
Volume 21 - Number 3 - December 2014
Pages: 245 - 361
Carveth, D. (2014). Civilization and Its Discontents: A Kleinian re-view. Clio’s Psyche, 21(3), 328-333.
Civilization and Its Discontents: A Kleinian Re-View
Abstract
This article offers a Kleinian re-view of Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents, written on the thirteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. The author applies Kleinian theory, together with Kohut’s self psychology, drawing on Robert Jay Lifton’s The Nazi Doctors, Frans de Waal’s primate research, Paul Bloom’s “The Moral Life of Babies,” Fred Alford’s Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory, and an illustration from the author’s own clinical practice. The author argues that Freud erred in merging conscience into the superego and proposes separating them. The superego, grounded in introjected persecutory objects, aggression turned on the self, and internalized cultural ideology, generates persecutory guilt. Conscience, grounded in attachment and love, generates reparative guilt. Citing the animal and infant research, the author contends that morality has roots in early attachment, that much immorality is culturally acquired, and that Freud wrongly located human destructiveness in the id. The author maintains that the superego sustains a cycle of violence in which the victimized victimize others. The author is sharply critical of American counterterrorism, arguing that it multiplies terrorists. In Kleinian terms, escape lies in moving from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive, reparative position, a move the author says therapy mediates through holding and containing. The author concludes that this kind of bond is largely absent in large groups, that abstractions such as God or a theory of history can support fanaticism as readily as growth, and that civilization needs less superego and more conscience.
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Civilization and Its Discontents, counter-terrorists, cycle of violence, historical cycles, Melanie Klein, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide, psychohistory, Robert Jay Lifton, Sigmund Freud, The Still Small Voice: Psychoanalytic Reflections on Guilt and Conscience, superego, trauma, war on terror
I write this on September 11, 2014, the 13th anniversary of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. It is important to note that the terrorists responsible for these attacks were superego-driven ideologues more than id-driven psychopaths—not unlike the Nazi doctors. Most Nazi doctors, as Robert Jay Lifton (The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide, 1986) discovered, were racist ideologues, no more psychopathic than Truman and those who dropped atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or the so-called “counter-terrorists” waging our terroristic “war on terror.” One of the main reasons that in The Still Small Voice: Psychoanalytic Reflections on Guilt and Conscience (2013) I recommend distinguishing the superego from the conscience is that while the superego plays a central role in the cycle of violence wherein the formerly terrorized come to terrorize others, the conscience represents our only hope of transcending it.
Freud’s merging of conscience into the superego (in The Ego and the Id, 1923) is regrettable: whereas the superego is about
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punishment fueled by aggression, mostly turned on the self, though often righteously displaced outwards via the superego onto scapegoats, conscience is about caring, both for others and one’s true self—caring fuelled by attachment and love. Without the distinction between superego and conscience, it is difficult to distinguish the two very different types of guilt each generates: persecutory guilt generated by superego, and reparative guilt generated by conscience. The superego wants to beat, the conscience to heal. Those naïve psychologists who think guilt is something we need to rid ourselves of have only punitive guilt in mind. Due to the fact that Freud himself was not alert to the distinction elaborated in 1948 by Melanie Klein (“A Contribution to the Theory of Anxiety and Guilt,” International Journal of Psychoanalysis 29: 114-123) and in 1964 by Léon Grinberg (“Two kinds of guilt: Their relations with normal and pathological aspects of mourning,” International Journal of Psychoanalysis 45: 366-371), he failed to see that while in civilization we need less persecutory guilt. We are in need of a great deal more reparative guilt.
In other words, in civilization we need less superego and more conscience. Whereas the conscience is grounded in attachment, concern, and love, the superego, as Klein understood, is grounded in pre-genital introjection of the persecutory other (the bad breast) part-object (object is the psychoanalytic term for a loved one—a significant other), together with later turning of aggression away from the oedipal rivals back against the ego, to which is then added internalization of (often immoral) cultural values via the parents’ superegos.
Although in his clinical thinking Freud recognizes the superego’s sadism, in his sociological contributions he views it in prosocial terms as the upholder of law and order, while projecting what is antisocial and perverse in human nature onto the id, the repository of the alleged animal in man. Despite our clinical awareness of its sadism, this association of the superego with the prosocial and the moral has made it difficult for us to keep its destructiveness clearly in mind, including the antisocial ideologies (the racism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, childism, etc.) we internalize in socialization (which, in this respect, might well be thought of as “antisocial-ization”).
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In associating the id with our allegedly natural destructiveness and perversity we have been blinded to the loving, caring, and sympathetic inclinations grounded in the primary or unlearned attachment systems we share with other primates. Animal research (De Waal, F. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals, Harvard University Press, 1997) has revealed the positive, mutually supportive, and sympathetic capacities of other primate species, challenging the myth of “the beast,” which turns out to mostly be a projection onto animals of our uniquely human destructiveness toward ourselves, one another, other species, and the environment in general. Growing evidence from infant research (Paul Bloom, “The Moral Life of Babies,” New York Times Magazine, May 3, 2010) indicates that children as young as three months of age distinguish right from wrong, good from bad, and prefer the former over the latter. This is not evidence of an “innate” morality, for even three-month-old infants have had considerable opportunity to identify with the loving nurturance of their caretakers. However, it does demonstrate the roots of conscience in early attachment, quite distinct from the internalizations of cultural ideology at five or six years of age that Freud saw as forming the superego. It is high time we deconstruct the false equations of the id with immoral nature when much of what is truly moral in us stems from innate attachment tendencies, and the superego with moral nurture when a great deal of our immorality is culturally acquired.
For decades we have been living in a neo-liberal culture of narcissism, a culture in flight from guilt and conscience, and as a result we have until recently lost touch with our own best insights into the unconscious guilt and self-punishment underlying diverse symptoms that on the surface often appear to have little or nothing to do with moral conflict. Most people who suffer from emotional pain and torment are self-tormentors, even when their self-torture has its roots in trauma. Victims of abuse usually end up as abusers, at least of themselves if not also of others. In the all too present historical cycle of violence we witness victimized people unconsciously imposing their own victimization upon others and in this way bringing further victimization upon themselves. Wilfred Bion in “The Differentiation of the Psychotic from the Non-Psychotic
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Part of the Personality” (International J. Psychoanalysis, 38, parts III-IV, 1957) writes of the “bizarre objects” created when the bad object is attacked and fragments proliferate into a multitude of bad objects. In seeking to destroy terrorism we create many more terrorists, not least by becoming terrorists ourselves.
In order to understand how victims come to victimize themselves and others, the concept of the superego is essential. Trauma generates rage that due to both love (ambivalence) and fear is turned on the self in the form of the superego. In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) Freud argued that civilized order depends on inhibition of our antisocial tendencies. As most people lack the strength of character needed to restrain themselves without self-deception and lack the talent for much sublimation, they are forced to resort to repression with the consequent disguised neurotic return of the repressed this involves. The higher the civilization, the more aggression is repressed, and the more it is turned inward against the ego resulting in the build-up of neurotic guilt. The superego is formed through an identification with the aggressors: Instead of retaliating against them, I identify with them and turn my aggression against myself. Later, as a defense against such self-victimization, I identify with my persecutory superego and attack (scapegoat) others instead. Through projection these others come to embody my own aggression, a projection aided by evidence of their aggression, including that which mine has provoked in them. In this way, the cycle of violence is perpetuated.
It is becoming ever clearer that there is only one way out: this is for victims to recognize the aggressor in themselves and to seek to disarm and make peace with the enemy inside, rather than continuing to project, provoke, and find it in the other and thus perpetuate rather than breach the cycle of violence. While Freud is right to point to the neurotic consequences of the build-up of punitive guilt due to repression and turning against the self (superego), he fails to understand that authentic morality (conscience) is not something we learn from society but something that derives from both our primate heritage and our earliest experiences of life-giving nurturance that establish our need to nurture others in return. Conscience not only calls us to reject the immoral superego and the false societal values comprising it, it requires us to recognize that
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“the enemy is us”—a “crucifying” experience that can happen on the individual level in the context of a deep psychoanalytic process.
In Kleinian terms this is an advance from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive or reparative position. I recently observed a patient I’ve been working with for many years achieve this advance. He had for a long time had a compulsion to visit “happy-ending” massage parlors. We analyzed this from every possible perspective. It was only when I finally got around to asking him if he ever considered how his wife might feel if she knew of his activity that things began to shift. He replied that he never allowed his mind to go there because if he did he might have to stop. He subsequently reported that he had never considered what he was doing as going to prostitutes or as “cheating,” managing to view it instead as a kind of “health and relaxation” regimen. Next he reported overhearing a group of men at work talking about a colleague who was having an affair. He was stunned to realize they were not impressed, but speaking of him with derision and contempt. He stopped going to massage parlors and subsequently became much more empathic, kind, and loving toward his wife. At the same time, he grew in confidence and responsibility in his work life, no longer needing to change his shirt three times a day due to sweating, and pretty much overcame the lifelong, chronic dysphoria, pessimism, and irritability that had characterized him.
However, it is one thing to help bring about such healing on the individual level. It is quite another to achieve it on the collective level. He and I had developed a trusting mutuality over the years. I liked him and he knew it, and he respected me. I was, after many years, able to confront him with questions that did not initiate a superego attack but that, instead, evoked his conscience. He did not feel morally attacked by me and he did not inflict useless punitive guilt upon himself. Instead he managed to shift into the reparative position and began to be able to far more effectively love his wife and then love and respect himself. The problem is that on the collective level the sort of intense, tested, tried, and true bond between therapist and patient that provides the context in which such healing can occur is largely absent. Freud discovered the role of the transference in therapy. Heinz Kohut elaborated the role of the mirroring and idealizing “selfobject” transferences in the healing
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process. Klein and Kohut are seldom mentioned in the same breath but they should be because the Kleinian advance from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive-reparative position is generally mediated by the presence of a therapist who provides needed “selfobject function” for the patient—the functions Donald Winnicott called “holding” and that Bion called “containing.” In ordinary language, we can simply say that in a good therapeutic relationship the patient comes to value, trust, and respect the therapist, who through such trust and respect acquires the capacity to help the patient achieve developmental milestones previously unattained.
Unfortunately, as Fred Alford has explained (in Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory, Yale University Press, 1989, chapter three: “A Psychoanalytic Theory of the Large Group”), whereas in small groups where face-to-face contact occurs one can encounter and be affected by the other, in larger, more anonymous groups such feedback is unavailable. Alford points out how in large groups personal identity is less supported and anxiety is generated. For these and other reasons it is hard for people to find in large group settings the kind of “selfobject” responsiveness that facilitates personal growth and, as a result, regression rather than progression all too frequently occurs. The trouble with abstract substitutes for the therapist, such as a loving and forgiving God for believers, or a trusted theory of history providing political guidance, is that such abstractions are precisely that—abstractions—rather than living, breathing others with the heart and the conscience to confront. Such abstract others are not really “other” and can as easily support fanaticism as personal growth. Feeling that my trusted therapist is fundamentally on my side sometimes allows me (eventually) to tolerate him being “other,” thinking differently, even confronting my darkness. An abstract significant other, such as God or my theory of the laws of historical development, is as likely to feed my madness as it is to help me overcome it.
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How to cite this article
Carveth, D. (2014). Civilization and Its Discontents: A Kleinian re-view. Clio’s Psyche, 21(3), 328-333.



