

Four of Harvard Professor Lawrence J. Friedman's undergraduate students (Kelsie E. Griffes, Samuel E. Kish, Shawn A. Wright, and Thao Vu) wrote a fine article that *Clio's Psyche* decided to publish on our website as an example of what students are capable of contributing to psychohistory. They were part of an interdisciplinary program at Eastern Nazarene College in cooperation with Harvard. These four were students in a larger seminar that Friedman teaches in the Spring semester in his Personality Theory course. Those wishing to respond to the paper and student authors should write Professor Friedman at LJFRIEDM@INDIANA.EDU.

**PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS AS PERSONALITY THEORISTS:  
THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTIONISM**

**By Kelsie E. Griffes, Samuel E. Kish, Shawn A. Wright, and Thao Vu**

William James – the father of American psychology and arguably the continent's most accessible philosopher next to Ralph Waldo Emerson – was one of the first names to be mentioned in the development of 20<sup>th</sup> century personality theory. In 1873, fresh out of medical school, James monitored an underequipped, rather avant-garde, physiological laboratory that staged and observed bodily responses to environmental stimuli. <sup>1</sup> He saw few applications from these repetitive and pedantic tests, recoiling from the dissection of human behaviors in terms of biological adaptation. Considering Darwin's hypothesis that all actions must result from the organism's struggle for survival, <sup>2</sup> for James, men – unlike beasts – must set out to experience the unknown universe and greet new experiences with active catalysts of actions. The emphasis on individual activeness stood in opposition with the succeeding behaviorist belief that the subject's response was passive under the influence of either biology or the nature of rewards and punishments. James never reinforced a theory of personality – the reason why will be later discussed – but through his classic model of reasoning one could deduce a free-flowing, non-structuralized approach to personality. <sup>3</sup>

In this abstract model, James described two basic mechanisms for reasoning: the superior method of dissociation, used by the ideal intellectual, and the inferior method of association,

used by animals or, occasionally, the less than ideal thinker. As delineated by Figure 1 below, one *associated* the entirety of object/experience A with object/experience B because A was either contiguous or identical to B.<sup>4</sup> In laboratories, experimenters controlled this causal relationship, whereas in reality, associations occurred fortuitously and repetitively, because it was a natural reflex for mice to hide as a cat approached.





Figure 1 - Method of Association - A elicits B

The supremacy of human intellect lied in that individuals, each in his unique way, appropriated a response to a specific environmental stimulus in accordance with his own interests. Through the method of dissociation, the individual connected A with B, not because they mirrored one another entirely but because of a mutually shared element and, more importantly, because he foresaw that through mutual elements, he would arrive at a desirable goal.<sup>5</sup> James disapproved of categorizing individuals, because the very moment that such a system was established, there was to be no more potential growths or changes in personality. Indeed, he was a faithful evangelical of sort for the non-reductionist way of living.<sup>6</sup>

The most lucid description of the contingent relationship between man and his environment appeared in James's 1904 article, addressing the works of John Dewey and the School of Pragmatism. James praised how the school recognized the mutual impact of the self

(the Organism) and the society around the self (the Environment) and went on describing the transactions between O and E as an ever-exploding chain of production, during which reality was made and remade and remade again in a perpetual interaction between a constantly changing self and an ever-changing social environment.<sup>7</sup>



Contrasting sharply with James, various schools of thoughts in the 20<sup>th</sup> century ubiquitously mirrored one another in their appreciation of the O-E relationship, in that only one-way reactions can occur. By reducing the complex interaction between the individual and his environment to rudimentary principles, (closing down the system) theorists implied that it was feasible to categorize man's thoughts and behaviors. They were experts in employing the method of dissociation to extract and unite phenomena in theory. Orthodox psychoanalysis and fundamental behaviorism were prime examples; they commanded order out of chaos and predicted a stable, almost unchangeable, system of interactions. Non-reductionism was often

dismissed and cheapened by an all-or-nothing attitude, though James's system strived to achieve non-radicalism.

Meticulous observers could confirm that what was written in theories had helped James to cope and survive in practice. Similar were the stories of successive personality theorists, whose determination to establish a clear-cut system contrasted sharply with James's reluctant spirit. James suggested that these influential theories might have been a form of "necessary" reductionism. By examining how a number of personality theorists after James had operated, it is possible to discern the advantages and short comings of what he and we might call absolute reductionism, non-reductionism, and an apparent "necessary reductionism" – in practice as well as theory.

## II

World War I left the stigma of death, violence, barbarism, and meaninglessness on the surface of James's world. Upon the epic failure of ancient political and religious systems that had governed the West for a millennium, men gathered in trepidation to establish even more structuralized systems. In the social sciences, by the 1920s and 1930s, behaviorists had won over key program officers in several nonprofit foundations to a utopian-like vision of a good society - - a smoother functioning human social system -- through behavioral manipulations that extended the laboratory into the actual physical society people inhabited. Beardsley Ruml of the Rockefeller Foundation presumed that the Rockefeller money at his disposal could accelerate this transition from the laboratory to the world. He contributed substantial Rockefeller money, for example, to Elton Mayo's "Hawthorne Experiment" at Western Electric where workers were provided improved heating and lighting conditions on the production line. Mayo determined

through experimentation that these improvements made workers feel less alienated, better cared for, and in turn more diligent in their work tasks. The prestigious purses of enthusiastic foundation officers like Ruml thereby provided considerable legitimacy to behavioral scientists as they moved their often-tenuous laboratory experiments into the more complex venues of human existence.<sup>8</sup>

Perhaps the most celebrated behaviorist, John B. Watson, was also one of the most rigid. In addition to founding a behaviorist school in 1913, his book, *BEHAVIORISM*, published in 1925, laid down the laws. Although there were behaviorists before Watson, his writings produced an organized theory that is still referenced today. Well aware that his groundbreaking perspective disturbed people, he described the movement as “treading on the hoof of somebody’s sacred cow.”<sup>9</sup> He advocated a move to expand the body of experimental knowledge to the extent that humans could be as thoroughly mapped out as animals.<sup>10</sup> Consequently, there was hardly any middle ground for this rigid behaviorist, who endeavored to sever the ties between “objective” behaviorism and “subjective” “introspective psychology.”<sup>11</sup> William Wundt, so called the “father of experimental psychology,” was far more open to the option of inner consciousness, at a time when religion and science were butting heads, daring to suggest that humans could look inward and examine their own soul.<sup>12</sup> According to Watson, a direct attack on William James was also in order. James’ definition of psychology highlighted “states of consciousness,” which Watson was not comfortable with because these states were abstract and did not fit in the proverbial experimental box.<sup>13</sup> The solution was clear, and the rest of the scientific world must have been blind not to see it. If any psychologist was to be a true scientist, he must literally “limit” himself “to things that can be observed and formulate laws concerning only those things, in a sort of absolute reductionism.”<sup>14</sup> After all, if something could not be

physically represented, then it did not exist as something worth studying. Limit says it all. The rigidity of Watson's devotees on one end of the spectrum and that of the Freudian devotees on the other end were engaged in a theoretical tug of war for the reigns of modern psychology.

Some of Ruml's largest Rockefeller Foundation grants went to the Yale Institute for Human Relations and its director, Clark Hull, to create a behavioral science of humankind. The Institute began as an initiative for an integrated and interdisciplinary approach to human relations, with over 4.5 million given by the Rockefeller Foundation in its first ten years.<sup>15</sup> The current president, James R. Angell, and the Executive Committee compiled a group of Yale faculty members in pursuit of a more practical and personal service for their clients. Improving the system would necessitate a distinct methodology paired with stable reductionism, but with a distinctly humanist focus, a perspective psychoanalyst Erik Erikson would have appreciated. Mark Arthur May, a later Institute director, stated, "There was a very real concern at the time that doctors and lawyers were being turned out who simply treated their clients as hunks of protoplasm. The days of the good old country doctor who knew all about your family were gone, and they wanted to include this in the professional education of their students."<sup>16</sup>

One of the Institute's later directors, Clark Hull, and associates assumed that if ideas were subsumed by actions, they could be captured in mathematical formulas after stimulus-response trials, similar to the O to E paradigm. Hull's colleague, O. Hobart Mowrer, drew hope from laboratory experiments where an animal "rewired" itself from ingrained patterns to reduce escalating stress and anticipatory anxiety. This gave Mowrer hope to help both animals and humans to throw off inborn habits like masochism, which were difficult to alter.<sup>17</sup>

Amidst the blatant behaviorist orientation displayed by the Institute's most prominent director, Clark Hull, he managed to conceptualize the limits of behaviorism's unnecessary reductionism in his "Simple Trial-and-Error Learning: A Study in Psychological Theory." He diagnosed the flawed attempt to conceive of society and human relations in the context of behaviorism's simple stimulus and response as the major downfall of this school of thought. Acknowledging the inability to grasp the inner confines of the human psyche, Hull stated, "Perhaps no theorists have been more naïve in their attempts at system construction than those who seek in the principles of stimulus-response the main explanation of those forms of behavior usually called mental."<sup>18</sup> The stimulus response theory appears to directly bear on the organism versus environment debate, in which the environment represents the stimulus and the personality forms in response to the social world. Acknowledging the inner qualities of the individual, which behaviorism particularly eschews, Mark Arthur May, one of the leaders in the institution, popularized the theory of conscience, attributing behaviors to an inward drive (conscience) influenced by outward stimuli.<sup>19</sup> Even so, some of his studies framed the conscience within the behavioral terms of rewards and punishments. If all scientists, both in the realm of psychoanalysis and of behaviorism, as well as those forging their own path, could have acknowledged inhibitory reductionist pitfalls, perhaps a more practical, integrated, and applicable approach could have emerged from the focused research of the institute.

Despite the two camps, there were undoubtedly valiant attempts to bridge the gap and develop a combined hypothesis. Unfortunately it appears that many from the scholarly, scientific realm were more likely to pledge allegiance to behaviorism, while those taking a more therapeutic, philosophical, and/or individual approach were inclined to consider the existence of an inner realm, whatever that may be, possibly reminiscent of a Jamesian approach.

Another distinguished member of Hull's team, John Dollard, initially felt more at home with the humanist Culture and Personality movement than with behaviorism. Indeed, his 1936 classic, *CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN*, had characterized a system of racial and class subjugation in Indianola, Mississippi with all its deluding "truths" in terms that were neither mathematical nor stimulus-response manifestations. Dollard's social-justice perspective naturally lent itself to more abstract theories. For instance, how could one directly measure the "Negro" ideals of "personal dignity and freedom" if they were undoubtedly intangible concepts? While lending an ear to human ideals, which bear a striking resemblance to instinctual drives, Dollard incorporated the behaviorist theory of frustration and aggression in the black community's attempt to adjust to white-dominated America. For example, Dollard asserted that understandable aggression towards whites was necessarily deflected onto the black population themselves, because of the fear of white retaliation. The frustration and aggression hypothesis was a self-described derivative of Freud, but one that blended amiably with the behaviorist camp. Dollard's humanistic approach to racism continues to be an authority today. In fact, *CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN* was cited in *Brown vs. Board of Education's* landmark decision to desegregate American public schools. Erik Erikson, a scholar strongly disposed toward psychoanalysis, also found it difficult to collaborate with the Institute on the basis of foreordained behaviorist logic. Consequently, in breaking fealty to the stimulus-response credo in favor of a more open-ended Jamesian approach, Dollard left a gigantic footprint that may have overshadowed the legacy of the Yale Institute.

Surprisingly, Dollard later embraced Hull and Mowrer's behavioral principles common to rats and men and repudiated the *CASTE AND CLASS'S* "soft" findings on community bias and discrimination. He was troubled over the "imprecisions" of open-ended humanist scholarship

compared with the clarity and “neatness” of stimulus-response functionalism. Indeed, S/R seemed to have a comforting foreordained logic. Dollard’s correspondence with scientist colleagues Margaret Mead and Allen Gregg’s diary notations are especially suggestive here. The Dollard example illustrated how difficult it was for a researcher who imaged himself a “scientist” to maintain a worldview leaning in the direction of Jamesian O-E non-reductionism.<sup>20</sup> If a leader as innovative as Dollard succumbed to the pressure of behaviorist institutions, what does that say about the negative impact that closed systems were having on the broad spectrum of research on the human psyche? It is worth noting that revolutionaries, such as Dollard and Freud, were able to captivate an audience without major governmental and organizational funding.

One fall evening in 1936 the behaviorists at the Yale Institute deduced the one obstacle to be conquered for a “true” science of human behavior to exist. They sought to incorporate the strongest and most influential anti-behavioral psychological perspective, psychoanalysis, into their methods of inquiry – to essentially obliterate psychoanalysis through theoretical incorporation. If they could subsume Freud’s focus on the profoundest secrets of the human soul within a system that presumed external behavioral machinations shaped human interiority, the contest for theoretical hegemony would be won. They could pursue S/R logic more assured than ever that their premises had no consequential theoretical gaps. Perhaps the negative attitude toward other schools of thought is best illustrated in the desire to change the name of the institute to human relations instead of human behavior. The name change from the original Institute of Psychology grew out of an effort to integrate the sciences involved in the study of human behavior. Ironically, one scientist cited the unacceptable Freudian ring of the word Behavior in the Institute’s original title.<sup>21</sup>

Trained in psychoanalysis or having been analyzed, Dollard and Mowrer were joined by Yale Institute associates Neal Miller, Robert Sears, and Leonard Dobb. At the request of the director, Clark Hull, for a collective scientific approach, weekly seminars were instituted in which the group discussed potential “translations” of Freud’s theories, rendering the instincts of the id, in constant conflict with the ego and the superego, into behavioral terms. The outcome of these sessions birthed the frustration-aggression hypothesis, which for all practical purposes appeared to represent a watered-down portrayal of Freud’s original psyche and its accompanying drives.<sup>22</sup> Playing loose with Freud, however, they insisted that these drives were no more than desires that were frustrated and provoked aggressive responses. This assertion was the primary negative aspect of the institute’s groundbreaking theory. The beginning of the Frustration-Aggression treatise acknowledged a desire “to bring a degree of systematic order into such apparently chaotic phenomena.”<sup>23</sup> The desire to bring order illustrated the fine line between necessary and unnecessary reductionism. On one hand, uniting different perspectives and developing a collective perspective is positive and necessary if applied research is to change society; however, the desire for excessive classification limits the necessary chaos of the unending mysteries of human nature.

The stimulus-response pattern could be measured in purportedly objective behavioral terms and it could be modified. If frustration necessarily followed aggression, and one could explain away inner mysteries, such as waking and sleeping dreams and fantasies, then unexplainable consciousness could be put to rest. In the same way that frustration and aggression responses, whether outright or underneath the surface, were an extension of the stimulus response paradigm, so they also cordially aligned themselves with the denouncement of inborn instincts for the classic behaviorist. Even inner emotional responses were learned, just as for

Watson, man was composed of raw material without instincts, and learning reshaped his foundation and produced responses.<sup>24</sup> Quite unlike Freud who felt that efforts to tame the inner drives yielded deep discontent, they saw psychological benefit to the individual when he fully adjusted to normal bourgeoisie life so that he fit seamlessly into society. Supposedly, this social adjustment would reduce a person's frustration and his consequent aggression. Essentially, the Institute collectivity advocated behavioral modification of the untamed self.<sup>25</sup>

Lemov takes her history of behaviorist thought into World War II where it moved its laboratories more decidedly than ever into the everyday world and had considerable opportunity to break from its own internalist logic. In the case of Dollard, a break was evidenced, especially given the fact that his unconventional book was published when he was part of Yale's faculty. As Gerald Grob has shown, In World War II, key psychiatrists and psychoanalysts connected to the military did re-examine their premises. However, this was much less the case within behavioral psychology. The self-referentiality of the Watsons and the Hulls had by then been cast so profoundly that there was rarely anyone pondering a complex, ever-changing Jamesian O-E interactive pattern that eschewed unnecessary psychological reductionism. Just before the war, for example, anthropologist George Murdock of the Yale Institute launched the Human Relations Area Files with the hope of eventually classifying all knowledge about all peoples in the world. Starting with 400 ethnic groups (10% of all known cultures), Murdock's research group created ethnographic abstracts of each group under specific informational categories, sub-categories, and sub-sub categories. During the war, American military and government agencies deployed the Index and the Files to procure data on corners of the world that were of U.S. strategic interest. The Murdock project embodied an unmistakable behaviorist vision, naïve enough to assert that the complexities of diverse cultures and the human spirit could be

quantified and altered, eradicating global instabilities and creating a more uniform and predictable world.<sup>26</sup>

Once again, the hubris of the behaviorist imagination and its quest for social control came forth, supported not only by nonprofit foundations but also increasingly by the federal government. The military and the government drew more and more on the Murdock File to acquire vital information. For example, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs commissioned Murdock to build a special File for each Latin American country so that government and military could deal with the ramifications of World War II in that part of the world. By November 1942, Murdock had compiled 30,467 pages on Latin America and indexed them so that within a few moments “all existing material on every vital subject” could be located by the State Department or any other agency. By 1943 as the U.S. Navy began to occupy tiny Pacific islands, it sought Murdock’s File for vital information on each. Critics like anthropologist-psychoanalyst Clyde Kluckhohn feared that Murdock’s group had become “a trifle intoxicated” by their influence upon policy makers even as the Files leave us little more than a extensive encyclopedia. They covered many topics but with neither profundity nor depth. The File was hardly beneficial to serious policy makers.<sup>27</sup>

We might go on at considerable length, citing postwar illustrations of the social engineering imagination, but the contours are clear.<sup>28</sup> Behaviorism’s intellectual formula from Watson to West and beyond was a simple dialectic – stimulus/response, frustration/aggression, and the like. It also promised to control things and people in the interests of a smooth running, efficient society. The complex interiority of the human psyche was no obstacle, for behaviorists assumed that it simply replicated the manipulated conditions in the external environment. Nor did they worry about how, in the very process of conceiving and managing their experiments and

then interpreting the results, they were at least partially reflecting their own values and apprehensions and merging these personal qualities into the experimental conditions. And yet, if the human engineering movement eschewed open-ended intellectual inquiry for a rigid dialectic and arrogant reductionism, its assurances of understanding and regulating people and things commanded enormous support in America. In *ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE*, Richard Hofstadter maintained that brokers of power and shapers of culture have long been more taken by seemingly “demonstrable” and predictable results than by intellectual subtleties that shunned reductionist formulas. American behaviorism was a case in point.

Nonetheless, Lemov, Herman, Capshew, and other historians remind us that the primary theorists of social engineering were extraordinarily bright men. At times, a few of them saw or at least felt the limits of the behavioral paradigm, and we need to study these “magic moments” more fully. O. Hobart Mowrer of the Yale Institute, like Dollard, offered a case in point, and it is well that Lemov reminds us of his intriguing transformation. In his 1930s animal experiments, Mowrer articulated a “feedback system” where the prospect of stressful and traumatic experiences conditioned the subject to take realistic precautions against them. By the mid-1940s, Mowrer came under the influence of Neo-Freudian psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan and Sullivan’s emphasis on the centrality of interpersonal relationships. After this initial success, Mowrer became an advocate of a “soft” therapeutic approach -- integrity groups whose participants pledged to be totally honest to each other. Soon he became a pioneer in Alcoholics Anonymous and in communities for drug addicts. As interpersonal integrity and empathy profoundly impacted his life and thought, Mowrer rejected the “total determinism” of stimulus-response. It was not so much wrong as it was unable to account for the full depth and uniqueness of human endeavor. As a system of self-predicting inevitability in which man was doomed by the

relentless flow of behavioral responses, Mowrer held that behaviorism was antithetical to human freedom and man's capacity to correct his own sins. It is in the realm of the mental health movement that Mowrer gave openness and interactions with humankind their dues.<sup>29</sup> Perhaps it is necessary to experience frequent interaction with real patients to internalize the fact that personality is complicated. Mowrer's most profound responsiveness toward the psychoanalytic movement was evidenced in his desire for a "new group therapy" fueled by transparency between individuals. In contrast, psychoanalysis promoted free association usually between a therapist and a patient, instead of Mowrer's perpetual transparency between everyday groups. This new approach to therapy became increasingly distrustful of professional organizations, likely because of their own brand of unnecessary reductionism. On the "new psychological liberty" conceived by Freud, Mowrer expressed his concerns with Freud's complete disdain for social control, adding that sanctions existed having a positive effect on society's wellbeing. Freud labeled some social controls as unnecessary and restrictive to natural human instincts, while also necessary to control the now familiar concept of human aggression.<sup>30</sup> In Mowrer's terms, the human self was not simply goaded by external stimuli but that man's "response" could "become goal-directed, purposive, deliberate, or if you will, free and responsible."<sup>31</sup> Mowrer struck a satisfying, logical balance between Freudian id suppression and the rigid stimulus and response paradigm dictating the behavior of society.

In the late 1930's, the primary funder for the Institute, the Rockefeller Foundation, began withdrawing support. This was at the same time that the Institute attempted to display a more integrated approach, with the inclusion of psychoanalytic spectrum via the frustration-aggression hypothesis. The absence of expected funds perhaps paved the way for public approval of other schools of thought, such as psychoanalysis. Today, the Institute no longer exists, but instead

there exists the collaborative Human Relations Area Files between Yale and several other educational institutions. The Institute is remembered for its efforts to integrate varying sciences into its tangible categorization of human behavior, while clarifying the limits of observable psychology.

### III

As contrastive a system as behaviorism was to psychoanalysis, few realized that perhaps the inner circle of Sigmund Freud's society shared the same bureaucratic system with the Yale regime. Theoretically, on the opposite end of the spectrum lied Freud's non-reductionist system: while behaviorists were obsessed with reserving an absolutely impenetrable, unchangeable external environment, psychoanalysis acknowledged a vast reservoir of inner subjectivity that was inherent in the self. Freud focused on the centrality of deep inner drives. These drives tended to be repressed, but always remained central agents in human personality. It is also striking that whereas all behaviorists agreed that external engineering premised on E-R would shape whatever there was in the internal psyche, there was more diversity among psychoanalysts regarding the interplay between the inner psyche and outer social circumstances.

Within a movement, there is a necessary level of stability needed in order for growth to occur. Similar to a grapevine, an academic movement must have a frame to hold it up. Without support, the vines grow out in all directions and produce no fruit. They spread and die for lack of structure. With a frame in place, the movement begins to make progress; it can grow upwards and explore new ideas. While this growth is taking place, the movement must be continually pruned. If not pruned, the new sprouts eat up all the nutrients and the movement's growth

ceases. This pruning must be done correctly, for if pruned too aggressively, the plant will never grow and produce fruit.

Through self-analysis and work with his earliest patients, Freud saw his “science of the psyche” addressed to the human unconscious. Although he had “discovered” the unconscious before his 1899 classic, *INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS*, he richly elaborated the concept there.<sup>32</sup> Freud viewed dream analysis as a manifestation of his larger clinical approach – the probing of free associations. Through this process of free association, Freud postulated that repressed childhood memories and feelings would eventually come to mind. They did, at least, in the small number of cases he elected to write about, allowing the analyst to discern the most primitive workings and contents of the patient’s mind. These primitive processes involved the distribution and utilization of psychic energy, and Freud explained it through his tripartite structural theory of the human psyche.<sup>33</sup>

It was this perspective that put Freud and his followers most directly at odds with the behaviorists, who either assumed that the internal psyche simply replicated external social design or that it could readily be controlled through propitious social engineering. In *CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS* (1930) Freud asserted that even efficacious ego mediation was often less than effective when the id collided with the superego. The inner psyche was like a boiling caldron of water (the id), which might be contained temporarily by putting a top on the caldron. However, this superego constraint only intensified the pressure on the boiling water; it would eventually blow off the top and spill over, rendering considerable damage.

Although Freud had not focused his clinical practice on children, he postulated from the free associations of his adult analysands that the first five or six years of life were determinative of

subsequent personality development. Freud asserted that the child passed through four stages, which decidedly shaped his adult psychological life. More than many other aspects of Freud's theory, his characterization of these stages became bones of contention and modification within the psychoanalytic community. Each of Freud's developmental stages defined itself by a particular zone of the body that was important to the child at a specific point in time.<sup>34</sup>

If the Stimulus-Response premises of behaviorism were reductionist, Freud's paradigm may have been somewhat less so. To be sure, Freud absented himself from the tradition of experimental psychology initiated by Fechner in 1860 and developed into a science by Wundt over the next few decades. He did not perform controlled experiments and never collected data to analyze quantitatively. Freud also eschewed diagnostic tests and other purportedly objective measures of personality. He derived his theories primarily from the verbalizations and expressions of his analysands. Only when he felt he had assembled an interlocking network of internally consistent facts and inferences on the analysand did he venture to formulate an interpretation of the organization of the person's personality. In contrast, the typical behavioral experiment observed under controlled conditions took no more than an hour or two in total. The behaviorist replicated the experiment, to be sure, and was involved in measuring a specific reaction of the subject, but Freud obviously had a greater familiarity with his patient as an integrated human being.

Although the behaviorists were subject to searching criticism, even among themselves, it hardly compares to the critical comment over the past century that Freud has received. For one, critics have noted that he only made public six of the hundreds of clinical cases from which the corpus of his theory was derived. In none of his cases did he keep a verbatim record of what a patient said during the treatment session but made notes several hours later. Freud felt that he

had recalled all significant material and placed them in his notes, overlooking only “trivial” material. This is an example of an area where Freud may have pruned his ideas too far, as these “trivial” details may have become significant later in his observations. A second basic methodological criticism has been that Freud did not seek to corroborate what a patient said through external evidence – medical detail, testimony of friends and relatives, and independent social and economic data. His retort was unnecessarily reductionist – that what free association and dream analysis revealed about the unconscious was all that mattered. Third, Freud’s writings presented clear conclusions – theoretical and diagnostic, though he rarely made explicit most of the lines of reasoning and inferences that took him there, the full array of supportive data, or his specific methodologies. Fourth, must one essentially take on faith the existence of Freud’s basic psychic structures? How can one be assured that deep inner drives, especially the death wish, represent the primary energy sources of human personality? How weak must the ego be before it can be overridden by these drives? Indeed, how does one measure any psychic quality or its relative strength or weakness with any degree of precision?<sup>35</sup>

Unlike behaviorism, psychoanalysis launched itself as a movement with a founder, Sigmund Freud, who never ceased to be regarded as the central authority. Theoretical modifications, innovations, and even dissents among psychoanalysts almost invariably began by referencing Freud’s posture. Freud was regarded as a radical but still found support and was able to found the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1908. This group began very openly without much structure, at first existing as a group consisting of Freud and four other Viennese physicians meeting once a week to discuss psychoanalytic questions in 1902. The group grew and finally became the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1908. During this time, Freud began having to deal with the politics of fathering a new movement.

The University of Vienna was not very welcoming to outsiders and Freud as both a Jew and non-native member of Vienna may well have had a difficult time moving up in the university.

Although he spent almost his entire life in Vienna, Freud was never particularly fond of Vienna.

In the beginning years of his movement, he wished to expand psychoanalysis beyond the confines of the University. His pursuit of Jung as a possible successor was fueled by Jung's lack of Jewish and Viennese heritage. He himself may have been subject to what he felt was over-pruning of his intellectual movement. Freud waited a long time to be appointed a professor, but when he finally was appointed as an associate professor, he was both elated and plagued with guilt that he had given in to the authority he hated. This reaction to his appointment is ironic because his psychoanalytic movement turned into this exact authority he so despised. When Freud's movement began gaining traction, even he realized the need for a structure to help his movement continue to grow. Freud's view of the university was that it was over pruned. With his history with Vienna, one would think that Freud was in no danger of becoming this controlling metaphorical gardener. Unfortunately, with the split of Adler and the impending split of Jung, Freud's group gave in to the temptation to take control. The formation of the Committee signified the beginning of the Freudian reign. Freud continued his own work as he always had, but the exploration of different branches of psychoanalysis was very strictly monitored. If a new idea was not very close to the base of the psychoanalytic movement, it was immediately lopped off. This greatly stunted the growth and influence of the psychoanalytic movement. There were a few, however, that were able to quietly and carefully fill out the gaps within ego psychology while remaining in Freud's good graces.

Heinz Hartmann was the central presence in the emergence of ego psychology. Coming from a cultivated Vienna family and trained as a physician and a psychiatrist, he had been

analyzed by Freud and was always deeply respectful of Freud's contributions. Like the founder, Hartmann had wide ranging aesthetic tastes and interests, including music, art, philosophy, and history. A skilled writer with perhaps a closer eye than Freud for theoretical nuance, he characterized his 1937 classic, *EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION*, as an extension and elaboration of the founder's basic tenants. Freud's inner circle was generally pleased with the volume. Although Freud had referred to the ego as the "executive" of the human personality, he had never granted it autonomy. It always played a role subordinate to the id, which Freud saw as the primary agent in generating psychological energy and motivation. Subtly and with considerable deference to Freud, Hartmann insisted that the ego originated and developed separate from the id. Indeed, in addition to the ego's buffer or broker function between the id and the superego, there was also a "conflict free sphere" within the ego where it was able to operate with considerable autonomy while continuing to be energized by the id. For Hartmann, this was accomplished because the ego had a capacity to "neutralize" or filter out the most disruptive sexual and aggressive drives and thereby establish a relatively "conflict free sphere" within itself. By reducing the constancy and pressure of the most disruptive drives while continuing to be energized, the "conflict free sphere" facilitated a person's adaptation to the imperatives of the surrounding world. It helped the therapeutic patient to "achieve a better functioning synthesis and relation to the environment."<sup>36</sup>

Perhaps Hartmann's clearest departure or "amplification" of Freud was in underscoring the adaptive functions of ego defenses. The ego defenses were more than responses to the instinctual drives. Intellect, for example, was more than a defense against instinctual pressure. It was also a mode of adaptation to the realities of the environment since "ordered thinking is always directly or indirectly reality-oriented." Referencing an essential adaptive function

facilitated by the ego, Hartmann summarized: “Learning to think and learning in general are independent biological functions which exist alongside, and in part independent of, instinctual drives and defenses...” Indeed, Hartmann argued for the adaptive, non-conflict laden possibilities of several other ego defenses. Fantasy could at times be preparation to master reality while the defenses of denial and avoidance could represent a search for a less benign environment. Hartmann went on to offer a considerable number of other learning and maturation processes that could develop outside of the id-ego conflict (i.e. within the “conflict free sphere” of the ego). These included perception, intention, thinking, language facility, object comprehension, and memory. His list included many of the traditional concerns of academic psychology and child development studies. Indeed, the concept of a “conflict free sphere” held out the potential to bridge psychoanalysis with cognitive and even behavioral directions of psychology.<sup>37</sup>

There could hardly have been a “conflict free sphere,” Hartmann acknowledged, without the capacity to detach the energy of the drives from their instinctual origins. The drives could be “neutralized”. It was especially important to “neutralize” the aggressive drive through sublimation if a person was to form permanent object relations – to relate meaningfully to the people and things in his environment. Indeed, when the aggressive drive was neutralized, the neutralized energy became a source of added ego strength and reinforced the potential for a myriad of activities in the “conflict free sphere.”<sup>38</sup>


Hartmann continued to elaborate his essentials for ego psychology after he immigrated to New York in 1941 and became a very formidable presence in the “mainstream” of the American psychoanalytic movement. Not incurring the displeasure of the “orthodox” as Jung and Adler had done, he made Freud’s theoretical edifice far less reductionist and was able to build bridges

with non-psychoanalytic psychologists. Hartmann's view of a strong and capable ego closely resembled traditional psychology's notion of an "enlightened will." Hartmann also offered other reforms to make "mainstream" psychoanalysis less reductionist than Freud had left it. Well-developed psychoanalytic hypotheses clarified what was to be observed, he insisted. Thus, it became more possible to test the hypotheses by replicatory research. Like behaviorists and other experimental researchers, he insisted that psychoanalytic theory needed to interpenetrate with observation. In sum, Hartmann worked hard to connect psychoanalysis with other areas of psychological and general scientific inquiry even as he cautioned that Freud's "science" dealt with more complex phenomena involving far more variables. Too much a Freudian to end up with a Jamesian O-E hypothesis, Hartmann spent decades trying to make Freudian psychoanalysis less reductionist and largely succeeded.<sup>39</sup>

If psychoanalysts had not, for the most part, accepted Hartmann's much augmented view of the ego, they would have had little use for the breakthrough innovations of Erik Homburger Erikson. As a young trainee of Anna Freud in child analysis during the 1920s, Erikson first met Hartmann in her Kinder-seminar, and then on several other occasions. Although Anna Freud did not explicitly endorse a "conflict free sphere" or drive neutralization, she insisted on the primacy of the ego in child development. She had taught Erikson how the normal ego was a fixed entity that dealt with a reality that was both within and external to the self. When the child felt anxious, he released a wide array of ego defenses to cope with it. Privately, Erikson agreed with Hartmann that Anna Freud failed to address qualities of the ego involved more than defenses warding off anxiety producing drives; she failed to explain how the ego was able to grow and to assume other functions. Hartmann addressed this, Erikson felt, in his amplification of the nature of ego strength and particularly through his discussion of a "conflict free sphere." But for young

Erikson, even Hartmann was too much in the shadows of Sigmund Freud's structural theory, failing to fully illuminate the deeper essence of the ego itself.<sup>40</sup>

While training in Vienna, Erikson also found himself attracted to colleague, anthropologist Ruth Benedict, who invoked the term "configuration" to describe how a particular society patterned its emotional and cognitive dispositions in accord with its shared "inner necessities." Erikson was taken by Benedict's term and the thought behind it but sought to reshape it to service the psychoanalyst's focus on the specific individual and especially his own work with children that had begun in Vienna in the 1920s. For him, a "configuration" was something fairly tangible, words, a sketch, a dream, an arrangement of objects, and so forth, which a person created that illustrated how his inner emotions influenced and were influenced by his outer social circumstances.<sup>41</sup> For example, in Erikson's *Studies in the Interpretations of Play* (1939) a little boy, Johnny, who soiled himself whenever he felt a state of rage or sexual excitement, was brought in for therapy and was asked to create whatever he wanted out of modeling clay. John produced himself, his mother and many other male figures in the shape of nuts. He called the other males his "mother's brothers", the therapist replied, "your uncles?" Immediately John went to the bathroom and this occurred whenever the uncles were mentioned. He created an airplane that is flying far away and then back to his mother and himself, which represented his father, a sailor, coming back from work at sea. The many 'uncles' represented the many men that were involved in his mother's infidelity that he had witnessed and was told to keep a secret by his mother. The therapist then talked to the mother about her problems, which in turn helped Johnny. Configurations created from representations like this were the beginning of counseling and a break from psychoanalysis and reductionism.<sup>42</sup>



When Erikson had been invited to participate in the Yale Institute project to establish compatibilities between externally focused behaviorism and internally oriented psychoanalysis, he had hoped that colleagues like John Dollard would help him to concretize his concept of a psychosocial “configuration.” But they were uninterested because he lacked Stimulus-Response premises. Moreover, their Frustration-Aggression hypothesis was wholly unconnected to anything he had learned in Vienna. As a child analyst and researcher in California during the late 1930s and early 1940s after he left the Yale Institute, Erikson felt that he was finally able to elaborate, clinically and theoretically, what a “configuration” was with some degree of definitiveness. He would give a child some dolls, blocks, and other toys and asks him/her to make something with them. Erikson would then talk with the child about the meaning of what was constructed, just as in the story of Johnny above. He explored what was missing (e.g. a parental figure, a much loved toy, or even the child himself), what was perhaps too conspicuously present, and how the child felt about these absences and presences. For Erikson, the play construction and the feelings and perceptions that accompanied it was the child’s “configuration”, the pattern that revealed the interconnection between his inner feelings and his outer social circumstances. Succinctly, the specific “configuration” presented the shape of his identity. As James might have put it, the Object and the Environment interacted in terms of one another. But whereas James saw the O-E interaction as perpetual and not always predictable, Erikson hoped that through therapeutic intervention a more comforting long-term sense of continuity, security, and happiness for the child would emerge within his reformulated

“configuration.” Perhaps James would have benefited if Erikson were his clinician because unlike James, Erikson premised that greater continuity and balance between inner and outer life would make for a more stable and productive identity, which James lacked. Erikson’s aims were more therapeutic than those of James; he was understandably less preoccupied with averting any form of theoretical reductionism.<sup>43</sup>

Erikson’s clinical work with troubled American veterans from World War II at San Francisco’s Mt. Zion Hospital helped him to gain more experience with adults and to work with “configurations” that revealed themselves through the patterns of their speech and dreams as well as their sketches and the physical arrangements in their lives. Working with these veterans and their often traumatic wartime experiences, Erikson described how he was able to gain far greater clarity, through the “configurations” they presented, on how discontinuity between inner and outer worlds created confusion and distress. The ultimate clinical goal was to obtain a firm sense of ego identity where one felt a sameness and continuity over time between the inner self and the people and conditions in the outer society. When the inner emotions were disjointed from the outer social conditions, one lacked for ego strength and experienced something of an “identity crisis”, a “central loss of identity”.<sup>44</sup>

By the late 1940s, Erikson was transforming this identity issue into the central developmental stage within his model of the human life cycle. This model differed from Freud’s infancy based oral, anal, and genital model in several respects. It extended from birth through old age. The stages of the human lifecycle emphasized how throughout childhood, one strives to obtain adulthood and when one becomes an adult, they strive to sustain what they have developed.<sup>45</sup> This distressed Erikson no end, for it overlooked his underlying goal. He was out to move psychoanalysis toward a far more open-ended approach than Freudian drive theory.

What Erikson meant by his “configurational” approach was a “dialogue” between inner psyche and outward social circumstances. It came the closest of any psychoanalytic perspective to approximate James’s formula for averting reductionism in personality theory – a constant interchange between the Organism and the Environment (O-E). But whereas for James the personality was forever being remade, for Erikson in his therapeutic capacity it was to stabilize as the ego gained strength – to reach the point where a comforting continuity was achieved between a person’s inner emotions and his outer social circumstances.

With Erikson, then, psychoanalytic ego psychology went as far as it ever had toward the Jamesian O-E formulation, more of a necessary reductionism, assuredly much closer if less “scientific” than any behavioral S-R perspective. Indeed, if not for Erikson’s perspective as a clinician that his patients needed the continuity and stability provided by a good sense of their psychosocial identities by looking to their assets as strengths, he might have embraced a protean elasticity in personality structure even more than he had by the late 1960s. Fairly regularly in his publications, lectures, and casual remarks, moreover, Erikson quoted James to amplify what he meant by a strong sense of identity. It was a “center of personal energy” where one felt “most deeply and intensely active and alive.” The two were exceedingly close in their appraisals of the human personality, its processes, and its needs. Because of his comparatively open-ended and non-reductionist perspective, Erikson fretted constantly that he might be ostracized by more orthodox Freudians. A psychoanalytic theorist with Hartmann-like nuance and systematization, his friend David Rapaport regularly reviewed drafts of Erikson’s publications during the 1950s to correct marked deviancy from Freud and to try to assure that he kept up with recent directions in psychoanalytic scholarship.

Through good theoretical guidance and an abiding personal desire to remain in the “fold”, the least reductionist psychoanalytic ego theorist of the mid-twentieth century had constantly to worry that he would be regarded as an outsider and would lose his own sense of professional identity.<sup>46</sup>

#### IV

A disquieting aspect of both behaviorism and psychoanalysis is that allegiance to a founding paradigm tended to distance its participants from theorists outside their “walls” who might have enriched their undertakings. The absence of significant references in either field to gifted and innovative outsiders like Durkheim, Jung, Adler, and Max Weber makes this abundantly clear. But the case of Erich Fromm, who could have added important elements to both fields, represents one of the most disquieting stories of all.

Fromm’s 1941 classic, *ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM*, has been regarded as one of the most profound of all studies of the social psychology of authoritarianism. Successor volumes like *THE SANE SOCIETY*, *THE ART OF LOVING*, and *TO HAVE OR TO BE* have been global best sellers and have influenced policy makers. Yet none of Fromm’s work has sat well with the established schools of personality theory. Although the behaviorists at the Yale Institute invited Erikson to join their collectivity, none save for John Dollard would consider any professional rapport with Fromm. Orthodox psychoanalysts were directly dismissive. A member of the International Psychoanalytic Association since the early 1930s, he was dropped from its rolls twenty years later. Erikson saw great affinity between Fromm’s concept of “social character” and his own configurational approach uniting the inner psyche with outer social circumstances,

and he found that Fromm too was concerned with psychosocial identity. Yet fearing ostracism from the Freudians, not to mention the animosity between the two, Erikson only privately and discretely acknowledged his conceptual affinity with Fromm

To some extent, Fromm's professional ostracism was rooted in his very explicit quest to develop a theoretical posture that eschewed the reductionism of both the behaviorist S-R model and orthodox psychoanalysis. Quite explicitly, he held that a person was heavily the product of a "social character" system consisting of the primary social groups that surrounded him, the material conditions these groups faced, and the psychological directives they propagated. As Erikson had discovered, Fromm's idea of social character had a striking resemblance to a configuration except that the social character had to do with the external environment rather than what one was feeling inside. Succinctly, it was the unique and constant interaction between the inherent qualities in the self and those in the society that shaped life.

In explicating his theoretical posture, Fromm also rejected the Freudian premise that psychologically, man was primarily a product of his interiority, especially his drives. Long before it became fashionable among many psychoanalysts, Fromm directly dismissed Freud on life wishes or drives versus death drives, the notion of a primal horde, the "imperfect" nature of female psychological development, and other problematic baggage. Man could not be separated, psychologically or on any other count, from his primary social groups. The outer and the inner housed regularly interpenetrating psychological and social forces. Although he never said so explicitly, Fromm's theoretical framework was broadly compatible with the Jamesian E-O interactive pattern that both mainline behaviorism and orthodox psychoanalysis eschewed.

A second factor was at least equally relevant in explaining Fromm's ostracism. He held himself out considerably more than most personality theorists as an ethicist. He was concerned with how man functioned psychologically, to be sure, but this involved discerning and elaborating what was "good" for him as a human being, specifically the five basic human needs to live happy and content. Unlike most behaviorists and psychoanalysts, who held themselves out as bias-free "scientists," Fromm was proud that his approach was explicitly value laden.

Fromm insisted that pressures toward conformity and obedience to authority existed in both twentieth century fascist and democratic regimes, and that they made man feel more secure. But as an ethicist of the human psyche, he insisted that only by exercising his autonomy, freedom, and rational thinking capacity could man satisfy his basic needs and garner happiness.

Fromm's analytic patients did remarkably well and his ethically informed social psychology inspired a mass global readership that has hardly ebbed a quarter century after his death. Predictably, Mowrer and Erikson were among his close readers and both valued the fact that he was an ethicist who regularly addressed topics important to the human condition. Even so, Fromm's private correspondence suggests that some of the very behaviorists and psychoanalysts who cavalierly dismissed him as a polemicist would turn privately to his texts as they sought to enhance their own lives.

Just as James formulated his O-E theory, Freud worked diligently to change Psychology forever through the id, ego and superego. The Yale Institute attempted to solidify its S-R theory, while Erikson endeavored to help his patients by getting to know them, and finally, Fromm wanted to help his patients by modifying their social environment. The works of these men will endure through innovative and evolving theories such as *The App Generation: How Today's*

Youth Navigate Identity, Intimacy, and Imagination in a Digital World (2013) by Howard Gardner, who was significantly influenced by some of the theorists above. Erikson was Gardner's undergraduate professor at Harvard, where he learned about youth and identity, intimacy and imagination. Also of note is Gardner's Theory of Multiple Intelligences, which discusses how everyone has a selective profile of intelligences with which he or she approaches the world. Gardner is but one of many involved with modern theories influenced by the legacy of those who have gone before him, and just like his predecessors, he inherits their struggle to maintain an open system, characterized only by necessary reductionism, when faced with the labyrinthine task of piecing together the mysteries of the human psyche.

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<sup>1</sup> Palmer, *William James Remembered*, pp. 30-36.

<sup>2</sup> Burkhardt, INTRODUCTION, *The Works of William James: Essays in Psychology*, pp. xviii-xxix.

<sup>3</sup> James, BRUTE AND HUMAN INTELLECT, *The Works of William James: Essays in Psychology*, pp. 4-22.

<sup>4</sup> James, BRUTE AND HUMAN INTELLECT, *The Works of William James: Essays in Psychology*, p. 4.

<sup>5</sup> James, BRUTE AND HUMAN INTELLECT, *The Works of William James: Essays in Psychology*, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> James criticized the intellectual idealists' compulsions to firstly classify all objects stumbled upon his way and secondly decided from where they originated. *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 21.23.

<sup>7</sup> In James's words: "They interact and develop each other without end; for each action of E upon O changes O, whose reaction in turn upon E changes E, so that E's new action upon O gets different, eliciting a new reaction, and so on indefinitely. The situation gets perpetually 'reconstructed'...and this reconstruction is the process of which all reality consists." THE CHICAGO SCHOOL, *Psychological Bulletin*, p. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Lemov, *World as Laboratory*, pp. 55-67; Sealander, *Private Wealth and Public Life: Foundation Philanthropy and the Reshaping of American Social Policy From the Progressive Era to the New Deal* provides in some ways a more insightful and contextually grounded portrayal of Ruml and his efforts than Lemov.

<sup>9</sup> Watson, *Behaviorism*, p. vi

<sup>10</sup> Watson, *Behaviorism*, p. v

<sup>11</sup> Watson, *Behaviorism*, p.1

<sup>12</sup> Watson, *Behaviorism*, pp. 3-4

<sup>13</sup> Watson, *Behaviorism*, p. 4

<sup>14</sup> Watson, *Behaviorism*, p. 6

<sup>15</sup> Morawski, *Organizing Knowledge and Behavior at Yale's Institute of Human Relations*, p. 219

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- <sup>16</sup> May, *A Psychologist of Many Hats*, p. 657; See also, Capshew, *Psychologists on the March*, Ch. 1
- <sup>17</sup> Lemov, *World as Laboratory*, chapter 5; May, *Toward a Science of Human Behavior: A Survey Of the Work Of the Institute Of Human Relations Through Two Decades, 1929-1949* and Morawski, *Organizing Knowledge and Behavior at Yale's Institute of Human Relations* specifically p. 235-237.
- <sup>18</sup> Hull, *Simple-Trial and-Error Learning: A Study in Psychological Theory*, p. 242.
- <sup>19</sup> May, *A Psychologist of Many Hats*, p. 656-657
- <sup>20</sup> Lemov, *World as Laboratory*, chapters. 5,6. For a somewhat more instructive analysis of Dollard, see, Steven Weiland, *Life History, Psychoanalysis, and Social Science: The Example of John Dollard*, especially pp. 275-277. See also Lyle Lanier's old article, *Mr. Dollard and the Scientific Method. Correspondence during the late 1930's between Dollard and Mead in the Mead Papers*, Library of Congress, and letters and memoranda at the time by Lawrence Frank plus entries in the important Allen Gregg diary – both at the Rockefeller Archive Center – are particularly instructive in addressing Dollard's change.
- <sup>21</sup> Morawski, *Organizing Knowledge and Behavior at Yale's Institute of Human Relations*, p. 229
- <sup>22</sup> Morawski, *Organizing Knowledge and Behavior at Yale's Institute of Human Relations*, p. 237-240
- <sup>23</sup> John Dollard, Neal E. Miller, Leonard W. Doob, O. H. Mowrer, Robert. R. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression*, p.1; Page 22 gives specifics about which Freudian positions the authors of the book specifically agree and disagree with.
- <sup>24</sup> Dollard, *Caste and Class In A Southern Town*, p. 111-112
- <sup>25</sup> Lemov, *World as Laboratory*, chapter 7.
- <sup>26</sup> Grob, *From Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern America*, especially Chs. 1, 2; Lemov, *World as Laboratory*, pp. 147-156.
- <sup>27</sup> Lemov, *World as Laboratory*, pp. 157-161.
- <sup>28</sup> Louis West, longtime head of UCLA's Neuropsychiatry Institute, assembled a research group for the CIA after the Korean War to investigate brainwashing of prisoners of war in North Korean and Chinese detention camps. Studying Watson and invoking the traditional stimulus/response perspective, West's team described unrelenting pressure on the prisoner as the way to break down and reconstitute the self in terms of inner emotions as well as outward behavior; Capshew, *Psychologists on the March*, and Herman, *The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts*; Lemov, *World as Laboratory*, pp. 188-200 on West.
- <sup>29</sup> Mowrer, *The New Group Therapy*, p. iii
- <sup>30</sup> Mowrer, *The New Group Therapy*, p. 41
- <sup>31</sup> Mowrer, *The New Group Therapy*, 8-11, 39, 147. See also Lemov, *World as Laboratory*, pp. 100-106.
- <sup>32</sup> My basic sources for Freud are the *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (SE) under the general editorship of James Strachey. Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams*. I have also drawn extensively from Peter Gay's *Freud: A Life for Our Time* and the Freud chapter (II) in Hall & Lindzey's *Theories of Personality*.
- <sup>33</sup> Freud's INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (1915) in the SE, Vols. 15 & 16 and NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES (1933) in SE, vol. 22 represent the fullest elaboration of his structure theory. See also David Rapaport, *The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory: A Systematizing Attempt*, pp. 55-183.
- <sup>34</sup> Hall & Lindzey, *Theories of Personality*, pp. 49-53 provides a cogent yet succinct summary of Freud's developmental stages.
- <sup>35</sup> There is a massive literature critical of Freud's theories and methods. Edward Shorter, *A History of Psychiatry*, Ch.5; Adolph Grunbaum, *The Foundation of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique*; Richard Webster, *Why Freud Was Wrong: Sin, Science, and Psychoanalysis*; Hanz J. Eysenck, *Decline and Fall of the Freudian Empire*.
- <sup>36</sup> Hartmann, *Ego Psychology and The Problem of Adaptation*, pp. 13-19; Hale, *The Rise and Crisis of Psychoanalysis in The United States: Freud and the Americans 1917-1985*, pp. 234-36; Mitchell & Black, *Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought*, pp. 34-38.
- <sup>37</sup> Hartman, *Ego Psychology*, pp. 8, 13-19; Hale, *Rise and Crisis*, pp. 235-36.
- <sup>38</sup> Hale, *Rise and Crisis*, p. 236.
- <sup>39</sup> Hale, *Rise and Crisis*, pp. 236-237.
- <sup>40</sup> Friedman, *IDENTITY'S ARCHITECT*, pp. 92-93

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<sup>41</sup> Friedman, *IDENTITY'S ARCHITECT*, pp. 98-99, 134-139; Erikson, "Configurations in Play," (1937) in Stephen Schlein, ed., *A WAY OF LOOKING AT THINGS: SELECTED PAPERS FROM 1930-1980. ERIK H. ERIKSON* (New York: Norton, 1987), pp. 77-138.

<sup>42</sup> Erikson, *STUDIES OF PLAY* (New York: Arno Press 1975) pp. 589-595.

<sup>43</sup> Friedman, *IDENTITY'S ARCHITECT*, pp. 39, 154.

<sup>44</sup> Erikson, "Ego Development and Historical Change: Clinical Notes," *PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD, II* (1946), 363-64, 371-72; Friedman, *IDENTITY'S ARCHITECT*, pp. 158-161.

<sup>45</sup> Friedman, *IDENTITY'S ARCHITECT*, Ch. V, fully discusses the development of Erikson's life cycle model.

<sup>46</sup> Friedman, *IDENTITY'S ARCHITECT*, pp. 275, 341 quoting James. *Ibid.*, pp. 286-97 on Rapaport and Erikson, and p. 440 on Wallerstein and Erikson.