
Clio's Psyche

Understanding the "Why" of Culture, Current Events, History, and Society

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Did 1940 Vichy Shape 1958 Paris? A Symposium (15 authors)

De Gaulle as Pétain

Rudolph Binion
Brandeis University

The Third French Republic came to an inglorious end between Bordeaux on June 16 and Vichy on July 10, 1940. That June 16 in Bordeaux, makeshift capital of France at the height of the German invasion, Premier Paul Reynaud made way for a successor, Marshal Philippe Pétain, to request armistice terms. Then on that July 10 as much of the French parliament as could meet in Vichy voted Pétain's government full powers to draft a new, authoritarian constitution for popular approval and to rule by fiat meanwhile. Eighteen years later, between May 28 and June 1-3, 1958, the Fourth French Republic came to an equally inglorious end. In Paris on that May 28
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Thomas A. Kohut: Historian With a Psychoanalytic World View

Paul Elovitz
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Thomas August Kohut, PhD, was born on March 11, 1950 in Chicago where he grew up as an only child. As a youngster he attended the innovative Lab School of the University of Chicago. He later took his bachelors degree from Oberlin College in 1972 and his masters and doctoral degrees from the University of Minnesota in 1975 and 1983. He practiced psychotherapy and psychoanalysis in Cincinnati from 1981-84, and in 1984 graduated from the Cincinnati Psychoanalytic Institute where he became
(Continued on page 49)

Filial Loyalty and Rebellion in Watergate: Woodward, Felt and Nixon

Kenneth Fuchsman
University of Connecticut

Bob Woodward was 26-years-old, a Navy Lieutenant, bored, and uncertain of his future when in 1969, in the basement of the Nixon White House, he met W. Mark Felt, a senior FBI official. Out of this chance encounter and subsequent developments, a hidden psychological drama developed that resulted in Nixon's resignation and forever marked the lives of these three men. It involved issues of worthy and unworthy father figures, generational loyalties, and ego ideals.

This story begins with the identity issues of the young Bob Woodward. Woodward's own father was a prominent attorney in Wheaton, Illinois who, Woodward says, "wanted me to go to law school and eventually join the firm" (*The Secret Man: The Story*
(continued on next page)

The Sin Against the Blood, Hitler, and the Holocaust

George Victor
Psychohistory Forum Research Associate

Many studies of the origins of Adolf Hitler's decision to exterminate Jews cite internationally known books by the racists Arthur de Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and books by prominent German anti-Semites—notably Theodor Fritsch. However, they omit or barely mention the man who most influenced Hitler: Artur Dinter who, ironically, remains little-known in the United States.

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of *Watergate's Deep Throat* [NY: Simon & Schuster, 2005], p.24). In a 2003 interview, Woodward says: "my father to a certain extent was my model" (Academy of Achievement, "Bob Woodward: Journalist For Truth," p.8 [www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/woolint-1-9]). Family developments modified the extent to which Al Woodward was a model for Bob, the oldest of three children. When Bob was around 12 his mother had an affair and his parents divorced. His father won custody of the children while his mother remarried and moved to another town (Adrian Havill, *Deep Truth: The Lives of Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein*, [NY: Birch Lane Press, 1993], p.7). Speaking about the dissolution of his parent's marriage, Woodward says: "Divorce is painful...it destroys the very notion of context, because the only context you know as a child is family" ("Journalist," p.7). Three years after the divorce, Al Woodward remarried. His new wife, Alice, had three children of her own and then together they had a daughter. According to biographer Adrian Havill, Bob Woodward "viewed his stepfamily with suspicion and jealousy" (Havill, *Deep Truth*, p.11). One Christmas,

Bob investigated and found his father had spent substantially more on gifts for his stepchildren than his offspring from his first marriage. "I confronted him," he told *Playboy* in 1989, "and showed him that the money he spent on them and on us was so dramatically out of balance...it was kind of sad, but the fact is that it's a very competitive world when two families are brought together this way" (Havill, *Deep Truth*, p.11). Despite the emotional wounds, Woodward endured and as a young man he felt some obligation to adhere to his father's expectations. In accordance with his father's wishes, while still in the Navy, Woodward applied to and was admitted into Harvard Law School for the fall 1970 term. Woodward was having second thoughts about this decision. "This was a time in my life," Woodward admits, "of considerable anxiety, even consternation, about my future" (Woodward, *Secret*, p.18).

Mark Felt came along at a crucial time in Woodward's life. Impressed with Felt's bearing and personality, Woodward turned to Felt for mentoring. Woodward writes in *The Secret Man: The Story of Watergate's Deep Throat*: "Mark Felt had

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in some respects been an extra father" (Woodward, *Secret*, p.186). When Felt told the younger Woodward he should follow his own inclinations, this gave Bob the needed permission from a father figure to go against the hopes of his own father. For Bob Woodward, there was an inner conflict between filial piety and the separation-individuation process. By transferring, in part, his ego ideal and identification from his biological father to Mark Felt, both of whom were born in 1913, Woodward took the step towards individuation and chose journalism over law. When Bob told his father about his decision, the elder Woodward replied: "You're crazy." Bob says that this "was probably the severest thing he has ever said to me" ("Journalist," p.7). With the advice of Felt, Woodward had established independence from the expectations of his father. Interestingly enough, the same father-son drama over loyalty and independence that occurred between the senior and junior Woodward was to reoccur between Bob Woodward and Mark Felt, with significant and varying consequences for both of them.

W. Mark Felt was a loyal "company man." His ego ideal and father figure was personified by its authoritarian and perfectionist director, J. Edgar Hoover. Felt writes: "I had tremendous admiration for the man" (W. Mark Felt, *The FBI Pyramid: From the Inside* [NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1979], p.178). Hoover "was a sincere human being... with real greatness" (Felt, *FBI*, p.204).

Hoover had built the FBI into the agency that defended the country against "public enemies." These public foes of the FBI evolved from depression era professional criminals, to Nazis, Communists, Martin Luther King, Jr., and other assorted radicals. As the loyal and capable son, Felt had risen to be the third in command in the agency. W. Mark Felt adhered to Hoover's paternalistic ideology of the FBI as the defender of virtue against public enemies. After Hoover died on May 2, 1972 and the next in command retired, Felt believed his service to the "Bureau" and filial loyalty entitled him to succeed Hoover. The good son should inherit the father's company. "I allowed myself to think I had an excellent chance," Felt admits (Felt, *FBI*, p.178). However, President Nixon thwarted Felt's hopes by appointing a Nixon loyalist, L. Patrick Gray, rather than Felt, a Hoover loyalist, as Acting FBI Director.

Richard Nixon, who was also born in 1913, had loyalty and father issues of his own; he was raised by an erratic and tempestuous father. As a freshman Congressman in the 1940s, Nixon had allied himself with Hoover's war against the "public enemy" of the Communist menace. His alliance with Hoover had helped him break the Hiss case. Nixon exploited the fear of Communism to rise to national prominence and be selected as Eisenhower's running mate in 1952. As Eisenhower's Vice President for eight years, Nixon endured rejection and distance from the fatherly President. In a move for independence, when Nixon first ran for president in 1960 he did not seek the help of the popular Eisenhower until late in the campaign, and may have lost the presidential race as a result.

For the next eight years, Nixon endured the slings and arrows of fortune, many of them self-inflicted, until he barely won the Presidency himself in 1968. As the resentful son who had finally earned the role of Supreme Commander,

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Nixon saw the president as a law unto himself, as someone almost above the law. He asserted on more than one occasion that some things might be illegal for others but if the president did them, they would be legal. Certainly, such a man, fearful that others might have authority over him, did not want an FBI Director who might put the interests of the law and the FBI over those of the president. Where FBI loyalists adhered to the "public enemy" ideology, Nixon had moved from fighting "public enemies" to combating his "political enemies." The Nixon White House developed an "enemies list." It was this descent from "public" to "political enemies" that led Nixon's followers to their ill-fated adventures culminating in the Watergate break-in on June 17, 1972. Where Hoover and the FBI used a paternalistic model to enforce social injunctions, Nixon and his men used power and authority to go after those sibling rivals: political opponents.

We have three different men with divergent ego ideals and moral beliefs who become central figures in one of the great dramas in American history. Interestingly enough, the generational struggles that each of our protagonists had were echoed by the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. For this time period was one where generational conflicts were prevalent. Many of America's youth were attacking the legitimacy of paternal authority in the family and in government and other adults were seeking to control the actions of disobedient youth. Oedipal and generational struggles pervaded these years.

Mark Felt is an unlikely candidate as a rebel against presidential authority. He was willing to sponsor FBI intrusions into the activities of the radical left, and believed in upholding the law as interpreted by the puritanical J. Edgar Hoover. Though Felt could rationalize secret black bag searches and seizures at the homes of radicals and wiretapping Martin Luther King's private activities as protecting the public against its enemies, he found the White House's thwarting, with Acting Director Gray's assistance, of the FBI probe into the June 1972 break-in at the Watergate complex as a threat to the integrity and independence of the FBI. Felt writes, "once in the Oval Office" Nixon "saw the possibilities of making the FBI a White House police force." Nixon wanted the FBI to be

"an adjunct of the Nixon White House" (Felt, *FBI*, p.277). To Felt, the threat to the FBI from the Nixon administration was serious. "What Nixon did not foresee," Felt declares, "was that the Bureau's professional staff would fight this tooth and nail" (Felt, *FBI*, p.277). Even so, Felt believed that FBI agents should not leak the details of investigations to the press—such disclosures go against the very grain of the agency. So it was not without intense inner conflict that on June 19, two days after the Watergate break-in, Felt turned to a reporter to get information out about the extent of Watergate activities. There were probably senior reporters in whom Felt could have confided. He chose to talk to the relatively inexperienced but talented Bob Woodward, someone 30 years his junior whom he could treat as a subordinate, as a loyal son faithfully carrying out the wishes of the "father." So Mark Felt became the legendary "Deep Throat."

Leaking to the *Washington Post* was only one part of Felt's tooth and nail fight. Within the Bureau, on July 5, Felt and FBI colleagues forced a confrontation with Acting Director Gray to stop the White House and CIA obstruction of the FBI probe into the Watergate break-in. As a result, Nixon and the CIA backed down and the investigation into the break-in resumed without restriction (Felt, *FBI*, pp.253-257). Nevertheless, Felt was still worried about political influence on the conduct of the agency and continued to turn to the young reporter.

Felt laid down strict conditions to Woodward regarding how and where they would communicate. Part of their understanding was that Felt's contributions would be on what is known in journalism as "deep background." Early in *The Secret Man*, Woodward explains, that in deep background "information can be used but no source of any kind would be identified" (Woodward, *Secret*, p.4). Later in the book, after the Watergate break-in, when Felt has laid out the elaborate rules by which they could contact each other, Woodward reiterates that "deep background" meant that "no source would be cited—not an FBI, Justice Department or administration source" (Woodward, *Secret*, p.66).

The secret conversations Woodward and Felt had in the underground parking garage in Vir-

ginia were very helpful in providing direction for Woodward and Bernstein's investigations. The reporting in the *Washington Post* helped break the Watergate case and was influential in getting other investigations going which eventually led to the fall of the President. Woodward and Bernstein recognized in late 1972 that Nixon could be impeached and that they would have a role in toppling the Commander in Chief of the United States. Whether Mark Felt knew his conversations with Woodward would lead to Nixon's fall, we will probably never know. Felt was focused on upholding one authority over another: the FBI's role in law enforcement over the White House's political attempt to subvert legal investigations. For Woodward and for Felt, higher authority and father figures might be corrupt, so there may be legitimacy in overturning them. One wonders about feelings of guilt and remorse over this rebellion against authority.

The issue of filial loyalty arises for both Felt and Woodward. It has been reported that Felt was reluctant to admit he was "Deep Throat" because in revealing information and his fears to a reporter he had violated his own professional ethics. He was torn between adhering to two different value systems and did not want his rebellion against presidential authority to be known. In his 1979 memoir of his FBI career, *The FBI Pyramid*, Mark Felt on a number of occasions addressed the question of whether he was the source known as "Deep Throat." In his book, he asserts: "I never leaked information to Woodward and Bernstein or anyone else!" (Felt, *FBI*, p.226). We now know this is false. Curiously, in his book, Felt says that "Deep Throat" leaked details" of the contents of Howard Hunt's White House safe "to *The Washington Post* which carried the story" (Felt, *FBI*, p. 259).

Woodward's filial loyalty to Felt took an interesting turn. Because of the recognition that came to Woodward and Bernstein and because of their reporting, albeit assisted by Mark Felt, they were offered a book contract. When writing *All the President's Men*, Woodward phoned and inquired of Felt if he would mind being identified in the book. Woodward writes: "He exploded. Absolutely not. Was I mad even to make such a request?" Felt insisted, as Woodward writes, that

"he had to be able to count on our agreement, to count on me. He used the word 'inviolable'" (Woodward, *Secret*, p.110). What was Woodward's response to his "extra father's" call for loyalty? "Felt made me feel shame. I wondered how I could even have made such a request.....Exposure would challenge his probity with everyone important in his life" (Woodward, *Secret*, p.111). Despite Felt's admonitions, Woodward and Bernstein decided to take Mark Felt off deep background and identify him by his newsroom nickname of "Deep Throat" in their book. "It never really crossed my mind," Woodward admits, "to leave out the details of Deep Throat's role" (Woodward, *Secret*, p.113). In moving Felt from deep background to "Deep Throat," Woodward was going against his own definition of "deep background" where no source of any kind is identified. As Woodward wrote, this would include not giving any indication that he had a source from the FBI, Justice Department or the administration. Woodward and Bernstein in announcing in *All the President's Men*, that "Woodward had a source in the Executive Branch" and that "Woodward had promised he would never identify him or his position to anyone" were being ingenuous (Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, *All the President's Men* [NY: Simon and Schuster, 1974], p.71). For it was not only Felt's personal identity or position that was to be protected, on deep background there was never supposed to be a printed acknowledgment that such a source existed. Did Woodward either inform Felt or ask his permission for breaking their agreement that he would remain on deep background? No, he did not. So much for Woodward protecting the inviolate nature of his agreement with Felt. By going against Felt's conditions, was Woodward exhibiting a filial disloyalty to Felt as he had with his own father? In all likelihood, yes. There were layers of generational revolt on Woodward's part in the Watergate affair.

After Woodward and Bernstein's book was published in 1974, Woodward phoned Felt. Woodward writes: "I was dying to know what he thought....When he heard my voice, he hung up. For days I was haunted, imagining the worst....he would go public and denounce me as a betrayer and scum who had exploited our accidental friendship....I can still hear the banging of his telephone

and the sudden dial tone...I did not have the courage to phone him again" (Woodward, *Secret*, pp. 115-116). Woodward then goes on to add that soon afterwards that both the *Washingtonian* magazine and the *Wall Street Journal* identified Felt as "Deep Throat." For the next 31 years, Felt would publicly deny that he was the secret source for Woodward and Bernstein. Felt's payback for befriending Woodward was a life of public lying and private shame.

It has often been said that the sins of the fathers are passed on to the next generation. In this case, Mark Felt the father stand-in may have been both a sinner and a savior, but the sins of the psychological son were inflicted onto the father figure. In 1978, when Felt was indicted for his role with the radical Weather Underground, it became clear that if his role as "Deep Throat" were revealed it would further complicate Felt's life and fate. Around that time Woodward and Felt talked. Felt reminded Bob of his "commitment not to further exploit our relationship" and this added to, Woodward says, "my growing feelings of personal responsibility for his plight" (Woodward, *Secret*, pp.144-145). After Woodward had wounded his mentor, he felt and feels guilt. This brings to mind "the remorse" the sons in the primal horde feel after they "had satisfied their hatred" of their father (Freud (1913), *Standard Edition, Volume 13*, p.143). While outwardly for over 30 years Woodward appeared to be a loyal protector of "Deep Throat's" privacy, inwardly Woodward knew that he had exploited his relationship with Felt for his own fame and fortune.

The ironic circle of these three players is continued when at Felt's criminal trial, former President Nixon testifies in Felt's defense and Woodward remains silent. Nixon's historical fate will always be entwined with those of Felt and Woodward, men he hardly knew or had not met at all. Nixon's presidency, with all its abuse of power, was exposed by two aspiring reporters, some anonymous sources, including a disgruntled federal official. In this saga, Nixon, Felt and Woodward form an unusual triangle. For all three unresolved issues of paternal authority and generational loyalty combined with more public factors to produce a complicated drama. Public issues of power and authority have parallel sources in how

families interact. The actions of players in public political dramas are also reflections of their family conflicts. Political issues and childhood dramas are forever entangled. In Watergate and its exposure, the lead actors have mixed motivations and are enacting family dramas on the public stage. The father figures in this drama paid severe prices for their actions, while the son becomes a heroic reporter, a slayer of dragons, a symbolic killer of various father surrogates. In victory, *The Secret Man* is Woodward's confession of his betrayal and remorse.

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Reflections on "Deep Throat"

Paul H. Elovitz
Clio's Psyche

The recent revelation that William Mark Felt was "Deep Throat" has sparked considerable interest, including the publication of Bob Woodward's *The Secret Man: The Story of Watergate's Deep Throat* (2005). My first concern is why the movie that gave its name to the source for the truth of the Watergate cover-up was such a phenomenon of 1972-73. Then I move on to the questions of the connections between the language of sex and power, power as an aphrodisiac, fear and envy, political and personal betrayal, and a comparison of the star secret source ("Deep Throat") and the star of the *Deep Throat* movie.

Although the early 1970s were an extremely busy time in my life when I did not get to a lot of films, my first wife rather sheepishly said, "There's a film that we *must* go see." I took my head out of whatever book on history, psychoanalysis, or psychohistory I happened to be reading

at the moment, inquiring, "What's it about?" Blushing a bright red, she responded, "Ah, eh, umm, uh, it's something different. It's something you'll like. It's something men like. It's sexy. *Everyone* is going to it. We ought to go!" My curiosity—to say nothing of my libido—was aroused by this unusual request. So we went.

The out-of-the-way theater was in a seedy section of a city well past its prime and the movie posters in its display cases illustrated that pornography was its mainstay. Not only was the movie house jammed, but it was overflowing with middle-class *couples*. Indeed, we ran into two colleagues and their spouses from my department of a dozen professors. They proclaimed that they also had *never before* been to a pornographic movie but they *had* to see *Deep Throat* because "*everyone*" was talking about it.

The success of *Deep Throat* was not based on the negligible acting ability of Linda Lovelace (Linda Susan Boreman) or the extremely limited plot. The main action of the movie had to do with the act of fellatio—a subject I had never previously encountered in the cinema. The film's premise is that Linda, who was sexually frustrated despite an Olympian effort to achieve orgasm with a large number of partners, sought medical help. The doctor discovered that her clitoris was in the back of her throat, rather than in the usual place, and gleefully betrayed medical ethics to personally demonstrate how she could achieve satisfaction—as would a variety of other men whose penises were long enough to reach her misplaced clitoris. The audience watched with rapt attention.

Why were the prohibitions on watching pornography overcome by so many middle class couples that *Deep Throat* became the first pornographic film to cross over to a mainstream audience in 1972-73? Why by this particular sample of cinema? We were more disgusted than titillated in watching the second film, *The Devil in Miss Jones*. It was becoming "in" not simply for women to perform oral sex (in the process of which bowing down before a man like a knight showing his subservience to his lord) but for men to begin to talk in public about women's pleasure. In the early 1970s, the clitoris as the real source of female sexual pleasure was entering public discourse after Masters and Johnson's pioneering work, *Human*

Sexual Response (1966), and Comfort's *The Joy of Sex*, a best seller in 1972. Part of the male fantasy of *Deep Throat* was that the men Linda Lovelace performed fellatio on were giving her pleasure through the stimulation of her clitoris.

"Deep Throat" was chosen by Howard Simons, Managing Editor of the *Washington Post*, as the cover name for Woodward's source because he was in "deep background" (Woodward, *Secret Man*, p.4). The "Deep" in "Deep Throat" implied how well entrenched Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward's most famous secret source was within the Washington establishment. However, there were also other reasons that may be less apparent, though not necessarily less important.

Deep Throat was the "in" movie for people in the age group of the gutsy *Washington Post* reporters, Bernstein and Woodward. Using this name, in violation of Woodward's agreement with Felt that he was only to be referred to as a source for "deep background," further strengthened their sense that they were in the "in" group. After all, the President, the head of the FBI, all of Washington, and soon the nation would be guessing the identity of the confidential source from whom the reporters were getting their information. The psychology of having secret, special knowledge known only to a tiny handful of people at the *Post* was intense. "Secrets have a power...and we had the power," is how Carl Bernstein now remembers the situation (Woodward, *Secret Man*, p.225). There was both a sense of being chosen and a fear that, at moments, transformed itself into Woodward's having "paranoid" thoughts (pp.87-88). This reminds me of the fleeting paranoid thoughts I had about being exposed for going to a "dirty" movie! The excitement and fear of the movie *Deep Throat* was mirrored in Washington politics in what was an age of permissiveness.

The language of romance and sex is used quite extensively in politics. For example, a newly elected president normally has a "honeymoon" period during which there is a minimum of criticism. "Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac" according to Henry Kissinger. He liked to say that, before he became National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, he was just a pudgy professor avoided by beautiful women at cocktail parties, and that, afterward, women found him to be quite sexy.

The sexuality of power and bringing down the powerful is worth probing. During the Watergate scandal, having the second-in-command at the FBI clandestinely providing the darkest secrets of the President was dangerous and titillating. There was an enormous risk involved. The *Post* and its reporters were earning the enmity of one of the most powerful men in the world—a man who kept an enemies list. In 1972, John Mitchell, Nixon's Attorney General, had declared to Bernstein that "Katie Graham's [publisher of the *Washington Post*] gonna get her tit caught in a big fat wringer if that's published."

Politics is about power, and for that matter, sex often is as well. Fellatio is usually about a woman making herself subservient to a man as well as giving him sexual pleasure. The power games played among men in Washington bring to mind the emphasis in the movie on the size of men's penises. I am also reminded that the origins of the word *fuck* is from the Middle English word *fuchen*—meaning to strike, move quickly, or penetrate.

While I was growing up, fellatio was associated with perversion. This is how all male-to-male sex—homosexuality—was seen. As a young man, my father was awakened by what appeared to be a nocturnal emission (wet dream), which turned out to be caused by someone he had never seen before performing oral sex on him. Outraged, he beat up the man. In male society among some workingmen and college students, there were many references to "blow jobs," "cock sucking," and "giving head." The Army introduced me to "flying fuck," "fuck-up," "not giving a fuck," and "suck my dick"—as a sign of contempt. Most vivid in my mind is "fuck-your-buddy-week"—when betraying your buddies was not only allowed, it was said to be mandatory because of the pressure put on soldiers by their higher-ups. Its implications were to anal, male-to-male sex. In the virtually all male groups (the Army, business, college dorms, sports, and truck driving/warehousing) of my early manhood, sexual references among men always seemed to me to have more to do with power relationships than to the orgiastic pleasures of sex and nothing to do with love. In studying politics from a psychodynamic perspective, I also discovered that the same was true in politics.

Clearly, Mark Felt was out to "get"—to "screw" or to "fuck" Dick Nixon. He felt that he, personally, and the FBI as an institution, had been screwed by the President; he was not going to let some politician keep his agency from both getting to the truth and getting the truth out to the public. He thought that Haldeman and the cocky young men who served the President were treating him like an office boy whenever they needed information, a further measure of their dishonoring the "Bureau" he had given his life to and loved. He might have to come running when they called, but he could, by his clandestine actions, have them called to the bar of justice by getting out the truth of their illegal activities.

Bob Woodward, who said Felt thought of him as his secret field agent (Woodward, *Secret*, p. 106), had spent a "gutless five years in the Navy" during the Vietnam War that he "detested" and had decided against law school because it also "seemed gutless" to him (Woodward, *Secret*, p.26). He was looking to find his own way in the world, and what better way to prove his courage to himself than to go after the truth of the illegal activities associated with the Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP) and the White House? Under the guidance of experienced *Post* editors and, with the assistance of his "friend" at the FBI, a veteran of WW II espionage, he would prove that he was no longer "gutless." For Woodward, "Watergate was a cleansing" though, for Felt, it would be the "opposite" (Woodward, *Secret*, p.145).

Envy, betrayal, and guilt are discernible in the life of Nixon and are apparent in the relationship of Woodward and Felt. Richard Milhous Nixon was a second son of five, who was envious of the attention his mother gave to his eldest and youngest brothers. After their tragic deaths during his teenage years, his guilt drove him to be, in the words of his mother, "three sons in one." His envy would be one wellspring of his drive for success and power. Along the road to success, he betrayed Quaker pacifism and many other of the values he was taught, to say nothing of his closest advisors, some of whom served jail time for their services to him in the Watergate cover-up. Most members of his inner circle reciprocated by publishing memoirs portraying Nixon in an unflattering light. Men like Bernstein, Felt, and Woodward, who felt little loy-

alty to the commander-in-chief of their country, were out to suck the power away from his administration. Ultimately, however, Nixon betrayed himself, brought down by his own disclaimed guilt (David Abrahamsen, *Nixon Versus Nixon: An Emotional Tragedy*, 1976).

W. Mark Felt was envious of L. Patrick Gray III, who was given the position of Acting Director of the FBI, a job he himself felt entitled to and coveted. Ultimately, he would become envious of Bob Woodward's success, power, and wealth made possible by the information he had fed to the young reporter at great peril to himself. In short, "Deep Throat" felt used, betrayed, and unable to speak even to Bob Woodward about these things because of the danger of being exposed as a result of violating his own FBI code of ethics as well as the law.

The star of the other *Deep Throat* had similar feelings. In her 1980 autobiography, entitled *Ordeal*, Linda Lovelace claimed that she made the film with her husband literally holding a gun to her head, and that she was paid nothing for her work in it. Despite her fame, she does not appear to have done well financially from her other films, including *Linda Lovelace for President* (1975).

This daughter of a policeman went to parochial schools and subsequently presented herself as having been an abused child and wife. She would have a troubled life that included an arrest for drug abuse, prostitution, a career campaigning against pornography after her porno career was over, and death in her early 50s from injuries sustained in an auto accident. The genuineness of Linda Lovelace's status as a victim betrayed by those around her is problematic: she reveled in the role of the injured party, benefited financially from the anti-porn lecture circuit, and she enjoyed her career making porno "flicks" according to a co-worker and friend from her *Deep Throat* days. By contrast, there is no question in my mind that Mark Felt was betrayed by the young reporter he befriended.

The extent of Woodward's betrayal of his "extra father," Mark Felt, is easy to document (Woodward, *Secret Man*, p.186). The younger man wrote that "he beat it into my head: security at all cost" (p.106), yet Woodward did not follow this

injunction. "His friend" had told him to never give the FBI as the source for anything to any one—Woodward did just this; Felt said never quote him even anonymously—Woodward quoted him; and the former undercover agent insisted the very existence of their talks had to be a secret—Woodward spoke about his conversations with "my friend in the FBI" to a colleague, his superiors, and even wrote him into *All the President's Men* as "Deep Throat," which drew even more attention to the agent who would soon be on trial for other activities. Bob Woodward presents his recent contact with Felt as a sentimental reunion, expressing feelings of gratitude for the Watergate help as well as showing him how to develop a trusting relationship with sources. This appears to be just more flattery by Washington's most successful journalist, who used Felt and is now scooping the older man in publishing Felt's own story which he had written in preparation for publication upon Felt's death since Woodward would then be released from his commitment to conceal the identity of his key source.

Bob Woodward spoke about feeling guilty, and even sounded guilty, while pushing his *The Story of Watergate's Deep Throat* book from talk show to talk show in July. He expressed guilt regarding having "used" Felt and the fact that he benefited financially while Felt is worrying about money. He sounded tempted to provide money to his former mentor and father surrogate, but explained that he couldn't do this because paying sources would set a terrible journalistic precedent. On "Larry King Live" he offered to serve some of *The New York Times'* Judith Miller's jail time for refusing to divulge her sources, but he knew very well that this was really an empty gesture of solidarity with a fellow reporter since neither the prosecutor nor judge would accept such an arrangement. His feelings of guilt don't seem to get in the way of his being the ultimate Washington insider, who even the President feels he has to talk to as he did for *Bush at War* (2002) and *Plan of Attack* (2004). Bob Woodward is wonderful at getting close to his sources, as he did with Mark Felt. In the end, many of these sources feel used—"screwed" or "fucked" in the vernacular.

"Deep Throat" (Mark Felt) and *Deep Throat's* star Linda Lovelace are the starting points

for this essay. Of course, in most ways, they could not be more different. The first symbolizes a struggle to get the truth out about a failed political burglary and criminal presidential cover-up, while the other is the star of a pornographic movie. The key player in the first kept his secret for over 30 years until Felt's Alzheimer's disease and the desire for money for his grandson brought it out into the open. The star of the second exposed her body and herself in her pornographic movies, *Playboy* magazine, her various autobiographies, and, later, as an anti-pornography crusader. The first is a male born in Idaho who is alive at the age of 91 and the second was a female born in the Bronx who died in 2002 at the age of 53.

Yet, in some ways, they are rather similar. In an era of permissiveness, both broke taboos, one secretly and the other in the most flagrant of ways. Both have had their 15 minutes of fame. Both lived dangerously: one as an FBI undercover agent for his country and the most talked about secret source bringing forth the truth, and the other in the porn industry and as a drug user facing arrest. Each had two children. In the public mind they share a common name that implies sexuality, betrayal of codes of conduct, the risk of exposure, and danger.

"Deep Throat" and *Deep Throat* reflect two important elements of American life in Nixon's second administration.

Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, lived through the Watergate scandal and was pleased to see the cover-up unravel and Nixon forced from the White House because of his intense opposition to Nixon's continuation of the war in Vietnam and enlargement of it to Cambodia. He may be contacted at pelovitz@aol.com. □

Our Horror: A Psychohistorical Meditation

**Howard F. Stein
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For the last several months—spring and summer 2005—I have been able to listen to virtually nothing else except Dmitri Shostakovich's Eighth Symphony ("Stalingrad"): in my office, at home,

while driving in my car to work and to teach in rural Oklahoma. I have felt that it is as much music for our time as it was the child of Shostakovich's torment in 1943. Josef Stalin and his regime had expected from him a triumph symphony, since the tides of World War II had finally turned in favor of the Allies. Instead, Shostakovich gave them a bleak portrait of war's brutality and horror. Implicitly, without "saying" so at the time, he also depicted the endless terror that Stalinism inflicted on its own people in the name of Soviet Socialism.

This symphony was his horrific Picasso "Guernica" painted in musical notation. It is a vision in sound of implacable darkness. In this symphony was to be found no sentimentality, no nationalistic boosterism, only anguish. In the language of music, Shostakovich told the truth that everyone knew but was kept a national secret. Now at war in Iraq, we in the United States are far displaced in time from the particulars of Shostakovich's circumstances, but not from their terrible emotional outline.

As a psychoanalytic anthropologist who has long studied my own culture, I am here both "key informant" and "scholarly interpreter" (*Beneath the Crust of Culture*. New York: Rodopi, 2004). In organizational consulting as well as large group cultural analysis, I use my countertransference as crucial data about the group as well as about myself (*Nothing Personal, Just Business: A Guided Journey into Organizational Darkness*. Westport, CT: Quorum 2001; "Countertransference and Organizational Knowing: New Frontiers and Old Truths," *Free Associations* [11 Part 3 No. 59, 2004], pp.325-337). My obsession with listening to this Shostakovich symphony is trying to teach me something – about the psychohistory of our own time in America, about our war. In a sense, this music is a methodological starting point on the road from empathy to understanding. I am reminded of what the British poet-soldier Wilfred Owen wrote during the First World War, a war that would soon consume him in it: "My subject is War, and the pity of War. The poetry is in the pity.... All a poet can do today is warn. That is why true Poets must be truthful" (Preface, *The Collected Poems of Wilfred Owen*. [NY: New Directions, 1963]). It is the stark

truthfulness of Shostakovich's Eighth Symphony that has seized me.

What others have done and are doing to harm us is paralleled by what we have long been doing to ourselves. But we are silent about it. Years before President George W. Bush proclaimed "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists," following September 11th 2001, corporate leaders across America had been demanding the same uncritical loyalty and sacrifice from their employees and managers. It is a loyalty they did not return. In the war room atmosphere of countless corporate meetings, to think and speak critically was to be despised and expelled. Years before foreign terrorists attacked the United States in jumbo jets, we were already terrorizing ourselves.

Endless waves of corporate mergers and hostile takeovers, downsizings, RIFings, reengineering, restructurings, outsourcings, deskilling, and the proliferation of managed health care created tens of millions of disposable and disposed-of Americans in blue and white collar jobs. These issues have long concerned me as someone who has personally as well as professionally struggled with downsizing and who has helped other individuals and institutions to face and address the psychic wounds that occurred and that persist even after new employment is found. I feel these issues of brutality and disposability in my very being, which makes the music of Shostakovich resonate with my own experience. Over the past decade, these issues have inspired much of my psychohistorical and psycho-anthropological work (*Euphemism, Spin, and the Crisis in Organizational Life* [Westport, CT: Quorum, 1998]).

For two decades we have witnessed economic purges in the workplace and the abandonment of employees to the streets. What happened to them did not matter so long as they were out, gone, and the workplace is purified by their absence. We are now our own teeming refuse. Stockholder value has become not only the highest social good, but the only good. The associated virtues of increased productivity, profitability, and the implacable "bottom line" have followed not far behind. We do not disappear those whom we rid ourselves to Siberia or to Gulags. But they are no less invisible in our midst. We commit our internal terror in the name of democracy, freedom

and unbridled economic competition. Called "television without pity," Donald Trump's popular reality television show, "The Apprentice," urges our corporate gladiators on to ever greater conquests, while the audience cheers them on. Gone is civility; there is only victory or defeat. Who dares to disagree?

Stalin and his propagandists directed everyone's attention to the "Great Patriotic War" against Nazi fascism, as they called World War II, in part to deflect public attention from the millions he and his regime were killing at home in the name of revolutionary socialism. It often appears to me that our national leaders are doing much the same in the War Against Terrorism. We are waging a war on two fronts, against a foreign enemy and against ourselves. That is the terrible truth Shostakovich's Eighth Symphony is trying to tell me and refusing to relinquish its hold.

Business as usual. War as usual. Sacrifice as usual. On many fronts, we are systematically getting rid of fellow human beings. Perhaps truthfulness in the face of propaganda's obligatory cliché is the beginning of an awakening from our cultural trance. It is our own creeping totalitarianism from which we have most to fear (David Lotto. "Fascism Resurgent," *The Journal of Psychohistory* [30 No. 3 Winter, 2003], pp.296-305). In large measure, we have made desolate our own cultural landscape. We, like Shostakovich, are left with the tasking of bearing witness to the horror — ours as well as theirs.

The psychohistorical task, it seems to me, is three-fold. As psychohistorians, the emotional capacity to *contain* our own culture's atrocities is a starting point. *Bearing witness*—seeing beneath the official veil of secrecy and denial, and finding words for what we observe—is perhaps the next step. Finally comes emotionally grounded psychohistorical *explanation*. But there is no shortcut to it. That is what Shostakovich's Eighth Symphony is trying to tell me as a psychohistorian about life in contemporary United States.

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most recent book is *Beneath the Crust of Culture* (2004). He can be reached at <howard-stein@ouhsc.edu>. □

The Sin Against the Blood

(Continued from front page)

During the late nineteenth century, animal breeders reported an imagined phenomenon called telegony. If a superior mare, for example, was bred just once to an inferior stallion, she was biologically rendered permanently incapable of bearing superior foals. Anecdotal reports of telegony came to the attention of Charles Darwin and other scientists, who published them without verification.

Artur Dinter (1876-1948) was a scientist, fanatical theologian, novelist, playwright, and drama critic—probably a genius. There is no full biography of him; the following is based on a dozen articles and brief mentions in books, of which the most detailed is “Race and Spirituality: Arthur Dinter's Theosophical Antisemitism” by George Kren and Rodler Morris (*Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 1991, Vol. 6 #4). In 1917, Dinter suffered a mental breakdown, prompted by a war injury, disease, and his belief that his wife had taken a Jewish lover, and had a child by him while he served at the front. Dinter regained a measure of sanity by hastily writing *The Sin Against the Blood*, an autobiographical novel in which his suspicions of his wife's infidelity were a crucial element. After release from the hospital, he sued his wife for divorce, citing the alleged affair. The court found his accusations to be unwarranted and found for her, awarding her a divorce on the grounds of *his* marital infidelities.

His thesis, for which he claimed authority by virtue of his expertise in zoology and botany, was that an Aryan woman, once impregnated by a Jew, was rendered permanently incapable of bearing Aryan children. Dinter alleges that Jews were aware of this and therefore systematically tried to seduce and rape as many Aryan women and girls as they could and to impregnate them. By ruining them as breeders, Jews were wiping out the Aryan race. The “sin” was pollution of Aryan blood by mixed mating. To convince readers, Dinter devoted a fifth of his novel to scholarly notes.

During Germany's fearful chaos after World War I, *The Sin Against the Blood* was an enormous bestseller with its erroneous thesis treated as scientific fact, especially by the Nazis. A few years after its publication, its author joined the newly founded Nazi Party. Hitler was impressed with Artur Dinter, making him the political leader of the large, important district of Thuringia. Hitler also made Dinter's ideas a central thesis of *Mein Kampf*, as in, “*The sin against the blood and the race is the hereditary sin of this world and the end of any race that yields to it*” (Emphasis in original).

Seemingly, Dinter found his niche in the Nazi Party, but he was a provocative, litigious person whose zeal had gotten him into trouble before. As a Nazi leader, his religious statements offended not only Jews but also Catholics and Protestants, costing the Party votes. His disregard of Hitler's orders to drop religion from his official speeches and pamphlets resulted in removal from his position. When he challenged Hitler over his removal, Hitler expelled him from the Party in 1928. From then until his death, except for publishing his own translation of the *New Testament*, Dinter withdrew from public life. Perhaps because Lamarckian theories of evolution became more popular at this time, his thesis that women were changed biologically by experience and they passed the change on through their children, grew in influence.

Julius Streicher, publisher of the Nazi newspaper *Der Stürmer*, was quite impressed with it. Week-after-week, Streicher featured “news” stories in support of Dinter's warning. They consisted of unverified anecdotes sent in by readers and of items fabricated by staff writers, sometimes illustrated by retouched photos of deformed monsters produced by mixed matings. Streicher extended Dinter's thesis in a *Stürmer* article, stating that “for those in the know, these are established facts... the seed of a man of another race is a ‘foreign protein.’ During copulation the seed is, in part or in whole, absorbed by the woman's fertile body and thus passes into the blood.” Furthermore, “a single act of intercourse between a Jew and an Aryan woman is sufficient to pollute her forever. She can never again give birth to pure-blooded Aryan children.” Streicher added, “Now we know why the Jew uses every artifice of seduc-

tion in order to ravish German girls at as early an age as possible, why the Jewish doctor rapes his female patients while they are under anesthesia" (Quoted from *Der Stürmer* [1935] in Randall Bytwerk, *Julius Streicher* [NY: Stein and Day, 1983], p.148).

At the end of *The Sin Against the Blood*, Dinter had proposed government regulation of marital choices and sexual acts, and suggested that Jews who had affairs with Aryan women be killed. On becoming German chancellor in 1933, Hitler began to implement Dinter's proposals. He immediately used his influence to have officials deny marriage licenses to Jewish-Aryan couples. He appointed geneticists to recommend policies as to who should be encouraged or allowed to have children, who should be discouraged, and who should be prevented. In addition, he had judges study legal controls to be enacted.

In 1935, Hitler was ready and announced The Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor (better-known as the Nuremberg Laws), which prohibited marriage between Jews and Aryans. It also stripped Jews of citizenship, thereby making them legally helpless against measures to come. The Nuremberg Laws were followed by a wave of regulations against marriage and intercourse between Jews and Aryans. Jewish men were prosecuted—and even executed—for only looking at Aryan women or girls.

Then Hitler went beyond prohibition and punishment to physical prevention. A largely secret program of involuntary sterilization, outwardly intended to control hereditary disease, was directed against Jews. Public discovery and protest of sterilization led to a fully secret project in which physicians experimented with methods of sterilizing people without their awareness. While Germany's half million Jews had no legal recourse against sterilization, the intended targets of surreptitious sterilization were those who were part-Jews—an estimated three million citizens who still had legal protection.

The project failed because sterility-inducing X-rays left external lesions, risking exposure of surreptitious sterilization. Other methods such as an undetectable chemical (caladium seguinum) that caused sterility, derived from a South

American plant, was unobtainable in sufficient quantity after the start of World War II. Also, efforts to synthesize caladium seguinum failed. In the end, failure of legal control of sex and marriage and of sterilization influenced Hitler's decision to kill all Jews as the only way to prevent pollution of Aryan blood and consequent destruction of the Aryan race.

George Victor, PhD, was educated at Columbia, Harvard, and NY universities. He is a retired psychologist and *Psychohistory Forum Research Associate* who lives in West Orange, New Jersey. Among his publications are *Invisible Men: Faces of Alienation* and *The Riddle of Autism*. This article is based upon his book *Hitler: the Pathology of Evil* (1998) and on his research for a book in progress on religious fundamentalism and genocide. Dr. Victor may be contacted at <Geovictor@aol.com>. □

Thomas A. Kohut: Historian

(Continued from front page)

a faculty member. In addition, he was Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Cincinnati from 1982-84. In 1984, Kohut began his career teaching European history at Williams College in Williamstown, Massachusetts where, in 1995, he assumed the position of Sue and Edgar Wachenheim III Professor of History. In 2000 he became Dean of Faculty and in 2003 served for one semester as Acting Provost.

Thomas Kohut's revised dissertation was published as *Wilhelm II and the Germans: A Study in Leadership* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Among his various publications are "The Creation of Wilhelm Busch as a German Cultural Hero, 1902-1908," in Mark Micale and Robert Dietle, eds., *Enlightenment, Passion, Modernity: Historical Essays in European Thought and Culture*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp.286-304; "Psychoanalysis as Psychohistory or Why Psychotherapists Cannot Afford to Ignore Culture," in Jerome A. Winer and James William Anderson, eds., *The Annual of Psychoanalysis, Psychoanalysis and History*, 31 (Haworth, NJ: Analytic Press, 2003), pp.225-36; "History, Loss, and the Generation of 1914: The Case of the *Freideutsche Kreis*," in Jürgen Reulecke, ed., *Genera-*

tionalität und Lebensgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert: Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien 58 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003), pp.253-77; "The Impact of Psychoanalytic Training on My Work as a Historian," *Clio's Psyche* 4 (September, 1997), pp.44-46; With Jürgen Reulecke, "'Sterben wie eine Ratte, die der Bauer ertappt.' Letzte Briefe aus Stalingrad," in Jürgen Förster, ed., *Stalingrad: Ereignis, Wirkung, Symbol* (Munich and Zurich: Piper Verlag, 1992), pp.456-71; "Empathizing with Nazis: Reflections on Robert Jay Lifton's *The Nazi Doctors*," *The Psychohistory Review* 16 (1987), pp.33-50; "Psychohistory as History," *The American Historical Review* 91 (1986), pp.336-354; "Mirror Image of the Nation: An Investigation of Kaiser Wilhelm II's Leadership of the Germans," in Charles B. Strozier and Daniel Offer, eds., *The Leader: Psychohistorical Essays* (New York: Plenum Press, 1985), pp.179-229; and "Kaiser Wilhelm II and his Parents: An Inquiry into the Psychological Roots of German Policy Toward England before the First World War," in John Röhl and Nicolaus Sombart, eds., *Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp.63-89.

Dean Kohut has been awarded various grants and honors, including a Fulbright Fellowship Award and guest professorships at the universities of Munich and Siegen. He is a member of the board of trustees of the Austen Riggs Center in Stockbridge, Massachusetts. During the months of April and May, he was interviewed electronically by Paul H. Elovitz (PHE) and Geoffrey Cocks (GC) for *Clio's Psyche*. Kohut may be reached by e-mail at <Thomas.A.Kohut@williams.edu>.

CP: (Clio's Psyche): What brought you to psychohistory?

TAK: (Thomas A. Kohut): In a sense, you could say it was preordained. My middle name, "August," refers, in part, to my father's favorite history teacher in his gymnasium, August Hornung, and to his analyst, August Aichhorn. Although, like lots of first-year college students, I imagined I was going to medical school, already as a freshman at Oberlin, I was interested in psychohistory. I'm pretty sure that I wrote a paper about it for the course in introductory psychology I took that first year. Certainly, by the time I became a

history major with thoughts about graduate school I was pretty much determined to become a "psychohistorian."

CP: Did growing up in the psychoanalytic milieu created by your prominent psychoanalyst father (Heinz Kohut 1913-1981), and your mother, a psychoanalytically trained social worker (Betty Meyer Kohut 1912-1992), influence you and your work?

TAK: Absolutely. Virtually all my parents' friends when I was a child were analysts and most of them were German or Austrian refugees from Europe. I remember being fascinated by them and by the conversations I overheard when I was little. I knew so many of the famous, second-generation analysts. I still recall being swung in the air by Ernest Jones and meeting Marie Bonaparte in Paris when I was six or seven. I was extremely close to Marianne Kris and to Anna Freud, who were like grandmothers to me. I think the first adult book I ever tried to read was something by Freud (I probably got through a page). So, yes, that early milieu was decisively important and created what now seems like a magical childhood, associated with central Europe, with deeply cultured, intellectual people, with what I now realize was also Jewish culture, and with, of course, psychoanalysis.

CP: When did you first become interested in history?

TAK: I have been interested in history for as long as I can remember. I still have my first history book somewhere, an illustrated history of the Second World War. In fact, my original historical interest focused on World War II and then World War I, but I also remember reading books in high school (on my own) about the Russian Revolution. The decisive moment in my historical interest came in high school when my European history teacher, who like my other history teachers, seemed to think that history was memorizing facts, invited a friend of hers, who was a graduate student at the University of Chicago, to teach a section on the Russian Revolution. It absolutely blew me away and was the absolute highlight of high school for me! I have no idea who he was, but I owe him a lot. Then in college, once I dropped the idea of medical school, I realized that what I was really interested in were people. I didn't encounter

people in psychology, but I did in my English and history classes. I debated about which field to major in, but chose history when I realized that there I could treat the historical figures I encountered as if they were real, whereas in English I couldn't; they were texts.

CP: Was German history always your chief area of historical interest?

TAK: It was between German and Russian history. But when I tried to learn Russian as a senior in college, I realized that given my knowledge of German (which I could read and speak reasonably well following years of grade school and high school German), German history was what I ought to study. Despite my father's background, I never had much interest in Austrian history.

CP: Did Otto Pflanze, your mentor at the University of Minnesota, encourage your interest in the psychoanalytic study of history and then your going into psychoanalytic training?

TAK: I actually chose to work with Pflanze based upon his article in the *American Historical Review* (*AHR*), "Toward a Psychoanalytic Understanding of Bismarck." Also, he wrote like a dream: lucid, intelligent, balanced. Although he actively discouraged me from writing psychohistory, fearing that I would never get a job, I ignored him and wrote a dissertation that became the basis on my psychoanalytically informed study of Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany.

CP: Were there other historians in Minnesota who shared Pflanze's interest in psychohistory?

TAK: No, but because I think they came to respect me, a number of faculty members there allowed me to do work that had a psychoanalytic dimension. I'd put Jim Tracy in this category, a professor for whom I have the utmost respect. I wrote a paper (as a comprehensive exam) for him on European witchcraft. I did do a "supporting field" in psychoanalysis for my PhD, working first with Nathaniel London, a psychoanalyst in Minneapolis, and then with Paul Meehl, of the Psychology Department at the university.

CP: What led you to do your dissertation on Wilhelm II, the last Kaiser of Germany?

TAK: Pflanze did. Originally he wanted me to transform my Master's thesis on the Prussian Land

Tax Reform of 1861 into a dissertation. Then he tried to persuade me to study the development of secret services in Germany in response to assassination attempts against various prominent leaders, including Kaiser Wilhelm I. Finally, when he realized I was bound and determined to write something psychohistorical, he suggested a study of Wilhelm II, which fit nicely with his own work on Bismarck and connected with a workshop Nathaniel London and I attended in Chicago at the Psychoanalytic Institute on the subject of kingship. London and I presented a paper on the Kaiser and England to the workshop, which included a number of analysts: George Moraitis and Ernie Wolf, and a number of historians from the University of California, including Carl Pletsch and Richard Wortman.

CP: Doing a dissertation, especially when not in residence at the university where you studied, can be such a lonely and daunting task that many fail to complete it. Were you helped or hindered by being in psychoanalytic training in Cincinnati at the time you wrote it?

TAK: I was helped immeasurably. It gave my week structure and stimulation. Also I was in analysis during that period, and, although I don't remember talking much about the dissertation in my sessions, it too helped to give me structure and focus. It was really important to leave Minneapolis, I think. My friends in graduate school, with one or two notable exceptions, all gave up after doing their dissertation research, thinking that getting a job was simply going to be impossible. They've all done well and have had good lives, as far as I can tell, but I think it would have been tough for me to finish in that atmosphere of demoralization.

CP: How well received was your dissertation, which was subsequently published as *Wilhelm II and the Germans: A Study of Leadership* (1991)?

TAK: I suspect many authors have this reaction, but I was pretty disappointed in the response. Most of the reviews of the book were positive, quite positive I'd say. But virtually none of the reviewers seemed to really understand what I was up to. In fact, some of the most positive reviewers seem to have not read the book all that carefully. I can recall only two responses to the book that

seemed to grasp exactly what I was trying to accomplish. One was a review by Geoff Cocks, and the other was a letter I received from a former student. But, as I said, I suspect that my disappointment is a pretty common reaction. We're all probably pretty grandiose in our expectations, and, in the end, nothing can adequately respond to all the time and energy and thought and suffering that goes into writing a book. All responses are ultimately inadequate.

CP: How has your work been influenced by your psychoanalytic training?

TAK: I think my psychoanalytic training and experience as a psychotherapist has profoundly influenced my teaching, my administrative work, and, of course, my scholarship. I'm probably more attuned to the experiences of my students in class. Certainly my training and therapeutic experience has been a great help to me as dean, which involves centrally dealing with people. As far as my scholarship is concerned, it's hard to know where to begin. If I can point to one thing, it would be the way I handle theory in my work. I discussed this at length in an article called "Psychohistory as History" that was published in 1991 in the *AHR*. When I was in the Institute, listening to clinical case conferences, it was always striking how the presenter, when he or she knew what was going on with the patient, would use ordinary language and would interpret the patient's concerns in terms of the patient's experience. Every time that the presenter would start speaking in theoretical terms, it was clear that he or she didn't know what was going on and was hoping to discover in theory what he or she wasn't understanding in the patient. Just as in therapy, theory is almost never a part of the therapist's interpretations, so in my historical writing, I try to keep theory relegated to the footnotes. You have to make sense of the past, including its psychological dimension, in its own terms.

CP: Of which of your works are you most proud?

TAK: I'm proud of *Wilhelm II and the Germans*. I'm proud of my article, "The Creation of Wilhelm Busch as a German Cultural Hero, 1902-1908," which was published in a Festschrift in honor of Peter Gay. I think I'm proud of the book I've just about finished.

CP: What are you working on now? What is its

importance and when do you expect to have it published?

TAK: I'm on the homestretch in finishing a book on twentieth-century Germany as experienced by 62 Germans who were all born around the outbreak of the First World War. It's based upon oral histories and relates the stories of these people's lives, attending specifically to the impact of history on their psychology. In a sense I've turned things around from where I started. When I began working on the Kaiser, I was a traditional psychohistorian who studied the impact of his psychology on history—his support for the construction of a mighty German navy and his policies toward England. Although I already began to shift away from this position in the Kaiser book by studying the impact of Germans on the Kaiser as well as his impact on them, the current project is a study of the impact of history on the psychology of these 62 Germans. The book needs a little editing and an introduction, but otherwise it's done. Given the way it is written, I suspect it will be quite controversial, as you'll see when it comes out, hopefully in the next two years.

CP: What training should a person entering psychohistory today pursue?

TAK: It seems to be that "psychohistory" isn't the historical subfield that it once was. On the one hand, this represents a real loss and is probably coupled with the move away from psychoanalytically-oriented treatment models in psychiatry. On the other hand, psychohistory has become so well integrated into historical writing that in some ways one can argue that most historians have become to some degree psychohistorians. Most historical biographies take the psychology of their subjects into account. Historians influenced by literary theory often make extensive use of psychoanalytic theory. Finally, those who study the experiences of the people of the past also cannot escape attending to the psychological. I would place myself within this latter category, both in my scholarship and in how I teach history. Virtually every course I teach is psychohistorical. Given all that, I'm not sure that historians need "training" necessarily. More important is that they be sensitive to the psychological experiences of those whom they study.

CP: When you were in graduate school there were so few jobs for historians that you considered mak-

ing a living as a psychoanalyst. In terms of career development, was your combination of psychoanalysis with history a plus or a minus for you?

TAK: A definite plus. I don't regret that combination for a minute. But frankly, it was the only kind of historian I could ever have been. My one regret is that I feel often very isolated in the historical profession.

CP: Has your theoretical orientation in psychoanalysis evolved over time? To what extent do you find postmodern applications of psychoanalytic theory (e.g., Lacan, Chodorow, etc.) helpful? Has your application of your father's self-psychology also evolved in your practice as a psychohistorian?

TAK: No. Again, I think therapists need to listen less to some theoretician and more to their patients and historians, or at least this historian, needs to listen most to the people of the past. My current book is completely psychoanalytic and I don't make use of any particular theoretical framework that I'm aware of.

CP: As a historian, I (PHE) have been working to develop a psychohistory based upon adaptability, childhood, creativity, empathy, innovation, personality, and overcoming trauma, which uses little psychoanalytic terminology. Any thoughts on this endeavor?

TAK: Based on my previous answer, I think you're on exactly the right track.

CP: What has been your experience teaching psychohistory at Williams? Do you incorporate psychohistorical methods into all of your history courses or do you teach psychohistory only in the context of a course or courses devoted specifically to the field?

TAK: Again, I think I've answered this question already. I think virtually all my classes are psychohistorical, at least those that investigate how and why people experienced their world in the ways that they did.

CP: How do students respond to psychohistorical and psychoanalytic methods and material, and is it harder to teach psychohistory than traditional history?

TAK: I suspect that none of them notice the psychohistorical approach.

CP: Have you done any interdisciplinary psychohistorical teaching or research with colleagues at Williams?

TAK: I once taught a course with a colleague from the English department on Weimar Germany and Weimar cinema.

CP: How open is Williams College to psychoanalysis and psychohistory and what are the linkages to the Austin Riggs Center in Stockbridge where you are a trustee?

TAK: I actually think that my colleagues highly respect the fact that I have had psychoanalytic training and admire my historical work, which one could probably describe as psychohistorical. For the last two years, there has been a reading group of Riggs people and Williams people. We've been meeting once a month and it's been a great experience for all concerned.

CP: Does your psychoanalytic training influence your style as an administrator?

TAK: Definitely. I think my greatest skill is my ability to understand people, which is something one needs to do as dean of the faculty. I tend to solve problems (which is a lot of what one does in the job) not by looking at them from the vantage point of the outside observer who objectively tries to find the correct solution. Instead I tend to see problems as the product of different people experiencing the same situation in different ways. I generally try to bring those experiences together. I'd say empathy plays a big role in my administrative style, both in how I analyze situations and in how I attempt to deal with them.

CP: Have your administrative experiences as Dean of Faculty and Acting Provost changed the way you have seen leadership in Germany?

TAK: I can't say that I've thought a lot about leadership recently.

CP: Is there much psychohistory discussed and psychohistorical work done at the Riggs Center?

TAK: I think much of the work sponsored by the Erikson Institute at Riggs can be described as psychohistorical.

CP: On your resume, you are listed as a faculty member of the Cincinnati Psychoanalytic Institute from 1984 to the present. Do you have any incli-

nation or plans to resume your practice?

TAK: No, I think that belongs to my past.

CP: How do you see psychohistory developing in the next decade?

TAK: My recent historical work has focused on generations, and partially as a result I currently tend to see things in generational terms. Our generation is very psychological in its worldview. That accounts in part for the development of psychohistory both as a separate historical approach and as a way that historians generally tend to write about the past. How subsequent generations will look at the world isn't clear to me. I'm not sure that college kids today love to look at films by Bergmann and Fellini. A great many of them are taking medication instead of going to see psychotherapists. I suspect that the future of psychohistory depends in part on what goes on in psychiatry. Recent developments suggest a return to the talking cure, and Riggs is doing a follow-along study that suggests that a psychodynamic approach is cheaper and more effective with some severely disturbed patients than the more medicalized approach (medication and hospitalization). Also, in the nature/nurture debate, recent studies suggest that our experience of the environment can actually change the biochemistry of the brain. So, perhaps, the future for psychoanalysis and for psychohistory looks brighter than it did even a few years ago.

CP: What are prospects for psychoanalysis and psychohistory in Germany at the present time?

TAK: I think that psychoanalysis is more respected in Germany than in the United States. Historical writing in Germany is still unfortunately strongly influenced by the "social science" of the 1960s. I find it often depopulated. History that is the product of structures, forces, and processes and not of people isn't a history that is particularly congenial to psychohistory.

CP: What are your thoughts about several major losses suffered by psychohistory in recent years? Specifically, the termination of the *Psychohistory Review* in 1999 and more recently the closing of the Center on Violence and Human Survival at John Jay College of CUNY, where Lifton and Strozier so productively got people to think psychohistorically?

TAK: I think it reflects some unfortunate developments (the move away from psychoanalysis generally in this country) and some positive developments (the integration of psychohistory into history more generally).

CP: What do we as psychohistorians need to do to strengthen our work?

TAK: I think we just need to be courageous and write and teach what we believe in.

CP: What is the importance of childhood to psychohistory?

TAK: I think childhood or knowledge of the early life of one's historical subjects has been vastly over-emphasized in psychohistorical investigations. After all, as historians we are able to observe the entire life curve of the people we study, an arc that tells us far more about their personalities, the core of themselves, than do the facts of their early life.

CP: Some Psychohistory Forum researchers have been struggling with the issue of identification with a particular parent and achievement. Also, in your experience and life, are high achievers more identified with their fathers?

TAK: Not necessarily. Wasn't it Freud who said that high achievers are the first-born children of young mothers?

CP: Are historians or psychohistorians more father-identified than other people?

TAK: I probably identify at least as much with my mother as with my father.

CP: Following up on an issue raised by Freud, what is the impact of parental loss on your level of achievement and those of subjects you have studied?

TAK: I see loss, and especially parental loss, as key to the Germans I have been writing my current book about.

CP: It would be helpful to get your age at the time of parental loss.

TAK: My father died when I was 30 years old and mother when I was 42.

CP: Some psychoanalysts and psychohistorians have written about or presented to our Work-In-

Progress Seminars on the impact of having a famous parent. Sue Erikson Bloland was the most recent person to do this. If you would care to comment on this issue, it would be informative.

TAK: I really don't know.

CP: How do you explain the growth and psychology of fundamentalism?

TAK: This issue and those raised in the questions below are obviously enormously complex, multifaceted and multi-determined, so any thoughts I have obviously represent tentative and partial attempts to understand this important phenomenon. I think that many people, for various reasons, feel a loss of certainty in the world, a loss of clear boundaries, a loss of distinctions that helped them to order the world, to help them to think and to act, to know who they were and weren't, that gave them a sense of order and purpose. It may be in part a reaction against the 1960s and all that that decade represents, a loosening of various strictures and mores, against globalization and information overload, against relativistic ways of thinking, produced, in part, by the breakdown of traditional communities in the flood of information about other people and places, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism as a viable ideology. It's striking that abortion in this country is such a hot button issue for people on both sides of the debate as is the question of gay marriage. In both cases, the attempt to preserve boundaries is crucial (when life begins; what the institution of marriage represents). So I would see the rise of fundamentalism in part as an attempt to preserve and/or resurrect boundaries, boundaries that people seem to need to anchor themselves. But that's a fairly facile answer to a very complex question.

CP: What are your thoughts on the psychology and psychodynamics of violence and terrorism in our world?

TAK: I think I've responded to this question in part in my answer to the question about fundamentalism, but let me add a few thoughts. I'd say that one aspect of terrorism is that it expresses the golden rule in psychology; namely, "do unto others as one feels has been done unto the self." Terrorists attempt to engender the same feelings of helplessness, humiliation, injury in those they attack that they themselves believe they have experi-

enced. In addition, I think it's significant that so many terrorist attacks today are so-called "martyrdom operations." One of the psychological features of suicide is that it can represent an attempt to achieve autonomy and agency. It's not simply self-hatred, it's also "turning passive into active," (sorry, I just used a theory so I probably don't know what I'm talking about) for suicides seek to end their experience of being the helpless victims of others and of their own feelings of despair by taking independent action to end their lives. I think that suicide bombers are countering feelings of helplessness and passivity by taking violent action against others and themselves.

CP: How can psychologically oriented scholars have more impact in academia and on society in general?

TAK: By continuing to teach and to write.

CP: What is the impact of psychohistory on your area of expertise?

TAK: I think I've answered that already. But, for obvious reasons, German history is probably the area of history that psychohistorians have focused on the most.

CP: How can we recruit new people to the field?

TAK: Also, by continuing to write and to teach.

CP: What books were important to your development?

TAK: Leopold Haimson's *The Origins of Russian Marxism*, Friedrich Meinecke's *Cosmopolitanism and National State*, Reinhard Koselleck's *Prussia Between Reform and Revolution*, Peter Gay's *Freud, Jews and Other Germans*, and J.R.R. Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings*.

CP: Who was important to your development as a student of psychosocial phenomena? Did Erik Erikson have an impact on you?

TAK: I can't say that Erikson was particularly important to me in this regard. My father was far more influential, for obvious reasons.

CP: Are there any mentors besides Pflanze who come to mind?

TAK: Jim Tracy, whom I've already mentioned, as well as my undergraduate adviser at Oberlin, Robert Neil. I am also deeply, deeply indebted to

Peter Gay and Peter Loewenberg. Without the two of them, I wouldn't be where I am today.

CP: How do you define psychohistory?

TAK: For me, now, it's the study of experience, less what the people of the past did and more what they thought and felt. So I'd subsume psychohistory under intellectual and cultural history—not of elites necessarily, but also especially of ordinary people.

CP: Please list the five people who you think have made the greatest contribution to psychohistory in order of their contribution.

TAK: I can't really do this. Given my definition of psychohistory above, I can only reflect on their impact on me. I'd list Freud, my father, Peter Gay, and Peter Loewenberg (in no particular order). I also thought that Hanns Sach's article, "The Delay of the Machine Age," was pretty neat.

CP: Thanks for sharing your thought and experiences for our Makers of Psychohistory Research Project and Featured Scholar Interview. ◻

De Gaulle as Pétain

(continued from front page)

Premier Pierre Pflimlin made way for General Charles de Gaulle to succeed him in order to avert a coup d'État by the military fearful of a sellout to rebels fighting French rule in Algeria. Then on that June 1-3 the parliament voted a government under de Gaulle full powers to draft a new, authoritarian constitution for popular approval and to rule by fiat meanwhile.¹ Pétain did not, whereas de Gaulle did, deliver on a new constitution for popular approval, but never mind: for now I am considering only how the two republics fell.

Regime change has been the rule in modern France after any major military defeat like the one that brought Pétain to power in 1940. On the other hand, a mandate for regime change as a condition for taking power was unprecedented when de Gaulle demanded one in 1958. In seeking regime change, de Gaulle was manifestly out to make good his failure to overhaul France's political institutions and political cul-

ture to his liking at the Liberation, when he had pushed in vain for a strong, independent executive for the nascent Fourth Republic. At the same time, the mandate he sought in 1958 for regime change and, meanwhile, personal rule threw back, in letter and spirit both, to the one granted to his deadly rival of World War II, Marshal Pétain, on July 10, 1940. On taking power in 1940, Pétain had grandiloquently made—in his own famous words—"the gift of my person to France." In much the same vein, de Gaulle, when bucking for power in 1958, styled himself a loner at his country's disposal "who belongs to no one and to everyone."² Like Pétain before him, de Gaulle aspired to represent eternal France as against any special or passing interests within the body politic. For his return in 1958 he proudly insisted on being excused from appearing in person before the National Assembly as its rules required. To stand aloof in that way accorded with his *mystique*, to be sure, but it accorded as well with Pétain's failure to appear in person before the parliament on July 10, 1940. After much wrangling, de Gaulle settled on reading a brief statement of intent to the Chambre on June 1, 1958, and stalking off before the debate on his investiture. Then, after having been voted in with the emergency powers he demanded, he presided mutely the next day over the debate on his constituent mandate.

The replay by de Gaulle in 1958 of Pétain in 1940 was only the more faithful for one big tactical difference. Pétain in 1940 did not put in for a regime change until after he had succeeded Reynaud for a different purpose: to negotiate an armistice in preference to continuing the losing war outside of metropolitan France. De Gaulle too was given power in 1958 for a purpose other than regime change: to resolve the raging Algerian crisis. He, however, declined to address the Algerian issue directly in his cryptic public pronouncements before his empowerment. Indeed, he proposed no specifics of any kind other than regime change on the contrived ground that France's troubles, Algeria inclusive, were all attributable to the nature of the political regime in place. He evaded the Algerian issue, moreover, in terms exactly applicable to June

1940 when on May 15, 1958, he broke a three-year public silence to blame “the degradation of the State” for “our army’s troubles in combat, our national dislocation, our loss of independence.”³ In effect, with seditious generals in Algeria clamoring for his return and poised to invade the mainland otherwise, he struck a tacit bargain with the Assembly: he would return only in exchange for a constituent mandate like the one granted to Pétain in 1940. Tactics aside, the basic equivalence of 1958 with 1940 remains: just as Pétain had used the 1940 defeat to destroy the Third Republic,⁴ so de Gaulle used the 1958 Algerian crisis to destroy the Fourth Republic.

But de Gaulle did not destroy the Fourth Republic without its help any more than Pétain destroyed the Third Republic without its help. So our focus must now broaden from just those two historic personages to the fall of the Third and of the Fourth Republics compared—to the structural overlap between those two events and ultimately to the psychohistorical meaning of that overlap. When I say “structural overlap” I am thinking far afield: of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structural anthropology with its “permutation groups,” or clusters of key elements of a myth that exists in various forms. Those key elements à la Lévi-Strauss all occur in every version of such a myth. Some occur literally, others topsyturvy as when, say, a sterile old maid in one variant is a pregnant boy in another. Lévi-Strauss tended to identify the key elements of a myth circularly as just those elements that he found repeated in every version of the myth, but *passions*: genius has its privileges.

Seen in this comparative perspective, the key elements of the two nonmythic events of June-July 1940 and May-June 1958, the fall of the Third and the fall of the Fourth Republic, match up for the most part quite closely right on the surface. Each of the two events was a high French political drama played out during an acute national crisis. In each an incumbent chief of government, without being voted down, stepped aside for a successor from outside the regular political ranks. Both times the heads of the two *chambres* resisted until the president of

the republic overrode them. Each of the two outside successors was a military figure with a mythic aureole as France’s savior in a dire hour of need—Pétain as the hero of Verdun, which he had defended tenaciously and victoriously in 1916 against an all-out German offensive, and de Gaulle as “the man of June 18” (1940), when from London he had called on his compatriots to join him in resisting the German occupation despite the armistice announced by Pétain the day before. Each was a staunch traditionalist and a passionate patriot besides. The parties for their part split over the two comeback saviors each in turn. Fittingly, the two were themselves both down on parties and high instead on strong personal rule in direct rapport with the nation. To quote the expert opinion of Robert Paxton: “De Gaulle and his former mentor and adversary resembled each other in many respects, but in none so clearly as when they talked contemptuously of the ‘regime of parties.’”⁵ The parties split over the crisis issue itself as well, which, moreover, was the same at bottom in 1958 as in 1940: whether to negotiate with the enemy. In May 1958 as in June 1940, finally, the government came under severe pressure from its own military, though to exactly the opposite effect in 1958, when the army nixed all negotiations, as against 1940, when Marshal Pétain, Commander-in-Chief Maxime Weygand, and Admiral François Darlan had all demanded negotiations. But again: in permutation groups, diametric opposites meet.

The parliamentarians for their part yielded to Pétain and to de Gaulle respectively only under outside pressure acutely felt, though the sources of that outside pressure differed superficially from 1940 to 1958. Those deputies and senators who met in the Vichy casino in July 1940 to bury the Third Republic were nervously mindful of the German army fifty kilometers off in Moulins, of a fresh French division under Pétain’s confederate Weygand, now minister of national defense, in nearby Clermont-Ferrand, and in Vichy itself of bands of collaborationist thugs behind Jacques Doriot.⁶ “What was at work was fear,” Léon Blum later testified.⁷ At work too then in Vichy was Pierre Laval, who

later concurred: "I saw fear break out."⁸ On the other hand, the outside pressure felt in parliament in June 1958 came from a single source, the French army, but likewise from several directions—from Algeria primarily, though also from Corsica,⁹ from Germany, and from suspected points within France proper, besides enjoying police sympathy in Paris itself. Beginning on May 13, 1958, when a self-styled committee of public safety led by generals and colonials ("*pièdes noirs*") seized power in Algiers and pugnaciously put Paris on notice, political leaders from President René Coty and Premier Pflimlin on down, and not least de Gaulle himself, invoked the imminence of civil war again and again. An ultimatum from Algiers early on May 29 forced de Gaulle's appointment, and when a mute de Gaulle met with the National Assembly that June 1, "Operation Resurrection" (as the Army called its projected *coup*) was all set to go, the capital being already invested by paratroopers in civvies. "I cannot concur in a vote given under pressure of an insurrection and threat of military force," Pierre Mendès France memorably told a mute de Gaulle from the floor of the *Chambre*, adding: "the decision the Assembly is about to take, as everyone here knows, is no free decision."¹⁰

More, in June-July 1940 as later in May-June 1958 the political leadership of France was largely demoralized. In 1940 it was reeling from a present, crushing military defeat. In 1958 it was shot through with a sense of ineluctable decline given the loss of Indochina in 1954, then of Morocco and Tunisia two years later. Deep down it felt rightly that France could not hold Algeria much longer, being ideologically on the wrong side of the war of repression there. True parity for eight million natives with the million European colonists in Algeria was in fact the last thing the French really wanted—and, fortunately for them, the last thing the rebels wanted either, as it could only slow their struggle for independence. (That most Algerians probably would have preferred true parity to independence is sadly beside the point.) Hence little by little, as they kept pledging to keep Algeria French, successive French governments lost faith with all

concerned including themselves. No less demoralizing for the political assemblies confronted with a constitutional challenge in 1940 and again in 1958 was the discredit into which they had by then fallen among the broad public: Pétain and later de Gaulle were hardly crying in the wilderness against (as the phrase then ran) the omnipotent, impotent *chambres*.

For all these outer and inner pressures on them, the parliamentarians committed regime suicide both times only irresolutely, with split votes and divided wills.¹¹ On this key score too the specifics, but not the fundamentals, differed as between the fall of the Third and the fall of the Fourth Republic. And the "permutations" between the two were all transparent, despite even so drastic a surface contrast as the one between the top brass pressing for negotiations with the enemy in the one case and pressing against negotiations with the enemy in the other, or again between the two gigantic successor figures of Pétain and de Gaulle. Pétain's credentials as savior were unique in 1940, as were de Gaulle's in 1958: hence in that crucial regard they were two of a kind however much it hurt some former *maréchalistes* to vote for de Gaulle in 1958 and some *gaullistes* of the first hour to vote against him then.

This issue of remembering 1940 in 1958 requires us to leave the timeless mythic realm of "permutation groups" à la Lévi-Strauss for the historic realm to which my material properly belongs. Unlike myths, which need have emerged in no known sequence, the Third and the Fourth French Republics fell by turns, in 1940 and 1958 respectively. Thus the 1958 fall, in its structural equivalence to the 1940 fall, was a reedition of it, a replay. The actors in that second regime change were reenacting the first regime change beneath the surface—or, to call a spade a spade, unconsciously. There are several possible circumstances in which people reenact, or relive, events unconsciously, but the most usual one is unmistakably the one that obtained on this occasion: when the event being relived was traumatic.

That the fall of France in 1940 was trau-

matic for the French requires, I hope, no elaborate evidencing. Robert Paxton, to cite him alone, begins his authoritative history of Vichy France: "No one who lived through the French debacle of May-June 1940 ever quite got over the shock." And he adds, crossing his t's diagnostically: "For Frenchmen, confident of a special role in the world, the six weeks' defeat by German armies was a shattering trauma."¹² The surface effect of that trauma was a widespread public apathy or lethargy, a sort of collective numbing, that endured at least as long as the Vichy regime itself and that was to help shroud the Vichy experience in selective amnesia afterwards.¹³ Something of that detachment reappeared to impress outside observers during the crisis of May 1958, when, even with the National Assembly surrounded by tanks to protect it from an expected assault on the capital by the French army, the population at large looked on as at a staged spectacle of *son et lumière* or else blithely went off holidaying for the Pentecost weekend.¹⁴

This popular disconnect from the traumatic reliving underway on the governmental and parliamentary levels highlights the peculiarity that, whereas all of France was traumatized in June-July 1940, all of France relived that trauma only by proxy in May-June 1958, through its political representation, which it no longer even felt to be quite representative of it at that. Or rather, the political establishment of the Fourth Republic alone relived the fall of the Third; the rest of France remained outside the charmed, or accursed, circle of power brokerage. The big exception that proved the rule of public exclusion and self-exclusion in 1958 was a massive march in Paris against de Gaulle on May 28 from the Place de la Nation to the Place de la République: it changed precisely nothing. De Gaulle merely postponed his sneak entry into Paris by some hours; for the rest, the scenario ran its prescribed course. A republican militant recollected: "Our illusions lasted a single evening behind the placards and banners. While the crowd was swarming, the dénouement was being prepared behind the scenes: the soldier's grand entry."¹⁵ It cannot be said even loosely that France as a whole got

itself into the same political mess or its equivalent in 1958 as in 1940. Only on the parliamentary level was the pressure from the outside comparable as between July 10, 1940, and the first days of June 1958. The Germans in Moulins, Weygand in Clermont, Doriot in Vichy in 1940, then in 1958 the seditious generals and riotous colonists: all remained at a distinct existential remove from the bulk of the French public.

If, then, the French people collectively did not contrive in 1958 to relive their 1940 trauma of defeat, who did? An obvious suspect is the prime beneficiary of that reliving, *le grand Charles*. He did buck for, and get, the Pétain role in the replay. He did hoist the Algerian crisis into a regime crisis 1940-style as the replay required. The putschists rallied to him because he had defied a capitulationist government in 1940, and the antiputschists yielded to him because he had restored republican legitimacy in 1944. For all that, he did not himself conjure up the political crisis that enabled the replay of July 10, 1940; rather, he hijacked that political crisis and replay for his own public and private purposes. One public purpose was the obvious one of making good his failure of 1944-1946 to forge a new regime in his own image as Pétain had done just previously. At the same time he too, along with his compatriots, had been traumatized by the debacle of May-June 1940, though in his case with a personal twist. Appointed undersecretary of war in Reynaud's cabinet on June 5, he failed in his first assigned task of winning British air support for France. Then his colleagues pooh-poohed him for planning a Breton redoubt. Finally, from London on June 16 he and Churchill together telephoned Reynaud in Bordeaux with a British offer to fuse the French and British nationalities until victory, whereupon he flew to Bordeaux in high hopes, only to learn that the offer had fallen flat and Reynaud had resigned. This last and worst setback resurfaced in thin disguise in June 1958 when, fast upon his empowerment, he flew to Algiers to proclaim a fusion of the French and Algerian nationalities: it too duly fell flat.¹⁶ Meanwhile, from Bordeaux on June 17, 1940, he flew back to London as if in a daze¹⁷ and there that evening learned of

Pétain's bid for an armistice and order to cease combat. His dominant reaction was denial, indeed double denial. He denied the military defeat and denied the legitimacy of Pétain's defeatist regime both at once.¹⁸ His historic identity was built on that double denial of the national trauma of 1940.

With that historic identity went a powerful ambivalence toward Pétain. Its positive side, which enabled de Gaulle to assume the Pétain role in 1958, may have poked out of hiding already in December 1946, when he reportedly told a confidant: "France needed both Marshal Pétain and General de Gaulle in June 1940."¹⁹ Even while playing the Pétain role in 1958 he appeared rather to be enacting the historic personage de Gaulle. Where Pétain had aggrandized himself on taking power ("*Nous, Philippe Pétain...*") in the belief that a "providential mission was reserved for him,"²⁰ de Gaulle, who acquired that same belief in turn, characteristically spoke of his public persona in the third person (de Gaulle this, de Gaulle that), as if to advertise that he was role-playing. On May 19, 1958, in his first public pitch to return to power, he told the press that the French instinctively cried "*Vive de Gaulle!*" whenever they were carried away by anguish or hope: such was his wishful thinking of himself as the national idol that Pétain had in fact been in June-July 1940. Pétain scored highest in his triumphal beginnings in Bordeaux and Vichy. If the parliament on July 10, 1940, invested him with more power than any sovereign of France ever enjoyed,²¹ the populace was far from dissenting. "He was a sort of life raft to which all hands reached out," the leader of the Senate later testified.²² Or as Laval put it: "More than a king, more than an emperor, he symbolized, he incarnated, France."²³ Such a personification of France was de Gaulle's ambition for himself in turn after his paltry start in London on June 18, 1940, and his long, slow struggle for a following in Pétain's France. In 1958, much of the impressive near-80% popular vote for his new constitution on September 28 was a climactic endorsement of his comeback itself, yet it still fell far short by all estimates of the untabulated Pétainolatry of June-July 1940. As a postscript

to his imitation of Pétain, after having been returned to power in 1958 by the putschists because of his legendary refusal of a negotiated surrender to the German enemy in 1940, he wound up negotiating a surrender to the Algerian enemy after all in 1961.

Not just de Gaulle's historic identity dating from June 18, 1940, but his entire earlier career, was dominated by intense ambivalence toward Pétain, his first regimental commander in 1912-1913 and his loyal patron of the 1920s and 1930s.²⁴ That ambivalence exploded fatefully over a history of the French soldier that de Gaulle ghostwrote to order for Pétain in 1925-1927. In ghostwriting for Pétain he was already playing at being Pétain even while impressing his own personality on the commandeered historical work. In 1928, however, Pétain assigned another hand to revise the chapter on the First World War, thereby shattering de Gaulle's fond fancy that the book was his by common consent even if Pétain meant to sign off on it. De Gaulle did not simply boil over; he demanded open acknowledgment of his authorship up front in the published volume, telling Pétain boldly and baldly that "others will perforce discover it later" anyhow.²⁵ Pétain filed the manuscript away. De Gaulle on his side kept a copy and in 1938 contracted to publish it without Pétain's few, pedestrian rewordings. Pétain, consulted tardily and dryly, objected sharply, telling his erstwhile protégé: "Your attitude is very painful to me."²⁶ Shifting his stance, de Gaulle appealed against Pétain's objection in conciliatory, ingratiating accents, stressing his distinctive and ambitious personal investment of ideas and style. Pétain relented, only to take keen offense next when de Gaulle refused to let him check the proofs as agreed, and again especially when de Gaulle rephrased a co-authored dedication acknowledging Pétain's input. In return, de Gaulle cavalierly paid the fulminating marshal no further heed. But even this revenge of 1938 for Pétain's intention of 1928 to steal his literary thunder—his sole, and precious, claim to fame at that juncture after a childhood spent fancying himself a great man and a young manhood spent training to be one—did not placate him down in the deep dark

depths where grudges fester. For in 1958 he reversed what he had experienced in 1928 as Pétain's intended theft of his very person ("A book is a man," he had lamented then²⁷). That is, de Gaulle in 1958 literally took a leaf from Pétain's historic book when he demanded the same constituent powers as Pétain in 1940 in the same terms as Pétain in 1940 while refusing to acknowledge Pétain as his source. Unconsciously he did unto Pétain tit-for-tat what, thirty years before, he had blown up at Pétain for intending to do unto him: to attach his own name to the other's historic handiwork.

High as was de Gaulle's stake in the traumatic reliving of regime change in May-June 1958, that stake was personal before being national. Besides, even his adroit control over that reliving was limited. Yet a traumatic reliving it surely was. Not only did it replicate the key elements of its 1940 prototype; it came with the telltale feel of fatality that was its traumatic birthmark. As early as May 16, 1958, Pétain's defense lawyer from his postwar trial told the Chambre: "Ladies and gentlemen, these may be the last days of the Fourth Republic."²⁸ A student agitator against de Gaulle's return later recollected: "Force was useless; surrender was a foregone conclusion."²⁹ One by one, without consulting their constituencies, the key party and parliamentary leaders, the Premier, and the President of the Republic came around to de Gaulle as if by some dynamic inherent in the crisis. Those who relived in concert in 1958 were, then, I repeat, the government and the parliament, with the country as a whole outside the loop just as it had been in 1940. They it was—the government and the parliament—who brought the regime into disfavor again toward 1958 as in the late 1930s and who let the pressures on it build up until de Gaulle was the sole recourse. And the trauma that they relived was not—here is the crucial point, hard to see clearly on first, second, third glance—that relived trauma was not the military debacle of May-June 1940, but the regime suicide that ensued. Or better, the relived trauma was the regime suicide as a derivative of the military debacle. Those who committed that regime suicide in July 1940 later claimed that

they had been tricked³⁰—a vintage childish form of denial. Indeed, trauma works childishly. Imagine children whose house has collapsed over their heads and who, panicked, run for protection and comfort to a strong- and kindly-looking old soldier who turns out to be vainglorious, inept, and treacherous; they say he tricked them, but they know better at bottom, for they contrive to relive their panicked surrender. Just that childishly the government and parliament of May-June 1958 contrived to relive the panicked surrender by the government and parliament of June-July 1940—with, though, of all things, a happy outcome this time round.

The return of de Gaulle was, then, a disguised return of Pétain, a traumatic replay of June-July 1940 by the political establishment of May-June 1958. This traumatic replay presents several psychohistorical novelties as far as my own and, I think, others' researches have gone. For one, the Bordeaux-Vichy governmental and parliamentary trauma of June-July 1940 was a spinoff of the national trauma of defeat, which, however, did not enter into the replay in its own right. What the politicians later reenacted was not the fall of France, but their specific traumatic sideshow, the fall of the Third Republic, just as through the fall of the Fourth Republic de Gaulle too later restaged in reverse his own specific sideshow, Pétain's intended theft of his identity in 1928. As for the nationwide shock of the German onslaught in 1940, it was nowhere discernible in 1958—not even in the negative on a small scale through the country's failure to panic at the armed threat from Algiers.

Another, equally intriguing novelty of the replay with de Gaulle in 1958 cast as Pétain in 1940 is that the corporate body that did the replaying, the parliament with its dependent government, had undergone a nearly complete turnover in membership in the 18-year interim. This singularity throws into sharp relief the theoretical question of how a group trauma gets transmitted down the years or, in some cases, down the decades or centuries. Earlier studies of traumatic reliving *en groupe* have all dealt with whole nations or whole continents composed by

and large of the same people, or their descendants, from trauma to reliving to eventual reliving, so that some form of genetic transmission of the traumatic impact could be tacitly supposed. I stress "tacitly," as for my part I have always expressly distinguished the known fact of transmission from the unknown means of transmission, my preferred analogy being with the fact of gravitation, undisputed since Newton, as against its mode of transmission, first defined by quantum field theory over three centuries later. Nonetheless, for all my dismissal on principle over the years of the issue of transmission, I did secretly suspect some genetic mechanism or other at work. Now that misconceived suspicion is refuted.

I have saved for the last the most entertaining psychohistorical oddity about this historic incident of group traumatic reliving. In no other such case could I discover any individual awareness within the group of the reliving underway, however obsessively the trauma being relived may itself have been recalled in the process. On this score, let me quote some earlier words of my own that I shall promptly eat. In a lecture of 1990 I presented Romanticism as a European reliving of the Europe-wide trauma of the revolutionary dream of 1789 turning into the revolutionary nightmare of 1793-1794, whereupon in the course of my conclusion I remarked that "it was not contradictory for the Romantics to relive the failed Revolution unconsciously with that Revolution in mind: in traumatic reliving it is the fact of reliving, and not the thing relived, that is unconscious."³¹ So in researching how the Fourth Republic fell to de Gaulle in 1958 as the Third Republic had fallen to Pétain in 1940 I was hardly surprised to find continual allusions to 1940 in the 1958 run-up to de Gaulle's investiture. At a secret meeting called by President René Coty with de Gaulle and the leaders of the two houses of parliament on May 28, 1958, André Le Troquer of the Chambre drove de Gaulle to tears by citing the Vichy precedent behind de Gaulle's terms for returning. In the parliamentary debates meanwhile, deputies kept noting the incongruity that Pétain's first great adversary of 1940 was being backed by so

many former Pétainists in 1958. It struck the Socialist leader Guy Mollet that de Gaulle evidently imagined in 1958 that he was back in 1940 again opposing an illegitimate government.³² Communist hecklers were quick to call the 1958 de Gaulle a fascist like the 1940 Pétain. But in such allusions Vichy was ever a polemical referent, never an acknowledged presence—never, that is, until an eleventh-hour intervention in the constitutional debate by the rightist lawyer and deputy Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt. Tixier had voted for Pétain at Vichy, then served the Pétain regime. He was to run against de Gaulle for president in 1965, scoring 5.27% of the first ballot, only to throw his support behind his friend and erstwhile political confederate François Mitterrand in the runoff. On the issue of de Gaulle's Pétain-like bid for constituent powers on June 2, 1958, Tixier spoke directly to the new head of government, who, sitting wrapped in proud silence, vouchsafed him only a single (I quote the *Journal officiel*) "sign of denegation."³³ I shall quote Tixier's intervention at great length (though omitting most of the numerous interjections) because it shattered my prior understanding of group traumatic reliving as unconscious to all concerned. Not only was Tixier aware of the reliving underway; he was even privy to the permutation principle involved, as will be seen.

"*Monsieur le président du conseil,*" Tixier began,

... this evening's session reminds me of another one. I have before my eyes the draft by which you ask our Assembly to delegate its constituent power to the government you head on the understanding that the constitution to be drawn up by that government will be ratified by the nation through a referendum. In addition, an advisory committee chosen from parliament will be consulted. Such is the text before us.

Monsieur le président du conseil, yesterday I voted for your investiture. This morning I voted for the full powers you sought. But this evening ... it will be impossible for me to vote to delegate the fraction of constituent power conferred on me by universal suffrage. Here is why. Some years ago you assembled a commission of jurists, among them, if memory serves, Monsieur Edgar Faure, whom I am pleased to see here at his bench. ... Now, this committee advised all of us deputies and senators of the Third Republic who on July 10, 1940, had voted for a motion stipulating that the Gov-

ernment would draw up a constitution to be ratified by the nation and applied by the chambres it would create, that we had no right to delegate this constituent power and that we had therefore--580 deputies and senators--committed a grave fault that warranted our being penalized with ineligibility. ... I understand, *monsieur le président du conseil*, that in the present grave circumstances you should have felt the need to launch this appeal to the Chambre and tomorrow the Senate. I can see that. But you will excuse me if I would never have believed that twice in my existence I would be asked to delegate the fraction of constituent power that I held and, to top it off, if I never could have imagined that the second time I would be asked to do so by the very person who punished me for having granted this delegation a first time.

Edgar Faure. Monsieur Tixier-Vignancourt, may I interrupt you?

Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt. Gladly.

Edgar Faure. ... I own that the question of delegating constituent power is a delicate one. But, Monsieur Tixier-Vignancourt, as in searching our memories we doubtless followed the same path at least up to a point, it happens that I have with me this evening a review published in Algiers at the time, when I had the honor, *monsieur le président du conseil*, of directing the legislative services of the committee of national liberation.

Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt. I knew you had brought this review.

Edgar Faure. According to this text, our main criticism of the delegation of constituent power in Vichy was that it provided for the constitution to be ratified by the assemblies that it would itself create and that would apply it.

Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt. Wrong!

Edgar Faure. So I must say ... that was something quite different from the referendum being proposed now. Since you alluded to my opinion, allow me to quote from this text: 'As for the provision for ratification by assemblies, it can only be seen as a mockery in that these assemblies are to be chosen arbitrarily at some unspecified date.' I felt the need to point out this essential difference. The constituent power belongs to the Assembly only by delegation from the people; hence [our] referendum provision, to consider that alone, returns the constituent power to its source.

Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt. Very interesting.

First I thank Monsieur Edgar Faure for his intervention. Then I congratulate our colleagues who confidently applauded him, for in the commentary he did in Algiers on the text adopted on July 10, 1940, Monsieur Edgar Faure made a fundamental mistake. He based his juridical exercise on the Government's draft, which was later revised at the prompting of a group of veterans from the Senate and some deputies... . They raised exactly the same objection to that text. For the constitution to be ratified by assemblies that it created was a mockery, they said. That is why ratification by the nation--that is,

by referendum--was introduced before the National Assembly met. That is also why, *Monsieur le président Edgar Faure*, your commentary in Algiers was worthless, as it was based only on a draft and not on the text that had been adopted.

Paul Ramadier. May I interrupt you?

Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt. Please do, especially as we too have some memories in common.

Paul Ramadier. Monsieur Tixier-Vignancourt, it remains that the constitutional texts were to be applied before any ratification....

Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt. No!

Paul Ramadier. ...without having been submitted in any which way to any instance derived from universal suffrage.

Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt. Wrong!

Paul Ramadier. That is where violence was done to national sovereignty, to the sovereignty of universal suffrage.

Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt. No! I thank Monsieur Ramadier for his intervention anyhow.

President [of the Assembly]. Let's not reconvene the commission of jurists that sat in Algiers!

Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt. *Monsieur le président*, you will allow us, I am sure, in a debate sufficiently important to each of us because of the vote to be cast, to examine in full the only existing precedent of the sort in the annals of the deliberative assemblies of the Republic. President Ramadier, I beg leave to remind you that the text adopted expressly provided for no application of the constitution before its ratification by the nation, since it was worded as follows: 'It will be ratified by the nation and applied by the assemblies it will have created.' ... And that is why, my dear colleagues, as I told you at the outset, I cannot, in the same conditions as eighteen years ago--I'm sorry, but this debate has proven that the conditions are exactly the same...

Maurice Schumann. The same?

Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt. Yes, Monsieur Maurice Schumann, the conditions are the same, except perhaps, to your mind, that the vote of July 10, 1940, followed a military defeat. This evening's vote follows--otherwise it wouldn't be taking place, you surely agree--multiple, successive political defeats that wind up being equivalent, alas! to the greatest of all setbacks.

After a final refusal to replay along, Tixier took a parting shot at his audience: "Protest all you like! It's true and you know it."³⁴

None of Tixier-Vignancourt's indignant contradictors, let alone their loud supporters, remembered the incriminated Vichy text straight even after it was recalled to them straight: they were in total denial.³⁵ The 1958 text, as Tixier rightly contended, was congruent with its 1940 original, which de Gaulle had opposed for all he

was worth. The reenactment in progress was accordingly a political about-face, or reversal, on de Gaulle's part. And Tixier topped off his *explication de vote* in terms of what I have called (adapting Lévi-Strauss's usage) "permutation"—the principle of surface substitutes for key elements of a trauma being relived. As Tixier had it, the circumstances in 1958 were, *mutatis mutandis*, the same as in 1940, with "multiple, successive political defeats" as of 1958 standing in for the military defeat of 1940. By those "multiple, successive political defeats" Tixier presumably meant the loss of Indochina, Morocco, and Tunisia, possibly the Suez War too, and prospectively Algeria. In none of these cases, not even in Indochina, had French arms failed as previously in 1940, but, as seen from Tixier's right-wing vantage point, French politics and diplomacy were losing what French arms were not. I would sooner stress other equivalences between 1940 and 1958, beginning with immediate outside pressure on the Assembly in both cases—the pressure that Mendès France so eloquently denounced in his own *explication de vote* against de Gaulle. But then, Tixier had a right-wing agenda far removed from my scholarly concern.

René Rémond concludes his fine political monograph *Le retour de de Gaulle* by stressing the contingent nature of de Gaulle's sudden triumphal reemergence from political obsolescence—the concurrence of several flukes, chief among them President René Coty's unexampled threat to resign unless his appointment of de Gaulle were confirmed.³⁶ By contrast, psychohistorical analysis tends to suggest a forced run of events along a preset trajectory: the Third French Republic having self-destructed traumatically in 1940 at the top of a traumatic national catastrophe, its later close copy, the Fourth French Republic, looks, with psychohistorical hindsight, fated to self-destruct in turn under equivalent conditions of its own devising. That it did just that is, I think, amply evident. That it *had to* do just that is, though, a retrospective optical illusion despite the strain of compulsion involved in the mechanism of reliving once it is operant. For one thing, a trauma need not be relived. Whether a given trauma ever gets relived instead of just being obsessively remembered, or obstinately denied, or defended against after the fact,³⁷ depends on lots of unpredictables such as, in the

present case, the availability of a national hero of a stature comparable to Pétain's. For another, a reliving has a pick of acceptable equivalents to any element of its traumatic original: thus many another outside threat to the Fourth Republic could have served as well as the one from the self-proclaimed committee of public safety in Algiers. And again, the felicitous outcome of de Gaulle's investiture on his Pétainist terms—above all, a new republican constitution that fast laid all his opponents' fears to rest—was by no means a foregone conclusion; quite the contrary.

For all that, political history, or indeed history *tout court*, is less contingent than it appears in nonpsychohistorical perspective. In our example again, once the mechanism of reliving kicked in, Pierre Pflimlin was bound to resign as head of government in 1958 the way Paul Reynaud had resigned in 1940, without being voted out, and President René Coty was bound to appoint de Gaulle next in 1958 the way President Albert Lebrun had appointed Pétain next in 1940, overriding the leaders of the two chambres. As for de Gaulle-1958 cast as Pétain-1940, how could he resist swiping a leaf from the historic Pétain, who had traumatically sought to steal his identity in 1925-1928 through that ghostwritten book about the French soldier in history ("A book is a man")? The bottom line is that even under outside pressure people act, or react, as they are inwardly impelled to act or react. Such inward impulsion, whether of individuals or groups, may be flexible as to its mode of discharge or in its choice of outlets. But it, and it alone, is the active principle of history. There is no explaining de Gaulle's return, or recall, to power in 1958 without considering what inwardly impelled him to return and likewise what inwardly impelled the political establishment to recall him. The closer one examines both inner pressures in their interplay, the less accident-prone history proves to be.

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Endnotes

¹Also like Pétain, de Gaulle was to work on the new constitution through a consultative council and to legislate through the Conseil d'État. Unlike 1940, on the other hand, the chambres voted separately in 1958, and de Gaulle's special powers were limited to six months

²Pétain, June 16, 1940; de Gaulle, May 19, 1958. The Pétainist journal Rivarol coupled these two quotations to justify supporting de Gaulle out of fidelity to Pétain: Henry Rousso, *Le syndrome de Vichy (1944-198...)* (Paris: Seuil, 1987), p. 90.

³"...le trouble de l'armée au combat, la dislocation nationale, la perte de l'indépendance." As for "la dégradation de l'État," "State" in this context had a distinctly Pétainist resonance, Pétain having ruled in the name of "the French state" rather than of the French Republic.

⁴This was Henri Queuille's formulation, quoted by Noguères, 118. Léon Blum went further: see République Française, Haute Cour de Justice, *Procès du maréchal Pétain Compte rendu in extenso des audiences* (Paris: Imprimerie des Journaux Officiels, 1945), p. 79.

⁵Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France. Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944* (New York: Knopf, 1972), p. 351.

⁶See especially *Le procès Laval. Compte rendu sténographique* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1946), pp. 153-154 (Pierre Laval); *Procès Pétain*, p. 48 (Albert Lebrun), pp. 77-80 (Léon Blum); cf. *ibid.*, p. 141 (Maxime Weygand).

⁷*Procès Pétain*, 77.

⁸*Procès Laval*, 153.

⁹Seized by parachutists on May 24, 1958 on orders from Algiers.

¹⁰Pierre Mendès France, in *Journal official. Débats parlementaires, Assemblée Nationale*, June 1, 1958, p. 2577. Mendès's intervention recalled Léon Blum's argument for the illegitimacy of the vote on July 10, 1940: "Our mandate forbids us to abdicate to force": Michel Winock, *La fièvre hexagonale. Les grandes crises politiques de 1871 à 1968* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1968), p. 299.

¹¹The National Assembly's vote of 329 to 224 with 39 absences on June 1, 1958, was much closer than the parliamentary vote of 569 to 80 with 17 abstentions on July 10, 1940, but not so drastically if, for 1940, the seventy-odd Communists disqualified since 1939 and the thirty parliamentarians detained in North Africa are counted as opposed.

¹²Paxton, p. 3. Similarly for Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle*, vol. 1, *Le rebelle* (Paris: Seuil, 1984), p. 449, the French public under Vichy was "a traumatized mass." Further, Julian Jackson, *The Fall of France. The Nazi Invasion of 1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 2 ("the

trauma of the defeat of 1940"—and, quoting René Rémond, "a deep and lasting traumatism") and *passim*.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 237. In loose French usage, the Occupation is often called traumatic: see, e.g., Rousso, 83.

¹⁴Pentecost fell on Sunday, May 25.

¹⁵Michel Winock, *La république se meurt. Chronique 1956-1958* (Paris: Seuil, 1978), p. 206; more generally on the public's sense of exclusion, pp. 198-218.

¹⁶"I declare that as of today France considers that in all of Algeria there ... are only full-fledged Frenchmen [*à part entière*]" : *Le Monde*, June 6, 1958, p. 3.

¹⁷Lacouture, p. 363, compares him to a sleepwalker.

¹⁸Unlike the first, the second denial was only implicit in his early public pronouncements, as in his allusion over his BBC on August 3, 1940, to "the so-called government formed in the panic of Bordeaux": *Discours et messages du général de Gaulle, Première Série, 18 juin 1940 - 8 octobre 1941* (Cairo: Éditions "France Toujours," 1941), p. 29 (cf. Lacouture, p. 348). But in private he denounced Pétain's "treason" promptly on June 17: Lacouture, p. 367.

¹⁹Colonel Rémy (Gilbert Renaud), in Rousso, pp. 43-44; further, *ibid.*, 43-50. Or perhaps his commutation of Pétain's death sentence of August 1945 to life imprisonment was precursive.

²⁰Jacques Szaluta, "Apotheosis to Ignominy: The Martyrdom of Marshal Pétain," *Journal of Psychohistory*, vol. 7, no. 4 (spring 1980), p. 439.

²¹Lacouture, p. 411.

²²Jules Jeanneney, in *Procès Pétain*, p. 191.

²³*Procès Laval*, p. 165.

²⁴Such ambivalence suggests Oedipal input. "Women, de Gaulle? The same ones as Pétain," François Mauriac knowingly affirmed of Lieutenant de Gaulle: Lacouture, p. 50.

²⁵Lacouture, p. 145.

²⁶Lacouture, p. 276.

²⁷Lacouture, p. 144.

²⁸Jacques Isorni, in *Débats*, p. 2366.

²⁹Winock, *République*, p. 209.

³⁰Louis Noguères, *Le véritable procès du maréchal Pétain* (Paris: Fayard, 1955), pp. 139-169; Paxton, pp. 24-33.

³¹Rudolph Binion, "Romanticism and the Revolution of 1789," in Robert Aldrich, ed., *France: Politics, Society, Culture and International Relations. Papers from the Seventh George Rudé Seminar in French History and Civilisation, The University of Sydney, 21-23 July 1990* (Department of Economic History, University of Sydney, 1990), p. 129.

³²*Débats parlementaires. Assemblée Nationale*, May 16, 1958, p. 2368.

³³*Ibid.*, June 2, 1958, p. 2618.

³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 2618-2620.

³⁵Assemblée Nationale, *Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée d'enquêter sur les événements survenus en France de 1933 à 1945* (Paris: Imprimerie de l'Assemblée Nationale and Presses Universitaires de France, [1947]), p. 502; further, *Procès Pétain*, pp. 69-70 (Louis Marin), 112 (Édouard Herriot). Even René Rémond in *Le retour de de Gaulle* (Bruxelles: Complexe, 1987), while recognizing that the Vichy precedent obsessed the deputies debating the constituent powers for de Gaulle (pp. 20, 104, 168-169), gets that precedent wrong (pp. 104-105). Rousso, pp. 81-83, credits Tixier-Vignancourt with clever polemics if nothing else. Eberhard Jäckel, "Charles de Gaulle und die Vierte Französische Republik," in *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, IX (1958), 490-504, esp. 498-503, came closest to recognizing the 1940:1958 parallel.

³⁶Rémond, pp. 164-168.

³⁷The Fourth Republic also defended after the fact against the fall of the Third in the long run-up to reliving it: hyperfearful of personal empowerment, it constitutionally maximized the control of the chambers over the government and asserted that control continually thereafter by toppling ministries in quick succession. □

Reflections on the Binion Symposium

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In a long and distinguished career that has included professorships at Brandeis, Columbia, MIT, Collège de France, and working for UNESCO in Paris, Rudolph Binion has demonstrated an enormous breadth and range of historical and psychohistorical knowledge. His *Frau Lou: Nietzsche's Wayward Disciple* (1968) and *Hitler Among the Germans* (1976) are psychohistorical achievements of the first order. For almost three decades his primary focus has been to go beyond individual to group psychology—his "De Gaulle as Pétain" is a prime example of this.

Organizing the symposium has been an exciting and challenging task. As serious scholars, we want our work to be refereed by the most knowledgeable colleagues—researchers who are also open to new ideas and who do not automatically find scholarship objectionable because they

read the words "psychology" or "psychohistory" in it. This task became challenging for several reasons mostly having to do with limited lead time and the problem of overcoming the understandable professorial disinclination to take on another unpaid scholarly obligation during a time usually set aside for one's own research and relaxation. We were approaching busy, highly productive scholars, requesting that they take valuable time from their own important work. It was only at the beginning of June that Binion's article was accepted as a suitable long article for our small quarterly by being anonymously refereed by an appropriate board of scholars. We quickly decided it would make an excellent symposium issue and went on to identify two rather distinct groups—psychological historians and traditional historians—with the expertise to best respond to this excursion into French history by the Leff Families Professor of Modern European History at Brandeis University.

Identifying the first group of well-qualified psychologically-informed historians was easy and its members were generous in spending their precious time on our symposium, rather than their own research and publications. In the end, we were quite fortunate to find a group who felt that they had sufficient knowledge of the subject matter as well as of the methodology of psychohistory to respond. Most serendipitously, we even had two scholars of France as well as of psychological history (Shapiro and Szaluta). Jacques Szaluta, in fact, has published articles on Pétain as well as a psychohistory textbook first published in France.

"Traditional" historians of France represented the biggest challenge. First, I didn't know them and they did not know me, my reputation as an editor, or our journal. Therefore they had no special reason to accede to my request. Nevertheless, they were quite accommodating, going to great lengths to recommend colleagues with special expertise on de Gaulle, Pétain, the general period, or at least French history. I suspect a few found it much easier to recommend others than to volunteer to write a response themselves because they often seemed unsure of what to make of a request for a comment on a paper based on psychohistory. Some made it quite clear to me that they read the Binion piece carefully before they decided

they did not have enough time. Several clearly felt they would have to immerse themselves in psycho-historical literature to do the job properly, even though I specified that this was not required. Two accepted the invitation only after being reassured that we were only looking for good scholarship from colleagues well versed in France of the period, rather than from experts on psychohistory.

Among the resistances to participating was the common reluctance of the specialist of a particular place and time to go outside of the materials they know so well within an historical context, on the grounds that there are too many variables. For example, a distinguished French historian from one of our most famous universities declined on the basis of inadequate time, while rather gratuitously suggesting that the very idea of comparing men from these different periods was suspect. Yet, as professors in our survey courses we must do precisely this to make history intelligible to our students. If we can't compare two Twentieth century French generals turned head-of-state whose lives overlapped by 61 years, and who had long-term relationships with each other, then whom can we compare?

Direct prejudice against psychohistory was something I did encounter from one of the 55 correspondents I had in conducting this project. I thanked this scholar, who has a Harvard doctoral degree and who teaches at a well-known urban university, for his candor in declaring his lack of "sympathy" and "prejudice," inquiring as to why he held these views. He declared that his doubts came from a conviction that contemporary American culture has too much psychological jargon. This is a point I have long been making, so I agreed and mentioned the paper I had just given in Canada on my ideal of a psychohistory to be written without significant psychological terminology. When he sent me a rough draft of his response, it became perfectly clear that his lack of sympathy for our field led him to misinterpret a fact as well as only make interpretations hostile to the approach. As much as we welcome differences of opinion, it had become crystal clear to me, and the member of our Editorial Board to whom I showed his response anonymously, that this professor was not a suitable responder for this symposium. I thanked him for his time and effort.

In the end, I am most appreciative of the scholars of France and Europe who responded to the symposium paper or helped me identify well-qualified colleagues who might be able to write on "De Gaulle as Pétain." Several scholars who stand out in this regard are Professors William Keylor (Boston), Kim Munholland (Minnesota), Robert Paxton (Columbia), John Sweets (Kansas), and Irwin Wall (UC-Riverside). It struck me just how many of the French historians were either on their way to or from France for research or pleasure. (I must confess to some envy of their enjoyment of the wonders of France while I edited and typed away in northern New Jersey.) In the future I hope to tap their expertise for more articles on French history, since I feel that our publication has been stronger in American, English, German, and Russian history than it has been for France.

The respondents in this symposium represent many different universities and colleges throughout the United States and Canada. Virtually all are trained in European history and a number are scholars of France with publications specifically in the area of our discussion. Though the majority are psychological historians, there are five without a background in this area. They approach the materials in a variety of ways. John Hellman of McGill, for example, offers information on de Gaulle's background and military affairs while Lee Shneidman of Adelphi provides a personalized assessment. David James Fisher, a psychoanalyst and modern European historian, asks the types of questions that reflect his therapeutic experience even more than his historical training. Given the number of commentators, there is comparatively little overlapping coverage. The overall result is a richness of insight.

The symposium is a special pleasure for me since when I think of Rudy Binion, the three words that come to mind are erudition, intellect, and friendship. I'm often in awe of the breadth and depth of his knowledge of European culture, history, group process, and so much more. He is a generous supporter of this publication, who sits on our Editorial Board. In submitting this paper he encouraged its use as a symposium so that *Clio's Psyche* might become known to a larger group of scholars. In three decades I have learned an enormous amount by both listening to him develop his

ideas at numerous conferences and reading the results of his in-depth archival research and profound thought. Awe and gratitude, however, are not a good basis for writing a critical response to a major paper. Nonetheless, this does not present a problem since I do not feel as critical of Binion's "De Gaulle as Pétain" as appreciative of his accomplishment in writing it.

This being said, I must note that despite our common doctoral degrees in modern European history, we have very different backgrounds and ways of looking at the world. Childhood is the main focus of my research and I integrate it into the many psychobiographies I have written of people like Humphry Davy, Thomas Telford, the Bushes, Bill Clinton, and Paul Tsongas. Binion, on the other hand, has written about childhood in the past but in recent decades has increasingly turned his focus away from it, concentrating on group psychohistory, sometimes to the exclusion of childhood. Group psychology is a subject I approach quite cautiously as reflected in my comments in the Clio's Psyche Group Process Symposium (Vol. 7 No. 3, December 2000, pp.148-149). While I agree that people in groups often act differently than they do as individuals, I look for the motives of the individual, having found this to be a more reliable source of information than trying to explain the motives according to some theoretical framework, as is done by most students of group behavior.

Fortunately, Binion does not lead with theory. Indeed, I am impressed by his humility in acknowledging the limits of his knowledge as to the means of transmission of group trauma and his willingness to "eat" his own words when the evidence disproves an earlier hypothesis about trauma always being unconscious. In reading Binion's theoretical framework I am left wondering what the relationship is between the traditional Freudian notion of the repetition compulsion and Binion's idea of traumatic reliving. It is worth noting that the unconscious compulsion to repeat encapsulated in the first concept is focused on the individual rather than the group. (As we know, while Freud used the word *repetition*, singular or plural, over 190 times, he never used *repetition compulsion* as a phrase. The reader should note that though I do not recall ever before having used the term repeti-

tion compulsion in my published work—beyond in a listing of psychological terms—it is one of many psychological concepts that help to frame the hypothesis that I utilize in making sense of the data that comes from my study of history and life.)

"De Gaulle as Pétain" is informative, suggestive, and thought-provoking and produces in me thoughts of betrayal, denial, grandiosity, and withdrawal. Pride and grandiosity are apparent in so much of the behavior of the founder of the Fifth Republic. His identification with the grandeur of France is so profound that he could not accept its defeat in June 1940. When he could not dominate French politics, de Gaulle chose to retreat to his tent and await the call to service under *his* terms. He acted above politics and politicians, both of which he disdained. In the face of such expressions of superiority over others I wonder about what lies beneath. As a psychoanalyst, I know that grandiosity is a defensive mechanism, covering up feelings of inadequacy, vulnerability, and weakness.

Professor Binion does a good job of highlighting de Gaulle's denial, even noting that "His historic identity was built on that double denial of the national trauma of 1940." Charles de Gaulle was in denial of his status of having ghostwritten a book for his mentor, Pétain, denial of defeat in 1940, denial of the legitimacy of Pétain's Vichy government, denial of his position as dependent on the good will of the British and Americans in World War II, and in denial that France was no longer a really great power after WW II. As is often the case with many famous leaders—as well as ordinary people—he denied that which did not fit his picture of reality and his role in the world.

Betrayal is another important theme in the life Charles de Gaulle. He saw Pétain's creation of the Vichy regime as a betrayal of France in 1940, rather than as a partially successful attempt to save it from the full force of the German Reich. He saw Pétain as having betrayed him personally in claiming his words in the book he ultimately published, in defiance of his mentor, as *France and Her Army* (1938). He saw the English and Americans as betraying France by treating it as one of the great powers in name only, not really recognizing its grandeur and significance as a full partner. De Gaulle in turn betrayed Pétain's Vichy govern-

ment, the Fourth Republic, and in 1961 the generals and Algerian colonialists who brought him to power.

In conclusion, each reader will have to decide if the De Gaulle as Pétain Symposium accomplishes our goal of creating a lively intellectual exchange furthering our knowledge of historical re-living, French history, Pétain, de Gaulle, and the relationship between leader and led.

[See Elovitz profile on page 106] □

Repeat Performances

David R. Beisel
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Rudolph Binion, the author of my all-time favorite psychohistorical essay, "Repeat Performance: Leopold III and Belgian Neutrality" (1969), has also produced path-breaking book-length studies on *Frau Lou: Nietzsche's Wayward Disciple* (1968) and on Hitler's murderous anti-Semitism (*Hitler Among the Germans*, 1976). His literary essays in *Sounding the Classics* (1997), his work on late Nineteenth-century European demography, his recent essay on the psychological repercussions of the Black Death in Western Civilization, and his little gem on Bismarck in a recent *Clio's Psyche* are also models of the best scholarship psychological history has to offer.

The range of psychohistorical subjects he has tackled over the last four decades is impressive. He has moved from detailed psychobiography to the group processes at work in several kinds of groups. He's written importantly on psychohistorical method. This time out he returns to psychobiography while putting the Pétain-de Gaulle connection into a group-psychohistorical setting.

Although some readers may take it for granted, I think it's important to take special note of this aspect of his essay since there's been a tendency among psychobiographers to focus only, or primarily, on individuals to the exclusion of group psychological factors. In these studies, the psychobiographical subject is either presented "naked"—without historical referents at all, or is plunked down into a historical milieu that is indeed historical but not psychohistorical, or not psychohistorical enough. (Waite's study of Hitler, *The Psycho-*

pathic God, so valuable in many other ways, is a case in point.)

Hence, an unmentioned subtext in all of Binion's work—I find it there implicitly—is to insist, rightly, that psychobiography must be located in group-psychohistorical, not just historical contexts, which he does again in "De Gaulle as Pétain." (De Gaulle is driven for personal reasons as much as "France" is driven by its own related, but separate, group reasons, the two connecting on the historical stage.)

The other, more important dimension of Binion's work is, of course, his abiding emphasis on the centrality of trauma, specifically adult trauma, which ties together his studies of diverse topics and has been the mainstay of his pioneering research. It is interestingly and convincingly developed again in "De Gaulle as Pétain," not from theory, but—as he, and all historians rightly insist—by emerging from the documentary evidence. The overt and subtle connections he finds in the sources, and how he weaves them together with repetitions and causes, is to me the most compelling part of his work.

Of course, it's not just trauma that counts—historians without psychology constantly misuse the term—but it is the possibility of the traumatic event leading to eventual traumatic reliving, or continued relivings, as Binion shows again in this essay. It's what makes trauma important to history. It shows up particularly convincingly in its consequences.

Psychohistorians have for years asserted that by emphasizing the irrational, the emotional, and the unconscious, psychohistory's main goal has been to deepen and enlarge the understanding of human motivation, namely the "Why?" of history. I suggest that this focus on motivation may have accidentally led us to think too much of causes, too little of consequences. Perhaps we should consider the possibility—I also find it implicit in Binion's essay—that we begin to stress consequences as much as causes, that, in fact, they're crucial to proving our psychohistorical case.

Statements about cause are traditionally based on what historical persons have said, and, for psychohistorians, on the dreams, fantasies, and

fears we find explicitly and implicitly buried in the historical documents. But these should not be our only sources for corroborating evidence. Outcomes matter too.

For most historians without psychology, outcomes are the result of conscious planning, or conscious planning run amuck, or unforeseen circumstances, or blunders by ill-informed or stupid leaders, never the result of unconscious intent.

To make our psychohistorical case, we need more often and self-consciously to point to consequences, including the contradictions between what people say and what they're actually doing, between the reasons they give for what they're doing, and what actually "happens" to them when they do it. Those with insight know that people sometimes get what they unconsciously wish for even when they don't know they want it or don't believe they're doing anything to get it.

It's as hard for non-psychological historians as for any psychologically defensive person to believe that people, groups as well as individuals, sometimes arrange the world so that things turn out the way they say they don't want them to turn out. Because it is sometimes impossible to conclusively prove unconscious wishes from available documentary evidence focused on causes, it is possible to argue that the proof of an unconscious process also comes from outcomes, especially when the repetitions producing those outcomes lead to self-defeating or self-destructive behavior. If we can help others to see in this way, the corroborating sources available to historians for understanding unconscious processes can multiply exponentially. Hence, the proof for traumatic reliving—seeing the outcomes of behavior as the result of unconsciously driven tendencies—serves a purpose in Binion's current essay beyond the immediate needs of that essay.

Part of the essay's broader significance lies as well in the notion of contingency. It may seem paradoxical but can be argued that an understanding of traumatic reliving helps avoid the heavy hand of inevitability demanded by other kinds of psychohistorical models. While the compulsion to relive sets up a certain degree of determinism, flexibility is also possible. I don't find this especially evident in Binion's "De Gaulle as Pétain" as

much as in his earlier Hitler work, where adult trauma and re-traumatization take place in a narrative framework historians would find more congenial.

I'm not a fan of the "What if?" school of history but do think counterfactuals may, at times, serve a purpose. For the psychological origins of Hitler's murderous anti-Semitism it's possible to argue that: if Hitler's father Alois wasn't so much older than his mother Klara; if Alois didn't have two children from an earlier marriage; if Klara had not suffered the traumatic loss of her three children to diphtheria within six weeks of one another; if Adolf didn't then become the apple of her eye; if the deep symbiosis between them had been modified by a more normal separation-individuation; if Klara didn't develop breast cancer; if Dr. Bloch hadn't treated it with iodoform; if Klara did not suffer from an iodoform overdose; if Hitler did not sit continuously at the side of her death bed; if he had been prevented from symbiotically absorbing the symptoms of her iodoform overdose; if he did not re-experience the symptoms of that overdose when he was wounded by mustard gas attack in October 1918; if, upon his recovery, the traumatic news did not suddenly arrive that Germany had lost the war; and if Dr. Bloch was not a Jew, it's possible to imagine that Hitler could have emerged from World War I as traumatized as any other veteran, but neither more nor less anti-Semitic than any other German. This complex chain of events appeals to the historian in me.

Other types of psychohistory dogmatically assert several simple Iron Laws of Psychohistory—having to do with group fantasy "cycles," or conditionings of childhood, or speculations about fetal or birth traumas. They're as unlikely to convince historians as they are unlikely to account for the role of contingency, which must be given a place in history if history is to reflect reality in any real sense.

This is not to diminish the compulsive need for trauma to be reenacted. Despite recent strivings in the Culture Wars to denounce, devalue, even destroy the very notion of trauma, its existence, and the existence of traumatic reliving can be proven phenomenologically. The evidence shows that trauma is not the same for all people at all times, but is important for some people at crucial times. History repeats itself, at least once in a while. Anything that moves us to a better understand why things happen needs to be included as part of history's and psychological

history's methodological and conceptual framework.

I assume that some readers will wonder why I've spent time making what to them may be obvious, even mundane, comments. I've done so because, predictably, some of my fellow psychological historians will be as reluctant as my fellow historians to put traumatic reliving at center stage since their understanding of the world is based on one or another of the psychological models which have served them well for a long time. These include biologically inherited, life-long aggressive impulses, the denial of death, symbolic immortality, the failure of good enough parenting, child abuse both physical and emotional, the universality of incest, rage against mommy, Oedipal conflicts, a failure to separate and individuate, pre-Oedipal conflicts, and the like.

I'm not sure that it's only, or mainly, adult traumatic reliving which runs history, but after four decades of studying modern history and looking for psychological causes I think that traumatic reliving best explains the persistent phenomenon, in individuals and groups, which has become for me the central question of historical study: why people act in ways which bring about the very things they're most trying to avoid.

It's not a new question, certainly, and is familiar to all of us. It has many dimensions, and can be explained in several ways, traumatic reliving among them. Pronouncements that historical trauma studies are not psychohistory, that everything derives from the history of childhood, are not only ungenerous, but off the mark. Childhood history is important: I've said so many times and have shown links between historical childhoods and historical events in my own writing. But denouncing traumatic reliving from within the ranks of psychohistory is especially serious. It echoes charges from the larger culture, and it is clear that one reason for the denunciations of trauma in the larger post-9/11 world is precisely because we live in a post-9/11 world. Our media continually call the events of 9/11 traumatic while at the same time asserting that the notion of trauma is controversial, or completely bankrupt. By aiming at making trauma problematic at best, they feed our need for collective denial.

In a world presumably waging a "War Against Terror," in a world in which people can bring about the very thing they most want to avoid, we no longer have the luxury of treating studies of traumatic reliving casually, or as mere intellectual games, or as simply another point of view. Nor do we have the luxury of declaring them neither historical nor psychohistorical. "De Gaulle as Pétain" adds another chapter to an illustrious body of work whose lessons we ignore at our peril.

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Pétain as de Gaulle

**David Felix,
City University of New York**

With his hyperacute sensibility to the deeper movements of the psyche, Rudolph Binion has precisely traced the character of French leadership in both 1940 and 1958. He has found it uncannily congruent. I don't believe I invalidate his conclusions if I find a Pétain as de Gaulle in his narrative. As Binion says, "Diametric opposites meet."

Of course, the psyche must respond to outer events. The great crash of the 1940 battle defeat—the destruction of the French state—was as traumatic as it was real. The events of 1958, radiating out traumatic effects, recalled 1940—but with differences which Binion has expertly delineated. The first was a monolithic disaster, the second, a puzzle of a splintering of defeats: Vietnam, Tunisia, Morocco, and, after de Gaulle accepted

it, Algeria.

I marvel at Binion's fine understanding of the two huge personalities: their individual touchiness, magical thinking, and somnambulistic triangulation of political reality. As he shows, both triumphed at the cost of the other, but then the great ego, in character, recognizes no other. Binion does not mention the dénouement: a jury had declared Pétain guilty and sentenced him to death but with a recommendation for mercy. Having previously refused to let Pétain escape by way of banishment, the victor de Gaulle granted him that much, but not a *miette* [crumb] more—to live out his 95 years as a state prisoner. For de Gaulle it was surely a fair concordance of personal pique, appropriate politics, and justice.

In the mediocre record of overt history, as Binion shows, de Gaulle was another Pétain. But are we not forced to see Pétain as de Gaulle? Consider de Gaulle's legerdemain. Defying assassination, the military man completed France's decolonialization as the civilian leaders had disgracefully begun it. He went to Algeria to tell the exultant colons: "*Je vous ai compris*" [I have understood you]. He understood them better than they understood themselves and prepared their welcome in France.

De Gaulle balanced France's parliamentary institutions by giving the country an effective executive. Accepting and extending the Monnet Plan, he supported a reasonable organization of the economy. He befriended Germany as part of a prickly adjustment of a uniting Europe. If he strengthened French and European democracy so much, cannot he rescue Pétain as well? At his trial the old man told the court: "while General de Gaulle pursued the struggle beyond our frontiers I prepared the way to liberation by preserving France stricken but alive."

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Personal Trauma or Traumatic Reliving

David James Fisher
Private Practice and UCLA

As in much of Rudy Binion's scholarship, I found his essay "de Gaulle as Pétain" suggestive, well written, and controversial. I assume that he will be elaborating his theory of traumatic reliving in his forthcoming book, *Past Impersonal: Group Process in Human History*. I would have liked to see more of that elaboration in this article. On page 19, Binion argues that group trauma does not have to be relived; it can be remembered, denied, or defended against. Earlier in the piece, he speaks of psychic numbing (is he borrowing from Lifton here?), again on the group level. What the reader wants to know, especially one who is receptive to the psychohistorical perspective as I am, is what are the mechanisms that propel these reactions? Is Binion postulating a group unconscious? Or, among political elites, a political unconscious, where the past can be relived in situations of real or fantasized crisis, as in the unforeseen loss of a war, or in the prospect of a bloody civil war?

I would have liked Binion to differentiate more sharply individual from group process. Are the anxieties the same? Are they multiplied in the collective setting, given the absence of a secure and safe framework to contain these anxieties? Given the propensity of individuals in groups to be susceptible to contagion, to an intensification of massive fears, does Binion think that collective trauma is distinctly different from individual trauma? Is he talking of anticipatory anxiety, or of real fears generated from the actual, lived experience of crisis? Through the historical/psychological study of groups at war, in situations of revolution or counter-revolution, severe economic dislocation, such as high inflation or depression, in the face of civil war or dislocation from one's homeland, do groups react differently than individuals? Are there mediations psychodynamically between the individual and the collectivity? If so, how does the historian document these differences or similarities? What are his critical sources and documents? How does the historian evaluate for typicality? What are the norms and average expectable responses in groups at mo-

ments of enormous anxiety, bordering on panic? I remain curious about these issues and I wish that Binion would have addressed them more directly.

In working psychodynamically with severely traumatized patients, some of whom were sexually molested (including same sex molestation by a parent), others who were abused with violence, including repeated episodes of verbal assault, and still others who were severely neglected (another form of abuse in my view), I have discovered many of the same defenses that Binion outlines, including psychic splitting into good and bad, massive projecting, denial and avoidance, disavowal of affect, dissociation, psychic deadness, and the compulsion to repeat. These powerful psychological mechanisms can be seen as ways of attempting to master or adapt to the massive pain of the original trauma. I have found that these traumatized individuals are highly inhibited in certain instances, that they often have difficulty in accessing and expressing anger and aggression (even though they are suffering from profound sources of rage). I have observed that traumatized individuals suffer from shame, that guilt dynamics often hide the shame, that they protect themselves against the enormous anxiety about being exposed and humiliated. They are often secretive about their deepest sources of vulnerability. That fragility pivots on the fear of being retraumatized, a fear that they experience as potentially shattering to their sense of self. I wish that Binion would address the dynamics of shame that may be at work in his understanding of group process. Furthermore, in my traumatized patients, I have encountered severe self-loathing, self-doubts, passivity, and sado-masochistic dynamics (with masochism prevailing on the more manifest level). Most anticipate the inevitability of future humiliation, which structures their depression, their pessimism about life, their sense that life has no meaning, or very limited meaning.

Traumatized individuals also fear they themselves will inflict another trauma, not necessarily the same, on others, usually weaker or more vulnerable than themselves. Many of those who experienced sexual molestation find themselves confused and disoriented about their own sexual orientation; many fear that they are gay, or that they brought on the abuse by their own seductive-

ness. Those victimized by violence wonder if they, themselves, somehow provoked the violence, that they are to blame for these episodes. In terms of the countertransference dynamics (not at all addressed by Binion: a significant omission, I believe), I find that working with traumatized individuals highly challenging (and highly rewarding if one can establish and re-establish trust, safety, and a secure working alliance). What is challenging is working with the prevalence of dissociation, the persistent deadness and emotional unavailability of these patients during the hour. They literally do not know what they are feeling; affects are foreign to them. They often are unable to read the affective signals and cues from others, making their relationships often stormy and problematic, often resulting in inappropriate behavior and expectations, in addition to self-destructive choices. They usually have enormous terror around separations and panic around the prospect of abandonment.

As a therapist, then, I find myself having to be patient, caring, affirming, and sensitive to their ability to express emotions. I have to be unusually empathic and careful about their propensity to experience shame. That can often inhibit my own spontaneity and my own desires to engage my patients. Once the intimacy begins to emerge, if it does evolve, the work and relationship can be quite rewarding, mutually rewarding and life transforming. But it is often a marathon—never a sprint. It would be welcome, but perhaps it runs against his style as an historian, for Binion to have revealed to his audience his own ambivalences and difficulties in working with the history of traumatic reliving. What, if anything, is he reliving traumatically? Can an historian who has been traumatized heal himself in working toward a psychohistorical understanding of earlier collective trauma? My preference, and this may be a matter of taste, is for the historian to lay bare more of his or her own subjectivity. I also wish that Binion would reveal more explicitly what clinical and/or psychological theories inform his historical thinking, rather than assume that his favorite theory of trauma is fully integrated in his narrative and analytic structure.

Binion, to summarize, needs to specify how group trauma recapitulates individual forms of trauma, or whether mass trauma has other significant pathways and meanings. He needs to alert his

fellow historians about how to detect latencies in the group process. What clues are there to deciphering collective unconscious process? Clearly, charismatic leaders like De Gaulle and Pétain, both with heroic pasts or military stature, can capitalize on these dynamics when the country is experiencing crisis. But do these leaders operate unconsciously, or are they just being expedient and/or opportunistic? What is the relationship between the traumatized collectivity and their particular longings for a master, or a leader who will calm their anxieties? History can repeat itself but never in exactly the same ways, because trauma is never identical. De Gaulle may have been able to use the mystique of Liberation and his own ideological form of cultural nationalism, linked with his sense of himself representing the grandeur of France, as a way to secure power, but also to make his countrymen feel (probably in an illusory way) safe, secure, and immune from further disaster. In this instance he may have been functioning more as an omnipotent and omniscient mother than as a reassuring father (which may have been Pétain's role and symbolic position at the moment of the Fall of France). Traumatized groups may gravitate more to mother figures than father figures, or fathers who are mothers on a more latent level.

On the group level, ideology may also be operative; after all, ideas and propaganda also have an important psychological component. Pétain's appeal to religion, work, family, and country may have been soothing to a majority of the French after their shameful defeat. De Gaulle's invoking of the mythical greatness of France may have also had a powerful unconscious impact on the population of France facing massive, civic unrest, particularly at a moment when France appeared to be losing its Empire in Algeria, i.e., losing its former greatness, displaying its national fragility. Binion might want to expand upon how ideology mixes in with group trauma and enters into his concept of how history repeats itself. Lastly, Binion, an excellent reader of Nietzsche who has written a fine study of Lou Andreas-Salomé, might have discussed the strengths and weaknesses of Nietzsche's concept of "eternal return." Was Nietzsche actually addressing precisely the same issue of historical trauma? Is Binion's idea of traumatic reliving different from Nietzsche's sense of the inevitability

of history endlessly repeating its essential cycles and patterns?

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History Does Not Repeat Itself

Richard Joseph Golsan
Texas A & M University

I have read Professor Binion's provocative essay, "De Gaulle as Pétain" with a good deal of interest and, frankly, a great deal of skepticism. I should stress at the outset that I am not sold on psycho-historical approaches, and I have serious reservations concerning the application of Levi-Strauss's structuralist paradigms to complex events from recent history. One of the criticisms of structuralism is, of course, its lack of historicity as well as its schematization of complicated human circumstances and situations. Because Professor Binion is dependant precisely on these two approaches in making his arguments, he simplifies and indeed skews the historical record in comparing Pétain's coming to power in summer 1940 after France's defeat at the hands of the Nazis, and de Gaulle's return to power in 1958 at the height of the Algerian crisis.

To be sure, there are interesting—and disturbing—comparisons to be made between these two watershed political moments in postwar France. In both cases, the national assembly voted

virtually dictatorial powers to the two military heroes, and in both cases as well, the assembly members were acting under duress in the form of potential military (and other) pressures. They were also acting without receiving strong signs of visible support from "the people," in fact, as Binion shows, quite the reverse in 1958. In Binion's view at least, the legislators, as well as the French nation itself, were also each time reeling under the weight of terrible military defeats, in 1940 at the hands of the German army and in 1958 at the hands of, primarily, formerly colonized people.

Granting these broad similarities, there are nevertheless equally, and in my view, much more telling historical and political divergences between the two events that easily trump the comparisons. To claim, at least implicitly, that the threat of a *possible* military coup at the hands of rebellious elements in one's own army creates the same circumstances as the *fact* of a military defeat at the hands of one's traditional enemy, and a fascist enemy at that, strikes me as highly dubious. To appreciate the profound differences between the two experiences in both abstract and concrete terms, one need only consider the continuing trauma in France over the memory of Vichy. No comparable trauma surrounds de Gaulle's coming to power, nor the legacy of the "regime" he created—today's Fifth Republic.

Moreover, while de Gaulle can be criticized as vain, arrogant, and even egomaniacal—as was Pétain—and while both men shared a deep-seated dislike of political parties and the chaos of Third and Fourth Republican politics, from there their political visions diverged sharply. Pétain created an overtly dictatorial state, *l'État Français*, complete with a successor designated by the Marshal in royal fashion, anti-Semitic laws, and a vision of the nation that was reactionary in the extreme and committed to belittling the French people and blaming them for their recent defeat. On the latter score, one need only to watch Claude Chabrol's disturbing documentary on Vichy's propaganda, *L'Oeil de Vichy*, to get a sense of the degree to which the regime sought to humiliate the French in order, in part, to control them. By contrast, de Gaulle, the cantor of French *grandeur*, was certainly no racist or xenophobe, and despite the claims of many of his critics, exercised no dic-

tatorial ambitions and, in fact, voluntarily resigned when the French people voted down his proposed reforms at the end of the 1960s. The same profoundly democratic outlook and acceptance of the will of the people has certainly not been evident on the part of France's current president, Jacques Chirac, who clings to power despite a strong vote by the French against the European constitution Chirac championed.

If other political and historical circumstances not discussed by Professor Binion tend to stress strong differences rather than similarities between the events in question, the author's psycho-historical approach creates other difficulties as well. In the case of de Gaulle himself, Binion reduces France's most important—and complex—postwar leader to a psychologically simplistic and immature individual bent on symbolic vengeance against Pétain, a vengeance enacted in "replaying" in 1958 Pétain's *coup* of summer 1940. Supposedly responding tit for tat for Pétain's earlier refusal to give de Gaulle full credit for ghost writing a book in the former's name, de Gaulle, Binion asserts, "plagiarized" Pétain's political demands of 1940 in making his own demands for returning to power in 1958. So, in fact de Gaulle's return in 1958 was the "disguised return of Pétain." While provocatively phrased, this last assertion is in my opinion dangerously misleading in historical terms. So, too, in this context, is Binion's quoting of de Gaulle's statement that "France needed both Maréchal Pétain and Général de Gaulle." Here the statement calls to mind the old—and debunked—claim of former Vichyites in the postwar period that Pétain was "the shield" and de Gaulle "the sword." Pétain was certainly no "shield" for all the French—especially Jews—against the Nazis. Vichy's paramilitary police force, the *Milice*, was created, after all, to fight France's *internal* enemies: the Resistance, Jews, and so on.

Professor Binion closes his article with a final claim I find objectionable. He asserts that an "inward impulsion" like de Gaulle's urge to settle scores belatedly with Pétain, and like the 1958 assembly's "unconscious" urge to imitate their predecessors in 1940 by handing over power irresponsibly, constitutes the real motor of history. Or as Binion phrases it: "it [the inward impulsion], and it alone, is the active principle of history." If

this is the case, if rationality and even chance play no part, then any effort to control our destiny through positive planning and action is simply a pipe dream. In my view, historical defeatism of this sort is dangerous indeed.

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Memory and the Sense of Self in Time of Crisis

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What tribal memories come to mind when peoples are threatened with total annihilation? What did the traumatized Parisians remember when the Panzer units were racing through the lowlands and they saw their city in mortal danger? Paul Reynaud, who had become Prime Minister of France on March 21, 1940 after Edouard Daladier was sacked, made the brilliant and combative young tank commander Charles de Gaulle a member of the Cabinet as Undersecretary of State for National Defense and War (assistant minister of war). He also went to the Cathedral of Notre Dame with other leaders of the government on May 19 and participated in a service where, in the presence of the reliquaries of Saint Denis, Saint Louis and Saint Genevieve, the intercession of the great French saints was implored with a special petitionary prayer to Joan of Arc.

But Reynaud resigned on June 16, 1940, soon after the occupation of Paris, and was replaced by General Pétain, who organized an armistice. Reynaud was arrested on Pétain's orders (despite the fact that he had made the fatal mistake

of bringing the appeaser Pétain into the government) and was turned over to the Germans, who kept him prisoner until the end of the war. After de Gaulle's famous appeal of 18 June, Pétain also issued a warrant for the arrest of de Gaulle who was condemned to death for treason. For the Third Republic it was indeed "an inglorious end" (Binion, p.1).

Charles de Gaulle would have found nothing odd about Parisians invoking the memory and intervention of the great French saints in time of crisis. He had been born in Lille in 1890 into a stolidly Catholic and patriotic family, and his father, Henri de Gaulle, a charismatic and influential professor of history in the Jesuit lycée where Charles himself studied, had a great influence on him. While Henri de Gaulle described himself as "a monarchist" and subscribed to *L'Action française*, his children never questioned the Republic. During the height of the Dreyfus affair, Henri de Gaulle was convinced of the captain's innocence of the charges of treason and followed his conscience to express pro-Dreyfus views "heroically" for a person from his social background (Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle, I. Le Rebelle, 1890-1944* [Paris: Seuil, 1984], p.15). Saints Genevieve, Joan of Arc, and Louis, were among those historic figures Henri de Gaulle had so eloquently described: in every century of her long history three or so figures emerged, in different times of great national emergency, to save France.

Charles himself, at age 15, already imagined himself playing such a role due to Henri de Gaulle's remarkable pedagogical skills and his influence on his son Charles (Lacouture, *De Gaulle, I*, p.14-15). When Charles led representatives of the liberating army and the Resistance to Notre Dame for the great *Te Deum* mass of thanksgiving for the liberation of Paris on 26 August 1944, he might have imagined fulfilling his destiny, and the lesson, or law, about the centuries of French history his father Henri had taught him years earlier. It is possible, with his lofty inspiration, fearlessly standing tall and erect when all others ducked at the outburst of gunfire in the cathedral, that he may have consciously remembered St. Genevieve, St. Louis, Joan of Arc, even Napoleon, but not Pétain at all. With his unusual sense of his place in long periods of historical time, he may have put his dis-

graced former mentor out of sight and out of mind. Professor Binion's suggestion that Pétain weighed on his unconscious memory, and that of his comrades, is certainly pertinent.

During the pre-war period de Gaulle was even more intellectually precocious than Professor Binion suggests. He published articles that attracted attention such as "*Doctrine a priori ou doctrine des circonstances*" in which, contrary to the established doctrine that an army's action should be ordered according to predetermined rules, Captain de Gaulle argued that it was essential to respond, pragmatically, to circumstances. He lectured at the École Supérieure de Guerre, sponsored by Marshal Pétain. He showed himself to be an independent thinker, working out his own conceptions of military leadership (in essays on "*L'Action du chef de guerre*" and "*Du caractère*"), and reforming army in the light of relations between it and the political authorities. In his first work, *La Discorde chez l'ennemi* (1924) he stressed the fact that the political powers and structures must take precedence over the military. In 1932, in *Le Fil de l'épée* he emphasized the importance of the training given to military leaders and the crucial role played by circumstances. He discussed the need for an armored corps combining fire-power with mobility, capable of bold initiatives and offensives. In his work *Vers l'Armée de métier* (1934) he called for a professional army to be created alongside the conscription system. This idea met with a largely unfavorable reception, except with a few people like conservative MP Paul Reynaud. Socialist leader Léon Blum warned that this army of professionals might become a sort of Praetorian Guard.

Outside France, however, the use of armored vehicles as recommended by de Gaulle attracted the attention of certain visionary military men like Generals Conrad Huhnenlein and Heinz Guderian, who were also working on plans for developing a highly mobile mechanized army. Guderian wrote *Achtung Panzer* which came to the attention of Hitler. Guderian's plan was to make war mobile by having a force that was consistently moving forward, keeping the enemy off balance, never giving them time to regroup. From July 1934, Guderian was given the task by Hitler of perfecting the fighting techniques of the Panzers—light tanks, supported by infantry and planes—

which were to become the legendary *Blitzkrieg* mode of attacking an enemy. Meanwhile in Paris, de Gaulle was desperately trying to draw the attention to this new method of warfare so foreign to the mentality of French high command figures like Pétain. In this effort he was aided by l'Ordre Nouveau, an elite group of young Nietzschean philosophers, historians, and technocrats who organized talks for him, and arranged for the publication of his books. The defensive strategies of ensconced High Command figures like Pétain, however, continued to prevail.

On his promotion to the rank of colonel in 1937, de Gaulle was given command of a tank regiment in Metz. When France and Britain declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, Colonel de Gaulle was appointed 5th Army tank commander. Unlike Pétain, who remained very much the cautious, iconic Marshal of France, defeatist and set in his ways, de Gaulle, in January 1940, sent a memorandum based on operations in Poland to 80 influential figures, including Léon Blum, Paul Reynaud and Generals Gamelin and Weygand. The document, entitled *L'Avènement de la force mécanique*, advocated combining tank operations with air power. When the Germans attacked he demonstrated the well-foundedness of his new ideas: as commander of the 4th armored division, de Gaulle distinguished himself at Montcornet and Laon, and halted the German advance at Abbeville (27-30 May 1940).

Appointed acting brigadier with effect from June 1st de Gaulle was invited on June 5th by Paul Reynaud, president of the Council, to serve as undersecretary of state for National Defense and War. His task was to coordinate action with the UK in order to continue the war. On June 9th he met Churchill and tried in vain to convince the British leader to commit more forces, including air forces, to the battle. On June 10th, de Gaulle left Paris, now declared an open city, for Orleans, Briare and Tours. On June 16th returning to Bordeaux from a mission to Britain, he learned of Paul Reynaud's resignation as President of the Council (of Ministers), his replacement by Marshal Pétain and the call for an armistice. General de Gaulle was thus no longer a member of the government.

Was De Gaulle traumatized by the defeat of May and June 1940 as Professor

Binion suggests (p.8)? According to his memoirs, he was more angry and annoyed—particularly with Pétain—than traumatized. The tank units under his command, following the guidelines he had been prescribing for the French army since the 1920's, performed well against the Germans and proved, at Abbeville, that the enemy could, with fresh and skillful generalship and will, be checked. He later remembered himself as seeing his worst fears and prophecies fulfilled: the French army, France herself, had failed to heed the warnings about the new sort of *Blitzkrieg* attack they would face. He tried, with the help of Reynaud, to rally French people lucid about the reasons for the success of the German attack, and determined to resist, to continue the fight.

Was there “a replay by de Gaulle in 1958 of Pétain in 1940” (p.2)? In 1958, as Professor Binion points out, several circumstances were quite different from what they had been in 1940. Ministerial instability and the Fourth Republic's inability to deal with the Algerian crisis, which was sparked off by an insurrection on November 1, 1954, led the regime into serious difficulties. Political figures from all sides of the political spectrum found themselves wishing for the return of the General. On May 13, 1958, a menacing vigilance committee called for a demonstration against the FLN (National Liberation Front) in Algiers. A Committee of Public Safety was created, headed by General Salan, who issued a call for the return of General de Gaulle on 15 May. The insurrection spread and risked degenerating into civil war. On May 19th, the General expressed himself as “ready to assume the powers of the Republic.” Some saw this declaration as a message of support for the army, and were fearful for democracy, as Professor Binion shows. But de Gaulle soothed their fears, stressing the need for national unity and that, although tending his services to the nation once again, he (unlike Pétain, who built his power upon the army in 1940) favored neither the army nor any other institution.

On May 29, 1958, President of the Republic René Coty called upon the services of “the most illustrious of Frenchmen.” Charles de Gaulle agreed to form (unlike Pétain in 1940) a Republican government which was voted into office by the National Assembly on June 1st, by 329 votes out of

553. General de Gaulle was not invested with all power as Pétain in 1940 but rather became the last President of the Council of the Fourth Republic. The members of the National Assembly granted him the power to govern by decree for a period of six months, and to carry through the sort of constitutional reform of the country which de Gaulle had been thinking about for years. The new Constitution, drawn up over the summer of 1958, was very close in spirit to the proposals of de Gaulle's earlier Bayeux speech, with a strong executive. General de Gaulle was not an uncompromising authoritarian but, rather, accepted that the Parliament should play a stronger role than he considered wise. The Constitution was adopted by referendum on September 28, 1958, with 79.2% voting “yes.” The Empire, too, voted in favor with the single exception of Guinea, which became the first African state to gain independence. Charles de Gaulle was elected by a broadly-based Electoral College to the Presidency of the French Republic and the African and Malagasy Community on December 21, 1958. He took up office on January 8, 1959. He was seen to have “destroyed the Fourth Republic” (p. 3). But he also determinedly established the Fifth, which endures.

In the period between taking up office as President of the Council and his election to the Presidency of the Republic, Charles de Gaulle did not bask in adulation like Pétain in 1940 but already began establishing the policies that would mark his term of office: in addition to providing France with a new Constitution, the General had shaped France's European policy (meeting with Chancellor Adenauer in September), her independence from the United States (memorandum to President Eisenhower the same month), the state of public finances (measures in December) and the fate of Algeria (rejecting the agenda of the committees of public safety and calling for reconciliation in October). In 1958, as in 1940, he had bold and serious plans and ideas for reorienting France.

Professor Binion has made a good case for de Gaulle and the French unconsciously remembering Pétain in 1940. De Gaulle and the French, in 1940 and again in 1958, also consciously or unconsciously remembered national defeats and disasters extending back over very long periods of time. These memories encouraged them to believe

that their community had a fate, or destiny, in which great men and women had played decisive roles. In 1958, de Gaulle must have had in mind his former mentor, Pétain, but also his own father, whose lessons, intellectual and moral, in and out of those lycée classes, helped shape his reaction to defining events. De Gaulle could unselfconsciously describe himself, in the third person, as one of those great men his father had brought him up to appreciate and respect. This helps explain why Parisians simply left for a Pentecost weekend holiday when the fate of their government and country seemed at stake.

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From Vichy to Algiers

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Philippe Pétain and Charles de Gaulle certainly occupy central positions in the history of contemporary France. The former is associated with the momentous victory at Verdun in February 1916, and more ominously symbolizes the authoritarian and xenophobic Vichy regime that emerged following the German victory in June 1940. Intimately tied to the Pétainist moment, de Gaulle's ascendancy began with his formation of the Free French as a bulwark against Vichy. Seemingly discredited by the failure of the post-liberation RPF (Rally of the French People) in 1952, he returned for a "second rendezvous with historical destiny," to use Michel Winock's phrase, inaugurating the Fifth Republic and effectively ending the Algerian crisis during and after May 1958.

Rudolph Binion's examination of the tumultuous end of the Fourth Republic proposes an-

other dimension to the centrality of Pétain and de Gaulle to the French Twentieth century: that the crisis which vaulted the General to power represented an "unconscious replay" by French politicians of the traumatic events of June-July 1940 during which his nemesis emerged as the leader of *l'État français*. Binion further alleges that he played the part of the *maréchal* (marshal), "while refusing to acknowledge Pétain as his source." As a result, an "inward impulsion" propelled historical actors and circumstances during the 1958 crisis that ended in the return of de Gaulle to power and the formation of the Fifth Republic.

The Pétain-de Gaulle analogy is thought provoking, and Binion fittingly notes the numerous similarities between the two men. In 1940 and 1958, they benefited from traumatic crises that engendered intense political spectacles, concluding with the anointment of a charismatic outsider. In agreement with René Rémond, he observes that Pétain and de Gaulle were acknowledged as mythical saviors, reputations garnered due to the military triumphs of Verdun and the liberation successively (René Rémond, "Two Destinies: De Gaulle and Pétain" in Hugh Gough and John Horne (eds.), *De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France* [London: Edward Arnold, 1994], pp.9-17). Furthermore, both men despised party politics, and parlayed their moral authority into popular and political support for the creation of a new regime. Last, but certainly not least, Binion references their monumental egoism. The two consistently referred to themselves in transcendental terms, evident in Pétain's public discourse and de Gaulle's frequent use of the third person in speeches and his memoirs.

These observations raise excellent questions about the nature of, and relationship between, both men. Yet beyond surface similarities, the comparison is somewhat difficult to sustain due to genuine qualitative differences between the two series of events and their beneficiaries. First and foremost, although Pétain and de Gaulle disparaged the Third and Fourth Republics respectively, they based their conclusions on entirely different rationale. Vichy in many ways represents the concluding chapter of the *Guerre franco-française*, Charles Maurras's "divine surprise" which eliminated the hated Third Republic in favor of an au-

thoritarian state dedicated to moral and spiritual renewal, anti-Semitism, corporatism, and the cult of the soil. Although certain figures proposed alternatives to extreme-rightist values, most notably the young technocrats in charge of industrial planning, Pétain dismissed their conclusions. His Vichy harkened back to the philosophy of Maurice Barrès and the leagues of the 1930s—the slogan “work, family, fatherland” was first used by the Croix de Feu, which Pétain termed “one of the most healthy elements in our country.” He derided bourgeois decadence, weak and ineffective parliamentary democracy, and the declining birthrate that brought France to the edge of the abyss; “intellectual and moral retraining” and a new politico-economic order would remove such impediments.

Far from imitating Pétain, de Gaulle espoused the opposite conviction: that the Republic should be altered but preserved. To be sure, he possessed a penchant for Bonapartism, and his constitutional reforms strengthened the executive at the expense of the National Assembly. In his Bayeux speech on 16 June 1946 and subsequently as the leader of the RPF, de Gaulle frequently dismissed the “regime of political parties” (and particularly the communist PCF), insisting upon direct communication between the President and the population through elections and referenda. But for all that, democracy remained the procedural *élan vital* of the Fifth Republic, and parliament retained significant responsibilities. Not only was the President elected by universal suffrage, but the party system and personal liberties remained critical components of the new regime. Neither did de Gaulle’s nationalism devolve into *Vichyisme*. His government welcomed all political, religious, and social groups without exception. How different from Pétain in 1940, who never delivered the promised new constitution and paid mere lip service to representative institutions, placing the blame for French misfortunes squarely on the Judeo-Republican “other.”

Similar problems arise with the contention that de Gaulle manipulated events in order to eradicate the Fourth Republic, just as Pétain harnessed the June 1940 military debacle to identical ends. It is true that the Marshal fortuitously benefited from the success of the *Blitzkrieg*. For as William Irvine

writes, the Third Republic “in four years managed to parry the forces of domestic fascism, integrate the working class into the nation, rally the bulk of the obdurate Right, all the while rearming the nation” (William D. Irvine, “Domestic Politics and the Fall of France in 1940,” *Historical Reflections* 22 [1/1996]: 77-90). Were it not for flawed military planning and concomitant defeat, which resulted in shock and humiliation, dislocation and confusion, the “divine surprise” seems a very remote possibility indeed.

Pétain, Pierre Laval, and Maxime Weygand actively opposed Premier Paul Reynaud, practically forcing his resignation on 16 June, and then awaited the parliamentary capitulation that culminated in the secession of power. It is crucial to note that the decision to seek armistice terms, dissolve the Republic and grant full powers to Pétain were voluntary. No fascist threat existed in Bordeaux or Vichy, the Nazis never demanded the elimination of the Third Republic, and the army did not plan a coup attempt. The argument that fear caused both the cessation of hostilities and the dissolution of the republican regime was originated by Léon Blum to explain the decisions of June-July 1940, and later used (for obvious reasons) by Pierre Laval and other collaborators to justify their actions. Yet Jacques Doriot had only a few dozen men at best in either city in June 1940, and the units stationed in Clermont-Ferrand were too few to possibly effectuate such a plot. Naturally, the Germans did not care about “regime change”—they simply wanted France out of the war (Jean-Pierre Azéma, *From Munich to the Liberation, 1938-1944* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984], pp.36-49; Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944* [NY: Columbia University Press, 1982], pp.3-50; Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001], pp. 112-136). This provides quite a contrast to May 1958, when the Fourth Republic faced a direct threat from the Algerian rebels and Operation Resurrection, which succeeded in taking Corsica and next targeted the *métropole*, although they had not yet sent paratroopers to Paris.

In fact, de Gaulle did not “use the 1958 Algerian crisis to destroy the Fourth Republic.” Instead, as Anthony Hartley asserts: “The Fourth

Republic was not so much murdered as pronounced dead on arrival" (Anthony Hartley, *Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972], p. 135). It is true that the French economy improved dramatically by 1958, as wages rose 40% after 1949, and the Schuman Plan inaugurated a trade surplus and long-term prosperity, in stark contrast to the shortages and rationing of the immediate postwar era. But governmental instability remained acute, with 24 failed ministries from January 1946 onwards, and in the radio-television age the entire population bore witness to such foibles. Nor could the deadlock be broken, because of the "Hexagonal Chamber." The National Assembly split into six factions, each containing 90-120 seats, necessitating shaky coalitions that broke down in a matter of weeks or months, and no leader emerged to forge national unity during the opening stages of the Algerian war, as Édouard Daladier managed to do in 1938. By the time of de Gaulle's return, there existed no comparable force in French politics, capable of resolving the political and colonial gridlock. Thus Algeria became the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back, and far from succumbing to de Gaulle's manipulations, the Fourth Republic summarily collapsed under its own weight.

Finally, the argument that de Gaulle and the National Assembly "contrive[d] to relive the panicked surrender by the government and parliament of June-July 1940" is slightly off target. Neither the General nor the authorities conspired to foment the military rebellion, despite the presence of Gaullists like Jacques Soustelle among the insurgents. In fact, the Algerian problem predated the Fourth Republic altogether. Caught between the demographic imbalance of the Muslim and European populations on one hand, and the intransigence of those of European descent in North Africa regarding the extension of rights and freedoms to indigenous inhabitants on the other, relations between the colony and the *métropole* began to deteriorate after the Great War. By the 1930s, well before the Algerian war and the crisis of 1958, the extreme-right found a willing audience among the locals. Jacques Doriot's Parti populaire français garnered 7,000 adherents in the department of Oran alone, buoyed by the 1936 Blum-Viollette proposal to increase the number of eligible Muslim

voters. The Croix de Feu/Parti social français similarly attracted crowds of thousands when Colonel de la Rocque spoke in Algeria (Archives d'Outre-Mer, GGA 3CAB/100, Report--23 July 1937; GGA 3CAB/47, Report--July 1935; Constantine B/3/635, 3 July 1937, "Parti social français"). Such European intransigence fuelled indigenous anger: it is no coincidence that the popularity of separatists like Messali Hadj and a variety of movements envisioning either radical reform or the disintegration of the colonial relationship soared at this time. Worse still, when the French government finally offered token advancement in March 1944, allowing 65,000 Muslims the right to vote, it simultaneously entrenched political inequality. Unsurprisingly, even the moderate voice of Ferhat Abbas rejected the deal. Subsequently, amid the postwar climate of decolonization and the 1954 defeat of French forces at Dien Ben Phu, the National Liberation Front declared its insurrection.

Such long-term trends explain why "little by little, as they kept pledging to keep Algeria French, successive French governments lost faith with all concerned including themselves." Michel Winock notes that the death knell of the Fourth Republic actually sounded on 6 February 1956, when socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet confronted an angry mob in Algiers, who understood all too well that he proposed to do in Algeria what Pierre Mendès-France had accomplished in Indochina, ending the problem-riddled colonial drama once and for all (Michel Winock, *La République se meurt: 1956-1958* [Paris, Seuil, 1985], chapter one). Although he paid lip service to the notion of "French Algeria," de Gaulle also realized that such an antiquated notion could not survive in the era of decolonization, and instead demanded a new form of association during the 4 June 1958 speech in Algiers.

Hence instead of an "unconscious replay," the May 1958 crisis conforms to a recurring pattern in French history, in which national emergencies initiate breaks with past political traditions, a phenomenon equally apparent after the revolution of 1848 with the emergence of Napoleon III, in 1871 with the birth of the Third Republic under Adolphe Thiers following the disastrous Franco-Prussian War, and even Clemenceau's ascension in 1917 during the Great War (René Rémond, 1958, *Le Re-*

tour de De Gaulle [Paris: Éditions Complexe, 1998], pp.146-148). Perhaps the most unique variant in 1958 is the limited nature of the emergency powers granted under Article 16, which placed a six-month term on de Gaulle's extra-parliamentary authority and demanded genuine constitutional revision within a republican framework. Pétain and Vichy operated under no such limitations.

In the final analysis, then, there existed no "inward compulsion" to relive a prior trauma. Instead, the disastrous political failure of the Fourth Republic, combined with the agony of decolonization (itself the product of long-term historical trends) and the threat of armed intervention from Algiers, vaulted De Gaulle to power. This is not to imply a condemnation of psycho-historical theory and practice in general, and certainly not the prolific and highly influential work of Rudolph Binion, but merely to state that in this narrow instance the argument presented does not correspond to the larger historical picture.

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National Trauma and History

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Rudolph Binion has written a fascinating article on the parallels between de Gaulle's destruction of the Fourth Republic and Pétain's destruction of the Third Republic 18 years earlier. Binion examines de Gaulle's personal psychology in order to illuminate his political actions in 1958. Binion combines the personal motivations of de Gaulle and his political action.

Binion puts the actions of Pétain and de Gaulle into their parallel political contexts, showing how each took advantage of a national trauma

to come to power and refashion France. Binion shows that in each case the National Assembly committed regime suicide in the face of national disaster, with the difference being that the 1958 instance was not a trauma for the French people, only for its political class. All this is handled brilliantly. Binion is concerned with the interaction of personal psychology, personal political goals and the wider political in the context of national trauma. What I think needs further clarification is the nature of political trauma and its effects on individuals. Why is it that the fall of France in 1940 or September 11, are experienced as traumatic even by people whose daily lives have not been altered?

Before going into the main subject of my comment let me raise one question about de Gaulle's rivalry with Pétain and its connection with the events of 1958. My question is, if de Gaulle had not been close to Pétain before WW II and had never gotten into an imbroglio with him over de Gaulle's ghost writing for Pétain, would de Gaulle have behaved any differently in either 1940, or, especially, in 1958? The discussion of de Gaulle's relationship with Pétain certainly adds to our understanding of de Gaulle personally, but is it likely to have made much difference to French history?

One issue Binion raises is the nature of national trauma and its transmission across generations. The fall of France was not the first national trauma to affect Pétain and de Gaulle. For both 1940 recalled the disaster of 1870-71, which they thought had been reversed in 1918. It is easy to understand how Pétain was traumatized by that French defeat; he was an adolescent when it happened. De Gaulle, however was not born until 20 years after the Franco-Prussian War. Never the less he suffered from that national trauma. How? His father, his teachers and others transmitted their feelings about the defeat to Charles, as he was growing up. This solves the problem Binion seems to have with the transmission of social trauma down the generations. It is transmitted socially. An individual grows up learning what is traumatic for his country or his people. The French Revolution of 1789 split the French people into two sides for the better part of two centuries. How was this achieved? The split was transmitted by the social

environment. It is perhaps ironic, that it is precisely the Fifth Republic that dissolved that long standing split, as Mitterand, I think it was, pointed out at the revolutionary bicentennial. Similarly, the French and Germans were hereditary enemies for about a century; an enmity that was eliminated and made irrelevant by the Cold War, the EU, and post war prosperity.

Binion approvingly quotes Paxton as saying 1940 was a trauma for the French. But for individual French people, it was a social trauma, not an individual one. (To be sure, for many French the defeat led to personal trauma as well. People fled their homes, were captured by the Germans, etc.) Defeat in war is in itself not a personal trauma. The emotional shock is a result of the individual's identification with the nation. An attack on the twin towers is experienced as an attack on me, even if I live in Peoria and don't know anyone in New York. An individual does not simply have a personal identity based on his or her individual life. We all have a "we" identity in addition to our "I" identity and there is not even a clear boundary between the two identities. What happens to us happens to me. Us, of course, includes many different groups. My family is disgraced, my school wins a football game, my nation loses a war; all affect me and in extreme cases traumatize me.

Why then was 1958 a trauma for the members of the French National Assembly and not for the French people. I can only speculate. For members the Assembly of the Fourth Republic, structured very much like that of the Third, the Republic's Assembly was part of their "we" identity. Their republic had failed. It could not solve the Algerian problem. So it turned to a man on horseback, as it had done in 1940, and as France had done a number of times before that. The French people saw this as a constitutional crisis, not a national crisis and were not unduly perturbed. In the end they were right. France under de Gaulle remained a "normal" European democracy. The French people's "we" identity was not traumatized by the events of 1958.

Marx famously begins his *The 18th of Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second

as farce." This statement has become almost a cliché, but it serves to remind us that in addition to the Freudian unconscious, there is a Marxist unconscious; or, what we might more broadly call a social unconscious. When de Gaulle said that in 1946 that in 1940 France needed both a Pétain and a de Gaulle he might simply have meant that given the French defeat, there was bound to emerge a defeatist leader and there was bound to be someone who would organize further resistance. These were social roles and it was likely, if not inevitable, that two people would emerge to fill them. How exactly each of them performed their roles was individual, and would depend in part on their personalities, but there were clear limits on what they could do. Pétain could not have revived French democracy and de Gaulle could not have created a semi-monarchy. As Norbert Elias has pointed out, society is a complex dance, which does not determine what each dancer does, but severely constrains it.

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De Gaulle, Collective Trauma, and Oedipal Drama

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Binion's notion of the intersection of a personal trauma with a collective one is interesting and within a psychohistorical tradition that he has enriched. In my response I will first summarize his arguments and then make some critical comments focusing on the author's failure to spell out his arguments as explicitly as I would prefer.

The young de Gaulle's dispute over authorship with Pétain is a threat to de Gaulle's identity. The personal ambivalence toward the good/bad father is then crucial to de Gaulle's historical reenactment of an Oedipal drama in a public arena. De Gaulle gets his revenge and affirms his identity by becoming the good father (the real savior) to Pétain's bad father (castrator of de Gaulle, whose pen's achievements are erased, and destroyer of the nation with whose greatness de Gaulle identifies).

Yet all the while de Gaulle retains the unconscious identification that produces imitation of Pétain. The crisis of 1958 leads to self-affirmation rather than guilt and self-defeat, just as it did with the dispute over authorship in the personal conflict with Pétain. That works well. It is de Gaulle's resolution of the Oedipal drama with Pétain as father figure. As for the politicians who replayed 1940, that is more clearly a case of fixation to the trauma and repetition compulsion. Binion identifies the problems associated with a theory of collective trauma. There is clearly a differential response to collective trauma and in politics the group is small enough and the reenactments public enough for a historian to see the differences. Binion thinks that this is a crucial point because he offers at length the transcript of the debate that shows that not all participants in the trauma have the same defenses; Tixier-Vignancourt, at least, had conscious access.

Aside from differential response, there is the transmission problem: how does collective memory get transmitted to future generations in a political community? Obviously, the intersection with and revival of the French variation of widely distributed mythologies helps to create greater uniformity and submission to the symbolic father/savior. The politicians and the media not only bear witness to the collective trauma but also use national mythology to evoke group psychology. Their narratives mediate and vivify the experience. One wonders how the Oedipal drama of submission to the father figure/savior plays to individuals or subgroups in a cultural community when the community's collective manhood is challenged in the rolling trauma of loss of power. Obviously, some are more likely than others to be governed by the reality principle and achieve conscious recognition of the repetition of an illegal cession of power to a strong man rather than remain enthralled by an unconscious fixation to the trauma. Others (the rebellious military men, etc.) are likely to assert their manhood against any father figure who represents surrender. So de Gaulle, like Pétain before him, faces different kinds of rebel groups. It would seem that loss of manhood is central to the French problem and de Gaulle just the right man to play the central role.

Binion's elegant style and manner of com-

position have both strengths and weaknesses for the exposition of the complex psychohistorical problems posed in this article. By choosing elegance over construction of the theoretical scaffolding and suggestion rather than full exposition he lets the psychohistorically educated reader tease out the implications and fill in the blanks. Sometimes less is more. However, the casual approach to theory and sources does create problems. I doubt that the author would agree with all of the summary that I produced. Nonetheless, writing it out made me aware of how little was actually said about the basics. In my next three paragraphs I spell out some of the reasons why I had to work to produce the summary.

The symptomatology of collective trauma is presented *en passant*. As the article unfolds it becomes clearer what the symptoms are and how they play out historically, but there is never a condensed statement or reference to the theoretical source(s) of the psychohistorical model. One might infer the classical Freudian theory of fixation to the trauma, repetition compulsion, etc., or Lifton's psychic numbing and other symptoms of trauma. Also, one wonders whether denial rather than repression should be invoked, but I'm not enough of a student of the defense mechanism to say. Of course, there are different kinds of trauma: loss or threatened loss of manhood, power and prestige, rape of the motherland, death immersions in warfare, historical dislocation, desymbolization, etc. If Binion's notion of good writing compelled him to present these things with a light touch or to ignore them altogether in the text, then perhaps he might have relegated such matters to footnotes.

The section on mythology might have been strengthened. French political mythology and the savior on a white horse go back quite a way (the French offering their variants of a more general mythology). The historical revival of the mythology in times of crisis (warfare, political chaos, loss of international prestige) can no doubt be plotted in French history (if it hasn't already been done) in a *longue durée* approach. Once again, Binion tends to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, which is understandable. At times, however, one still longs for a fuller statement of what may seem obvious to Binion and perhaps boring to specialists in the area.

The transmission problem for the collective memory of a trauma is presented late in the paper and, once again, the theoretical issues are discussed somewhat lightly in a personal statement about the author's changes of mind about genetic transmission. (To me, at least, genetic transmission of memory of events is beyond the pale of scientific speculation.) Surely, Binion cannot deal with the transmission problem definitively here, but he should at least give readers enough information to educate themselves about it. Clearly, there is some sort of differential transmission that depends upon a variety of factors, for example, a group's location (sometimes geographic, as in a death immersion in warfare, sometimes cultural and social) in relation to a process of historical dislocation or desymbolization (Lifton's terms) and loss of national-imperial prestige in a "rolling" trauma (events of 1940-1958). Obviously, the sight of Nazi troops and tanks parading in Paris was traumatic for those actually witnessing it, but a variety of media made that and similar experiences available to a larger population. More generally, participation in some kinds of trauma depends mainly upon one's physical place in a collective catastrophe whereas other kinds depend on one's access to the shared symbolism and mythology that revive universal or national dramas about catastrophes and survival in "the garb of the historical day." The French (as well as de Gaulle's) variations of traumas connected with the Oedipal drama are germane, but only suggested in footnote 24. I imagine Binion didn't want to repeat such matters.

In sum, I found Professor Binion's article extremely stimulating. It revived my own memory (perhaps a little traumatic) of trying in 1970 to study the collective trauma of the siege of Lenin-grad/St. Petersburg and failing. The relevance of trauma to psychohistorical work is so well established that it need not be argued. Indeed, there is a contemporary tendency to see trauma everywhere. Postmodernists, for example, have made trauma an important part of their historical work, leading them to reconnect with psychoanalysis on new terms. Quite clearly, the problems of collective trauma and its transmission remain central to historians' efforts. Whether we agree with him or not, Freud made collective trauma central to his theory of the origins of the Oedipus complex and the history of group psychology. One must applaud Pro-

fessor Binion's efforts to present in brief compass his latest solutions to the problems after long years of grappling with them.

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What was Relived in 1958?

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Having been firmly convinced by Rudolph Binion's dazzling and brilliant *Hitler Among the Germans* (1976) that the Führer and his confederates were indeed driven by a kind of inner compulsion to relive the traumatic shock of defeat that they had experienced in 1918, I find myself much more skeptical about Binion's present contention that the fall of the Fourth French Republic in 1958 constituted a traumatic reliving of the Third Republic's 1940 demise. Much of my skepticism centers around the related questions of exactly what was being relived in 1958 and who was doing the reliving.

Whereas the twin German defeats of 1918 and 1945 line up neatly, at least to the eye of this French revolutionary specialist, as closely matched versions of each other, the political/military threat to the Fourth Republic posed by rebellious French forces in 1958 appears as only the thinnest of echoes of the chaos, terror, and demoralization generated by the advancing German army of 1940. Moreover, however much the analogy may have served Tixier-Vignancourt's immediate political purposes, the "multiple, successive political defeats" suffered by the Fourth Republic would hardly be regarded by most historians of France as being anything close to "equivalent" to the "greatest of all setbacks" that the French suffered at the hands of the Nazi war machine (pp. 17-18). Binion, of course, recognizes the fundamental lack

of historical equivalence between a serious domestic crisis and a crushing defeat administered by a foreign army. However, he would no doubt insist, in the face of this rather obvious point, that, whatever criteria historians might invoke in attempting to differentiate significant historical similarities from superficial ones, 1958 was psychologically equivalent to 1940 in the minds of the relevant political actors and that these actors were ultimately internally driven to replay the scenario that had been enacted in 1940. But again what was the scenario that was relived in 1958 and who were the relevant actors?

In presenting the proposition that "the fall of France in 1940 was traumatic for the French" (that is to say, "all of France," including the political leadership) [p.7], Binion is clearly referring to the specific impact of devastating military defeat. Thus, quoting Robert Paxton, he notes that "the six weeks' defeat by German armies was a shattering trauma" and, with specific regard to the political establishment, states that "it was reeling from a present, crushing military defeat" (pp. 5,7). However, when it comes to his discussion of the reliving of the trauma of 1940, it turns out that the trauma that was relived "was not the military debacle of May-June 1940, but the regime suicide that ensued" or, in an alternative formulation, "the regime suicide as a derivative of the military debacle" (p.12). Now in asserting that regime suicide was the relived trauma, Binion would seem to be advancing the notion that in addition to the traumatization engendered by military defeat that everyone experienced, the political leaders who took part in the humiliating surrender of republican legality and legitimacy to Pétain were further traumatized by the "traumatic sideshow" that unfolded in Bordeaux and Vichy, and that it was this particular "governmental and parliamentary trauma," not the more general trauma induced by the military debacle, that was relived by the politicians who surrendered to de Gaulle in 1958 (p.13). But this way of looking at the matter immediately presents some problems.

For one thing, however generally accepted the proposition that "all of France" was traumatized by the 1940 defeat may be among the eminent historians that Binion cites and however justified he may be in concluding from this apparent

consensus that he need not provide "elaborate evidencing" for such a proposition (p.7), the same would hardly be true for what seems to be his own original suggestion that the regime suicide sideshow was a separate source of trauma for the political leadership. While it is certainly plausible and indeed perhaps quite likely that the wrenching and terrifying circumstances in Bordeaux and Vichy that eventuated in the handing over of unlimited powers to Pétain served to further traumatize many of the custodians of the republican flame, one would like to see more evidence of this than a couple of vague quotes about "fear" from Blum and Laval (pp.4-5). More substantively, even if we grant Binion's assumptions about the traumatic nature of the 1940 regime suicide, the decisive shift in focus in his paper from the military debacle of 1940 to the parliamentary debacle of 1940 raises serious questions about what he would call the "transmission" of this regime suicide trauma. (The problem of transmission, incidentally, is one that I am fortunate in not having to consider in my own current investigations into the ways in which the trauma induced by the threat of imminent death in summer 1789 impacted the subsequent behavior of early French revolutionary legislators who had been directly exposed to this threat.)

Referring to "the nationwide shock of the German onslaught in 1940," Binion states that "all of France was traumatized in June-July 1940" (pp. 7, 13). Accepting the general thrust of this idea as intuitively true, it is relatively easy to see how the 1940 "national trauma of defeat" (p.13) could, given the proper triggering circumstances, have become an influential factor in determining the course of conduct of the Fourth Republic's political leadership. For most if not almost all of the political leaders of 1958 had of course lived through 1940 and would therefore have had their own traumatic memories of that time. As for those who had somehow escaped direct exposure to the national trauma, most would have been exposed to the traumatic memories and reactions of family members who had lived through 1940 or, more broadly, to the traumatic narratives of that time that later took shape in French society and culture. (For an illuminating analysis of the process of social construction of "cultural trauma" as a possible means of trauma transmission, see Jeffrey

Alexander, "Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma," found in Alexander, *et. al.*, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004], pp.1-30.) But since, by Binion's own account, only the political establishment of 1940 and not "all of France" was traumatized by the sideshow of Third Republic suicide (which was of course the trauma that was supposedly relived), I found myself struggling to imagine a credible scenario through which this much less pervasive regime suicide trauma of the political leaders of 1940 might somehow have been transmitted to the 1958 politicians.

Now Binion might well object at this point that the means of transmission of the regime suicide trauma does not matter since he has "always expressly distinguished the known fact of transmission from the unknown means of transmission" (p. 13). But surely the "known fact" to which he is referring here is that transmission of trauma *can* occur, and it would seem to be the author's job to provide grounds for persuading the reader that such transmission actually occurred in this particular case. In the absence of at least a plausible hypothesis that might explain how a trauma experienced by a group of politicians in 1940 was transmitted to an almost entirely different group of politicians in 1958, it would seem prudent to assume that, whatever personal dramas de Gaulle may have been enacting or re-enacting in 1958, the surface parallels between the actions of the political leadership of 1940 and the actions of the political leadership of 1958 had little if anything to do with the reliving of a 1940 trauma.

Having said that, Binion's thesis could perhaps be resuscitated through the hypothesis (which would naturally require some documentation) that the memory of the 1940 regime suicide trauma emerged in the years following the war as a prominent element in the political culture of Fourth Republic parliamentary life. Pending such a demonstration, however, a more banal explanation of the regime suicide of 1958 would seem to be sufficiently serviceable. For faced with rebellious military forces seemingly intent on mounting (or at least carrying matters to the very brink of mounting) a violent coup and politically discredited on many levels, the political leaders of 1958 would seem to have done pretty much the only thing that

they could have done short of embracing some version of a blood bath. That the politicians of 1940 had done a similar thing under what amounted to no more than vaguely similar circumstances would not seem to have been something that they were, as Binion would have it, "in total denial" about (p.18); rather it would seem to have been something that was politically embarrassing and therefore something that they were understandably reluctant to publicly acknowledge, especially in response to the right-wing taunts of Tixier-Vigancourt. Indeed, if 1940 was somewhat of a precedent for 1958, so were 1799 (Napoleon Bonaparte's coup against the First Republic) and 1851 (Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte's coup against the Second Republic): in all four cases, the machinations which led to the illegal transfer of power from a parliamentary regime were accompanied by gestures of lip service to the forms of popular sovereignty. (Granted the parliamentarians of 1851 refused to acquiesce in their demise, but it certainly could be argued that a precedent for parliamentary suicide had been established in 1799.) Considering that each of the first three French republics also fell to a militaristic figure with a mythic allure, it would seem to make at least as much sense to read the fall of the Fourth Republic as a reliving of the recurring French fascination with the "man on horseback" than to read it as a reliving of a specific trauma associated with 1940.

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Psychohistory
makes the unconscious conscious

Pétain and De Gaulle: Recollections of 1940

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Professor Binion's article brought back a flood of memories. In June of 1940 it was my 11th birthday—no different than my other birthdays. I was in the hospital being prepared for another operation to exorcise the recurring melanoma. In bed in a ward most of the time, I had nothing to do but read, listen to a little portable radio, and work on my stamp collection. I had been an avid observer of European developments since 1937 when I helped collect food for the Spanish Republic and I was not particularly pro-allied. I considered the French rather stupid, and the English no better. The League of Nations was a failure. Spain, Ethiopia, Albania, and Czechoslovakia were symbols of cowardice. I thought that the Maginot Line, especially after the failure to link it with either the Albert Canal Line or extend it northwest toward the sea, as a useless and dangerous fantasy. With a detailed map I followed the progress of the German army—and much later the Italian army as they pushed through France. I hated the Fascists, but, in a way, I thought that the French got what they deserved for their betrayal of Spain, Ethiopia, and Czechoslovakia.

While radio commentators wondered where were the Parisian taxicabs, I wondered how the French General Staff could be so stupid. Hitler followed the same path as Bismarck in 1870 and the Germans in 1914. If I could see that, why couldn't they? What made them think that the Germans would attach through Alsace and Lorraine? A good typographical map would have demonstrated the stupidity of such an idea.

On June 5, the Germans opened a mass drive from Sedan to Abbeville. By then, the Netherlands and Belgium had capitulated and 215,000 British and 120,000 French had squeezed into boats at Dunkerque and reached the white cliffs of Dover. France was alone. The French army melted away. I studied the map and wondered where the French would make a stand. Would it be at the Loire? Would a new Charles Martel appear to stop the invaders? But my fantasy of

Charles Martel proved to be as realistic as the French fantasy of the Maginot Line. Verdun fell and the defenseless rear of the Maginot capitulated. Paris was declared an open city and the government fled to Bordeaux where, on June 16, Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain replaced the weary Paul Reynaud as Premier. A week earlier Italian troops crossed the frontier to retake that which Napoleon III had gained.

On June 17, Pétain requested an armistice. Hitler, who understood symbolic events, pulled the "infamous" railway car from the museum, and had it brought to Compiègne. Hitler, who had constantly referred to the shame, the humiliation, the degradation of 1918, was going to undo that. Now that railway car would symbolize German triumph and French humiliation. Hitler did not share his victory with II Duce, who had to wait two days for the signing of his armistice.

In London de Gaulle watched these events in horror. He and Churchill had called Reynaud in Bordeaux, but to no avail. De Gaulle flew to Bordeaux. Back in London, de Gaulle announced that he did not recognize the capitulation and that the struggle would continue. One can suppose that de Gaulle expected his June 23 pronouncement would be hailed by the French throughout the world. It was not! With the exception of French officials in Polynesia, most French colonial officials opted to serve the new remnant government being formed in Vichy.

It was in Vichy that the remnant of the Third Republic dissolved itself and transferred authority to Pétain, who created an executive-driven state. In a way, de Gaulle agreed with Pétain's creation. An authoritarian state could galvanize the glory of France and lead to a rebirth. But Pétain could not operate freely: he fired Pierre Laval in December, but was forced by Hitler to reinstate him in April of 1942. Pétain had failed.

France continued to be humiliated. On July 3, 1940, the British fleet sailed into Oran harbor and demanded that the French join them. When the French officers and crew refused, the British sank, disabled or captured the French Fleet. In the Caribbean, Roosevelt neutralized the French fleet. In Hanoi and Saigon the Japanese turned French officials into puppets. After June 22, 1941,

Stalin refused to recognize de Gaulle, except to note that a French legion was fighting for Hitler.

Only after December 7, 1941 did American and British forces allow de Gaulle to take over the French colonies in the Western Hemisphere and India—it served American and British interests to support the Free French. However, both Roosevelt and Churchill would have preferred someone else to lead the Free French.

The war ended. To many, de Gaulle was the symbol of France. Unfortunately for de Gaulle, France no longer was a world power and the French had more pressing problems than the loss of Empire. De Gaulle offered to lead under certain conditions—conditions which he though would restore the grandeur. But the French were busy creating the Fourth Republic, which included a Third House to represent the colonies. A magnificent idea, but it did not work, except that a few island territories became “French Overseas Departments.” The Fourth Republic did not solve the liabilities of the Third.

Except for the Overseas Department, the Empire was dissolving, while inflation reduced the Franc to over 500 to the dollar. By 1958, the monarchs in Morocco and Tunisia ended the French Protectorate while West Africa was just waiting to end the French occupation. In Algeria, the nationalists, with minimal popular support, were challenging the European population while the French army was preparing a coup to force the government to protect the rights of the European minority. In France, the government turned to de Gaulle in order to prevent the Algerian crisis from turning into a French civil war. De Gaulle demanded “reforms” such as those secured by Pétain and those he had failed to obtain in 1945-1946. The fear of a civil war in France was so pronounced that the Government capitulated and thus the Fourth Republic followed the Third into oblivion and, in the process, gave birth to the Fifth Republic.

If 1958 were a reply of 1940, with de Gaulle taking the role of Pétain, and I think that Dr. Binion's evidence is convincing, then we have to see if the catastrophe of 1958 was equal to that of 1940.

It was, but to see that reality we have to

look beyond the obvious military situation. The age of Empires was over. One by one, the European colonies had declared their independence. What happened to France happened to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Denmark and would soon happen to Portugal and eventually to Russia. But the French trauma was caused by something more than a loss of political-military power. In fiction, France was one of the “Big Five.” But that was a veneer. There was a deeper reality, a reality not quantifiable by the number of divisions, atomic bombs, or foreign bases. Let me spell it out.

English had replaced French as the language of diplomacy. Scholarly journals published in Europe and Asia appeared in English, while those that maintained the native language began to also accept articles written in English. Paris no longer had a monopoly on fashion. Teenagers all over looked the same—jeans and “DA” haircuts. Even for high fashion you had to make it in New York to be successful. On the university level the world flocked not to the Sorbonne, but to the United States. French cuisine still had lots of appeal, but the hamburger and coke was ubiquitous. The Paris Opera was great but was dwarfed by the Metropolitan Opera. Americans, Catalans and Russians *had* come to Paris to study art; *now* they flew to New York. Musicians *had* flocked to Paris, where jazz was welcomed, but *now* they went to the United States to learn and perform.

The trauma of 1958 was not so much the loss of Empire as the loss of status as a center of civilization. De Gaulle was a figure—a successful man on the white horse—a new Karlus Magnus—who would restore French grandeur. Churchill and Roosevelt disliked him for that very reason—they considered it arrogance. But that did not matter to the French. Yes, French India was lost, but the school in Pondichéry still taught in French. Yes, West Africa was lost, but Félix Éboué wrote his poetry in French and French was the working language of those states. The “Ivory Coast” insisted that the New York based United Nations change its official listing from the English Ivory Coast to the French Côte d'Ivoire. With pride the French could point to the French-African Free French who marched Chad through Libya to outflank the Germans at the Mareth Line and then move on to D-

Day, the entrance into Paris and the liberation of Strasbourg. Arrogance to the Anglo-Saxons was a restoration of dignity to the French.

Action has many levels of causation. De Gaulle had a private matter to settle with Pétain. De Gaulle and the French had to undo the humiliation of 1940 and 1958. To undo the humiliations it was agreed to sacrifice the Fourth Republic and create the Fifth Republic with the Great Charles as "the Sun President," who would illuminate the glory of France. If that vexed the Anglo-Saxons, "Long Live de Gaulle."

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Pétain and De Gaulle: A Contrast in Personality and Leadership

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The two most momentous and severe national crises for the French people in the Twentieth century brought to power individuals who were uniquely suited to handle these crises: Marshal Phillippe Pétain in dealing with the military defeat of France and the concomitant fall of the Third Republic in 1940, and General Charles de Gaulle in presiding over France in the wake of the fall of the Fourth Republic. Professor Rudolph Binion demonstrates how their personas intertwined and how the crisis of 1958 bears many similarities to the one of 1940, as well as great differences.

I concur with Professor Binion's thesis regarding de Gaulle identifying with Pétain about a

change in regimes; what he did resembled Pétain's own actions 18 years earlier. My paper, is also in line with the psychohistorical approach, which Professor Binion takes, will be to contrast their personalities. At the beginning of de Gaulle's military career, when he was a lieutenant, he chose to serve in the regiment commanded by Pétain, but they eventually came to clash in the 1920's over the authorship of a book de Gaulle ghost wrote for Pétain. In wanting credit for his work, de Gaulle defied Pétain, who was not only his superior officer, but now as a *Maréchal de France* was one of the most illustrious leaders in the French army.

Pétain and de Gaulle were temperamentally quite different, even though they had similar backgrounds and political orientations. True, these authoritarian traditionalists were both graduates of Saint Cyr, chose military careers, had Catholic upbringings, were monarchists, were not enamored with the course of the French Revolution of 1789, and were critical of the political system of the Third Republic. Eventually, they diverged, turned against each other, and came into power under dissimilar historical circumstances.

Fundamentally, Pétain and de Gaulle had radically different characters: disparate psychic structures, unconscious motivations, methods of reconciling intrapsychic conflicts, and patterns of behavior, feeling, and action. Their personalities developed in divergent childhoods, they came to power under quite different historical circumstances, and, because of their personal histories, took the French people in opposing directions. Pétain served to establish the reactionary, fascist, Vichy regime in 1940, whereas de Gaulle, despite his controversial rise to power, essentially took France in a progressive direction in 1958.

Professor Binion observes that eventually there was an "ambivalence" in the relationship of these two figures that turned "deadly" and that for their historic acts, "Tactics aside, the basic equivalence of 1958 with 1940 remains: just as Pétain had used the 1940 defeat to destroy the Third Republic, so de Gaulle used the 1958 Algerian crisis to destroy the Fourth Republic."

Turning our attention to the essence of their personalities and backgrounds, we begin with Pétain whose life and career can be epitomized in a

remark he made about himself, which was, "They only call me in disasters" (See Jacques Szaluta, "Marshal Pétain and the French Army Mutiny of 1917: A Study in Military Leadership and Political Personality," *Third Republic—Troisième République*, [No.6, 1978], pp.181-210). Pétain was a passive person who liked to be asked to respond to a crisis, unlike military officers who are expected to be assertive, like the more typical de Gaulle.

Pétain's childhood was traumatic. Philippe was born in 1856 to a peasant family in a small village, as the fourth child and the first-born son. When his mother died when he was 17-months-old his father hired a temporary housekeeper. In 1859, his father remarried and the following year his wife gave birth to a child. Soon thereafter, he was sent from his father's home to live with his maternal grandmother. At the age of 11 Philippe was sent to board in the Jesuit *collège* at Saint Bertin. In short, Pétain's childhood was marked by the anxieties and fantasies most dreaded by children. By the time he was only four years old he felt that he had been rejected by at least two women, and by his father. He was further abandoned by his family when he was sent to a boarding school. Such early traumatic experiences prevented him from developing, in the words of Erik Erikson, "basic trust" in people. This was accompanied by feelings of rage, loneliness, and low self-esteem.

The consequences of Pétain not having the advantages of a consistent, loving family affected him adversely throughout his life. His adult behavior was noted, widely witnessed, and recorded by his contemporary critics and supporters alike as being aloof, cold, reserved, cautious, and secretive. He did not have any close friendships with men or women. Not surprisingly, he did not marry until he was 64 years of age, and only after he had become a Marshal. Many felt that he was a pessimist, and at critical times in his career he was considered a defeatist. Many noted that he had a nervous tick in his eye, an example of unresolved emotional conflict defended against by repression. In his last years of life, he recalled his childhood experiences with bitterness: "My father remarried; my step-mother turned out to be a bitch; my parental home was practically closed to me" (For a more detailed discussion, interpreted in a psychoanalytic

light, see Jacques Szaluta, "Apotheosis To Ignominy: The Martyrdom of Marshal Pétain," *The Journal of Psychohistory*, Vol. 7, No. 4, [Spring 1980], pp.416-453).

Certainly, Pétain was an ambitious man, but in a reserved, overly modest, and sometimes self-effacing manner. In his pattern of behavior, he needed to be coaxed—to be "wanted"—and although he was to eventually win fame he did this in a defensive mode and he also ultimately acted in a self-destructive manner as I will show below. In 1914 he won an important battle on the defensive, and when he was in command at Verdun in 1916, the battle was fought on the defensive. He was summoned to quell the French Army mutinies of 1917 and again in 1934 following a Right-wing political insurrection in France. Then he served as ambassador to Spain after Franco's victory and finally, in 1940, to head the French state at Vichy. As France was being defeated by German armies in 1940, the government was split as to the continuation of the war: Pétain favored an armistice while Reynaud and most of the ministers were opposed to it. As Professor Binion discusses, the French government was being compromised by defeatist pressure to stop the fighting. Pétain especially wanted to end the war and was opposed to the government leaving for North Africa to continue the resistance, in opposition to Reynaud and most of the ministers who were opposed to the armistice. Due to his enormous prestige, a resignation by Pétain would have meant the collapse of the government. President Lebrun turned to Pétain on June 16, and asked him to form a new government. The Marshal of France was prepared and power was legally handed to him. Underlining the legitimacy of his ascendance, the opening words of Pétain's first address to the French people were, "At the appeal of the President of the Republic." The way Pétain reacted to and treated France's greatest national trauma, the *débâcle* of 1940, was distinctly linked to the experiences of his own childhood trauma. On July 10, the National Assembly voted full constituent powers to Pétain. Vichy, the new state which emerged was the kind of authoritarian regime he had always wanted for France. Pétain promised to create a better "New Order" with the Vichy State. In actuality, Vichy caused immense suffering for the French people, created civil war conditions, collaborated with the

enemy, and opposed the Allied liberators (Jacques Szaluta, "Marshal Pétain's Ambassadorship to Spain: Conspiratorial or Providential Rise Toward Power?" *French Historical Studies*, Vol. VIII, No.4 [Fall, 1974], pp.528-533).

Pétain courted suffering. Well before 1940, this was manifested in his speeches as he preached the value of regenerative suffering. Although born and raised a Catholic, he was in conflict with his religion and defied many doctrinal prohibitions: he did not attend church and married a divorced woman in a civil ceremony. (For his relationship with his wife, see Jacques Szaluta, "The Correspondence Between Marechal and Madame Pétain, 1913 to 1949: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation," *American Imago*, Vol. 47, No. 2 [Summer 1990], pp.169-196.) What was congenial to his neurosis is that he accepted the Church's social teachings such as mystical fatalism, motivated by personal suffering: he did seek martyrdom as he identified with Jesus Christ. It is in this sense that he declared in 1940, "I make to France the gift of my person to alleviate her suffering."

Ultimately, because of his rage and hostility, and unconscious recognition that he had "sinned," he sought to be punished. When he was tried for treason at the end of the war, he did little to contest his sentence but instead entrusted his judgment to "Fate," which is synonymous with what Freud calls "Destiny"—"the last representative of the parents." In August 1945, Pétain was found guilty of having collaborated with the enemy and he was condemned to death. Marshal Pétain wanted to be punished, to sacrifice himself, and to be a martyr (Szaluta, "Correspondence," p. 194). De Gaulle, the head of the Provisional Government, upheld the sentence, but because of Pétain's advanced age of 89, commuted it to life imprisonment. He insightfully observed of Pétain: "He wished to be judged and he *was*; for reasons of state, he had to be."

De Gaulle judging Pétain was a total reversal from only five years earlier, when following his own defiance of Pétain's Vichy State, he had been tried *in absentia* and condemned to death. However, in the inter-war years, Pétain had been de Gaulle's great benefactor. Just as there was an emotional cohesiveness and consistency throughout Pétain's life, culminating in his ignominious

martyrdom, de Gaulle's life and career made possible his apotheosis in 1958, culminating in being widely considered as the greatest leader of France since Napoleon.

In contrast to Pétain's early years, de Gaulle's childhood was remarkably stable and loving. He was born in 1890 as the third of four brothers and one sister. His parents had a comfortable bourgeois life and, as his father's financial circumstances improved, they lived in fashionable homes and had servants. They were devout Catholics and monarchists who had a patriotic interest in the position of France in European affairs. The de Gaulles were attentive to their children, they staged plays at home, went to the theater, and took vacations together. The future general identified closely with both of his parents. Charles remained close to his mother, maintaining an active correspondence with her until her death in 1940. The influence of Charles' father was heightened by all of his sons attending the Jesuit school where he taught. De Gaulle was a good student and a voracious reader who had a passion for history (Bernard Ledwidge, *De Gaulle* [NY: St. Martin's Press, 1982], pp.3-11). In line with growing up in such a nurturing family, he married at the age of 31, had three children, one of whom he named Phillippe, after Pétain.

As an indication of this fortunate and privileged childhood, de Gaulle opens the first of his three volume memoirs movingly as follows, "All my life I have thought of France in a certain way....inspired by sentiment as much as by reason. The emotional side of me tends to imagine France, like the princess in the fairy stories or the Madonna in the frescoes, as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny." This is a paean to his mother. Also in the first paragraph he states: "France is not really herself unless in the front rank...to my mind, France cannot be France without greatness." De Gaulle adds: "This faith grew as I grew, in the environment where I was born. My father was a thoughtful, cultivated man, imbued with a feeling for the dignity of France. He made me aware of her history. My mother had an uncompromising passion for her country, equal to her religious piety...a certain pride in our country came as second nature" (Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs: The Call to Honour, 1940-1942*, Vol. I, [NY: Viking

Press, 1955], p.4).

These remarks are revealing of his identification with his parents, the religious convictions he maintained, and an unstated royalism: French traditionalists believed that France could only be great when ruled by a king. By extension, this was a veiled criticism of the republican government and the multi-party parliamentary system. These remarks also serve to indicate de Gaulle's motivation for pursuing a military career, the nature of his principles, in the sense of his having demanding superego ideals and values, or conscience, as in his strong sense of duty. As he said, "When I joined the Army, it was one of the greatest things in the world" (De Gaulle, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p.4). De Gaulle was consistent. As a young lieutenant, he addressed new recruits, and he told them: "You are no longer ordinary men: you have become soldiers" (Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle: The Rebel, 1890-1944*, [NY: W.W. Norton, 1990], p.22).

Freud said that the essence of success was to have gotten farther than one's father. De Gaulle surpassed his father who was an ardent French nationalist who fought in the war of 1870, with the rank of lieutenant and was wounded in battle. It grieved Henri de Gaulle that Prussia defeated France, diminishing French prestige and power, and bringing about a republican form of government. As Jean-Raymond Tournoux writes, the father was "obsessed, and the obsession was revenge" (*Sons of France: Pétain and De Gaulle* [NY: Viking Press, 1966], p.5). Imbued with the glories of France by his father, as well as its reverses, the young de Gaulle was his father's apt pupil. The French army could be Charles de Gaulle's instrument of redress. While in the infantry during World War I, he amply demonstrated his valor and fighting spirit. Living by the code he advocated, he was wounded several times, narrowly escaped death, and ended up as a prisoner of war.

De Gaulle was a brilliant military historian and intellectual as well as a soldier. He wrote widely on military affairs, was a visionary if not a prophet, and with realism explained and rationalized the historic importance of armies and the use of force by the state. His book, *At the Edge of the Sword*, (Criterion Books, 1960), points to his behavior in 1940 and 1958 and reveals his dedication

to exemplary military virtues such as the need for courage and the necessity to maintain the will to achieve victory. He believed "the fighting spirit, the art of war, the virtues of the soldier are an integral part of man's inheritance.... The self-sacrifice of individuals for the sake of the community, suffering made glorious...are the basic elements of the profession of arms." Furthermore "The noblest teachings of philosophy and religion have found no higher ideals" than the profession to which he devoted his career (*Edge of the Sword*, p.10).

In both his writings and actions, de Gaulle is consistent. While still a junior officer, he wrote his book, *The Edge of the Sword*, which he starts with a quote from Shakespeare (italics are his): "*Rightly to be great is not to stir without great argument*" (p. 7). It is a meaningful precept, revealing that he understands that to be a maverick, to stand out against great odds, is going to be controversial. It's a premonition of what he will do in a crisis, and it points to the role he will play throughout his career, tenaciously in 1940 and in 1958.

Although there are similarities between the acts of de Gaulle and Pétain, ultimately de Gaulle's intentions were quite different. Highlighting their dissimilarity, de Gaulle was an astute politician who was more in touch with reality than Pétain. This included acting deceptively and cryptically even to his supporters. Under the circumstances he did not have much of a choice, for he had a higher purpose in mind, a form of "necessity of war."

What he planned and he achieved was to establish a new republic, save the nation from civil war, and end the conflict with Algeria. Though de Gaulle often acted imperiously and controversially while in power, his rule was marked by many successes and reverses. Overall, he was a more adaptive, flexible, intellectual, and realistic than Pétain. Also, he was far less angry toward the people of France.

There is also the matter of the psychic differences between the two men. Certainly, de Gaulle initially had a favorable opinion of Pétain, and was impressed by him since Pétain was distinguished, the colonel of his regiment, and appeared to be a military maverick. But this idealized view could not last, as the course of events would even-

tually determine, for their diverging temperaments revealed themselves in the military theories they espoused. Clearly, their conscious and unconscious motivations were not compatible. Before World War I, Pétain favored the doctrine at the defensive, which had much tactical merit, but de Gaulle was a man with a zeal for the offensive spirit. De Gaulle sensed, or intuited, that Pétain's military strategy was not the ideal one for ultimately achieving victory. As Jean Lacouture writes of the private notebooks de Gaulle kept of this time, he already was not in agreement with Pétain (*De Gaulle*, pp.21-23). The seeds for 1940 and subsequent divergences with Pétain germinated in 1913. Remarkably, in a lecture on patriotism to a group of officers in 1913, in which he made many encouraging remarks, de Gaulle said perspicaciously "the man who does not love his own mother more than other mothers and his own country more than other countries loves neither his mother nor his country!" (Lacouture, *De Gaulle*, p. 25). Pétain did not love his mother, while de Gaulle certainly loved both his mother and motherland.

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Commentary on Binion

Henry R. Winkler
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Binion's paper compares the similarities (and the differences) in the accession to power of Pétain in 1940 and the return of de Gaulle in 1958. The end of both the Third and the Fourth Republics came in the aftermath of defeat—by the German armies in 1940; in Indo-China and North Africa, as well as after Suez, but also, in 1958, to avert a military coup by the army leaders fearful of a sellout in Algeria to those struggling against

French control. De Gaulle orchestrated surrender in Algeria quite contrary, presumably, to the expectations of those whose possible revolt had precipitated the political crisis in France, but like Pétain he then proceeded to implement a change in regime that put much greater power in his hands as the executive leader of the state.

All this is simply to outline what occurred. Binion's paper is an exploration of how de Gaulle followed in the footsteps of the man whose protégé he had been and with whom he had broken long before the debacle of 1940. As he puts it, "...just as Pétain had used the 1940 defeat to destroy the Third Republic, so de Gaulle used the 1940 defeat to destroy the Fourth Republic." To do this, both had to have help. By far the most interesting part of this paper is Binion's commentary on the actions of French legislators and government. In 1940 the split and uncertain parliamentarians were under pressure from the German armies at the doorway to Paris and from collaborationists at home; in 1958 from the French army in Algeria but also at home. Fear was the dominant note in both cases. Structurally, Binion notes, 1958 was a replay of 1940. In effect, the politicians were reliving the trauma of the first crisis in the second. No one who lived during 1940, he cites Robert Paxton as pointing out, quite got over the shock. An amateur psychologist might go further than the informed assessment of Binion and suggest that perhaps a substantial element of psychological guilt at their respective roles in the ordeal of defeat encouraged the surrenders of both years.

In this part of the paper in particular, Binion raises serious questions about the contingency of history. In psychological perspective, once the mechanism of reliving the past experience kicked in, Pierre Pflimlin, the head of government in 1958, had to resign as did Paul Reynaud in 1940 and President René Coty was bound to appoint de Gaulle just as President Albert Lebrun had appointed Pétain.

Binion is clear about the reasons for de Gaulle's success in 1958. The potential Algerian putschist diehards supported him because he had resisted capitulation in 1940, while the anti-putschist did so because he had restored republican legitimacy in 1944. Having failed to forge the new regime in his own image in 1944-46 as Pétain had

done earlier, he now saw himself as carrying out the “providential mission” that was reserved for him. In effect, he hijacked the political crisis for his own personal and public purposes. All of this, Binion argues both explicitly and implicitly, was done under the shadow of the man who had once been his mentor. His ambition for himself was to emulate the role that Pétain had played as a symbol of France itself.

The similarities between 1940 and 1958 are obvious enough and Binion has clearly assembled the parallels that make his case. He is even persuasive on what “inwardly” impelled de Gaulle to return to political life and what “inwardly” impelled the political establishment to recall him. Least convincing is his commentary of the “Pétain book” ghost-written by de Gaulle in the 1920s and published under the latter’s name in 1938. Citing de Gaulle’s comment that “a book is a man,” Binion remarks on his ambivalence toward Pétain who had been his “loyal patron” in the twenties and thirties. To suggest that de Gaulle was already playing at being Pétain in the earlier period and that in 1958 he was reversing Pétain’s previous unwillingness to give him credit for his work may well be psychologically correct, but in this paper at least the evidence is not marshaled to make the case. A comparison may be apt in the case of another larger than life figure. Winston Churchill’s biography of his father has been offered as evidence of his desire, both to deny the obvious failure of Lord Randolph and at the same time of his drive to reverse his father’s failure in his own career. What then to make of his somewhat hagiographical biography of his ancestor Marlborough which might appear to be a different kind of model impelling him to success in the field and in the corridors of political power. But it needs more than the suggestions in the two biographies, of course, to explain the complicated motivations of a Churchill. Similarly, I would suppose, in the case of de Gaulle.

Contrary to his earlier view that the 1940-58 parallel was unconscious—on the part particularly of the politicians making decisions—Binion now sees the parallel as much more consciously remembered, however much denied. He quotes from the constitutional debate of 1958. Although Vichy was seldom mentioned in the debates that

succeeded de Gaulle’s accession to office, Binion pointedly notes the exchange of views between the rightist parliamentarian Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt and the new head of state on the latter’s bit for Pétain-like constituent powers. He notes that in the earlier period, de Gaulle had opposed granting such powers to Pétain “for all he was worth,” yet he, along with the politicians, now was following in almost the exact footsteps of their predecessors.

Binion suggest the continuity of understanding in the two eras, but might well have expanded his evaluation of the continuity of politics in the France of post-1940. Whatever may be—if ever—the final verdict on the French resistance after 1940, many of the politicians who served in 1958—like the right-wing Tixier and his left wing friend, Francois Mitterand, a future Socialist President of the Republic, also served, if only in minor roles, in the Vichy regime that emerged from military defeat. Binion’s emphasis on the psychological elements behind the reprise of 1958 helps illuminate, if it doesn’t entirely explain, not only “De Gaulle at Pétain” but also the remarkable similarities between 1940 and 1958 in the choices made by French legislatures and governments when confronted with the reality of traumatic defeat.

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Thoughts on Binion's "De Gaulle as Pétain"

Robert Zaretsky
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I enjoyed Rudolph Binion's brisk, energetic and provocative narrative of the falls of the Third and Fourth Republics, but I also have a number of hesitations that, due to the limitations of time, must be addressed in rapid succession.

First, Professor Binion states that the great republican march on 28 May 1958 was "against de Gaulle"—this is perhaps too broad a claim, when speaking of nearly 200,000 participants. More nuanced, I think, is Jean-Pierre Rioux's conclusion, in his authoritative work on the Fourth Republic, that the march was instead directed more against "the *paras* [paratroopers] and 'fascists'" in Algeria than de Gaulle (*The Fourth Republic: 1944-1958* [Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987], p.308). Similarly, Professor Binion claims, with no documents in hand, that de Gaulle, in his meeting with President Coty, agreed to an appearance before the National Assembly only after "much wrangling" (p. 2). Yet according to de Gaulle's *Memoires d'espoir*, he and Coty "reached an understanding at once" (Quoted in Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle: The Ruler: 1945-1970* [NY: W.W. Norton, 1994], p.175). While de Gaulle's version is of course de Gaulle's, I would like to learn of conflicting accounts if Professor Binion knows of any. Professor Binion also dismisses as "contrived" de Gaulle's assertion that "France's troubles, Algeria inclusive, were all attributable to the nature" of the Fourth Republic (p. 2). Yet most contemporary and retrospective accounts cite the structural inadequacies of the Fourth Republic as a primary cause of the political *immobilisme* that was made fatal by the Algerian question.

Now, these reservations may well be quibbles. Yet I mention them because they seem symptomatic of a larger and more problematic interpretative approach, one that strikes me as invariably hostile or dismissive of de Gaulle (with whom, I must add, I do not share a particularly deep ideological kinship). Professor Binion avers that there is a "basic equivalence" between Pétain and de Gaulle's assumptions of power because both men

used national crises to destroy, respectively, the Third and Fourth Republics. Yet it is surely important to recall that Pétain (and his erstwhile collaborator, Pierre Laval) had no intention of maintaining republican institutions or values, while de Gaulle explicitly committed himself to doing so. It is, in this respect, telling that Professor Binion relegates to a footnote the six-month limit on the use of special powers accepted by de Gaulle—a limitation that was non-existent for Pétain and his *Etat français*—and ignores the fact that de Gaulle's cabinet, stocked with republican *notables*, emphasized continuity, not rupture with the past.

Finally, there is Professor Binion's assertion that de Gaulle's rise to power in 1958 was a deliberate "restaging" of his "own specific side-show, Pétain's intended theft of his identity in 1928" (p. 11). The reference here is to the squabbles between the two men that spanned the years 1928-1938 and concerned their respective roles in the writing of the book that de Gaulle ultimately published as *La France et son armée*. It may well reveal my own inadequacies as a student of psychohistory, but I simply do not see any evidence for the claim that de Gaulle remained emotionally dissatisfied even after his declaration of independence from Pétain's patronage in 1938. Not only is there the absence of any proof for Professor Binion's assertion that the book's publication in 1938 "did not placate [de Gaulle] down in the deep dark depths where grudges fester" (p. 10), but as far as I can tell, there is the absence of any narrative or interpretive *need* for such a claim. To state with Professor Binion that de Gaulle's festering grudge led him to "literally [take] a leaf from Pétain's historic book when he demanded the same constituent powers as Pétain in 1940 in the same terms as Pétain in 1940 while refusing to acknowledge Pétain as his source" (p. 10) strikes me as a clever gloss but dubious history. That France still enjoys political life under the constitution of the Fifth (i.e., de Gaulle's) Republic reminds us, contrary to Professor Binion's claim, that the two men did *not* demand the same constituent powers. Moreover, the proper contextualization of events in 1940 and 1958 reveal that these powers simply were not demanded in the same terms. Finally, there is the ostensible refusal by de Gaulle to acknowledge Pétain as his source. Let me suggest that he may have done so for the very good, though pedestrian

reason that an abiding concern for a stable form of republican government, and not settling an old score with Pétain, was the source of his actions.

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Rudolph Binion Replies

Such a variety of expertise has been lavished on my brief study that, unsurprisingly, its basic contention has more than once been lost in the shuffle. This contention is that the key factors of the French regime suicide of 1940 recurred *mutatis mutandis* in 1958 even while the 1940 precedent was expressly denied. That recurrence was accordingly an unconscious reliving, which in turn argues a traumatic original.

To say that the key factors of the 1940 original were replicated in 1958 is emphatically not to say that the two events were identical otherwise. Indeed, even those key elements each recurred with unessential variants galore. Thus one key factor of the Vichy trauma relived in 1958 was

the figure of the heroic savior claiming rapport with the French nation as a whole as against its politicized factions. That, beyond this crucial likeness, Pétain and de Gaulle were less than ideological twins is no news and no matter. Another key factor of the 1940 trauma relived in 1958 was an escalating crisis of felt vulnerability within the regime. Two discussants contend that in 1958 the pressure on the regime from the French insurgents and native rebels in Algeria was nowhere near that from the advancing German army in 1940. A third reverses the disparity, contending that neither the Germans nor still less Weygand or Doriot threatened the regime in 1940 as much as did the seditious colonels in 1958. Still others find that the regime was equally squeezed in the two instances. The bottom line remains: that in both cases the regime felt itself on the brink. Yet another key piece of the 1940 action replicated in 1958 was the personal powers accorded Pétain and then de Gaulle. That a six-month constituent deadline was set for de Gaulle as against Pétain is no objection; on the contrary, it was set just because of the Vichy precedent. Nor does it hurt that some pre-1940 precedents also show through the 1958 collapse: none of them shares in the telltale structural equivalence of 1940 with 1958. Neither does it stymie me that the Fifth Republic, unlike Pétain's État Français, has proved durable: its duration is beside my point of the congruence of de Gaulle's with Pétain's terms of empowerment. True, de Gaulle's constitution, because it required popular ratification, left the chambers with a stronger role than de Gaulle personally considered wise. For the rest, though, it was custom-made for de Gaulle, so it is one of the ironies in which French history abounds that it should have outlasted him this long. François Goguel, while helping draft it with Michel Debré in the summer of 1958, told me they were reckoning on a ten-year run. But this Hegelian cunning of history is irrelevant to my focal concern with the structural equivalence of the two events.

On to the individual comments, beginning with our genial editor's. Unconscious repetition was for Freud now a substitute remembering, now a striving for inurement. Neither quite applies to traumatic reliving. In a book-to-be on reliving in all its forms I intend to show, though, that Freud initially understood and treated hysteria as trau-

matic reliving—as the disguised, contrived, unconscious replay of some recent trauma. Alas, de Gaulle's personal psychology, so finely illuminated by Paul Elovitz, was not my subject—"alas" because I would have stuck with biography all my days except that I saw as a historian that it could never add up to history and as a psychohistorian that groups often pursue purposes unknown to their members. So I've been bogged down in "group process" ever since.

I bask in the tribute to my work from such a master of psychohistory as David Beisel and applaud his powerful vindication of traumatic reliving, which has spooked history since day one. More, I actually share his one reservation about my present piece, for I see compulsion as outweighing contingency in the fall of the Fourth French Republic only "once the mechanism of reliving kicked in." There I am sadly adamant: once traumatic reliving starts, it just won't stop. For the rest, history is what people do, and people do what they want to do as far as they are able. What they want to do is, though, often dictated by unconscious compulsions of which I have spent much of my life isolating and defining that one insidious, nasty kind.

I revel equally in the tribute from brilliant David Felix (to think he was once actually my student!) even while also admittedly failing to see wherein Pétain played at being de Gaulle as Felix suggests. Or no, wait! In the very act of writing this now I think I've caught it: Pétain at his trial tried to steal de Gaulle's thunder by presenting himself in de Gaulle's own language as France's savior too. Ingenious, indeed irresistibly so—and if I am guilty as charged, and I think overcharged, of not spelling out my theses in full, now I can boast that I am in the best of company.

A crack therapist and theorist both, David James Fisher raises all the big basic questions to which I'm still seeking answers. In effect he lays out pretty nearly my own entire agenda for psychohistory. Would I could draw on clinical experience like his to complement my historic approach, especially for insight into how groups and their individual members interact. How group consciousness works even in traumatic reliving (my signature syndrome) is still far beyond me. I do not even know yet which persons or groups will relive a

trauma rather than just painfully remember it, let alone why. A couple of years ago I figured out that the choice to relive turned on felt guilt—only to spot exceptions after I'd gone to press. Myopically, I never so much as glimpsed shame behind the guilt. I did see, though, like Fisher, that the pain of a trauma is what fuels its later relivings (tricky as is the concept of unconscious pain). In sum, I can answer precious few of Fisher's probing questions, and those only provisionally. Thus collective trauma appears not to differ from individual trauma, at least not in the ways in which it is relived, though admittedly I may be blind to the differences. Also, trauma in my historical experience is not earmarked so much by fear at the heart of it as by a stunning upset to the accustomed order of things, physical or moral. I can comfort myself however feebly for the theoretical inadequacy of my shorter historic case histories, including this one, by considering that empirical studies are no place for elaborate theorizing. I do more theorizing in my "group process" book now in press (*Past Impersonal*) and plan to do still more in the book on reliving that's next on my drawing board. But even there I fear I may leave readers dissatisfied—which, I submit, isn't the worst way to leave them. As for my personal traumatic input into my research, I must leave that for Jimmy Fisher to tease out of me when next we meet.

I am puzzled by Richard Golsan's reservations about my approach in "De Gaulle as Pétain." How can structuralism applied to successive historic events lack "historicity"? And isn't it also a schematizing of "complicated human circumstances" on Golsan's part to say anything as unexceptionable as that "Pétain created an overtly dictatorial state" or that this state "sought to humiliate the French in order, in part, to control them?" Yes, the apprehensions over de Gaulle's return in 1958 proved ill-founded, wherewith it left no legacy of trauma behind. How does that trump the structural equivalence of de Gaulle's return and Pétain's advent? As for de Gaulle's die-hard grudge against Pétain over *Le soldat*, (*France and Her Army*) it surfaced baldly enough in 1928 and 1938. But no further proof of it is needed than de Gaulle's later appropriation of Pétain's Vichy text without acknowledgment; to paraphrase Dave Beisel, the proof is all in the pudding. Such tit-for-tat is, alas, the "simplistic and immature" way with uncon-

scious grudges, however great the soul that harbors them. Even so, my closing statement about inner compulsion expressly applies only to the mechanism of traumatic reliving, not to de Gaulle's grudge. I too would want history more open to purposive control than I often find it. I trust that my quoting de Gaulle on France as having needed both Pétain and de Gaulle reminds no one else of false claims by former Vichyites. And did I really say that what the politicians were bent on reliving in May 1958 was "handing over power irresponsibly"?

John Hellman's masterly brief account of young de Gaulle smarting against the rule-bound military hierarchy topped by Pétain nicely contextualizes my reductive analysis. I meant to stay noncommittal as to whether de Gaulle was personally traumatized by the 1940 defeat—whether in his "double denial" of it he spoke for himself as well as for France. His memoirs do blur the point, which might suggest that he was not except that some traumas are not consciously registered or are denied along with the traumatic event itself (thus my Frau Lou forever denied Nietzsche's traumatic putdown of her that she spent her whole later life reliving). Yes, de Gaulle's return in 1958 did differ in several particulars from Pétain's advent in 1940, beginning with its having been a return as against an advent: no contest. But can't it as well be argued that Pétain was the last President of the Council of the Third Republic as that de Gaulle was the last President of the Council of the Fourth?

Samuel Kalman stresses several very real ideological differences between Pétain and de Gaulle. But again, apart from that pivotal item of the 1958 reprise of 1940, "the appointment of a charismatic outsider," the likenesses and unlikenesses of those two "mythical saviors" were none of my proper business as I sought to distill structural basics out of the maze of detail. Maybe in hindsight the Fourth Republic was more of a push-over for de Gaulle than the Third had been for Pétain, but few who did the pushing in 1958 felt that way. Shaky as it was at times, like all French regimes, surely the Fourth Republic was not still-born. Mendès-France galvanized it even in liquidating Indochina where Daladier had split the Third Republic in selling out Czechoslovakia. To the points that Kalman concedes to the Fourth I

would add: the best social insurance system anywhere. And strain as I may, I find it hard to see some rotten tomatoes thrown at Guy Mollet in Algiers toppling however shaky a Republic in Paris by delayed action over two years later.

Daniel Klenbort raises the question of contingency differently from Beisel and, I think, unanswerably: would it have made much difference to French history in 1940 or 1958 had de Gaulle never been personally involved with Pétain? I'd guess not on de Gaulle's side—only that he might then quite likely have been open to less tainted terms of empowerment in 1958. His nontraumatic grudge against Pétain triggered no compulsive mechanism, only a comical tit-for-tat. On the other hand, the reliving of the collapse of the Third Republic downright required that same Vichy text again in 1958. On another score, if the trauma of 1870-1871 struck young de Gaulle with full force through transmission by his elders, he was preternaturally receptive. Ordinarily a traumatic punch sufficient to impel reliving cannot be conveyed once removed, let alone twice or more removed as in certain other historic cases. That is why, though I continually reconsider social transmission, I continually conclude against it. Finally, Klenbort is right on target with that "'we' identity" except that I would pluralize it, as indeed Klenbort promptly does in practice (my family, my school, my nation). His resultant explanation of how the French political establishment could relive a 1940 trauma of its own in 1958 is compelling: *Chapeau!*

Philip Pomper, who knows his theoretical scaffolding, has a deft grasp of the weaknesses of mine. I have no "psychohistorical model," let alone any "theoretical source (s)" for it. I am still only piling up empirical cases before synthesizing and theorizing—still only groping my way where others have gone astray. On "traumas connected with the Oedipal drama" I have, though, had my say, if not in the sense that Pomper intended, in the Oedipus chapter of my *Sounding the Classics*.

Like John Hellman fleshing out my all too analytic presentation with rich historic detail, J. Lee Shneidman has my immense gratitude for his "flood" of personal memories that make it come alive.

Well may a regime trauma within a na-

tional trauma be puzzling to Barry Shapiro (unlike Daniel Klenbort), but I can't help it if just such a trauma was relived in Paris in May 1958. All France was traumatized in 1940 by the defeat while France's political representatives were traumatized additionally by the death blow they dealt the Republic. Though collateral evidence for this second trauma abounds, its point-by-point reliving is the clincher. With a single, maverick exception, the national assembly of 1958 was in total denial from left to right not of some vague repetition in remotely similar circumstances (can perceptive Barry Shapiro really see no more than this between the two events?), but of the black-on-white congruence of the death warrant it was issuing for the Fourth Republic with the one issued in Vichy for the Third. Agreed, this unconscious reliving raises thorny problems of trauma transmission, but they cannot be solved by reducing the complexities of a two-time regime suicide to the cliché of the "man on horseback."

Jacques Szaluta has sharpened my point by differentiating and indeed contrasting Pétain and de Gaulle as to character and intentions even while maintaining the basic equivalence of the 1958 with the 1940 crisis and its dénouement. For the course that crisis ran was determined in each case by the political establishment and not by Pétain or de Gaulle. I really should let more than well enough alone, but I can't help remarking that de Gaulle too was a crisis politician like the Pétain who said: "They only call me in disasters."

I am much in Henry Winkler's debt for so ably distilling my arguments. For reasons alphabetical, I have already spoken to his closing points previously raised except to stress again now that the Fourth Republicans were not conscious of going out as the Third Republicans had gone; only Tixier-Vignancourt noticed the reliving under-way—a baffling anomaly in my data base.

Robert Zaretsky is right that the May 28 march was a demonstration of popular solidarity against the threat from Algiers, but it was no less unequivocally a demonstration against de Gaulle. De Gaulle blamed the regime for all of France's problems without specifying Algeria, nor did the regime cause the Algerian problem just by failing to solve it. I did not say that de Gaulle's return in 1958 was a deliberate restaging of the earlier theft

of his identity by Pétain, but only that he restaged that theft of his identity through his return. His "much wrangling" over the terms of his return is so richly documented as against his own denial that I saw no need to reference it—and can't do so now, being away from my sources for the year ahead: my apologies. Finally, my point is not that de Gaulle's intended use of his constituent powers in 1958 was identical with Pétain's in 1940, but only that the terms on which he demanded and then received those powers were dated Vichy 1940. His ministers deceptively denied this for him to the Assembly in his presence with no one objecting despite Tixier's exact if taunting statement of the fact.

In closing, my great thanks to our ever so enterprising editor and again to all who answered his call. I have done their searching comments scant justice with my rough responses. These leave me uneasily aware that the very ground rules of psychohistory have yet to be written. At the same time they encourage me to keep trying.

[Editor's Note: The reader should know that Professor Binion responded to the 14 commentators under severe time pressure, in extreme heat, and without a printer, so he had to work from the screen without paper copies. We are most appreciative of his endeavors, intellect, and openness to other peoples' ideas. He continues to be a pioneer doing yeoman service in the building of psychological history.] □

Book Reviews

The Changing World of Children

Valerie Scott Massimo
Ramapo College

Review of Ted George Goertzel and Ariel Hansen, Cradles of Eminence: Childhoods of More Than 700 Famous Men and Women. Scottsdale, AZ: Great Potential Press, 2004[1st edition in 1962], hardcover. ISBN 0-910707-56-1, xxxi, 456 pages, \$24.95.

Review of Shirley Camper Soman, Lets Stop Destroying Our Children: Society's Most Pressing Problem THEN AND NOW: A Compari-

son. NY: ASJA Press, 2003 [1st edition in 1973], paperback. ISBN 0-595-28228-8, xiii, 377 pages, \$26.95.

Last week my father died, sensitizing me all the more to issues of death, loss, and remembrances of my own childhood. I thought of mine as a safe, if not entirely happy childhood, but these two books made me realize the minefields I navigated and the benefits I enjoyed growing up. As a social worker, professor, and mother, my responses range from optimism about the prospects for children and my fears for their future. In the 1960s and 70s, two conflicting views of children were coming more clearly into the focus of society and those who were creating psychohistory. Much less was known about childhood and its influence on adult lives, but as these connections were beginning to be made, two very different works appeared and added to our understanding of childhood, society, and societal responsibility for children. The Goertzels, building on the traditional biographical emphasis on family in the development of character and the newer field of child psychology, represent the strand of finding the origins of adult accomplishment in the lives of the "eminent" as children. Shirley Soman, in contrast, approaches the lives of children from the standpoint of the engaged and enraged social worker, calling for society to wake up and stop destroying our children. The former book is hopeful about using our knowledge to help children to flourish, while the latter is pessimistic, evincing a gloom supported by myriad horror stories and statistics. I lived a blue-collar childhood in a trailer park typical of the South, surrounded by prejudice, as well as many of the dangers Soman explores. But I was also surrounded by family members who knew I could "do better" than they had. Their support was palpable and representative of families described in *Cradles*.

Both of these books are second editions published decades after their first release, with concluding chapters written about children and families today. The original editions suffered from the myopia of their time. In the 1960s and 70s there was far less discussion of girls than boys, something the authors have become sensitive to and attempted to rectify. Initially, there was a miniscule representation of women among the eminent

and less discussion of girls among the suffering children. Despite chapters on "today" that conclude the new editions, their juxtaposition with the original editions and with one another brings into focus the many ways in which things have changed for children, and, as is so often the case in society, how much remains the same. While Goertzel and Hansen concentrate on what goes right for a fortunate 400 children of yesteryear and 300 "eminent" of today, Soman describes in graphic detail what goes wrong for 1000s of others in recent years. Her accounts are most disturbing when she reviews bureaucratic responses to her first edition, particularly in Texas, where it appeared that her work might precipitate lasting change. Both books provide valuable insights into the world of children and tell engaging or enraging stories, and each adds to the literature on children, families, and society in a unique way. After a short overview of the two books, I will examine their contrasting and complementary themes.

Cradles of Eminence was originally published in 1962 and focused on the childhoods of 400 eminent individuals. The authors defined eminent persons as those who had at least three biographies written about them. As an elementary school student growing up in South Florida, I remember haunting the "biographies" section of the school and public libraries. After discovering a book I liked, I would venture through the author's other works, and then read all the biographies I could find about that author. My plan was to be an author myself some day, and I wanted to know how they did it. I'm sure I read some of the biographies the Goertzels reviewed for their first edition. These very biographies may have been the basis of selection of "eminent" found in the first edition.

The Goertzels' 1962 method of selection protected against personal bias through selection of their own favorite players in society, such as actors or politicians. However, cultural bias is clearly reflected in the biographers' (though not Goertzel and Hansen's) choice of subjects. Biographical authors were influenced by the time during which they wrote and their perspective audience—impacting on their selection of subjects. Rather than focusing on the constraints of their selections, I appreciated the "view from within"—just as I had as a child, I felt surrounded by the people who

shaped the world.

As to content and organization of material, *Cradles of Eminence* completely avoids the encyclopedia approach that could be "dry as dust" in covering 700 individuals. This book is anything but. Not only are characters presented in something other than chronological or alphabetical order, they are not grouped by discipline, geography, or any other limiting method. Instead, they are grouped according to themes discovered by the authors. The key to the themes lies in the 12 chapter titles such as "Homes that Respect Learning and Achievement;" "Dominating Mothers, but Few Dominating Fathers;" "Children with Handicaps;" and "Dislike of School and Schoolteachers."

Regarding the role of families in children's lives, *Cradles* is a model of how to minimize a boring focus on generalities in favor of a biographical approach presented in a spirit of storytelling. Through stories of fathers, mothers, siblings, teachers, friends, and communities that seem serendipitous, there are more complex psychological forces at work which the authors are aware of. The meticulous research on these 400 is clear from start, but its delivery is delightful rather than pedantic. They are woven into a narrative that flows naturally, albeit unpredictably, from one topic and one person to another.

The final chapter of the new edition follows the style of the original edition and is written by the Goertzel's son, a Rutgers sociology professor and Psychohistory Forum researcher, and his step-niece, Hansen, a writer. Its 300 additional entries come from a very different age, as is evident in who this generation chooses to honor with multiple biographies. Goertzel and Hansen's tables indicate that the 1962 and 2003 samples differ in a number of ways. While there has been a decrease in the commitment to social activism and politics, there has been a corresponding rise in actors (nearly double the 1962 percentage), athletes, and criminals (there were none among the original 400). However, for both samples, the subjects' eminence was nurtured not by society at large, but by a home life made possible by relative affluence and safety. This summary of 300 encourages readers to compare past and present. It is extremely effective in this regard, presenting a clear contrast that reveals both similarities and differences.

Like the Goertzels, Shirley Soman has clearly done a massive amount of research. This New York City social worker with a longtime commitment to psychohistory, also organizes her material according to themes and writes in clear, readable prose. Despite the common interest in children over time, these are strikingly different books. The Goertzels seek to inform engagingly and, in their final chapter, to contrast past and present. While they suggest some inferences about their research, these are largely restricted to the introduction and conclusion of their work, leaving the body to flow in the manner just described. This is not the case with Soman, who reports that her book "aims to shock you" (p. ix). It does just that. There is also another, somewhat oblique aim to shock you into action against a plethora of companies, government agencies, and others guilty of destroying our children. A final aim is to change policies so that funds are diverted to prevention rather than correction of, or worse, collusion with greed that devastates our future citizens. For example, she calls for major funding of accident prevention and parent training programs.

Each chapter focuses on a problem area, beginning with moving, and often horrifying accounts of children suffering or dying because of something society might, but doesn't, correct. Soman's book is an exposé in the tradition of muckraking journalism rather than the type of psycho-biographical work advocated in this journal. The final chapter, "THEN AND NOW," compares the horrors of the 1974 edition with the conditions for children in the new millennium. Most poignant is her description of how the state of Texas took the original text seriously and funded programs to "promote better conditions for children and parents in Texas" (p. 283). She closes this story with a sad review of the current programs in that state, from childcare, schools, and a punitive court system, to child homelessness.

While *Cradles of Eminence* drew me into its tales of childhood environments, I found it necessary to read *Let's Stop Destroying Our Children* one segment at a time. I suspect most readers will find the accounts of preventable, senseless tragedies perpetrated on our defenseless young to be disturbing and only palatable one morsel at a time. This does not suggest that Soman's work is not of

the highest quality and well worth reading, just that it portrays devastating realities and the thorny, complex web of political, social, and commercial choices that permit the tragedies to continue.

Families are the major source of strength for the eminent-to-be, but today a large segment of U.S. society cannot afford to nurture and protect its young. This is a message found in both works. Goertzel and Hansen's comparison of past and present prompts readers to imagine how we might provide nurturing "cradles" in an age of technology, working mothers, and media blitz. Soman, instead, urges outrage. She claims that these changes force responsibility for a safe and nurturing childhood environment on the state. She argues for legislation, rules, and regulations to keep *all* children from being destroyed, to afford them *all* with the provisions Goertzel and Hansen's families gave and still give their eminent-to-be children, most of whom are white, middle class, and male. This radical support of state responsibility for children causes Soman to rank herself among the "so-called 'do-gooders' ... a description I proudly wear" (p. 279).

"Do-gooder" Soman builds the case to have government pick up the slack for the current generation's families. Though there were surely hazards for children in the days of the eminent 400, family involvement combined with a degree of ignorance regarding dangers for children and a belief in families as independent entities made government regulations appear unnecessary. Goertzel and Hansen present accounts of some eminent individuals raised in poverty, some minorities, and a few females, but the majority of the renowned are white males brought up in well educated, middle class families. This is true for the original 400, and despite the authors' best efforts, a disappointingly reoccurring theme for new entries as well. The families of 40-50 years ago were not incessantly hearing news about the dangers of flammable pajamas, inadequate school bus protections, pollution, and labeling on a plethora of drugs. They certainly confronted some of these and similar issues, but each family was responsible to care for its own and, when possible, to reach out to others in need.

Shirley Soman gives one example after another of how rampant greed is responsible for conditions that destroy children. Then she shows

how the state fails to curb this greed and, at times, its leaders even collude with the greedy or line their own pockets. So while she calls for governmental intervention to protect children, she also fears the very same government.

The books reviewed here may differ greatly, influenced by the authors' orientations, but each makes a contribution toward a deeper understanding of the needs of children in today's world. They argue for a dialogue on families, policies, commerce, and both the psychological and physical needs of children and families. Soman hits readers with the suffering of kids, kids we do not know as human beings. They stay unknown. Hers is a study of the problems, looking at individual children only as their stories support her argument for change.

Lets Stop Destroying Our Children led me to reconsider my safe, free childhood, one in which I rode my bike constantly, with no knowledge that helmets existed. I remembered riding in the car with my mother prior to seatbelts becoming commonplace, sure that her outstretched arm could prevent me from harm. We had Christmas trees year after year, laden with flammable icicles, red-hot bulbs, and ornaments with small, removable parts. I am troubled by the realization that the father I just lost, like the mother who died a couple of years earlier, exposed me to untold dangers. In contrast, *Cradles* led me to memories of a mother who was home when I got sick at school, who helped me with homework and only "permitted" me to fail in "boy" subjects like math and science. My recently deceased father took me to band practices in the broiling Florida sun, and I remember his pride and joy in my accomplishments, his sure and constant presence in my life. *Cradles* is a study of children that leads us to our own conclusions regarding problems and possibilities. Today I am a social work professor, one who holds Soman's outrage in one hand and an insatiable belief in the possibilities of families and society in the other. I need both.

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together of technology and pedagogy. She may be e-mailed at <vmassimo@ramapo.edu>. □

The Next Assignment of Psychohistory

Paul H. Elovitz,
The Psychohistory Forum

Periodically, we like to take time to provide our readers with a description and some analysis of The Psychohistory Forum's Work-In-Progress Saturday seminar meetings. One topic was "The Next Assignment of Psychohistory." The presenters were chosen for their ability to represent a variety of different fields and viewpoints. They were: Ralph Colp, representing psychoanalytically inclined psychiatry; Jerry Piven, representing psychoanalytic psychology; Robert Quackebush and Henry Lawton as social workers; Jacques Szaluta (in absentia) and the author as historian-psychoanalysts. The sharpest dichotomy among fields was drawn by Ralph Colp and Mary Lambert who, while not a formal presenter, had promised to give her own perspective on social work.

When Ralph Colp entered the field of psychiatry in 1957—which, coincidentally, was the same year that Langer gave his "Next Assignment" presidential address to the American Historian Association—he got the distinct impression that psychiatrists needed to be steeped in psychoanalysis to be at the top of their game. Dr. Colp's understanding that psychoanalysis was "the way" to best help the patient and his ego ideals have lasted the duration of his lengthy career in psychiatry and was embodied in the persons of Elvin V. Semrad and Les Havens who had been his teachers. To best understand these individuals, he heartily recommended that we read Susan Rako and Harvey Mazer, eds., *Semrad: The Heart of a Therapist* (1983) and Leston Havens and Alex Sabo, eds., *The Real World Guide to Psychotherapy Practice* (2000). Colp pointed out the dramatic changes that have occurred within his field as the notion of becoming a psychoanalyst ceased to be regarded as the professional ideal—though perhaps not by all the practitioners. Much of this change has been brought about by the advent of more effective drugs, which have done wonders for many pa-

tients, but which have also changed the role of the psychiatrist. Colp has no doubts as to the efficacy of modern drugs, but also appeared to be very appreciative of the diagnostic value of psychoanalytic insights. He does feel a certain sadness regarding the decline of psychoanalysis within the field because it has been an invaluable aid to his work in private practice and during his many years treating graduate students at Columbia University.

By contrast, Mary Lambert spoke to the drastically different situation of psychoanalysis in relation to social work during the course of her career in New York City. When she entered the field many years ago, psychoanalysis was reserved for psychiatrists who did not want to allow social workers access to their special status as "psychoanalysts." This harkens back to a time when American psychiatrists, in opposition to Freud's expressed approval of lay (i.e., non-medical) analysis, sought to monopolize the designation of psychoanalyst. Today, all the clinical social workers she knows have become or are becoming psychoanalysts. She reports that the Society for Clinical Social Work has a committee on psychoanalysis and the primary journal in the field is thoroughly psychoanalytic. However, Lambert acknowledges that the relationship of social workers with analysis in New York City, with all of its analytic institutes, is not typical of the country.

This author used his presentation time partly to speak as a psychohistorian, rather than as a historian, and to transmit the ideas of Jacques Szaluta, who was scheduled to represent the psychoanalytic historian, but could not be present in person because of a conflicting commitment after the meeting was rescheduled because the original session was snowed out. Fortunately, many of Szaluta's ideas are already in print in, "Conclusion: The Future of Psychohistory," the final chapter of his book, *Psychohistory: Theory and Practice* (1999) which I brought to the meeting. Among other things, I pointed out what a strong advocate Professor Szaluta has been for psychohistory within the historical community.

My main point was that there is an uneasy relationship between history and psychology in general. This is in sharp contrast to the situation of psychology in literature and political science where psychological insights are widely accepted as valu-

able tools of insight and discourse. I first heard of the field from a bright history graduate student at Rutgers who was broadly denounced by a professor for his interest in psychohistory: he was urged to leave the graduate program and given a low grade to encourage his departure. Historians as a group tend to be quite suspicious of theory as reflected in the cool reaction to William Langer's American Historical Association's inaugural call for applying psychoanalysis to history. Nevertheless, historians haphazardly pick up bits and pieces of psychological information for their own purposes. Still, psychoanalysis and psychohistory have had a strong impact within the historical community on those doing biography, but those same historians have been slow to acknowledge their debt because of the misconceptions and prejudices that arise when anything that begins with "psycho" is applied to characterize their work. When they need it, many historians will use what we have to offer, but usually go out of their way to denounce the field. This behavior of taking the message but killing the messenger is quite frustrating. Still, the message is taken.

Of course, there have been some more open psychological historians, such as Richard Hofstadter, whose *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (1965) caught the attention of many young historians as an effective condemnation of the low level of political discourse common in our history. Regrettably, Hofstadter, who was developing as a psychological historian, died young. His graduate school friend, Peter Gay kept quiet about his psychohistorical tendencies until he was at the top of his field and would never encourage his students to do psychohistory for fear it would ruin their careers. Gay complains that his book, *Freud for Historians* (1986) is barely read by historians. The Group for the Use of Psychology in History, with the unfortunate acronym of GUPH, was quite active when founded in the early 1970s, but appears to be dormant at the present time.

None of the speakers claimed that they were typical of people in their fields, nor were they encouraged to speak simply for their fields. This forthright discussion sometimes created tension. When Robert Quackenbush, who is a modern psychoanalyst, child analyst, social worker,

teacher, artist, and author/illustrator of over 180 children's books, referred to his work in writing children's books as psychohistory, a historian took strong exception as most historians initially would do to this idea. To him, Ralph Colp's studies of Darwin's illnesses, Paul Elovitz' studies of presidential candidates, and traditional psychobiographies of Marx and others are psychohistory or have significant psychohistorical content. To his mind, books for nine-year-old children on Ben Franklin, Darwin, Jules Verne, and many others, which were brought by Quackenbush to the session, had nothing to do with psychohistory. Ralph Colp, the Darwin scholar, perused the Darwin biography for children looking for psychological content as he considered the conflicting viewpoints in the room. He concluded that these are psychobiographies, but worried that the author would have access to the best scholarship in writing for young readers.

Robert Quackenbush was amazed at this difference of opinion and the moderator, who is the author of this report, came down strongly on these as psychohistorical studies, but for people of a different age. Seven-year-olds, nine-year-olds and fifteen-year-olds all need literature and psychohistory to enrich their lives. Quackenbush talked of the need to help children express their fears and aggression relevant to the September 11th attacks. He discussed his 20 years of research on his Davy Crockett book, including the detailed family history of Crockett as a Westerner. To this talented author and illustrator, every book he works on is a psychoanalytic project. I hoped this exchange prompted participants to take a broader view of just what is psychohistory.

Jerry Piven sees himself as an idiosyncratic psychologist because of his own special interest in Buddhism. He complained of the tendency of some psychohistorians to create Procrustean beds in which they distorted the facts for the sake of illustrating their own theories. Ralph Colp talked at some length and with regret about the decline and death of humanistic psychotherapy. Margie Quackenbush, a psychoanalyst and administrator of the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (NAAP), began a discussion about the television phenomenon "Angels in

America” and the manner in which it deals with homosexual themes. The conversation also involved the work of Peter Swales (who now lives in Chinatown) on Freud’s first patient. Henry Lawton spoke from the perspective of his position as an expert on the psychological study of film, a Nixon psychobiographer, and a student of social services for children based on his many years as a caseworker for the New Jersey Department of Youth and Family Services. Ralph Colp discussed how Adolf Mayer influenced social work to become psychoanalytic through the intermediary of his wife.

Psychohistory’s relationship to psychoanalysis was also examined in passing. Some see psychohistory as dependent on psychoanalysis and others, such as this author, point out that far from all psychoanalysts base their ideas on analysis. The discussion then turned to the issue of popularizing psychohistory. Would there be another Erik Erikson to find a large audience for our ideas? What characteristics would such a popularizer need?

At one point during the conversation, this author wanted the Forum group to pay attention to its own group process since the meeting had broken down into a number of separate and pleasant exchanges, with one of the attendees focusing on Adolf Hitler, which was far from our topic. I wanted to know why some individuals in the group were switching from very psychoanalytically informed insights about our motivations and the motivations of others to non-psychoanalytic elements that were not at all relevant to our discussion. Upon refocusing on the subject of the day (December 13, 2003), the dominant thought was that both psychoanalysis and psychohistory are doing extremely important work, and that despite many disappointments, the next assignment of psychohistory is to do the best possible psychohistorical thinking, research, and publication.

Paul Elovitz, PhD, took his doctoral degree in history in 1969, trained for a decade in psychoanalysis, and has been a psychohistorian since teaching at Temple University in the latter 1960s. He recommends reading the March and June 2000 issues of Clio's Psyche devoted to the future of psychohistory and psychoanalysis. He may be reached at <pelovitz@aol.com>. □

My Collaboration with Alan Dundes

Carl R. Pagter
Independent Scholar

My association with Alan Dundes began some 41 years ago in the fall of 1964. I had just graduated from the law school of the University of California–Berkeley and was working in the corporate law department of Kaiser Industries in Oakland. At the university, I signed up for an introductory folklore evening class taught by a young assistant professor from the Anthropology Department named Alan Dundes.

Alan was a wonderful and talented teacher, bursting with exuberance that contagiously infected the entire class of 35 adult students. One could not ask for a more brilliant, scintillating guide through the field of folklore. We briefly explored folk tales, songs, proverbs, riddles, children’s games, folk customs and beliefs as well as lesser forms of folklore such as blaison’ populaires, rebuses, latrinalia, and spooneristic conundrums. There was no required textbook for the course and Richard Dorson’s just-published *Buying the Wind* (University of Chicago Press, 1964) was recommended. Each student had to collect and turn in 100 items of folklore (reduced in later years to 50 items) in a prescribed format, to eventually repose in the recently created Folklore Archives at the university. In the seven and one half years of my prior higher education, I had never enjoyed a class as much or left one with a greater sense of excitement over newly gained knowledge.

Alan and I had much in common leading to our long friendship. We were the same age, had been officers in the U.S. Navy, had young families, and shared interests in music and literature. A few months after taking his course, I collected a couple of versions of a hand-drawn cartoon being circulated via office copier at the office building where I worked. I met with Alan, who immediately confirmed the crudely drawn cartoons as folklore, although in written form rather than in “oral tradition.” Despite the existence of such folkloric forms as autograph book inscriptions and tombstone epitaphs, many if not most folklorists at that time included “orality” as one of the key criteria in

the definition of folklore itself.

For the next five years or so we both collected items of "Xeroxed" folklore, and in 1970 we prepared the manuscript for *Urban Folklore from the Paperwork Empire*, eventually published in hardback by the American Folklore Society in 1975 through the University of Texas Press which did not put its name in the book because the academic value of folklore was not yet established. The book was reprinted in a quality paperback edition by the University of Indiana, re-titled *Work Hard and You Shall Be Rewarded* with the subtitle: *Urban Folklore from the Paperwork Empire*. After four re-printings by Indiana, a new edition of the book was published in 1992 by Wayne State University Press and it is still in print.

By 1978 we had completed the manuscript for our second collection of office copier folklore entitled *When You're Up to Your Ass in Alligators*. It took nearly ten years before this book was finally published in 1987 by Wayne State University Press. In the years that followed, we produced three more published collections of office copier folklore that resulted in publication: *Never Try to Teach a Pig to Sing* (1991); *Sometimes the Dragon Wins* (1996); and *Why Don't Sheep Shrink When it Rains?* (2000). At the end of 2004 we completed a sixth collection, taken primarily from computer e-mail, entitled *Put the Bibles Away – Our Prayers Have Been Answered: A Sampling of Sacrilegious Folk Humor*, as yet unpublished except for a selection in the June issue of this quarterly. We had planned to work in the summer of 2005 on another book, this time focusing on "senior moments"; i.e. office copier/computer folklore involving senior citizens—which both authors noted they had become! We would have continued to produce manuscripts after that from our voluminous files of materials.

While Alan was an outstanding teacher and public speaker, as illustrated by 450-500 people attending his memorial service at Berkeley, he was also a consummate scholar and prolific author. He brought encyclopedic knowledge to any project he tackled, and what he didn't already know he learned through extensive and thorough research. In addition, he was never distant or pedantic, or afraid to say "I don't know." He was always a student, eager to learn and investigate. His interests

and research covered virtually all areas of folklore and he added richly to the field's scholarship. Alan Dundes was the author of more than 250 published articles and more than 30 books he authored or co-authored. One of the last articles he prepared was in collaboration with his son-in-law Paul Renteln, Professor and Chair of the Department of Physics at California State University—San Bernardino. It was entitled "Fool-proof: A Sampling of Mathematical Folk Humor" and published in *Notices of the AMS* (Vol. 52, No. 1, January 2005, pp.24-34). Alan later confided in me that this was the only thing he had ever written or co-written where he did not understand the arcane material comprising the subject of the article. Japan intrigued him, so he had begun research on and the collection of materials in anticipation of an eventual book looking at Japanese culture as revealed through its folklore. Though this was sadly interrupted by his death, his daughter Alison, who has already published a psychohistorical article, has hopes of bringing this book to fruition.

The two of us worked together at the Dundes' home in the Berkeley Hills over the years, as we watched each other's family grow up and prosper. His wife usually joined us for the dinner she often prepared, though sometimes we all went to a local restaurant. Carolyn was Alan's soul mate and life companion, spouse of 48 years, manager, scheduler, and frequently used sounding board for concepts and text choices.

Alan Dundes was a joy to be with. He was always upbeat, enthusiastic, quick witted, down to Earth, and eager to get on with the job. Our collaborations were never really work, but opportunities to share and test ideas, review new materials, compose, laugh frequently, and interact. What could be better? I shall miss this more than words could ever express.

Carl Pagter, JD, is a folklorist, independent scholar, lawyer, and musician. In our June 2005 issue (Vol. 12 #1:1,26-29) he published "Sacrilegious Folk Humor" from the last book. Alan Dundes and he had prepared for publication.

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Attend the next Saturday Seminar on September 17, 2005 when Don Carveth, Paul Elovitz, and Ken Fuchsman will present "Watergate and the 1970s as the Age of Permissiveness-Narcissism."

John E. Mack (1929-2004): In Memoriam

Paul H. Elovitz
Ramapo College of New Jersey

The death of Harvard psychiatrist, psychoanalyst psychobiographer, researcher, and social activist John E. Mack came on September 28, 2004. Mack was crossing a darkened section of a street when he was hit by a car driven by an individual who had consumed slightly over the legal alcohol limit for driving. The psychiatrist died shortly afterward without regaining consciousness. At the time he was attending a London conference on T.E. Lawrence, the subject of his most celebrated book. In a lengthy career, he won both academic and public acclaim for his Pulitzer Prize-winning psychobiography, *A Prince of Our Disorder: The Life of T.E. Lawrence* (1976), as well as many other accomplishments. Mack was also the recipient of intense academic criticism in the 1990s for his work on alien abductions. The failure of efforts to discredit his subject of research and his methods which would have endangered his position at Harvard, helped reaffirm academic freedom.

John Mack was born in New York City on October 4, 1929. His mother died nine months later and his father married a widow with a young daughter, thus "Johnny" grew up as the second of two children and the only son. His parents, descended from 19th century German Jewish immigrants to America, were academics with doctoral degrees. Both children were educated at the experimental Lincoln School of Teachers College of Columbia University in Morningside Heights where they lived. In 1951, he graduated as a Phi Beta Kappa from Oberlin College in Ohio with a degree in history before taking his medical degree *cum laude* from Harvard Medical School in 1955. His residency was in adult and child psychiatry at the Massachusetts Mental Health Center from 1956-59, after which he served two years as a United States Air Force psychiatrist in Japan with the rank of captain. He returned in 1961-1963 to the Children's Unit at Massachusetts Mental Health Center as a fellow in Child Psychiatry.

In 1967, John Mack graduated from the Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute and

two years later he was certified as a child analyst. In the late sixties he started working at Cambridge Hospital culminating in the establishment of its Psychiatry Department in 1973. He was a deeply caring, committed psychotherapist who was much quicker to listen carefully to his patients rather than quickly medicate them. The young doctor, who was a most determined, enthusiastic, and able administrator, would later be quite proud of his accomplishments in building up the department and Cambridge Hospital, especially its psychiatric residency program. Though he did not show it to the outside world, at the time he was quite anxious about overcoming the obstacles to making great improvements to a city hospital which had grave doubts about psychiatry. In 1973, he had become a professor of psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School. While doing important administrative work and seeing patients, he was also an extremely disciplined researcher on the Lawrence book which took 12 years to write. In 1989, Mack founded and directed the Center for Psychology and Social Change—formerly the Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age. In 2004, it was rededicated as the John E. Mack Institute. From 1991-92, he was president of the International Society for Political Psychology.

Professor Mack had over 180 publications on a wide range of subjects such as his 1964 article on nightmares, the 2004 chapter, "Looking Beyond Terrorism," in *The Psychology of Terrorism*, and "Approaching Extraordinary Experiences in the Mental Health Field," in *The Psychospiritual Clinician's Handbook* (2005). His books, counting co-authored and edited ones, include *Nightmares and Human Conflict* (1970, 1974, 1989), *Borderline States in Psychiatry* (1975), *Vivienne: The Life and Suicide of an Adolescent Girl* (1981), *The Development and Sustaining of Self-Esteem in Childhood* (1983), *The Alchemy of Survival: One Women's Journey* (1988), *Human Feelings: Explorations in Affect Development and Meaning* (1992), *Abduction: Human Encounters With Aliens* (1994), and *Passport to the Cosmos* (1999). He was one of many authors of *The Psychiatrist as Psychohistorian: Report of the Task Force on Psychohistory of the American Psychiatric Association* (1976) that was somewhat restrictive of the role of psychiatrists in psychohistory who worked with live subjects. He also won numerous awards in-

cluding being named Freud Lecturer at Yale in 1978. As a colleague and friend of Erik Erikson and Robert Lifton, he attended the Wellfleet psychohistory annual meetings in October which played an important role in the early development of psychohistory and which continue to this day.

In 1959, John married Sally Stahl, a social worker and psychotherapist. They went camping on their honeymoon and had three sons. Mack was an avid baseball fan who enjoyed tennis, a game of basketball when his sons were younger, photography, and reading. He always loved history and travel. He was an upbeat individual who was excellent at getting the assistance of others, yet someone who had an unusual awareness of and ability to "look down into the abyss." At most times he could be totally aware of his surroundings, and at other moments totally cut off from them as he concentrated on the task at hand.

Mack was quite impressed by Erikson's idea of pseudo-speciation and interested in how individuals identified their own hurts with those of their nation or ethnic group. He became quite concerned about the dangers of the nuclear arms race. When the United States continued nuclear testing after the Soviets abandoned it in 1986 following the tragedy at Chernobyl, at his suggestion the entire Mack family went to the Nuclear Test Site in Mercury, Nevada, to protest the U.S. action and were arrested together with other demonstrators in an act of civil disobedience.

Professor Mack was an inquisitive, intense, and restless man. The range of his interests was enormous as reflected in his publications on subjects such as academic activism, addiction, adolescent suicide, aggression in international relations, alcoholism, alien abduction, borderline states, ecological crisis, the development of self-esteem, fire starters, nationalism, nuclearism, the relationship of psychoanalysis to biography, and spiritualism. He was heavily involved in Russian/American exchange at the Esalen Institute and influenced by the Czech psychoanalyst Stanislaw Grof. Robert Jay Lifton, who worked closely with Mack in the anti-nuclear movement, remembers him as "a restless, highly creative man who was many-sided," and also "as sensitive to other's needs as anyone I've known." He was intensely curious and saw himself, much like Lawrence of Arabia, as holding to

his beliefs and persevering in the face of intense criticism.

Sally Mack reports that John was always aware that there was so much we don't know about the human mind and was far more open to new and challenging ideas than most professionals. Mack first became interested in the accounts of alien abductions when he spoke to someone he respected who reported there were people who believed they had been abducted by aliens. At first he thought that the person who claimed this must be crazy. But after he talked with several people who described having such experiences, he came home and declared they were certainly not "crazy" or mentally ill—thus he initially had the same reaction he would soon experience from colleagues in academia. He changed his opinion upon meeting numerous other people who believed they were abducted when they reported identical unique details, such as the temperature and smell of the room or the nature of eye contact from the aliens. Mack began an in-depth study of the phenomenon, using hypnosis normally in the presence of another researcher, though not necessarily a fully-qualified one.

Mack eventually became intrigued by reports of surviving spouses who claimed to have had contact with their dead mates. It became his conviction that with few exceptions his research subjects believed in the reality of their accounts of alien encounters. He did not think they were either hallucinating or mentally disturbed.

One wonders if this openness to possibilities dismissed out-of-hand by most academics could have some bearing on an unconscious desire to connect with his birth mother who died when he was nine months old and of whom he was forbade to mention by the mother who raised him. His son Danny reports that this became a conscious desire he was able to achieve "via the work he did with Stan Grof."

Whatever John Mack's conscious or unconscious motivation was or was not, in 1992, he co-chaired the Abduction Study Conference held at MIT, which drew public attention to his current field of inquiry. He related this research to healing the mind body split. A close relative reports that it is hard to know exactly what he believed about

alien encounters: "In quieter moments, he did not necessarily believe there were actual alien encounters because he was open to other possible explanations for their experiences involving as yet unknown dimensions of our existence and of communication among beings." At times he became quite insistent on presenting his findings and challenging the unwillingness amidst the intense criticism, ridicule of his work, and distorted public accounts.

According to his sister, her brother was so interested in doing his research that he neglected to take the time to set up the rigid scientific safeguards that would have protected him from some of the criticism that became quite intense after he began to publish on abductions and aliens. At the time, there was considerable suspicion of hypnosis because of the false memories controversy. In 1994, in response to calls for Mack's removal from Harvard Medical School, its dean set up a committee of peers to investigate his clinical work. Fortunately, Mack was able to use private funds to pay the considerable costs of his legal defense. He also received support from defenders of academic freedom, such as Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz, who questioned the investigation of a tenured professor. After fourteen months, the committee "reaffirmed Dr. Mack's academic freedom to study what he wishes and to state his opinions without impediment," and concluded with: "Dr. Mack remains a member in good standing of the Harvard Faculty of Medicine."

John Mack died on the same date his father had been killed in 1973 in an auto accident while driving. He was cremated on October 13th in London. He is survived by his sons Daniel of Boulder; Kenneth of Almaty, Kazakhstan; David (Tony) of Cambridge; Sally Stahl Mack of Cambridge, (they were divorced in 1995 after 36 years of marriage while remaining friends); his sister Mary Lee Ingbar of Cambridge; and two grandchildren.

Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, is the author of over 165 publications. He wishes to thank individuals too numerous to list for assistance in researching this obituary. □

Articles
are only accepted for publication by
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experts

Bulletin Board

The next **Psychohistory Forum Work-In-Progress Saturday Seminar** will be on **September 17, 2005** when **Donald Carveth** (York-Canada), **Paul Elovitz** (Ramapo), and **Ken Fuchsman** (University Connecticut) will present "**Watergate and the 1970s as the Age of Permissiveness-Narcissism.**" Subsequent 2005/2006 presentations will include **Thomas Ferraro**, **Christine Silverstein**, and Paul Elovitz on the psychology of sports and **David Lotto** on vengeance. We are also planning a session on suicide and on suicidal terrorism. **CONFERENCES:** The National and International Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (**NAAP**) is having its annual conference on **October 15, 2005** in New York City with the central theme being love and loss. "Psychoanalysis and the Stories of Our Lives: Memory, Narration, Discovery" is the theme of the International Federation for Psychoanalytic Education (**IFPE**) at its meeting on **October 21-23, 2005** in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. "Psychoanalysis and Community" is the focus of the Association for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society (**APCS**) at its meeting on **November 4-6, 2005** at Rutgers University in New Brunswick. At the International Society for Political Psychology (**ISPP**) meetings in Toronto on July 2-6, 2005, **David Beisel**, Donald Carveth, **Anna Geifman**, Paul Elovitz, and **Jacques Szaluta** were among the presenters. (Next year's ISPP will be in Barcelona on July 12-16, 2006.) Among the Forum members presenting at the June 8-10, 2005 International Psychohistorical Association (**IPA**) meetings at Fordham Law School were **Herbert Barry III**, David Beisel, **Dan Dervin**, Paul Elovitz, **John Hartman**, **Richard Morrock**, **Denis O'Keefe**, **Lynn Somerstein**, and **Charles Strozier**. (Next year's IPA will meet on June 7-9 in New York City). **AWARDS:** Congratulations to **David S. Barry** of Bradenton Florida on the award of his doctoral degree in psychology from Argus University and marriage. He has been nominated and received a **Psychohistory Forum Young Scholar Award**. (Some members may remember David attending several of our meetings in the 1990s.) **NOTES ON MEMBERS:** Congratulations to **Suzanne Adrion** on being appointed to a full-time, tenure-track position at Monroe Commu-

nity College in Rochester New York. Herbert Barry spent part of June following in the steps of Charles Darwin in touring the Galapagos Islands. Dan Dervin will be spending September in Italy. On June 18th **Alan Strachan** taught a seminar on "Healing the American Psyche: George Bush, the War on Terror, and the Mythic Dimensions of American Identity." Welcome to new member Donald Carveth. **DEATHS: Norman Cantor**, a distinguished medievalist and professor at NYU, Princeton, and Columbia universities who participated in our Group Process Symposium (December 2000), died of heart failure on September 14, 2004. Fortunately, he wrote the autobiography, *Inventing Norman Cantor: Memoirs of a Medievalist* (2002). **OUR THANKS:** To our members and subscribers for the support that makes Clio's Psyche possible. To Benefactors Herbert Barry and Ralph Colp; Patrons David Beisel, Andrew Brink, Mary Lambert, Peter Loewenberg, David Lotto, and Shirley Stewart; Sustaining Member Jacques Szaluta; Supporting Members Rudolph Binion, David Felix, Jacqueline Paulson, Edryce Reynolds, the Shneidmans, and Hanna Turken; and Members Suzanne Adrion, Ben Brody, Geoffrey Cocks, Ted Goertzel, John Hartman, Margaret (Peggy) McLaughlin, Geraldine Pauling, Howard Stein, and Richard Weiss. Our thanks for thought provoking materials to David Beisel, Rudolph Binion, Geoffrey Cocks, David Felix, David James Fisher, Kenneth Fuchsman, Richard Golsan, John Hellman, Samuel Kalman, Daniel Klenbort, Thomas Kohut, Valerie Massimo, Carl Pagter, Philip Pomper, Barry Shapiro, J. Lee Shneidman, Howard Stein, Jacques Szaluta, George Victor, Henry Winkler, and Robert Zaretsky. Our thanks to: Dick Booth and Bob Lentz for selective editing, Nancy Dobosiewicz for proofing/Publisher 2003 software application, Tom Ossa for proofing/researching/computer instruction, and to Gary Schmidt for editing/proofing. We wish to thank our numerous referees, who must remain anonymous. ▢

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in Topeka Kansas for the gift of
psychoanalytic
and psychohistorical books and journals**

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