" in the *Journal of Unconventional History* (Spring, 1994) and to J. **Donald Hughes**, a professor of ancient history at the University of Denver for many years, who has been named John Evans Professor - the highest honor at his beautiful university. Ever peripatetic, he is back from Italy as well as a trip to Vancouver for his son's wedding. Now that all their children are married we expect Pam and Don to travel even more. **HOLOCAUST NEWSLETTERS:** **When we asked Judith Kestenberg** to write a brief article on the Nazi persecution of children she generously offered to send out sample copies of the *NEWSLETTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF ORGANIZED PERSECUTION OF CHILDREN* which Clio S Psyche subscribers should have received in October. This year's Milton Kestenberg Holocaust Memorial Lecture is December 18 on "Trauma, Loss and Creativity." For further information write Dr. Kestenberg at 30 Soundview Lane, Sands Point, NY 11050. **NETWORKING INQUIRY:** Biographers of two famous twentieth-century thinkers would like someone to interpret the Rorschach tests of their subjects. Please contact the Editor. **RETIREMENTS:** Mel Goldstein, who served the University of Hartford for twenty-eight years in a variety of positions and was granted a number of honors, has retired from teaching, but not from his psychoanalytic practice nor the life of the mind. **AUDIO CONFERENCES:** **Alberto Fergusson** and other contributors to the Colombian Industry of Pleasure (Cocaine) Research Group participated in audio conferences with Professor Elovitz' psychohistory seminar at Ramapo College on November 2 and 30. Interested parties are welcome to join the Research Group - please write to Alberto Fergusson, P.O. Box 093563, Bogota, Colombia. Mary **Coleman** of Chicago is scheduled for a December 7 audio conference on civil rights. **MEETINGS:** The Forum's next meeting on January 28 (Saturday) is devoted to

the motivation for war. See the partial schedule of meetings listed below. **FORUM WORKSHOPS AT THE WA:** We are working on the following arrangements for the June 7-9, 1995, International Psychohistorical Association convention in New York City. Our Research Group on War, Peace and Conflict Resolution will sponsor a paper, "The Table of Human Sacrifice," by **Mary Coleman** (Georgetown University-Emeritus), with comments by David Lotto and Faris Kirkland and the group members able to attend. It will be followed by the Group's third annual luncheon at the IPA. The Teaching Research Group will sponsor a workshop by Professor **David Beisel** (S.U.N.Y. at Rockland). People wishing to register for the IPA should contact Henry Lawton, 266 Monroe Avenue, Wyckoff, NJ 07481. To present, call Professor Jerrold Atlas, (718) 488-1000 or (718) 713-5961.

COMMUNISM RESEARCH GROUP MEETING: On Saturday, December 10 from 1-4 at the apartment of Lee and Conalee **Shneidman** this group will begin a new phase of its research when it probes what led people to join the Communist Party and then become disillusioned with communism. All interested parties are welcome. **OUR THANKS** to our members for their support which makes *Clio's Psyche* possible. To a Patron - Herb Barry; a Sustaining Member - Ralph Colp; Supporting Members Andrew Brink, Alexander Papiasvili, Marga Speicher and Jerome Wolf; and new Contributing Members H. John Rogers and Norman Simms. Thanks for their edifying articles to this issue's contributing authors: Mel and Margot Goldstein, Joseph Held, Leyla, Peter Loewenberg, Mena Potts and J. Lee Shneidman. Also to Anna Lentz and Pauline Staines for their assistance in producing this newsletter.

1995 Psychohistory Forum Meeting Schedule (partial)

Date	Topic	Presenter
1/28/95	"Hawk and Dove Personality Types"	Brian D'Agostino, PhD (Center on Violence and Human Survival)
	"Paul H. Nitze and the Arming of America"	Scott Thompson, PhD (US Peace Institute & Tufts University)
3/4/95	"John Maynard Keynes: Fathers, Mothers and Sons"	David Felix, PhD (C. U. N. Y. -Retired)
4/8/95	"Swartout's Stress Reactions and an Early Indian War"	Andrew Brink, PhD (formerly of McMaster University and the University of Toronto)
4/29/95	"The Non-Rationality of Nationalism"	J. Lee Shneidman, PhD (Adelphi University)
9/16/95	"Love and Work in Margaret Mead"	Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, PhD (Rutgers University)
	"Towards a Psychobiography of Linus Pauling"	Ted Goertzel, PhD (Rutgers University)
Papers and the locations of meetings in New York City are mailed to members approximately one month before each meeting.		