Psychohistory Applied to Military Leadership

Review of Robert Pois and Philip Langer, Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. Hardcover ISBN 0-253-34378-X, xviii, 283 pages, $29.95.

Pois and Langer claim in Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership to show “that psychology has an explanatory role to play in historical analysis rather than to serve simply as a vehicle for extraordinary generalizations on the nature of man” (p. x). In accomplishing this end, the authors provide us with the first text that concisely examines a process of thought: “military failure due to dysfunctional personal rigidity” (p. ix) across historical events and the individuals that helped form the outcomes of those events. The idea is intriguing and to do it justice requires a tremendous amount of research, which Pois and Langer perform admirably. Through this concept, they open the door of psychohistory even wider, inviting analyses in new and expanding forms. However, I hope that those following in the footsteps of Pois and Langer can refine this new way of psychologically analyzing aspects of history; for although the concept is inspired, the outcome, at times, becomes plodding and repetitive, and their choice of leaders is imbalanced.

Command Failure in War includes an evaluation of Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf; Napoleon in Russia; Robert E. Lee, George McClellan, and John Hood, all of the American Civil War; the British military during World War I; and the German military at Stalingrad during WWII. Herein is my first criticism of the book, their choice of generals appears to be random at best. In their introduction, the authors do acknowledge that they chose military leaders in whom they had a personal interest or background, and “there was no attempt to provide any balance” (p. ix). But this reasoning is insufficient; the reader needs to understand why the choice is so skewed toward 20th-century leaders, the American Civil War, and a Western point of view – not merely because it is an “odd sort of read,” but because particular behaviors are influenced by time, culture, and environment. In all fairness, the authors include in their conclusion one mention of Japanese generals in WWII and the impact of different times and cultures on their argument. But the comment comes a little late in the text. Their hypothesis would carry more weight if proven across these variables or if they had addressed the reason for particular omissions from the beginning. How can they successfully argue any common outcome when three of the six chapters of analysis are devoted to Civil War leaders? How do they know that some of the choices made by these leaders were not unique to the particular culture or time? Granted, drawing in non-Western military leadership would probably have been an impossible task, but it would have soothed this reader if the authors had at least acknowledged that battles and leadership mistakes occur in parts of the world other than the West.

Although the authors’ choice of leaders weakens their otherwise promising argument – that rigidity in leadership is the common theme/mistake found across these case studies – they still provide a thought-provoking and groundbreaking analysis. By using various models of in-depth psychology – identity diffusion, group think, field theory, achievement need, cognitive dissonance, frustration-aggression hypothesis, and folie a deux, to name only a few – Pois and Langer argue that they always came to the same conclusion: even among generals with a string of successes, the moment of failure occurred because of an inability to adapt to changes in the battle, a lack of flexibility. If this thesis holds true it could have a resounding impact on the training of future military leaders.

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In the individual details of the generals and their failures, the book provides deeply complex and thoroughly researched evaluations. Pois and Langer’s recounting of moment-by-moment events provide the reader with a vivid sense of each leader’s heightened emotions. Their choice of psychological model for any given event is carefully argued and convincing. Sometimes, though, it is too well argued, to the point of becoming tedious. I questioned whether I was missing some subtle point. Perhaps my stronger grounding in history overshadowed my psychology background, causing me to overlook the need for such repetition. But I don’t think so. For example, the authors repeatedly refer to McClellan’s tendency to avoid actual combat and continue training his men. Granted this is a key part of their analysis, but, unnecessarily, their point was made multiple times. In discussing the untenable situation at Stalingrad, the authors reiterate – three times, in three different ways – that the German Commander Paulus was waiting for a clear order to withdraw and seemed paralyzed to commence the withdrawal without such an order. Again, this is an important point in arguing for the development of groupthink, and his inability to act with only vague orders did result in the destruction of his army. But does the reader need to be told three times?

In regard to the technical aspects of this book, Indiana University Press is to be commended for finding the funding to allow for copious endnotes, a complete bibliographic section, and an index. Given the current financial difficulties of many university presses, it is all the more relevant that a publisher continues to maintain a certain level of scholarly development. If the text were to go into a second printing, however, the reader might find some of Pois and Langer’s many battle details more understandable if maps were provided. Not all of the case studies require them, but some of the more complex battles, like the Battle of Stalingrad and McClellan’s battle at Malvern Hill, would be easier to comprehend with maps.

In conclusion, although I have made criticisms of the text, I believe that Pois and Langer have contributed a groundbreaking book to the field – groundbreaking in its form of analysis and through its suggestion that rigidity in the field typically results in failure. The premises at the heart of the book are well argued, and it opens the door to new and more complex studies. Globally, Pois and Langer’s book begs the question that if we claim war is dysfunctional, then how can we claim battle strategies and plans to be “functional” – as all analyses of wars implicitly do? If war allows leaders to shine for a moment in their lives, does this infer that outside of war they likely will not succeed because they are dysfunctional? If that is the case, then how do we help these social “outsiders” become functional without war – or, if there is war, and these would-be successful leaders have become functional, can they still succeed? Locally, one could hope that this work will encourage similar studies across cultures, periods, or classes of warfare. Finally, Command Failure in War seems to be a fitting memoriam for a respected psychohistorian, Robert Pois, who died January 18, 2004, leaving us with a significant final legacy and many new probing questions.

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