Clio’s Psyche
Understanding the “Why” of Culture, Current Events, History, and Society

Special Issue on
Psychoanalytic Anthropology

The Psychohistorical Roots of Apartheid

Anderson, Elms, and Runyan on
Erik Erikson and Psychobiography

A Historical Examination of Genius

Volume 20 Number 4
March 2014
Clio’s Psyche
Vol. 20 No. 4  March 2014
ISSN 1080-2622

Published Quarterly by the Psychohistory Forum
627 Dakota Trail, Franklin Lakes, NJ  07417
Telephone: (201) 891-7486
E-mail: pelovitz@aol.com

Editor: Paul H. Elovitz
Book Review Editor: Ken Fuchsman
Guest Editor for Anthropology: Aaron Denham

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Subscription Rate:
Free to members of the Psychohistory Forum
$72 two-year subscription to non-members
$70 yearly to institutions
(Add $50 per year outside U.S.A. & Canada)
Single domestic issue price: $21
$65 two-year overseas online subscription

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Introduction

There has always been a kinship between anthropology and psychoanalysis, however uneven, from Freud’s interest in anthropological data and his attempts to link the psyche with social forms, to more contemporary shared theorizations of the self and subjectivity in culturally diverse contexts. Psychoanalyst and anthropologist Elizabeth Bott-Spillius believed that while the content and expressions between psychoanalysis and social anthropology differed, their fundamental mode of thinking, generally speaking, was “surprisingly similar” (“Anthropology and Psychoanalysis: A Personal Concordance,” *The Sociological Review*, 2005, 670). Indeed, anthropologists have described a number of interpretive parallels between the disciplines, compared our ways of listening and orienting toward the other, emphasized the importance of attending to one’s own subjectivity, and even remarked that psychoanalysis is, ultimately, a “micro-ethnography.”

The disciplines of psychoanalysis and anthropology opened the 20th century with, according to Waud Kracke, two important insights into the nature of humanity: Freud’s discovery of the unconscious and the power of desires of which we are unaware, and the recognition that humans are “profoundly” cultural beings. While these two insights, Kracke continues, are not incompatible, they have, at times, seemed to pull in opposite directions (“Between Desire and Culture: Conversations between Psychoanalysis and Anthropology,” in Anthony Molino, ed., *Culture, Subject Psyche*, 2004, 175). For a significant portion of their inter- and cross-disciplinary history, scholars have characterized the relationship between psychoanalysis and anthropology by both their productive engagements and antagonistic foreclosures. Historically, a number of anthropologists have been generally cautious of psychoanalytic
theory and anthropological interpretations that turn toward “the internal.” A number of accounts concerning the relationship between the disciplines further describe the territorial squabbles, dismissiveness, and failures to acknowledge cross-disciplinary influences and debts. Dated and nearly cliché critiques of psychoanalytic reductionism or of how psychoanalysis ignores cultural diversity continue to circulate among those who refuse to consider a vision of psychoanalysis beyond Freudian theory or recognize the contributions of psychoanalytic anthropology over 75 years. Working from two disciplines is not without its complications. Charles Lindholm describes how the difficulties of marrying distinct disciplines such as anthropology and psychology risk producing “bastard offspring” that could be perceived as a threat to the integrity of each discipline and would not be acceptable to either field (Culture and Identity, 2007, 10).

Despite the historical tensions, I remain increasingly optimistic that the intersections between anthropology and psychoanalysis will continue to produce innovative insights into our broader, mutual quest to understand humanity. It is in these spaces of overlap, whether imbued with tension or enthusiasm, where the productive dialogue occurs and where psychoanalytically oriented anthropologists generate a range of insights, interpretations, and contributions to our understandings of, for example, symbolism, cultural meaning, dreams, fantasy, the self, subjectivity, and a range of intrapersonal processes and their relationship to sociocultural worlds.

The diversity of perspectives within anthropology and psychoanalysis and the innumerable ways in which anthropologists use psychoanalytic themes make it difficult to articulate a decisive definition or to characterize a unified vision of psychoanalytic anthropology today. I am hesitant to refer to psychoanalytic anthropology as a distinct disciplinary subfield within anthropology (see also Stein this issue), despite several past references to it as such. Psychoanalytic orientations in anthropology cut across several subfields and anthropologists often draw upon psychoanalytic perspectives to enhance or frame selected parts of their ethnographic work, rather than committing themselves to dedicated psychoanalytic research agendas. Perhaps a more accurate depiction of the contem-
porary landscape of psychoanalytic anthropology is to say that there are “psychoanalytically oriented” anthropologists or that there are anthropologists working from positions that are psychoanalytically informed. This notion of what it means to have a psychoanalytic orientation will become clear shortly.

Despite my hesitancy, I broadly define a psychoanalytically oriented anthropology as using a range of psychoanalytic theories, methods, and practices in ethnographic research, interpretation, and writing to frame research and interpretive efforts, orientations toward others, ways of listening, and modes of understanding the diversity of human life-worlds within their contexts. There is a shared recognition that we cannot ignore the intertwined relationships between our embodiment, the subjective, and the intrapsychic and the sociocultural, political-economic, and historical life-worlds in which we dwell.

George Devereux, an early figure who trained first as an anthropologist and later as a psychoanalyst, frequently emphasized that understanding human behavior requires the application and cross-fertilization of both social and psychoanalytic methods and explanations. He was adamant about the inclusion of the psychological with the sociocultural and remarked it is “impossible” for any meaningful framework for the study of humanity to “dissociate the study of Culture from the study of the psyche,” since they are inseparable yet complementarity concepts (*Basic Problems of Ethnopsychiatry*, 1980, 71). While emphasizing the importance of the psyche and the social, however, Devereux believed the psychoanalytic and sociocultural could not be blended or fused together; rather, they must stand in a complementary relationship to each other (320).

Few, if any, anthropologists work solely from a psychoanalytic paradigm. While psychoanalytic theories and methods can enhance our perceptual and analytic thinking, they alone cannot be the sole mode of ethnographic analysis. They are best used alongside other approaches or, in Devereux’s words, be employed in a “serial manner.” Recently, Michael D. Jackson emphasized that rather than binding ourselves to specific theories, it is wise for both scholars and clinicians to explore a variety of theoretical and methodological guidelines—or employ a “toolkit”—that varies accord-
ing to the “exigencies of the situation we are trying to understand.” Such a toolkit could be used to provide the most “therapeutically useful, analytically productive, or intellectually satisfying understanding” (“Commentary: The Complementarity of Intrapsychic and Intersubjective Dimensions of Social Reality,” *Ethos* 40: 1, 2012, 114).

The notion of a psychoanalytic and ethnographic toolkit is an adept metaphor for this issue. The contributing authors demonstrate a range of dialogues, integrations, and overlaps between anthropology and psychoanalysis in their theoretical discussions, personal reflections and histories, and psychoanalytically oriented ethnographic cases and interpretations. In the remainder of this introduction, I offer a brief and by no means complete glimpse into the variations within psychoanalytic anthropology. I start with a discussion of how several anthropologists “discovered” or gravitated toward psychoanalytic perspectives followed by a synthesis of the diverse approaches and strengths within the psychoanalytic orientation in anthropology.

**The Gravitation toward Psychoanalysis**

While preparing for this issue, I was drawn into the narratives of how anthropologists discovered or came to value psychoanalytic perspectives and I came to consider how these narratives are central to understanding the foundations of an author’s work. Understanding what brings people to psychoanalytic theory is one way to demonstrate the strengths of the perspective and, more importantly, inform how we introduce it to others.

A common discovery narrative involved reading Freud or another noted psychoanalyst who captured the readers’ interest and opened them up to new ways of thinking about humanity. This initial exposure often leads to further psychoanalytic exploration. Elizabeth Bott-Spillius remarked that after reading Klein, she knew psychoanalysis was for her and she subsequently continued reading other analysts as she began fieldwork with British families and soon began formal psychoanalytic training (“On Becoming a British Psychoanalyst,” *Psychoanalytic Inquiry*, 29, 204). Gananath Obeysekere, distinguished by his research on personal symbols and religion, came to psychoanalysis from literature and a fascination with unconscious motivation. Vincent Crapanzano, noted for
his work on theories of interpretation, found psychoanalysis to be a
useful interpretive schema against which to reflect (see Anthony
Molino, *Culture, Subject, Psyche*, 2004). Howard Stein (this issue)
notes how he found himself gravitating to the field after taking a
class on culture and personality in anthropology. Stein also credits
a series of mentors that helped guide his reading and further his de-
development. Ellen Corin (this issue) describes how she did not ini-
tially suspect that when she first explored psychoanalytic theory it
would become such a central part of her life.

In my case, it was the other way around; psychoanalysis is
what finally drew me into anthropology. During my early work as
a child and family mental health counselor, I was fortunate to work
for an agency that remained open to thinking from psychodynamic
and other perspectives. While exploring a selection of readings, I
came across a collection of work in psychoanalytic and psychologi-
cal anthropology, which opened new ways for me to think about
mental health and the relationship between individual experience,
family dynamics, and the sociocultural and political-economic con-
text. The merging of psychological perspectives with anthropology
offered more holistic and satisfying explanations that better fit how
I was thinking through my work. However, later on in graduate
school, the interpretive approach of Clifford Geertz remained domi-
nant—underscoring the inaccessibility of the mind with an empha-
sis that the study of culture rests only within what is visible. It was
not until my first long-term period of fieldwork in Northern Ghana,
where I studied infanticide, discourse, and practice and family per-
ceptions of children considered to be spirits, that again brought to
the fore the importance of integrating psychoanalytic perspectives
into my considerations of the relationships between the subjectivity,
 intra- and interpersonal processes, and the sociocultural.

Narratives of how one’s respondents or the community
taught the anthropologist the importance of psychoanalytic thought
are common. George Devereux conducted several fieldwork trips
in a Mohave community while working from a non-psychoanalytic
perspective. He remained, in his words, “anti-Freudian” until his
Mohave informant, he explains, “taught me psychoanalysis, as
Freud’s patients had taught it to him” (“The Works of George
Devereux” in George D. Spindler, ed., *The Making of Psychologi-
Recently, Byron Good emphasized the importance of a psychoanalytically attuned form of listening and conception of the self in fieldwork. He described how this realization occurred during a routine visit with a young Javanese man who had earlier experienced his first episode of psychotic illness. Good notes how his phenomenological interest in the spirits and magical forces haunting the man, while fascinating, were incomplete. It was a psychological attunement that demonstrated a haunting that was, as he describes, “something far less exotic but more primal, the loss of his father.” Working solely from a phenomenological perspective missed important elements of the man’s experience and loss. Good recognized that another sort of listening is necessary, one that is able to better attend to the “unspoken, unsaid, repressed, unspeakable—in politics and in everyday life, as well as in psychopathology” (“Phenomenology, Psychoanalysis, and Subjectivity in Java,” *Ethos* 40: 1, 2012, 32).

The background and training of psychoanalytically oriented anthropologists is eclectic. Early American anthropologists were encouraged to enter psychoanalysis under the belief that it would help in conducting ethnographic fieldwork. Today, teachers and advisors with an interest in psychological and psychoanalytic anthropology play a significant role in introducing and mentoring students. Some students and scholars are able to take advantage of psychoanalytic institutes or societies and participate in seminars and, in some cases, enter formal training programs. A small number of psychoanalytically trained anthropologists maintain a clinical practice while also working in academic settings. Several anthropologists approach the literature alone. One senior scholar remarked that much of her engagement in psychoanalytic ethnography has been self-taught. She described her trajectory to me as, “Nothing special. I just started reading about it and doing it.” Jadran Mimica describes how experience in analysis and ongoing reading of psychoanalytic publications and case studies are essential to developing a psychoanalytic understanding of human experience (*Explorations in Psychoanalytic Ethnography*, 2007, 3).

There is significant diversity in how anthropologists have engaged or adopted psychoanalytic methods and theory in their ethnographic research and writing. To summarize these perspectives, I
grouped these approaches into four categories. While presented as distinct, the categories often overlap and are not mutually exclusive.

“An Awareness of One’s Awareness”
Psychoanalytic ideas and practices have played a far-reaching role in directing attention to the role we play in the lives of those we work with and the influence of our intrapsychic processes in shaping the research trajectory. Psychoanalytically oriented anthropologists often work from a mode of attention that considers how their inevitable involvement consciously and unconsciously shapes the research design, interviews, interpretive and analytic processes, representations, and relationships with consultants. Attending to our participation in the research process can heighten our awareness of the role of desires, power relations, and self-other processes that shape the ethnographic dialogue and can inform how our anxieties and ethnocentrism, for example, influence the research. George Devereux is most noted for calling attention to the use of countertransference and our anxieties to better understand what it is that might blind us to other interpretations or lines of inquiry—proposing, in his words, the need for “an awareness of one’s awareness” (Anxiety to Method in the Behavioral Sciences, 1967, 23). For Devereux, the ethnographer’s anxieties and countertransference are essential data that should not be simply explained away but be used as part of the explanation for the data and as a tool to understand what might be impeding our research. Ultimately, knowledge of psychoanalytic observational practices, Katherine Ewing notes, can help us overcome some of the difficulties and issues surrounding participant observation and how our relationship with informants shape our research and writing (“Is Psychoanalysis Relevant for Anthropology?” in Theodore Schwartz, et al., eds., New Directions in Psychological Anthropology, 1992, 252).

Method and Practice
Psychoanalytically oriented anthropologists adopt a wide range of psychoanalytic methods and practices, many of which are akin to clinically oriented techniques. These practices, when used alongside ethnographic methods, enhance our ability to examine symbols, relational and interactive processes, and that which re-
mains unsaid—specifically, the gaps, non-verbal communications, assumptions, and structures present in our interactions. Depth metaphors are common in descriptions of what these methods offer. Scholars speak of deep listening and attending to what lies beneath, underground, or in the shadows of our field interactions. One might argue that this notion of depth is misleading or not relevant across cultures, since it implies an untapped or hidden repository requiring special skills to access. Ewing remarked that the metaphor of depth is “unfortunate” because of its association with something underlying or not directly observable within our dark interiors and thus outside the reach of anthropology and restricted to the domain of psychologists (253).

Anthropologists commonly describe two similar psychoanalytically oriented ethnographic approaches: person-centered ethnography and clinical ethnography. Articulated by Robert Levy and Douglas Hollan, person-centered ethnography reflects a mode of inquiry and listening that prioritizes the individual and their experiences of their social context and life-world. When compared to other ethnographic approaches, interviews are frequently longer in duration and ongoing. The ethnographer closely attends to self-processes and involvement in the present interaction. Consideration is also given to the relationship between the consultants, communities, and their sociocultural and historical contexts. Common themes of interest include inquiries into conflicts, coherences, and transformations. Since the self is a focal area of study, closely related constructs such as the body, emotions, morality, and understandings around illness and healing are of particular interest (Robert Levy and Douglas Hollan, “Person-Centered Interviewing and Observation” in H. Russell Bernard ed., Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology, 1998, 333-364). Similarly, clinical ethnography, as described by Gilbert Herdt and Robert Stoller, is the cross-cultural study and close examination of subjectivity, both that of the researcher and the participants. Attention is paid to the symbols, context, demonstrations of agency, and the ways in which people express feelings, beliefs, and motives (Intimate Communications, 1990, 29-30). Herdt, an anthropologist, and Stoller, a psychoanalyst, conducted ethnographic research together with the Sambia of Papua New Guinea, demonstrating their unique anthro-
Practitioners using psychoanalytic practices recognize that the contexts and situations encountered during fieldwork are often quite different from those of Western clinical practice. Time limits, research scope, and a less controlled setting can be limiting factors; however, ethnographers make efforts for privacy and long-term, multi-year arrangements. Moreover, compared to clinical settings, ethnographers have the benefit of living within the community and participating in and observing daily life at a level not otherwise available in a clinical setting. Nevertheless, while psychoanalytic approaches can be beneficial for short-term projects and brief interactions, clinical ethnography, Herdt and Stoller explain, “is like psychoanalysis, best done for years” (31).

**Interpretation and the Relations between Self and Society**

Central to the psychoanalytic orientation in anthropology is the application of psychoanalytic concepts and theory to the interpretive process. Vincent Crapanzano noted that interpretation has become a bridge between anthropology and psychoanalysis (“Some Thoughts on Hermeneutics and Psychoanalytic Anthropology,” in Theodore Schwartz, et al., eds., *New Directions in Psychological Anthropology*, 1992, 296). Psychoanalytic anthropologists have been interested in interpreting symbolic expressions and processes and the role they play in emotional experiences, meaning creation, dream, fantasy, psychic conflict, and, importantly, how culture and other contexts shape these areas. Key areas of inquiry include, for example, the interpretation of myth, rituals, and their symbolic content, the use of personal symbols and their relationship to the public, culturally constituted defense mechanisms and their role in managing psychic conflict (see Rae-Espinoza this issue) and the relationship between symbolism, gender, and sexuality, and unconscious desires. In their interpretive efforts, anthropologists will often include the effects of social change, stability, and globalization, for example. Other ongoing themes of interest include descriptive and theoretical inquiries into the construction of personhood, the self, lived-experience, the subject, and subjectivity across sociocultural contexts.

Anthropologists are also interested in “cultural psychodynamics”—the study of the complex relationship between the sub-
ject, the vicissitudes of individual subjective experience, and the sociocultural context in which these processes are embedded. This study of the relationship between intrapsychic processes, such as defenses and fantasies, and the larger social structures and cultural representations, has been an enduring area of study dating back to Freud. Early in the history of anthropology, Meyer Fortes regarded one of the more important questions within anthropology to be how culture corresponds to, or is a product of, the various “mechanisms” revealed by psychoanalysis. For example, in his discussion of the relationship between social structure and “psychological substructure,” Fortes described how Oedipal dynamics demonstrated between fathers and the first-born sons are built into Tallensi social organization as a means to manage it (*Oedipus and Job in West African Religion*, 1959). More recently, Robert LeVine described Mel Spiro’s exploration of the relationship between behavior, defense mechanisms, unconscious desires, and culture and Gananath Obeyesekere’s work on the connections of cultural narratives and the symbolic means of managing tension as important examples of research in cultural psychodynamics (*Psychological Anthropology: A Reader on Self in Culture*, 2010, 122).

While Robert LeVine characterizes cultural psychodynamics as a later phase in psychoanalytic anthropology that focuses on topics such as culturally constituted psychic defenses and drive-based psychoanalytic theories, other recent perspectives in cultural psychodynamics continue to integrate newer work from contemporary relational models emphasizing, for example, the role of intersubjectivity. Kevin Groark offers a productive contemporary perspective on cultural psychodynamics that remains open to integrating a variety of paradigms as a way to understand the complex mediation between individual idiosyncrasies and sociocultural worlds. Avoiding both the reductionism of an individual psychology alone and social determinism, Groark describes cultural psychodynamics as bridging “the often disparate worldviews of anthropology and psychoanalysis, yielding a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the complex ways in which human subjectivity is shaped—and is, in turn, shaped by—the cultural world in which it is always embedded” (“Willful Souls: Dreaming and the Dialectics of Self-Experience Among the Tzotzil Maya of Highland Chiapas, Mex-

**Shared Psychic Processes**

This final category concerns the examination of shared or universal psychological processes, concerns, and cross-cultural comparisons. Early interests in psychoanalytic anthropology were oriented toward whole cultures, characterizing the structures that constituted a basic personality within a culture, and discovering the larger patterns of thought and emotion. Anthropologists took interest in finding similar psychological patterns or processes across cultures and studied topics such as the Oedipus complex, human developmental stages, child rearing practices, the presence of the unconscious across cultures, the ubiquity of sexual desire, and the cross-cultural presence of defense mechanisms such as repression. Researchers also were concerned with constructions of normality and abnormality across cultures. Melford Spiro, working from a biosocial Freudianism, argued that humans do share universal cultural patterns and common features of social interaction that are deeply rooted in the mind (Charles Lindholm, *Culture and Identity*, 2007, 161). Discussions concerning universal psychological processes are relevant to a range of anthropological debates concerning relativism, the Western origin of our theories, the relationship between structure and agency, and the prioritization of individuals versus shared processes within and between groups. In general, anthropologists today are less likely to support or develop universalistic models. Rather, greater interest rests in reframing the universalist questions to focus on variation, existential concerns, relational processes, lived experiences, the influence of context and its relationship with psychological processes, and explaining how what appear to be human universals are creatively handled in each situation (Robert Paul, “Psychoanalytic Anthropology,” *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 18, 1989, 189).

**This Issue**

Many anthropologists remain adamant that we cannot understand culture and human experience without adequate consideration of the psychological. While we cannot directly access or see into the minds of others, the inclusion of psychoanalytic orientations in anthropology can enhance our research efforts and offer
greater openness toward and insight into self-processes, self-representations, and subjective experiences. As described above, psychoanalytic perspectives work best when part of a larger anthropological toolkit and are deployed according to one’s research goals and circumstances. Further work in psychoanalytic anthropology will continue to recognize the benefit of the psychoanalytic tools available and, ideally, anthropologists will increasingly apply them to examine important topics ranging from inquiries into individual subjectivity in post-colonial settings to larger topics such as transnationalism and globalization, the entrenchment of neoliberalism, and the consequences of rapid social change.

The articles within this issue demonstrate the diversity of contemporary anthropological thinking and writing at the juncture of anthropology and psychoanalysis. In preparing for this issue, I offered the authors a broad framework, asking them to discuss the role of psychoanalysis in their ethnographic work and lives or to describe their ethnographic fieldwork from the intersection of the two disciplines. I suggested authors offer engaging ethnographic examples, fieldwork accounts, personal histories, and discussions of their relationship to psychoanalytic theory and practice. This rather broad net captured a range of ideas from scholars working in a variety of ethnographic settings and from several psychoanalytic traditions and levels of expertise. This is by no means a comprehensive representation of the diversity of psychoanalytic approaches in anthropology, but an engaging glimpse into the value of psychoanalytic orientations in enhancing anthropological thinking and enriching our mutual efforts to come to novel and more helpful understandings of humanity.

Aaron R. Denham, PhD, is a Lecturer in the Department of Anthropology at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia and a former fellow in the American Psychoanalytic Association’s Fellowship Program. His research and publications have addressed topics such as intergenerational trauma, child mortality, and infanticide discourse and practice in Northern Ghana. He can be reached at aaron.denham@mq.edu.au
Reflecting on How We Know

Dreamwork and Fieldwork in Sri Lanka

Bambi L. Chapin—U. of Maryland, Baltimore County

I woke up one morning in 2004 out of a dream that held the solution to an ethnographic puzzle I’d been struggling with. At the time, I was in Sri Lanka finishing a month of fieldwork following up on research I had conducted there between 1999 and 2001. During that 2004 visit with families I had known at a rural village in the center of the island, I saw something I had not taken note of before. When little children screamed for things, their mothers and other older people usually gave in to whatever the children demanded. This was the kind of behavior that I—like most people in the U.S.—called “spoiling.” It was the kind of parenting I expected would lead children to become increasingly demanding, selfish, and out of control as they got older. However, contrary to my expectations, the older Sri Lankan children I knew were remarkably undemanding, restrained, even self-denying. So how did this happen?

I had been struggling to make sense of this question in the weeks before the dream. I had been asking mothers and others about this, but they told me that children just stop demanding things on their own starting around five as they develop a capacity to “understand.” Adults didn’t need to do anything in particular to teach children this, and in fact it was useless to try to do so. Until children can understand, one can’t reason with them; so, if efforts to distract or ignore failed to stop a child’s demands, one usually just gave in to those demands, no matter how unreasonable. This all made perfect sense to the adults I talked to in Sri Lanka, but it didn’t to me.

I have written at length elsewhere about these observations, the research I did to investigate them, and my eventual analysis of it (“We Have to Give: Sinhala Mothers’ Responses to Children’s Expression of Desire,” *Ethos*, 38: 4, 2010, 354–368). But in doing so, I have omitted the dream that provided the key insight to my analysis, a dream that I wrote about in my fieldnotes that morning in
2004. I quote the segment from my fieldnotes at length:

My dream…was about Ann [a pseudonym for a U.S. friend] who was on a plane to go on a trip without her kids—I was keeping her kids. Heather [her daughter, also a pseudonym] was at the door crying and screaming for Ann, so Ann stopped the plane during take off and said she wouldn’t go if Heather was so upset. I disapproved (though I hadn’t thought out exactly why) and then Ann got mad at me later and said that I was the kind of parent who would rather hit their kid than give up what I wanted—or something like that. I was furious and took her aside, away from the kids and said I was so insulted—that she made all these assumptions without asking and that I would first of all never hit a kid and second of all, if she really wanted to know, here was the problem with what she was doing, not that it was my business except that I cared about her and cared about Heather.

[I said] that Heather should be allowed to be so sad and express that without it reaching out and controlling Ann. That was too much power to give a little girl, and it was overwhelming. It was asking her to do something she could not reasonably be expected to do at her age—it asked her to deny or at least not express her feelings or else be responsible for making her mother unhappy. She has to choose between her own happiness or her mother’s with the mother refusing to take responsibility for the situation. The child’s feelings are so powerful and overwhelming to the adult as well as the child that they dictate the outcome of the situation.

So that’s the bind for the indulged child—that’s the bind for kids in Sri Lanka I think. If they experience and express frustration, it overpowers the parents who give in. The child doesn’t experience butting up against limits that they must accept. Instead, those who love them let them live in this
boundary-less world where their emotions and desires are all-powerful. However, the parent and others around also disapprove and resent the giving so the child is in a bind as they come to “understand” that—which is what everyone has been telling me. When children understand that something is limited, they should not ask any more. Their wanting is undeniable to others, so—unless they want the judgment, rejection, and responsibility for hurting those they love—they must deny their own desires since no one around them will. Also though at the same time, the idea that someone would deny them something is so horrible a prospect—as the child has no experience dealing with hearing and accepting a “no,” an “eppa” [the refusing “no” in Sinhala] as not a rejection of self, not as evidence of lack of love, but as a simple boundary another sets up without dislike.

I need to continue to work this out, but I think this is right (too bad it’s so pejorative).

This dream work was not only about my own psychodynamic conflicts—although it clearly was, given that I had been away from my own seven-year-old for nearly a month, having flown off in a plane and left him behind. It was also an effort to work out deeply felt puzzles about what I was observing in the field, suggesting that children might have a more psychodynamically complex response to indulgence than my own cultural model allowed.

The dream suggests something further: the process of ethnographic research is a psychodynamic one. The analysis of data from participant observation is not something that can be done by a software program, feeding in fieldnotes and getting back meaning. Our interpretation of other people’s inner and interpersonal lives is a process in which our own inner and interpersonal lives are deeply implicated and required. My interactions with people over my lifetime and the sense that I have made of them contribute to the understandings of people that I add to intentionally and systematically with my research observations and interactions. My own internal
object world is part of what I think with, part of the unacknowledged tools of anthropology. This can be embarrassing, because this is not how science is thought to be done; it is not strictly rational and objective.

There is a deeper source of embarrassment in this dream, too. Even as I wrote about it in my fieldnotes, I knew it was “too bad it’s so pejorative.” We feel so grateful to those who open up their lives and their hearts to us, that it is horribly guilt inducing and anxiety provoking to think of saying anything negative or judgmental, as well as potentially shameful in an academic era in which we call each other to account for our own ethnocentrism and collusion in systems of oppression. This nearly pre-conscious self-censorship in response to our anthropological superegos often, I think, leads to overly rosy, sometimes defensive-feeling ethnographies in which we romanticize the people we represent. We displace our negative judgments and our own repressed hostility onto exploitative colonialists, benighted NGO workers, tyrannical regimes, and greedy multinational corporations.

This is what the dream did for me. In the dream, I articulated things I would never have said to any mother—not a friend in Chicago and certainly not a friend in Sri Lanka. But in the dream, I was freed from those constraints to lash out in fury and in a flurry of words, saying what I saw happening. When I wrote it down, I could see that it was not just about my friend in Chicago, but about the parenting all around me in Sri Lanka. Pejorative though it may have been, it helped me identify what I had been seeing all along. It also laid my own judgments before me so I could identify them, too—and question them, using them to think about difference, how it might be valued in other ways, and where my own biases were.

This is how ethnography is done—messily, from a particular perspective, and with all parts of the researcher’s self. At least this is how ethnography is done by me.

Bambi L. Chapin, PhD, is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. She has conducted fieldwork centered on interpersonal relationships, childrearing, and everyday life among Sinhala speakers in Sri Lanka since 1999. In addition to previous publications focused on spirit
Participant Observation in Toxic Interactions

April Leininger—Psychotherapist in Private Practice

Human relations are fraught with conflict. Anthropological accounts of how people manage (or in some cases, fail to manage) to continue coexisting in the face of conflict have shown the ways in which cultural beliefs and practices mitigate and transform aggression. To take one classic example, Clyde Kluckhohn’s *Navaho Witchcraft* argues that witchcraft beliefs and practices among the Navajo serve defensive purposes, allowing aggression arising in close family relationships a culturally appropriate outlet (1963). From a relational psychoanalytic perspective, it can be argued that interpersonal aggression of the sort Kluckhohn studied is often underlain by internal representations of “bad objects” (in psychoanalytic terminology, a loved one or significant other).

A “bad object,” in psychoanalytic theory, is an other who is experienced as malevolent—a witch, for example. A “bad internal object” is a tenacious mental representation of the malevolent other which, when activated, gives rise to powerful negative feelings such as hate and fear. While the example to follow is drawn from clinical work, my hope is that a depiction of toxic interactions underlain by “bad internal objects” will serve to explicate the phenomenon and will give a sense of the kind of material—both interpersonal and within their own subjective experience—to which anthropologists might attend.

The following clinical vignette (a composite case with all identifying information disguised) will serve to ground the discussion. Tracy, a 59-year-old white woman with a history of being both victim and perpetrator of domestic violence, was referred for a mental health evaluation after threatening her physician. Tracy was hoping to receive free transportation, but her physician did not
think she qualified. The interaction culminating in the threat is as follows:

T: I CANNOT get to my appointments if someone doesn’t fill out this form. No one is helping me! You guys are going to find me dead on the side of the road one day because I was trying to walk to my appointments and had a heart attack or got hit or something.

Dr. O: You said you needed transportation because you cannot walk, but I just saw you walk from the lobby into my office.

T: (angrily) I can walk a few feet! Not all the way to your office from home!

Dr. O: This paperwork is asking me to assess whether you would be able to walk to a bus stop, and after reviewing your chart and today’s physical exam, my assessment is that you are able to walk well enough to walk to a bus stop.

T: (shouting) If I miss my follow up, it’s going to be your fault for not completing this paperwork!

Dr. O: I’m happy to complete your paperwork, but I have to complete it accurately. You’re welcome to get a second opinion, though.

T: (screaming): Why would I want to see someone else? You guys all just want me to die. You’ll be sorry!

By the end of the interaction, security officers were attempting to escort Tracy off the unit, and Tracy struggled against their grip on her arms. This was the culmination of several months during which Tracy had made several nonverbal threats against Dr. O. Fearing for her safety, Dr. O arranged with a colleague for him to take over as Tracy’s primary care physician and also secured a restraining order.

One way to understand this interaction is to notice Tracy’s apparent errors in reasoning. When Dr. O informs Tracy of her assessment that Tracy is able to walk to a bus stop, Tracy infers from this assertion that Dr. O wants her dead (other conversations with Tracy provided evidence that this was not hyperbolic—that Tracy
did feel her survival was at stake). How does Tracy arrive at this conclusion? Based on this and other clinical observations, I came to infer that Tracy’s apparent misperceptions are caused by an internal “bad object”—a mental representation of a persecutory caregiver that easily becomes activated when she is frustrated. In a psychoanalytic framework, this phenomenon has been conceptualized using constructs such as projection and transference. In a more cognitive framework (Mardi J. Horowitz, ed., Person Schemas and Maladaptive Interpersonal Patterns, 1991), it may be conceptualized as the activation of a deeply internalized interpersonal schema that is highly resistant to modification. In either framework, Tracy appears to be experiencing Dr. O as a sadistic, willfully neglecting caretaker.

An utterly consternating property of internalized bad objects is their tenacious resistance to exposure as being pre-existing mental representations rather than self-evident, accurate perceptions of social reality. In the example above, Tracy was convinced that Dr. O was completely without regard for her needs or even her life. Any attempt on my part to explore other possible interpretations of Dr. O’s actions merely suggested to Tracy that I, too, would neglect and mistreat her, just as Dr. O had.

This brings us to another difficulty with “bad objects”: none of us are without them, and when confronted with someone else’s, our own tend to get activated. I found it very difficult to maintain a sympathetic stance toward Tracy. I could see her as a woman who had suffered horrible abuse as a child, and whose current struggles with abuse, poverty, and continued abuse warranted, in her mind, free transportation and many other services. I wanted to help her understand the restraining order as a model of the kind of proactive valuing of safety that she might enact for herself against her abusive partner. However, this view was difficult to maintain in the face of Tracy’s accusations and inability to engage in dialogue or self-reflection.

In a session with Tracy following the above incident, for instance, Tracy angrily denied having threatened Dr. O and demanded I “set the record straight” on her behalf. We seemed to reach a fragile alliance when I acknowledged how painful it must have been for her to not get the help she was seeking. However,
then Tracy pressed for my agreement to write a letter on her behalf for her to give to the police in response to the restraining order. When I remarked that I hadn’t witnessed the interaction but from what I understood, Dr. O did feel concern for her safety, Tracy exploded, convinced that I, too, “don’t care if I die.”

I was acutely aware of my response to what I experienced as her dictatorial stance: you will not control me. I kept this rage, which I understood as both hers and mine, in my awareness and made several attempts to open the conversation. Tracy interrupted me each time, further confirming (in my subjective experience) that she was my “bad object,” a dictator whose fear precludes any questioning of their version of reality. I was in my personal hell, where attempts at dialogue are met with vicious snarls. Tracy was in hers, where a person on whom she depends loathes and abuses her. Each of us was feeling terribly threatened and persecuted by the other and by the caustic relationship in which we seemed trapped. As a psychoanalytic colleague pointed out, my rage can be understood as coming from the “induced countertransference.” Tracy may have induced it in me but the feeling was definitely mine. My interactions with Tracy had activated my own malevolent internal objects and the rage directed at them (and now, at Tracy).

Countertransference has come to be thought of as key to psychotherapy’s efficacy (see Glen Gabbard, “A Contemporary Psychoanalytic Model of Countertransference,” Journal of Clinical Psychology, 57: 8, 2001). As anthropologists, we do not have the “therapeutic frame” to help us when our bad objects come to life, but perhaps we can make use of an awareness of our internal objects to inform our analyses. As a brief example, take the sociocultural context in which the toxic interactions described above take place. A central goal in the cultural world of psychotherapy is to loosen the grip of internalized bad objects on patients’ relational perception. In contrast, the cultural goals of U.S. health care systems more generally (here, I am thinking of programs like Medicare and organizations like county hospitals and HMOs) are to provide high quality care as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. These differing goals do not necessarily conflict. But a health care system that is strapped for resources, when faced with a patient like Tracy, is at best like an overworked mother who needs her chil-
dren to be highly competent and fend for themselves. Or so it may be argued. But is this a useful metaphor, or is it a demonization of the health care system rooted in my own malevolent internal objects (see Chapin, this volume)? Could it be argued, conversely, that Dr. O is guilty of revictimizing Tracy? Or that in refusing to advocate for Tracy, I am colluding with a system that is stacked against victims of poverty and abuse? In the face of suffering like Tracy’s, there is a strong temptation to find an enemy to blame. A psychoanalytic approach asks us to question such black-and-white stances.

As anthropologists and psychoanalysts have long recognized, conflict is inherent in the human condition. We have all, in one way or another, participated in painful interactions co-created by our own and an other’s internalized “bad objects.” To understand the intrapsychic and interpersonal vicissitudes of aggression in sociocultural context, anthropologists may be called on to closely examine hostile aspects of the psyche, be they projected onto witches, demons, social entities like health care systems, or—perhaps more frighteningly—the research subject and the anthropologist themselves.

April Leininger, LCSW, PhD, is a University of California, San Diego-trained psychological anthropologist and a psychodynamic psychotherapist. She earned her MSW at Smith College and completed post-graduate psychodynamic training at The Psychotherapy Institute in Berkeley, California. She currently serves as a mental health provider in a Medicare/Medi-Cal program and may be contacted at arl@arleininger.com.

Intercultural Transference and Countertransference in a Deeply Divided Society

Ekaterina Anderson—Boston University

Each practitioner of psychotherapy, whether of psychoanalytic inclination or not, deals with thorny issues surrounding transference/countertransference, therapeutic alliance, and trust. In a society deeply divided by a political conflict, these issues are further complicated if the practitioner and the patient identify with op-
posing sides in the conflict. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of an account of psychotherapy between a Jewish practitioner and an Arab patient during the first Intifada in Israel. This case study is used to highlight several dubious assumptions about the workings of transference and countertransference in a therapeutic alliance threatened by cultural and political differences. The analysis is followed by some suggestions as to how an anthropological approach may inform the psychotherapeutic thinking about transference and countertransference in intercultural clinical encounters against the backdrop of political tensions.

For the sake of simplicity, I rely on a single case report published in 1991 by Smadar Bizi-Nathaniel, Michel Granek, and Mira Golomb, *Psychotherapy of an Arab Patient by a Jewish Therapist in Israel during the Intifada*, in the *American Journal of Psychotherapy* (45: 4, 594-603). However, I have faced the issues I analyze here in other accounts of Jewish-Arab clinical encounters in psychotherapy and mental health training. The article describes the course of psychodynamically oriented psychotherapy conducted between a female Israeli Jewish practitioner and a male Israeli Arab patient, Ali, at an Israeli mental health center over the course of two years at the time of the first Palestinian Intifada. The latter was an uprising against the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories from 1987 to 1991 that emotionally affected and politically mobilized Arab citizens of Israel, like the patient described in the article, even though most did not actively participate in it. Ali sought therapy for interpersonal difficulties and specifically requested a Jewish therapist to create some emotional distance from the painful material—the outcome of the therapy is unknown.

The case study, as well as other reports of Jewish-Arab psychotherapeutic encounters, contains three problematic assumptions: the ignoring or misconstrual of power imbalances, the reduction of political opinions and sentiments of the patient to resistances or complexes, and the idea that therapists can “bracket out” their own political reactions. First of all, there is very little consideration of how the disparities between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel may affect the therapeutic process. The patient is diagnosed with avoidant personality disorder due to his “social ineptitude, fear of criticism, shyness, and withdrawal” (Bizi-Nathaniel et al., 1991,
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596), but it is considered whether these behavioral traits could have been amplified to some extent by the extremely loaded and unusual situation in which an Arab Muslim male had to talk about intimate experiences with a Jewish woman during a political conflict that flared up. Furthermore, the article characterizes the “exaggerated sense of guilt” on the part of the therapist and mistrust on the part of the patient as a feature of the transference/countertransference dynamic, but it never considers that the guilt/mistrust dynamics and the therapist’s compensatory reactions reflected the very real power imbalance, one that cannot be wished away in a psychotherapy session.

The second problematic issue, the attribution of political thoughts and issues as psychological resistances, is well displayed in this case report. Consider, for example, this passage:

…it was very hard to differentiate when political material was used as a vehicle for transferential feelings and when it was concerned mainly with painful reality. For instance, Ali once complained about the Israeli way of law enforcement and behavior toward Arabs in such a way that the therapist felt he was showing childish anger and an immature extremist attitude. Retrospectively, she started wondering: was it a political point of view? A disguised expression of the transference? The manifestation of a defense mechanism, such as denial and splitting? (Bizi-Nathaniel et al., 1991, 598, emphasis mine)

In a different session, when the patient talked about his frustration with constant searches when driving through checkpoints, the therapist “listened attentively to his words, focusing on the intrapsychic processes and trying to minimize the weight of the realistic content” (Bizi-Nathaniel et al., 1991, 598, emphasis added). At the end of the session, the patient recalled a dream about traveling to Jerusalem and seeing that the road was becoming steeper, until it reached a 90-degree angle. After some pondering, the therapist was struck by “the obvious sexual meaning of the steep road” and concluded that “the deeper intrapsychic material had been disguised by the overriding awareness of the national/ethnic differences” (Bizi-Nathaniel et al., 1991, 599).
These two examples strikingly privilege the intrapsychic processes over the political and cultural reality. After some doubts on the part of the therapist, she nevertheless interpreted the political opinions and sentiments expressed by the patient as mere proxy for his “deeper” personal concerns or dysfunctions (that are presumed to be sexual). This is perhaps the most problematic issue of the three reviewed here, because it reduces very real concerns experienced by a representative of an underprivileged minority to an “idiom of distress” through which the “real” problems can be seen.

Finally, whereas the patient is thought to merely couch his personal concerns in a political idiom, it is assumed that the practitioner, unlike the patient, not only has to but is able to get her/his political reactions out of the way. The practitioner sees her/his role in keeping the political reality that is intruding on the therapeutic space, “confusing and obscuring transferential and countertransferential difficulties” (Bizi-Nathaniel et al., 1991, 596) at bay. Interestingly, at some point the therapist felt that she had to “step out of the classical therapist’s role” (Bizi-Nathaniel et al., 1991, 601) by empathizing with the patient’s feelings about the painful political reality, but it was just a technique to preserve the authenticity of the therapeutic encounter and not the prominent feature of it. The “real” features of the therapeutic situation (that is consistently and tellingly surrounded by scare quotes) are but a distraction from the core material, which is presumed to be intrapsychic.

Anthropologists and anthropologically informed clinicians have long been arguing that the acknowledgment of and attention to cultural difference is a crucial determinant of the success of a psychotherapeutic encounter, but this suggestion becomes an imperative when therapy unfolds against the backdrop of a politically divisive situation. Anthropological concern with reflexivity and positionality should motivate psychotherapists to go beyond narrow definitions of countertransference, asking them “to question their own culturally determined selves, emotions, values, and assumptions, to recognize the specific cultural positions that they occupy, and to be willing to discuss the effects of their varying cultural subjectivities with their patients” (Karen Seeley, *Cultural Psychotherapy*, 2006, 243).

A good example of this approach is a case study of counter-
transference during psychotherapy conducted in a cultural consultation clinic by a team consisting of a psychiatrist, an anthropologist, a sociologist, and a clinical psychologist (Byron J. Good, Henry Herrera, Mary-Jo Delvecchio-Good, and James Cooper, “Reflexivity and Countertransference in a Psychiatric Cultural Consultation Clinic,” *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry*, 6: 3, 281-303). Reflecting on their experience of collaborating with spiritual healers in the treatment of a Mexican American woman with psychotic symptoms, the team members very frankly describe how their own cultural heritage and political beliefs colored their perception of the causes of their patient’s distress and affected their assessment of the healers’ efficacy.

Furthermore, an anthropologically informed approach to psychotherapy is incompatible with the notions of the “intrapsychic” realm as completely distinct from and superior to the cultural and political context that dominates a patient’s life. The classic concept of transference implies that the patient’s feelings toward the clinician are displaced and distorted expressions of the feelings intended for other individuals that the patient has actual interpersonal relations with. However, the therapist working in a culturally and politically divided society should acknowledge the salience and legitimacy of negative feelings experienced by a patient identifying with another side in a political dispute or conflict.

As hard as it can be, these reactions should not be devalued, pathologized, or explained away as expressions of sexual frustration or emotional immaturity. If, as Nancy Chodorow argues, “neither the intrapsychic nor the interpersonal past… nor the culturally given… fully determines meaning and experience in the immediacy of the present” (Nancy Chodorow, *The Power of Feelings*, 1999, 2), the personal, the cultural, and the political are all intertwined in a psychotherapeutic encounter, because it is, after all, a deeply human one.

**Ekaterina Anderson, MA, is a second-year PhD student and Teaching Fellow in the Department of Anthropology at Boston University. She plans to conduct research on the clinical practices, decisions, and experiences involved in the development of cultural competence training and multicultural community mental health care in Israel. She may be reached at ekanders@bu.edu.**
Countertransference in an Anthropological Study of Extreme Violence in Pakistan

Nichola Khan—University of Brighton

From 1993 to 1995, I lived in Karachi in a community of ethnic Mohajirs, the Indian Muslim migrants to Pakistan following Independence (1947). The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) party was formed in 1984 to represent Mohajir concerns. Since then, intense violence involving MQM, the state, and all political and ethnic groups has dominated Karachi; MQM has won all major elections in the city. I lived in Liaquatabad district, identified as a major “terrorist den” where the security forces raided houses, arrested, terrorized, and fought armed battles with residents.

Between 2001 to 2006, I conducted fieldwork in Liaquatabad with men who became mercenaries in MQM. Whilst killing purportedly became normalized—“easy” in Karachi’s violent political culture—their cases raise difficult questions. Here I reflect on a single case, that of “Arshad,” who grew up in Liaquatabad, joined MQM at 16, and was in his mid-20s when I first met him in 1993. I query my use of psychoanalytic concepts as a political tool serving an anthropological ethics of engaged witnessing—emphasizing the structural and political violence underpinning young men’s own trajectories into violence. What are the moral limits to empathizing with the suffering of a killer? How can Arshad’s disclosure be analyzed, when in a gesture simultaneously intimate and detached, he cut bodies into pieces?

Academic accounts characterize the Mohajirs’ condition as deeply intertwined with their position in Muslim India, Pakistan’s bloody inception, and their marginalization from Pakistan’s social and political power structures. Previously, I incorporated neo-Marxist and anthropological analyses with Kleinian psychodynamic arguments to argue killing was a “sane,” albeit extreme, response to threats to individual and collective security, wellbeing, and ontological cohesion. I elaborated a moral-political position to counter the discrimination against Mohajirs’ in Pakistan’s political institutions, public-sector employment and the media, to defend their humanity and “tell” their plight.
Now, I wonder if I was too protective of these men (my former neighbors) to consider questions of pathology and accountability, including my own complicity and fascination with their perversely enthralling tales of violence, even though they were racked with terror and torment. I highlight the concord between normality and madness and draw significance from the meaning and security Arshad found in a movement that fostered individual and political/cultural continuities between normative and pathological modes of dissociation and psychosis.

Classical psychiatry is less concerned with the symptomology of classifications than with the underlying logic of symptoms, which may take “normal” or pathological form. Many people may have “ordinary psychosis” and live perfectly normal lives: they are “mad” without going mad. They may fit well with society, show no intellectual impairment, and their underlying paranoia or delusional beliefs never erupt into dramatic symptomatology or disintegrate into breakdown. Psychosis is often triggered by revelatory moments involving the crystallization of a delusional idea. This provides the logic for the person’s conviction that something is wrong with the world (paranoiac) or themselves (melancholic). Psychosis, Karl Jaspers argued in 1913, concerns less the content of delusional idea, which may be quite reasonable, as the person’s belief it expresses an undiluted truth. Ronald Laing attributed psychosis with cathartic and transformative potential. He argued that psychosis and delusions are not constitutive of madness, but are people’s attempts to communicate their distress and recover their natural state.

Psychosis may originate in childhood trauma; traumatic events may also precipitate psychosis. Arshad’s clear realization, amidst deadly attacks on Mohajir areas, that killing would be necessary “because a war was happening” may have triggered an underlying paranoid psychosis, and it highlighted the repetitive homology of the conflict with earlier violences of his childhood. These include experiencing absolute terror during the bombings of Karachi in the 1971 Bangladeshi war, frequent hunger, and severe beatings by his father. The individual who experiences annihilation terrors in early life, the “murder” of his ability to feel safe, may later realize these fears through violent recreating traumatic shock in
Elizabeth Howell suggests such individuals may “turn the tables”; visiting their past experience of terrorization on many victims, they recreate the “timeless” (never-ending) loss of their safety and imagination (The Dissociative Mind, 2005, 256).

Psychosis ubiquitously features the belief in one’s exceptionality. Arshad distorted events in many self-aggrandizing tales in which he was “chosen,” destined to be a martyr, savior of the community, and killed “more than 400.” These stories buffered him against a fragmenting reality and detached him from any “normal” sense of reality. Wernicke theorized in the 19th century that surviving psychosis entails creating a secret place to rationalize delusions of persecution. This allows the person to exist in yet also outside the world they inhabit. Being uniquely entrusted with “secret tasks” vitalized a fantasy space for Arshad within which real social power relations and a new self-image could be materialized. Killing became a way to distance from reality—and to feel safe.

The Other in psychosis is vital for survival, yet it is highly destructive. The person may identify with the Other in a magic way, assuming their “special powers” as their own, needing the (violent) Other to complete himself. MQM’s charismatic leader Altaf Hussain fulfills this role for Arshad, epitomizing a suprahuman extraordinary ethical icon whose words “were like magic, they pierced my heart, I could cry, kill anyone for him.” This magical appeal of violence, its martyrdom and treacherous power, also bear on ways magic realism creates realities out of fiction, in which an unstable interplay of truth and illusion becomes a phantasmic social force. Magic realism’s use as a political-ideological tool of liberation may also be a powerful means of control—vitalizing phantasmatic cults of personality, death, and redemptive violence in ways politics is conducted in Karachi. Revered and feared, Altaf Hussain created terror and chaos at will. Amidst the ferocity of the violence instrumentalized, many miraculous stories circulated: his image has appeared on trees and buildings across the city and throngs of birds alighted on his saintly body. Despite their gruesome details, Arshad’s stories had an unreal quality—bearing on ways psychosis leads to dissociation, wherein one feels as if one is watching oneself in a film.
Arshad’s dream ruptured. I have written about the traumatic breakdown that followed his decapitation of the pregnant wife of a police superintendent in her home (“Violence, Anti-Convention and Desires for Transformation amongst Pakistan’s Mohajirs in Karachi,” *Cultural Dynamics*, 22, 2010, 225). He described being ordered to “make it horrible,” so it might “come in the newspapers.” Afterwards, he continued; killing to forget about this killing. Howell observes that severe trauma may deprive a person of fantasy and illusion, writing: “when the terrible becomes true, not only are we unsafe, we lose the ability to imagine” (256). This killing ruptured Arshad’s hiding place, forcing him to become the hero, with its evidence of a permanent dissociation, of any possibility of returning to “normal” life. The moment he desperately wanted to erase an irreversible act, story, the film-like quality of his life and reality became permanently joined. In sum, killing the woman was traumatic. It forced him into a reality condition and the realization he was, in his own words, “a criminal, not a revolutionary,” whilst at the same time “proving” his heroism. His fantasies had been vindicated. This produced for Arshad a painful and irresolvable dilemma.

Writing Arshad’s story was a relational enterprise. He wanted the shared fantasy; I, myself enthralled, reinforced a personal mythology in which he suffered, an innocent pawn in a deadly game. The story described a man who failed to get a government job, joined MQM, became a killer, and spun stories that made him feel extraordinary, proud to be named on “86” murder charges. His unprompted confession of killing the pregnant woman shocked me. It shows how far into “madness” a person can go before the mind unhooks from reality. It detached me too from reality—my head felt like it was spinning sometimes afterwards, appearing to fly from my body, like that woman’s. Was this his feeling when he cut into her body, half-living his story, half trying to absorb its finality? Was telling me an aggressive attempt to traumatize, inflict on me the death-in-life experience he lived through?

More than feelings of guilt, shame or anathema, Arshad suffered a deep narcissistic rupture to his self-image as a “good terrorist.” In Freud’s ideas of psychosis, disturbing ideas are not forgotten, but totally abolished. Erased from the psyche, the banished
thought, “I am a bad person,” returns in the delusion of being persecuted—here, used and exploited by corrupt politicians. If trauma and psychosis held positive potential (Laing) for remorse or a new politics to emerge, it did not. Rather, Arshad stubbornly reattached himself to the dissociative thrall of the fantasy, the idea he would, if “necessary,” kill again: his story less grandiose, as an essential way to survive. Killing, after all, was the one time he felt truly alive.

Stories are seductive. They become the fabulations of very different realities. We must critique our collective enthrallment and collusion that detaches us from atrocities; the ease with which individuals and political leaders pursue mass murder; the phantasmagoric cultural enfolding of violence into subjectivity and experience. Arshad’s story propelled me toward a radical pacifism. For Arshad, this means I have betrayed him. His story is sad. As it engulfed him, and assumed a life of its own, it animated another truth: we are accountable for our stories.

Nichola Khan, PhD, CPsychol, is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Brighton. Her research in social and psychological anthropology focuses on violence, war and migration, with emphasis on ways ethnic communities in Pakistan, and Afghan diasporas, are affected by these processes and forces. Her book is Mohajir Militancy in Pakistan: Violence and Transformation in the Karachi Conflict. She may be contacted at: N.Khan@brighton.ac.uk.

Formalizing the Interpersonal in Anthropological Field Research

Ute Eickelkamp–University of Sydney

Ethnographic field research and psychoanalytic psychotherapy are professional practices that rely on interpersonal relationships which are instrumental and deeply emotional, amicable and inimical, close and distant. Both could be seen as contrived social settings that, nonetheless, facilitate a genuine engagement between two or more people. Both require mutual affective attunement as well as moments of “cold” analysis. Both are held in place through the formalization of what, in a “natural” social setting, would be friendship or kinship or some sort of private business. Special
agreements, rituals, and boundaries such as payment rates for the exchange, time schedules, meeting sites, confidentiality, and, for many anthropologists, the nominal integration into the local kinship system or system of social relations, set the parameters in which close and often intimate encounters can take place.

However, as I will suggest here, when relationships are reified through bureaucratic regulations the positive effects of formalization are erased, which in turn can destroy the social relationship it is meant to protect. I contrast such sterile formalizations with the mechanisms through which Aboriginal people in Central Australia safeguard the immanent goods of relatedness in the research process. I argue that accountability and responsibility in the local Indigenous society are enacted interpersonally, and that this differs fundamentally from the contractual if often internalized relationship that binds Western individuals to the external authority located in institutional bureaucracies. Moving between the two, the ethnographer is faced with the challenge to build a viable professional conscience without relinquishing a healthy skepticism towards either one.

Putting Relationships on the Books: Sterile Formalizations

On the face of it, the politics, ethics, and practice of anthropological research with Australian Aboriginal people has changed considerably over the last ten years or so. Methodologies are being “decolonized,” Indigenous intellectual and cultural property is receiving fuller acknowledgement, and rather than “feeding” information to the inquiring researcher, Aboriginal people have become partners and collaborators in the co-production of knowledge. Much of this has been good practice all along but these prima facie conditions of building relationships based on love—the anthropologist’s willingness to submit to total dependency on his host society, mutual recognition, reciprocity, emotional support, and desire for intellectual exchange—are now proscriptively demanded and thus deontologized by the academy. In other words, ethics become detached from personhood and confined to the level of prescriptive rules of behavior.

New levels of administrative surveillance of the research process are stifling and even perverting what is essentially an open-ended process of knowledge production that hinges on the dialogue
between two or more people, and in which the success of the communication depends a great deal on the goodwill and subtle mutual perception of the interlocutors. In Australia where I work, the litigious stance of the academy towards its practitioners has something in common with the (more intangible) control mechanisms through which psychoanalytic training institutions reproduce themselves. Hidden within the hierarchy of professional rank in the latter and within positions and administrative bodies in the former are the desires, frustrations, aggression, and resentment of those who interpret and enact regulations that are seemingly objective. The lack of transparency and personal accountability can have negative consequences for the actual practice. What Jurgen Reeder observes for the psychoanalytic training institutes seems true for the Australian university and other research funding bodies: “there is often a clear distance between the immanent goods of the practice…and the…institutional functions meant…to safeguard these goods” (Jurgen Reeder, *Hate and Love in Psychoanalytical Institutions: The Dilemma of a Profession*, 2004, 147).

University ethics committees have put regulations in place that seek to protect the Indigenous “informant” from intellectual exploitation by the researcher. They take for granted that the Indigenous collaborator will identify with their protectionist measures, which may not be as benign as they look. Institutional ethics compliance might be an unproblematic aspect in survey type studies, where people tick off boxes on questionnaires. But when research means engaging the whole person, ideally over many years, the quasi-contractual moment seeds doubt: the relationship is set in legalistic terms from the start, adding an external gaze to the social experience at the heart of the mutual open production of knowledge, and implying that the exchange should be flawless or else contentious.

Just like the modern legal system at large, ethics committees disavow “direct appeal to the group, to ideas of relatedness to others as a basis for responsibility or justification for action” (Gary Robinson, “Violence, Social Differentiation and the Self,” *Oceania*, 65: 4, 1995, 323–347). As an external juridical eye that functions as the superego system of the academic institution (after Reeder), it invites suspicion in the goodness of the relationship itself. Subse-
quently, after a personal relationship has become an intrinsic and crucial element in the research process, the Indigenous friend might develop thoughts of bad faith about the persona “Chief Investigator.” In the mind of the participant, the elaborate assurances on paper, namely that the Researcher is conducting the study with good and not with malignant intent, might encourage the feeling that he or she must be an untrustworthy character in need of such legalistic assurances to the contrary.

**Safeguarding Relationships in the Field: Living Formalizations**

In working with the Aboriginal people I have come to know, the personal encounter is the basis of the formalization of the relationship. It took two years and a visit by ten desert women invited by a private art dealer to Berlin, during which we came to know each other, to get my first research permit for the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Lands in the northwest corner of South Australia. The formalization of the relationships through a research agreement followed suit when I received an invitation to present my proposal in person to the women’s representative body in Alice Springs.

The key supporters from among the ten women who had come to Germany remained my friends. They also taught me a lot and were initially seen to be responsible for my proper conduct once I had entered their home communities. However, they did not become my *malpa*—the Pitjantjatjara term for a social-politically significant friendship now used in bicultural organizations where Indigenous and non-Indigenous employers form a two-person team.

I breached the most important rule on day one of my first arrival in 1995, namely by very nearly driving without company into the male ceremonial ground, for which those women who had invited me were subsequently severely scolded in a dedicated meeting. I knew that, in these neocolonial days, death, the traditional form of punishment for women thus trespassing, would not be meted out. Yet fear of punishment was real, as I could be expelled from the lands, meaning that my research and all that was to flow from it were destroyed before it had even begun.

Dependency was all on my side and I wanted to question the legitimacy and even reality of local forms of power and authority. I
felt confused about my refusal to believe in the sanctity of the ritual domain, as if I, a white cultural novice, was going to be exempt from the social consequences of such a transgression. Having failed to slip unerringly into the Anangu life-world into which I had finally been allowed, the narcissistic blow to my professional ego ideal was made palpable as waves of discontent were ushered over our lowered heads. Yet I was not singled out as perpetrator and instead endured the accusation of having disregarded men’s law in a we-relationship with the women. If we had to avert our eyes defiantly from the accusers—powerfully present in person—enacting the law in the flesh. Moreover, there was room for generosity and re-integration based on a form of authority that relies on compassion rather than an authoritarian impulse to control from a distance. After a good hour of having endured blame and shame, through which we were able to express not defeat but respect, one of the senior men ended the reprimand by announcing formally that, as my “older brother,” he would exert care and excuse my misconduct committed out of ignorance. A veteran of cross-cultural interaction, he gave me and everybody else the chance to keep face.

I arrived a second time when another woman decided to pair up. A few nights into this same large initiation camp, YY came and “claimed” me as her malpa. Taking hold of my arm she said, “You’re coming with me!” This ritual form of “seizing” someone traditionally signaled wife-taking, and I presume some negotiation had occurred about her taking responsibility for my learning and wellbeing. YY, a senior law woman and Christian, single in practice (her disabled husband in permanent care in town) with grown-up if severely dependent children, could do well with a young malpa equipped with a vehicle and time to help in all sorts of ways. It turned out this “marriage,” certainly for me, was much more than one out of convenience. We shared a sense of humor, passion for scavenging, and tendency to improvise, while YY generously taught me language, songs, stories, family relationships, and much more. Every now and then, she would hold up a mirror to my “greed” for knowledge when, instead of answering yet another question, she’d look at me and burst into laughter. Utterly capable of deciding for herself who to engage with and why (without the help of an ethics committee), and of safeguarding the good of rela-
tionships on the basis of committing to her own judgment and local cultural protocol, YY had enjoyed widespread recognition as an ethical personality. For me an inner voice of conscience survives her death and I rely on her voice in moments of crisis.

Conclusion
I have shown how accountability and responsibility in an Australian Indigenous society are enacted interpersonally, through my experience as a non-Indigenous anthropologist working in a remote desert settlement. In this cultural context, the interpersonal is structured according to kinship and friendship, with which certain behavioral patterns, rights, and obligations are associated. Here, the face-to-face encounter counts, and this means that the anonymous power of institutions is neither perceived as a threatening distant authority nor internalized. Social, rather than bureaucratic processes, bind people together, which for a non-Indigenous interlocutor, is both rewarding and immensely demanding. Research regulations put in place from the distance by academic Human Research Ethics Committees can disempower the Indigenous participants whom these very regulations are meant to “protect”: they are bound to undermine the trust that the Indigenous protocols—based on interpersonal accountability as it is lived and practiced locally—are taken seriously.

Ute Eickelkamp, PhD, has primarily worked as a university-based research anthropologist with a special interest in developmental perspectives on social process and change. Her ethnographic fieldwork with Aboriginal families in Central Australia has focused on cultural imagination, creative experience and individuation in art and children’s play. She can be reached at ute.eickelkamp@sydney.edu.au.

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Psychoanalytic Insights in Ethnography

Reconstituting Culturally Constituted Defense Mechanisms for Globalization

Heather Rae-Espinoza—California State U, Long Beach

Common explanations for understanding people’s behavior range from theories that privilege the self and individual choice to frameworks that emphasize larger group motivations. Interpretations of behavior might describe how older generations pass down their knowledge or describe powerful drives for social acceptance. Adopting an integrated perspective that blends considerations of both the individual and the social reveal how people adopt shared cultural values that suit their own psychological needs. As I will demonstrate, this process of bringing together nuanced perspectives on the self and the psyche within the cultural context is worth the analytic work, especially in our effort to understand cultural variability and culture change within our globalized world.

We can best understand the convergence of culture and the psyche through the examination of culturally constituted defense mechanisms. A defense mechanism refers to a way of thinking that protects or defends someone from unpleasant thoughts. A person may repress bad childhood memories, focusing on more positive experiences when he recalls his past. Another may compartmentalize certain behaviors, like the mistreatment of a spouse, to view themselves as a good person overall. In actuality, we all have distortions of the world through defenses. This is how we come to terms with our place in it. Our ways of approaching the world can preserve self-esteem and confirm longstanding views. As such, defenses can be a healthy means for handling distress.

When we find our place in the world, it is a world filled with cultural beliefs. Irving Hallowell described how culture plays a “constitutive role in the psychological adjustment of the individ-
ual to his world” (Culture and Experience, 1955, 89). Melford E. Spiro emphasized the prominence of culture in his description of culturally constituted defenses, which are formed primarily through shared cultural understandings over idiosyncratic personal meanings (Gender Ideology and Psychological Reality: An Essay on Cultural Reproduction, 1997, 115). Rather than early childhood abuse or marital relationship patterns, cultural beliefs about karma or titled men, for example, shape the creation of a defense. Interestingly, someone may find greater social acceptance for a culturally constituted defense mechanism instead of an individual defense mechanism because of its resonance with cultural values.

Conceptualizing such defenses can help us understand the dynamics of transnational lives. Studying children’s reactions to parental emigration—separately from the claims émigré parents make in the developed world—can inform analyses of developmental risk and resilience from parental separation. Developmental assumptions view children “left behind” from parental emigration, especially maternal emigration, as at risk. However, longstanding Ecuadorian support of economic migration both nationally and internationally offered resiliency for many children when an exodus of workers following a devastating financial crisis in 1999. In the new millennium, Mestizo, middle-class women from Guayaquil increasingly emigrated. Remittances soared as émigrés sent money principally to the households of their female kin to care for the émigrés’ children who stayed. Often, émigrés’ children stay because émigrés only plan brief absences and because of the availability of affordable care in Ecuador. However, the feminized migration from Mestizo caused urban life to challenge existing cultural models, which led children to integrate individual and cultural resources for psychological adaptations and social adjustments. The psyche can become the defining locale for transnational family life that lacks the geographic boundaries that once defined the study of culture.

In my fieldwork in Guayaquil, Ecuador, children’s reactions to parental emigration revealed the need to consider both a dynamic culture and a dynamic psyche. Instead of a unified set of values, children who remained in Ecuador after parental emigration came to understand their transnational families in a sea of contradictory cultural values. Children interacted with a wide array of people and
information in their urban setting. From non-émigré families, school officials, government rhetoric, and media discourses, children heard disparaging representations of parental émigrés; in their own transnational households, resounding approvals of parental sacrifice framed everything from receiving new socks to holiday festivities. On the whole, children’s urban context presented divergent values on parental émigrés for their negotiation. For some children, these divergent values became a resource for their defenses.

Their carefully crafted defenses from diverse cultural values served both psychological and social motivations. Children found ways to minimize parental physical distance through emphasizing emotional closeness, helping their psychological adaptation to parental separation. Eight-year-old Juan Carlos was one of many émigrés’ children to freely discuss his mother checking on schoolwork, but offered no descriptive memories of her departure to Italy. Seven-year-old Ramona emphasized her émigré mother’s presence in Ecuador through indicating toys from her mother, special clothing requests, and conversations.

Further, children found social acceptance through denying the differences between their transnational households and other households. Children would hide the agents of their daily caregiving. When a non-émigrés’ child spoke about his mother’s promise to cook empanadas if he passed a test, ten-year-old Alex responded that he would go home to lunch prepared for him (by a female) and get help with homework (by a male). Alex’s parents had migrated separately to different destination countries, but the non-émigré peer likely assumed Alex meant his parents and that they were still together at home. Without distorting reality, Alex had successfully displayed an ideal family image to his peer. Even though his non-émigré peers likely heard the teachers’ disparaging views of parental émigrés’ confirmed at home, Alex still found belonging.

Similarly, eight-year-old Daniel displayed a strong, positive attitude toward all of his caregivers after his mother migrated to Belgium. In a child adaptation of the adult attachment interview, he described his mother as “brave” because she got involved with businesses and “preoccupied” because she asks about his plans. Perhaps referring to phone calls, Daniel said his mother was
“happy” because she would tell him she loves him. He considered his mother “honest” too; she bought his grandmother new clothes even though her old clothes were intact.

With this representation of his maternal bond, Daniel did not refute the values judging émigré parents in wider society; alternatively, he adhered to values esteeming all parents. Daniel sought belonging, and society prizes entrepreneurial, concerned, loving, and honest parents. Daniel emphasized cherished, continued parental bonds. For his mother to possess these characteristics, she did not need to be in Ecuador. In a way, emigration meant she could better express her care for others through remittances, perhaps helping him to psychologically adapt to her emigration. Combining culturally valued parental behaviors to a psychological connection with his mother he reacted to her separation with a defense that allowed social acceptance. While culturally constituted defenses were common in Guayaquil, some children reacted differently. The children of émigrés I studied in a Cañari village in the late 90s learned consistent cultural values; others who experienced abuse created individual defenses. In each of these reactions to parental emigration, individuality and culture play different roles in how children come to terms with their place in the world.

Culturally constituted defenses represent a meaningful blend of individual needs and cultural values for social acceptance and psychological wellbeing. This useful blend means certain defenses can become widespread. Thus, psychological motivations can reveal the reciprocal relationship between culture change and stability. This dynamic of change and stability may mean the maintenance or growth of particular perspectives to regulate for the loss of others. For example, some children with maternal émigrés’ revitalized traditionally valued distributive care practices. On rural homesteads, grandmothers, aunts, and mothers jointly cared for the group of cousins. Even though this value waned with the previous generations’ rural to urban migratory journeys, children emphasized these practices for their extended families to minimize the importance of unique maternal care.

The psychoanalytic resonance of family life and earlier experiences especially further the study of children’s cultural negotiations of culturally constituted defense mechanisms. However, inte-
grating psychoanalytic and anthropological concepts through these defenses extends beyond the study of children and migration. Different perspectives gain force, reconcile with other perspectives, and are resisted across the lifespan through the psychological activity of individual cultural actors. As global processes impact local ways of life, the groups of ideas are not isolated, disembodied entities. Instead, people create alternative sets of ideas based on the efficacy and redundancy of certain values, enacting them in variable settings. Changes in cultural values come from more than dislocations or gradual drift. Nor is change an instantaneous, unpredictable alteration from a past stable state to a present state bereft of all previous meanings. Change is a dynamic, continuous process of gradations, contradictions, and heterogeneity between existing and new, covert, and spoken values. Determining the over-determined motivations behind these processes can advance studies of everyday ruptures. Internal psychological processes are the battleground of disjunctive culture.

Heather Rae-Espinoza, PhD, is Associate Professor in the Department of Human Development and Director of Global Migration Studies at California State University, Long Beach. As a psychodynamic anthropologist, she researches children’s social adjustments and psychological adaptations to parental separation, previously with Ecuadorian emigration and currently with U.S. deployment. She can be contacted at hre@csulb.edu.

DMT, Ecocide, and the Western Psyche

Sebastian Job—University of Sydney

Plagued by fears of civilizational collapse, the human relation to nature is charging back into modern consciousness. The natural sciences alert us to calamities on a vast scale, yet court the suspicion that they themselves presuppose an attitude intrinsic to the destructive dynamic. Thoughtful people diagnose a spiritual malaise at the heart of modern western culture. They wonder aloud how consumerist, status-conscious, gadget-obsessed urbanites in pseudo-democracies dominated by mega-corporations can ever recapture a compelling relationship to the suffering Earth.
In different ways in different locales, but everywhere to an unprecedented degree, modernized people have become insensitive to the environmental costs of “progress.” The situation is obviously dire. One can imagine a rewriting of Nietzsche’s famous Madman declaring the death of God in the marketplace. Only now the Madman declares the death of the living planet, of Mother Earth, and “it is we”—he shouts—“it is we who are killing her!” The crowd shrugs and goes about its business.

However, the shoulder-shrugging is deceptive. In thinking about these reactions in the broadest context, we become aware, as Jungians have long insisted, of archetypal mobilizations in the collective unconscious: the archetypal images of death, of the looming apocalypse, of Divine Retribution of Mother Earth. Social scientific thought has no automatic immunity from such archetypes; nor from neurotic defenses against their presence; nor from the host of inherited mythic figures, from Prometheus to Faust, Pandora to Kali, Darwin to Gandhi, which crowd in upon the mind, offering their metaphorical associations like baited fishhooks for the anxious psyche.

It would be simple enough to say that I have been studying users of the psychoactive alkaloid dimethyltryptamine (N, N-DMT), along with an associated brew of Amazonian provenance, ayahuasca—a vine noted for its hallucinogenic properties. It would be more accurate to say I have joined in the ceremonies of use of western “psychonauts”—those who explore their inner psyche through various means such as hallucinogens, meditation, ritual, and dreaming—in Australia, Argentina, Mexico, and Peru. These are people who largely belong, sociologically speaking, to the neo-shamanic revival, where the “teacher plants” are carefully and often reverently processed so as to extract the sacramental molecules, or “enteleogens,” which open onto what, phenomenologically speaking, are multi-dimensional worlds populated by what practitioners describe as “entities” or “spirit beings.”

Many of the experiences in these worlds take natural processes as their theme. Stan, an Australian man in his mid-40s with a military background and a long-term meditative practice, discovered this on his first ayahuasca journey. Early on, as plasty patterns began to form in front of his eyes, he tried to change the pat-
terns into wood. As he did so, Stan noted:

A voice said to me, ‘Not power over. At one with’ ...

When I tried to be at one with the experience, all of a sudden the experience changed, and I found myself inside a tree. ... I was literally standing inside a tree trunk. I travelled up the tree trunk right up to the very top of the tree. And it was a pine tree. It was almost like I was the tree. I went right out to where the pine needles were in the sunshine. And I could feel the sunshine on the pine needles. And it felt so good! Oh my God! And I remember thinking: “No wonder plants reach up for the sun, coz it is so good!” (fieldwork interview).

Speaking for myself, under the influence of the teacher plants, it is easy to conceive a thought that goes like this: here, finally, is the lost bridge between civilized humanity and the natural world; here, in the nick of time, are the messengers intent on turning us inside out, displaying the wilderness at the heart of human being. Rak, an Australian journalist and film maker, tells me of “a plan by Madre Ayahuasca.” Perhaps, he speculates, “she is emerging from the Amazon, sending out her vine intelligence across the planet, answering our need for a consciousness upgrade.”

Was it always the “plan” to wait until global midnight? In any event, as the well-known writer on psychedelics James Kent puts it, “[W]hen you get to the heart of what the typical DMT message is, it is usually something about the environment or living systems or the vast plant consciousness that penetrates our world” (“The Case Against DMT Elves,” Tripzine.com, 2004). Is it not astonishing, then, that most environmentalists continue to overlook these powerful allies in the struggle to let the biosphere be heard?

Yet things are not so simple. For here, with the aid of the plants, one enters realms that are paradoxically both too crazy for the ecological “download” they are tasked with (since these realms are much weirder than anything resembling what most of us think of as “nature”). At the same time, the realms are too familiar to serve as the wished for Archimedean point (since on inspection the
experiences are still clearly marked by the user’s culture).

How to begin thinking about the promise, and the seduction, of these plant substances for the modern western attempt, such as it is, to avert ecocide? In a DMT journey, we are thrown, I suggest, into the “objective psyche.” By this, I mean the nutrient grounds of culture itself: what we actually get when we go looking with powerful enough magnification for the wellsprings of meaning; what the psychoanalyst Cornelius Castoriadis designated in volcanic terms as psycho-ontological “magma”; what in numerous pre-modern cosmologies is to some degree included within “the world” and is referred to as the realm of spirits or entities, where mythic creation happens and the culture heroes are born.

Under the tutelage of the plants, it becomes all too obvious that the so-called “unconscious,” in its personal, collective, and “psychoid” forms, is very far from unconscious. It is better thought of as an infinitely capacious, transpersonal energetic-protean consciousness of its own, an ever-present primordial soup of electromagnetism and biosemiosis, which can in no way be plausibly understood as a “result” of repression—though repressive dynamics are certainly at work in it, and in its symbolizations and cultural institutionalizations.

Interestingly, DMT and ayahuasca are usually spoken of in Western circles as “medicines” of personal healing and vehicles of spiritual and philosophical “exploration.” These personal agendas intersect with the existential politics of the anthropocene. One of the common connecting links, as we have seen, is an archetypal mother: ayahuasca as Gaian healing presence full of promise. May an “Entheogenic Reformation” lead us, Jonathan Ott writes, to “the spiritual rebirth of humankind at Our Lady Gaia’s breasts, from which may ever copiously flow the amrta, the ambrosia, the ayahuasca of eternal life!” (Jonathan Ott, The Age of Entheogens and The Angel’s Dictionary, 1995, 12).

Ott’s reference to “eternal life” reminds us that this feminine archetype is breaking the surface in the context of anxiety about looming collective death. Here, too, the plants are not shy. Experiencing a kind of death, usually personal, but sometimes more general, is one of the key dimensions of the experience. To take
but one instance, Nen, a very experienced Australian DMT user in his late 30s, advocates high doses of DMT as training for “bardo”—or transitional—states, so as to be “forced out of any control... to be forced into a disembodied state, to understand that consciousness continues regardless of a body and can have all sorts of different forms... So for me once we just get over dying, for a start, on mass, that makes a big change” (“Conversations on the Edge of the Apocalypse,” *In a Perfect World* podcast, 50, 2011).

What then is the upshot of all these journeys into hyperspace? We can perhaps see the contemporary cultural situation in the West as one of a breakdown of ontological coordinates, of rising “ontological insecurity,” to echo R. D. Laing’s echo of Soren Kierkegaard. Many, in this situation, are struck dumb, condemned to terminal uncertainty. Others, more active, become spokespeople for archetypal forces fashioned into ideologies, into “beliefs.” Those who journey with the plants are no doubt distributed across both camps. However, because all of these processes happen in this zone with heightened uncanniness, we can perhaps hope not so much that journeys will come back with the solution, but rather that they will continue to practice a more reflective and conscious relation to these options than otherwise possible. Keeping alive a free, intelligent, and experientially grounded discussion of our situation is perhaps one of the best things the entheogens can offer. That and the realization that non-human others—the plants, animals, and the ever so strange other others—not only can be, but actually are and have always been, part of the conversation.

*Sebastian Job, PhD,* has taught anthropology, history, and sociology at the universities of Sydney, Macquarie, UNSW, and UWS, and is currently lecturing at the Australian National Institute of Dramatic Art. He has published principally on Russian politics and social theory. He may be contacted at sebastian.job@sydney.edu.au.

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A Brief Psychoanalytic Ethnography of Speech and Knowledge among the Yagwoia

Jadran Mimica—University of Sydney

This is a short extract from my psychoanalytic ethnography of speech and knowledge among the Yagwoia people of Papua New Guinea. In New Guinea, life-worlds attitudes to speaking and knowledge point to a material sense of their bodily nature. Here I cannot explicate this cultural understanding through the interplay of the indigenous cosmological notions and my psychoanalytic conceptualization. Instead, I will focus on the un/conscious libidinal determination of *Yaquye Ququne*—“Yaquye talk = word.” Within this internal dimension, the matrix of speech is the bodily substantiability generated by the libidinal energy and its flow.

Speaking and its phonic substance have the same generative determination as semen, milk, and food. Certain classes of words and speech production can be inordinately potent, such as spells. They can be both life-engendering and destructive. Furthermore, much of ordinary talk can be rubbish or drivel, devoid of any substantial value. Whatever it may be, for the Yagwoia, the value of verbal substance always has a concrete bodily coefficient. Speaking is irreducibly oral-generative work on par to eating, and hearing is the activity of sounds in relation to the ears. All speaking is emissive and injective. When words come out of the mouth of the speaker, they are his/her immanent bodily substantiality, and in so far as they go into another person’s ears, they enter into his/her body, feed or spoil him, or have no effect; still, it is bodily substance that has been imparted and with it the speaker’s self. The more a person is self-invested in his/her words, relative to their content and situation of engagement, the greater their egoic-bodily value. Reciprocally, the greater the value of knowledge that is imparted through words, the greater its substantiality and its loss when discharged. This is why all valuable knowledge, especially spells and accounts of ancestral origins, is tightly kept inside oneself.

The bodily coefficient of words varies with their contents, or the knowledge that they contain. Speech is deeply linked to
knowledge precisely because both are modalities of corporeal generative substantiality and activity. Knowledge is not insubstantial information but a substantial bodily possession that, as such, makes the possessor bodily enhanced and strong. The more of it one has, the stronger he is. Additionally, the more knowledge pertains to the cosmogonic truth, the greater its power and value. The disclosure of all such knowledge is seen as a loss of bodily potency and substantiality.

An excellent example of this attitude was the reaction of an old man, Palaquye, when he learned that Hiwoye, one of my four chief co-workers, imparted to me the most secret set of spells used in a life-insuring rite. He scolded Hiwoye, saying that I should have been told only the superficial spells rather than the base-root ones. Having done so, Hiwoye is now like a rubbish man, his body empty of strength.

The evacuation of valuable knowledge is manifested in the poor condition of the body. One of the reasons why the old Palaquye’s body is in good shape despite his age is due to his plentiful knowledge that in all these years he had communicated to only two of his agnatic sons (related through paternal descent). For his part, Hiwoye argued that although he did impart so much of his secret knowledge to me, his body was clearly in excellent condition. Similarly, when his agnatic brother’s wife complained that he gave me all his spells, Hiwoye told her that she ought not to talk. Rather, she and her husband should copulate more and produce a few male children to whom he could transfer his spells.

Presently, while his own children are still very young, I am the only person to whom he could give his knowledge since I amply repay to him and therefore am looking well after his body. Having witnessed our systematic work involving laborious transcriptions, translations, and grammar-focused inquiries, Hiwoye remarked on a few occasions that for his part, he was “just vomiting,” whereas I was the one who made my thought-soul go into his talk-knowledge and made it all clear so that it could become a book. “Just vomiting” meant in this context of talking as a mode of oral ejaculation of valuable knowledge, but which as such required my soul’s thinking to become transformed into the “book-knowledge.” He thus tacitly acknowledged that I wasn’t a passive
recipient of his seminal knowledge on par to a junior fellator in the context of the traditional relations, which included homo-erotic practice of insemination, between the senior and junior initiates. As a metaphor for ejaculation, “vomiting” is rooted in the historical practice of fellatio confined to the male initiations and the male-exclusive life in bachelor houses. This verbal usage applies to both homo and hetero spheres of erotic desire and sexual and verbal commerce.

In this perspective, the flow of all speech and knowledge must be seen as a current within the global libidinal effluence, conterminous with nourishment and copulation. In the activities of the Yagwoia embodiment, food and feeding are intrinsically related to all other bodily substances and their circulation through differential emission and incorporation. The primary matrix of this circuity is the mother-child relation focused on breast-feeding. It is in this micro-cosmic infant-mother conjunction that is continued and transfigured the primordial totalizing self-circuity of the Yagwoia macro-cosmic Self, the speaking phallus. In terms of this generative container of the Yagwoia life-world, the flow is ceaseless. Its different modalities are but self-translations of the permanently self-same phallic being and its autogeneration. So fucking = speaking = knowing = breast-feeding = eating = fellating = pro-creating = dying = etc.

This is not just a synthesis of critical ethnographic understanding. The un/conscious of concrete Yagwoia attests to this self-understanding. For example, a fragment from a dream by another one of my core co-workers (Ploqwaye) that he had while we were working on the translation of a cosmogonic song. In the dream, he comes to the top of a rocky outcrop at the summit of a range. Here he encounters a boy and a girl and their mother located a bit away from them. He tells the two children to hold his penis. They do so, and he feels that it got erect. He tells the girl to open her mouth so that he can inseminate her. The boy just holds his testicles. As he was getting ready to ejaculate, he looks at her mother who is sitting at some distance and is looking at them. He feels ashamed and stops fellating the girl. Then, together with the two children, he walks toward their mother. As they approached her, he discerns that she is a different woman, actually his long term lover Ataum-
nye. His whole body jolts, and he wakes up.

I will not dwell on the layers of meaning of this dream-fragment; it will suffice to elaborate on the fellatio episode. At first, Ploqwaye said that he wasn’t clear about it, but he immediately suspected that this may indicate that some people could try to interfere with his work with me concerning the ancestral cosmogonic knowledge. Then he became more definite. Our work, the relationship involving transmission of knowledge, hasn’t been firmly tied up. Ploqwaye said that in the dream he put his penis into the girl’s mouth but then he withdrew it because her mother was looking. Therefore, this means that there are some other men who would like to work with me, and they will try to make Ploqwaye slack. Clearly, he was worried about the envy and anger of my other collaborator, the “some other men” that he was referring to. He didn’t elaborate on the connection between the girl in his dream and me as the recipient of his knowledge = word = semen. But there was no doubt about this libidinal character of our conjunction. In his view, the dream clearly showed that he and I, so to speak, didn’t completely lock-in, and this may be due to the malign intentions of some other men who envy and begrudge what he has to say to me. Hence their souls interfere with his.

Here, all the fundamental characteristics of the speech = knowledge flow are fully objectified. It would be an undue limitation to circumscribe this inner determination of Yagwoia word-talk in exclusive reference to semen despite its overtness in this particular dream. Since all substances in the Yagwoia body are subject to trans-substantiations and mutual derivations, word is as much seminal as it is lacteal (of milk) and as such bears the essence of the marrow as well as of the bone and the bodily flesh. Within the internal circuity of the body word = talk is “flesh” in the pregnant sense of self-diversification of bodily substantiality. Herein is also the totalizing generative source of all speaking activity.

**Jadran Mimica, PhD**, is a senior lecturer at University of Sydney. He can be reached at jadran.mimica@sydney.edu.au.
Psychoanalytic Anthropology

Hidden Meanings at the Masters
Matthew Richard—Valdosta State University
Matt Newsom—Washington State University

Totems and Tropes: Why We Identify with Green Jackets

The Masters Golf Tournament, played annually at the Augusta National Golf Club (ANGC) in Augusta, Georgia, is an extravagant sporting event with the ostensible aim being to showcase the game’s most skilled competitors. Every April, as many as 90 golfers vie for millions of dollars in prize money—and a green jacket, the iconic sports coat worn by ANGC members while on club grounds. Winning the green jacket confers lifetime honorary membership to the very exclusive ANGC (300 members), putting champions in the exalted company of golf legends like Ben Hogan, Sam Snead, Arnold Palmer, Jack Nicklaus, and Gary Player. But it’s not only the winners who gain from the Masters; so, too, do members of the ANGC. Owing to the adroitness of the golfers, the ANGC’s emblem, the green jacket, is widely recognized as a symbol of excellence, and the glory associated with victory extends to those wearing the green jacket, namely, ANGC members themselves, who never have to compete for it. In short, the green jacket functions both as a metonym for champion—much as crown functions as a metonym for king—and as a contemporary totem, creating a small, clan-like, status group of southern gentlemen connected to one another in a manner similar to what anthropologists call fictive kinship. As will be explored further below, the game of golf itself acts as metaphor for capitalism—a game at which ANGC members not only compete but excel.

Somewhat more than a golf tournament, therefore, we claim that the Masters is an elaborate socio-political allegory that artfully aims to reshape the American public’s imaginary as to what constitutes, and who represents, the virtuous American. Southerners and southern culture are often omitted from such considerations; the stereotype of the rural-racist-dimwitted-region-that-has-yet-to-join-the-21st-century persists, and with it the impression that the South is a place that is foreign to the rest of America. For the 300 proud members of the ANGC, whose ranks include many of the country’s
super-rich, this snub simply will not do. To many of them the southern man represents the nation’s noble archetype—the epitome of class and civility—and the Masters is their way of projecting this image to the world, ultimately staking a claim to regional exceptionalism that some would say has been denied since the South’s defeat in the Civil War (Bertram Wyatt-Brown, *The Shaping of Southern Culture*, 2001).

But how are the proud members of the ANGC to attain legitimacy tactfully—that is, without jeopardizing the dignity of the organization and its members? After all, a group wishing to be perceived as elite cannot be seen to grovel; the use of tropes is shrewd. Indeed, psychoanalysis tells us that human consciousness is constituted via the unconscious mechanisms of fantasy and desire. At Augusta, the ANGC’s bid for national recognition relies on adoring fans identifying with green-jacketed champions whom they associate with members of the ANGC. It takes place tacitly, subconsciously, with the assistance of totems and tropes.

**Golf and the One Percent**

Golf is the ideal medium in which to attempt this renegotiation of meaning. The game itself has a lengthy list of rules and an elaborate code of etiquette, imparting a sense of noblesse oblige that is missing from other sports. Indeed, knowledge of and conformity to the rules is regarded by everyone who plays the game to be of equal or even greater importance than the sum on one’s scorecard. Golf is a gentleman’s game. It’s an individual sport. There are no coaches or teammates; no uniforms; no military-like tactics. Rather, the intrepid golfer succeeds or fails all on his own through a combination of athletic skill and mental acuity—an exalted combination said to represent “character” by those who follow the sport.

The average golfer is not freakishly muscular but rather very average in size. He is lean and lithe, which some admirers regard as a sign of restraint and self-discipline. He is nattily attired, well-groomed, and composed. He never seems to sweat or grunt, and although victory on the tour is statistically rare, the golfer learns to lose with dignity. In sum, the golfer is self-reliant and self-made; there are no regular salaries, only uncertain prospects of winning. The game represents a true meritocracy; the golfer is more analogous to the risk-taking entrepreneur or investor than to
the gladiator, a comparison that is bolstered by the multiple corpo-
rate logos plastered all over his brightly colored clothes. All of
these attributes, overlearned by most Americans as values, resonate
with golf fans at both conscious and unconscious levels—
knowledge that is deftly exploited by the ANGC.

In addition to their many parallels to the market and free-
enterprise, golf and golfers share a number of other traits—both
demographic and ideological— with business and members of the
ANGC. Both groups of men are overwhelmingly white, wealthy,
heterosexual, Christian, and patriotic; in a word, ultraconservative.
Few PGA professional golfers come from working class back-
grounds. Rather, most were raised in upper-class, predominantly
southern families, and they honed their strokes at private, all-white
country clubs. *Sports Illustrated* reported in 2004, that of the 125
golfers then on tour, 123 were Republicans, a finding that shows up
in myriad ways over the years (Orni Starn, “Golf Politics,” http://
golfpolitics.blogspot.com/ 2006_09_01_archive.html, September 1,
2006). In annual surveys of more than 70 touring professionals,
conducted from 2002-2010, *Sports Illustrated* also found that many
members of this group shared a number of additional right-wing
beliefs: solid support for war with Iraq and Samuel Alito, on one
hand; unequivocal opposition to the film “Brokeback Mountain”
and Obamacare on the other (“SI’s Annual PGA Tour Player Sur-
vey,” www.si.com). On Twitter, after the last presidential election
(2012), golfers such as Chris Smith tweeted displeasure with the
reelection of Barack Obama: “Sad day. *I hope I don’t get sick or
need surgery or a job or a loan before I learn to speak Chinese and
get on food stamps*” (Tweeting Athletes, www.tweeting-athletes.
com/index.cfm?CatID=6). What really tees off golfers, *The Herald*
(UK) reports, is taxes, as one reporter found out when he inter-
viewed golfer John Cook in 1996. “My taxes are wasted on people
who don’t give a damn,” Cook fumed. “I’ve earned my money. . . .
Liberals are always fighting what this is all about, [namely], people
working hard, not getting something for nothing” (Bruce Selcraig,
“Playing the Patriot Game,” http://ww1.theherald.co.uk/
sport/70559-print.shtml, September 22, 2006).

Not exactly a sympathetic group; certainly not the under-
dogs that Americans are known to favor. So, the question is how
do 100 million people, worldwide, become captivated for four days by these bland men hitting small white balls up hill and down dale with clubs?

**CBS Sorts: Projecting Southern Virtue Nationwide**

Adam, an agnostic golf fan, attempts to answer that very question. On a golf message board, he posted:

“I can’t really explain why, but I love the Masters. I’m not proud of this, but it’s the truth. I’m not an old man. I don’t really like golf—especially on TV. I think all the whispered talk of the ‘hallowed ground of Augusta,’ or it being ‘a tradition unlike any other,’ is silly. . . . Yet every year, without fail, I watch. I wish I knew why . . .” (6 April 2006).

Adam’s comments suggest that the Masters succeeds as other televised dramas do, namely, through effective story-telling. For this, the ANGC relies on CBS Sports, especially lead announcers Jim Nantz and Nick Faldo. Starting with a stock of symbols—18 named holes, and other vernacular phenomena, like Butler Cabin, Eisenhower’s Tree, Amen Corner, and of course, the coveted green jacket, as well as a list of legendary past winners and a sublime landscape featuring 80,000 plants of 350 species that elicits both awe and dread—Nantz and Faldo weave a variety of familiar cultural tropes aimed at arousing Americans’ emotions and convincing them that they are witnessing something extraordinary.

The narrative is invariably a version of the following: the intrepid golfers—all men of good character—are up against the ravishing but treacherous Mother Nature whom they must conquer through guile and courage in order to join the legends who have worn the coveted green jacket. It’s a steady dose of danger, nostalgia, honor, and virility—all of which are tacitly understood and highly arousing meanings. Every drive, approach, chip, and putt is objectified and turned into institutional—and collective—memories, many of which spectators and audience recall and discuss year after year—like Larry Mize’s 140-foot chip in for birdie in 1987, and Scott Hoch’s missed 24-inch in 1989. And if that still isn’t enough, the announcers furnish viewers with folksy backstories of the contenders, as Nantz did this past April when he gushed,
“Brandt Snedecker; the pride of Nashville, Tennessee. He married his high school sweetheart, Mandy, and now they have two children, daughter, Lily, born in 2011 and son, Austin, born in 2012.” In short, the announcers sanctify the events and project an honorable identity on the players. The idealized history of the Masters creates an American morality play, one where champions succeed on talent and character alone; where everybody competes on a level playing field and has the same chance of winning; but what separates the champion from the other non-contenders is courage and determination.

Just like capitalism. Thus, by way of totems and tropes, transference and countertransference, internalization and externalization, spectators and viewers see members of the ANGC and the golf professionals as one and the same. And southern gentlemen, stigmatized since the Civil War, replenish their prestige and perhaps achieve a modicum of redemption.

Matthew Richard, PhD, teaches at Valdosta State University in Valdosta, Georgia. He may be contacted at mjrchar@valdosta.edu. Matt Newsom, MA, is a PhD student at Washington State University. He may be contacted at mattdnewsom@gmail.com.

Meaning and Political Subjectivity in Psychotic Illness

Sadeq Rahimi—University of Saskatchewan

In what follows I will give an overview of my research on culture and psychosis to illustrate the powerful ways in which contemporary psychoanalytic theory can contribute to anthropological research. I have in mind specifically the French schools of psychoanalysis, in which semiotics and linguistic systems play a central role in the formation of subjective experience.

My research project was constructed around the basic psychoanalytic premise that subjective experience and culture are intrinsically related to each other since they are both constructed in terms of basic chains of associations and systems of meaning.
From that premise, one could expect to find structural signatures of the common system that orders both cultural processes and subjective experiences all the way from highly private experiences—like mental illness—to collective domains like history and politics. The objective was to search for that relationship through one of the most obviously idiosyncratic private experiences: psychosis.

The challenges a psychotic patient faces are somewhat similar to those of a person awaking to the aftermath of a terrifying earthquake and realizing their survival depends on the daunting task of reconstructing the landscape. It is in this kind of a setting that the significance of the basic building blocks of meaning that French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan termed *points de capiton* (literally, quilting points) becomes obvious. Think of systems of meaning as complex structures built around basic blocks and then expanded through successive levels of metaphoric and metonymic associations. As you move away from the basic blocks, each new layer is progressively more intricate and less solid. Just as in a city hit by an earthquake, the surviving structures are usually foundational elements. Similarly, a mind that is hit by psychotic illness has certain foundational signifiers that tend to remain intact, and they serve as extremely important points of reference for the patient’s desperate struggle to orient their chaotic experience.

It is the rudimentariness, the solidity, and the certitude with which these points of reference are vested that renders them most resilient to the ravages of psychotic illness. Significantly, the solidity and certitude of these *points de capitons* is determined politically and historically—that is to say, collectively. They function as the turning points where private experience is determined and held together by the collective systems, which is why they also produce the fundamental continuity of private experience with collective systems. Psychotic constructions of meaning tend to deviate significantly from common sense, but when it comes to those basic blocks, my case analyses clearly showed that the points of reference are generally the same as those used by the non-psychotic subjects. These points of reference are almost without an exception signifiers associated with great amounts of power, such as God and his prophets or the Devil and his associates, or significant mythical and historical characters.
For a concrete example, consider the following from a young psychotic woman I will call Emel. A number of salient themes of reference repeatedly surfaced throughout Emel’s narrative, one of which I will introduce here, namely the much revered founder of the Republic of Turkey, Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938). Struggling to locate and identify herself, Emel said at one point:

E: So Atatürk is my grandfather. We are from the same earth
I: You are from the same earth...
E: Yes we are from the same earth... No one has my blood type. Only my father and I have it.
[...] I: What kind of blood is that?
E: Turkish blood.

Note the strong identification with Atatürk here. The idea of a pure “Turkish blood” is associated strongly with the legacy of Atatürk, whose phrase “the pure blood in our veins” continues to be used and reproduced widely in Turkish social and political jargon. At another point in the interview, Emel gave a striking metaphor for her illness and the consequent hospitalization: “it’s a spider web,” she said. Then when I asked her what she meant by that, she said: “spider! spider web. That means the opposites. Like East and West!” Unable to hide my confusion, I asked for more explanation:

I: Like East and West? I don’t really understand this East and West thing. Could you explain that for me?
E: It means siblings… It means peace… Peace at home. Peace in the world I was reading Atatürk’s writing, Atatürk’s address to Turkish Youth [a historic talk in which he calls the Turkish youth to respect the ‘pure Turkish Blood’ in their veins]. Do you like Atatürk?
I: I don’t know much about Atatürk.
E: If I gave you a book would you read it? A gift.
I: Thank you. Why don’t you tell me the name of the book?
E: Bütün Dünya [The Whole World]
I: The Whole World. What does it say inside?
E: It talks about Atatürk. When he died, when he was born. How he won the battle of Sakarya. How Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror conquered Istanbul [15th century conquest of Is-
Let me call your attention to the years she attributes to Atatürk’s birth and death: 1981 is Emel’s own date of birth, and 1983, two years later, coincides with the time she herself had a serious illness and her parents considered her dead. Identification with Atatürk is a recurring theme in Emel’s interviews.

There are at least two important aspects to this identification: first that Atatürk is a collectively constituted signifier functioning here as a personal reference of identity, and secondly that it functions as a trope of unity, not simply in the collective or national sense of the word, but at an intimately personal, subjective level, as a signifier around or within which Emel attempts to anchor her unhinged sense of selfhood. Atatürk is associated strongly with wholeness here. Notice also the title of her imaginary book The Whole World. Atatürk enters as a figure in whom the opposites come together, and through him, peace is restored. Emel’s world is riddled with binary oppositions, but Atatürk is capable of joining the opposites together.

The idea of an intermediary catalyst that brings the two conflicting worlds together and restores a stable self-identity not only is a prominent theme in Emel’s search for a sense of self, but it also coincides immediately with the history of Turkey and the political figure of Atatürk. Atatürk, whose famous adage she repeats, “peace at home, peace in the world,” becomes a pivotal point de capiton for Emel through which she finds a locally legitimized way of deferring her frustrating struggle for self-identity to the larger and more promising domain of the collective apparatus.

Using new psychoanalytic theories for cultural analysis of psychotic content sheds light on an intricate yet easily discernible series of semiotic and psychological structures, constellations of meaning and associative patterns that run across collective processes and private experiences. The possibility of tracing the conti-
nuity of the private and the collective within the realm of psychotic experience clearly shows that psychotic reality, as exotic, different, and disjointed as it might appear, is “analyzable” insofar as it is formed within the collective system in which the illness unfolds. Analysis clearly shows that what may originally appear as disorganized, incomprehensible, and broken chains of associations, may indeed be read and analyzed to bear sense in levels of meaning not immediately available to consciousness.

Needless to say, if it is possible to systematically find patterns of association that coincide with those of the psychotic subject’s local systems of meaning, then it is only reasonable to attribute continuity to the psychotic and the non-psychotic experience, at least insofar as they both are constructed using the same pool of semiotic resources.

Sadeq Rahimi, PhD, is Assistant Professor of Medical Anthropology and Associate Faculty in Psychiatry at the University of Saskatchewan. His training includes a PhD in Transcultural Psychiatry from McGill University; Child and Adult Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy from Montreal and Boston; and Postdoctoral Fellowship in Social Medicine at Harvard Medical School. He can be reached at Sadeq.Rahimi@usask.ca.

Illness as Intimacy: Rethinking the Ego and the Id

Sara M. Bergstresser—Columbia University

I have recently taught courses that necessitated incorporating biological and evolutionary concepts into my primarily cultural and social approach to medical anthropology. During this process, I was pleased to discover that rather than the seemingly definitive narrative of “survival of the fittest,” the story of evolution is primarily one of ambiguity and overlapping processes of struggle and cooperation. Survival is a constant negotiation and renegotiation of boundaries and influence, and the limits of self and other are always in flux. Lewis Thomas noted that, “Disease usually results from inconclusive negotiations for symbiosis, an overstepping of the line by one side or the other, a biologic misinterpretation of bor-

This discovery came at a time when I was particularly interested in two different types of entity that can both become embedded in the human body: demons and microbes. Demonic possession and microbial infection are both conceptualized as invasion, but there is growing awareness of the body as necessarily full of microbes, a complex ecological system of its own. Rather than the constant refinement of human exceptionality, evolutionary processes have produced a body defined by multiplicity, symbiosis, and the ambiguous boundaries of selfhood.

Then, of course, one must consider the demons. If microbes became incorporated into other life forms by virtue of continuous intimacy, is it possible that we have enveloped demons (and other spirits) over time in much the same way? Might other entities have been long nestled within us? Though once outside, are they now considered essential and inseparable parts of the psyche? These questions draw me toward a reconsideration of the early visions of psychoanalysis. Perhaps there is no better picture of struggle, negotiation, and mutual necessity than that of Freud’s ego and id.

**Freud and Evolution**

Freud was particularly engaged in the idea of biological evolution, and he was also captured by the general trend of the time, envisioning “progress” at its core. Allan Young (“Remembering the Evolutionary Freud,” *Science in Context*, 19: 1, 175) suggests that the “evolutionary Freud” has been mainly forgotten. In “Overview of the Transference Neurosis,” written in 1915 but not published until 1987, Freud discusses how the id is produced at an early stage, with the evolution of the vertebrates; the ego appears later, during the Paleolithic human phase of hunting and gathering. The evolutionary heritage of humankind remains embedded within, and these atavistic elements are variously linked to different neuroses.

Some elements of Freud’s evolutionary vision are quite compatible with current views; for example, it is still relevant to understand the human body as adapted to an earlier Paleolithic era, because it can explain many diseases in terms of a physiological
mismatch with modern foods and lifestyles. Other elements, such as the imagined hierarchy of civilized Europeans versus “primitives” that may be felt while reading *Totem and Taboo*, have fallen far out of favor in academic and scientific discourse.

Science is a reflection of its day. Contemporary science has not abandoned the idea of progress, though it now may be expressed more subtly. Neuroscience still categorizes bits of the brain in similar sorts of hierarchies, with emotion and survival instincts located in the “lower brain,” and thought, consciousness, and other hallmarks of “humaness” located in the cerebral cortex. The idea of evolution, hierarchy, and the animal/id versus the human/ego remain central to the conceptions of human pasts, presents, and futures.

What would happen if the id did not come before the ego? Could they both have been outside entities, simultaneously incorporated into all multicellular organisms? Or, perhaps, it is the ego that is the “animal” part of us, and only we humans have acquired a pesky id? House pets notwithstanding, animals do not seem to suffer from the range of neuroses that plague humans. Could the id be a vestigial force, somehow swept into the mix as our ancestors hunted and gathered? Or perhaps it truly was the ego that joined primates along their temporal journey, not developed from within, but incorporated from without. What would happen if the conceptual ties between change and progress were permanently severed?

**Endosymbiotic Intimacy**

Beginning in the early 20th century, a few biologists started to consider that the mitochondria in our cells look a lot like bacteria. The mitochondria, which generate energy in the cell, have their own DNA, and in humans it is inherited only through the maternal line. This theory was completely against the prevailing orthodoxy of the day and therefore quite unpopular. It was mostly ignored for many years. By the end of the 1960s, the theory of endosymbiosis had become more widely accepted. Bacteria, which were once separate, became incorporated into a cell, and a pattern of mutual reliance—symbiosis—was established, with one participant dwelling fully inside the other. The mitochondria are not something produced from our own genetic path; rather, they are different historical and genetic entities that have become functionally indistinguish-
able from our bodies.

How does this unexpected cellular intimacy fit within the prevailing idea of evolutionary survival? In the 1970s, Richard Dawkins pioneered the idea of “selfish genes.” This theory writ the “survival of the fittest” paradigm quite large (or, rather, small); Dawkins argued that genes themselves were constantly competing for supremacy. While endosymbiosis increases the reproductive success of both organisms, it is not directly incompatible with theories of selfish genes, but it does lend a cynical cast to any and all forms of mutuality. Using this model, we could imagine the beleaguered ego and id, stuck with each other and with us because alone they cannot achieve resurrection.

Freudian psychoanalysis can be quite problematic for a female scholar. Though most of the overt discussion may be about the penis, the real dilemma is that of the mother-as-womb. How does the little boy fully escape his origins in the interior of the mother to become his own separate, bounded individual? The mother is blamed for the tensions arising from this process of creation, ambiguously endosymbiotic or parasitic as it may be. Perhaps we should treat this story as a dream or a phantasy: what deep fears might it conceal? Are we, perhaps, never to become separate as selves, no matter what we do? Might this complex embeddedness go far beyond the fetus in the womb, all the way to the (maternal) mitochondria in each of our cells?

**Demons and Disciplinary Repressions**

“We still think of human disease as the work of an organized, modernized kind of demonology, in which the bacteria are the most visible and centrally placed of our adversaries. We assume that they must somehow relish what they do... These are paranoid delusions on a societal scale, explainable in part by our need for enemies, and in part memory of what things used to be like” (Lewis Thomas, *The Lives of a Cell*, 1974, 75-76).

The accepted difference between a demon and a bacteria or virus is one of intentionality. Contemporary visions of science teach us that germs are not “evil” because they lack intent. Demons, on the other hand, always wish us harm. In making us sick, bacteria and viruses are not enacting a personal vendetta; rather,
they are trying to survive, just like any other successful biological organism. What would happen if we were to give demons the same benefit of the doubt?

There are certain categories of entity that we are not supposed to combine. Imagine the peer review process for an academic narrative that genuinely believes in everything at once: microbes and mitochondria, the ego and the id, all cavorting alongside demons and maybe even souls! Is there room for psychoanalytic microbiology? Evolutionary demonology? Are the boundaries between academic disciplines resistances? What kinds of discomfort can one produce with unacceptable combinations and through the miscegenation of segregated domains?

We may find that we are all cobbled together of bits—our bodies, our psyches, our families. The intimacy needed for survival can also wear thin. If illness emerges from uneasy symbiosis and uncertain boundaries, then the tense negotiations between ego and id take on new meanings. We can’t escape the past, because it lives within us. Then, of course, one must also consider the demons.

*Sara M. Bergstresser, PhD, MPH, is a medical anthropologist who has taught most recently at Boston University and Columbia University. She may be contacted at smbergst@gmail.com.*

**Between Geertz and Kohut:**

**Chicago in the 1960s**

Robert A. LeVine—Harvard University

My life during the 1960s was split three ways: between the University of Chicago, where I was on the faculty; the Institute for Psychoanalysis, where I was a “research candidate” (a student not to be certified for practice); and, fieldwork in Nigeria and Kenya (in Nigeria before and after psychoanalytic training, and in Kenya during most summers). At the beginning, in 1962, I was the only anthropologist in psychoanalytic training at the Chicago Institute. My analyst was Gerhart Piers, a Viennese who had succeeded Franz Alexander as director of the Institute and had published a book on shame and guilt with Milton Singer. I saw him five times
a week most of the year, though he allowed me two months off during the summers to go to Africa (instead of one month—a counter-transferential mistake?).

After two years in analysis (1962 to 1964), I was admitted to classes at the Institute. No theoretical course had a more exciting reputation than “The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis,” taught by Heinz Kohut, another Viennese analyst, who delivered extremely coherent and deeply insightful lectures without notes. During each lecture after the first, he would ask a student in the first row where he had left off and would then begin lecturing without pauses or hesitations.

My notes on his lectures reflect his coherence; I had never taken such good notes. I particularly appreciated the fact that his view of psychoanalysis and neurosis contained so many points I had never encountered before. Three years later, in 1967, I took Heinz Kohut’s Continuing Case Seminar, in which we heard material from Kohut’s supervisee Arnold Goldberg and first encountered some of the concepts Kohut detailed in his book, *The Analysis of the Self* (1971), including narcissistic character disorder, and his novel therapeutic approach to such cases.

I joined the Committee on Human Development at the University of Chicago as an assistant professor in 1960 and immediately joined the Committee for the Study of New Nations. That committee was started by a political scientist, David Apter, whom I had known in East Africa, with the sociologist Edward Shils and with Clifford Geertz and Lloyd A. Fallers, two newly arrived anthropologists I had known during my student years. Geertz and I were colleagues in the Anthropology Department, but it was at the weekly meetings of the New Nations Committee that we engaged in intellectual dialogue. This was the period when Geertz was writing the papers like “Religion as a Cultural System” that formed the core of his approach, some of which were later published together in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973).

Cliff and I had been doctoral students together at Harvard—he three years ahead of me—but he returned from fieldwork in Java without having taken his “specials” (that is, the written and oral exams in social anthropology) beforehand. That meant he was in di-
rect competition with the rest of us novices on the exam, and we inevitably appeared mediocre by comparison with his brilliance and erudition; I felt lucky to have passed. However, what came between us primarily was our notion of research: I was a passionate logical positivist who had studied briefly with Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel and found my ideals embodied in John Whiting’s cross-cultural approach; Cliff was an avowed phenomenologist who regarded positivism with disdain.

At Chicago’s New Nations Seminar, these differences were not in focus, and I became more interested in Cliff’s elegant formulations. After 1968, when the Africanist Victor Turner joined the faculty, my aversion to cultural phenomenology, as represented by his work and Geertz’s, began to erode. I could see that their approaches took account of religion as cultural fantasy in ways that were compatible with psychoanalysis (Turner agreed). At the Institute for Psychoanalysis, Kohut was now espousing what amounted to a phenomenological version of psychoanalysis, with “empathic understanding” as its key tool and his injunction to “clarify the surface before going to the depths” as a point of convergence between his approach and those of Geertz and Turner.

I don’t mean that I ever fully agreed with either Geertz or Kohut about theory and method. They both viewed their work as closer to the humanities than the sciences, while I always took science as the goal for psychocultural research. Still, their positions were taken largely in opposition to conceptions of science as restricted to the search for universal generalizations and that had no place for the particulars of the individual psyche, the local culture, or the historical period. Since the work of Geertz and Kohut was focused on just such particulars, they rejected the physics-based models of science then prevalent among social scientists—in my view, however, Darwinian biology was a more suitable model of science for social scientists, and it did have places for particulars and variations as well as uniformities. But Geertz and Kohut formulated standards of credibility for cultural anthropology and psychoanalysis, standards that made them as skeptical as I was of interpretation or depth analysis without sufficient attention to context. Thus, I found myself influenced by them as well as by Vic Turner.

I want to emphasize that the convergence of my viewpoint
with those of Geertz and Kohut was mine; neither of them changed their minds about any of the issues. I worked with Kohut regarding the founding of the Center for Psychosocial Studies in the early 1970s, and I participated in the conference given in honor of his 60th birthday in 1973. The last time I saw him was on a return visit to Chicago in 1977, when I gave a lecture that was co-sponsored by the Institute and the University of Chicago’s Continuing Education Program. Kohut was in the audience when I said his theory of childhood psychic development has a “Japanese problem,” in that evidence from Japan shows early development there has a normal course that would be “pathogenic” according to his theory. My lecture was the only one in the series to be rejected for publication in the Chicago Institute’s *Annual of Psychoanalysis*, on the grounds that it was “insufficiently psychoanalytic.”

As for Cliff, I had a warm relationship with him that did not involve criticizing each other’s viewpoints. Then in 2002, when I participated in an American Anthropological Association panel celebrating him and presented a brief paper, “Coded Communications: Symbolic Psychological Anthropology,” suggesting that he needed but did not have an explicit psychological or psychoanalytic dimension in his writings, he agreed, explained why—exaggerating issues with the earlier culture and personality period—and indicated a willingness to consider new trends in psychocultural research (Richard Shweder and Byron Good, eds., *Clifford Geertz by His Colleagues*, 2005, 24-27). I am unaware that there is any sign of having made other statements on this subject before his death a few years later. It was quite different with Vic Turner, who wrote a chapter called “Encounter with Freud” in George Spindlers’ *The Making of Psychological Anthropology* (1978) and also told me how much he regretted about not incorporating a psychoanalytic dimension in his work.

I presented an initial form of the convergence between Kohut, Geertz, and my own views in the book *Culture, Behavior and Personality* in 1973 and a more advanced form in an additional chapter, “The Self in Culture,” added to its second edition (1982). That chapter proposed the idea of a person-centered ethnography as fieldwork that may or may not reach the depths to which Freud aspired. It is a project that others have carried out with success, and
one to which I hope to make a further contribution in the next years. As I argued in my 2010 book of readings Psychological Anthropology: A Reader on Self and Culture, we have made some progress in this field, and there is reason to think that more is possible.

Robert A. LeVine, PhD, is the Roy E. Larsen Professor of Education and Human Development, Emeritus, at Harvard University. His most recent book, with his wife Sarah and former students, is Literacy and Mothering: How Women’s Schooling Changes the Lives of the World’s Children (Oxford University Press, 2012), which won the 2013 Eleanor E. Maccoby Book Award in Developmental Psychology of the American Psychological Association. He is currently at work, with Sarah LeVine, on a book introducing American parents to cultural variations in parenting around the world. He may be contacted at Levine68@gmail.com.

The Mixed Legacy of Gregory Bateson

Philip K. Bock—University of New Mexico

Gregory Bateson (1904-1980) was a British anthropologist who worked in New Guinea and in Bali with his wife, Margaret Mead. After World War II, he became interested in schizophrenia and studied alcoholic veterans with various mental disorders in California. He also made contributions to family therapy, arguing that distorted communications were responsible for many personal problems. Later, he investigated dolphin and octopus learning and wrote about ecological issues. Many of his papers are collected in his Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972).

My only personal encounter with this unusual man was a lunch in San Francisco during the mid-1970s at an anthropology conference. Bateson was witty and charmed my wife. I mentioned that I had been his daughter’s teaching assistant at Harvard and that I had brief contact with Dr. Mead in connection with my anthology, Culture Shock (1970). We probably discussed his book, Naven (1958), and his ideas about ecology.

In this article, I am primarily concerned with the relation of
psychoanalysis to Bateson’s writings on anthropology and psychiatry. In both fields, his point of view seems to come down to “a failure of communication.” I believe his concepts of “schismogenesis” and the “double bind,” require supplement by methods of depth psychology. Much of his work denies unconscious processes, and I think he regularly ignored obvious ambivalence.

In *Naven*, Bateson analyzed a Melanesian initiation ritual involving cross-dressing by adults. His interpretation of social processes that make people behave in similar or complementary ways (“schismogenesis”) later invoked cybernetic feedback. Personally, I find more convincing the dynamic mechanisms described by Bruno Bettelheim in *Symbolic Wounds* (1962). He found male envy of female anatomy and reproductive capacity at the base of many initiation rituals, including those invented by disturbed children. The Naven ceremony itself clearly expresses ambivalence of men toward women and of the mother’s brother toward his sister’s son—as the male initiators are called “mothers” in this Iatmul tribal ritual in New Guinea.

In the second edition, Bateson writes, “*Naven was written almost without benefit of Freud*” (1958, 252). In an article on Bateson, anthropologist Charles Nuckolls focuses on the word “almost,” pointing out many similarities with Freud’s handling of emotion (“The Misplaced Legacy of Gregory Bateson: Toward a Cultural Dialectic of Knowledge and Desire,” *Cultural Anthropology* 10: 3, 1995, 367-394). I, on the other hand, am more curious about the phrase “without benefit of,” which is commonly completed by the word “clergy.” This wording may allude to a family drama involving Mead’s second husband Reo Fortune, whom she abandoned for Gregory. After her divorce from Fortune, Bateson and Mead were married in Singapore.

Bateson’s concept of the “double bind” changed over time but always involved an insoluble problem due to faulty communication leading to more or less serious mental illness, including schizophrenia. It seems that the usual definition of a dilemma, as a situation involving choice between equally unsatisfactory alternatives, includes the notion. In a classic double bind, a person is punished for trying to escape a painful situation. I would interpret these as intrapsychic conflicts existing between parts of the psyche.
Charles Nuckolls suggests that a “dialectic” is also involved in schizophrenic communication. Nuckolls considers Bateson’s “legacy” in two chapters of his fine book *The Cultural Dialectics of Knowledge and Desire* (1996).

**What “About Bateson”?**

In Rollo May’s collection of articles *About Bateson* (1977) the authors included students, friends, and family (Margaret Mead and their daughter, Mary Catherine Bateson). May wrote about Bateson’s influence on “humanistic psychology” while others treated related topics. Margaret, Gregory, and “Cathy” had formed a lasting alliance, surrounded by admiring colleagues and students as their interests went from topic to topic and conference to conference.

In several chapters in *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (Bateson, 1972), Cathy is cast as the “Daughter” who questions “Daddy” in (semi-fictional) “metalogues” wherein Gregory expounds his changing views of learning, ecology, and religion. Bateson’s subsequent marriage to Betty Summer included fathering another daughter and adopting a stepson. Toward the end of his life, he married Lois Cammack and had another daughter. His interest in psychiatry seems not to include study of his own conflicts.

Gregory’s own “family drama” cast him as son of a famous biologist and survivor of two older brothers, one killed in World War I, the other by suicide. His dominant father (who named him after Gregor Mendel) promoted genetics but rejected Darwinian evolution. He tried to steer his surviving son into the natural sciences, but Gregory rebelled. According to his daughter, he was also hostile toward his mother and “heartily wanted to get away” from her (Mary Catherine Bateson, *With a Daughter’s Eye*, 1984, 59). His professional relationship with Mead continued for decades after their 1950 divorce and through his two later marriages.

Bateson’s account of his own (brief) analysis (ca. 1950) seems quite peculiar. He later told David Lipset:

> When I was undergoing what was vaguely called my psychoanalysis, I had a dream [that] I have committed a sin...And because I am guilty, I am condemned and taken to the place of execution where [I
make] a very noble speech...at the end of the speech I bow, and I say, ‘Excuse me if I dramatize myself a little,’ and wake up roaring with laughter [No interpretation follows] (Gregory Bateson, 1980, 176).

Watts About Bateson

After short postwar positions, including a difficult year teaching at Harvard, Bateson landed in California in 1949 to head a project about “paradoxes in psychotherapy” and other forms of communication. His work involved therapists and people as different as Jurgen Reusch, Norbert Wiener, and Alan Watts, whose mystical views he admired.

Priest and Asian scholar Alan Watts clearly had interactions with Bateson during the Big Sur California years of Esalen Institute and Zen. In *Nature, Man and Woman* (1970, 100) Watts calls the double bind “a contradiction of the specially intolerable type… wherein all the alternatives offered are forbidden.” This is an unusually clear statement; however, from his Buddhist standpoint, it can also be part of a healing process, for “finding himself in the double-bind predicament where every road is closed… [he may find] the sensation that every road is open” (Alan Watts, 1970, 181). Watts says that this is the main function of the puzzling *koan* that Zen masters set to their pupils, opening them to new modes of awareness. He also likens this state to “the type of awareness which Freud considered essential for psychoanalysis” (183).

The article, “The Cybernetics of Self: A Theory of Alcoholism,” was based on Bateson’s work from 1949 to 1952 with patients at the Veterans Administration hospital in Palo Alto (*Psychiatry*, 1971, 34, 1-18). Though he confesses that “I fear I that I helped them not at all,” he continued that “the theology (sic) of Alcoholics Anonymous coincides closely with the epistemology of cybernetics” and went on to examine the Twelve Steps in terms of experiences such as “alcoholic pride” and “hitting bottom.” His one reference to psychoanalytic theory is to the early work of another friend, Erik Erikson. If Bateson ever had a drinking problem, I found no mention of it.

What About Bateson Today?

It is difficult to determine the influence of Bateson’s ideas
in contemporary science. He often had problems communicating with students and peers, and his quest for a “metaepistemology” seems futile. Yet there is great stimulation to be found in his attempts to rethink fundamental problems, and his final book, *Mind and Nature, a Necessary Unity* (1979), published just before his death, was written to be understandable by those who had not read his earlier works.

My mixed feelings are probably evident in this essay. How different is the “double bind” from other types of dilemmas? Does cybernetic theory really shed light on social processes and individual pathology? Without insisting on the truth of Freudian dynamics, does Bateson’s apparent denial of conflict theory weaken his claims?

Samuel Roll, a practicing psychotherapist, confirmed my opinion that Bateson’s influence on that field was a quickly passing phenomenon. Roll said that, like Gestalt Therapy, which flourished at that time, Bateson’s work “left no body of research that is currently important” (personal communication). In his treatise, *Culture in Mind*, anthropologist Bradd Shore takes up Bateson’s several useful discussions of “play” as paradoxical communication (1996, 111-114) and as different from “ritual” (90-91).

He also mentions Bateson’s analysis of photos and films, and his ideas about “digital cognition,” but Shore did not integrate these ideas into his discussions of “the problem of meaning.”

My opinion is that, today, Bateson would be most at home with ecological awareness groups such as the Bioneers, attending and organizing conferences on the relationships among natural and social processes, provoking thought and insisting on the central importance of communication, while pointing out paradoxes and contradictions in the speech and writing of other scholars. I’m sure we need people like him.

*Philip Bock, PhD,* is Presidential Professor Emeritus at the University of New Mexico where he taught for 30 years and edited the *Journal of Anthropological Research* for 12 years. A past president of the Society For Psychological Anthropology, his book, *Rethinking Psychological Anthropology,* is in its third printing. He may be contacted at pbock@unm.edu.
Am I a psychoanalytic anthropologist? Over the course of my 45-year career, I have accrued many disciplinary labels to categorize my work. In the early-to-mid 1970’s, Weston La Barre, Melford Spiro, L. Bryce Boyer, and George DeVos—all mentors—told me that I was a psychoanalytic anthropologist. Around the same time, Lloyd deMause and Henry Ebel contacted me to present a paper at the 1978 inaugural meeting of the International Psychohistorical Association (IPA) and said that I was clearly also a psychohistorian. Through my work since around 1980 with the High Plains Society for Applied Anthropology, I have been called, and call myself, an applied anthropologist. Around 1990, Michael Diamond, a leader in the field of organizational psychodynamics, invited me to join the International Society for the Psychoanalytic Study of Organizations. I have been claimed by medical anthropology for my work in ethnicity and health, family medicine, and American biomedicine.

My work spans and attempts to integrate many disciplines. Ultimately, if I must label myself, I would say that I am simply an anthropologist for whom the unconscious dimension has always been essential to understanding culture, and for whom “psychoanalytic” deepens and completes the “anthropology.” For me, “psychoanalytic anthropology” is an approach to doing both theoretical and applied anthropology. I do not experience it as a distinct field. Ironically, much of my publication has been in literatures and disciplines outside academic anthropology. My version of psychoanalytic anthropology has been welcomed more in disci-
plines outside academic anthropology than in it.

Ever since I took a course in culture and personality, taught by Otto von Mering in the late-1960’s, I have included the unconscious dimension in all my work. Dr. von Mering introduced me to the writing of Erik Erikson, whose work I devoured and whom in the early 1980’s I had the pleasure of meeting. I had a Maurice Falk Medical Fund fellowship during my graduate school years in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Pittsburgh and Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic (WPIC). I was blessed to be taken under the wing of Jeremiah O’Mara, the WPIC chief librarian, who introduced me to Freud, Abraham, Ferenczi, Hartmann, Winnicott, and many other classical and object relational psychoanalytic writers. Later, George DeVos and L. Bryce Boyer helped guide my reading and thinking at long distance—California to Tennessee, and later to Oklahoma.

In my first full-time postgraduate job, in psychiatry at Meharry Medical College (1972-1978), in Nashville, Tennessee, the chair, the child psychiatrist/psychoanalyst Jeanne Spurlock, recognized my fledgling interest in the unconscious and let me to join her psychiatry residents as a full-fledged participant in her seminars in classical psychiatric/psychoanalytic literature. I remember taking Freud’s case study of the “Wolf Man,” reading everything I could get my hands on about the Wolf Man by Freud and others, and making a formal presentation in the seminar. That work led to a paper linking the Wolf Man to Russian-Soviet history and culture; it was later published in *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society*.

My doctoral dissertation work from 1968 to early 1972 was a study of multi-generation Slovak and Rusyn (a Slavic speaking group east of the Slovaks in the Carpathian Mountains) American identity (in Erik Erikson’s sense of the term), in what was then the “Steel Valley” of Western Pennsylvania. The era coincided with the rise of the White Ethnic Movement, about which my fellow graduate student and colleague Robert F. Hill and I wrote a book called *The Ethnic Imperative* (1977). Early in the manuscript, we wrote that we had been highly influenced by the writing of Weston La Barre. To our great fortune, Dr. La Barre was the reader the press chose to review the manuscript. This led to my long friendship with him that lasted from the late 1970s to his death in 1996.
He was one of the most influential thinkers as well as a kind of surrogate father in my life.

The reader might expect my family of origin to have exerted a power on my interest in the unconscious and its cultural manifestations. Born in 1946, I grew up in Coraopolis, Pennsylvania, a factory town near Pittsburgh. My mother was often profoundly, suicidally depressed and emotionally unavailable. Even when I was a child, she often would tell me her problems; from her, I learned to be an attentive listener and to try to help even when it felt overwhelming. My father, the stabilizing person in our apartment, was alternately thoughtful, kind, encouraging, enraged, and brutal. From him, a violinist before he became a small-town merchant, I received my love of classical music, and learned to read the entire score—precursor to anthropological holism!

My maternal grandfather, who owned the apartment building and lived in the apartment across the hall from us, detested my father both as a person and because he was a Rumanian Jew (the lowest rung on the status hierarchy of Jews). My grandfather, who was always tender toward me, was an immigrant Lithuanian Jew (via the Russian-partitioned part of Poland) who was a descendant of generations of learned rabbis and scholars (the top rung of the Jewish status hierarchy). Long ago, a wise therapist told me that my grandfather emotionally saved my life. At the same time, I was chronically “in the middle” in all of my family relationships, a role that later deeply informed my applied anthropology, including organizational consulting, where I became able to listen to and contain all sides of a conflict.

After a rebellion and split in a local orthodox synagogue by a large group of younger Jewish members who wished to be more modern and reform, my family became the only conservative Jewish family in town. One of the younger group actually spit on my father during one of his daily walks. So even among Jews in my home town, I was the marginalized Other. To make matters worse, when I attended Hebrew school in the Jewish district of Pittsburgh, I was spurned as the “small town kid” who did not attend the others’ high status schools. I did not belong there either.

The chronic psychological “warfare” between virtually eve-
ryone in my family, and my perpetual experience of outsidersness, set the stage for my lifelong interest in projection and projective identification as the “glue” in the relationship between enemies over history and in current international relations where an us/them polarity prevailed (US/USSR, Slovaks/Hungarians, Jews/Christians, Jews/Palestinians). In part, I came to “specialize” in my family, cultural, and community conflicts (including my own) writ large in organizational, ethnic, national, and international life.

In 1980, I came to serve as Ittleson Consultant to the Committee on International Relations, of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, to study ethnic conflict and nationalism; I collaborated with them on a book titled *Us and Them: The Psychology of Ethno-Nationalism* (1987). I met with them twice a year for six years. Here I met Vamik Volkan, who became one of my closest colleagues and dearest friends. Around the same time, I twice participated in Erik Erikson seminars at Esalen on the psychology of U.S.-Soviet relations. In the mid-1980s, I twice spoke on the notion of psychogeography to executives of Shell International Maatschappij at Mt. Pèlerin, Switzerland. These talks led to several essays and two books on psychogeography, one of which was issued in 2013 in a second edition by the Library of Social Science.

In 1980 occurred another life-changing event: Lloyd de-Mause, founder, editor, and publisher of *The Journal of Psychohistory*, named me as editor of *The Journal of Psychological Anthropology*, which I renamed *The Journal of Psychoanalytic Anthropology*. I remained editor until 1988, when the journal was absorbed into *The Journal of Psychohistory*. For those eight years, I was able to advocate for the voices of some of the freshest thinkers in the psychodynamic study of culture.

As I look back on my career, I realize that most of my research has been the result of some *applied* project in the sense of problem-solving, such as teaching behavioral science to family medicine residents, consulting in American academic and rural healthcare settings, or teaching cultural medicine in rural Oklahoma. For example, I did not obtain a formal grant to “study” Oklahoma wheat and cattle farming culture, or the psychodynamics of the doctor-patient relationship. Rather, I found myself learning from, observing, teaching, and visiting with rural folk, physicians,
and patients, and writing about my experiences in clinical and rural settings, and about the culture of Oklahoma.

Taking a cue from La Barre and Devereux, I have had a longstanding interest in the role of the conscious and unconscious personhood of the observer, researcher, and scholar, and of unconscious intersubjectivity, in all facets of anthropological work. Most recently, as organizational consultant and clinical teacher, I have come to compose and use my own poetry as tools of insight, imagination, collaboration, and intervention.

Although I formally retired in mid-2012 after teaching for nearly 35 years at the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center, I remain professionally and intellectually active, contributing to the medical humanities, applied anthropology, and psychohistory, practicing psychoanalytic anthropology in these contexts.

Howard F. Stein, PhD, a psychoanalytic and applied anthropologist, psychohistorian, and Psychohistory Forum Research Associate, is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Family and Preventive Medicine at the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center, and Consultant to the American Indian Diabetes Prevention Center in Oklahoma City. He can be reached at howard-stein@ouhsc.edu.

The Work of the Other

Ellen Corin—McGill University

I have always perceived myself as “in-between”: between two countries (Switzerland through my mother and Belgium through my father) and between two names (Ellen as my “true” name and Elizabeth as my official name, because Ellen was not accepted by the Belgian register of births). No wonder that when I decided to train as a psychologist, it was with the idea to explore a border space, the influence of culture on psychic processes, and thereby to question the universal validity of Western theories.

The subject of my master’s thesis in psychology was “The Influence of Culture on the Oedipus Complex.” The Oedipus complex is a key notion in psychoanalysis. It concerns the interlacing
between love and prohibition, identification and rivalry, and typically involves intricate relationships between child, mother, and father. Some authors defend its universality, while others argue for its cultural relativity. I was particularly interested in Edmond and Marie Cecile Ortigues’ idea that the Oedipus complex is universal because the child everywhere is taken with the mother’s love and encounters the father’s law prohibiting too intimate relationships with the mother. However, the Ortigues’ clinical experience with children in Senegal led these two psychoanalysts to describe a typical Senegalese-African resolution of the Oedipus complex (Edmond and Marie Cecile Ortigues, *Oedipe Africain*, 1966).

In order to explore further the cultural relativity of Western ideas, I decided to base my doctoral thesis on fieldwork in a matrilineal society in Central Africa. In matrilineal societies, children “belong” to the mother’s lineage, and they are under the authority of maternal uncles (their mother’s brothers). I was very young at that time, 21, and I had two very young children. As a family, we settled down in a little remote village for two years. I now realize that this was a perilous experience, but my children were an excellent way to connect with the women’s world.

For my thesis, I approached the father figure through rituals associated with the lifecycle, from birth to funeral. I also considered beliefs and reactions concerning sickness and death. The research revealed the respective roles of the three figures associated with two main lines of identification: One, the “official,” concerned the collective dimension of identity and involved maternal uncles and ancestors; it was perceived as both structuring and threatening. The second was associated with protection and individuation; it developed through relationships with fathers and fathers’ fathers. The Ortigues’ description fit the first side of this process but missed the second, more latent, line of identification.

I later realized that the ambiguous character of authority exercised along the mother’s line echoes some aspects of my personal relationship with a “powerful mother” after the death of my father in my early infancy. This led me to reflect on the situation of children who are the object of the exclusive desire of women and on the fate of fathers in our Western world.
When I began to teach courses on psychopathology at the Université Nationale du Zaïre, I encouraged my students to explore beliefs and practices related to madness in their native cultures. I also conducted a series of studies on therapeutic spirit possession groups offering cure and initiation to women whose illnesses were attributed to spirits. Here again, I focused on rituals and beliefs, but this time I collected personal histories that improved my understanding of the concrete significance of ritual initiation in women’s lives. I discovered the extent to which these rituals supported a process of individuation for the initiated women.

These studies led me to emphasize the heterogeneity of cultural codes and representations, and made me sensitive to the necessity to go beyond what appears valued at the manifest and formal levels of a culture.

In Ivory Coast, I went with a colleague, Elizabeth Uchoa, to a little village where she was conducting research. When we arrived, villagers were performing rituals for a healer’s funeral. We were seated on little benches under a canopy when a tall “possessed” woman entered the scene and looked at us with a gaze that I will never forget; it froze me to the heart. Soon, village women came to sit on both sides of us, telling us not to be afraid. I perceived this encounter as a direct confrontation with an Otherness left out of my anthropological description of rituals. Before, I had been fascinated by their beauty and symbolic value and had not paid sufficient attention to moments when something deeply infringing or foreign to the ritual surfaced and troubled the ceremonies. My research pushed me to go beyond coherent narratives in order to explore what can only be told in a fragmented way.

Societies differ in their reaction to Otherness: either pushing it aside or laying out a space where it can surface and remind people of unknown territories surrounding the common world. If we consider the treatment given to persons with psychotic disorders or to homeless people, Western societies would rather belong to the first category.

All of the preceding played a role in my choice to work with people diagnosed as schizophrenics when I came to Montreal and, later, in my decision to begin psychoanalytic training and practice:
a desire to approach what is enigmatic or unknown on its own terms, rather than reducing it to what we think we know about it.

In Montreal, where I was attached to the research center of a large university psychiatric hospital, I was not impressed by the “objectifying” character of most research done with psychotic patients. I worked at developing research perspectives more sensitive to their subjective world, to their own perception of the drift of their world, and to aspects of their relationships to the world that seemed to have a protective value for them. I also decided to conduct parallel studies with psychotic people from different cultures, particularly India.

I was particularly interested in what helps these persons to tame an always frightening experience and to find some avenue of “recovery.” Study revealed the protective value associated with the construction of an intimate space of withdrawal, a kind of social and psychic skin. In several cases, forms of spirituality or religion played a significant role in that process. Interactions with clinicians revealed that although they observed these findings, they did not pay attention to them because that was contrary to what they had learned to do.

Comparative studies on schizophrenia’s course and outcome indicate a better prognosis in India than in Western countries. Among other factors, I decided to explore the potential value of the availability in the culture of a model of ascetic radical withdrawal best embodied in the sadhus, ascetics met on pilgrimage roads and ashrams. I wanted to explore the degree of flexibility of that “language” (radical withdrawal) and the extent to which it may be appropriated by psychotic people.

When I first began psychoanalytic training, my objective was mainly to acquire additional tools allowing me to deepen my reading of paradoxes and contradictions permeating personal experiences. I did not suspect that this was to become the central part of my life.

My interest in Otherness developed through my work with spirit possession groups and with ascetics. It sensitized me to moments in the clinical work that seem permeated by a feeling of the uncanny invading the transference/countertransference space.
member moments when the light in the room seemed to change and the shadows on the wall took on frightening images. Associations led to hidden memories involving death and abandonment by the mother. I also paid special attention to cultural elements surfacing in the session, like words, fragments of poems or memories, even changes in pitch and tone, opening a space where the meaning could be spoken.

Considering my journey through countries and disciplines, I am struck by the intimate relationship between elements of my own history and aspects of my research findings. This was the case in my doctoral thesis, but I might also mention, from my work with psychotic people, the discovery of the importance for me of preserving withdrawn spaces. I understand it as a particular sensitivity opening me to aspects that might escape others’ gaze—a kind of transference to the research field, with its revealing character.

At the interface between anthropology and psychoanalysis, I am also particularly interested in what Freud has described as the work of culture, a process of transformation of sexual and death drives that takes place at the levels of humanity in general and each human being. Sacred texts and elements of the sadhus’ initiation suggest that the radical detachment associated with Hindu asceticism is animated by references to death, austerities and eroticism in a way that seems paradoxical for Western minds.

How can we understand, from a psychoanalytic perspective, the influence of culture on the elaboration of basic human psychic drives? How can we approach the interweaving between universal and culturally relative phenomena without imposing our Western categories on ethnographic data but also without enclosing cultures in their own peculiarities?

Ellen Corin, PhD, is a clinician psychoanalyst and member of the Société Psychanalytique de Montréal. She is Emeritus researcher at the Douglas Mental Health University Institute and retired professor in the Departments of Psychiatry and Anthropology at McGill University. Her research has addressed the expression of subjective experience in culture. She has published numerous papers, chapters of books, and a few books, and may be contacted at ellen.corin@gmail.com.
Argentinidad or Nuerosis?

Melissa Maldonado-Salcedo—New York University

When I look in the mirror, I see myself, but my beauty mark is reflected on the left and not on the right. Everything is accurate, except it is reversed. As a child, I’d spend hours looking in the mirror. Superficially, I understand how I could have appeared to be self-absorbed and narcissistic. However, I was trying to think of ways to trick my reflection. Interestingly enough, this practice sums up my life as an anthropologist working on Argentina and inspired my dissertation research.

Crisis and trauma are features of Argentine history, and as such, have produced a sense of identity that is rooted in a constant struggle between “barbaric” tendencies and civilizing aspirations. This pathological reflex originates in the founding of the nation by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, which cannot be divorced from the brutal dictatorships, the loss of the Falkland Islands to England, or the mass migration of nationals up north. These events have wounded the Argentine psyche that feels like a birthmark at times, and at others like a glaring blackhead.

When I first started doctoral studies, I had a recurring dream. I was in my freshman dorm, and I could not find my room. I would go door-to-door in search of my armchair. Before heading to the field, this dream drove me to lay on the couch. I came to a similar interpretation as my therapist: I was anxious about finding my place within anthropology. I shared with her that I was often scared to speak because I was afraid someone would yell “Offside!” After explaining the soccer metaphor, she suggested I read the work of the anthropologist Eduardo Archetti. I asked her if she read a lot of anthropology, and her response was, “No, I read a lot about Argentina.” It made sense to me, since after all, she was Argentine.

It was only after reading the work of Eduardo Archetti that I began to feel that within this internal matchup between Argentina versus anthropology, I could score on either side and cheer without guilt. This classico, a customary Sunday soccer match between historically rival teams, was part of the becoming process, and like
Archetti, I learned that even a national pastime such as football was imbued with ideas about what it means to be Argentine. Archetti’s contributions further a collective quest for self-understanding that provided a mirror into which Argentines could see themselves in a new light. It made understanding sport and play impossible without understanding Freud. Up until that point, I felt intercepted by someone else’s voice, not realizing that all the time it was my own.

I was welcomed by the atrocious charm of Buenos Aires and its people as soon as I hit the runway at Ezeiza Airport. In no time, I convert miles into kilometers, and kilometers into minutes. I remind myself that my bed in Lomas de Zamora is exactly 37 minutes away. The smell of croissants, espressos, and dulce de leche makes my stomach grumble. As I walk towards the exit each image, person, and thought are acculturating me back home. A new lingerie ad campaign reminds me that despite it all, as the popular rock band Bersuit sings, Argentina has the “most beautiful women in the world.” I immediately suck in my belly and know I probably won’t let go for another month. My ability to squeeze into a size six will help me fit in and enable access to the places where I could “study” the nightlife.

When compared to its neighboring countries, Argentina’s economic crisis can seem insignificant to foreign eyes. After all, the memory of having five presidents in one week, the rampant supermarket lootings, and the dollar converting into a depreciated peso is something my grandmother, for one, would like to forget. Every so often, when I call her from Manhattan to check in, she tells me, “Things are the same here, like always.” Just a few years back, she lived in a luxury apartment in downtown Cordoba. She owned two high-end women’s boutiques and drove a brand new Fiat. She now lives on a street that leads to nowhere, in a partially owned house in the suburbs with extended family, around the corner from where the family clunker was stolen, outside of the flea market where she now sells clothing for “older and fatter” women. I find comfort in knowing that she is resilient and copes well with adversity. After all, she was married to my grandfather: a former bank robber with a penchant for baking, gardening, and prostitutes.

On the first half of my flight, I listened to a compelling critique of the World Bank by the passenger next to me, who hap-
pened to be a plumber. Not to be outdone, the last seven hours was spent listening to a woman three seats away from me explain to a fellow passenger why her daughter moved to Miami after obtaining her Italian citizenship. I thought maybe she wanted to confirm her daughter was of European descent, in order to feel comfortable venting that she also was working as an undocumented waitress and living in fear of deportation.

As an anthropologist, I love to listen to stories and many eventually find their way into my ethnographic notes. What is unusual for me is when I am asked about my opinion. How do I answer? As an anthropologist? Argentine? Foreigner? I have become adept in simply nodding my head and taking notes. I jotted, “This is what Argentina now sounds like, a misunderstood has-been whose comeback we anxiously await. Godot, Diego and Jesus.”

I stopped by the airport pharmacy for over-the-counter sleeping pills, forgetting that this is something that does not exist in Argentina. Sleeping aids are only prescribed. Surely a bottle of Malbec is more effective than the herbal tea the pharmacist is now trying to sell me. I explained I had just taken a 14-hour flight from New York and was exhausted.

In 1963, the newspaper Primera Plana ran an anonymous piece that asked, “Are we (Argentines) neurotic?” Referencing the parallels between what constitutes mental illness and the pathological behaviors that are indicative of Argentine history, culture, and politics, the question suggested that disorders are pervasive or even normalized. In a country where the disappeared and the living co-exist, where sport is religion, and where rock music (rock nacional) harmonizes with tango, said query reads like a rhetorical hyperbole.

In 2008, Simon Romero in The New York Times makes a related inquiry. He cites that for every 100,000 people, 196 are psychologists, so, “Do Argentines need Therapy?” Not as much as they need soccer.

One of the few things that the Argentine state equally gives for free is therapy. For example, it is not uncommon for those who are unable to pay to barter services like cooking or painting in exchange for sessions. In addition to the gratuitous advice ordinary citizens offer, it is safe to say that, like Diego Maradona the soccer
legend, and Pope Francis, Freud is omnipresent. No space is exempt from becoming a “couch,” no one is spared from becoming a patient, and most conversations have the underlying potential to become an impromptu therapy session. Was the pharmacist judging me or simply diagnosing me? Either way, I found myself fighting back the urge to explain why I generally had trouble sleeping at night: dissertation, my eight-year-old, teaching, grey hair, fieldwork, my love handles.

I gazed behind the counter to see what was available for purchase: an entire course of antibiotics, steroids, and sexual enhancement drugs of all kinds. I can cure an infection, build muscle, and increase my libido without a prescription. The pharmacist sent me home and told me that I will purge the stress of New York immediately after I have my first bite of asado (Argentine barbeque). In his educated opinion, my need for sleeping pills was probably a result of being homesick. I wanted to respond, “I’m a vegetarian.”

After many hugs and glasses of wine, I finally crawled into my bed. I could hear my grandmother outside recounting her workday and laughing about her different sales pitches. As I turn over and close my eyes I ask myself, “What would Archetti do?” In a matter of minutes, I am asleep. Had I not seen Argentina through Eduardo’s eyes, I might still feel overwhelmed by the task of creating a non-reversed reflection of a place, a people, and of myself.

Melissa Maldonado-Salcedo is a doctoral candidate at CUNY Graduate Center in anthropology working on the Argentine diaspora’s embodied identity. She teaches at NYU on science and feminism and can be contacted at mm659@nyu.edu.

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The Meninger Library Psychohistory Award

A full set of *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* will be awarded to a young clinician or scholar for outstanding psychohistorical work in the form of a book or path-breaking article or chapter of a book. The set was donated to the Psychohistory Forum by the Meninger Library. It is used, but in good shape. Nominations should include the outstanding work and a biography of the author, sent to Paul H. Elovitz/Convener/Director of the Psychohistory Forum at pelovitz@aol.com.
If it is the case that we can truly deceive ourselves—and this appears to be one of humanity’s most consistent achievements—then many consequences follow. For starters, it means I can envy someone else without letting myself know. What comes immediately to mind, something I can fairly easily stomach, is how I felt toward stars in my field when I started out. My first job after graduate school was as visiting assistant professor of anthropology at Columbia University, where there were many big names on the faculty. My initial strategy, the same one I employed when meeting a star at the professional meetings, was to smile a lot and hope that they liked me. It never occurred to me then that I envied them, but I felt a kind of reticence with them, a holding back that, in retrospect, included some suspicion that I had to be careful not to anger them with bold presumption, the way the tenant farmers I lived with in Brazil presented themselves meekly to a jealous God.

Two of these stars at Columbia, Marvin Harris and Robert Murphy, took an interest in me, showed me their work and asked my opinion, read my papers, and mentored me. They were generous to me, and I was grateful. Gratitude being the main antidote for envy, my envy for them faded into the background, far behind genuine friendship and well-wishing. Other stars, however, remained distant and critical, leaving room for me to imagine they did not wish me well and might be glad to see me fail. To my envy of their financial and professional security were added a measure of disdain that they did not really deserve what they had—another consequence of disavowed envy. Implicitly, I thought the success they enjoyed should rightfully have been mine.

A further consequence, harder to stomach, is that envy usually contains the wish to see the envied one suffer. Once, in my childhood, I was sitting alone with my grandmother, who was born in Sweden in the 19th century, listening to stories about the family in which my father grew up, when she sneezed. Immediately, she said to me, “Did you envy me that?” I had no idea what she meant, but the odd expression stayed with me for decades until, while re-
searching some European folktales, I came across the folk belief, formerly widespread throughout northern Europe, that a sneeze creates a momentary opening in oneself through which evil spirits may enter. It makes sense that, when you sneeze, someone in the room who envies you and wishes you harm has caused the sneeze, and this belief made its way into a perhaps joking traditional saying. Even without knowing this history, I routinely said “Bless you!” when someone sneezed, to stymie the evil spirits that lurk, like holding a cross up in the face of a vampire. Guilt about my own envy may have made this blessing feel even more imperative. Knowing this history has changed nothing—I still say “Bless you” every time anyone sneezes.

Another regrettable consequence of envy is schadenfreude. Some years ago, I was standing on the veranda of the landlord’s mansion on a large farm in northeastern Brazil along with a few peasant women. They had come to say goodbye to the landlord and his wife, Dona Maria, who, after a short visit to the farm, were returning to their opulent house in the city, with its solid gold dinner plates, fine linens, and uniformed servants. Earlier that day, Dona Maria had asked our research team to leave for her the cheap plates, cups, and utensils we had brought with us for our use during our project. When we explained to her that we had already given the items to several of the dirt poor tenant families who had helped us during our research, she was gracious. However, it clearly had not occurred to her that we might do this. She had on another occasion explained to us that the differences in wealth and social position that separated her family from those of the tenant farmers were ordained by God.

The landlord and Dona Maria got into their pickup truck—which cost 100 years worth of the average income of a tenant household—and had driven some distance to the gatehouse where the farm steward lived. As they got out of the truck, Dona Maria slipped and fell into a mud puddle in the dirt road. For a moment, about the length of a photo flash, the faces of the women with me lit up with surprised delight, mouths open, smiling as they exchanged glances. Then their faces turned worried: “Oh, Dona Maria!” they exclaimed, “Is she hurt?”

Dona Maria was helped up and back into the truck, appar-
ently okay. But that moment of glee had been real, and before sunset, every tenant family throughout the farm and beyond had heard the story of Dona Maria’s fall from her carriage into the mud, a story worth telling and retelling and not soon forgotten.

I do not like to feel envy and notice that when it arises, I tend to dismiss it quickly, to squelch it. When someone I know—even someone I like very much—receives an honor or other good fortune, I may feel an immediate queasiness. I do not approve of feeling this way and shake my head, even snort at such foolishness, and fling envy away (into the arms, alas, of my disavowed self). More is involved than simply that I do not like the thought of myself as envious. Envy is dangerous to me, too: if others were aware that I envy them, they would intuitively know that I wish them ill, and they might be inclined to take defensive measures or to retaliate. In a world of envy, poison darts fly around in all directions. In many societies, these take the form of witchcraft and the evil eye, explaining misfortune as the supernatural actualization of envious wishes.

My contempt for envy finds frequent support in my culture. I often think of Uriah Heep in *David Copperfield* and Gollum in *The Lord of the Rings* (particularly in Peter Jackson’s film trilogy). These and many like them are mean, despicable, degraded creatures. In Gollum, for example, we find a stark and creepy representation of the essential envious being. Gollum, once a hirsute and robust hobbit named Smeagol, gains long life through temporary possession of the all-powerful Ring, but in consequence becomes a misshapen and disgusting creature, bloodless and naked, with moist bulging eyes (the better to see in darkness) and pointy teeth with which he tears apart the food he forages as he skulks among barren rocks and slithers in the deep forest damp. He eats goblins, too, when he can get them—and he drools.

Gollum is cursed by fate (in the guise of J. R. R. Tolkien) to be both greedy and envious, a double whammy of deadly sins. With phony humility, he connives to kill the good hobbits Frodo and Sam, but ultimately is consumed horribly (along with the Ring) in the volcanic fires of Mount Doom. At his demise, I felt strong relief—not at all mindful of Gollum’s agonizing death—and this feeling was reinforced by the subsequent images of the massive
structures of Mordor crumbling and the fading of the black clouds that have covered the sky, as sunshine, blue sky, and puffy white clouds return.

Such cultural models leave no doubt about the attitude I should have about envy, and I do loathe it. But what has become of my envy? I have my share and have encountered it throughout my life, at home, in school, at work. Our tendency is to disavow envy in ourselves but see it abundantly in others. If I try to be honest with myself (talk things over with my disavowed self), I find some uncomfortable degree of identification with pale, twisted, smarmy Gollum. What I, as a reasonably well-functioning ego in the world, disavow, my disavowed self embraces. He accepts as natural that Gollum is completely self-centered in his quest for the Ring, without any regard for anyone else. I am reluctant to say that my disavowed self would contemplate murder, but the idea of annihilating or making disappear all opposition to his desires is not alien to him. Hiding his envious desires seems entirely justified when dealing with other envious persons.

The few anthropologists who write about envy invariably note that it is a subject largely ignored in their field, and point out that envy is the emotion we are least likely to acknowledge having in ourselves, with good reason: it is a mean thing and nothing to boast about. Still, envy is a powerful emotion, pervasive in human affairs and worth attending to.

Allen Johnson, PhD, is a Professor Emeritus in the Department of Anthropology and Psychiatry, University of California, Los Angeles. This is one of a series of pieces he has organized under the rubric, The Sins of My Disavowed Self. It has been abbreviated to meet the word limits for Clio’s Psyche. He can be reached at ajohnson@ucla.edu.

Book Review Essays

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Ken Fuchsman at Ken.Fuchsman@uconn.edu
The Psychohistorical Roots of Apartheid

Hélène Opperman Lewis—Private Practice, Cape Town

When their Afrikaner elders spoke of their own history, “leave the past alone” became a standard response for many of the post-1950 Afrikaner generations. Ours is a wounded past. Only recently has a need arisen to understand why my people, the Afrikaners, created the shameful system of apartheid. This conundrum preyed on my mind during an annual cultural festival in the Karoo town of Oudtshoorn in the mid 1990s. It prompted 13 years of research and culminated in a book.

An embarrassing (for the Afrikaner) perception prevails that pre-apartheid South Africa was a paradise of idyllic indigenous people living happily alongside Englishmen occupied in noble pursuits. Afrikaners have been disreputably marked with being the sole originators of the apartheid epoch.

So first, a little history: In 1652, a few Europeans arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in the Dutch East Indian Company’s trading ships. They were later joined by French Huguenots fleeing religious persecution, some German sailors, and Scotsmen. Soon the Cape had many men and few women, and the inevitable happened—“close friendships” formed between immigrant men and slave and indigenous women. More Europeans arrived in the 18th and 19th centuries, bringing with them a Western, predominantly Protestant, worldview.

In 1795, the British Navy arrived and took control of The Cape Colony. At the time, the early Afrikaners were calledburghers. From the outset, they were humiliated by the British, who considered themselves—in good Social-Darwinist fashion—to be a race superior to both the Afrikaners and the blacks (who were seen as savages useful only as cheap labor), and were degraded in their daily interaction with the British. By the mid 1830s, the early Afrikaner had had enough, packed up and trekked, leaving British rule behind. After much hardship finally settling in two Republics—the Transvaal and Free State—that were officially recognized by Britain in 1852 and 1854. But not for long.
When diamonds in the Free State, and the world’s richest gold deposits were discovered in the Transvaal, the writing was on the wall: Britain would be back. The Empire coveted the gold and diamonds lying beneath the dusty ground, and a moral imperative became the pretext of colonization and imperialism.

After two failed attempts—in 1887 and 1896—to annex the Transvaal Boer Republic, British military might arrived in full force in 1899, and the fateful second Anglo-Boer War ensued. The war was instigated by a “jingo press” that whipped the British public into a frenzy to wipe out what they came to perceive as the “most backward beast on the face of the earth.”

A scant three months before the start of this devastating war, Britain had signed an agreement at The Hague Convention. This agreement was a call by European nations for civilized war, specifically to prevent the recurrence of violence—including the first implementation of concentration camps—done to civilians by the Spanish during the 1895 and 1898 Cuban uprisings. Close on the heels of this agreement to protect civilians in war, Britain would flagrantly defy it in a desperate attempt to win the war against a surprisingly tenacious minority, the Afrikaners, called Boers, which in Afrikaans means farmer.

In a desperate attempt to win the war—Britain had 448,000 soldiers, not including African troops, in the battlefield; the Boers had 50,000, including old men and boys from age eight—the British forced Afrikaner women and children into concentration (euphemistically called refugee) camps. The women, the “undesirables,” were chased on foot by soldiers on horseback and transported in cattle trucks. This trauma followed after the British had burned down their homesteads and towns and killed and maimed thousands of animals in the service of their scorched earth policy. Boer women and girls were molested and raped by Her Majesty’s Forces, which included both black and white soldiers. Two out of every three children died from starvation or disease in the camps—95% of those that died were under the age of 16, and accounted for 12% of the Afrikaner Nation of 23,000 in the two republics, mostly women and children. Thousands of black women and children died in camps, as well as outside, from widespread famine, a result of the British scorched earth policy.
From a psychological perspective, what was worse than the horrors of war was the impact of the deaths of thousands of children—more than fighting men on both sides—on the collective Afrikaner psyche. This was compounded by traumatized mothers grieving the deaths of their children and caught in PTSD and depression. Furthermore, the surviving children had lived through this horror, witnessed the destruction of their homes and family farms, the degradation of their mothers, and the deaths of their siblings. The impact this kind of trauma has on future generations is well documented in recent literature on enactment. The potent combination of loss and humiliation was complete for this group; a stage set for inter-generational trauma. These surviving children and the first subsequent generation became the engineers of apartheid in 1948.

British historian Thomas Pakenham in *The Boer War* (1998) quotes an utterance by Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain in May 1896, under whose governance this 1899 to 1902 disaster played itself out in South Africa: “A war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars ... a strife which I believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish ... a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise” (25). Not even in his imagination could he foresee how much worse things would turn out.

After the first Anglo-Boer War in 1881, the first instance of referring to themselves as Afrikaners with the clear meaning “from Africa” appears. Psychohistorian Bruce Mazlish, in his study of groups, *Psychoanalytic Theory and History: Groups and Events* (1978), says that groups consolidate as “a nationality, a race, or people” when they share experiences “that have shaped them into a group” (*The Annual of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 7, 47). A century of humiliation and harassment by the British, in its many forms, was that experience—the cohesive force that shaped this group of disparate individuals into one group, the Afrikaners.

This identity gained greater prominence after the Second Anglo-Boer War, from 1899 to 1902, when the Afrikaner people, a small group by any standard, felt their survival was at stake. After 1902, the surviving Afrikaners were left severely traumatized by the death of many children (and the attendant fear of extinction and
unprocessed grief), degradation of the survivors, extreme poverty, total destruction of the means to re-establish livelihood and ownership, subjugation in the job market, and continuing daily submission to the rancorous and mocking English press. Their language, which the British mocked and tried to suppress, became the core around which they developed their identity.

So traumatized and destitute was the post-war Afrikaner that in 1915, a despondent Dr. D.F. Malan, an Afrikaner theologian and later the first Prime Minister post-1948, remarked, “Should the Afrikaners collectively commit suicide?”

Determined to survive, the drama would play itself out in a country where whites (including the English), were outnumbered by blacks in a 5:1 ratio (it is currently 11:1). Both Afrikaners and blacks had been ethnically disfranchised, disempowered, impoverished, and had to compete for jobs. Because the British had used blacks as labor as well as active fighters against the Afrikaners during the war, a further wedge had been driven between the groups of victims. This eventually led to apartheid in 1948: a trans-generational re-enactment of trauma that carried within it the seed of Afrikaner destruction.

The Second World War provided the catalyst for Afrikaner enactment. In 1939, South Africa was a British colony. South Africans were expected to fight for Britain. Many Afrikaners, particularly the most traumatized, now young adults, were outraged. Britain was their enemy. They demanded that South Africa, like Ireland, stay neutral. With a small margin of 13 votes, it was decided that South African soldiers, Afrikaners included, should fight for Britain. Mayhem followed: the collective Afrikaner psyche fragmented, and a fear of survival as a group and hatred for the British resurfaced. Enactment within what Vamik Volkan labels a phenomenon called “chosen trauma,” swung into action. Defined by Volkan as a frequent occurrence for groups who have suffered traumatic losses in the past, it is when one trauma of possibly many is chosen from the traumatic history and elevated to a symbol for all the bad things that have befallen the group. The phenomenon of “identification with the aggressor” could also apply in this situation.

By 1948, Afrikaners took charge; the humiliated became the
humiliator. The rest is history. This psychohistorical perspective explores the unconscious motives and circumstances that compelled the choices that were made after 1902. It is this painful and tragic history of my people that prompted the research that led to a book currently forthcoming: *Britain’s Bastard Child: Transgenerational Trauma*.

**Hélène Opperman Lewis, MSc** (Clinical Psychology), is a counseling psychologist in private practice in Cape Town who has written this article as an abstract of the introduction to her book, *Britain’s Bastard Child: Transgenerational Trauma*. The book is peer reviewed and will be self-published in March 2014. It will be available through Amazon and as an e-book. You may get added information about her work at www.bbctransgenerational.com and email her at hlobook@gmail.com.

### The Loss of Ego Ideals, the Sadistic Superego, and Guilt in America

**Tom Ferraro**—Forum Research Associate

Interest in the superego appears to have waned by the middle of the last century as psychoanalysts began to focus on self-issues and on narcissism in general. The decade of the 1970s was called “The Me Decade,” and analysts were influenced by this cultural zeitgeist. While guilt appeared to have nearly disappeared from psychoanalytic concern, in fact guilt and self-punishment were merely repressed and have increased, with self-defeating behaviors, depression, and psychosomatic diseases being some of the more obvious expressions of such.

Christopher Lasch warned of this problem as far back as 1976 and in his 1979 book *The Culture of Narcissism*. Lasch hypothesized that powerful, consistent, and effective media attacks on most of the culture’s ego ideals and authority figures starting in the mid-50s would cause the culture to fall back on and to use a harsher primitive and archaic superego based upon early childhood parental introjects. Lasch wrote in a footnote, “The aggressive, punishing, and even self-destructive part of the superego is usually modified
by later experience, which softens early fantasies of parents as devouring monsters. If that experience is lacking—as it often is in a society that has radically devalued all forms of authority—the sadistic superego can be expected to develop at the expense of the ego ideal, the destructive superego at the expense of the severe but solicitous voice we call conscience” (41). This is in direct support of York University Professor Don Carveth’s hypothesis, as laid out in my first paragraph above, with the superego being now more problematic and more toxic than ever, and therefore, in need of analytic attention (*A Still Small Voice: Psychoanalytic Reflections on Guilt and Conscience*, 2013).

In attempting to understand whether there is proof that more primitive archaic superego guilt and anger has in fact increased, we may turn to another Canadian scholar. Edward Shorter was concerned with the reasons behind the epidemic of psychosomatic diseases that has occurred. His work on psychosomatic disease tells us that, unquestionably, there are significant rises in these diseases over the last 20 years, with increases in depression, hypochondria, anorexia, chronic fatigue, and other conversion type illnesses (*Mind into the Body: The Cultural Origins of Psychosomatic Symptoms*, 1994). Shorter suggests that the fragmentation of society has contributed to this rise, where we no longer live in good-enough holding environments. The anger that is felt produces disease. The antithesis of this was found in Roseto, Pennsylvania, where epidemiologists discovered virtually no heart disease in a town with a strong community (*The Power of Clan: The Influence of Human Relationships on Heart Disease*, 1993).

We can also turn to the classic text by Felix Deutsch to understand the connection between guilt and physical illness. In *On the Mysterious Leap from the Mind to the Body* (1959), many leading psychoanalytic writers, including Deutsch, Alfred Ludwig, Samuel Silverman, Jason Mann, and Elvin Semrad, noted that guilt was a major cause of many psychosomatic diseases. They suggested that when anger and rage is felt and repressed, it often produces self-punishment in the form of arthritis, colitis, migraines, or skin lesions.

But psychosomatic illness is only one way to suggest that the culture is now plagued with rage, guilt, and punishment. We
need only turn to the major trends of the day—school shootings, sports, and cinema—to discover proof.

The number and severity of school shootings have increased steadily since the 1950s. In the 40s, there were 13 incidents, 21 in the 1950s, 16 in the 1960s, 21 in the 70s, 24 in the 80s, and 34 in the 1990s, with Columbine producing 15 deaths. In the 2000s, there were 33 incidents, with 33 deaths at Virginia Tech alone. In the 2010s, we have already had 40 incidents, with 28 (including the shooter and his mother) deaths in Newtown, Connecticut—and we are only three years into the decade (Final Report and Findings of the Safe Schools Initiative, U.S. Department of Education, 2013).

In sports, we see more examples. Mike Tyson bit the ear off of Evander Holyfield in 1997. In the brawl called “Malice at the Palace” in 2004, Ron Artest led a scuffle where the fans and the players assaulted each other at an NBA game. In 2003, I was invited onto a television show to discuss an incident in Bellmore, Long Island after seniors on the high school football team hazed freshmen by inserting pine cones and broom sticks up their anuses. The NFL was also forced to give out $25,000 fines to players because their celebratory dances in the end zone started to include throat slashing gestures and the imaginary use of machine guns.

Cinema usually does a good job of expressing these largely unconscious socio-psychological problems, and there is ample proof that popular films include symbols of primitive archaic oral rage and punishment, such as in The Exorcist (1973), Silence of the Lambs (1991), I Am Legend (2007), and World War Z (2013). The Exorcist, based on the book by William Peter Blatty, may have been channeling the emergence of the regressed punishing archaic and violent superego. In it, a child possessed by the devil defeats the priests in what may have been the first to reference the arrival of the new archaic superego that began to take possession of the culture at that time. The film struck a nerve in the country, and many viewers were terrorized by it.

Silence of the Lambs became a multiple Oscar winner as Hannibal Lector, a psychiatrist turned cannibal, demonstrated a true personification of regressed oral rage and a harsh superego function. There were three sequels. The more recent zombie films such
as *I Am Legend* and *World War Z* have also become popular in recent years. In the first, we see the world overrun by hungry and very angry zombies, and in the second, again we see the world being taken over by zombies—always portrayed as dead, hungry, and with large mouths. In the television series *The Walking Dead*, zombies are the star feature. The silent, dead and undead zombies—who cannot be killed—are a good referent to the character of our unconscious state, where the superego is said to dwell in silence until something awakens it.

Carveth notes that despite—or, perhaps, because of—psychoanalytic neglect, there are ongoing and increasing levels of archaic guilt in the culture expressed through violent acting out, depression, and psychosomatic disease. He suggests that guilt ought to once again be discussed by analysts both in clinical and intellectual settings. If Lasch and Carveth are correct, the loss of ego ideals has produced this regression to more primitive and aggressive forms of punishment. Carveth also calls for the development of a more flexible conscience to replace the superego, and both scholars call for the reemergence of ego ideals or forms of authority that are not devalued by the media.

Since the 1970s, the power of investigative journalism has destroyed most forms of authority or ego ideals. The press brought down Nixon and severely damaged Clinton’s reputation and has emasculated and ridiculed every contemporary president. The press uncovered sex scandals in the Catholic Church. Television series like *All in the Family* and *Married with Children* regularly devalue the parental image. Teachers are shown to be fools and dunces in films like *Ferris Bueller’s Day Off*. In fact, we can say that nearly all of our culture’s ego ideals have been destroyed.

It is necessary to restore these ego ideals or cultural heroes, but the notion of controlling the press is not likely to happen any time soon. Freedom of the press is one of America’s most cherished amendments. I learned firsthand of the power of the media while in graduate school. One of my professors was asked by the White House to do a Surgeon’s General’s report for President Nixon on the impact of media violence on children. The findings were irrefutable that TV violence had a very negative impact on the kids and that it led to increased violence. The report was promptly
buried, and the results were never published. The powers that be, including both media and big business that sponsored the shows in question, had enough power to crush the results.

Suffice it to say that there is ample evidence to warrant Carveth’s book and his concern. He suggests that this state of harshness within is so deeply unconscious and so difficult to face that even psychoanalysts tend to deny it. But the fact that school shootings continue is proof enough that this problem must be faced and dealt with. We now are plagued with a morality of cruelty in this nation. Average citizens are suffering from depression, which is hatred and guilt turned inward, athletes are beating up fans, and kids are shooting their peers and then themselves because of the cruelty of the world they live in. The world remains as harsh as ever.

We like to think America is a land of freedom and peace, but underneath is this harsh and cruel judge within that is the death wish personified. It is time to look at guilt and the insidious cultural causes that are producing it.

*Tom Ferraro, PhD,* is a Research Associate of the Psychohistory Forum, sports psychologist, psychoanalyst, and columnist, who may be contacted at DrTFerraro@aol.com.

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**Reflections on Happiness from My Clinical Practice**

*Neil Wilson*—Psychoanalyst in Private Practice

The term happiness is difficult to define and even harder to understand because it means many different things to different people. In *Happiness: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford University Press, 1913), Daniel Haybron reviews various attempts to understand it over the years. For example, does a smile on someone’s face reflect true inner happiness? A tribe in the Amazon, the Piraha, was considered an all-inclusive happy group since they never stopped smiling and laughing. However, they are poor, have a short life expectancy, and lose many children at childbirth. So is smiling a sign of happiness? When they were told about the suicide
of the stepmother of a researcher who lived with the tribe for a number of years, they all broke into laughter. How are we to understand that reaction?

In his small volume, Haybron offers no deep understanding of this situation or most other aspects of happiness. He presents a number of life factors tied in with happiness, such as virtue, the experience of meaningfulness in one’s life, well-being, and self-fulfillment. Aristotle’s ideas on it are examined and his emphasis on virtue is rightfully seen as questionable.

Countries have also been rated for happiness as Haybron points out. For years, Denmark was listed as the happiest country. The rating was based on the measurements of security, outlook, autonomy, relationships and skilled meaningful activity (SOARS). However, a different recent rating system has Denmark in 110th place! Costa Rica, followed by Vietnam and Colombia, were the leaders. A third rating system had Switzerland on the top. The measurements were life satisfaction, good health, short work hours, disposable income, and life expectancy (4-5). All of the above standards sound good, but one must question this “scientific” approach. As Freud wisely stated, “Happiness is something essentially subjective.”

Frustrated by Haybron’s lack of psychological depth, I turned to what I have learned as a psychoanalyst. Some people laugh from true enjoyment. Others may laugh due to social standards. There are also the smiling depressives who disguise their misery from others and put on a happy face. Their parents may have attempted to laugh off anxiety-ridden life situations to protect their children, and this may well have been misunderstood. Laughing off a deep tragedy may be a necessary mechanism of defense, or it may be self-defeating. We sometimes call such people laughing idiots.

I have had patients with all of the above who still felt quite anxious, depressed, and pessimistic. Clearly, the external factors listed above do not necessarily lead to being a happy person. It is interesting to ask various people what makes them happy. The question itself usually brings a smile on their face. Responses have included dancing, cuddling in bed, dining out in Paris, being with
family, having a good poop, listening to favorite music from years ago, traveling and seeing new things, waking up and praying to God, and even being high on drugs. Interestingly, most of these responses reflect a merging quality, suggesting that a comfortable regression to infancy, and even an aura of prenatal existence, leads to bliss. However, of course, these moments cannot be too extended, since we would then be seeing severe mental illness.

Another approach to exploring happiness is to ask someone what was their peak life experience. An example from a patient was remembering having just had sex with his wife, holding each other lovingly, their cat jumping on the bed and the three of them falling asleep. A peak experience, I have found, is usually an experience the quality of which is missing in one’s life. This man was so often yearning for closeness with his wife, then got divorced, and when he regularly got close to a woman, he would unconsciously destroy the closeness. So, as clinicians know, merging presents its own dangers, and the happiness of that type of closeness can lead to unconscious anxiety and its destruction.

Another patient’s peak experience was when he was on Vancouver Island and drove to the northern tip. He saw about 1,000 birds on the seashore facing the setting sun and wind, and he slowly walked toward them and finally was standing in the middle of the flock. They gradually calmed down and accepted him. It was almost as if he was one of them, and he stood there for at least an hour. Yes, this was merging again, this time with nature.

Clearly, we all can have happy moments regardless of our life situation, and yes, there are some people that are very often feeling happy. It can be a life goal, but paradoxically, being happy too often can be a warning sign. It may be a major denial of some painful reality or a manic state that is an inner fight against depression. It may be too good to be true.

In conclusion, a much more profound understanding of the complexities of happiness is offered by my clinical practice where I usually find it connected to a desire to merge with an early experience, than can be found in Haybron’s book, but his Happiness can be a useful starting point in probing this complex subject.

Neil Wilson, EdD, is a psychoanalyst and psychologist in
Encountering Psychobiography and Erik Erikson: Three Personal Perspectives

Alan C. Elms—University of California, Davis
William McKinley Runyan—U of California, Berkeley
James William Anderson—Northwestern University

JAMES WILLIAM ANDERSON (JIM): We decided to talk about how we became involved with psychobiography and to see where this discussion goes. Alan, you encountered psychobiography first. Tell us about what happened.

ALAN C. ELMS (ALAN): I had just turned 17 when I first read a psychoanalytic case history, Robert Lindner’s “The Jet-Propelled Couch.” It appeared in the January 1956 issue of my favorite magazine at the time, The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction. “The Jet-Propelled Couch” was “a true psychoanalytic tale” rather than fiction, according to Lindner, but his patient had delusions of living much of his life in a science-fictional world. I was intrigued by Lindner’s account of the patient’s earlier life history as well as his fantasy life and the apparent connections between them. I soon read Lindner’s bestselling book, The Fifty-Minute Hour (1954), from which “The Jet-Propelled Couch” was drawn. My intense interest in that case history did not determine my later career in psychobiography, nor did it lead me to become a clinical psychologist like Lindner—but it was one of the major influences in my choosing to major in psychology when I started college the following fall. I have continued to have a strong interest in how psychobiography can be applied to the lives and work of science fiction writers.

I went to Penn State as an undergraduate, not realizing that the psychology department there was heavily Skinnerian. My classes gave me little exposure to any sort of case history research,
but I began reading Freud on my own, as well as Ernest Jones’s three-volume biography of Freud, which was strongly psychobiographical in its approach to the Master. I also took a course in personality theory, using the new textbook *Theories of Personality* (1957) by Hall and Lindzey, which exposed me for the first time to such theorists as Henry Murray and Gordon Allport, who both used individual case studies in their research. Hall and Lindzey didn’t mention Erik Erikson, but their chapter on the learning theory approach of John Dollard and Neal Miller persuaded me to apply to Yale for graduate work in personality and social psychology.

At Yale, I took one seminar each from Dollard and from Miller, but I didn’t really want to do the kind of research either of them were pursuing at the time. Instead, I was invited by Irving L. Janis to collaborate on his experimental studies of persuasion. I also signed up for his first-year seminar on “abnormal psychology,” partly because one of its main textbooks was Freud’s *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), which I had not yet read. Our first homework assignment was to read Freud’s account of his “Dream of Irma’s Injection,” including his free associations to the dream, and then to go beyond Freud’s interpretation (if possible) to offer our own ideas about its meaning.

I didn’t realize that Professor Janis was planning to have us read Erik Erikson’s paper on the Irma dream (“The Dream Specimen of Psychoanalysis,” 1954) the following week; indeed, I had never heard of Erikson. But after finishing Jones’s biography of Freud, I had gone on to read the selection of Freud’s letters edited by his son Ernst, so I knew that Freud’s wife was pregnant at the time of the Irma dream. (Anna Freud was born of that pregnancy.) I prepared a large poster board chart listing the elements of the dream, Freud’s free associations to them, his stated interpretation of the dream, and my suggestions about how Freud’s concerns about his wife’s pregnancy were reflected in the dream. Professor Janis was quite impressed with my interpretations.

I was pleased to see, when I read Erikson’s paper, that I had said something in addition to what Erikson wrote. His paper, of course, emphasized identity. I was later told by Henry Murray that Erikson had also included some discussion of the dream’s pregnancy aspects in his first draft but omitted it from the final draft be-
cause Anna Freud objected to its inclusion. (When I asked Erikson to say more about that omission, he said he didn’t recall that Anna had expressed any concern at all about the dream’s content.)

WILLIAM McKINLEY RUNYAN (MAC): As an undergraduate at Oberlin College in psychology and sociology, I had read Erikson’s *Childhood and Society* (1963, 2nd ed.) and *Young Man Luther* (1958).

When I began graduate school in clinical psychology and public practice at Harvard in 1969 to 1970, I went to Erik Erikson’s office hours to ask if I could do a reading course with him about my interest in making the study of life histories more systematic or scientific. My sense is that he was not interested in what I was proposing, and he did not agree to supervise a reading course. Erikson had earlier interests in art and saw himself as interested in the aesthetic side of psychoanalysis and in applying psychoanalysis in biography and history.

I came to psychobiography through my interest in trying to develop the study of life histories as a level of analysis in the social sciences. The sciences of human behavior, according to J. Milton Yinger (Toward a Field Theory of Behavior: Personality and Social Structure, 1965, 18), can be “carried forward on four levels—biological, individual, cultural and social. These can be identified, roughly, with the four sciences of biology, psychology, anthropology, and sociology.” I was interested in developing the systematic study of life histories, the study of persons’ experience from birth until death, as a level of analysis in the social sciences to complement these other levels of analysis. I was also hoping to learn about the variety of ways that others had lived their lives, and perhaps that would help me develop ideas about how to live my own.

I did my dissertation on *Life Histories: A Field of Inquiry and a Framework for Intervention* (1975). At the time, I wrote about my reservations regarding psychobiography. In a few pages on “Psycho-Biography and Beyond,” I stated that psychobiography consists of the application of explicit psychological theory to the understanding of individual lives. However, the course of experience in individual lives is also influenced by non-psychological factors, such as health, appearance, wealth, and credentials. Individual
biographies may also be interpreted in relation to biological factors ("bio-biography"), or to social and cultural factors ("socio-biography"). I stated that from this perspective, it was too narrow to have only a psychological perspective on a life.

In the following years, I became more open to the word "psychobiography" as I saw that better psychobiographies, such as Robert Tucker’s *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality* (1973), Robert Waite’s *The Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler* (1977), and Walter Jackson Bate’s *Samuel Johnson* (1977), included these different perspectives. By the time I published my first book, based partly on my dissertation, I used psychobiography in the title: *Life Histories and Psychobiography: Explorations in Theory and Method* (1982).

**JIM:** Your mentioning Erikson, Mac and Alan, reminds me how central he was to my initial interest in psychobiography. I had a fascination with India, because I had spent a summer there before my senior year of high school, through the American Field Service. That fascination with India led me to read, while I was a senior at Princeton, Erikson’s recently published book, *Gandhi’s Truth* (1969), and I was enchanted. I’d had the idea of possibly becoming a historian, and the book gave me the idea that if I became a historian, I could then become a psychohistorian. That would give me a chance to do something distinctive as a historian, rather than to write the same kind of history as others did.

Then I came to Harvard to work on a master’s degree in the divinity school. I had just missed Erikson. He left Harvard at the end of the 1969-1970 academic year, the year in which you, Mac, tried to do a reading course with him, and I began in the fall of 1970. I took a graduate seminar with George Goethals II on psychoanalysis and decided to write a paper for the course on Erikson’s views of and experiences with religion.

I wanted to interview Erikson, and George, who knew him well, arranged for me to talk with Erikson when he came to campus to deliver the Godkin Lectures. I explained to Erikson in a letter that I was particularly interested in his experience with religion because he, like me, had mixed Jewish-Gentile ancestry. I also made reference to these sentences of his quoted in Robert Coles’s *Erik H.*
Erikson: The Growth of His Work (1970, 181): “Jewishness as such has meant little to me, although I would consider some of the Jewish elements in psychoanalysis ancestral to my work. What some genuinely Lutheran elements in Christianity have come to mean to me is indicated in my book on young Luther.”

But at the last moment Erikson cancelled the interview, and I was terribly disappointed. He wrote to me: “I do not know what I could have contributed to your paper. As to the quotation from the Coles book, I have recently asked him in future printings to change Jewishness to Judaism, and Lutheran to Paulinian. Maybe you can make something of that…[his ellipsis] For the rest, I think you must try to make sense of my experience by thinking of your own.”

In looking back, I see his letter as a dodge. It is obviously incorrect for him to imply he could not contribute to my paper. The mention of “Judaism” and “Paulinian” is of negligible value, and using my experience to understand his would not get me anywhere. Either he didn’t want to talk about his religious background, or he didn’t want to waste time talking with a student.

To finish what I was saying about how I got involved with psychobiography, I followed up on that early intention to become a psychobiographer. At first, I thought I would study history and do some psychology on the side. As I came to know more about psychology, I decided there was so much to learn there that I’d be best off doing it the other way around, to study psychology and to try to pursue knowledge of history on the side. Psychology became all the more attractive to me when I realized I could become a psychotherapist. I went to the University of Chicago for a doctorate in psychology.

Just as Mac’s dissertation on life histories was unorthodox in a graduate program related to psychology, so was my dissertation at Chicago: a psychobiographical study of William James. Erikson had a tie-in there too, because his treatment of James in Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968) helped create in me a fascination with James.

Later, I made further attempts to interview Erikson and got nowhere. You’re the lucky one, Alan. You’ve told me that you were able to meet personally with Erikson and to interview him.
ALAN: I first wrote to Erikson in June 1981, explaining that I was working on a book of psychobiographical studies of psychological theorists and asked for an interview. I enclosed a copy of my recently published psychobiographical paper on B. F. Skinner (1981). Erikson responded by return mail, saying, “Yes, I will be glad to meet with you,” and suggested a date in the latter part of July or September. But then he sent a letter in early July, saying, “You probably have received my letter telling you that I would be glad to meet with you for an interview. The fact is, I liked your letter (and the Skinner paper) very much. Since then, however, a number of contrary sentiments have come up and I want to communicate them to you. For one, it dawned on me that I have, in fact, declined similar requests—one from a very good colleague—with the explanation that I intend to round out the fragments of my life published so far in a coherent autobiographic account.

“For the psychoanalyst in me has begun to wonder how a psychoanalyst—as the interviewee of an ever so respected psychobiographer—can find the proper emphasis and the necessary limits to discussing what he thinks he knows about his own motivations. And here, the writer in me has intervened with the suggestion that maybe I better take a reflective look at the kind of questions you wish to ask—if, indeed, you would care to send me some—and see how I would answer them.”

I found that letter quite disconcerting. I had been delighted with his first quick response, and here he was perhaps taking back his agreement to be interviewed altogether. Still I persevered, with a very carefully written response of my own—honestly praising Erikson’s own work in psychobiography and assuring him, “I do not have in mind an interview that would range over your total developmental history, no holds barred, or that would ask you to analyze yourself for me.”

Without yet specifying the questions I wanted to ask, I told him “the areas in which my questions of highest priority would fall”—his “personal experience of youthful identity crisis,” his “establishment of a professional identity in the U.S.,” his “points of identification with (and away from) Sigmund Freud,” and his “points of identification with (and away from) Martin Luther.” I said I had a particular interest in the last of those points: “I’ve been
using *Young Man Luther* as a text for the past three years in an undergraduate course on psychobiography, and in the process a number of questions about the personal context of the book have occurred to me.

My letter seems to have been somewhat reassuring. Erikson responded with another quick note saying, “Permit me, without further apologies, to propose a procedure which would, I think, make it easiest for me to answer your questions: Could you formulate them in (informal!) writing or in the form of a long letter? I would answer them the same way; and we could then meet to discuss our exchange.” So after considerable further thought, I wrote him a long letter—four pages, typed and single-spaced—informally but carefully asking him a variety of questions, with diplomatic explanations of why I was asking these particular questions, trying not to sound at all like the contentious Paul Roazen or other critics of Erikson’s public persona. There things sat for the next eight months, with not another word from Erikson.

Finally I wrote him a brief letter politely encouraging him to respond, as indeed he did: “First, my heartfelt thanks for your generous letter which, in the face of my negligence, admits that you were occupied with other research ‘anyway.’ So let me refrain from elaborating on excuses for my long silence.” After a couple more notes back and forth, he sent me five hand-written pages, answering at times in almost telegraphic style many of the questions in my year-old long letter.

A sample response: I asked, “You mention in several places that you resisted adopting an identity as an analyst, and continued feeling ambivalent about that identity even after you had tentatively adopted it. … Were you finding it difficult to identify in some ways with your principal mentor, Anna Freud?” Erikson boiled my question down to “Ambivalence concerning identifying with principal mentor A. F.,” which he answered with a single parenthetical word: “(Naturally.)”

Soon afterward, we met for an interview at his summer home on Cape Cod. He began by complimenting me again on my paper about B. F. Skinner; he seemed especially pleased that I had applied the Eriksonian concept of identity crisis to crucial points in
Skinner’s life history. I did not ask any strongly confrontational questions beyond what I had already asked in my letters, and Erikson offered no really surprising disclosures. He did say at the end, after I had turned off my tape recorder, “I hope I was forthcoming”—as if he had been afraid of saying too much but wanted me to accept his answers as sufficient for my purposes. I assured him that he had indeed been forthcoming. He then said (as he had mentioned in one of his letters) that he had been thinking of writing an autobiography and asked me whether I thought he should do so. Surprised that he should ask for my advice, I responded without hesitation, “Absolutely!” Unfortunately, he had several smaller projects to finish first. By the time he completed them, his memory and his focus had so faded that, according to his biographer, Lawrence Friedman (Identity’s Architect: A Life of Erik H. Erikson, 1999), he was no longer able to take up the challenge of a full-scale autobiography.

MAC: I tried to interview Erikson later, too. He was living back in the San Francisco Bay Area in the early 1980s. I’d run into him at UC Berkeley’s Institute of Human Development and talked with him briefly. Three different times we arranged appointments to talk, yet each time he cancelled. There is documentary evidence for this. I later saw Erikson’s personal calendar, courtesy of Daniel Benveniste, and the name was there, “Runyan,” on three different dates, with a line through it each time.

I should add that I talked with Erikson later in his life, when he was living back in Cambridge on Dana Street, although his memory was declining. I asked what the Harvard psychology course was that he said in his essay, “Autobiographic Notes on the Identity Crisis” (Daedalus, 99, 730-759, Fall 1970) he had failed. Was it a course by Edwin G. Boring, I wondered? Erikson said he didn’t remember (which seemed unlikely to me) and then gave me the exact quotation from the essay.

JIM: It seems to me that Erikson was using his loss of memory to avoid answering some of your questions. There is something in common here. His magnificent writing played a role for all of us in our becoming interested in psychobiography, but he did not take a personal interest in any of us as younger scholars who were studying and writing psychobiography. He danced away from us; he
proved to be elusive. This reminds me of something Bert Cohler (via personal communication) told me. He said Erikson was “self-absorbed” and many students felt poorly treated by him, including Bert and several people he knew, including Bob May, Kenneth Keniston, and Helen Kivnick. Bert said one of these people said Erikson would make notes on his own writing while this person was talking with him. He said, as Cohler remembered being told, “I’m going to die soon. I have to spend every minute on my next book.”

Erikson published that one excellent paper on the writing of psychohistory, entitled “On the Nature of ‘Psycho-Historical’ Evidence: In Search of Gandhi” (1968), but he did little else to encourage or help others in doing this kind of work. I learned from Robert White (via personal communication), a contemporary of Erikson’s and a Harvard professor, that the two of them had a chance to start a center for the study of lives at Harvard, and they declined, as neither of them was willing to direct the center.

MAC: It is unfortunate that Erikson had so little interest in encouraging each of us in this area. At first, I took it more personally. However, in talking with others, examining Erikson’s correspondence at Harvard’s Houghton Library, and reading Friedman’s biography, I learned this may have been a more general pattern in Erikson’s life. For me, it was meaningful that Henry Murray and Robert White and then many in later generations supported work in the psychological study of individual lives.

JIM: We started out discussing how we became involved with psychobiography, but a more specific theme seems to have emerged, our interactions with Erikson’s writing and with Erikson the person.

Alan C. Elms, PhD, is Emeritus Professor, Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis. He has written many works related to psychobiography, including the book, Uncovering Lives: The Uneasy Alliance of Biography and Psychology, and the paper, “Freud as Leonardo: Why the First Psychobiography Went Wrong.” He may be contacted at acelms@ucdavis.edu. Publications may be downloaded at http://starcraving.com. William McKinley Runyan, PhD, is Emeritus Professor, School of Social
Welfare, University of California, Berkeley. His many writings related to psychobiography include the book, *Life Histories and Psychobiography: Explorations in Theory and Method*, and the paper, “Why Did Van Gogh Cut Off His Ear? The problem of alternative explanations in psychobiography.” He may be contacted at runyan@berkeley.edu. His publications may be downloaded at http://williamrunyan.com. **James William Anderson, PhD**, is Clinical Professor in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Northwestern University; a faculty member at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis; and a member of the Editorial Board of this publication. He has written on the methodology of psychobiography and has published psychobiographical papers on such figures as William and Henry James, Edith Wharton, D. W. Winnicott, Woodrow Wilson, and Frank Lloyd Wright. He may be contacted at j-anderson3@northwestern.edu.

**Book Reviews**

**Psychoanalysis, Subjectivity, and History**

**William R. Meyers**—University of Cincinnati


*History and Psyche: Culture, Psychoanalysis and the Past*, edited by Sally Alexander and Barbara Taylor (2012), is based on seminars convened by the editors in London from 1994 to the present. The aim of the book is “to remind the readers of the omnipresence of subjectivity in the historical sources.” The 15 papers represent efforts by psychoanalytically informed historians to conceptualize “subjectivity” in historical research.

In the “Introduction” to the book the editors try to come to terms with the “post-modern” attack on three elements of psychoanalytic thinking: the idea of a “self,” the feasibility of authentic empathy, and especially the idea of cross-culturally stable differ-

Part I of the book, “Freud, Freudianism, and History,” begins with an examination of Peter Gay’s contribution to the understanding of psychoanalytic history. Next is a paper on the relation of Freud’s ideas to *fin de siècle* politics. There follows a paper on Freud’s work on Leonardo Da Vinci and Freud’s theories of homosexuality.

Part II of the book, “Psychoanalytic Pasts,” includes an assessment of the work of H.R. Rivers, the experiences of analysands traveling abroad, and on “adolescent subjectivity.” There is also a paper on Winnicott, and one on Bion, each of which I discuss below.

Part III, “Psychoanalysis and Historical Subjectivities,” begins with papers titled “Historical Subjectivities” and “Keeping Our Distance.” Next comes a paper on Martin Luther and psychology, and then a paper on early modern autobiography, one on postwar art, and one on psychoanalytic theory and the British welfare state. The final paper concerns psychoanalytic interpretations of oral history.

I will comment in a bit of detail on some of the papers that may be of particular interest to readers of Clio’s Psyche.

Michael Roper’s paper, “Beyond Containing: World War I and the Psychoanalytic Theories of Wilfred Bion,” considers Bion’s writings about World War I, “from the returning soldier of 1919 to the psychoanalyst in his seventies.” We learn that Wilfred Bion’s “traumatic experience as a tank commander in World War I shaped his later concept of psychotic anxiety.” Roper argues that Bion’s very traumatic combat experiences helped shape his concept of the “containing” of anxiety by maternal figures, so called “maternal containing.”

Sally Alexander’s *Primary Maternal Preoccupation: D.W. Winnicott and Social Democracy in Mid-Twentieth Century Britain* is a thoughtful exposition of much of Winnicott’s life and his theo-
rizing, with special attention to his concerns about child health, the environment, and institutional care. A mother’s “absolute absorption in her newborn child”—primary maternal preoccupation—is key to these theories. We learn for example, that Donald Winnicott attributed his fascination with mothering to his special relationship with his own mother. Winnicott was influential in some of the welfare state legislation. He also fought the closure of nursery schools and opposed the increasing use of psychosurgery (like lobotomies). Winnicott “exerted influence on public opinion through his teaching, writing, and broadcasts.” The text is a fascinating story and an illuminating look at the practical meaning of Winnicott’s theories.

Adam Phillips has contributed a most interesting paper, “Keeping Our Distance.” In it, the taking of a history by a physician is compared with the process of psychoanalysis, which is conceived by Phillips as a lengthy taking of the patient’s history, and is also compared with the work of the traditional historian. This process is considered in terms of “distancing” or “keeping our distance.” Phillips writes, “For Freud all personal history is defensive history, and all defensive behavior is distance regulation,” which can include forgetting and other mechanisms of defense. Phillips’ hope is that the conceptualization of the defenses in terms of distancing adds to our understanding.

The paper on “historical subjectivity” by Barbara Taylor includes a thoughtful discussion of the role of empathy in historical writings. The views of McCauley and Dilthey are briefly presented, and the work of Collingwood is presented in detail. These views are then compared with the discussions of empathy in the psychoanalytic literature, including the work of Heinz Kohut, Marion Milner, Carolyn Dean, Dominick LaCapra, and Donald Winnicott. Each of these is treated in detail. This paper is useful reading for anyone interested in the topic of empathy in psychohistorical investigation.

Taylor’s paper also includes an extended consideration of “anti-essentialism”: that is, the “post-modern” attacks, by writers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Jacques Lacan, on the traditional concept of self. She writes, “The death of the subject…the self is a discursive artifact: there is no extra-social ‘I’ but only culturally assigned identities that shift and transmute over
time.” To me, some of the post-modernists sound a bit nihilistic and obscurantist, but Taylor sets forth their views as lucidly as possible, and she values them for their contribution to eroding rigid stereotypical views of masculinity/femininity.

T.G. Ashplant’s very scholarly paper, “Freud, Fin-de-siècle Politics, and the Making of Psychoanalysis,” delves deeply into important issues. My only reservation is that the estimates of Freud’s own personality by some of the writers she summarizes seem a bit harsh and punitive. I think that as the founder of a vast and complex new field of inquiry, Freud could be expected to make some errors that later investigators could rectify. Plus, Freud’s work did require exceptional personal courage, which these writers do not comment on.

The book concludes with a fine afterword by the Cambridge cultural historian Peter Burke, who gives a valuable history of the use of psychological concepts to characterize historical figures and insightful suggestions for future psychoanalytically informed research. Burke’s paper is an outstanding conclusion to a stimulating scholarly book.

William R. Meyers is Professor Emeritus in Psychology at the University of Cincinnati. He holds a B.A. in history, magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, from Harvard College, and a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from the Department of Social Relations at Harvard. He has been on the faculty of M.I.T. in urban planning, and of Harvard in Psychiatry, has served as the Director of Research for the Peace Corps, has been a business and organizational consultant, and has had a clinical practice. Professor Meyers is finishing the manuscript of his third book, Seeing Deeper: Social Science Methods for Psychohistory. He may be contacted at wrmeyers@fuse.net.

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The Online Forum Invites You to Participate
Join the lively psychohistory conversation in the online leg of the Psychohistory Forum. To do so, contact Molly Castelloe at msc214@nyu.edu.
Creativity has helped propel much of humanity from our hunter-gatherer origins to a technologically advanced, affluent state. Among us have been individuals whose original and exemplary discoveries, inventions, creations are so extraordinary that these persons have been called geniuses. Newton, Beethoven, Einstein, and Hitler are names that come to mind when genius is invoked. Not surprisingly psychologists, literary critics, and historians (among others) have investigated this topic. Most recently, this includes Darrin McMahon’s *The Divine Fury: A History of Genius*.

Dr. McMahon is the Ben Weider Professor of History at Florida State University who has also written books on the Enlightenment and the history of happiness. Here McMahon has jumped into arenas where history encounters psychology. Though McMahon’s subject is within the psychological domain, *The Divine Fury* is more the history of the idea of genius; it is about the reputation of genius within public discourse in the Western world from Socrates to Steve Jobs. McMahon believes “that genius is in part a social creation” (xvi). If you want to know about the complexity of being a genius itself, for example how Isaac Newton combined his remarkable scientific innovations with his involvement in alchemy and the occult and having a nervous breakdown, you will not find much of that here.

Instead, McMahon traces the idea of genius back to Socrates who proclaimed he followed his daimon, and this accounts for what he knows. Varieties of this notion of inspiration have been part of the notion of genius from Athens through the Romantics and beyond. Once Christianity came to dominate Western culture, the notion of inspiration was seen as stemming from God, and thus when it manifested itself in humans, it was derived from the Holy...
Spirit rather than some inherent human quality.

McMahon says that the “modern genius was born in the eighteenth century….the birth itself occurred in the bright place of deliverance we call ‘the Enlightenment’” (xvii). It is in this period of history that McMahon says God withdraws and humanity itself comes to the fore. Yet though it appears that the West is becoming more secular in the 18th century, McMahon says that throughout this history there is a “profound religiosity associated with genius and the genius figure” (xii-xiii). When he discusses genius in the modern period McMahon talks about either the cult of genius or the religion of genius. While discussing the romantics he will quote from writers who say that they are passive vehicles for forces and their creations or discoveries. McMahon will spend less time discussing what these discoveries entailed than on how the genius is elevated to a cult figure.

There are geniuses in many walks of life. McMahon though is as much concerned with political leaders who were considered geniuses as with poets or scientists. In his chapter on romantic genius, the first nine pages are on Napoleon, while Goethe and Shelley are given some attention, Wordsworth is mentioned just three times and Keats not at all. Similarly, Hitler is discussed in 13 straight pages, while his contemporary counterpart Einstein gets six pages. McMahon says that “the religion of genius” reached “its terrible apotheosis in the genius-cult of the Nazis” (191). While McMahon gives due diligence to creative scientists, he is more concerned with the dangers of this cult of excellence than he is with what genius has positively contributed to civilizations, or to understanding how genius appears in individuals. McMahon also connects genius to the publicity given them in the media, somehow seeing marketing as being part of the package that makes one considered to be a genius.

As well as there being a religion of genius, there have been attempts by academic psychologists to study the emergence of genius. The most well-known attempt was by Stanford psychologist Lewis Terman and the long range study of those with extremely high IQs. As McMahon and others have pointed out, these highly intelligent individuals studied since they were children in the 1920s did not produce any recognized geniuses. McMahon adds, “the
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study famously failed to detect two men—Luis Alvarez and William Shockley—who would later be awarded the Nobel Prizes in Physics. Their tested IQs failed to meet the cutoff of 140, and they were weeded out and discarded accordingly” (181).

McMahon shows additional skepticism concerning psychological attempts to examine genius. One of Terman's students, Catharine Cox, studied 301 historical geniuses. While McMahon cites Hans Eysenck calling Cox's study a classic and the most cited work on genius, McMahon says “its conclusions were in many cases laughably speculative” (184).

Surprisingly McMahon is not interested in what psychologists after World War II have had to say about genius. Without documentation, he claims that “genius has largely vanished as a category of academic research” (238). A quick search of Google Scholar for psychology of genius finds 169,000 hits. While these are much fewer than the 954,000 hits for the psychology of creativity, they are similar to psychology of temperament with 213,000 hits. By claiming that academic study of genius has almost gone the way of the dodo bird, McMahon then does not have to deal with their findings about what genius is and the various psychological forms in which it manifests itself. These findings by psychologists and others would certainly fall within his theme of the history of the idea of genius, but would fit less well in his central theme of associating genius with religion. McMahon then does not consider pertinent evidence that does not fit comfortably within his thesis. Here then we have yet another historical volume whose subject matter entails psychology, but whose author has little respect for what psychologists have achieved in this field. In an age of interdisciplinarity, McMahon is able to maintain the divisions between related disciplines, when even within his framework more recent psychological research is pertinent to his topic. His work suffers from his disregard for what contemporary psychology adds to the study of genius.

Ken Fuchsman, EdD, is Director, Bachelor of General Studies and Assistant Extension Professor at the University of Connecticut. Dr. Fuchsman is on the Editorial Board of Clio’s Psyche and the Journal of Psychohistory, as well as Book Review Editor of this journal. He writes on the history of psychoanalysis, interdisci-
plenary studies, liberalism, trauma, and can be reached at ken.fuchsman@uconn.edu.

The Compulsive Energy Building America

George Johnson—Thompson Rivers University


What do the University of Virginia, Heinz ketchup, the hanging file, Youth Dew bath oil, and the first transatlantic flight all have in common? According to Josh Kendall in America’s Obsessives, they are all achievements of obsessionally driven innovators: Thomas Jefferson, Henry Heinz, Melvil Dewey, Estée Lauder, and Charles Lindbergh, respectively.

To this list of hyper-achievers, Kendall adds Alfred Kinsey, “The Rabid Orgasm Counter,” and batty batter Ted Williams, with passing reference to Steve Jobs. This collection makes for a fascinating popular introduction to the world of obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (OCPD), potentially a stimulus for achievement, which Kendall rightly distinguishes from obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), a paralyzing force.

Kendall coins his own term, “obsessive innovator,” but he might have drawn on Andrew Brink’s open obsessionals, those “able to make creative use of adverse early experiences” (Obsession and Culture, 16) and his pioneering applications of attachment theory and object relations to biography, particularly as Kendall’s book is dedicated to Brink.

Nevertheless, Kendall does suggest that his heterogeneous innovators all suffered “adverse circumstances in early childhood” and responded by attempting to control their worlds, focusing on tiny details rather than people or events. They are the victims of “extreme parenting,” whether domineering, neglectful, or absent through loss or abandonment. As a consequence, they tend to become “friendless loners” incapable of forming mutually satisfying emotional bonds. Instead, they manipulate others and frequently
the details of their own pasts, making them “fragmented individu-
als.” When Kendall does slip in a term from object relations, such
as transitional object, he does not define it, which may be a prob-
lem for the intended audience of general readers.

Each chapter begins with a defining moment in his subjects’
lives, an effective narrative strategy. With Thomas Jefferson, it is
the morning of July 1, 1776 when, among other things, Jefferson
recorded the temperature three times, an obsession he maintained
despite—or rather, because of—anxiety-producing situations, such
as the resolution that the American colonies would separate from
Britain. In fact, Jefferson was obsessed with minutiae his entire
life. For example, he kept track of every penny he ever spent, and
he even created the penny as we know it today.

Kendall then provides details of his subjects’ early lives and
the various traumas they suffered. Jefferson’s mother was over-
bearing, and his father died when he was 14, leaving him with a
lifelong rage against authority (or in attachment terms, an avoidant
resistant pattern). Jefferson’s difficulty in forming intimate bonds
does help explain why, after his wife died at a young age, he took
up with her half-sister and his slave, Sally Hemings, 30 years his
junior, whom he could control. Perhaps just as startling is his at-
tempt to “re-write” the Bible, “by slicing and dicing eight Bibles”
in order to reconstruct the life of Jesus, without any supernatural
events—an effort he called “The Jefferson Bible.”

Such eye-opening glimpses into the complexity of these
characters make Kendall’s book a compelling read. Henry Heinz,
who attempted to relieve his psychic ills by eating a third of a
pound of butter a day, successfully pioneered global branding (It
sometimes seems that there is no other ketchup but Heinz?) and in-
troduced Britain to canned baked beans, still a national obsession,
suggesting yet another unexpected and far-reaching consequence of
one person’s drivenness. Several of the men were notorious wom-
anizers, not surprisingly, but in the case of pioneering librarian Mel-
vil Dewey, this was unusually combined with an obsession with
measurements and multiples of 10, which would become the basis
for his library cataloguing decimal system, and for Alfred Kinsey,
the sexologist, this grew out of an obsession with gall wasps.
Charles Lindbergh represents the extreme example of a sex addict, who eventually maintained three German mistresses and his illegitimate children, as well as his American family. He was addicted to flight (in both senses) and had the connections in the air industry to carry out this subterfuge, although when on the ground in Germany he curiously relied on a VW Beetle to make his assignations. Lindbergh’s secret life was revealed by some of his German children about a decade ago, but Kendall has extended our knowledge in this text by interviewing a son.

Estée Lauder, who put on a face and an assumed identity to meet the faces that she compulsively made over all through her life, is the only woman in the collection. It would have been helpful to know why this is the case, whether there are fewer female obsessive innovators, or fewer ones who reach such prominence. Indeed, the selection process for the entire group is never made clear. Superstar slugger Ted Williams, whose biography closes the collection, seems to be the odd man out, although his single-minded focus—in his case on batting and his despicable treatment of women—matches that of the other men. It may be that this piece suffers a little from too many statistics for all but the most devoted baseball fan, perhaps revealing one of Kendall’s own obsessions?

Kendall claims to have been inspired by Lytton Strachey’s ground-breaking biographical collection *Eminent Victorians*, but Kendall is not as scathing as Strachey. To his credit, he does point out that mainstream biographers overlook the evidence for obsessionality and inexcusably ignore the findings and insights of psychology in general, or go so far as to put a positive spin on the impairments of their subjects. Yet, like Strachey, Kendall demonstrates some ambivalence towards his subjects, as hinted at in his book’s over-reaching sub-title, “The Compulsive Energy that Built a Nation.”

In his conclusion, he asserts that “particularly in these tense economic times, America could certainly benefit from a new generation of obsessive innovators” (264). Surely, however, it could be argued that these emotionally stunted, self-involved (and admittedly suffering) individuals who tend to accrue vast wealth partially through stingy treatment of their employees, must bear some responsibility for bringing America to its current state of extreme ine-
quality and economic dysfunction. Obsession and its various manifestations in collecting and hoarding are endemic in our consumer culture, and Josh Kendall gives us a lively depiction of some of the extreme cases, but the darker consequences of this drivenness on our social fabric, the environment and international relations will need to be further probed.

George M. Johnson, PhD, is currently Professor of English at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia. Johnson’s revised dissertation was published as Dynamic Psychology in Modernist British Fiction (2006). His current book project is Grappling with Ghosts: Mourning and Mysticism in First World War Britain, and he may be contacted at gjohnson@tru.ca.

Meeting Reports

Wine, Cheese, and Conscience at the Forum

Paul H. Elovitz with Joyce Rosenberg—The Psychohistory Forum

For the November 16, 2013 Psychohistory Forum meeting on “Social and Historical Influences on Psychoanalytic Thought,” sociology professor and psychoanalyst Donald L. Carveth came down from York University in Toronto to discuss some of the issues in his book The Still Small Voice: Psychoanalytic Reflections on Guilt and Conscience. Our meeting was conducted in the usual manner with the participants introducing themselves in 30 seconds and stating a question regarding the paper that had been distributed three weeks prior to the seminar. There were 20 participants altogether; allowing for multiple identifications, these included five historians, 13 psychotherapists, 11 psychoanalysts, a film professor and businesswoman, and others from assorted disciplines. The age range of the participants appeared to be from the 30s to the 70s.

Don Carveth, who is a compelling extemporaneous speaker, chose to focus on the questions that had been raised by the partici-
pants in the seminar from his perspective as a Kleinian. At the core of his approach was the distinction between conscience and superego. There was considerable focus on the flight from issues of conscience in psychoanalysis that was noted by Jacob Arlow. In the era when people were turning inward and becoming more narcissistic, issues of conscience and guilt greatly declined in psychoanalytic literature, and narcissism became a much more important subject. Our speaker argued that issues of conscience and superego are making a comeback because things that are repressed ultimately return. An interesting observation he made was that “those who have been abused become abusers” with many becoming “self-abusers” with “the rage leaking.” To illustrate his point about the decline of conscience in psychoanalytic literature, Carveth related that back in the 1980s when he wrote “Whatever Became of the Superego?” the paper was lost by two journal editors, one of whom was his friend.

In response to a question about the role of the “ego ideal” in his thinking, Carveth referred to Freud’s description of the ego ideal as a recipient of the child’s lost omnipotence when what Freud called “the purified pleasure ego” breaks down with recognition that there is both good and bad in the me and good and bad in the not me (the achievement of ambivalence). As “heir to primary narcissism,” the ego ideal is a narcissistic structure involving a focus upon oneself and how close or distant one is from one’s ideal. In contrast, for Carveth, conscience reflects concern for the other; it is grounded in the early attachment to and love of the primary caregiver, and our identification with that nurturer. He describes the not uncommon place situation of a male professor falling in love with a female graduate student, “loving the self he was” and of the grad student “loving what she wants to be.” He sees the superego as pseudo-moral, as wanting to punish, whereas the conscience wants to repair. He loves Mark Twain’s story of Huck Finn, whose superego tells him he should turn in his friend Jim because those are the standards of slavery but his conscience tells him to protect his friend even if it means he goes to hell. Carveth described himself as an “old hippie,” as part of the movement that was in flight from guilt and experimenting with sex and drugs while being narcissistic and out of control. He feels there was a lot of regression in
the 1960s.

Many of the generalizations he made were striking, such as “if the infant is loved it responds with love” and “if not loved, it responds with hate.” Clearly the neo-liberal ideology of Reagan, Thatcher, etc. is held in low regard by our presenter who prefers using the term the “social state” as opposed to the “welfare state.”

Carveth declared that the superego is sadistic, an internal persecutor, which he would like to disempower. However, he does not see morality as a thinking function but is fundamentally grounded in feeling, specifically what Rousseau called “pity.” He goes against established thought by declaring that psychopaths have a conscience but one that is deeply repressed owing to their flight from a primitive, punitive superego.

A presidential psychobiographer inquired about the denigration of the presidency that has become much more intense in recent years. Carveth responded that a narcissistic society hates both whistleblowers and decent individuals in the presidency. The press functions like wolves looking for blood. Leo Rangell was onto this issue in examining Nixon in his book *The Mind of Watergate*. When President Carter hired Christopher Lasch to help him deal with the negativity in the country, Lasch contributed to the “Malaise Speech.” They murdered Carter politically for speaking the truth. As a Canadian, Donald Carveth drew some interesting comparisons between the U.S. and Canadian experiences, declaring that “the way you guys threw out the British” with weaponry made a difference in your character versus the Canadian character. “We didn’t throw them out, we let the British go directly into the retirement home.” (Some laughter)

Other issues mentioned included the contributions of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Karl Manheim, and Ludwig Fleck to the sociology of knowledge. Also, “the unconscious tendency to repeat actively what you experienced passively.”

A book party followed the meeting. Our group toasted Don and *The Still Small Voice* with champagne and washed down the fine cheeses, apples, sausage, fancy cookies, and breads with wine. The Refreshment Committee consisted of Molly Castelloe, who brought the food and Ken Fuchsman, who not only brought the
wine but even donated a bottle of fine champagne. The view of Washington Square Park and lower Manhattan from the 9th floor of the NYU’s Kimmel Center was spectacular.

Paul H. Elovitz, PhD, is convener/director of the Psychohistory Forum, editor of this journal, a professor, and psychohistorian who may be contacted at pelovitz@aol.com. Joyce Rosenberg is a licensed psychoanalyst in private practice and a small business reporter for the Associated Press who may be contacted at psyjourn@att.net.

The Richards with the Online Forum
Sponsor a Book Party

Molly Castelloe—Forum Research Associate

Analysts, professors, writers, and artists convened January 5 at the Manhattan home of Arnold Richards and Arlene Kramer Richards who generously had the event professionally catered. The Richards and most of the group had come to know each other in the course of lively exchanges on the Psychohistory Forum’s online discussion group. They met in person to celebrate three recent publications: Encounters with Loneliness: Only the Lonely (eds. Arlene Richards, Lucille Spira, and Arthur S. Lynch, 2013), Psychoanalysis: Listening to Understand (Arlene Richards, 2013), and Emily Kuriloff’s Contemporary Psychoanalysis and The Legacy of the Third Reich (2014). These book covers, among others, were exhibited on a coffee table in the living room of the 45th floor penthouse apartment. The publisher of the first two, International Psychoanalytic Books, is an imprint that Arnold Richards began in 2006 and is devoted to clinical, theoretical, and applied psychoanalysis.

Writers and essayists spoke of their work. The anthology on loneliness grew out of an ongoing discussion group started by Richards and Spira at the American Psychoanalytic Association’s annual meetings. Themes of solitude and social isolation so common in human experience have rarely been elaborated in the psychoanalytic literature in such breadth. Remarkable are the book’s use of
contributions to the subject from social science, literature, and art, including the work of Samuel Beckett, Frida Kahlo, and Egon Schiele. An essay on Petro Almodóvar’s film *The Skin I Live In* examines a narrative in which a scientist, whose beloved wife dies in a car accident when her skin is incinerated, invents an artificial skin: flawless, unfeeling, and impervious.

Arlene Richards recounted a moment of epiphany when her research led her to discover that Marcel Proust’s episode of taste nostalgia catalyzed by the famed madeleine, a traditional finger cake from northeastern France, was also a childhood memory of Proust with his own mother who routinely read him a story in which the mother of the main character was also named Madeline. This character eventually becomes a motherly lover and marries her adopted son. In her collected papers, Richards describes longing as the experience of fantasied motion, of propelling oneself toward the object of desire.

Author Emily Kuriloff spoke passionately of her many interviews with Martin Bergmann and recounted one vignette Otto Kernberg told her of a day when he was 10 years old. During Hitler’s invasion, the Nazis stopped Kernberg and his mother on a busy promenade in Vienna and made his mother kneel and wash the street.

From the central spiral staircase, Arnold Richards queried the crowd: “How many psychoanalytic schools are there here?” After prolonged pause, Richards himself retorted, “I have brought together at least six groups of Jews—which is saying a lot.” Among the attendees were members of the Psychohistory Forum, New York Psychoanalytic Society & Institute, Division 39 of the American Psychological Association, the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, and the William Alanson White Institute. Toasts were given from glasses of white wine and Prosecco.

The evening recalled the culture of salon life in Europe so important to intellectuals of the 17th and 18th centuries and crucial to the education of women. Such a tradition highlights the historical relationship of society to stockings. Nicknamed *Bas-bleus* (“Blue stockings”) for the blue worsted leg coverings worn by
women at these get-togethers, as compared to black silk stockings, this appellation conveyed how the female activities of embroidery were being superseded by intellect pursuits. It is fitting that a psychoanalytically-informed assembly evokes the literary salon of the Enlightenment, which people enjoyed in informal attire, in casual and practical country clothing, what was then thought of as “society in undress.”

The gathering resounded with the music of the legendary Jim Hall, an American guitarist, arranger, and composer (1930-2013). In tribute, Dr. Ken Fuchsman compiled selections from various periods of his work, including the song “Goodbye My Love,” written in collaboration with his life companion, psychoanalyst Jane Hall.

**Molly Castelloe, PhD**, is founder and moderator of the Forum’s online listserv and may be reached at msc214@nyu.edu.

[Editor’s Note: At the book party, Molly Castelloe received the Psychohistory Forum’s Sidney Halpern Award for Outstanding Contributions to Psychohistory. This monetary award certificate reads “For Creating and Moderating a Vital Online Psychohistorical Discussion Group and Furthering our Discipline through the Medium of Documentary Film.” This prize is named for the late Temple University psychohistorian and scholar of the ancient world, Sidney Halpern (1927-1994), whose colleagues and family funded it.]

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**Aaron Denham: Guest Editor**

Is a Lecturer in the Department of Anthropology at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia who has served as treasurer of the Arizona Psychoanalytic Society and has been a fellow of the American Psychoanalytic Association. As a psychological and medical anthropologist, he is broadly interested in how people experience and derive meaning from misfortune, distress, and illness.

Denham’s research addresses family experiences of infanticide and the relationship and disjunctures between infanticide discourse and practice in Northern Ghana. His previous research and publication topics include an examination of the models and metaphors of mental health and healing in an Inuit community, ethnographic research with the Coeur d’Alene community in Idaho, and research into intergenerational transmission of identity and historical trauma. He is currently preparing a book on infanticide.
BULLETIN BOARD

CONFERENCES: The Psychohistory Forum’s 2014 Work-In-Progress Seminars will be announced as details are finalized. Tentatively Molly Castelloe will present “Discourse on a Documentary Film on Psychoanalytic Author and Peacemaker Vamik Volkan on March 8, 2014. Under consideration are presentation proposals on communist psychoanalysts, Freud, Latinos in America, the role of the American left in moderating the Cold War, and the psychodynamics of money. Proposed presentations must be submitted in written form to our program committee. Announcements and papers will be sent out electronically to Psychohistory Forum members. Upcoming conferences include the 37th annual International Psychohistorical Association’s (IPA) June 4-6, 2014 meetings at NYU and the International Society for Political Psychology’s (ISPP) 37th Annual Conference on July 4-7, 2014 in Rome. The Association for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society (APCS) Conference will be at Rutgers University on October 17-18, 2014. The November 6-8, 2014 International Forum for Psychoanalytic Education (IFPE) meetings will be held in San Francisco. The National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis conference will be held on November 15, 2014 in Manhattan.

CONGRATULATIONS: To Arlene Kramer Richards on the publication of her Listening to Understand and her co-editing, with two colleagues, of Encounters with Loneliness: Only the Lonely (International Psychoanalytic Books) and to Emily Kurloff, for Contemporary Psychoanalysis and the Legacy of the Third Reich (Routledge).

NOTES: Tom Artin followed up his September presentation in London at the Freud Museum Conference on Freud and Wagner with a similar presentation from his book to a German philosophical group in December.

OUR THANKS: To our members and subscribers for the support that makes Clio’s Psyche possible. To Benefactors Herbert Barry, David Beisel, Peter Loewenberg, David Lotto, Jamshid Marvasti, and Mary Peace Sullivan; Patrons Tom Ferraro, Ken Fuchsman, Peter Loewenberg, Alice Maher, and Jacques Szaluta; Sustaining Members Dick Booth, George Brown, Eva Fogelman, Joyce Rosenberg, and Nancy Unger; Supporting Members Peter Barglow, Don Carveth, Paul Elovitz, Bob Lentz, Joel Markowitz, and Mena and Dominic Potts; and Members Heiderose Brandt Butscher, Mi-
We Wish to Thank
Our Diligent,
Hard-working and
Prompt Editors, and
Anonymous Referees
Clio’s Psyche Call for Papers
Psychology and the Holocaust
For the June 2014 Issue the Deadline is
April 1, 2014

Clio’s Psyche is looking for articles on a variety of subjects, including the psychoanalysis/psychology of the following:

- From silence to Holocaust narratives and analysis
- The aftermath of the Holocaust
- Intergenerational transmission of trauma in the families of survivors and children of perpetrators
- Survivors as healers: psychologists and psychoanalysts
- From Holocaust to genocide studies
- The many faces of rescuers
- Studies of ego defense mechanisms used in the Holocaust/genocides
- Images of the Holocaust and the Holocaust as metaphor
- Art, music, and poetry emerging from the Holocaust
- Accepting the Holocaust throughout Europe, including the enormous resistance in Poland
- The changing faces of anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial
- How Holocaust studies developed or expanded psychological knowledge of genocide, reconciliation, survivors guilt, trauma, victims, etc.
- The impact of the Nuremberg Trials as a precedent
- What Milgram’s studies of obedience taught us about evil
- Teaching the Holocaust and genocide studies
- Victimology
- Intergenerational issues in acceptance of the Holocaust
- Psychobiographical studies of Nazis
- The Holocaust in cinema and literature
- Psychobiographical studies of Kestenberg, Niederland, Wiesel, etc.
- Reconciliation of victims and perpetrators: Germans and Jews

We seek articles from 500 to 1,500 words—including your brief biography—by April 1, 2014. Some 2,500-3,500 word essays are also welcome provided they are outstanding scholarship and well written. If received by February 15, 2014 one might be used as the basis for a symposium. We do not publish bibliographies and have citations only for direct quotes. Eva Fogelman is Guest Co-editor of this issue. Articles should be sent to pelovitz@aol.com.