Competing Views of Human Motivation and Psychology

Are humans more selfish than social, more competitive than benevolent? These complicated questions have found advocates on one side or another for centuries, even millennia. Often observers associate the competitive view with Hobbes and the more social perspective with Rousseau. I am going to examine these competing views, but focus more on the strengths and dilemmas within those contemporary academics who see humans as cooperative, collaborative, and empathic.

Beginning with the harsher view, Hobbes thought that in the proverbial state of nature everyone competed with each other and life was nasty and brutish. Herbert Spencer’s Social Darwinism championed the survival of the fittest, in ways that modified Hobbes by siding with the victors. More recently there are proponents of selfish gene theory, sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and rational self-interest. In these views, humans are cognitive actors who help others when it is in their self-interest and/or to benefit their ability to survive and reproduce. Human emotionality, outside of the joys of winning, plays a minor role in these more recent perspectives.

In the last few decades, a counter tradition among academic researchers that stresses our cooperative and empathic nature has been gaining ascendancy. Jean Decety and William Ickes proclaim that “empathy research is suddenly everywhere!” (2009, vii). The year 2009 alone saw the publication of books with titles such as The Age of Empathy and The Empathic Civilization, among others.

Advocates of humans as empathic use the findings of recent research to counter the perspective that humans are mostly focused

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on their own individual wants and needs over those of others. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy says that “discoveries by evolutionary minded psychologists, economists, and neuroscientists are propelling the cooperative side of human nature to center stage,” and “are transforming disciplines long grounded in the premise that the world is a competitive place where to be a rational actor means being a selfish one.” She concludes that the “ability to identify with others and vicariously experience their suffering is not simply learned: It is part of us” (2009, 4, 7). Hrdy is far from alone in saying that care and concern for others are intrinsic to human nature; so do primatologist Frans de Waal, psychologist Michael Tomasello and environmentalist Jeremy Rifkin, among others. Michael Hoffman says that empathy is “the glue that makes social life possible” (2000, 3). The die is cast; to these writers, being cooperative is at the core of who we are as a species, and those who characterize us as primarily selfish are mistaken.

If our prosocial tendencies are so essential, what exactly are cooperation and empathy? As with many concepts, there is much controversy on the definition of empathy. Michael Tomasello says that cooperation can involve being sharing, helpful or informative, depending on the activity involved (Tomasello, 2009, 5). C. Daniel Batson finds that there are eight different definitions of empathy, but boils them down to accuracy of understanding and concern. It is not only that individuals can know others’ internal world, but that they also “respond with sensitive care” and have “enormous importance for our life together” (Batson, 2009, 11). Empathy is distinguished from sympathy. In the Compact Oxford English Dictionary, ‘“Empathy’ means ‘the ability to understand and share the feelings of another person’…whereas ‘sympathy’ means ‘the feeling of being sorry for someone who is unhappy or in difficulty’” (Soanes and Hawker, 2005, 325). Empathy covers a broader emotional canvas than sympathy does. Some equate mind-reading, the accurate perception of thoughts, with empathy. If the thought-reader does not have a positive emotional feeling toward the other but is indifferent, neutral, or hostile, it is not, in Batson’s view, empathy. His notion that empathy includes accurate perception and sensitivity to the other is consistent with the Oxford English Dictionary’s usage. Those who equate mind-reading and empathy emphasize the cogni-

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tive more than the emotional, yet the question of the relationship of self to other in empathy remains open as does where are the boundaries and where the sharing in being empathic.

Understanding the virtues and dilemmas of cooperation and empathy requires tracing how they develop. Collaborative action does appear fairly early in life. When and why this happens is of central importance in understanding the complex fate of being empathic. Cooperation arises in the second year of life after the child can clearly distinguish him or herself from others (Pfeiffer and Depretto, 2009, 185). It also emerges from the ways the child is nurtured. To Batson, the evolution of empathy is part of a “parental instinct” in many mammals, which is highly developed in homo sapiens (Batson, 2012, 46).

Empathy develops in stages, beginning with the connection between caregivers and infants. Research shows attachment is derived from biology. Anthropologist Melvin Konner states, “Attachment… is wired into the infant’s brain.” It “is an instinct—a complex, highly motivated, unlearned behavior” (Konner, 2010, 233). Every infant who has “the opportunity to form an attachment,” does so, Mary Main writes, whether it is “to a battering parent as to a sensitively responsive one” (1999, 847). Van Ijzendoorn and Sagi-Schwartz report that research across cultures shows that attachment is universal (2008, 897).

It is in the nature of interconnections between nurturers and infant that lays the groundwork for what is to follow. For instance, no matter how many caregivers a baby may have by six months, the child makes his or her preference known by choosing one primary attachment figure. Then, the youngster depends on being near the individual to whom he or she is bonded. Where there is proximity of mother to child, and if things go well, after a while, periods of attunement between mother and baby can regularly occur. Responsiveness and sensitivity toward each other may well lead to a reciprocal, secure, fulfilling relationship that lays the foundation for the flowering of empathy. But there are challenges, as proximity between mother and infant can be disrupted.

When infants are separated from their attachment figure, they protest intensely (Zeifman and Hagan, 2008, 438). Separated

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youngsters may be fearful, angry, and fervent in seeking to restore connection to their mother and if this fails to happen, they often become despondent (Kobak and Madsen, 2008, 23). Jeffry Simpson and Jay Belsky write, “Across all human cultures and most primate species, young and vulnerable infants display a specific sequence of reactions following separation from their stronger, older, and wiser caregivers. Immediately following separation, most infants protest vehemently, typically crying, screaming and throwing temper tantrums as they search for their caregivers” (2008, 131). John Bowlby sees separation and loss as integral to the attachment process. Insecurity is built into the privileged relationship between infant and mother. From birth on there is a spectrum of closeness and distance, belonging and feeling abandoned in human entanglements. If out of the vagaries of attachment there can be a secure setting for the child, prosocial actions can easily emanate from those youngsters who do not have autism spectrum disorders. Still, not all social experience reinforces emotional safety.

As attachment is the first phase, cooperation is the next. Michael Tomasello says that not long after toddlers turn one, “human children are already cooperative…it comes naturally…they do not learn this from adults.” He cites a study where infants between a year and two months and a year and a half encounter a new unrelated male adult, and these children help this individual solve a problem such as opening a door when the man has too much in his hands to open it himself or when the child hands an object to him that he cannot reach. Of the two dozen toddlers studied, all but two helped and did so right away. Our close primate relative, the chimpanzee, does not initiate collaboration and cooperation in parallel situations (Tomasello, 2009, 4, 6, 63-4). This evidence shows that cooperation and concern for others are a distinctly human characteristic. Our collaborative responses contrast with the Hobbesian view that in the state of nature it is every one against everyone else.

The willingness to be cooperative may not be only inborn. A study shows German and Israeli five-year-olds being more sympathetic to an emotionally upset adult than are children from Malaysia and Indonesia (Vaish and Warnken, 2012, 141). Carol Dweck recounts a study of one- to three-year-olds in daycare that measured how children responded to another child who was dis-

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tressed. About 50 percent of the children were from abusive families and the others were from homes where there was not abuse. Most of the non-abused children were comforting and caring toward the upset child. In contrast, Dweck writes, “not one of the abused infants showed empathic concern; the most common responses were threats, anger, and even physical assault” (Dweck, 2009, 131-2). To paraphrase Winnicott, there is a maturational process that can promote prosocial empathy, as there is an environment that may be facilitating or non-facilitating and that impacts whether there is more care than hostility. The anger of the abused youngsters shows how difficult it can be for children when their caregivers are not supportive, but take actions that do not provide the deep care for which children hunger. Children have love and anxiety within them; both are manifested in early life during the relationships between caregivers and youngsters. The diversity within the attachment process can reinforce kindness or rage; it is the attachment process that then lays the groundwork for how empathic, cooperative, selfish, or cruel a child will likely be.

After the cooperative stage, later on empathy may appear. A related question is to whom empathy is directed. As each of us has distinct preferences and inclinations, we are likely to have more rapport with certain individuals and respond to certain emotions more than to others. Our emotions can be activated by incidents any place on the planet, though, by and large, our knowledge of others and caring is directed towards those who are in proximity to us and with whom we have affinity. Friends are more perceptive at ascertaining each other’s feelings than are non-friends (Lewis and Hodges, 2012, 74). In a cross-cultural study comparing perceptions between Japanese and Caucasian Americans, it was found that each group more accurately perceived fear in their own group (Echols and Correll, 2012, 57). “Mind reading,” David Berreby writes, “…works best…with someone you know well,” and “with people with whom we share many codes” (2005, 124).

It also helps If we like the others. Where competition is intense between individuals, Decety and Lamm report that “observation of the other’s joy results in distress, where pain in the competitor leads to positive emotions” (2009, 208). It is not a surprise that humans do not only feel kindly towards each other. All

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cultures distinguish between an in-group and an out-group. According to Keith Oatley and colleagues, “The emotional preference for ‘us,’ and hostility to ‘them,’ is indeed a candidate for a biologically inherited human universal” (Oatley, et al., 2006, 250). Tomasello says that an in-group/out-group frame of mind is present in infants at a young age. He also notes that “the best way to motivate people to collaborate…is to identify an enemy and charge that ‘they’ threaten us” (2009, 94, 100). Clearly another side of being human is hostility to those in the out-group or those in our circle towards whom we feel competitive. Empathy and anger are two sides of the same coin. Any theory of how important cooperation and empathy are to being human must also account for the disdain directed at the out-group. It appears that across all cultures, empathy and an us/them sensibility arise together. The root for the emergence of both is in the combination of reciprocal bonding and anger over separation that is integral to the attachment process.

The universality of an us/them sensibility across cultures has implications for both the selfish and social outlooks. For those who view humans as rationally competitive, the emotional bonds and empathic feelings that can extend beyond those with whom we are most closely connected biologically shows there is more to being human than natural and sexual selection. For those who stress our benevolent side, our caring and hostile feelings are not easily separable, favorability to an in-group and rage towards the out-group or those with whom we compete in our own group are part of the same emotional spectrum.

The champions of empathy are aware that cooperation competes with other tendencies, but they are not generally effective at seeing their interconnection. After Tomasello declares how altruistic children are, he adds that “children are also naturally selfish” (2009, 47). Frans De Waal, who proclaims that this is an age of empathy, also asserts that our “chief emotions are egocentric” and only “secondarily is there an actual concern for others, because we long for a livable, harmonious society” (2009, 184). Instead of having humans being empathic out of the goodness of their hearts, here De Waal theorizes that our cooperation with others derives from the practical needs of living together.

While being aware that humans can either collaborate or

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compete, be empathic or disdainful, nurturing or abusive, those championing empathy do not seriously try to elucidate the relationship between these different tendencies. Contrasting theories of humans as either primarily selfish or empathic then has its limits, as homo sapiens are clearly both. A reason why the relationship between the empathic self and the other is often left murky is that the advocates of empathy may long for a conception of human motivation that is sympathetic, benevolent, and virtuous. They may wish for an arena where we can judge ourselves as not having mixed motivations, and so they stress the collaborative over the self-centered. We can simultaneously be deeply concerned for the well-being of others and self-interested. This double sidedness is characteristic of humanity; it is what makes us, as Colin Talbot claims, the paradoxical primate (Talbot, 2005).

Though writers on empathy have not thoroughly attempted to clarify the relationship of care and selfishness, their research conclusively shows that the view that humans are primarily calculating and selfish is one-sided, for this latter view does not account for the emotions that draw us towards each other. Feelings of concern and caring emanate from deep inside us. Empathy remains an innate response to our inner circle and certain others. Those who say we are selfish and competitive want to underplay the emotional bonds between us and others. This inclination is part of that ancient Western tradition that champions the rational over the emotional.

Empathy is a way of knowing and being; it employs cognition and emotion to perceptively feel our way into another’s world and to respond to them with heartfelt concern. There are some other ways of knowing empathy that are worth mentioning. Empathy contrasts with rational self-interest where another is looked upon as to how they can advance my own purposes, rather than their being worthy of knowing just for who they are. Objectivity is another method of understanding. Scientific epistemology is concerned with methods of investigation that can produce measurable results that are reliable and valid. Each of these forms of knowledge has its place, but of these three empathy most humanizes and personalizes knowing.

Still, our empathic responses are also part of an internal dialogue. We each have a positive and negative agenda, which often

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manifests itself in the us/them dichotomy. Montaigne writes, “We are, I know not how, double within ourselves, with the result that we do not believe what we believe, and we cannot rid ourselves of what we condemn” (Montaigne, 1943 [1578-1580], 570). We have allegiance to that which we oppose and we doubt our own convictions. These inner divisions are often manifest in dividing individuals and groups into us and them. While empathy includes both understanding another’s world and being sensitive to another, it also includes the relationship of the empathic one to the other. This relationship would include the transference and the countertransference, closeness, and boundaries, the ways we are similar and different, the limits in our faith in what we believe, and our allegiance to that which we oppose. Empathy then is both a natural emotional and cognitive process, and an extremely complicated one. As mentioned before, those academics who rely on our being empathic to counter the Hobbesian perspective face a number of challenges.

So where do we go from here? One limit of the discussion of cooperation and empathy here is that is relies on academics rather than on what psychoanalysts and other clinicians think. These need to be included to form a more interdisciplinary dialogue. As well that there is a developmental process from attachment to cooperation to empathy that should be recognized. At each stage, there are positive and negative possibilities. Biology and experience are relevant. Those with autism spectrum disorders have more obstacles to being empathic than those who do not. A child from an abusive home is likely to be more hostile than cooperative; a youngster with a disorganized attachment pattern will also have problems relating to others. Even those with strongly developed empathy are not immune from an us/them outlook. We must recognize the partial nature of our empathic side, even as we try to foster it.

Tomasello says one “of the great debates in Western civilization is whether humans are born cooperative and helpful” or “selfish and unhelpful” (2009, 3). The time has come to move beyond the great debate over whether we are more kind than cruel, more concerned with ourselves than others. Many have already looked at other issues in being human. We are now and have long

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been a kind and killing species, perpetually discontented and self-actualizing, embracing deep bonds with loved ones and being brutal and destructive with others. We have been endowed with gifts of cognition, language, and creativeness beyond any other species. We have developed mass societies and technology beyond the imagination of anyone who lived at the time of the Renaissance. With the assistance of technology we can efficiently implement genocide toward those who fall into the “them” category. Any human psychology must account for the extremes of our existence, how unconscious drives and interpersonal longings intersect with culture and experience, and how experience, vulnerability, resilience, and character are so central. How is it that most children who are abused will not be empathic, while others have the character traits that enable them to understand and respond sensitively to others? These are among the paradoxes that need investigation by a psychology that abandons the ancient debate about whether we are more selfish than social and reframes issues within the context of attachment and interpersonal relationships, and how our inner drives intersect with culture and the environment.

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