

---

---

# Clio's Psyche

Understanding the "Why" of Culture, Current Events, History, and Society

---

Volume 13 Issue 2

September 2006

---

## John Forrester: A Cambridge Historian of Psychoanalysis

**Paul H. Elovitz**  
The Psychohistory Forum

*John Forrester was born on August 25, 1949 in London, England to working class parents transformed by education into the professional classes. He received a B.A. with honors in the Natural Sciences Tripos, specializing in the history and philosophy of science, from the University of Cambridge (1970). While on a Fulbright Scholarship he studied for eighteen months in the Program in the History of Science at Princeton University and he was elected a Junior Research Fellow at King's College, Cambridge on the basis of his Fellowship Dissertation "Language and Symbol in Freud's Psychoanalysis" (1975). Forrester received his Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge in 1979. He was Senior Research Fellow at King's College from 1980-84, when he was appointed to a position at the University of Cambridge as Lecturer in the History and Philosophy of Science. Since 2000 he has been Professor of History and Philosophy of the Sciences at the University of Cambridge.*

*(Continued on page 87)*

## Suffer the Children: Children in the Early Christian Centuries

**Daniel Dervin**  
Mary Washington University

Through late Antiquity, as Christianity reconfigured the Roman Empire, abandonment of children, mostly through exposure, remained a common practice, though officially condemned by the fourth century. Survivors of these practices likely entered the "slave populations" (Harris, pp. 1-22). Most families abandoned at least one of their offspring, according to Boswell (pp. 135, 163-9), who estimates abandonment rates between 20 percent and 40 percent. Accordingly, most psychohistorians agree with Lloyd deMause's designating parenting in this period as the Abandonment Mode of childrearing (deMause, 1982, pp. 30-6).

Conversely, it has been pointed out that a majority of these children were wanted or at least accepted. As classical ideals of socializing children for polis or Empire were reshaped by an other-worldly morality, children experienced their world differently.

*(Continued on next page)*

---

---

### IN THIS ISSUE

|   |  |
|---|--|
| A Cambridge Historian of Psychoanalysis.....81<br><i>Paul H. Elovitz</i>        | A Disappointing Book on Lust.....100<br><i>Book Review by Donald L. Carveth</i>        |
| Suffer the Children.....81<br><i>Dan Dervin</i>                                 | Arnold A. Rogow: In Memoriam.....102<br><i>Paul H. Elovitz with Jeanne Rogow</i>       |
| Binion Continues His Important Work.....94<br><i>Book Review by David Lotto</i> | In Memoriam: John Caulfield.....104<br><i>Paul H. Elovitz</i>                          |
| Women in the American Revolution.....96<br><i>Book Review by Edward J. Cody</i> | Announcing <i>Applying Psychology to Current Events, History, and Society</i> .....105 |
| The Mask of Niceness.....98<br><i>Book Review by Judith Harris</i>              | Call for Papers: Sports and Retirement.....106-107                                     |
|   | Bulletin Board.....106   |

---

---

Living in the Greek East of the latter fourth century and undeterred by the limitations of his celibacy, St. John Chrysostom freely advised on child-rearing and became a pivotal figure in adapting older ideals of military glory and worldly success to emergent paradigms (Leyerle, p. 268). Addressing well-to-do families, Chrysostom laid out a regimen of measured indulgence. A child should be deliberately provoked by tutors or servants in order to master his temper and avoid abusing his own class later on as civic or military careers were pursued. Physical discipline should be applied sparingly, lest the child grow accustomed and lose his fear (Leyerle, p. 256). Like threats of eternal damnation, the switch performs best as a warning. As a "third parent," (Wood) the pedagogue assumed a primary role in regulating behavior, although Leyerle notes that fathers and tutors alike interceded on the child's behalf for moderate treatment (p. 256). Yet while beatings were accepted, Chrysostom advises, "let us kiss and put our arms around" the fractious child: let us "show our affection... and mold him," as "God man-

ages the world through the fear of hell and the assurance of the kingdom" (Leyerle, p. 261).

Along with threatened and actual beatings, authorities used catechisms and sacraments, scriptures and clergy, to prepare offspring for the next world. However strict or lenient, this spiritual socializing was a daunting task made more arduous by a uniquely child-centered religion. "Unless you become as a little child you cannot enter heaven" (*Holy Bible*, Matthew 18:3), and "Suffer the little children to come unto me, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven" (*Holy Bible*, Mark 10:14-5) were admonitions that boggled the ecclesiastical mind and stirred numerous theological debates. How could children, lacking reason and being weak of will, be held up as guides to salvation? Like the rest of humanity, children were implicated in Adam's fall and thus born into original sin. Yet at least scripturally, they were singled out for special treatment: better a "millstone be hanged around his neck, and he [be] cast into the sea, than that he should offend one of these little ones" (*Holy Bible*, Luke 17:2).

By Adam's fall, they were heirs of sin; by God's grace, they were heirs of heaven. St. Augustine's image of the infant's fierce competition for oral supplies at the maternal breast proves "it is not the infant's will that is harmless, but his weakness of limbs" (*Confessions*, p. 49). Yet as this foreshadowing of Freud's drive theory also reveals, the Augustinian child is an active player from day one. However impaired by original sin, his free will and language capacity are exercised for lying as well as truth-telling, and as the saint's confessions of his wayward youth confirm, the innocence of children, the Gospels notwithstanding, is a myth, but an enduring one (Wills, p. 123).

Equivocally viewed as fallen and idealized as innocent, the child and the theologian interpenetrated especially in the primary ritual of faith. Baptism not only removed original sin and opened the gates to eternal bliss but revamped traditional initiation rituals. The water and the concave baptismal font "become a reverential womb for the second birth" so that those who "descend into it may be fashioned afresh by the grace of the Holy spirit and born again into a new and virtuous human nature" (Theodore of Mopsuetia, quoted in Finn, *The Liturgy of Baptism*, p. 156). The font/waters motifs represented the tomb and death as well as a reenactment of the crucifixion,

## Clio's Psyche

Vol. 13 No. 2

September 2006

ISSN 1080-2622

Published Quarterly by The Psychohistory Forum

627 Dakota Trail  
Franklin Lakes, NJ 07417/ USA  
Cliopsyche.org

Editor: Paul H. Elovitz, PhD

### Editorial Board

C. Fred Alford, PhD University of Maryland • James W. Anderson, PhD Northwestern University • David Beisel, PhD RCC-SUNY • Rudolph Binion, PhD Brandeis University • Andrew Brink, PhD Formerly of McMaster University and The University of Toronto • Ralph Colp, MD Columbia University • Joseph Dowling, PhD Lehigh University • Glen Jeansonne, PhD University of Wisconsin • Peter Loewenberg, PhD UCLA • Peter Petschauer, PhD Appalachian State University • Leon Rappoport, PhD Kansas State University

### Subscription Rate:

Free to members of the Psychohistory Forum  
\$48 two year subscription to non-members  
\$40 yearly to institutions  
(Add \$10 per year outside USA & Canada)  
Single Issue Price: \$15

We welcome articles of psychohistorical interest that are 500 - 1500 words—and a few longer ones.

Copyright © 2006 The Psychohistory Forum

burial, and resurrection via the virginal womb of Holy Mother Church (Finn, pp. 158, 164). Drawing on Paul's heavenly-adoption theme, Chrysostom held that the baptized alone "have been enrolled as citizens of another state, the heavenly Jerusalem" (Finn, 40).

Baptism is also emotionally overdetermined as sacred nuptials: a "spiritual marriage in which Christ is the bridegroom and the 'baptisand' is the bride" (Finn, p. 165). Preeminently, the ceremony as purified marriage and rebirth would undo the onus of being conceived in evil and born in sin (Saint Augustine's position in Wills, p. 46). For Augustine, this means that "original sin and spiritual concupiscence are handed down from generation to generation by means of propagation" (Rigby, p. 115). More precisely, "children are born infected with the lust which was biologically necessary for their conception" (Clark, p. 60). The sin-virus was transmitted by sexual activity. Despite Augustine's later revisions and more desexualized versions from medieval scholastics, childhood in the Christian era not only enters theology but children are deeply implicated in parents' sex lives, including their sexual fantasies and feelings of guilt. In other respects, parents cherished their children as innocent of lust and ignorant of death (Wood, p. 251).

While such dualist attitudes often impacted covertly on children, the culture overtly focused on baptism's proper timing. Defying his mother's practice, Augustine favored infant baptism. Pelagius, who drew the ire of Augustine and Jerome, was less enthusiastic about infant baptism because it preempted free choice (Rees, p. 15). But with the status of baptized children privileged, their behavior would logically be more closely scrutinized than the unbaptized.

Moreover, as all children are prone to temptation, their manifest immaturity undermined ideals of innocence, and in most struggling households theological niceties did little to alter the basic perception that, whatever their ultimate destiny, children in the here and now posed additional hungry mouths to feed. Requiring child labor and apprenticeship, early economies may have cut short childhood but did not disregard children per se as held by Ariès in *Centuries of Childhood* (Wood, pp. 81-2). No doubt abused and treated inconsistently, children were never invisible or mere adults-in-progress. The

demands for sweat-of-the-brow labor encroached on abiding family ties and undermined religious ideologies of innocence and purity. A more moderate solution than composing martyrologies of fallen youth was the cloistering of selected children as a means of perpetuating ideals of purity by handing over the young to God. Oblation became abandonment on a higher level.

It is instructive to see how the often incongruous images of children as vehicles of sinfulness and vessels of innocence were played out during the rise of monasticism in Carolingian Europe. Believing that "God reveals his truth to the simple and the innocent," St. Benedict involved the whole monastic community, children and adults alike, in decision-making, though children were not expected to preach until thirteen (De Jong, p. 136). Yet while minors were assigned the "role of innocent and pure mediators in sacred affairs," even in interpreting Scripture, their misbehaviors were "chastised with severe fasts and sharp blows," i.e., whippings (De Jong, p. 137; Wood, p. 86). Though not preventing child-abuse, the cloistered life served as the most effective means to protect and preserve "childlike purity," and the earlier they could be separated from worldly temptations the better their prospects for perfection (De Jong, p. 137). Thus reconstituted, childhood is no longer a purely time-bound period nor yet the cult of later centuries, but rather an ideal spiritual state to be preserved through celibates who embody the Gospels' child-imagery into adulthood.

It is uncertain how far the conditions of children were affected by religious discourses which only obliquely invoke actual children, but they were very much on theologians' minds. The Holy Innocents slaughtered by Satan's stand-in, Herod, achieved martyrdom and clearly deserved salvation, especially as their innocence was associated with the Savior's birth and their death with his future sacrifice. While to simply ignore them would be a "cruel injustice to children," the mental gymnastics rationalizing their slaughter went to extremes (Wood, p. 74). Augustine, who endured his schoolmasters' beatings with his parents' eager approval and yet engaged his own son in Platonic dialogues, recognized the dilemma but remained a hardliner.

By his house-rules, the unbaptized languished in the outer precincts of Hell and would have remained there for all eternity had not medieval scho-

lastics like Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas mindful of the "pre-Christian just" residing in "Abraham's bosom" (Luke 16:22) taken a page from the Pelagians and installed a children's Limbo (McBrien, p. 1178). However, this was a Pyrrhic victory for a buoyant reform movement that stressed the "goodness of creation" (Elizabeth Clark, p. 210, n. 123), placed a premium on free will, and minimized humanity's sinful inheritance--only in the end to be branded heretics. Infant baptism was allowed by Pelagians, not in order to remove hereditary sin, but to enlist children into the "communion of the blessed" (E. Clark, p. 211). For them, baptism "creates a new human being who is capable, with effort, to lead a life without sin" (E. Clark, p. 211). With his no-fault faith, Pelagius harbored doubts but little concern over the fate of unbaptized children because he projected a vision of a less punitive and more benevolent paternal deity who allotted his children their own space in which to choose their destiny (Rees, p. 13; Clark, pp. 208-10). In these respects, he emerges as a Jean-Jacques Rousseau before his time.

Despite Augustinian influences, the Holy Innocents dilemma persisted. In a reparative gesture, they were provided a feast on the fourth day after Christmas and by reason of their martyrdom were considered eventual candidates for heaven. Dante reifies these concerns by establishing Limbo as a bucolic refuge for the Slaughtered Innocents and the just pagans. Though allocated to the first circle of Hell, these souls are spared punishment, their only pain consisting in not beholding the face of God.

The Holy Innocents embodied not only instabilities within orthodoxy but underscored ambiguous attitudes toward children pervading the Christian era. Maintaining a select group in Limbo highlighted issues of membership and salvation, kept alive questions of mercy and compassion, and offered a safety valve from airtight orthodoxy. For many centuries, Limbo provided a means of abiding the undecidable and allowing the unknowable to appear known. But in late 2005 the Church concluded that it had outlived its purpose and in effect posted a "This Property Is Condemned" sign on the apparently long-since evacuated premises. With the second Vatican Council a broader and more generous definition of baptism, incorporating baptism of blood and baptism of desire, had already taken care of the hapless refugees

in their crowded holding pen (McBrien, p. 1179).

So would round to a close this inquiry were it would not for one further awkward detail. It is far from clear that the Innocents' slaughter, whose sole source is Matthew 2:16, ever actually occurred. Later casualty estimates ranged from 10 or 12 to 144,000, but the lack of corroborative data has prompted even so conservative a source as the *New Catholic Encyclopedia* to consign it to such grafted-on "midrashic elements" as the Star of Bethlehem, the Magi who figure in the Herod story, and logically the Flight into Egypt (Joyce, p. 532). More bluntly, Michael Grant concludes, "the story is invented" (Grant, pp. 228-9). The story's veracity then would not be literal but fitted to a symbolic system constructed from theological metaphors for didactic purposes. Yet despite providing a respectable cover for skeptics, a figurative reading cannot account for the tenacity of this pseudo-history. Other explanations may thus be considered. Such ahistorical religious constructions may be sustained by wishful contents. These would likely be enlisted to perform emotional tasks within fantasy-systems and, being widely held, would converge into historical group-fantasies. Some may insist that religious faith itself is an elaborate group-fantasy system, but the present focus is narrower and less contentious. In purely literary terms, the story offers staples of symmetry, logic, and irony in balancing off the Savior's birth with the wholesale slaughter of uncounted other children, of Rachel's inconsolable grief for her lost children counterpoised with the Virgin Mary's bliss in the manger, with the Magi's worship of the infant king's initiating a life-giving community of the blessed being played off against the evil king Herod's instigating death and disorder. At a deeper level the two events do interlock on suffering and appeal to the imagination as contrasting hues heighten each other. The darker implication of these contrasting affinities--that somehow the birth of the one set in motion the deaths of the others--remains a mystery that eludes the ever-widening umbrella of baptism's availability and will survive the termination of Limbo.

The many depictions of this slaughter--typically juxtaposed with a peaceful Nativity--are grouped by culture critics with the pornography of violence common in medieval and Renaissance art (deMause, 2002, pp. 411-6). These include the way

of the cross and the more graphic crucifixions, along with the martyred saints like Sebastian, whose flesh is festooned with arrows, and Agatha, whose breasts are severed. Somewhat akin to the tempestuous scenes of the Rape of the Sabine Women, Herod's soldiers combine violence against blameless women with the piercing and dismembering of their helpless infants. St. Prudentius's fifth century verses set the tone early on: "the torturer draws/His cruel sword and thrusts the blade/Into the tender forms,/ Bereaving them of budding life." He can hardly find "sufficient space/To hold the deadly gaping wound:/ The blade is wider than the throat." An infant "head is dashed against a stone/And milk-white brains are scattered round." Then another scene is evoked: "Alone among so many slain,/Unharmful and safe, the Christ Child lives" (*Poems of Prudentius*, pp. 88-9). Depending on perspective, the poetic contrast either heightens or lessens the gratuitous carnage. With Herod's cruel command to "Search out the bosom of each nurse,/And even at the mothers' breasts/Let blades be red with infant gore," Prudentius depicts the spectacle with an almost perverse relish. However, viewed in its own terms outside a discredited historical context, the scene suggests multiple traumas. We cannot avoid noting the invasive weaponry of male aggressors wreaking havoc on the maternal dyad as conveying the emotional fallout of violent primal-scene fantasy stemming from the child's exposure to adult sexuality. This staple of psychoanalytic interpretation is germane but too patent. Probing beneath that violent oedipal drama, we encounter more pertinent pre-oedipal contents. The pervasive imagery of infants being forcibly wrenched from their nurses by anonymous forces beyond anyone's control may point to an underlying trauma whose powerful and more primitive emotional force carried its own meanings.

If not a historical event then the Innocents' slaughter may be a psychological one: an enactment of precipitous maternal loss, of being wrenched from the biological mother and abandoned to a strange wet nurse or a series of surrogates, of being shunted aside and precipitously weaned due to the arrival of a new sibling. Such violent severance suggests a nuclear trauma with multiple fallouts. Some of the rage toward caregivers may then be displaced onto the avengers as delegates. Maternal figures are also implicated in the crime and forced to suffer. Separation as savage sundering is certainly a key theme, but there

may be another equally potent one. The assault on helpless undefended young bodies may be displaced memories of actual beatings administered by designated adults.

Firm data are lacking, but physical child abuse was so unexceptional in these centuries as to be normative. St. Jerome recalls the terror of being "dragged from his grandmother's arms" and handed over to a ruthless "schoolmaster with a reputation for beating" (Kelly, p. 8). Prudentius curtly notes his first years were spent weeping under the "crack of the rod" (Preface to *Poems of Prudentius*, p. 3). Augustine was notoriously whipped by his tutors under his parents' approving eye, but very few others managed to write down such humiliations. Many who suffered these traumas would emerge with a split and fragmented self-core consonant with the chaotic scene of slaughter. One can only speculate whether Pelagius, emanating from the Celtic fringe to the north, was spared the harsh discipline of the times. He may have avoided the cultural practice of wet nursing and enjoyed good-enough maternal care—to which his generous proportions may or may not bear witness. If so, in the evolution of childhood, his was a voice crying in the wilderness. Finally, there is the problem of the Innocents' slaughter as collateral damage from the Savior's birth. Whether that birth was a cause or a necessary condition for the horrific if imagined crime spree, the lives of the Christ child and of the other Bethlehem babes are bound together. It may be that the prospect of a divinely conceived and immaculately born babe who is worshipped by kings while merely lying in his cradle aroused too many discordant feelings for direct expression among those who were enduring the many trials and tribulations of an actual childhood. Intolerable feelings of envy and resentment not being suitable for that momentous intersection of time and eternity, ambivalence is ruled out. The only recourse is to the splitting of emotional experience and perceiving the world as good and evil opposites. Perhaps repressed fantasies of revenge are gratified via the scourging and the stages of the cross, events that were regularly enacted and portrayed with searing detail in sermon and fresco.

In addition, Leo Steinberg extrapolates from Max Ernst's painting of *The Blessed Virgin Chastises the Infant Jesus* to an anti-Jesus tradition dating from the Apocryphal Gospels and resurfacing in fourteenth

century Scottish folk songs. Here is a Jesus "conceited and malicious," misusing his miraculous powers and getting spanked for drowning playmates who taunt him as a Jew (Steinberg, p. 85). Among the many layers of the recently disclosed Gospel of Judas, a version of mutual implication between victim and criminal recuperates the latter's reputation; Judas may represent the other sibling passed over for the favorite. Ambivalent undercurrents may survive today in reports of Nativity crèches routinely being raided. Locally, an infant Jesus was kidnapped from a crèche and placed upside-down on an Interstate median strip; the figure's rescuers were celebrated as good shepherds working a miracle. Also, uncannily close to the feast-day of the Holy Innocents in 2005, four New Jersey teenagers were reported to have stolen twenty-seven baby Jesuses from outside churches and homes. The youths were apparently bored, i.e., left out of the holiday excitement, and were preparing a baby Jesus burning party. These innocent Savior-dolls would bypass Limbo and be sent straight to hell.

In sum, the construct of a children's Limbo for the unbaptized serves as the locus for unresolved emotional conflicts and childhood traumas centering on separation and abuse. They gain conscious representation and survive through dubious historical displacements, but they can neither be assimilated into the hierarchical framework nor safely repressed and laid to rest.

### Bibliography

- Boswell, John. *The Kindness of Strangers* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), pp. 163-8; 195.
- Clark, Elizabeth A. *The Origenist Controversy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
- Clark, Gillian. *Augustine: "The Confessions"* (Bristol: Bristol Phoenix Press, 2005).
- De Jong, Mayke. *In Samuel's Image: Child Oblation in the Early Medieval West* (New York: Brill, 1996).
- deMause, Lloyd. *Foundations of Psychohistory* (New York: Creative Roots Press, 1982).
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Emotional Life of Nations* (New York: Karnac, 2002).
- Finn, Thomas M. *The Liturgy of Baptism in the Baptismal Instructions of St. John Chrysostom* (Wash. D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1967).
- Harris, W.V. "Child-Exposure in the Roman Empire," *Journal of Roman Studies* (1994):4:1-22.
- Grant, Michael. *Herod the Great* (New York: American Heritage, 1971).
- Joyce, E.J. *The New Catholic Encyclopedia*. Volume 8 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-96).
- Kelly, J.N.D. *Jerome* (New York: Harper, 1975).
- Leo I (Pope), "Sermon 37." *St. Leo the Great: Sermons* (Wash. D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1982), p. 161.
- Leyerle, Blake. "Appealing to Children," *Journal of Early Christian Studies* (1997):5:2:268.
- McBrien, Richard. *Catholicism*. (New York: Harper, 1994).
- Prudentius. *The Poems*. Volume 1 (Wash. D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1962).
- Rees, B.R. *Pelagius: A Reluctant Heretic* (Rochester: Boyden Press, 1988).
- Rigby, Paul. *Original Sin in Saint Augustine's "Confessions"* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1987).
- Saint Augustine. *The Confessions* (New York: Doubleday Image, 1960).
- Steinberg, Leo. Letter. *New York Review of Books* (22 Sep 05).
- Wills, Garry. *Saint Augustine's Childhood* (New York: Viking, 2001).
- Wood, Diana, editor. *The Church and Childhood* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
- Holy Bible*. [St. James Version] (Austen, TX: Gideon National Publishing Company, 1978).
- Dan Dervin, PhD**, writes prolifically on various psychohistorical subjects from sports to literature. His books include *Enactments*, *Matricentric Narratives*, and most recently, *Father Bosetti in America: A Biographical Study* (2004). He is a Research Associate of the Psychohistory Forum and emeritus professor of literature at Mary Washington College. Professor Dervin may be contacted at <ddervin@umw.edu>.
- [Editor's Note:** Until 11/1/06 we welcome comments of 300-2,000 words on Dervin's article to be published in our December issue.] □

## Forrester: Cambridge Historian

(Continued from page 81)

*Professor Forrester is the author of five books, Truth Games: Lies, Money, and Psychoanalysis (1997), Dispatches from the Freud Wars: Psychoanalysis and Its Passions (1997), Freud's Women with Lisa Appignanesi (1992), The Seductions of Psychoanalysis: Freud, Lacan, and Derrida (1990), and Language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis (1980). Translations of his books have appeared in eight languages including Turkish, Korean, Polish and Portuguese. In addition, he has published over fifty papers on the history and philosophy of psychoanalysis and related fields.*

*John Forrester's teaching at the University of Cambridge has included courses such as Darwin and Darwinism; History of Thermodynamics; Freud, Psychoanalysis and the Twentieth Century; Cultures of Science; and the Social and Institutional Aspects of the History of Psychiatry. Professor Forrester has successively supervised sixteen PhD candidates and has been active in the administration of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science in a number of roles. Among his honors are a 1999 Gradiva Award for the Best General Book in the field of psychoanalysis, Honorary Life Membership, Library of the British Psycho-Analytic Society, and a variety of fellowships and scholarships. Prof. Forrester has held numerous visiting professorships in France, Switzerland, Germany, Brazil, the United States and elsewhere, including being Schaffner Visiting Professor, Franke Institute for the Humanities, University of Chicago and Visiting Directeur d'Etudes, Ecoles des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.*

*He is the co-founder of the Cambridge Group for the History of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis and Allied Sciences, as well as the Psychoanalytic Forum. He has served on the editorial board of several publications including History of Psychiatry and Psychoanalytic Studies. Since 2004, he has been the editor of Psychoanalysis and History. Professor Forrester was interviewed online in May 2006. He may be contacted at <jpf11@cam.ac.uk>. Our thanks to Drs. Ralph Colp (Columbia University-retired) and Kenneth Fuchsman (University of Connecticut) for several questions included in this interview.*

**PHE:** What brought you to psychoanalysis?

**JPF:** Reading Freud.

**PHE:** What is the climate regarding psychoanalysis in British intellectual and educational circles? Was there much openness to psychoanalysis at Cambridge University where you wrote your doctoral dissertation on it?

**JPF:** I'm writing a book about the reception of psychoanalysis in Cambridge, principally in the 1920s, so I will leave this question to one side, rather than give a book-length answer. When I was a student, my first contact with psychoanalysis was attending a series of lectures by Robert M. Young, in 1968-9, on "Dualism and Continuity from Descartes to Freud." Freud and psychoanalysis has been an intermittently vigorous but always unorthodox interest of Cambridge academics for most of the twentieth century, with, of course, different phases and types of interest. But always somewhat unorthodox, with a substantial body of extremely skeptical opinion being dominant.

**PHE:** Tell me about the publication you edit and its editorial policies.

**JPF:** *Psychoanalysis and History* is concerned with the relations between psychoanalysis and history; most of the papers accepted are on the history of psychoanalysis, which is also my principal interest. All papers are peer-reviewed.

**PHE:** Do you consider *Psychoanalysis and History* to be at all psychohistorical and what are your thoughts and feelings about psychohistory?

**JPF:** Relatively few papers on psychohistory are submitted to the journal; the general level of the few papers we've received is rather poor.

**PHE:** How many of the members of your editorial board are like Peter Loewenberg and Nellie Thompson in having a background in history and psychoanalysis? How many are like Larry Friedman, in having a background in history alone?

**JPF:** The range of backgrounds is considerable, but principally academic. I'm not sure what constitutes "having a background" in psychoanalysis. I suspect you mean having trained as a psychoanalyst. A small but significant proportion have trained as psychoanalysts; others have extensive experience of psychoanalysis of other sorts.

**PHE:** Do you see political psychology, psychobiog-

raphy, and psychohistory as the natural extension of applied psychoanalysis, or as other genres altogether?

**JPF:** I'm not clear what "applied psychoanalysis" is – this is a disputed category. After all, Freud regarded therapeutic psychoanalysis as "applied," and Lacan took this one step further by asserting that the training analysis is the only "pure" form. By temperament and by conviction I'm skeptical, for example, of rigid divisions between disciplines or sub-disciplines – so I take little notice, as far as is possible, of distinctions between economic, social or cultural history, and that would include being skeptical of the importance of the prefix "psycho-." Psychoanalysis has generated concepts and approaches which can be useful in many areas of history; but I would be skeptical of an attempt to distinguish "biography" from "psychobiography." Fine examples of the deployment of psychoanalytic categories in biography – e.g. in Frank Manuel's study of Newton – do not, in my view, mean that his biography enters another genre. It would be best to drop the prefix "psycho-," especially since there are so many different varieties of psychology that can be used in such studies. The best biographies amongst those I have read recently – e.g. Holroyd on Lytton Strachey, Skidelsky on Keynes – of necessity present a portrait of the inner life of their subject; that's as "psycho-" as one could wish for!

**PHE:** Are there those on your editorial board who share my personal commitment to write psychobiography/psychohistory based upon adaptability, childhood, coping mechanisms, creativity, empathy, innovation, and overcoming trauma while avoiding most technical psychological terms and all jargon?

**JPF:** I haven't asked them that question; I somehow doubt it.

**PHE:** Some of the members of the Psychohistory Forum, the twenty-three year old group I head, know and respect your journal, but I suspect most do not know it. Why should they read your publication? What will they find to be of most interest?

**JPF:** If they are at all interested in the history of psychoanalysis, they will find much to interest them.

**PHE:** Of which of your psychoanalytic works are you most proud?

**JPF:** Probably *Freud's Women*. At other times, I'm very taken with *The Seductions of Psychoanaly-*

*sis* for its breadth.

**PHE:** Since you've written extensively on Lacan, Foucault, and Derrida, please give us your overall assessment of them and their importance.

**JPF:** Lacan is the only psychoanalyst since Freud to have deployed to the same extent his contemporary cultural resources – from mathematics to art, from ethology to linguistics, from literature to physics. For all his infuriatingly rebarbative prose, which deeply offends me at times, his radical reconception of psychoanalysis is of fundamental importance. I spent several year (with Sylvania Tomaselli) translating two of his more accessible works, Seminars I & II, as a tribute to the importance of his work. Every time I return to his work, as it is progressively published (there is much more still to come), I'm deeply impressed. But with time, he appears as a more and more eccentric cultural figure as well. Slavoj Zizek is the most successful transformer of his ideas and, above all, his style into forms suitable for the age of the internet.

Michel Foucault was without doubt the most original historian/philosopher of the sciences and of the socio-political field of the second half of the twentieth century. His influence is still very great and will continue to be so. The fact that he accorded such attention to psychoanalysis is a marker of the importance of psychoanalysis for the scientific and cultural life of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; his at times hostile critique is something anyone concerned with psychoanalysis should read and consider. His articulation of a vision of history (of modernity), a new theory of power and a genealogy of the modern subject is unique.

Jacques Derrida was simply an inspired reader of Freud, whatever else he was; his sympathy for Freud underpins much of his philosophical work. There is a (Derridean) chiasmus in the relations between his work and that of Freud: it is tempting to identify "psychoanalysis" and "deconstruction" as being the same process. The generosity of thought which was deeply entwined with his capacity for "being inside" the thought of the other was exemplary—as a moral and personal lesson.

**PHE:** Do you think there is merit in one of my colleague's description of you as an enlightened advocate of psychoanalysis and defender of Freud?

**JPF:** I hope I'm enlightened! I defend Freud against criticisms that are based on poor evidence and misplaced arguments. There is no question in my mind that Freud was and remains a major cultural and scientific figure. The hostility to Freud from many different quarters is based on many different kinds of criticism, scientific, personal, historical. In these debates, it is historical accuracy and honesty of argument that concerns me most.

**PHE:** Though I thoroughly agree with your "wager that the more one knows about Freud...the more interesting and surprising and thought-provoking he becomes," I would appreciate your elucidating this comment.

**JPF:** It is a quasi-autobiographical remark; the wager is that many others feel the same way. It's not for nothing that Freud was the most widely read non-fiction writer of the twentieth century – "our Sophocles," as Philip Roth called him. But it also points to the fact that having read Freud's published works one has one view of Freud; having then read all the subsequently published letters of the private and political Freud one has a new and more interesting view; and then if one places him in an historical and scientific context, he becomes even more interesting. One can then undertake another kind of approach to Freud: for instance, one can isolate his four-page paper on "Negation" from his oeuvre and place it within a long tradition of reflection on negation in both linguistics and philosophy, alongside Plato and Russell; one can compare his project for a neuronal account of thinking alongside those of his contemporaries, such as Sherrington, or ours, such as Damasio or Edelman. Freud always becomes more interesting, rather than less, when one engages in these projects. Then there's the promise of the revolution in human consciousness that the psychoanalytic enthusiasts have often proclaimed and to which he, anti-prophet that he was, had a complicated relationship. All this makes Freud more and more interesting and thought-provoking. I often remember a young student I taught some fifteen years ago, a biological scientist, who confessed to me that reading Freud made her so angry that she threw the book against the wall... and then picked it up and went on reading in utter absorption. I find both bits of her story equally important! Both the passion and the sustained interest.

**PHE:** In the light of your having co-authored *Freud's Women* (1992), how open would you say

Freud was to women and their varied experiences?

**JPF:** The premise – and the finding – of *Freud's Women* was that Freud's relationship with women was fundamental to the creation of psychoanalysis. Without the possibility of absolute honesty, which was to some extent an extension of Freud's characteristic belligerence in relation to the world, there would have been no fundamental rule and no psychoanalysis. But it was the fact that patients, at least half of whom were women, trusted Freud that made the fundamental rule conceivable in the first place. In certain respects, Freud's relationships with women were more straightforward than his relationships with men: more amicable, more intimate in certain respects and with less suspicion mixed with the mutual respect characteristic of all his relationships. But the basic fact is that Freud took seriously whatever women said to him – including when they confessed erotic feelings for him which he (probably) did not reciprocate. To carve the concept of transference out of such propositions was Freud's unique achievement. I suppose one could interpret Freud's concept of transference as a catastrophic refusal of woman on his part, but it would be a rather perverse interpretation, in my view!

The hostility of some women to Freud's theories is in my view misplaced; there are many different sources for the vigorous opposition to Freud's theories, but the idea that Freud was not capable of having sustained and mutually understanding relationships with women and that this led to his "blindness" about their experience is historically implausible. Where did psychoanalysis come from? In one essay, I have argued that critics are often confused when confronted by the concept "penis envy": their objections seem as much to the foundational character of envy as to the idea that feminine sexuality is not autonomous and is constituted in relation to the masculine (the penis). After all, Freud's theory insists that masculine sexuality is constituted in relation to the feminine (conceived of as "the castrated"); otherwise the male subject would be marooned in phallic solipsism. If envy is the concept that incites this feminist rage, then Klein's theories of the infant's relation to the breast should be doubly objectionable. Also, in this respect, the arguments in *Freud's Women* were intended to remind readers that much of what all psychoanalysts once agreed was clinical reality – the fact of "penis envy," attested to by all in the early debates, especially Horney – may

no longer be clinical reality. Which would leave us with interesting consequences: either the basic constitution of masculinity and femininity have changed fundamentally since the beginning of the twentieth century, or the basic "data" of psychoanalysis are indefinitely pliable through subsequent revision and re-interpretation. I'm not sure which way present-day theorists jump when confronted with that choice.

**PHE:** What are your thoughts on Einstein's critique of psychoanalysis as lacking scientific validity?

**JPF:** Einstein did not have a well-thought out view of psychoanalysis lacking scientific validity. On Tuesdays he might be very enthusiastic about psychoanalytic ideas, on Fridays he might be skeptical. His views wavered markedly from the 1910s to the 1950s. Einstein's views on lots of things were decidedly eccentric, although they always had a certain charm and freshness which stemmed from his basically childlike character (a description he would probably not have denied!). The key fact about the scientific validity of psychoanalysis is how the criteria for "scientificity" have changed radically across the decades since the early twentieth century. Einstein's style of grandiose – and rigorous – mathematical exploration based on a few key facts tied to some fundamental physical intuitions is only one style of valid scientific reasoning; there are many others and new forms of scientific validity will continue to be developed. Nothing stays the same in science! That is the source of its continued efficacy and creativity.

**PHE:** As an historian and philosopher of science, what unique insights do you have to bring to Freud?

**JPF:** Freud's science was a very peculiar one, distinctive to his time and perhaps to his temper. Assessing that character makes him a very interesting and educative topic in the field of the history of psychoanalytic science. Does he belong alongside Copernicus and Darwin, as he argued, as a disturber of the ideological sleep of humanity? Well, quite obviously, if one puts it like that. Does he belong besides Copernicus, Galileo, Newton and Lavoisier as a scientific revolutionary? Or is he part of a pedigree that runs Kircher, Mesmer, Lodge (the physicist psychical researcher), Kammerer (the possibly fraudulent biologist), Dawson and Woodward (the discoverers of Piltdown Man) and Einstein (the diehard refuser of quantum mechanics)? These are interesting questions for an historian of science!

There is an additional curious feature: the history of psychoanalysis and the history and philosophy of science have intriguingly linked histories. It is not for nothing that Karl Popper's views on the criteria of scientificity were developed in Vienna in the 1920s with half an eye on psychoanalysis, all the rage then; the Vienna Circle, so influential for the development of philosophy of science, had links, sometimes covert, with their contemporaries developing psychoanalysis. In Paris, the fledgling historians of science and the fledgling analysts even shared a building! One might say that both psychoanalysis and history and philosophy of science are symptoms of a reflexive turn within the sciences. Whatever else Freud was thought to offer, his encomium to self-analysis was taken as essential to his message and made him peculiarly attractive to those developing overarching visions of the nature of science.

But perhaps the principal insights I can help bring concern the hybrid character of Freud's work: part medical discourse, part science, part cultural critique, part subtle analysis of human motivation and destiny (Rieff's *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*). This hybridity is one of the key elements leading to the confused arguments about whether psychoanalysis is or is not a science. As a student of the history of psychoanalytic science I'm familiar both with the historical conditions under which such arguments are mounted and the changing criteria of what counts as a science (or as high-status or low-status science) in different historical and cultural circumstances; as a student of psychoanalytic science I'm also aware of the disputed character of all the philosophical criteria mobilized for such distinction-drawing – if one has the right answer to a question, then it wasn't a philosophical question in the first place! Also, there is certainly no agreed answer amongst philosophers as to what distinguishes science from non-science. So a useful response to the question "Is psychoanalysis a science?" is: "Well, it certainly used to be. What might have happened to both psychoanalysis and the cartography of the sciences to put into question its status?"

**PHE:** What responses have you gotten to your interest in psychoanalysis?

**JPF:** Too many and too various to recount. One that always amused me was: "Oh, I'd better be careful what I say."

**PHE:** How do you relate to Nobel Prize-winning Eric Kandel and others like him who argue that psychoanalysis has a firm foundation in neuroscience?

**JPF:** Not being an expert in neuroscience, this claim interests me and I am interested in reading such accounts. I think the neurosciences have a very long way to go before they can begin to approach the questions that psychoanalysis has been struggling with for a long time. The neurosciences remind me of eighteenth century chemistry: lots of progress, important connections with industrial developments, but no one is sure if a Lavoisier just round the corner is not going to overturn the whole enterprise. Perhaps that is what they are hoping for!

**PHE:** In reference to an article listed on your CV on the influence of psychoanalysis on Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, what is this influence? What did you learn from Kuhn when you were a student of his at Princeton from 1970 to 1972?

**JPF:** I learned from Kuhn how to be a particular kind of historian of science, a close reader of scientific texts. Kuhn's ideal of graduate school training was to confront students with very difficult texts and tease us into making sense of them; for example, one week in the context of the history of nineteenth century heat theory we read Poisson's "Sur la vitesse de son" of 1823 – a highly mathematical paper, using early nineteenth century versions of calculus (nothing like ours!), in French. Kuhn thought you had to get inside the head of past scientists so that you could yourself do their work, indeed have a sense of where the work was going so that you could almost predict the next step in the development of theory. Given how contextual and cultural the history of science has become in the intervening decades, this nowadays looks like a very odd practice – almost not history at all. Kuhn's ideal historian of science was wholly identified with past practitioners of the sciences. I learnt that from him and it became a constitutive part of my professional personality. I have other parts as well, learned from others; but the experience with Kuhn was the most rigorously transformative precisely because I admired him so much. Reading his book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* was the most powerful stimulus – not the only stimulus, but the most powerful – for me changing tack from the sciences towards history and philosophy of science. (I'd had a love affair with physical chemistry from the age of fifteen on: I loved the mathematical de-

scriptions of messy dynamic processes.) And I now have developed my own speculative reconstruction of Kuhn's own development of the ideas in that book and of his conception of the practice of the history of science, which sees that development as fundamentally influenced by his own analysis when a graduate student. From analysis, he learned about getting inside someone else's head – namely his own! – from the odd point of view that the experience of analysis provides.

**PHE:** What are you working on now? When do you expect to have it published?

**JPF:** I have three major projects on the go. The first, which will be published next year, is an account of the surprising reception of psychoanalysis in Cambridge in the early twentieth century; the second is a cultural global history of Freudianism in the twentieth century. This will take me another couple of years. And the third concerns the genre of the case: its epistemic status, its historical development (case histories, case conferences, casework) and its importance in a range of disciplines that deal with human beings: the human sciences (which, in my view, include medicine, law and other social sciences).

**PHE:** What special training was most helpful in your doing psychoanalytic work? How has it affected yours scholarship?

**JPF:** I'm not sure if I do psychoanalytic work. Training by Kuhn and others in how to read scientific texts was crucial. Trying to understand Lacan over many years was also an education, that's for sure!

**PHE:** Please describe and analyze the recent growth of psychoanalysis and applied psychoanalysis in England? Has psychohistory also made inroads?

**JPF:** Psychoanalysis in Britain, as elsewhere, is in difficulties. Leaving aside the questions of daily bread and the overall interest of people in undergoing analysis, it's a field in some difficulties about its future. One symptom of that is the fact that it is determinedly fixated on its past glories and past achievements: it's not a sign of intellectual vitality when a field refers to Winnicott's work, Klein's work or any other of the important figures of that period as the standards or achievements by which present theoretical discourse is assayed and calibrated. They have both been dead for over 35 years! There is some work of astounding clinical virtuosity and some rather wonderful writing about such work being

done, but that is an odd place for psychoanalysis to end up. But I'm not very well informed about contemporary psychoanalysis; I'm an historian!

Psychohistory has made little impact, I sense. But there is significant work with a psychohistorical dimension: Daniel Pick has written a very interesting study of Garibaldi recently which utilizes psychoanalysis – he is both analyst and academic historian.

**PHE:** Have American scholars such as Robert Young and Brett Kahr had any impact on the growth of psychoanalysis in the UK?

**JPF:** Bob and Brett have both been very active in working with psychoanalysis. Bob was one of my teachers at Cambridge and had a considerable influence on my own development. Bob has had a broad cultural influence, in part because of the many parts he has played: a charismatic teacher at Cambridge, a political radical in science studies and in psychoanalysis, a founder and editor of journals and a publishing house specializing in psychoanalysis, which probably had as many readers as the somewhat flagging older psychoanalytic publishing ventures of the 1970s and 1980s. And then he has played a significant part in the development of psychoanalytic studies within the universities. Yes, Bob has had a great impact. But does he count as an American? He's lived in Britain for over forty five years! I think of him as a post-American.

**PHE:** How does the acceptance of psychoanalysis in Britain and France differ?

**JPF:** In France they think of Freud as essentially French, so strong is his influence on French culture since 1960. Freud in Britain is both a hugely respected and a widely dismissed figure. The numbers of person calling themselves psychoanalysts in the two countries also means a very different presence of "psychoanalysis": there are probably twenty times as many "psychoanalysts" in France as in Britain, perhaps fifty times! France, the United States and Argentina have had what I call "psychoanalytic cultures," whereas Britain hasn't. In France, in 1981 I rented a room from a cherry and truffle farmer in Provence who knew that when I told him I worked on "le langage et la psychanalyse" I was working in an area where Lacan was important and wanted to talk about it; in Buenos Aires you have to negotiate with your taxi-driver in case your destination will upset his schedule for making his appointment with his

analyst. Such comparable indices of the spread of psychoanalysis in everyday culture are entirely absent in Britain. On the other hand, the middle-brow English newspapers of the 1920s could declaim, "we are all psychoanalysts now," so these characterizations have to be nuanced. In France now, there is a debate over whether Freud was a charlatan and some of the responses are as if these critics are saying Marianne wasn't a virgin. In Britain, the responses to similar debates over the last few years are more along the lines: "Told you so."

**PHE:** In the light of your extensive experiences in and travels to Austria, Brazil, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States, what are your thoughts about the varying adaptations of psychoanalysis in these countries?

**JPF:** Too vast a topic to broach here and now. Wait for my big book *The Freudian Century!*

**PHE:** How do you see psychoanalysis developing in the next decade and beyond?

**JPF:** At a recent conference on "Therapeutic Training after Freud" I heard Elisabeth Roudinesco remind her audience that Freud had feared that psychoanalysis as a therapy would take over psychoanalysis as a science. This is roughly what happened, beginning in the 1920s, with the growing hegemony of the training institutes. Without its connection to "science" or "theory," psychoanalysis will be just another therapy, another treatment modality. I think it is almost there...! Whether there is another future, beyond being "just another treatment," admittedly of a peculiar and challenging sort (for both parties), is a question the next decade will answer. No predictions!

**PHE:** What do we as psychohistorians need to do to strengthen our work in the eyes of psychoanalysts?

**JPF:** Not being very familiar with the field of psychohistory, I hesitate to offer advice. The same as I would offer to analysts: write without jargon, with intelligence and with critical rigor.

**PHE:** What are your thoughts on the psychodynamics of violence in our world?

**JPF:** Nothing very original, I'm afraid. Old men send young men to war. Young men think they are immortal. Women think they are no different from men. A lot follows from these facts.

**PHE:** Why did you chose to write about lying in *Truth Games*?

**JPF:** Because lying and fantasy are very closely linked and fantasy is a key concept in psychoanalysis. I was also preoccupied with attempting to understand some of Lacan's thinking about the relationship between truth and fiction. Then I discovered that lying is a universally condemned activity, whereas it is obvious that, as Benjamin Jowett, once said, "There is a great deal of hard lying in the world, especially among people whose characters are above suspicion." So I tried to think hard about the pros and cons of lying, its significance and its relation to psychoanalysis. It took me nearly twenty years to work the various lines of thinking into a presentable form, and I'm still not satisfied with the book!

**PHE:** How can psychoanalysis and psychohistory have more impact in academia and on society in general?

**JPF:** I think the path here is through the universities, from which – certainly in Britain – psychoanalysis cut itself off, particularly when it established exclusive Societies dominated by training Institutes. There are changes in this respect in the last two decades or so. The universities have become increasingly dominant in determining what counts as "useful knowledge" in our societies. So psychoanalysis – and psychohistory – must pay attention to what is going on the universities across the board, from neuroscience to medical faculties, to literature departments, to anthropology. The funding now available within universities for research and development of ideas and projects is enormous, especially when compared with the funds available outside. Even the large Foundations, which, after the First World War, played such a key role in the development of disciplines and new sciences, channel most of their money through universities. Basically if a discipline is not integrated with the universities and its knowledge-power base, its future is unclear.

**PHE:** Has psychohistory had any impact on your area of expertise?

**JPF:** No.

**PHE:** In England and Europe, are universities and research institutions hiring psychoanalysts and psychohistorians for these credentials, or for other purposes?

**JPF:** In England, there are relatively few psychoanalysts and their training is almost exclusively directed towards a future career in private practice. In the few centers running courses in psychoanalytic studies, a qualification as a psychoanalyst would be of considerable significance, perhaps of overriding significance, although other qualifications might have equal weight. Psychohistorians I presume have primary qualifications in history, and therefore, I presume, would normally have a research qualification from a university. I imagine if they also have a qualification as a psychoanalyst this would make them of more interest to an appointments board. But such doubly qualified researchers are few and far between. I'm not in a position to talk about other European countries with any authority.

**PHE:** How can we recruit new people into the fields of psychoanalysis and psychohistory?

**JPF:** Teach lively and intelligent courses on these topics in universities. Write interesting books that sell to a broad mass of people, especially young people.

**PHE:** What books were important to your development?

**JPF:** So many! Just from when I was very young: Kuhn, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Eliot's *Middlemarch*, Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, Foucault's *The Order of Things*, Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams*, E.A. Moelwyn-Hughes, *The Kinetics of Reactions in Solutions*, Darwin, *The Origin of Species*.... I'll leave it there, in my early 20s...!

**PHE:** Who was important to your development as a student of psychosocial phenomena? Did Erik Erikson have any impact on you?

**JPF:** None. Bion's *Experience in Groups* was a revelation.

**PHE:** Are there any mentors who come to mind?

**JPF:** Bob Young and T.S. Kuhn were the most important personal influences on me in my development as an historian and philosopher of science. As an intellectual mentor, at a distance as it were, Michel Foucault, whose courses I attended but with whom I only had one lengthy conversation. Two teachers at my secondary school had a great influence on me, Johnny Carlton (chemistry) and Simon Stuart (English).

**PHE:** What is your psychoanalytic/psychotherapeutic experience and what is its influence on you as an editor? How has it changed your vision of the world?

**JPF:** I had an analysis which lasted some years and considered training as an analyst, but life got in the way. It was extremely educational working in a psychiatric hospital and day-center. Its influence is difficult to assess.

**PHE:** What is the state of the "Freud Wars" today compared to 1997 when you published *Dispatches From the Freud Wars*?

**JPF:** Not much change, I reckon. I think the "new lines" of attack and defense were drawn up in the early- to mid-1980s and things have not shifted much since then. Trench warfare. But there are shifts in France: the trenches are being dug there as well.

**PHE:** Thanks for an interesting interview. □

## Book Reviews

### Binion Continues His Important Work on Group Process

**David Lotto**  
**Psychohistory Forum Research Associate**

*Review of Rudolph Binion, Past Impersonal: Group Process in Human History. DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005. ISBN 0875803458, 218 pages.*

Rudolph Binion's latest book revisits and synthesizes some of his earlier psychohistorical work. Much of this previous work, going back to the 1970's, has been published in the *Journal of Psychohistory* and its predecessor *The History of Childhood Quarterly*.

In the preface, Binion sets out his basic approach and assumptions, starting with the claim that "Whatever we do, we tend to act out of our past. . . . Most of what we do is accordingly what we have already done and even redone . . ." (p. viii). Binion

suggests that there are three main ways that groups can function. The first he calls the adaptive mode, which might also be called the healthy mode, in which the group acts in a rational manner to promote its vital interests be they material or moral. He implies that this is the most common mode of group functioning.

The second mode he calls maladaptive and it is here that Binion, as well as most psychohistorians, have focused their attention. Binion sees collective trauma as one of the main components in the formation of group identity. As he says: "Deep-felt group identities come alive only slowly and never quite die, cohering most tightly around common wounds that fester instead of healing" (p. viii). This is the realm of trauma and repetitive reliving.

The third mode of group expression is what he calls the symbolic, essentially the realm of art, broadly defined.

The bulk of the book consists of seven chapters. These are erudite and scholarly studies spanning the history of Western Civilization from early Christian Times to the era of the Third Reich. The topics covered include Christian art, the Black Death, the American and French revolutions, Romanticism, and the Nazi era. They are organized and presented as examples of his tripartite classification system, two each illustrating the adaptive mode of group functioning, the maladaptive repetition of previous trauma, and the symbolic mode of group functioning. The seventh chapter explores Europe's reaction to the trauma of the Black Death. Binion argues that a full understanding of this reaction illustrates all three of his types of group functioning.

The chapters on traumatic reliving, particularly the third chapter, *A Community of Fate*, which deals with material covered in Binion's 1976 book *Hitler Among the Germans* are fascinating and illustrate the major principles of psychohistorical analysis. However, what I found most interesting was his chapters exploring adaptive group functioning.

The examples he chooses center on the issue of population control. The historical event he is seeking to understand is the reduction in fertility rates in nineteenth century France and the United States. This fertility decrease occurred because, for the first time in history, families voluntarily limited the number of children they had by using birth control. Bin-

ion suggests that the egalitarian and anti-patriarchal ideology of the French and American revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century transferred from the public to the private sphere. The result was that women began to take control of their reproductive lives.

At the end of the chapter Binion makes a plea for applying psychohistorical methods to questions of demography; to look for psychological and psychohistorical explanations that identify the mechanisms that account for shifts in human reproductive behavior and population growth or decline. We know from animal studies (mainly rats), that when a geographically confined population grows too big, self-destructive violence can occur. The mechanism that is responsible for this behavior is not well understood in the animal world, let alone for humans. But we do see that the huge population increase in Europe during the late eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries was followed by the slaughter and accompanying population decrease due to WW I, the influenza pandemic, and WW II.

Binion doesn't give us any specific answers as to what these mechanisms might be. Nor does he explore the broader ramifications of this issue. For example, rates of infanticide and severe child abuse, subjects which have been a central concern to many psychohistorians, can be seen, among other perspectives, as population control mechanisms. Similarly, wars, disease epidemics, and disasters both natural and man-made – events that throughout the history of our species, have been the sources of severe group trauma, can also be viewed as ways in which population growth is limited.

Psychohistorians, and others who study large group trauma, have explored and come to understand a great deal about the short and long-term sequelae of such trauma. Binion, Beisel, and Volkan, among others, have written extensively on the mechanisms and variety of ways in which such trauma is kept alive, transmitted to future generations, and re-enacted.

When the trauma is wholly or largely the consequence of human actions as opposed to natural disasters, psychohistorians look for psychohistorical causes. Perhaps we should be expanding our focus to include an awareness of the demographic dimension of these large scale group events in addition to the other factors that psychohistorians have come to understand as being implicated in the genesis of war

and other man-made catastrophes.

The population of our world has increased four fold, from under two billion to over six and a half billion souls in the last hundred years, even after the devastation wrought by two world wars, the Holocaust, the Armenian and Rwandan genocides, the influenza epidemic, the AIDS pandemic, and all the other wars, massacres, disease and catastrophes that have transpired over this one hundred year epoch. It is hard to imagine that this growth in population has not had some effect on the lethality of some of these events. This raises the question of whether, using Binion's tripartite nomenclature, such population reducing events might be considered as adaptive when viewed from the perspective of the species as a whole. The more usually emphasized maladaptive aspect, the reliving, via the repetition compulsion, of the original trauma experienced by the group is still quite clearly maladaptive or dysfunctional when considered from the perspective of the traumatized group.

Binion addresses, although far too briefly, the deeper sources of what he calls unsuccessful reliving—the repetitive attempts that groups make to master their previous trauma. As Binion points out, the outcome of such relivings is most often spectacularly unsuccessful, usually only succeeding in recreating the conditions of the original trauma, including the traumatic outcome. He implies that guilt may play a crucial role. As he says, "At the deepest level, those who relive trauma already feel that they had it coming, that it served them right, that they brought it on themselves" (p. 145).

It was also somewhat disappointing that Binion didn't say more about the mechanisms by which this traumatic reliving is perpetuated and how it is transmitted from generation to generation, as, for example, Vamik Volkan has in connection with a number of historical re-enactments of traumatic events that various ethnic groups have undergone.

The book is only 148 pages of text but has some 600 footnotes and twenty-one pages of bibliography and references. The material within each of the seven substantive chapters is both extremely rich, detailed and integrated coherently. For this reader there was a sense of disappointment that Binion didn't step back from the wealth of detail in order to explore in greater depth the broader psychohistorical issues raised by his studies.

*David Lotto, PhD, is a psychologist psychoanalyst in private practice in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, in the Berkshire Mountains, a Research Associate of the Psychohistory Forum, an adjunct faculty member of the University of Massachusetts, an active member of the Western Massachusetts Psychological Society, and a veteran and prolific psychohistorian. Dr. Lotto is a regular contributor to this publication who may be contacted at dlotto@berkshire.rr.com. □*

## Women in the American Revolution

**Edward J. Cody**  
**Ramapo College of New Jersey**

*Carol Berkin, Revolutionary Mothers: Women in the Struggle for America's Independence. NY: Knopf, 2005, xviii, 194 pp. ISBN 1-4000-463-5. \$24.*

Carol Berkin resists the temptation to make claims unsupported by historical evidence. Consequently, when she “retells the story of women’s role in creating the new nation,” she does not transform eighteenth century women into modern feminists. For example, she states unambiguously, “Abigail Adams was not an early suffragist, demanding that John and Congress grant women the right to vote.” She thereby keeps Abigail in the Revolutionary era at the expense of the ideological demands of many modern historians, who would impose their values and beliefs on historical figures without evidence. Occasionally she stretches the evidence to enhance the role of women and, at times, her personal ideas on what historical figures should have thought or done stand out, but never in clear contradiction to the historical record. Those interested in emotion, familial conflict and personality will find grist for their mill.

In Berkin’s final chapter on the legacy of the Revolution, she suggests a greater female impact than I would, but she has company in that regard among some very distinguished historians. Some readers of this review may denigrate both the claim and the desire for the kind of objectivity Berkin provides and this reviewer admires, arguing that all thought is dependent on the social context and consequently ideological. If that were true, then there would be no reason to read or write history, since it would be no

more valuable than fiction. I believe that Berkin has written an excellent book, which provides an antidote to the “gendered amnesia” which she asserts has befallen the story of the Revolution.

Berkin aims to tell “that story through the words and actions of individual women.” She follows in the footsteps of Elizabeth Ellet’s three volume work, *Women of the American Revolution* and subsequent studies to provide direct access to the words of the participating women. She makes clear that these women joined men in seeing themselves created by God “to be a helpmate to man...with a natural inclination to obedience, fidelity, industriousness and frugality,” and propelled by nature toward the bearing and raising children. When the war arrived, women and girls “developed concerns outside the private world of the family,” but those concerns and the new roles they engendered did not ultimately lead to a transformation of gender definitions as the horrors and deprivations of war ultimately inculcated a desire to return to the familiar.

The Revolutionary crisis began after the British sought to recoup a miniscule portion of the vast expense of the French and Indian War (1754-63) by imposing very modest taxes on Americans. The colonists, however, exaggerated the cost of the levies and developed dark fears of a plot to destroy their liberty and reduce them to slavery.

The first piece of British legislation aimed at raising Colonial taxes was the Stamp Act. The Americans responded with the hastily assembled Stamp Act Congress, which called for a boycott on the importation of British goods until the offending law was repealed. Colonial women responded with alacrity, which was vital because America had undergone what historian T.H. Breen called a “consumer revolution,” with women as the chief purchasers of a plethora of goods. The vast majority now refused to buy, organized, marched, published and even cajoled men to do more, moving out of the household and taking on public leadership roles. After this proved successful with the repeal of the Stamp Act, the crisis continued with the Townshend Duties which also engendered a boycott and women’s participation included the spinning of cloth for the creation of “homespun” clothing, which became a badge of pride and a symbol of defiance. The repeal of the Townshend Duties left a tax on tea which women again refused to drink even though the legislation would

have made the beverage cheaper. Berkin asserts that all this activity "was equally or more important to the colonial future than the actions of male congresses and assemblies." Such a conclusion seems excessive to me and needs a more detailed and comparative argument, but she has clearly made the case for an important role for women as the American colonists and the British stumbled toward "the shot heard round the world."

When shots were fired on Lexington Green, the Declaration of Independence and full scale war quickly followed. The real and emotional impact on women then became quite onerous. They saw husbands, sons and lovers depart to face mortal danger, suffered loneliness and worry and worked assiduously to hold the home front in some semblance of order, but found plundering by occupying armies of both sides common and devastating. To render the emotional impact Berkin quotes Eliza Wilkenson, "The whole world appeared to me as a theater, where nothing was acted but cruelty, bloodshed and oppression; where neither age nor sex escaped the horrors of injustice and violence; where lives and property of the innocent and inoffensive were in continual danger and lawless power raged at large." Wilkenson might have added rape to her comment, for the soldiers of both sides committed this heinous crime though the British and their commanders saw it as part of the accepted spoils of war. Such were the horrors that would ultimately lead to a desire to return to the familiar after the conflict, thus thwarting any immediate transformation of gender definition and roles.

Berkin also describes the women who followed the armies, serving as "cooks, washerwomen, seamstresses, nurses, scavengers for supplies, sexual partners and occasionally as soldiers and spies." She notes that the Americans were less used to having women in their rear ranks than were the British. General Washington tried to end it but to no avail, since many of the women were needed, and some even heroic. The modern understanding of "camp followers" as simply prostitutes is wrong, though many followed both armies to the frustration of commanders who tried to eradicate them and the venereal disease they brought. Many of the women, however, especially the American women, won praise for their often heroic service. Berkin gives examples and ends by quoting a British army officer, "if we destroyed all the men in North America, we should have enough to

do to conquer the women." While this ambiguous quotation can be read in various ways, including gender superiority for women, the authors choice to place it as the final summary sentence of a chapter certainly indicates her pride in the performance of Revolutionary women.

Berkin next discusses the role of the wives of generals. The American women in this category "would spend their time at the winter encampments in the most comfortable housing the army could provide," hosting dinner parties for officers and, thereby, making a statement that even the wealthy could make sacrifices for the Revolution. This also served to remind officers and soldiers that they could still "remember and function in a world far removed from the brutality and violence of warfare." Some of the wives, like Martha Washington, would have preferred to remain home, while others like Catherine Greene, wife of General Nathaniel Greene, would rush to shop for fashions whenever she could convince her husband to cease his worrying about her "delicate sensibilities." A bit of familial conflict overlaid with some gender stereotyping can be seen here. One also has to wonder about the problems caused by the fact that British generals "preferred camp wives to real wives, often taking as their mistresses the wives of junior officers."

The Revolution proved particularly trying for the wives of Loyalist men who suffered emotionally and in various other ways including abandonment by their husbands, confiscation and destruction of property, physical violence, and exile in England or Canada. Berkin provides valuable examples.

In exploring the role of Indian women in the Revolution, Berkin frequently makes the point that in the Native American matrilineal society, women often had a deciding voice in political and military decisions. Foreseeing that an American victory would inevitably lead to land grabbing and cultural assimilation they wisely sided with the British. Molly Brant led the Mohawks to this stance and other tribes motivated by women did the same. When the Americans won, Indian women quickly found that their "power was fading after the war," and the cultural and gender norms of white society were soon pressed upon them

Carol Berkin describes how African-American women also fared poorly in the Revolution, espe-

cially in the South, where their owners had no intention to free them. When the Earl of Dunmore formed a regiment of blacks in Virginia, it was defeated and its members treated with draconian harshness, to the sorrow of wives and daughters. When the fighting shifted to the lower south, runaway slaves followed the British army in the hope of ultimate emancipation. Some were freed and sent to Canada. A total of 914 women were thus emancipated, only to find that "prejudice and poverty replaced their earlier bondage." Others were sold back into slavery and the loyalty of those who had not left their masters was "rewarded" with a hardening of attitudes and harsher laws regulating African-American life. In the North some progress occurred. In Massachusetts a slave woman sued for her freedom won a ruling that outlawed slavery in the state. Overall, however, the Revolution brought African-American women little to celebrate.

Professor Berkin moves to a discussion of women as spies, couriers and saboteurs, a rarely mentioned and mostly unknown role. This is a story which comes down to us from family websites and essays created by proud descendants, from genealogists, town historians, amateur historians and finally from some scholarly books and articles. "In every case," she declares, "these stories survive because that kernel of truth found within them captures a wartime reality out of which myths are made." Did you ever hear of Deborah Champion or Sybil Ludington or Lydia Darragh? Though I am a colonial historian, I never did and so I invite the readers of this review to remember Berkin's point that the history of the American Revolution has usually been written with "gendered amnesia." You should enjoy this quite interesting and informative chapter.

With the end of the war, most Americans returned to their ordinary pre-war lives. For women, that meant hearth and home, children and a submissive gender role. For a small group of "elite American women and men," however, there came to be a short but intense moment of lively debate over "the women question." Berkin notes that the debate included a rejection of the idea that women were mentally inferior to men. She quotes the Quaker poet Susanna Wright, "Reason rules in everyone the same," she wrote, "No Right, has man, his Equal to control / Since all agree, There is no Sex in soul." This belief led to educational reform for women.

That reform, however, did not "envision female intellect free from the helpmate role." The new ideology saw women as homemakers who should rear the children, impart civic and patriotic virtue and personal morality to them, provide a safe haven for their husbands from the wicked world and nurse all when sickness developed. This is almost identical to the belief pattern described by historian Barbara Walters for women of the mid-nineteenth century, "The Cult of True Womanhood." In short, the Revolution did not bring quick reform. The publication of Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique*, in 1963, finally ushered in the modern women's movement, which enabled women to make "revolutionary" strides in all aspects of life. While Berkin can see this as "only a moment in the long flow of history," and historian Bernard Bailyn can refer to the "contagion of liberty" emanating from the Revolution, I believe that the long time frame suggests that the American Revolution did not lead to "revolution" in other aspects of life, in this case the role of women. This minor caveat, which some might even see as nit-picking, should not obscure my admiration for *Revolutionary Mothers*, an informative, enjoyable, prodigiously researched, carefully written and well-reasoned book.

*Edward J. Cody, PhD, is emeritus professor of Colonial American History at Ramapo College, where he was an award winning professor who served in a variety of administrative positions, most recently that of Acting Provost. He may be contacted at <EEJCdy@aol.com>. □*

## The Mask of Niceness Judith Harris

### American University

*Review of Evelyn Sommers, The Tyranny of Niceness: Unmasking the Need for Approval, Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2005, paperback, ISBN 10-1-55002-558-9240, 238 pages, \$24.99.*

Evelyn Sommers' *The Tyranny of Niceness* brings a therapist's insight into the psychological roots of niceness. By penetrating the fog of niceness, Sommers points out what is not nice about it, touching on the ambivalence, anger, envy, desire to manipulate, and self-delusion beneath the nervous smiles of niceness. She asks why we mask ourselves

with it in order to gain approval and avoid rejection. Beyond representing empty platitudes, “niceness” also cloaks hypocrisy and a retreat from reality. Sommers urges patients in therapy to use their relationship with their analysts as a model for self-transformation. In the consulting room, they can learn to be more self-reflective while exploring intrapsychic conflicts as they question and work to change lifelong habits of mind and behavior.

Through the experiences of her clients, Sommers shows how hiding one's true feelings can alienate people from their own inner selves, ruin relationships, and lead to illness. Instead of standing outside of the subject as the “authority,” Sommers is frank about her own dispositions toward niceness and how they often confused and hampered her, leading to some painful experiences. The book argues that entrenched beliefs in our culture keep us policed by silence, and some silence (such as the refusing to openly account for a clandestine offense) can damage the trust and welfare of other people. The more we can chip away at facades and pithy clichés, the more critical and flexible our response to our worlds will be. Without the ability to reflect or think critically, we short-circuit our ability for self-examination and understanding.

We've all heard the saying: “flattery will get you nowhere” but we are probably less aware of how we use flattery to manipulate others. When people refuse to think *through* their feelings and opinions, they are in danger of becoming robotic and unquestioning of attitudes and prejudices held against some members of society. In order to maintain humane responsibility, people must be critical first, and then, if they wish, conforming. Hannah Arendt emphasized the need for people to engage in active internal dialectical thinking. Being nice, or agreeable, or overly compliant can become a habit that enables us to avoid making more difficult choices.

Sommers' book is valuable for helping us to understand that change is always possible, and that staying silent when circumstances dictate that one should be outspoken can have serious consequences, even for one's self. In one example, Sommers illustrates a patient's overwhelming need to be nice to her physician and follow his orders, rather than to think through the wisdom of doing so. In that example, Sommers also discloses a painful truth about her own struggle as a medical patient when she failed to be

outspoken about her wishes to her surgeon and underwent an unwanted hysterectomy. This portion of the book is especially effective and enhances its motivational power. Moreover, Sommers' friendly and intimate tone demonstrates how an author can combine an agreeable and supportive approach with a critical and challenging perspective. She states that “one of the difficulties in writing a book such as this is that readers, left alone with their thoughts may see the worst in themselves. It is my hope that should this happen, that self-view will be short-lived.” She goes on to say that “I know from personal experience that the road to self-love is riddled with moments of self-loathing as we learn about our weaknesses. But our trip...encompasses these moments as surely as it encompasses an increasing amount of joy as we also recognize our attributes” (p. 134).

Sommers successfully explores the image of niceness, its origin, and consequences—“The High Cost of Being Nice”—and how to let go of it when it is no longer an expression of amiability, but a way to manipulate others in order to get what one wants. Sommers' last chapter, “Letting Go of Niceness,” offers some tips for cultivating a fairer image of one's own self and allowing one the room to make better decisions. Ironically, Sommers reminds us that if we agree with her too reflexively, too automatically, we ourselves are colluding with our own tendency to be passive and uncritically “nice;” we would rather defer to authority than risk disapproval. The author concludes that when the choice is continuing to relate in a mutually destructive manner, or taking a step outside of that dynamic, it is most often for the better to try to change the pattern. Holding on and acting upon the duality—one's own needs and wishes along with the needs and wishes of others—is not impossible. It simply means allowing more of the script to be written as events actually happen, rather than trying to mold them.

My only problem with the book is that Sommers does not acknowledge the psychoanalytic and philosophical thinkers who have already foraged through this topic, including ones as familiar as Freud, Foucault, or Sartre. While this foundation may not be the immediate concern of the author, I think that, by avoiding it, Sommers detracts from her own argument. In reading, I kept wondering when she would link her ideas of silence breeding illness with Freud's concepts of repression and reaction for-

mation. Overall, Sommers' book is very instructive. Giving up niceness and clichéd or lazy language means "speaking what is true and accurate and avoiding equivocation" (p. 78). A better awareness can foster more rewarding relationships and a greater personal authenticity.

*Judith Harris, PhD, is the author of Signifying Pain: Constructing and Healing the Self Through Writing (SUNY Press, 2003) and two books of poetry from Louisiana State University Press: Atonement (2000) and The Bad Secret (2006). In addition, her work has appeared in South Atlantic Quarterly, Psychoanalysis and Social Change, Tikkun, The American Scholar, Ploughshares, The Southern Review, Southwest Review, Ontario Review, and Clio's Psyche. Professor Harris may be contacted at <[jlha@gwu.edu](mailto:jlha@gwu.edu)>. □*

## A Disappointing Book on Lust

Donald L. Carveth  
York University

*Review of Michael Eigen, Lust. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2006, paperback, ISBN 0-8195-6809-0, 136 pages, \$16.95.*

In his latest book, Michael Eigen offers us a freely associative discourse on the theme of lust. There is no organization into chapters, little organization overall, separate themes and aphorisms being marked only with a kind of squiggle. "With all my might," Eigen writes, "I try to keep things open" (p. 5). While it's true that a closed mind may be an impediment to understanding, might not the same be said of one that is excessively open? In his resistance to what he calls "hallucinated certainty," Eigen seems to have fallen prey to "hallucinated uncertainty," as against singularity, he celebrates multiplicity; against knowing, not knowing; against stasis, flow; against totality, the partial; against plenitude, lack. In other words, against the metaphysics of presence, he embraces, in typical postmodern fashion (thankfully increasingly out of fashion), a metaphysics of absence.

Although generally opposing anything that might threaten to limit the multiplicity of possible meanings, he opens with a definition, "Lust, one of

the seven deadly sins, is part of what gives life luster, heightening existence" (p. ix). Allowing that it "can be degrading and part of a will to power, an assertion of dominance," he argues that it can also entail "an act of self-affirmation." He confesses "Since childhood I have wondered why 'evil' is 'live' spelled backward," an association congruent with his emphasis upon lust's vital and constructive elements as distinct from its destructive elements. In refusing to settle for conventional associations of lust with sin or pathology, Eigen departs from its ordinary definition, increasingly conflating it with *desire*, so that his book becomes as much a discussion of the latter as of the former.

Various dictionaries describe as "obsolete" the association of lust with pleasure and delight. Instead they define it as "intense or unbridled sexual desire," as "lasciviousness," or as "intense," "unrestrained," "overwhelming" or "obsessive" longing or craving. In other words, common definition associates lust with something essentially excessive, pathological or sinful, and contrasts it with normal desire. While certainly stemming from a sense of "lack"—as the book proceeds, Eigen relies increasingly upon Lacanian concepts—normal desire lacks these qualities of obsessive and lascivious drivenness. This is because, however passionate, normal desire is accompanied by an expectation of response and fulfillment. With confidence that my desire will be gratified I am not inflamed with envy, tormented by a teasing and withholding object, nor driven by the idea that I must aggressively seize what will otherwise be denied me, as is the case in lust. It is not that Eigen altogether neglects the desperate, envious and aggressive qualities of lust grounded in the luster's experience and expectation of frustration but, rather, that he resists defining it in these terms, broadening his definition to include the vital and life-affirming aspects more commonly associated with desire.

Whereas some may see this broadening as a virtue, I consider it more obscuring than enlightening. If theorists come away from this book wondering what it is about lust that has been clarified (assuming Eigen's aim in writing is to clarify, a dubious assumption in my view), clinicians will likely feel that not only is there little that is new here, but important elements of our current understanding have been ignored.

One of Heinz Kohut's most important contributions is the concept of the "disintegration product": the intense sexual and aggressive driven-ness that Freud viewed as a natural manifestation of the somatically-rooted drives of the id, Kohut reinterpreted as a "breakdown product" arising from frustration of what he viewed as natural (though sometimes pathologically intensified) needs for recognition, affirmation, soothing and "holding"—i.e., for empathy and love. W.R.D. Fairbairn had earlier made the same point when he argued against Freud that, in health, we do not turn to others as means to the end of pleasure through drive discharge, but rather for the sake of a meaningful and good human relationship. For Fairbairn, as for Kohut, it is the failure to establish such good relations with others that leads to driven pleasure-seeking of the sort we associate with lust.

At times, Eigen foregoes broad generalizations about the alleged nature of human desire in favor of genuine psychoanalytic insight. At one point he writes: "All through childhood I masturbated, day and night, many, many times a day, constantly. This means I was a sick child. Only sick children masturbate all the time. An attempt to soothe madness" (p. 17). There it is: lust as disintegration product. Much later, toward the end of the book, he provides a clinical vignette in which such insight appears again. At the outset, Gary and Marge enjoyed "Great sex!" Until one evening, in the midst of a perfect blow-job, Gary was appalled to find himself feeling nothing: "But it was great. It was great—and I didn't feel a thing. I couldn't get into it" (p. 77). After a host of rationalizations had been worked through it gradually became clear that the root of the problem was that neither partner had ever been prepared to make the other a center. Gary came to suspect that "it was his peripheral status [for Marge] that dampened his spirit. He thought he wanted more, but could *he* give more?" Each partner was "readily blaming the other out of their own unknown deficits. The beauty of sexual urgency was supposed to fill in blanks of self-knowledge? Too big a burden for lust to keep up with" (pp. 78-9).

Whatever the limitations of his theoretical work, Eigen's talent for acute and perceptive clinical description is undeniable. In particular, he has such empathy with psychosis that at times his descriptions of it seem to merge with the processes he describes.

There are a number of vivid case vignettes peppered throughout an otherwise meandering text, although their theoretical relevance to the theme of the book is not always so clear. But what is of interest here is that, having just implicitly acknowledged lust as a disintegration product of Gary and Marge's "unknown deficits," "blanks of self-knowledge," and incapacity to make an other a center—that is, their narcissism and inability to love—Eigen immediately veers away from such useful psychoanalytic insight into personal pathology (as he did earlier in the text with respect to his revelation of his own childhood pathology) in favor of highly questionable claims regarding the general nature of human desire. It is no longer the narcissistic pathology of Gary and Marge that is the problem: it is the universal problem that for human subjects "desire fades" because, as symbolizing beings, we suffer from "aphanisis," the perpetual disappearance of the meanings we create and the desires we experience.

But Lacan's saying so doesn't make it so—at least not in the case of the healthy desire that is mature and genuine love (which "Beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things") as distinct from the unhealthy desire that is lust. It's true that lust fades, because lust is about looking for love in all the wrong places. None of its objects will ultimately satisfy because the lusting subject, encased in narcissism and the sadism that inevitably accompanies it, is incapable of giving or receiving love. But as Freud reminds us, "in the last resort we must begin to love in order that we may not fall ill, and must fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we cannot love."

Writing of a patient who complains he has insufficient appreciation of the role of hate in lust, Eigen admits, "A lot of people are more down to earth than I" (p. 28). He writes, "I'm not sure I have ever felt lust that didn't take me closer to God, open God for me" (p. 26). My own experience is quite the contrary, I have never felt love, including loving sexuality, that didn't take me closer to God, or lust that didn't take me further from Him.

*Donald Carveth, PhD, teaches sociology and social and political thought at Glendon College of York University in Toronto. He is a training and supervising analyst in the Canadian Institute of Psychoanalysis and past Editor-in-Chief of the Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis/Revue Canadienne de*

*Psychanalyse*. He was the Clio's Psyche Featured Scholar in the March 2006 issue. Many of his publications may be found on his website <<http://www.yorku.ca/dcarveth>>. Dr. Carveth may be contacted at <[dcarveth@yorku.ca](mailto:dcarveth@yorku.ca)>. □

## Arnold A. Rogow (1924-2006): In Memoriam

Paul Elovitz with Jeanne Rogow

After a long illness, Professor Rogow died on February 14, 2006 from a massive stroke following a staph infection during treatment for lung cancer at New York-Presbyterian Hospital/Columbia University Medical Center. During a productive career as a political scientist, professor, and psychoanalyst, he published numerous books, primarily based upon psychodynamic concepts.

Arnold Austin Rogow was born in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on August 10, 1924, as the second of two sons. He faced early loss with the death of his father from a stroke when he was five years old and his mother of complications from diabetes when he was twelve. He did not have fond thoughts of the rabbi who assumed parental responsibilities. He was a survivor whose inquisitiveness, intelligence, and love of books helped him to endure despite his losses. Arnold graduated with high honors from high school; however, his education at the University of Wisconsin at Madison was interrupted when he volunteered for the infantry in World War II.

As a Jew he faced prejudices on the part of his superiors, just as he had faced anti-Semitism while growing up. A leg wound early in the Battle of the Bulge resulted in his being hospitalized, perhaps saving his life. In Paris, Arnold Rogow was friendly with Gertrude Stein, giving her his combat infantry badge. He fell in love with France, becoming a life-long Francophile. Writing for the Armed Forces newspaper, *Stars and Stripes*, enabled him to extend his Parisian stay for some months. The young man returned to America with various medals including the Purple Heart and Bronze Star. Like so many other veterans, he did not like to talk about what was the defining experience of his life. A sign of the importance of his combat experience was his request that his ashes be scattered among his fallen comrades

in a military cemetery in Luxembourg.

After WW II Arnold Rogow completed his bachelors degree at the University of Wisconsin in 1947. He went on to study at Princeton where he earned his masters degree in 1950 and PhD in 1953. The productive young professor became Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa in 1955, prior to going on to teach at Haverford College, Stanford University (where he earned tenure and became full professor in 1964), and at the City University of New York (1966-86). The lowering of academic standards due to open admissions caused a disappointing decline in the quality of his students, though less so in his capacity as Graduate Professor of Political Science. He held visiting professorships at Hebrew, Tel Aviv, and other universities, prior to becoming Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the City University of New York in 1986. Rogow received a Center for the Advanced Study of the Behavioral Sciences Fellowship in 1954-55, a Ford Foundation Fellowship in 1956, a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1965, and a National Endowment for the Humanities grant in 1978.

Professor Rogow was trained in psychoanalysis at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute in the 1970s and saw patients for some years. He worked on the staff of the Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research at Columbia University and was a member of the American Psychoanalytic Association from 1977 until his death. The Professor's psychoanalytic knowledge was integrated not only into his books, but also into his teaching. As a political scientist with an international reputation, he brought a unique blend of social criticism and individual psychology to his work. He was one of a relatively small number of professors in history, political science, and the social sciences apart from psychology, to become trained Freudian analysts—a learning process in mid-life which gave more depth of analysis to his academic publications. (See the Clio's Psyche Special Issue, "Dual Training in Psychoanalysis and History or an Academic Discipline" [September, 1997, 14 articles], pp. 33-62.) To share his new knowledge, he created and co-chaired the program on the Psychodynamics of Political Behavior with the Chair of the psychiatry department at Mt. Sinai Hospital.

Included in his eight books are: *Power, Corruption, and Rectitude* (with Harold D. Lasswell,

1963); *James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy* (1964); *Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century: Essays in Honor of Harold D. Lasswell* (1969); *The Psychiatrists* (1970); *Thomas Hobbes: Radical in the Service of Reaction* (1986, and published in a French translation in 1990); and *A Fatal Friendship: Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr* (1998). In the later he argued that Hamilton's manic depressive tendencies and hatred of Burr led him to commit virtual suicide in the famous duel between the former friends. In a 1970 *New York Post* interview Dr. Rogow argued that "Sick societies producing sick people who produce sick politics...They all feed on each other." In 1975 America was depicted by him as a confused, unfair, and violent country in *The Dying of the Light: A Searching Look at America Today*. However, his optimism emerged in a handwritten inscription on this book, which hopes that in the future "most of what I have said in this book is no longer relevant."

Arnold Rogow edited *The Jew in a Gentile World* (1961). He was the founding editor of *Comparative Politics* and served as the editor-in-chief from 1968 until 1979. He published numerous articles and book reviews in periodicals such as the *American Historical Review*, *Guardian*, *Monthly Review*, *International Review of Psychoanalysis*, *Nation*, *New Statesman and Nation*, *Political Science Quarterly*, *Psychiatric Quarterly*, *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, and the *Western Political Quarterly*, but not in the political psychology and psychohistory publications.

A political liberal and a cultural conservative who remembered the hardships of his childhood, he cared about the common man and disenfranchised, often remarking, as recollected by his daughter Jeanne, to "trust your generous instincts and mistrust your ungenerous ones." He had a keen interest in communicating his sense of life's drama, historical and otherwise. Despite strong opinions, he sought to avoid dogmatism. He saw himself as a man of the Left but not a doctrinaire. All through his life he had a profound concern for social justice and for a public integrity that he felt was being diminished by the failure of contemporary American government to pursue peaceful, progressive and honest policies. A former student and close friend, who believes Rogow's life warrants a biography, described him as "a sensitive cynic...a true classical liberal [in terms of] tolerance

of diversity... and something of an idealistic romantic deep down."

Professor Rogow's love of knowledge and books was present in various aspects of his life. He was quite serious about collecting first editions, mostly in his areas of special interest. Eventually, this hobby evolved into the business, "Firsts & Co.," which dealt with first editions, some of which were quite rare.

The Professor's life was not all books, family, and knowledge. The losses of his life left him with a certain level of depression that he struggled against. The "deeply rooted survivors guilt" [his words] he felt as a result of his parents' deaths was deepened by the deaths of his Army buddies killed in World War II and as well as of his fellow Jews killed by the Nazis. His anger at God for allowing the Holocaust eventually led him to become a "devout atheist." His strong support for Israel eventually turned to criticism after it took a turn to the right. Over his desk he had pictures of a displaced Jewish child after WW II and of a displaced Palestinian child.

Arnold Rogow is survived by his two daughters, three grandchildren and his longtime companion, Martha Moraes, who has returned to her native Brazil.

*[Editor's Note: I would like to thank Al Haas, Mopsy Strange Kennedy, Martha Moeraes, Jeanne Rogow, Michael Sigall, PhD, JD, and James Graham Wilson, MD, for help with my research.]*

*Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, is editor of this publication. Jeanne Rogow is an actor, writer, and filmmaker teaching at the Town Hall Theater of Middlebury, Vermont and the Gailer (private-college preparatory) School. Currently, she is working on a documentary film about Ethiopian orphans who are adopted by Vermonters, as well as ways to work her father's life story into her creative works. Their e-mails are [pelovitz@aol.com](mailto:pelovitz@aol.com) and [jrogow@usa-data-net.net](mailto:jrogow@usa-data-net.net). □*

<><><>CP<><><>

## In Memoriam: John Caulfield (1922-2006)

**Paul H. Elovitz**

**Clio's Psyche and Ramapo College**

John Blakeley Caulfield, who served for years on the Advisory Council of the Psychohistory Forum, died in his own bed at 1:35 pm on June 24, 2006, surrounded by his devoted family. His struggle with ill health included a heart bypass operation in 1999 and extremely painful pancreatitis beginning in 2001. After two full years of maintaining a reasonable quality of life while on hospice, he chose to die of liver failure rather than subject himself and his family to further medical interventions offering no prospect of good health. He did not want to be a burden on his loved ones.

Caulfield was born on March 22, 1922 in Guttenberg, New Jersey, as the second son of an Irish-American family that included four younger sisters. His family suffered a devastating economic setback during the Great Depression, resulting in his identifying strongly with the poor and needy. John worked his way through college, graduating from Seton Hall University and then the Darlington Seminary in Mahwah, New Jersey prior to being ordained as a priest in 1947 in preparation for his career of service. For three and one half decades he served in various parishes and did considerable hospital work. In the 1970s he was a founder and president of the National Association of Catholic Chaplains.

Though John Caulfield left the formal structure of the Catholic priesthood in 1981, he always considered himself a priest, continuing to preach and do hospital and charitable work. After marrying Marie Trum in 1982, he campaigned for reform within the Church, especially for a return to the tradition of optional celibacy. For several years he worked with the homeless in the Bowery in lower Manhattan. Following his move to Florida in 1987, he turned his hand to fundraising for charitable groups, while continuing to serve as a part-time hospice and hospital chaplain. As a member of the Forum's Advisory Council, he worked to strengthen the financial basis of our activities. See Paul H. Elovitz, "Funding Psychohistory: An Interview with John Caulfield" Vol. 2, no 1 (June, 1995), pp. 20-24.

John Caulfield was known for his humanity and good humor. He was a tall, dignified man with a warm smile. Indeed, even on June 14<sup>th</sup> when we last spoke, he remained humorous, though the telephone was soon too heavy for him to hold.

Optional celibacy, which had been the official policy of the Church until the Middle Ages, as well as the de facto situation of most priests prior to modern times, was a policy Caulfield came to advocate. He felt that parish priests should be free to marry if they so desire, as do Anglican and Eastern Orthodox priests. Counseling is an important part of the duties of the clergy and he came to believe that without having experienced family life it is hard to effectively counsel people about it. His wife Marie commented that after leaving the priesthood, he preached in a very different manner. With more and different types of life experience, Caulfield felt anger, compassion, frustration, love, pain and other feelings experienced in marriage differently and more deeply. Helping to raise the younger two of Marie's three children, enabled him to talk more effectively and empathically with them and young people in general.

There is no single, definitive reason why John Blakely Caulfield chose to leave the Catholic priesthood to which he had devoted his life. Central to his motivation was disappointed expectations of further reform after Vatican II; he felt anger and frustration at the injustices within the Church. Based upon a comment he once made to me, I think that an added consideration was loneliness—even while surrounded by a crowd of adoring people. The Psychohistory Forum and Clio's Psyche will miss a valued advisor and good friend.

*Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, is editor of this publication and may be reached at [pelovitz@aol.com](mailto:pelovitz@aol.com). □*

### Scholarly Recognition of Psychohistory Letter Writing Campaign Directed to the American Historical Association (AHA)

Prof. Peter Loewenberg of UCLA has alerted us to the fact that the AHA recently has dropped "psycho-history" from its subfields of history. He suggests, and we endorse, that letters be written requesting its restoration by present and past AHA members and other interested parties. The president of the AHA is Linda K. Kerber <[linda-kerber@uiowa.edu](mailto:linda-kerber@uiowa.edu)>. Loewenberg wrote David Darlington of *Perspectives* at <[ddarlington@historians.org](mailto:ddarlington@historians.org)>.

*Applying Psychology to Current  
Events, History, and Society:  
Essays from Clio's Psyche*

Paul H. Elovitz,  
Editor

## Table of Contents

- Section 1 The Editor's Introduction
- Section 2 Becoming a Psychohistorian and  
Personal Reflections
- Section 3 Psychobiography
- Section 4 Political Leaders and Their Followers
- Section 5 Group Process and Methodology
- Section 6 Some Psychohistorical Interviews
- Section 7 Interviews with Some Women  
Psychohistorians
- Section 8 Women in Society
- Section 9 Intimacy, Love, and Humor on the  
Internet
- Section 10 The Cost and Celebrity of Fame
- Section 11 Violence
- Section 12 Violent Movie Fantasies
- Section 13 Capital Punishment
- Section 14 September 11 and Its Aftermath
- Section 15 Germany, the Holocaust and the Trans-  
generational Transmission of Trauma
- Section 16 Apocalyptic Violence
- Section 17 Terror and War
- Section 18 Geography and Home
- Section 19 Conspiracy Theories and Paranoia
- Section 20 Religion

- Section 21 Disease, Illness, & the Denial of Death
- Section 22 Dreams
- Section 23 Teaching Psychological History
- Section 24 Expanding the Psychohistorical  
Paradigm
- Section 25 The Future of Psychohistory

## Appendices

- Section 26 Memorials to Builders of the Psycho-  
historical Paradigm
- Section 27 Featured Scholars, Special Issues,  
Special Features, and Symposia
- Section 28 Sources
- Section 29 Contributors  
(These include: C. Fred Alford, Herbert Barry,  
Rudolph Binion, Sue Erikson Bloland, Andrew  
Brink, Don Carveth, Nancy Chodorow, Mary Cole-  
man, Robert Collins, Ralph Colp, Henry Davis,  
Lloyd deMause, Dan Dervin, Alan Dundes, Paul  
Elovitz, Eva Fogelman, John Forrester, Lawrence  
Friedman, Peter Gay, Anna Geifman, Carol Gilligan,  
Betty Glad, James Gollnick, Jay Gonen, Phyllis  
Grosskurth, Paul Hamburg, Jean Hantman, John  
Jacob Hartman, Flora Hogman, J. Donald Hughes,  
Lynn Hunt, Irene Javors, Sudhir Kakar, Mel Kalfus,  
Daniel Klenbort, Danielle Knafo, Thomas Kohut,  
Henry Lawton, Robert Jay Lifton, Peter Loewenberg,  
David Lotto, Elizabeth Marvick, Jennefer Mazza,  
Ruth Dale Meyer, Maria Miliora, Robert Pois, Philip  
Pomper, David Redles, H. John Rogers, Robert  
Rousselle, Todd Schultz, Linda Simon, Evelyn Som-  
mers, Howard Stein, Charles Strozier, Jacques  
Szaluta, Ellen Toronto, Lawrence Tittle, Hanna  
Turken, Montague Ullman, Nancy Unger, George  
Victor, Vamik Volkan, Victor Wolfenstein, and  
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl.)

Published September, 2006, x, 236 pages  
\$38 (\$20 to students in college bookstores)  
Available from the Psychohistory Forum  
For Information visit  
Cliospsyche.org

## *Call for Papers*

### Psychology of Sports

**Special Issue, December 2006**

**Some possible approaches to this topic include:**

- The expression of emotion in sports
- Idealization & denigration of sports/athletes
- Baseball as the national pastime—an historical viewpoint
- Personal and national identity through sports
- The psychological functions of different sports
- The development and psychology of professional sports
- Girls and women in sports
- Steroid & alcohol abuse among athletes
- Sports as the “moral equivalent to war”
- The role of the media
- Sports psychology as a profession
- The team and the superstar

**Articles of 500-1500 words are due on October 30, 2006. One long article may be accepted.**

Please Send an Abstract or Outline ASAP.  
All Articles will be Refereed.

**Contact Paul H. Elovitz, Editor**  
**pelovitz@aol.com**

#### BULLETIN BOARD

The next **Psychohistory Forum Work-In-Progress Saturday Seminar** will be on **November 11, 2006** when **Christian Talbot** (Boston Psychoanalytic), **Paul H. Elovitz** (Ramapo College), and **David Beisel** (SUNY-RCC) will speak, respectively, on “**Osama bin Laden,**” “**Reflections on Terrorism, Suicidal Terrorism, and the Frustrating Search for Information on Osama bin Laden,**” and “**Mass Suicides in Germany at the End of the Second World War.**” **CONFERENCES:** The Association for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society’s (APCS) annual conference, Psychoanalysis and Social Change, will be held at Rutgers University on **October 20-22, 2006**. The Psychohistory Forum sponsored panel at it will include presentations by David Beisel, Paul Elovitz, and **Kenneth Fuchsman**. On **October 28, 2006** the 34<sup>th</sup> annual conference, “**Destiny: A Psychoanalytic Exploration,**” of the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (NAAP) will be held at the Marriott Financial Center Hotel with the Gradiva Awards announced at the luncheon. The 17<sup>th</sup> annual International Federation for Psychoanalytic Education Conference (IFPE) will be held in Pasadena on November 3-5, 2006 with the theme of “How We Learn When We Learn Why We Learn What Constitutes Psychoanalytic Knowledge.” The 30<sup>th</sup> Annual International Psychohistorical Association (IPA) meetings will be at New York University in lower Manhattan on **June 6-8, 2007** and the 30<sup>th</sup> annual meetings of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP) will be in Portland, Oregon on **July 3-6, 2007** (Paul Elovitz [[pelovitz@aol.com](mailto:pelovitz@aol.com)], who is organizing panels at both the IPA and the ISPP, welcomes ideas and panelists). The next International Conference on Literature and Psychology will be on July 4-9, 2007 at the University of Belgrade, Serbia. Among the Forum members who presented at the 2006 IPA were **Stanley Teitelbaum, Lynn Sommerstein, Edryce Reynolds, Dennis O’Keefe, Richard Morrock, David Lotto, Danielle Knafo, Paul Elovitz, David Beisel, and Herbert Barry**. David Beisel and Paul Elovitz were among the presenters at the 2006 ISPP Barcelona meetings. **PUBLICATIONS:** Congratulations to **Vamik Volkan** on the July 15, 2006 publication of *Killing in the Name of Identity: A Study of Bloody Conflict* and to Paul Elovitz on editing *Applying Psychology to Current Events, History, and Society: Essays from the Jour-*

*nal Clio's Psyche* (September, 2006). **Ted Goertzel** will spend the next month in Brazil, assuming President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva wins reelection, researching *Brazil Under Lula* for a publisher who wants to put it in print early in 2007. **NOTES:** Thanks to **Laura Fram** for a donation of \$100 to support two young scholar membership awards. **Dan Dervin** just spent a month in Italy and Vivian Rosenberg has enjoyed trips to Alaska and Israel. **Geri Elovitz** wants to thank our members for their good wishes as she recovered from her intestinal surgery in August and early September. Welcome to new member **Ken Rasmussen**. **ERRATUM:** The last issue of this Bulletin Board erroneously stated that the June 7-9, 2006 IPA conference was at Fordham University rather than NYU. **OUR THANKS:** To our members and subscribers for the support that makes *Clio's Psyche* possible. To Benefactors Herbert Barry and Ralph Colp; Patrons David Beisel, Andrew Brink, Mary Lambert, Peter Loewenberg, David Lotto, and Shirley Stewart; Sustaining Member Jacques Szaluta; Supporting Members Rudolph Binion, David Felix, Peter Petschauer, Jacqueline Paulsen, and Edryce Reynolds; and Members Sue Adrion, John Hartman, Peggy McLaughlin, Geraldine Pauling, and Richard Weiss. Our appreciation to Forum hosts Flora Hogman, Mary Lambert, and the Shneidmans (Connalee and Lee). Our thanks for thought-provoking materials to Donald Carveth, Ed Cody, Dan Dervin, Paul Elovitz, John Forrester, Judith Harris, David Lotto, and Jeanne Rogow. Also, to Cathryn Davis and Danny London for proofreading and to Theresa Graziano for proofing/editing/Publisher 2003 software application. We wish to thank our numerous referees, who must remain anonymous. □

**Psychohistory Forum  
November 11, 2006 Meeting**

**"Suicide, Suicidal Terrorism, and the  
Psychobiography of Osama bin Laden"**

Christian Talbot (Boston Psychoanalytic), Paul H. Elovitz (Ramapo College) and David Beisel (SUNY-RCC) will be presenting, respectively, "Osama bin Laden," "Reflections on Terrorism, Suicidal Terrorism, and the Frustrating Search for Information on Osama bin Laden," and "Mass Suicides in Germany at the End of the Second World War."

## *Call for Papers*

### The Experience, Joy, Sorrow, and Psychology of Retirement and the Golden Years

**Some possible approaches to this topic include:**

- The fantasies and realities of the "golden years" and retirement
- Fulfilling unfulfilled dreams in career changing and elsewhere
- Academic/clinical retirements allowing more time for scholarship and self-development
- The advantages and stresses of relocation
- Lifelong learning: teaching and taking Elderhostel courses
- Unexpected parental responsibilities for parents, children, and grandchildren
- Changing self-image, body image, and identity
- Battling disease, mental and physical decline: the fear of Alzheimer's
- The humor of old age and retirement
- Facing narcissistic blows and loss
- Coping with dependency and modern medicine: regression and self-assertion
- Marginalization and infantilization
- Confronting the prospect of death
- Psychologically oriented reviews of relevant books, movies, and television programs
- Why so many psychoanalysts put off retirement
- Case studies

**Articles of 500-1500 words are due on  
October 25, 2006. One long article may be  
accepted.**

Please Send an Abstract or Outline ASAP.  
All Articles will be Refereed.

**Contact Paul H. Elovitz, Editor  
pelovitz@aol.com**