Volume 24 - Number 1 - Summer 2017
Pages: 1 - 133

MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES

Fuchsman, K. (2017). Narcissism, DSM-III, and the status of psychoanalysis. Clio’s Psyche, 24(1), 111-115.

https://doi.org/10.70763/84c2d4860a0fc27bcf854c444fb8b400

Narcissism, DSM-III, and the Status of Psychoanalysis

article

Abstract

This article recounts how psychiatry and psychoanalysis came under public and scholarly criticism from the 1960s onward and how their standing then diverged. The author describes the challenges to psychiatry’s scientific and medical legitimacy in the 1960s and 1970s, including conflicting psychiatric testimony in court cases and the anti-psychiatry movement associated with Thomas Szasz’s The Myth of Mental Illness. The author then reports the American Psychiatric Association’s response, a revision of the diagnostic manual led by Robert Spitzer. The result was DSM-III, adopted in 1979, which stressed specified diagnostic criteria and reliability testing and removed neuroses and psychoanalytic theories of etiology. The author characterizes its construction as political as well as scientific, with compromises made toward psychology but little toward psychoanalysis. The article surveys criticisms of Freud and psychoanalysis by Karl Popper, Alasdair MacIntyre, P. B. Medawar, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, Adolf Grunbaum, Hans Eysenck, Patricia Kitcher, Allen Esterson, Frederick Crews, and Frank Sulloway, most of whom question the scientific soundness of Freud’s work. The author observes that doubts about the reliability of DSM diagnoses persist, yet the manual flourishes while psychoanalysis is widely dismissed. Identifying with those who see vitality in the psychoanalytic tradition, the author concludes that psychoanalysis faces unresolved epistemological problems. It should therefore delineate which claims can be tested scientifically and engage other clinical approaches and academic disciplines.

Keywords:

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III), Eli Zaretsky, mental health crisis, narcissism, Political Freud, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, psychohistory, Sigmund Freud

Psychoanalysis, according to historian Eli Zaretsky, was “the spirit of twentieth-century culture” until the 1970s (Political Freud, 2015, 16). But things have changed. In the 1960s, significant criticism of psychoanalysis reemerged. It was not only psychoanalysis that was under critical public scrutiny—so was psychiatry. In the 1970s, psychiatry’s scientific and medical legitimacy was being questioned. This paper tells a story of how both psychoanalysis and psychiatry were criticized, how they responded, and how the stature of both has altered as a result.

In numerous court cases, psychiatrists representing opposing sides gave conflicting diagnoses. Such “contradictory testimony” led many in the public to believe that the psychiatric profession did not know “what it was talking about” (Kirk and Hutchins, The Selling of DSM, 1992, 21-22). Not surprisingly, judges sometimes overruled testimony of psychiatrists (Decker, The Making of DSM-III, 2013, xvii). There was also an anti-psychiatric movement initiated by psychiatrist Thomas Szasz’s influential 1961 book, The Myth of Mental Illness, which questioned the legitimacy of psychiatry. Similar judgments were found in works of such prominent writers as Erving Goffman, Thomas Scheff, and R. D. Laing.

For these and other reasons, the American Psychiatric Association sought to make psychiatry a more respectable medical profession. They did so by revising and improving DSM-II. The individual spearheading this effort was Dr. Robert Spitzer of the Columba University Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research. Spitzer wanted to restore psychiatry’s reputation by making a scientific manual of mental disorders. He wanted each psychological disorder included to be based on empirical evidence. Spitzer and the psychiatrists allied with him concurred that psychoanalysis lacked scientific rigor. They were intent on diminishing the place of psychoanalysis in comprehending mental disturbances. Central to this endeavor was deleting neuroses from what was to become DSM-III. They also eliminated psychoanalytic theories of etiology, as they found no legitimate evidence to support these contentions.

The main focus of the task forces formulating DSM-III was

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to have an elaborate classification system of mental disorders, to have each disorder backed by reliable evidence, and to specify diagnostic criteria for each disturbance. This empirical approach had been promoted by psychiatrists at Washington University in St. Louis, but then others with similar attitudes took the same approach. Much research was conducted, and the results were tested for reliability.

Such a major shift in orientation as was planned for DSM-III turned out to be not only scientific, but political. Clearly those behind DSM-III’s construction battled psychoanalysts and other stakeholders. When push came to shove Spitzer, his cohorts, and supporters made compromises with the profession of psychology, but were frequently unbending with psychoanalysis. As historian Hannah Decker writes, “the rejection of psychoanalysis in DSM-III turned out to be complete” (Making of DSM-III, xvii). After much controversy and negotiating, on May 12, 1979 the Assembly of Delegates at the American Psychiatric Association Convention voted almost unanimously to adopt the new diagnostic manual.

When DSM-III appeared it soon became influential, not only among psychiatrists, but among health professionals and clinicians of many stripes. A significant sign of its success is, as Hannah Decker says, to “get reimbursed from health insurance companies, DSM diagnoses and codes must be submitted.” To Decker, the DSM has become “the ‘Bible’” for “the mental health clergy” (Decker, 305, xviii, 330). The Economist concurs: “the DSM series […] has become the global standard for the description of mental illness. Indeed, the DSM is treated by many people less as a medical handbook and more as holy writ” (“DSM-5: By the book,” The Economist, May 18, 2013). Kirk and Hutchins say the DSM-III in “influence alone […] may be one of the most significant events in psychiatry in the last half of the 20th century” (Selling of DSM-III, 6).

The psychiatrists’ association had successfully overcome the withering critiques of their legitimacy as a scientific field. While the fortunes of psychiatry went up, those of psychoanalysis did not. In a time when science had high prestige, psychoanalysis also came under a parallel scrutiny. Yet psychiatry was better able to counter attacks than psychoanalysis was. One element in the travails of psychoanalysis is how the DSM-III gave the appearance of being scientifically reliable, while psychoanalysis has had difficulty doing so.

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The cultural reputation of psychoanalysis had been quite high in the U.S. for several decades after World War II. But it has not been as influential and prominent since then. There are multiple reasons for this change in status, but one is certainly that psychiatry began to supplant psychoanalysis in influence.

The attempts to undermine psychoanalysis appeared in various shapes even before the DSM-III was published. Philosopher Karl Popper in 1962 said psychoanalysis was a pseudo-science. In the mid-1960s, William Masters and Virginia Johnson’s scientific research undermined Freud’s view of female sexuality, soon to be followed by feminist critiques of psychoanalysis. In 1971, distinguished philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre wrote that psychoanalytic theory “is certainly no better confirmed—and perhaps not as well confirmed—as witchcraft and astrology” (Against the Self-Images of the Age, 1971, 8). Four years later, Nobel Prize-winning biologist P. B. Medawar declared that “doctrinaire psychoanalytic theory is the most stupendous intellectual confidence trick of the twentieth century […] a vast structure of radically unsound design and with no posterity” (P. B. Medawar, New York Review of Books, January 23, 1975, 17).

After the 1980 publication of DSM-III, criticisms of psychoanalysis continued. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson’s book The Assault on Truth (1984) scandalously accused Freud of altering his views to become more popular. The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984) by philosopher Adolf Grunbaum found that Freud’s work lacked scientific rigor. Psychologist Hans Eysenck said that Freud is “a genius, not of science, but of propaganda, not of rigorous proof, but of persuasion” (Decline and Fall of the Freudian Empire, 1985, 208).

In 1992, philosopher Patricia Kitcher wrote that psychoanalysis “is widely regarded as the paradigm of bad science, a theory so obviously false that its proponents must be deluded or devious or both” (Freud’s Dream, 153). Mathematician Allen Esterson said the rise to prominence of psychoanalysis may “come to be regarded as one of the most extraordinary aberrations in the history of Western thought” (Seductive Mirage, 1993, 254). In November of 1993, The New York Review of Books published literary critic Frederick Crews’ “The Unknown Freud.” A few years later, Crews concluded that “Freud has been the most overrated figure in the entire history of science and medicine—one who wrought immense harm through the propagation of false etiologies, mistaken diagnoses, and

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fruitless lines of inquiry” (The Memory Wars, 1995, 298). Shortly after The New York Review article, TIME magazine’s cover story asked, “Is Freud Dead?” In that issue, Frank Sulloway said that “Psychoanalysis is built on quicksand. It’s like a 10-story hotel sinking into an unsound foundation” (November 29, 1993, 51). Most of the severe assessments of Freud and psychoanalysis found that Freud’s work is not scientifically sound. These attacks on psychoanalysis are part of the same broad phenomenon present in the creation and publication of the DSM-III.

The irony in the battles of the Freud Wars is that the assault on psychoanalysis in DSM-III was commanded by psychoanalyst Robert Spitzer. Another irony is that the problem of reliability that motivated the psychiatric association has remained. In 1992, Kirk and Hutchins claimed that the scientific evidence behind the DSM-III is flawed, inconsistent, and often weak (Kirk and Hutchins, 1992, 15). Harvard psychologist Jerome Kagan today finds that less than half of the disorders in DSM-5 have solid scientific backing (On Being Human, 2016, 55). Nevertheless, the DSM is a flourishing enterprise; in contrast, as historian Elizabeth Lunbeck says, psychoanalysis today is “casually dismissed as an outdated or even fraudulent practice” (The Americanization of Narcissism, 2014, 16). For those of us who see the vitality in the psychoanalytic tradition from the 1890s to today, it must be recognized that, as well as its insights, psychoanalysis is challenged by the epistemological standing of its pluralistic claims.

Psychoanalyst Robert Wallerstein puzzled over analysts that can make diverse but plausible interpretations of similar case material, but “have no systematic method for establishing the truth claims of […] the alternatives (“Psychoanalysis as Science,” in Psychodynamic Treatment Research, 1993, 97). Of course, non-analytic clinicians may also have divergent interpretations of related material. Though there are a variety of attempts to find solutions to these issues, psychoanalysis is often unable to have its claims conform to scientific standards of reliability and validity. “Daunting epistemological problems,” writes psychoanalyst George Makari, “lay at the heart of any psychological science that entertained inner subjective states” (Revolution in Mind, 2008, 439). As psychoanalytic stalwart Martin Bermann says, “Disagreements between psychoanalytic schools were not those encountered in the natural sciences, which further experiments eventually resolve” (Understanding Dissidence and Controversy in the History

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of Psychoanalysis, 2004, 2). Challenges to the scientific validity of psychoanalytic claims are formidable. Efforts to develop suitable standards by which psychoanalytic theories can be evaluated are ongoing. This can include evidence from anthropology and other social sciences that may have somewhat different standards than natural science. As some Freudian concepts just cannot be tested scientifically, this frequently leaves psychoanalysis in limbo, caught between the natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities.

Psychoanalysis as a field needs to clearly delineate the areas where it can be tested scientifically and where it cannot; it also needs to further engage itself with parallel claims from other clinical approaches, as well as from pertinent academic disciplines. The future of psychoanalysis is connected to its ability to meet the intellectual challenges to its concepts, methods, and claims.

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About the author

Ken Fuchsman

Ken Fuchsman, EdD, is an emeritus professor at the University of Connecticut, where he also served as Director of the Bachelor of General Studies (BGS) program. He met Philip Roth in 2001 when UCONN gave Roth an honorary degree and they conversed before commencement. Dr. Fuchsman has been president of the International Psychohistorical Association since 2016. He can be reached at .

How to cite this article

Fuchsman, K. (2017). Narcissism, DSM-III, and the status of psychoanalysis. Clio’s Psyche, 24(1), 111-115.

https://doi.org/10.70763/84c2d4860a0fc27bcf854c444fb8b400

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