
Volume 19 - Number 1 - June 2012
Pages: 1 - 125
Cohn, S. (2012). Hate in times of pestilence. Clio’s Psyche, 19(1), 113-116.
Hate in Times of Pestilence
Abstract
In this article, the author questions the widely held scholarly view that pandemics give rise to hatred and the blaming of outsiders. The author cites René Baehrel, Carlo Ginzburg, Dorothy Nelkin and Sander Gilman, and Paul Farmer as holders of that view, and contends that only a few examples, and no statistics, support it. The author disputes the sixteenth-century syphilis case, noting that it rests on the names given to the disease and that no persecutions are known to have followed. The author also reports that British experience of the 1918–19 influenza offers no evidence of Spaniards being blamed. The author recounts cholera, from the 1830s into the 1990s, as the clearest case of disease-linked class hatred and collective violence. Yellow fever in New Orleans in 1853 and influenza in Philadelphia in 1918–19 are described as easing social divisions. The author reports that epidemics before the Black Death of 1348 rarely sparked hatred, citing Athens, Rome, and Roman epidemics of 433 and 403 BCE. The author proposes that the Black Death began a pairing of pandemic and hatred that grew with modernity, culminating in German measures against typhus directed at the Eastern European poor and Jews. The author concludes that hatred was not an inevitable product of epidemics and did not diminish with scientific understanding, and calls for comparative study of whether the character of particular diseases mattered.
AIDS, blaming, Carlo Ginzburg, Early Modern European Witchcraft: Centres and Peripheries, pandemics, “Placing Blame for Devastating Disease,” psychohistory, psychology of hatred, René Baehrel, social sciences, violence, viruses
Historians and social scientists see pandemics as giving rise to hate and the blaming of “the other.” In René Baehrel’s words, such reactions are universal, part of our “structures mentales…constantes psychologiques” (“La haine de classe en temps d’épidémie,” Annales: E.S.C., 7, 1952: pp. 351-360). These notions gained strength in the wake of the AIDS pandemic. According to Carlo Ginzburg, “The prodigious trauma of great pestilences intensified the search for a scapegoat on which fears, hatreds and tension of all kind could be discharged” (In B. Ankarloo and G. Henningsen, eds., “Deciphering the Sabbath,” in Early Modern European Witchcraft: Centres and Peripheries, 1990, p. 124). By the reckoning of Dorothy Nelkin and Sander Gilman, “Blaming has always been a means to make mysterious and devastating diseases comprehensible and therefore possibly controllable” (“Placing Blame for Devastating Disease,” Social Research, 55, 1988: pp. 362-378). Most recently (2010), from earthquake-wrecked, cholera-ridden Haiti, Paul Farmer has proclaimed: “Blame was, after all, a calling card of all transnational epidemics” (Haiti after the Earthquake, 2011, p. 191).
Yet, despite this chorus of consensus, few examples— cholera in the 19th century, Black Death in the 14th, syphilis in the 16th century—and no statistics support these sweeping claims. Even some of their examples need to be questioned, as with syphilis in 16th-century Europe; its proof of blaming and persecution of “others” derives solely from the various names given the disease— the Neapolitan disease outside Naples, the French disease outside France, the Polish disease in Germany, the German one in Poland, and so on. However, no one to date has spotted pogroms stemming from this disease against Jews, or the prostitutes and invading foreigners who carried it from one region to another, or to any other “other.” As Ulrich von Hütten explained in the preface to his syphilis tract of 1519, he called it “morbo Gallico” “because of common usage” and “most definitely not because I bear any grudge against a most renowned nation which is, perhaps, the most civilized and hospitable now in existence.” Similarly, after concurring
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with the orthodoxy on big pandemics and blame—Sontag, Farmer, Nelkin, Gilman, and others—Niall Johnson in a recent book on the “Spanish Flu” of 1918-19 in Britain must admit that the British experience gives no evidence whatsoever of any Spaniard being blamed for the disease.
To be sure, there exists a long and consistent history of provoking hatred and riots against those suspected of spreading certain diseases. The best case is cholera, which infected communities with class hatred across Europe and the United States beginning in the 1830s. This was regardless of the underlying political conditions and structures from St. Petersburg in Tsarist Russia to liberal Manchester and New York City. Moreover, recriminations against the poor and acts of collective violence against the state and hospital workers recurred well after the mechanisms and etiology of this disease had been discovered: in Italy in 1911-12 and in Peru and Venezuela with its seventh wave in the 1990s. On the other hand, other diseases, despite fear of contagion, massive mortalities, gruesome signs and symptoms, and mysterious patterns of dissemination have shown few signs of hatred. Instead, diseases such as yellow fever in epidemics at New Orleans in 1853 did the opposite: communities were brought together, and race relations on the eve of the Civil War were momentarily eased. Similarly, influenza has never been shown to spark mass hatred, even during the Great Flu pandemic of 1918-1919, despite killing more in absolute terms than any pandemic in world history. Instead, in places such as Philadelphia, it mended divides across class, race, and religion, and this in the same city that would spawn some of the worse race riots in U.S. history two years later.
As the citations to Ginzburg, Gilman, and others above suggest, scholars now assume that when the causes and cures of pandemics are unknown, hatred is all the more likely, that the disease-hate equation was more prevalent before the laboratory revolution and more still before the scientific revolution and decline of magic of the 17th century. Before the Black Death of 1348, however, it is difficult to point to a single epidemic that ignited ethnic, class, or religious hatred. (The murder of lepers accused of poisoning wells in 1320 was not spurred on by any new epidemic.) The most famous of ancient pandemics, the fifth-century Plague of Athens, may have been an exception. Thucydides reports that when the disease entered the port of Piraeus, its inhabitants claimed the Peloponnesians, then at war with Athens, had spread the disease by poisoning their cisterns. However, when the plague reached Athens,
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leveling a third of its population, these accusations disappeared. Instead, the only blaming was ultimately against the Athenians’ own leader, Pericles, who pig-headedly failed to negotiate with the enemy.
Historians have also argued that the Romans blamed the plague of 252 to ca. 267 on the Christians and persecuted them as a result. Instead, as the Christian historian, Paulus Orosius, recognized, this plague did the opposite, initiating one of the longest periods of Roman tolerance of Christians from 252 to the Edicts of Diocletian in 303. That edict then sparked a decade-long persecution—probably Christendom’s bloodiest, the so-called “Great Persecution.” But no plague was present to trigger it. As with yellow fever in New Orleans or the Great Flu Pandemic of 1918, ancient history is filled with examples of pandemics healing class rifts. For example, in 433 BCE an epidemic “afforded a respite” from strife between plebes and patricians. With vows to Apollo to build a temple for the people’s health and organized efforts to import corn from Sicily to avert famine, unity was achieved. In 403 BCE Romans were dumbfounded by a plague for which their doctors knew no causes or cures, but instead of this mysterious disease leading to hate, for the Romans it did the opposite: after consulting the Sibylline books, throughout the city they celebrated lavish festivities for eight days to propitiate the gods: “…houses were thrown open…all sorts of things placed for general use in the open courts, all comers, whether acquaintances or strangers, …brought in to share the hospitality. Men who had been enemies held friendly and sociable conversations…and abstained from all litigation, the manacles were removed from prisoners” (Livy, 5. pp. 3, 6-8).
It was the Black Death that set off a new trend coupling pandemic and hate, and the pairing became more common with modernity—the later plagues of the 16th and 17th centuries, and especially in the 19th century with cholera, smallpox uprisings in cities such as Milwaukee in 1894, bubonic plague at the end of the 19th century and early years of the 20th century in Calcutta, Bom-
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bay, Puna, and Kampur against British governors and health workers and in Honolulu and San Francisco against their Chinese communities. These incidents of violence, however, pale by comparison with one disease of modernity and its vilification of the other: typhus. To quell fears of lice-borne pathogens ending Western civilization, German governments from the late 19th century to the Nazis quarantined and attacked the poor from Eastern Europe and ultimately the Jews, first with the development of new chemicals to cleanse bodies and defend borders, then with Nazi extermination of the supposed human carriers. Yet by 1909 typhus was no longer a mysterious disease or a demographic threat in Western Europe. As this last, most horrific nexus of disease and hate shows, neither a disease’s severity, mystery, nor newness necessarily determined its likelihood to spark mass hatred and blame as scholars presently claim.
Nonetheless, on occasion, pandemics did split societies with accusations and violence. Historians, doctors, and psychologists have yet to map when, where, or why these incidents occurred; to explain why some diseases were more or less persistently the exceptions, while others were not. They have yet to raise the questions within a comparative framework of world epidemics or to consider that, at least in part, the probabilities of a pandemic stirring social violence and the blaming of others may have depended on the character of the diseases themselves. The study of pandemics, from the ancient Greeks to the present, makes two things clear: hate was not the inevitable product of widespread contagious diseases—part of our timeless mental structures—nor did a supposed pandemic-hate nexus loosen its grip with the progressive march of modernity and our natural understanding of pathogens and disease. Instead, the correlation, if anything, was the opposite.
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How to cite this article
Cohn, S. (2012). Hate in times of pestilence. Clio’s Psyche, 19(1), 113-116.



