The Second Bush Persian Gulf War

The long-awaited and feared second Bush Persian Gulf War has come and gone. Below, I describe the war and free-associate about it. Elsewhere, in the Journal of Psychohistory, my December 2002 Clio’s Psyche (Vol. 9 No. 3) article, “Perspectives on Teaching About War-Making in 2002 America,” is being reprinted with the comments of eight colleagues and my response to their thoughts on it. These are different, but complementary, articles.

War brings both great fears and hopes, though often from different sectors of the population. Students, who as young people incline to favor action over inaction, tend to be more positive about war. Women and older citizens tend to be more aware of the downside of war. During the war, there were numerous fears expressed, suppressed, and repressed. Fears of biological or chemical weapons used against the invading armies or on the home front ebbed and flowed throughout the conflict. As a psychohistorian I wonder if the enormous fears of SARS (Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome) was partly a displacement of worldwide fears of terrorist biological and chemical weapons. After all, there was and is a tremendous focus on this health issue despite the facts that as of today’s news (May 12) there is not one confirmed U.S. death from it and that the flu kills 20,000­30,000 Americans every year. It has long been my conjecture that we humans in­cline to project our own individual health fears onto the nation, and that we feel more or less healthy depending upon how healthy the nation seems to be. Epidemiological studies showed a de­cline in the rate of death by some diseases and suicide in World War II when people were so focused

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on the health of the country itself.

Twentieth-century warfare and its after­math were devastating to ordinary people. Civilians died by the millions in World War II: the causes were “friendly” and unfriendly fire, bombing, starvation, thirst, disease, slave labor, incarceration under inhumane conditions, and genocide. Many deaths can be attributed to the policies of the governments of the civilians rather than their avowed enemies. Civilians died in large numbers in the Iraq-Iran Gulf War of the 1980s and of course they were not spared in the first Bush Gulf War of 1991. However, in that case, Peter Arnett’s CNN cameras showing civilian death and destruction reminded Americans that civilian death and destruction are a typical part of warfare. The images of Iraqi women holding their dead loved ones amidst piles of rubble, or angrily waving their fists at the cameras while denouncing America shattered the myth that we were only hurting him (“him” variously referred to Saddam Hussein, the Republican Guard, Hussein’s army and forces of repression, and the enemy in general). Despite our best efforts to dehumanize the Iraqis in the service of attempting to limit our compassion only to U.S. and allied sons and daughters in the war zone, these vivid images forced many to face some of the realities of war. There was much humor at the time aimed at dehumanizin^g the moral force of these Iraqi women. I remember a colleague at the college, who was also a state senator, asking as a “joke,” “How many Iraqi women does it take to get a full set of teeth?” His answer of “32” reflected contempt for the poverty of these poor displaced women who often appeared to have only a few teeth.

The recent propaganda war harkens back to the “War on Terrorism” which started out being called a “crusade,” but “crusade” had to be dropped because of its negative connotations in the Islamic world. The next proposed title, “Infinite Justice,” was an affront to devout Muslims because only Allah can dispense “infinite justice.” It also made too many Arab monarchs and dictators nervous, so the equally vague “Enduring Freedom” was used in the war with Afghanistan. “Operation Iraqi Freedom” is the official U.S. label for the war, though it is not supported by the pictures of the bodies of Iraqi children and civilians killed as “collateral damage” and the spontaneous calls for Americans to leave almost immediately after Sad­dam Hussein lost power. The Arab media never depicted the war as the “War for Iraqi Freedom” Different U.S. networks presented the news over banners at the bottom of the television screen such as “Attack on Iraq” and “War in Iraq.” At the end of the first week of fighting, a properly descriptive subtitle might have been, “Operation Dangerously Long Supply Lines,” but this was not apparent on any channel I viewed, since it did not fit the daily script.

When a president, who got elected denouncing “nation building,” uses terms like “crusade,” ^“Infinite Justice,” and “Enduring Freedom,” I worry that they reveal apocalyptic fantasies or a cynical willingness to simply sell the wars to the American public using rhetoric which will broadcast well. After all, if such goals are taken seriously, it could mean never-ending meddling in the affairs of others and endless wars with large casualties on all sides under the pretense of democracy. On the other hand, if the terms are mostly meant as propaganda, then American efforts will have been squandered. The situation in Afghanistan suggests the latter interpretation. The current administration won the war inexpensively through an alliance with the warlords, and, despite the slogan, “Enduring Freedom,” there is little sign of freedom for most people throughout the country. The government the U.S. installed in the capital city is sustained by our forces and its president is thought of as the mayor of Kabul since his control and influence is almost nonexistent beyond its out­skirts. Regarding Iraq, we do not know how the American public will react to the costs of the occupation, resentment over a Western presence, and struggles by different individuals and groups for dominance.

The language of war is of great concern to me as a psychohistorian. My ears always perk up when I hear words like “kill” and parental language. So I took notice when I heard about “kill boxes”­-areas where U.S. firepower killed with­out restraint in Iraq. The words “father” and “mother” also draw my attention, as when Saddam Hussein in 1991 promised “the mother of all battles.” For this Gulf war, the United States has developed the gigantic bunker-buster “mother of all bombs” (MOAB) which had been considered for use should Saddam Hussein or the Republican Guard assemble for a desperate last stand.

In a war in which the Defense Department partly chose targets after consulting with lawyers and with an eye as to how the results of the action would look on television, the idea of “kill boxes” clearly is worth probing. For the period of the war, in those special places (“kill boxes”), our repressed

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murderous desires are given free reign. I suspect that the opposition of the French, Germans, and Russians to this war was based in part upon the fear that Bush and Company are a bunch of Texas cowboy-types spoiling for a fight. They were re­pulsed by the President wanting bin Laden “dead or alive” and the Vice President’s referring to wanting the Saudi terrorist’s “head on a plate.” The Germans, at the behest of the West, have especially suppressed and repressed most of their murderous desires and are offended by the administration’s more open aggression. American pollsters (we are always taking our political temperature) perhaps should have some questions relating to re­action formations against violence, because I suspect these are some of the great divides in our society.

War is always a gamble and bored military personnel are well known for gambling despite the meagerness of their salaries, but this is the first war in which I recollect playing cards becoming a major interest of the media As the Baath Party disintegrated and Saddam’s forces retreated, the Defense Department issued 55 playing cards to the military and media with the pictures, positions, vital statistics, and other information on this most wanted list. The

U.S and its allies have won the first hand in this conflict, but it remains to be seen if our government understands the Middle East and its games well enough, and has the staying power to win its peacetime objectives.

In the first two weeks of this war, when “shock and awe” were emphasized, American civilian and military leadership had to do some quick public relations adjusting to the failed fantasies of an instantly successful war as a result of “taking out” (killing) Saddam Hussein Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the military had to work over­time trying to convince the public that the war was going according to plan, and that they never expected it to be over almost instantly. The problem was in sending their message simultaneously to Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi military, the Iraqi people, the American public, and the world. They would have much preferred being able to particularize the message to each audience, but that option diminishes in the era of global, 24­four­hours­aday, seven-days-a-week (24/7) coverage by competing news outlets. The longer the war endured, the less saleable was the idea of conflict without casualties and the danger of disillusionment increased. The logic of warfare, especially asymmetrical warfare (where one side has a preponderance of power), is at odds with the logic of winning over the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. For ex­ample, a suicide-bomb killing of American GIs resulted in field commanders giving “shoot-to-kill” orders to their troops at checkpoints, with some civilians being killed for not responding fast enough. Increasingly, the Iraqi people were caught between “a rock and a hard place.” The “rock” was allied bombing and firepower, the Hussein administration’s hiding its military equipment among civilians, using irregular troops and tactics of deception, and firing without regard into civilian areas (if we are to believe the reports allowed by American military sources). The “hard place” was the thirst, hunger, terror, bombing, desperation, looting, and hysteria of war.

Early on in this violent conflict, the war was being defined by government spokesmen and retired generals and colonels in primarily military terms. There was great interest in the technology in the early stages of the war, though not to the same extent as in the 1991 war when our country was fascinated by “smart bombs.” The hope (the fantasy) of the first few days was that the war would be over almost instantly as a result of our marvelous military technology “taking out” (killing) Saddam Hussein. The wish was that in the face of our amazingly precise technology, the Iraqi people would quickly throw off their oppressors and loudly hail us as liberators, thereby silencing much of the world’s criticism of President Bush’s choice of war rather than of continued UN inspection. The fantasy was of an instant war in which only the “bad guys” were the casualties. This fantasy did not become the reality. In fact, the rest of the world was more in tune with the reality of it being a bloody war than was and is the United States.

In war, there is no neutral terminology, de­spite the major effort the U.S. made to appear objective. What the Bush Administration calls the “War for Iraqi Freedom,” Al-Jazeera is calling an American war of aggression and occupation, rather like the Israeli occupation of the West Bank of Palestine. Arab media portrays dead Iraqis as Arab martyrs. The propaganda war was fought by all sides in cyberspace, and in many respects still is being fought. The Al-Jazeera television station in Qatar had its English language version delayed by Americans who disliked its bias and its eagerness to show American casualties even before the families were notified.

As a psychohistorical scholar, my transfer-

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ence and countertransference to the war must be monitored and its impact assessed. Let me give an example of my awareness of this. Although there appears to be an excitement for most people that comes with war, I usually experience the outbreak of war as a defeat and am slightly depressed when it happens. Simultaneously, I notice that while Americans of all ages appear to feel more connected by the common fear and hope for victory, I feel less connected. In 1991 when I faced this problem I created the Emotions of the 1991 Persian Gulf War Research Project of the Psychohistory Forum. I worked closely with colleagues and students studying reactions to the war, doing surveys of the emotions of over 1000 Americans, Russians, French, Israelis, Australians, and others. This activity energized me when my country was sending men abroad to kill others and be killed. The study also confirmed the well-known phenomenon of a sense of greater American cohesiveness during wartime.

The influence of my own experiences as a soldier in the United States Army during the Cold War should not go unmentioned. It taught me an enormous amount about the differences between the theory of war and the practice, especially because American wars are carried out mostly by very young, scared, and often careless males. I am saddened, but not surprised, by the number of personnel killed in accidents and by friendly fire, in fact, close to 40 percent in Iraq in 2003. (Amy Goldstein et al, “U.S. Casualties Came From More Than Enemy Fire,” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, Vol. 20 No. 26, April 21­27, p. 10)

It is instructive to examine many of the elements of the war with which my students are more familiar. From the onset of the conflict, in search of more information and baffled by different cover­age perspectives, students were open to discussions of the propaganda war. With some help from me, the misuses of journalism were apparent. The Department of Defense (as a historian I remember when it was called, with greater honesty, the Department of War) realized that its 1991 Gulf War strategy of keeping reporters far from the action was not likely to be successful in the 21st century due to the proliferation of Arabic news outlets and the hostility of much of the world to this war. It decided to “embed” reporters within different military units before and during the war. The advantage to reporters was the immediacy of participation in the conflict. The military benefited from the mostly temporary censorship regarding what was released to the news outlets and the reporters’ identification with the military personnel among whom they served. This arrangement, of course, meant that most American reporters were not covering the greatest victims of warfare: civilians. Regrettably, during wartime civilians are almost never covered by the media except to portray the inhumanity of the enemy.

Our administration’s stated goal was the liberation of the Iraqi people. Consequently, it began the 2003 Persian Gulf War by attempting to destroy the enemy, while leaving the Iraqi infra­structure and people unscathed. The policy of liberation meant some concern to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, the partial humanization of the Iraqi people (unusual during wartime), and the desire to disprove much of the world’s current view that Americans, or at least the Bush administration, is bloodthirsty. Many of the leaders of our government remember how little stomach the American people had for the televised images of the 1991 mass slaughter of retreating Iraqi soldiers on the “Highway of Death.” Rumsfeld had hoped that a policy of “shock and awe” would crush the will of the Iraqi administration, while saving the U. S. from having to rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure or look bloodthirsty on television.

On the American “home front,” the cover­age of the war news was pervasive. It involved “reality war” with “real-time” journalism, which, in the earliest stages, sounded like a commercial for whatever military unit in which the journalist was embedded. Television retired generals and colonels replaced the usual news experts. This defining of the war in almost purely military terms inclined to miss many of the central issues of asymmetrical warfare. When one power has overwhelming force, as did our military in Iraq, the weaker side normally uses whatever means possible to achieve its goals. This includes assuming the mantle of victim (difficult for Saddam Hussein, but not the long­suffering Iraqi people), attempting to win the propaganda war, and increasing the cost and brutality of the conflict. The great fear was that ultimately, if all else failed, Hussein would use whatever weapons of mass destruction were at his disposal. Fortunately, this never happened.

In thinking about war, I think it is helpful if I mention my usual levels of classroom discourse: What do you know about it? How does it feel? What are your thoughts about it? What are the underlying causes, the “why,” of it? What body(ies)

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of knowledge might be applied to gain greater in­sight? Sometimes I will use David Beisel’s five levels of classroom discussion. These are: the descriptive level (what facts are agreed upon), the causal level, the consequences, the judgmental level (the rights and wrongs), and the prescriptive level for improving the situation. (David Beisel, “Columbine: The Search for Causes,” Clio’s Psyche, Vol. 6 No. 1, June 1999, p. 14) Both of these systems work quite well.

War in itself is a comparatively simple process in which each force seeks to kill and disable the other before its own will to fight is broken. The transition to peace can be quite difficult. When the existing government has collapsed or been destroyed, it is difficult to re­establish peace through control of food and other necessities, fear, and force of arms. Uncertainty and even chaos can follow as in Iraq today where weapons are every­where and there is widespread looting as well as different individuals and groups seeking retribution and future advantage. Stability is re­established in these situations when people see enough examples of others being shot for looting, violating curfew, or even holding arms. The aftermath of war and the establishment of a workable, peaceful government through the force of arms is especially complicated when it is in a county without a representational and democratic tradition, that is fragmented by different ethnic and religious groups. When this is carried out under the scrutiny of 24/7 news coverage, in an area of the world hostile to the occupying county, the problems are multiplied, as Americans are presenting learning in Iraq.

Comparisons are being made in the media regarding the establishment of a civil society and democracy in post-WWII Germany and Japan, and the current situation in Iraq. There are very major differences. First and foremost, both the Germans and the Japanese had considerable experience with representational government The Germans had a viable democracy preceding and longer than the 12 years of Nazi rule. Both countries for years suffered from the deprivations and realities of war, preparing them to be submissive in peace. Both saw Western occupation as far superior to occupation by the Communists, a fact of life in East Germany and a realistic fear elsewhere. In Japan, the Emperor lent his prestige to an orderly transition to peace. In neither county was open opposition to the occupiers allowed.

Iraq has no tradition of effective representation in government, to say nothing of democracy.

It is also surrounded by neighbors who are hostile to Western influences and American dreams of establishing a secular, democratic state. It is not even certain that Saddam Hussein is dead or that many of his forces have not resolved to dissolve into the populace to wage guerilla warfare, as partisans did against the Nazis in World War II Yugoslavia. Probably the only thing that Iraqi Shiite and Sunni Muslims can agree upon is that they want the victors to both rebuild their country and depart almost immediately. Well-organized Shiite groups are calling for an Islamic Republic along the lines of Iran. The smallest of the major groups, the Kurds in the north, who really don’t want to be a part of Iraq, may very well want Americans to stay as a protection against both Baghdad and Ankara (Turkey).

What are the prospects for a democracy in Iraq? My answer is: not very good for democracy. However, there are some positive indicators for a viable state: Iraq has oil, water, a significant middle class, and a tradition of secularism, even if the latter has been weakened by the spread of fundamentalism in the region and through Saddam Hussein’s recent attempts to gamer support among the people by building mosques. It is unclear whether the United States (which so many Iraqis see as hating its religion and greedy for its oil) has the will­power to pay for rebuilding Iraq and to stay long enough_. for the firm establishment of a government which could become democratic. Whether an international body could do this better is also in question, though handing responsibility over to one may be a good exit strategy for an administration tired of bad publicity and a high price tag.

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