Putin and the Jews: Between Philosemitism and Antisemitism (article)

Russian Jews

The Russian Empire, established in 1721, already harbored a substantial Jewish population from preceding centuries. The Pale of Settlement, instituted in 1791, confined Jews mainly to annexed territories that, by the 19^th century, encompassed Russian Poland, Lithuania, Belorussia (present-day Belarus), a significant portion of Ukraine, the Crimean Peninsula, and Bessarabia. Stringent regulations confined nearly five million Jews in Imperial Russia to the Pale, which was dismantled during World War I.

Despite Lenin’s Bolshevist national policy opposing antisemitism and advocating against pogroms, and even Stalin’s official condemnation of antisemitism in the 1930s, Stalin’s personal and political biases against Jews (and many other nationalities), evident in various destructive campaigns, climaxed in the Great Purge and persisted until he died in 1953. After World War II, amidst a large population of displaced and homeless Jews in Europe, Stalin ordered the migration of 10,000 Eastern European Jews to Birobidzhan, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast he had established in 1928.

The revival of the Yiddish culture under Stalin’s regime was short-lived, as was his initially pro-Zionist foreign policy. Calculating that the creation of the State of Israel would advance socialism and end the British influence in the Middle East, the Soviet Un-

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ion voted in favor of the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine and was the first state to officially recognize Israel. When Israel turned out to be more aligned with the U.S., Stalin became increasingly fearful about the rise of Jewish nationalism among the Soviet Jews who were seen as a “fifth column” (Figes, 2008, p. 493) that conspired against the Soviet state and its fake internationalism through cosmopolitan currents. For Stalin, every Zionist was finally a potential agent of U.S. intelligence services.

The Soviet Union severed diplomatic ties with Israel after the 1967 Six-Day War. As Russian Jews began emigrating to Israel and the West, the Kremlin clung to the notion of Jews posing a threat to the Soviet state. The Soviet government distinguished between “good” and “bad” Soviet Jews, labeling the latter as those who, influenced by Zionist propaganda, emigrated to the West or Israel.

In the post-Soviet era, the old tradition of dividing Jews into “good” and “bad” persisted. As Dmitry Shlapentokh (2022) has remarked, Alexander Dugin, the ideologue of “Eurasianism” in the early post-Soviet era, divided Jews into “Eurasian” Jews, faithful servants of the great “Eurasian” empire, and “Atlantic” Jews, mercenary agents of cynical capitalism.

Putin the “Philosemite”

Stalinist mythology portrayed the destructive leader-demiurge as the architect of a utopian, superhistorical world and the designer of the people’s collective unconscious. Despite lingering antisemitic sentiments and attitudes after Stalin’s death, Soviet Jews experienced relatively better times than before.

In the 1950s, during Vladimir Putin’s childhood, his family resided in a communal apartment. Rabbi Berel Lazar, Putin’s favorite, shared in an interview that they first met in 1990, shortly after Putin became prime minister, establishing a strong bond. Putin mentioned to Lazar his parents’ frequent absence due to work, recalling his religious Jewish neighbors who generously provided him with food, assistance with homework, and care. Putin also recalled how the husband recited liturgical prayers, sitting covered with tallis (prayer shawl), and how the family had Shabbat meals, after which the husband learned religious texts for hours. Rabbi Lazar suggested that Putin “felt a sense of appreciation for what Yiddishkeit is, what a Jewish family is, what learning Torah is, what keeping mitzvot [Jewish commandments] is. The morality,

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the values” (Heschel, 2023, p. 33). He believed that Putin harbored a sense of gratitude for the kindness shown to him.

During the openness of Gorbachev’s leadership and into the 1990s, many Russian Jews saw improved prospects as Jewish businessmen and politicians formed the Russian Jewish Congress, with oligarchs contributing to synagogues and Jewish centers. In 2005, Putin, as President, made a historic visit to Israel, the first ever by a Russian (or Soviet) leader. During his time in Tel Aviv, he emotionally reunited with his former high school teacher. He also elevated his Jewish childhood friends, Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, to positions of oligarchic power. Several of Putin’s closest confidants, including his Judo teacher, who served as a mentor and surrogate father, are Jewish. Even his chosen surrogate president and later Deputy Chair of the Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, is supposed to have Jewish roots, although his identity is that of an ethnic Russian.

On a personal level, Putin has supported Russian Jews for decades, particularly the Chabad-affiliated community known for its loyalty to him. Russia used to fare better than countries like Hungary and Ukraine on the Global Index of Antisemitism. In 2019, Putin made headlines by standing on stage outside the Jewish Museum in Moscow, flanked by Victor Vekselberg, a Jewish oligarch and donor to local synagogues, and the Russian chief rabbi, Berel Lazar. Born in Italy and educated in the U.S., Lazar was sent as an emissary to Russia by Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the leader of the Hasidic evangelical Orthodox Chabad (also known as Lubavitch) sect, to promote the faith.

Putin has acknowledged that he knows that certain individuals wield significant monetary power. Stereotypically, he appears to link them mostly to Jews whose wealth reaches a global concentration of power that transcends national borders. This perspective leans on conspiratorial ideas, possibly stemming from his KGB background. Putin seems to have embraced the KGB conspiracy theory suggesting that the ruling “world-Jewry” should be approached with caution. He even speculated that one of the reasons for the loss of the Soviet Union during the Cold War was perhaps the wrong anti-Israel policy. Perhaps such caution has backed up Putin’s friendly approach toward Israel until the war in Gaza set a new tone.

Russian psychoanalyst Viktor Mazin refers to a consumer

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culture based on media and monetary power that is common to both the East and the West. Paradoxically, the unconscious of Putin’s Russia is influenced by American ideals, repressed by an emphasis on Russian nationalism and perceived Western manipulative attacks. The global dream and entertainment industry colonize the unconscious in both the East and the West, with discursive practices shaping different ideological meanings related to glamour and money.

Mazin (2010) sees glamour as a symptomatic notion of the Russian language in the 1990s. Alongside terms like “elite,” “exclusive,” and “VIP,” it became one of the most media-popular notions in the new millennium. Glamour implies an ideal lifestyle achievable only with money, fueling consumer egos. In the 1990s, capitalism and psychoanalysis gained status in Russia, returning in a new guise. Money became dollars, psychoanalysis became modern, and the unconscious was infiltrated by media stars and dreams, as well as by the indoctrinating messages of State-owned media.

The Self-Sacrificing Soldier

During Putin’s presidency, his initial enthusiasm for engaging with the West and fostering mutual contacts has transformed into disappointment and a fear of encirclement by the U.S.-led Western coalition. He has increasingly embraced a conservative doctrine grounded in three key principles justified by the savior plan. First, an emphasis on patriotism, where love for the Motherland, encompassing the nation and its people, takes precedence. Second, the integration of military ideology into Russian culture promotes self-sacrifice through a religiously oriented cult of heroes and martyrs to support imperial aspirations for a sovereign territory of “Eurasia” or “Novorossia.” Russians are constantly reminded of their Great Victory against Nazi Germany, reinforcing the moral imperative to be vigilant and prepared for war against the enemies in pursuit of peace. Third, the Russian state must be led by “specialists in human relations,” members of the power elite with strong ties to the FSB, Russia’s secret services. State-led media employs propaganda to portray enemies and their alleged plots.

Putin’s doctrine draws heavily from the writings of White Russian émigré philosopher Ivan Ilyin (1883-1954), frequently quoted in Putin’s speeches. Ilyin, an anti-Bolshevik ultranationalist, was convinced of the “national catastrophe” caused by the October Revolution. He opposed Western democracy, briefly flirted with national socialism, and later advocated for a strong Russia uni-

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fying Great Russia and Little Russia (Ukraine and Belorussia) based on shared faith, nationality, destiny, geography, economy, culture, and political ideology—akin to autocratic democracy. Ilyin, like Putin, vehemently opposed plans for an independent Ukraine, evident in Putin’s approving reference to Ilyin during his speech on September 30, 2022, regarding the Russian annexation of four Ukrainian territories.

In his 1950 essay “What Dismemberment of Russia Entails for the World,” Ilyin predicted the Soviet Union’s fall and advocated for Russians to form an all-military union, resisting the threats of evil through force. The Ilyin-Putin doctrine asserts that only by recognizing the necessity of war or the threat of war can the dismemberment of Russia and submission to Western control be prevented. Putin, summarizing Ilyin in a speech to the Russian Federal Assembly on May 10, 2006, emphasized “the elevated and honored function of the soldier, [representing] the unity of the Russian people” and “the will, force, and honor of the Russian state,” ready to counter “potential external aggression” (Eltchaninoff, 2022, p. 54). Notably, there was no mention of the dehumanization or depersonalization of the soldiers involved.

The “Nazi Jew”

Putin’s use of the defense of splitting is evident in his division between devout Jews supporting him and perceived traitor Jews, and it is manifested in his fixation on President Zelensky. To legitimize the war in Ukraine, Putin emphasizes Russia’s crucial role in defeating Nazi Germany and addressing Holocaust perpetrators. Putin seeks to redefine Zelensky’s Jewish identity, asserting, through alleged Jewish acquaintances, that Zelensky is not a genuine Jew but a disgrace to the community. According to Putin, Zelensky is a pawn set up by Western powers, with the Kyiv regime covering up the glorification of Nazism and the history of the Holocaust in Ukraine. Despite Zelensky’s Jewish roots, Putin views him as a traitor, a sort of Nazi Jew concealing the nationalist Nazification at the core of modern Ukraine. The Russian narrative is inscribed for offensive and defensive purposes, portraying crimes committed by the Kyiv government and leveraging the image of Stepan Bandera and Ukrainian nationalist organizations involved in the Holocaust.

Putin’s confidants from his KGB era, including Lavrov and Patrushev, were brought up in an antisemitic environment. Kremlin ideologues like Alexander Dugin and Alexander Prokhanov are

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known for their antisemitic remarks. Putin’s stance on Jews has been ambiguous; “bad” Jews, in his eyes, were mainly oligarchs opposing him, like Boris Berezovsky from the Yeltsin era. On the other hand, “good” Jews were loyal oligarchs like billionaire Roman Abramovich or Kremlin propagandists such as TV anchor Vladimir Soloviev. Interestingly, Putin appears more favorably disposed toward Russian Jews than any previous Russian ruler, including the Bolsheviks (Shlapentokh, 2022).

Medvedev’s stance echoes Putin’s intense focus and preoccupation with Ukraine and its President Zelensky. In his article (in the Kommersant journal, 2021), Medvedev has gone as far as mocking and insulting Zelensky, suggesting that he is a treacherous Jew and a distasteful individual. Accusations from Medvedev include claiming that Zelensky betrayed the Russian language, in which he was brought up, and flirted with Ukrainian nationalists whose predecessors ruthlessly persecuted Jews during WWII. Additionally, Medvedev implied that Zelensky should not pretend to be a Ukrainian nationalist but should instead embrace his ethnicity and take pride in being an Ashkenazi Jew (Shalapentokh, 2022).

Medvedev’s claims, including threats to launch a nuclear war, are also so contradictory and convoluted that they could be interpreted as both philosemitic and antisemitic, depending on one’s perspective and the context, as Dmitry Shlapentokh (2022) has concluded, adding that such convolution is not unique to Russia. A closer examination of history and beyond reveals that individuals labeled as “antisemites” may still praise Jews, while those identified as “philosemites” can sometimes harbor antisemitic sentiments.

The End Game

Recently, doubts have arisen about Putin’s alleged philosemitism and friendly stance toward Israel, particularly as antisemitic groups have been wandering through Russian cities seeking Jews to target. Despite the Kremlin’s usual response to street protests or dissent, it has remained conspicuously silent on this matter and the Islamist dissent in Russia.

Since the brutal Hamas terror attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, many Russian officials have expressed support for the Palestinians, overlooking Israel’s rights. Putin, for instance, refused to condemn Hamas for the massacre and even welcomed a Hamas del-

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egation to Moscow. The looming threat of internal fragmentation in Russia has led Putin’s government to adopt hybrid politics, establishing political and economic ties with China, India, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Syria, and African countries while also blaming the U.S. for escalating the Gaza conflict. Putin’s judo politics strategically adapts to destabilize adversaries, with selective antisemitism serving as a ritualistic maneuver. Russian propagandists and influencers utilize their channels to fuel hatred toward specific ethnic groups.

Another unsettling incident in Russia involves Lev Rubinstein, a prominent Russian-Jewish poet and a key figure in Soviet underground literature. Fiercely opposed to Putin and the Ukraine war, Rubinstein was tragically hit by a car in Moscow on January 8, 2024, and died at the age of 76 after spending several days in a coma. In his poem, “A Little Night Serenade,” he wrote, “A man can’t live / Without a way to die!” (Rubinstein, 1986, stanza 87).

Winston Churchill’s (1948) famous depiction of Russia as a “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” in a radio broadcast on October 1, 1939, is psychohistorically an interesting, albeit confusing, statement because it shrouds the unconscious motivations of history in a mystery, without trying to set them in any context. However, the return of the repressed scapegoating of Jews in Russia and elsewhere is far from enigmatic.

Lastly, a quote attributed to Jacob Mazeh, chief rabbi of Moscow in the 1920s, encapsulates a historical perspective: “Trotsky makes the revolution, and Bronstein [Trotsky’s birth name] pays the bill.” The quote marks the end game of this narrative.

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