A Psychiatrist Reflects on a Blind Spot in the Battle of Hürtgen Forest

In Europe during World War II, many “blind spots” were constructed and perpetuated by the U.S. military. The following is the most significant in my military experiences in the First Infantry Division (Big Red One), involving my participation in the Battle of the Bulge.

We were in the Hürtgen Forest, for two to three days of resupplying and special training. There were two divisions ahead of us that were supposed to split the enemy, opening the way for our attack. The technique was completely unusual in that we were supposed to be advancing not in columns in our usual fashion, but moving forward in line along the front, spraying gunfire ahead of us in a sweeping motion. Because our tanks could not readily get through the forest, they were going to meet us beyond it. Our plan was to then jump on the tanks and half-tracks and head directly toward the German city of Cologne. We were still in khaki brown, the skies were heavily overcast, and our planes weren’t flying. We began advancing with a relatively unprotected rear area as snow began to fall.

Shortly after our attack began and prior to our tanks arriving, the Germans counterattacked in much greater numbers. Furthermore, they dropped parachutists dressed in white behind us to cause confusion. The advancing German infantry wore white winter clothes and their tanks were painted white—in contrast to our khaki brown, which stood out against the snow. Before my division was decimated, I was hospitalized. When I returned to my di-

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vision in January, the Battle of the Bulge had been resolved. In the company of 200 men only three were alive after the battle, plus the four of us who had been hospitalized early on. Now, what does this have to do with “blind spots?”

You do not successfully attack an enemy unless you have and act on excellent information about their strengths and weaknesses and the conditions of the battlefield. This is accomplished by sending out combat and reconnaissance patrols. This was done quite inadequately. Such a large number of enemy soldiers and equipment in a concentrated area, and the approaching snowstorm, should have been respected and should have altered tactics, but were not and did not.

The “blind spot” was created by the officers above division level, who, believing in the invincibility, or exceptionalism, of the American military because of the successful preceding months, which created hubris, were in denial about the enemy’s strength in number of troops and tanks, their use of winter camouflage, and their overall tactical superiority. The “blind spot” meant that only seven out of 200 soldiers in my company survived the Battle of Hürtgen Forest. Fortunately, I am one.

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