The Myth of American Exceptionalism

The myth of American exceptionalism is a story of the heroic struggle of good against evil, of a virtuous new world against the corruption of the old. This political narrative is embedded in American history and the American dream. It has its origins in the religious beliefs of the first European settlers, traces its way forward through the rhetoric of President Thomas Jefferson’s warning about entangling alliances in his inaugural address, the Monroe Doctrine and its various corollaries, and the doctrine of Manifest Destiny. It finally arrives at the beginning of the 21^st century with America in its hegemonic moment as the sole remaining superpower. In this vision, America is the city on the hill, defending good against evil, leading the world into a new day of peace and prosperity, globalization and democracy, and the end of history and a new world order. This messianic rhetoric provides a powerful lever to consolidate domestic support, appeal to friends’ shared values abroad, and escape unilaterally from the hostile realist constraints of the international system (Francis A. Beer and Jeffrey S. Kopstein, “Between Maastricht and Sarajevo: European Identities, Narratives, Myths,” in Francis A. Beer, ed., Meanings of War and Peace, 2001).

The myth of exceptionalism is an essential element of American civil religion at the heart of American culture. This myth communicates part of the collective national vision and serves as an essential tool of political mobilization. “Redeemer nation,”

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“renewal through self-flagellation,” and building international community have been recurrent themes in American public life. Political leaders have used these themes strategically as they sought to build “sympathetic public ecologies,” to recreate the American nation and to advance an international program of “soft hegemony” (Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War, 2001, pp. 146-164).

Even granting the United States’ global dominance and its contribution to democratization and human rights, one may still ask if American exceptionalism has been oversold. If we transfer the narrative of exceptionalism from the collective American psyche (state as person) to that of a single American (individual as person), how might we interpret it? Taking a critical approach inspired by clinical psychology, we might note first the possibility of mythomania, or a propensity to portray oneself in ways that others might find to be unrealistic. The story of exceptionalism would probably exaggerate the subject’s positive qualities, understate the mundane, and neglect the unpleasant. Second, there is certainly a good chance of narcissism, or an excessive focus on the self. If one is exceptional, why bother with the inferior? Third, we might expect to find some degree of sociopathology. Unless he or she was the leader, this person would not be a team player. These themes are related to the symposium articles by Frank Summers and Paul Elovitz. Mythomania and narcissism map onto their description of grandiosity, and sociopathology attached to their discussion of paranoia.

The validity of these clinical themes, not just for particular individuals but also for the state, depends on how we resolve the tension between reality and fantasy. Is the person or state really exceptional? Ayn Rand’s fictional heroes may be exceptional, but there are variable views about Ayn Rand herself. Sarah Palin’s created frontier persona is not always consistent with her tolerance of pain when criticized. The United States is exceptional in many respects but less so in others. Whatever the validity of exceptionalism for individuals, the myth of American exceptionalism functions in the context of international, not interpersonal, discourse. There may be exceptional Americans, but the myth of American excep-

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tionalism does not focus on them. It rests upon the real or imputed virtues of the American polity—not America writ small, but America writ large.

Can the categories of abnormal psychology easily transfer to states? The validity of American exceptionalism must be examined within an interstate system with processes and structures that are very different from those of domestic society. Individuals are not states, even though individuals occupy state leadership positions. Particular political leaders may exhibit the characteristics of mythomania, narcissism, sociopathology, grandiosity, and paranoia. Indeed, there may be political selection processes that encourage these attributes in our leaders. At the same time, the application of clinical categories to primary and secondary groups has well known problems in scaling up. States are not people; international relations are different than interpersonal relations.

Whatever its truth value or the appropriateness of clinical categories, is the myth of American exceptionalism a rational political strategy? It does have pragmatic, functional virtues. The myth’s altruism can be politically useful, both domestically and internationally. It is at the heart of American soft power. It attracts political support and disarms political opposition. It is a core element in the story of America. In the world politics of the 21^st century, it is part of the narrative in marketing the American brand. It helps line the velvet glove of soft power that masks the iron fist of military hard power. The myth of American exceptionalism is an important part of the interpretive conflict between cultures and civilizations, of a post-realist struggle for meaning. The contest for hearts and minds in mainstream, alternative, and social media is the latest chapter, still being written, of this ongoing project.

The myth of American exceptionalism is an important element in American public diplomacy, or foreign policy rhetoric. As modern media extend their global reach, they bring national foreign policy actions out of the diplomatic closet and into full public view. Public relations experts market foreign policy as they do other products and services, strategically using rhetoric to legitimize national actions, mobilize support from allies, and counter the propaganda efforts of opponents.

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Even if one accepts the clinical criticism, the myth’s irrational flaws still have their rational strategic uses. The myth of American exceptionalism may be grandiose, narcissistic, paranoid, and sociopathological at the individual psychological level. At the same time, though, it seems to have survived and prospered as an important way that Americans have historically identified and justified themselves in the world. American exceptionalism constructs an idealistic, moralistic frame to rationalize a realist focus on national self-interest. Mythomania, narcissism, and grandiosity have their political uses. They flatter the domestic audience, generate political support, and disarm critics at home and abroad. Standard realist international relations discourse, on the other hand, describes world politics in harsher realist terms that allow less room for exceptionalism. This traditional view has some basis in world political reality. It has not forgotten World Wars I and II, Hitler and Stalin. In a state of international nature that is seen as deeply unforgiving, sociopathology and paranoia may be, if not always appropriate, at least partly understandable.

Whether the past history of American exceptionalism predicts future political success remains unclear. Insights from political psychology suggest that the myth of American exceptionalism is at least partly a fantasy with political uses, a form of delusion and denial, well separated from the reality principle. It soothes individual fears and insecurities by sheltering them in a larger, stronger political body. Collective mythomania, grandiosity, narcissism, sociopathology, and paranoia may be sustainable for a nation with a hegemonic power position. Very powerful people can claim external validation and can also afford to be unpleasant. The Greek historian Thucydides, commenting on the Peloponnesian War, famously said long ago that the strong do as they will; the weak do as they must.

As the 21^st century advances, the United States may move away from its hegemonic moment and become less of a superpower. The international context will change. Other states will challenge the United States. Old opponents like Russia have not gone away. Resurrected societies like China will continue to evolve. Emerging powers like Brazil and India will assert themselves. Allies like Western Europe will develop more independent

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identities. Other recent friends, like Japan, suffer ordeals of water and fire, nuclear and political meltdown. What if relative American power weakens? American exceptionalism may partly reflect real American attributes; it may contribute to American power. One may recognize the historical political virtues of the myth of American exceptionalism. At the same time, political psychology suggests that it may contain deeply dysfunctional elements that work less well in another context. The myth of American exceptionalism may play less well in a post-hegemonic multipolar world if relative American power declines. Machiavelli long ago advised the Prince that it is better to be feared than loved. For 21^st century America, both fear and love may be scarcer.

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