
Volume 21 - Number 4 - March 2015
Pages: 363 - 482
Fuchsman, K. (2015). Obama agonistes. Clio’s Psyche, 21(4), 391-396.
Obama Agonistes
Abstract
In this response article to the “Obama in History” symposium, the author replies to commentators C. Fred Alford, Herbert Barry III, David R. Beisel, Brian D’Agostino, Paul H. Elovitz, and David Lotto on his lead essay, “President Obama in History: The Political Intersects with the Personal.” Citing Census Bureau and foreclosure figures, congressional party strength, and the inaugural addresses of Barack Obama and Franklin Roosevelt, the author maintains that Obama’s response to the Great Recession was insufficient and that he was less effective than Roosevelt as a party leader. He defends the Roosevelt comparison against D’Agostino’s charge that it is ahistorical, disputing D’Agostino’s account of 1930s wealth concentration and leftist pressure. He answers Elovitz on public readiness for drastic measures and Barry on divided government. He argues that Obama’s choice of health care reform over a jobs bill, against the advice of his advisers, contributed to Republican gains in 2010, and that Obama missed a chance to build a lasting Democratic congressional majority. The author defends the lead essay’s psychological inquiry into Obama’s family history against Elovitz’s objections, while acknowledging Alford’s point that his conjectures can be neither proved nor disproved. He agrees with Beisel and Lotto on points of emphasis and concludes that Obama’s legacy should be judged against his unfulfilled pledge of bold, swift economic action.
American Politics, Barack Obama, economic downturn, Great Recession, psychoanalysis, psychobiography, psychohistory
In my article, I say that President Obama’s response to the severe economic downturn was not sufficient. Not one of the commentators on my piece asserts that Obama’s actions were adequate to restore prosperity. The impact of the recession lingers. The real median household income of Americans decreased by eight % between 2007 and 2013. The poverty rate in 2007 was 12.5%, with 37.3 million in poverty, in 2012 it was 15.9%, with 48.8 million poor (US Census). There were well over 14 million foreclosure filings in the seven years between 2007 and 2013 (realtytrac.com). The percent of our citizens owning their own homes dropped from 69% in 2004 to 63.9% in 2014 (Timaraos, Wall Street Journal, 1/29/2015). Too many of us are still suffering in ways that could have been avoided if President Obama had made the economy job one. A reason Obama will not be ranked as a superior president is that he did not take enough action to bring about full recovery.
In addition, he has not been an effective party leader. In 2015, there are 188 Democrats in the House and 44 in the Senate. It is only before the Great Depression that there have been fewer
Page 391
Democrats in Congress.
How do we make historical sense of these phenomenon? A way to place Obama’s presidency in perspective is to compare it with Franklin Roosevelt’s administration. Some of the commentators do not think the comparison is either historical or fair. However, the chief reason for examining these presidencies together is that both men took office after the economy collapsed. In Roosevelt’s first inaugural, he vowed to fight the economic ills with all his might. Almost the whole of his address was devoted to the Depression. In his 2009 inaugural, Obama asserted that, “we are in the midst of crisis.” While FDR focused on the economy, Obama listed six components of this current crisis, one of which was economic. He does say that the “economy calls for action, bold and swift.” This included jobs, roads, bridges, electric grids, and digital lines. Then Obama mentioned other goals including science, health care, solar power, and improving education (2009, 4 and 7). His address was more diverse and less focused than Roosevelt’s.
The same could be said for actions following the inauguration. In his first 100 days, FDR took decisive action on many facets of the economy. Not all of these actions were effective, but his leadership electrified the nation. Obama also acted quickly at the beginning; the stimulus act was passed in less than a month. Then the momentum relating to the Great Recession slowed. A bill to reform Wall Street was announced in June 2009, job legislation was proposed in 2011, the effort to stop foreclosures stalled, and many roads and bridges remain in disrepair. Employment, income, poverty, and home ownership are worse in 2015 than they were in 2007. Obama did not deliver the economic boldness and swiftness he promised.
Our current President is a politically divided soul, pulled in divergent directions. To this day, much of his rhetoric seems noble and yet more fit for an era of consensus and opportunity than an age when economic obstacles and political rancor dominate. Obama sometimes seems stuck in another political universe. In the President’s 2015 State of the Union address, Obama refers back to his 2004 speech to the Democratic Convention. He says, “You know, just over a decade ago, I gave a speech in Boston where I said there wasn’t a liberal America or a conservative America… Over the past
Page 392
six years, the pundits have pointed out more than once that my presidency hasn’t delivered on this vision… that there are too many people in this town who actually benefit from partisanship and gridlock… I know how tempting such cynicism may be. But I still think the cynics are wrong. I still believe that we are one people” (Whitehouse.gov). If this is so, how does Obama account for the fact that he was elected with a liberal Congress, and now we have Congress with the largest conservative majority since before Franklin Roosevelt became President? If we are one people, why does a conservative political party unite to oppose all the major legislation of a liberal President?
Franklin Roosevelt recognized intractable political divides. He worked to increase Congressional majorities. After the 1936 election, there were more than four Democratic Senators and three Democratic Representatives to every Congressional Republican. The contrast with Obama is striking. After Democratic Congressional sweeps in 2006 and 2008, in 2010 the Republicans gained control of the House and later the Senate. Obama, in trying to be a post-partisan President, has overseen the wreck of his party’s Congressional fortunes.
Brian D’Agostino thinks Obama’s bipartisan approach is necessary. I think Roosevelt’s strategy of strengthening his party’s power in Congress has proven more effective. Compromise will always be part of the poker game of politics, but a leader has a better hand when his party has large majorities. Obama has often been accused of giving away the store, and his party has paid the price for his limits as a partisan leader.
FDR was more decisive economically and more effective politically than Obama. Are there grounds to contest this assessment? Brian D’Agostino maintains my comparison is “unfair and ahistorical.” To show this, he says America is more of a plutocracy now than in the 1930s, there was a strong leftist presence pressuring FDR, and Huey Long’s Share The Wealth movement impacted Roosevelt. D’Agostino’s account has some historical holes. It is widely known that the American concentration of wealth reached a peak in 1928 and has only recently approached that level again. Republican presidents of the 1920s served the interests of the wealthy. In 1932, the three radical political parties received three
Page 393
percent of the popular vote, only half of what leftists had in 1912. By 1936, radical left parties had only 0.61per cent of the presidential vote. FDR took strong action before Huey Long became nationally prominent in 1934, and after Long’s assassination in 1935. The nation was more plutocratic and less radical in the 1930s than Dr. D’Agostino claims. Historical forces alone did not push Roosevelt or inhibit Obama from being active on the economy.
Paul Elovitz says my comparison of FDR and Obama misses the point that given the longevity of the depression, the public was more ready for drastic solutions than when Obama took office. I believe that by 2009, helping citizens find jobs and keep their homes was not drastic, but orthodox liberalism. The main point is that Obama did not feel the urgency to more fully combat the recession. As David Beisel writes, “part of Obama’s decline” was due to his “shifting the policy from saving the country’s economy to taking on a… hate-producing effort to create medical insurance for everyone.” Neither Elovitz nor D’Agostino focus sufficiently on Obama’s own choice to move away from fighting the recession and toward health care reform. The President did so despite the advice of the Vice President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chief of the Council of Economic Advisers, legislators, and public opinion polls. When Obama chose health care reform before a jobs bill, he crossed a Rubicon. Polls showed opposition to the Affordable Care Act energized the Tea Party. It is this movement that helped Republicans take control of the House in 2010, effectively ending Obama’s chances to pass major legislation.
Another way to place Obama’s record in context is to look at the history of Congress. Since the 1890s, political realignment in Congress has often followed economic downturns. After the recession of the 1890s, the Republicans generally controlled Congress until the Great Depression. With a few exceptions, the Democrats had majorities in Congress from the 1930s to 1980. After the 1970s economic slide, Republicans made inroads in Congress, frequently controlling the Senate and/or the House.
The Democrats took control of Congress in 2007. The 2008 recession resulted in even larger Democratic Congressional majorities. Democrats were poised to become the majority party again. Given the history of Congress and the economy, the opportunity
Page 394
was there, but a Democratic president did not seize it. Obama’s failure as a party leader is another reason he will not be among the Presidential greats.
Herb Barry thinks my criticism of Obama is overdrawn. He asserts that Americans tend to have presidents of one party and Congresses of another. This is not wholly accurate. In 64 of the 94 years since 1921, Congress and the president have been of the same party. Of the eight Democratic presidents since 1913, Barack Obama is only one of two who have seen the Republicans control at least one Congressional chamber for the majority of his Presidency. A significant reason for Obama’s lack of success is that unlike many other Democratic presidents, his top priority was not prosperity.
How then do we explain what in Obama led him to miss so many opportunities, to have trouble adapting to changing circumstances? There are multiple factors to consider. I have singled out the psychological.
In examining Obama’s life, I noticed that he had a similar difficulty in facing unpleasant facts in his own family as he did in relation to the economy and the Republican opposition. Paul Elovitz objects to my use of terms such as primal scene and family romance. Yet there is no attempt to refute the fact that trained attorney Barack Obama did not seek the best evidence about his family; instead relying on hearsay, he made many factual errors. Obama acknowledges he “lacked the courage to explore” the facts about his mother and father. Similarly, in still believing we are not conservatives and liberals even after being immersed in gridlock, Obama does not face how partisan our politics are. His party and the nation have suffered as a result of these blind spots.
Dr. Elovitz says that Barack Obama “was loved intensely and treated as special by both his grandparents and mother.” While this is true, it is only part of the picture. If Obama was so loved, then how come he felt abandoned and like an orphan? Michelle Obama said, “Barack spent so much time by himself that it was like he was raised by wolves” (Dowd, New York Times, June 15, 2010). Elovitz says Obama’s feeling like an orphan is based “on an adolescent living arrangement of his own choosing.” As Obama’s state-
Page 395
ment does not specify a time period, how can Paul Elovitz assert Obama is referring to his adolescence? There are plenty of other periods in Obama’s life and a number of actions by both his mother and father that could engender feeling abandoned and like an orphan.
My discussing these aspects of Obama’s childhood is part of my search to explore psychological factors that explain why Obama aided the wealthy more than the less fortunate. I say Obama may have been resentful of some of those who raised him. Fred Alford rightly points out that there is no way of either proving or disproving this conjecture on my part. I brought my ideas forward knowing their limits, yet as a way of exploring possible undersides to Obama’s psychology. There are non-psychological explanations for the Obama administration’s inequitable treatment, yet the psychological dimension, with all its uncertainties, should be included in this discussion
I agree with David Beisel’s concern that we need to understand why Americans bought into Obama’s redemptive myths. There is also merit in David Lotto’s contention that with Obama there was a real chance for a “transformative presidency… an FDR style New Deal… It is appropriate to call the situation tragic.” Dr. Lotto includes in this assessment the flaws and merits within the Affordable Care Act.
Since the downturn began, many Americans have faced hardships that could have been alleviated. We need to remain cognizant of these human costs. In evaluating President Obama’s legacy, we should not forget that he did not fulfill his pledge to be bold and swift in response to the economic crisis.
Page 396
How to cite this article
Fuchsman, K. (2015). Obama agonistes. Clio’s Psyche, 21(4), 391-396.



