
Volume 13 - Number 1 - June 2006
Pages: 1 - 80
SYMPOSIUM
Fuchsman, K. (2006). Evidence and concepts in psychohistory. Clio’s Psyche, 13(1), 13-14.
Evidence and Concepts in Psychohistory
Abstract
In this article, written for the Evidential Basis of Psychohistory symposium, the author responds to John Jacob Hartman’s lead essay, “The Evidential Basis of Psychohistory in Group Process.” The author characterizes Hartman’s approach as empirically based and conceptually sophisticated, and his move from empirical psychology to history as sound, while proposing improvements. The response summarizes Hartman’s reliance on six systematically scored small-group studies and his four propositions, including that groups develop solutions to distress that restore homeostasis and that groups develop a shared utopian political ideology. It notes Hartman’s acknowledgment that extending these findings to history is argument by analogy. The author argues that six studies may be too few, observes that not all groups reach agreement, and suggests studying distressed groups that do not reach homeostasis or consensus. Concepts from sociology and political science are proposed to clarify differences between small and larger groups. Contrasting the largely supportive American home front in World War II with the polarization over the Vietnam War, the author questions the homeostasis and shared-utopian-fantasy propositions, contending that ideological divisions may reflect differing primal fantasies and that Hartman assumes too much unity. The author maintains that differing standards of evidence across natural science, social science, and the humanities complicate an epistemological synthesis, and concludes that psychohistorians should weigh evidence for and against a thesis and make their concepts as complex as the phenomena require.
adaptive, conceptually sophisticated, defensive, emotional distress, empirical foundation, group homeostasis, interaction scoring, John J. Hartman, pitfalls, psychohistory, psychology
John J. Hartman’s article on the evidential basis of psychohistory is quite promising. It is empirically based, conceptually sophisticated, and it shows an awareness of some of the pitfalls in his approach. Still, there are ways his model can be improved.
The empirical foundation of Hartman’s approach is the research he and others conducted on small group processes. He cites six studies of small groups where systematic scoring of interaction occurred.
To him the findings from these studies demonstrate two psychohistorical propositions: “groups develop in ways that can be measured as reactions to emotional distress” and “groups develop solutions to reduce distress and return the group to homeostasis in adaptive and defensive ways.” Hartman extends these findings to history.
In moving from psychology to psychohistory, two more propositions are added: “groups develop a shared utopian political ideology based on a shared fantasy in order to deal with intra-group distress” and utopian “fantasies in groups derive from shared pre-oedipal symbiotic merger fantasies with the ‘Good Mother’ in individuals.”
Hartman states that “the jump from the small group to the large group to historical change is argument by analogy.” This kind of argument, he writes, does not provide “the same range of evidential certainty” as do the psychological findings. He says: “as systems become more complex, explanatory power can become markedly reduced unless our conceptual powers become as complex as what we are trying to explain.”
Building on Hartman’s base, other psychohistorians can go beyond argument by analogy to build the more complex conceptual approach he advocates. As full of potential as Hartman’s article is, there are psychological and psychohistorical issues to discuss.
His study of group interactions is systematic and detailed, but there are only six studies cited. More such studies may be necessary to give further empirical weight to his first two propositions, in particular to his conclusion that groups develop solutions to reduce stress and restore homeostasis. Not all groups may reach agreement or attempt to reduce stress. If members have not solidified identification with and loyalty to the group there may not be sufficient consensus to arrive at agreed upon solutions. It may be helpful to look at groups in distress who have not reached homeostasis or consensus to study if and how they make and maintain decisions.
In relation to psychohistory, Hartman discusses the need for a conceptually complex model
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between psychology and psychohistory. What concepts would be needed to have findings derived from the study of small groups apply to events in the historical arena? Concepts and findings on the study of groups from sociology and political science might help clarify the similarities and differences between the functioning of small groups and those of larger groups, communities, nations, and relations between nations. Incorporating knowledge from these other disciplines will he helpful in moving from psychology to psychohistory.
Hartman’s propositions need further clarification to realize their potential. I am not sure about the accuracy of two of his propositions: one in which he says distressed groups develop solutions to restore homeostasis and the other where he discusses group development of a shared utopian political ideology. To illustrate my concerns, I will discuss American domestic responses to two wars. Wars are stressful for combatants and those remaining at home. In World War II, the American home front was mostly supportive of the war effort, even though it lasted nearly four years and resulted in almost half a million American deaths. Patriotic feelings ran high; identification with the righteousness of the cause and loyalty to the nation were widespread.
Contrast this with the polarization that evolved in relation to the Vietnam War. Ideological divisions developed; a radical left portrayed the war as imperialistic, many liberals came to see the war as a misapplication of the containment policy, and many conservatives defended our involvement as a way to stop Communism. The solutions various groups proposed did not result in a consensus, nor were many designed to restore homeostasis. Some leaders, including Vice President Agnew, called for positive polarization. Identifications were not with the nation as a whole, but with political allies; loyalties were divided. There was not a single shared utopian political fantasy, but a variety of often competing ideological commitments.
Groups may design solutions to reduce distress, and they might agitate to further conflict. Shared political fantasies may permeate a group or nation, but just as well ideological divisions may reflect different primal fantasies. Hartman assumes too much unity in both group psychology and historical reality. His approach of moving from empirical psychology to history is solid; his application of his approach needs the further conceptual complexity for which he calls.
Hartman wants to establish an evidential basis for psychohistory—a major challenge. History is usually classified as one of the humanities, but it clearly contains a strong social science component. Psychology is a social science with roots in natural science and the humanities. Within and between these academic cultures of natural science, social science and the humanities, there are diverging standards as to what counts as evidence and how to evaluate it. Given that psychohistory has allegiance in all three academic cultures, a successful epistemological synthesis will be difficult to develop. Biologist Ernst Mayr declares: “consensus is hard to achieve” in “that disagreeing scientists adhere to different underlying ideologies, making certain theories acceptable to one group which are impossible for another group” (Ernst Mayr, This Is Biology, [1997], p. 103).
Historians have long lived with indeterminacy, with the reality of conflicting interpretations of the same evidence. There are various schools within psychoanalysis, yet alone the plethora of approaches to psychotherapy. Among psychohistorians, there are bound to be a plurality of concepts and standards of evidence on both the psychological and the historical sides of the discipline. Nevertheless, some things are facts and others are not. Still when it comes to developing a fact-based thesis or argument, the good psychohistorian must always ask what evidence counts for and what counts against the thesis, and continually strive to make his or her concepts clear, comprehensive and complex enough, as Hartman calls for, to explain the psychohistorical phenomena being studied.
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How to cite this article
Fuchsman, K. (2006). Evidence and concepts in psychohistory. Clio’s Psyche, 13(1), 13-14.



