
Volume 20 - Number 1 - June 2013
Pages: 1 - 125
Dervin, D. (2013). Anger vs. hate: The politicizing of American emotional life. Clio’s Psyche, 20(1), 111-118.
Anger vs. Hate: The Politicizing of American Emotional Life
Abstract
This article, written after the 2012 U.S. elections, sets out the author’s concern about political polarization, describing itself as exploratory. It attributes the decline of Senate moderates and the rise in Patriot groups to the reaction to Barack Obama’s election and health care law and to the Tea Party’s targeting of moderates, and asks whether animosities at both ends of the left/right scale share a rigid division of the world into good and bad camps. It proposes distinguishing anger, characterized as relational, specific, and aimed at repairing a disrupted tie, from hatred, characterized as impersonal, entrenched, and all-or-nothing, and suggests that most leftwing negativity is anger and most rightwing negativity hatred, with overlaps and exceptions. Examples include the movements of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., Vietnam-era protests, Occupy Wall Street, the Red Brigades, anti-abortion activism, Tea Party rhetoric, birther claims about Obama, and gun purchases after the Newtown shooting. It is sharply critical of Republican and Tea Party rhetoric and imagery directed at Obama, while allowing that both sides have negative tendencies. The far left and far right, it maintains, converge, driven respectively by an ideal of organic wholeness and an ideal of hierarchical order. Inferring what lies beneath hatred, it proposes that hatred defends against fear of losing control and of retaliation from the enemy hatred creates. It urges attention to underlying fears, less reaction to inflammatory rhetoric, and dialogue, while acknowledging the path will be arduous.
abortion, American emotional life, American politics, anger, Barack Obama, demonization, gun control, hate, political ideologies, psychohistory, psychopathology
The present essay is largely exploratory and inferential, aiming to distinguish which emotions tend to coalesce around and fuel political ideologies. A quirk complicating this task at the outset is that once a left/right scale is spread, positions on various issues—abortion, gun control, the U.N.—necessarily diverge with no ideal mid-point. Instead, one finds a middle-ground to be claimed only after one has taken sides on given issues. But self-serving rhetoric aside, in politics one gains visibility only by moving off the dead center. Also, both extremes of the scale tend to bend around and merge in more disturbed and shared psychopathologies, with reckless rhetoric, violent acting-out, demonizing the other, and no concern for consequences.
However, in the scale’s central area, we can identify moderate, functional positions, a willingness to compromise, with reality checks, pro/con tallying, etc. The one thing all commentators in the aftermath of the 2012 elections could agree on is that the country has become deeply polarized, if not more so than ever. So there is some urgency in making sense of where we find ourselves today.
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In the 2010 elections, most moderates were chased off the field, and some of those who survived, like Maine’s Republican Senator Olympia Snowe, opted to retire. In fact, the rough parity in the Senate between Conservatives (28) and moderates (27) through 2007 will end in 2013 with only six of the latter returning (Nate Silver, “Moderate Republicans Fall Away in the Senate,” New York Times, 8 May 2012).
One might attribute this decline to George W. Bush, who some say led the country into two unwinnable wars while presiding over a major recession by the end of his term. But such appears less the case than the 2008 election of the first African-American president and Obama’s establishment of national health care as per campaign promise. Its passage served as the political wedge for reenergizing Grover Norquist’s anti-taxation pledge and the Tea Party’s targeting moderates regardless of party. The point has been made that polarizing rhetoric began emerging in the 1990s with the Newt Gingrich-style politics of personal destruction, culminating in the Clinton impeachment proceedings. But others have claimed that Gingrich mainly exploited existing tendencies. The number of Patriot groups tracked by the Southern Poverty Law Center peaked under Clinton in 1996 in the upper 800s, declined after his impeachment hearings and into the Bush years to 150, only to soar in 2012 to 1,274 (Charles M. Blow, “Revolutionary Language,” New York Times, 12 January 2013).
As moderate voices continue to be silenced, and despite Obama’s hefty victory margins, diehard anti-Obama minorities of 5 to 10% cling to notions that he’s a Muslim, a Marxist, or foreign born (Marc Fisher, “Second Inaugural They’d Like to Call Off,” Washington Post, 15 January 2013, C1). In this context, it’s worth asking (and taking up below) whether animosities stretching toward either end of the scale share a similar emotionally rigid structure. This would seem to be the case insofar as polarization presumes a splitting into good-guy/bad-guy constructs that dehumanize opponents. True, on its face the present situation may seem anomalous: liberals have their good-guy in the White House and don’t appear exercised over targeting a bad-guy, while conservatives have their bad-guy in the White House but haven’t found a good-guy to lead the charge to recoup power. Accordingly, pundits have portrayed
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the GOP as traditionally running on negative energy: Reagan’s “Empire of Evil,” Bush’s anti-Clinton White House prior to 9/11, then his “Axis of Evil,” Cheney’s Islamofascists, and Senator Mitch McConnell’s declaration in 2009 that the party’s top priority was getting rid of Obama (Jennifer Durham, “The ‘False Self’ Projected on Obama by Many Republicans,” Clio’s Psyche, December 2012, Vol. 19, 3, 315-8). Not surprisingly, the post-election GOP has imploded, descending into “toxic internal politics,” according to New Jersey Governor Chris Christie. “People are mad as hell,” claimed Amy Kremer, chair of the Tea Party Express, “and I’m right there with them” (Steve Peoples, “Republicans Seem Divided as Ever,” AP, 6 January 2013). Whether the Party-of-No label is merited, the party of Goldwater and Reagan that made government the problem, not the solution, is hard put, as David Brooks, notes, to “have a positive governing program” (“A Second G.O.P.,” New York Times, 29 January 2013, A21).
Still, while allowing for both sides of the aisle their share of negative tendencies, I wonder if we can further delineate their respective emotional appeals along political lines. To that end, I will go out on a limb and propose that most leftwing negativity is best discerned as anger and most rightwing negativity as hatred, always allowing for overlaps and exceptions. I define anger as an affective state of arousal over a felt wrong, in which negative affects seek release. In the process, the subject tends to focus on a personal object as the cause; and whether the source is direct or displaced, the release aims, at least in part, at restoring a prior but disrupted relationship. Parents and children, friends and lovers, bosses and employees, will at times likely display anger and usually find a degree of resolution. Anger is then relational, specific, and mostly short term unless prolonged by grievance, resentment, or irreconcilable differences. Then it can shade into hatred, which presumes a more or less permanent mind-set that does not abide resolution or patching-up. Hatred tends to be more impersonal, likely more primitive, entrenched, and in any case, a function of either/or, all-or-nothing ideation. In anger, when temperatures cool, positive aspects of the angry source may emerge and foster alleviation; the hated object, on the other hand, is beyond the pale, unredeemable. The former allows for letting-go, moderating, and, by gestures toward forgiving
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and forgetting, clears the way for further development; the latter tends to view forgiving or forgetting as dangerous signs of weakness. At most, if one’s hatred can tolerate getting in touch with angry feelings, some alleviation may be possible; anger combining with hatred issues in rage. Taken separately, hatred subsists in a two-dimensional world; anger in a three-dimensional one. In the latter, there may be a fallback position; in the former, less so.
Applying these terms to political protest movements augurs a deeper clarification of their dynamics. For example, Gandhi’s and Martin Luther King, Jr.’s human rights movements privileged non-violence, which, by taking the higher moral ground, garnered sympathy from outside groups while exposing the inhumane practices of the powers that be. The massive marches and rallies in the Vietnam period were predominantly nonviolent, even festive as many of us can attest, although the New Left’s Weathermen and the Black Panthers added a reckless and violence-prone fringe. I would emphasize that the vast majority of the personally directed “Hey, hey, LBJ, How many kids did you kill today?” and the angry defiance of the “Hell no! We won’t go!” adopted a cathartic mode that owned the angry feelings by putting them out-front; not coincidentally, the movement began to fizzle after Nixon ended the draft. Concurrently, his White House was covertly compiling an unforgiving “Enemies List.”
Decades later, the street theatre protests against the World Trade Organization and globalization contained violent elements that tangled with the police and destroyed property. The out-front anger here seems aimed at dramatizing perceived injustices as well as provoking authorities to excessive physical responses by staging the oppressive nature of the system. Occupy Wall Street, on the other hand, marked a return to peaceful modes of protest, in part by relying on leaderless spontaneity. With external authority outside the group discredited, recourse to internal leaders was logically ruled out; but egalitarian anarchy offered a short shelf life. The hacker tactics of Anonymous and WikiLeaks also parlayed a decentralized network and eschewed any prescribed agendas, but their indiscriminate actions tended to exceed the range of anger. Still, social media networking proved effective during the Arab Spring, at least short term.
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Other more radical leftwing groups, like Earth First, have conducted assaults on property, and here we see what begins as mainly generational anti-authority gravitating toward an unrelenting and ideological-driven, guerrilla war-style hatred of the other. Often a generation older and fueled by nostalgic memories, antigovernment protesters from the right react more to felt betrayals of their country’s foundations and fear of being led down the primrose path of socialism. So it is that the far left nursing on utopian fantasies and the far right feeding on an idealized past tend to merge as the left/right scale curves around and opposites dissolve into never neverland. A few distinctions apply. The passions of the left seem driven by an ideal of lost organic wholeness with a lingering agrarian matrix; the right seems driven by an ideal of order within an inherent hierarchy, and in this respect, never the twain shall meet. These longed for absolutes are frustrated by equally formidable opponents who serve to marshal resources in an all-out crusade or revolution over the at-risk ideals and demand ever more drastic action and sacrifice, as love is long since sidelined by hate.
We can see how this sequence played out in the radical Italian group of the 1970s Red Brigades. Their original members emerged from idealistic communist youth movements whose tactics began turning to destabilizing the country by acts of sabotage, robberies, and assassinations. As Marxist-Leninists, their Manifesto targeted the State as an “imperialistic collection of multinational corporations” (cited in Wikipedia). In 1974, they killed two neofascist politicians, and four years later raised the stakes by kidnapping former Premier Aldo Moro as a bargaining chip for a prisoner exchange. After 54 days elapsed, his captors loaded him into a car under a blanket and fire eleven shots into his chest, gauged to prolong his suffering. The American counterparts would likely be neo-Nazis and white supremacists whose violent agendas have mostly been intercepted by the FBI (Dave Hall, Into the Devil’s Den, 2008). Less extreme but with a track record of hate are militant anti-abortionists who place abortion doctors in bulls-eyes on web sites while demonizing them as Adolf Hitler, whose procedures perpetrate a holocaust of the unborn. The Tea Party trades in violent gestures and menacing symbols. Its candidates have roughed up reporters, and supporters made a show of “packing heat” (guns)
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to Democratic rallies. Sarah Palin’s campaign ads literally targeted Democratic congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords in a weapon’s cross hairs (this was before her wounding in a Tucson shootout at a political gathering).
The Tea Party has been deemed an authentic populist movement directed against a demonized Washington. While it may not be possible to separate anger from hatred in their rallies and overheated rhetoric, their pogroms against moderate Republicans reveal all-or-nothing agendas that disparage compromise as weakness or striking bargains with the devil. Similarly, the birthers’ demonization of Obama as not a bona-fide-American, the caricatures of him as the blood-sucking Joker derived from the Batman films, as an African monkey, or as a bullet riddled zombie (Anita Kumar, “Va. GOP condemns Obama Email,” Washington Post 1 November 2011), display a two-dimensional cognitive mode (Durham). This by now familiar strategy has taken peculiar turns since the election, the most striking being the trending among several states, especially Texas, to secede from the Union; the petition, with 125,000 names, has been squelched for now as unconstitutional. This and other gestures, like the diehard flailing about for impeachment grounds, suggest ways to access deeper levels of hatred’s tenacity.
Given the overcharged and evidently over determined levels of hatred, what might be their latent content? Since latent levels are by definition repressed, they are less confidently sighted than inferred and supported by interpretation. The following vignette may offer one kind of entry. In the aftermath of the 2012 election, the Washington Post ran a story by reporter Anne Hull, who had apparently been embedded with a suburban couple near Tampa, Florida during the election. In their late 50s, the “Rs” are Republican precinct workers and “Tea Party patriots.” For the wife, “The battle is lost, the war is not. And it begins today.” Explaining that she and her retired electrician spouse were not doomsday “preppers” storing up food and other survival goods, she acknowledged they were planning to stock up on guns and ammo. “We’ll probably get a long gun and a short gun,” she said. “We’ve already got our concealed gun permits.” But she hesitates getting fingerprinted and registered, because then “they know who you are.” She worries that Obama is going to downsize the military, close bases, and build
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up his own, consisting of the National Guard and Homeland Security. Her husband can’t figure out who Obama is—Buddhist? Christian? Muslim? Suspiciously adopting a black dialect for African-Americans? “We are steeling ourselves. It’s time to regroup” (“For Some, the Painful Dawn of Four More Years,” 8 November 2012, C1). What can be felt seeping into these responses is less overt hatred than deep-seated fears, centering on losing control over their lives due to a hostile takeover. In this context, hatred is a defense against a more dangerous level of fear, an active response to fears over passivity and self-disintegration. Rather than surrendering a beleaguered autonomy, they have declared war against a designated and dangerously powerful but inscrutable enemy.
Similar reactions resound across the country. After the school massacre in Newtown, gun sales soared out of fear that Obama’s people would outlaw assault rifles; as NRA reps met with Joe Biden at the White House in mid-January, its membership grew by 100,000. “If I had 1,000 ARs [semi-automatic rifles],” claimed an Iowa gun dealer, I could sell them in a week” (Michael Cooper, 12 January 2013, New York Times, A1). A CEO for a Tennessee company that trains people in using firearms tactically has warned that if gun control measures are passed, it will “spark a civil war, and I’ll be glad to fire the first shot” (Blow, A17).
If there is a latent content to anger, one could surmise it’s touching on anxiety over the damage to an emotional tie, but a different scenario for hatred is required. Clues appear in the nature of hatred as a closed circuit, rarely if ever yielding to either internal or external pressures for change. The enemies that hatred creates stay enemies. Why? I would propose this is the case because the dangerous fear that is being warded off arises out of imagined retaliation from the hated other. When hatred creates an enemy through projection, there is always the danger of that projection boomeranging. This is why the enemy most often must be destroyed, either directly or, more commonly, by groups as designated delegates to locate viable targets and leave matters to an alienated gunman, as in the case of abortion doctors being ambushed and gunned down.
Thus in a sort of twisted psychic-logic, the prospect of an enemy becoming friendly is anathema. Politically, this can be played out in various ways, some more transparent than others. In
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the 2012 primaries, Rick Santorum seemed to see “Nazis everywhere: in the Middle East, in doctors’ offices and medical labs, in the Democratic Party, and in the White House,” writes Dana Milbank. The coming election was like the run-up to World War II when Americans failed to recognize Hitler’s threat (“Santorum Cries Nazi,” Washington Post, 22 February 2012, A15). During the Republican primaries, candidates burnished their tough-guy credentials by portraying Obama as weak for allegedly delivering ill advised apologies to potential enemies. Implicit in the candidates’ posturing was the groupthink that such gestures left the country vulnerable to evil-minded people lying in wait to exploit any sign of weakness. But far from Obama flinging out apologies pell-mell, James Traub shows his willingness to learn from past mistakes while seeking a more perfect union (“I’m Sorry: The Scariest word in Politics,” New York Times, 4 December 2011, SR5); in fact, actual apologies were never on the table. But strong leaders in this scenario project a world where one’s designated enemies are inherently untrustworthy—diplomacy, dialogue, and give-and-take are off the table. It’s a recipe for constant warfare geared to validate a conspiratorial mindset wherein hostilities are projected and then warded off as they recoil in spades, should we ever lower our guard. Scary—yes, but not for the reason alleged.
What to do? At the very least, we can become more conscious of what may underlie political forms of polarization, more urgently discourage knee-jerk reactions to all the saber-rattling bluster, and whenever opportunities for dialogues arise, try to tune into the underlying fears, without assuming the path to alleviation will ever be less than arduous.
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How to cite this article
Dervin, D. (2013). Anger vs. hate: The politicizing of American emotional life. Clio’s Psyche, 20(1), 111-118.



