Volume 07 - Number 3 - December 2000
Pages: 102 - 164

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES

Kahn, C. (2000). The paranoid style: Alive and well in the 21st century. Clio’s Psyche, 7(3), 118-120.

https://doi.org/10.70763/af1c25e88a9e818f809f6b5d18ca02e2

The Paranoid Style: Alive and Well in the 21st Century

article

Abstract

This article applies psychoanalytic and psychiatric accounts of paranoia to conspiracy theories in contemporary Western, chiefly American, society. Drawing on Daniel Pipes, Mark Fenster, Melley, Kenneth Stern, W. W. Meissner, and Richard Hofstadter’s The Paranoid Style in American Politics, the author proposes that conspiracy theories express anxiety over diminished personal agency amid globalization and growing institutional and structural control, which Melley terms agency panic. Conspiracy theories are said to resemble the paranoid process in relying on personal needs more than observable events. The article names projection, displacement of responsibility, grandiosity, and the assimilation of contrary evidence to a fixed belief as shared features. It contrasts them with vigilance, which rests on possibility and probability rather than certainty. Using U.S. militia movements and violence against abortion providers as examples, it argues that a victim stance paired with entitlement can blur the line between conspiracy theorists and conspirators. It further argues that rigid belief, expressed socially as prejudice and hatred, can translate into violence. Following Pipes, it asks why conspiracy theories fixate on Jews, Freemasons, Britain, and the United States. It proposes that envy of success and injured self-esteem are at work, and it speculates that the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion externalizes unconscious hostile fantasies. The author concludes that paranoia offers no protection from persecution, and persecution offers no immunity from paranoia.

Keywords:

21st century, anxiety, fringe groups, paranoid style, psychohistory, psychology of conspiracy theories

Human instrumentality has always been limited and those limits have always engendered anxiety. However, in the past, anxiety was allayed by the mythical powers attributed to human prayers and good deeds intended to induce the benevolent intercession of a Supreme Being on behalf of an individual, clan, or tribe. In the present, the human sphere of action has been globalized and extended beyond the illusion of remaining controllable. But despite the absence of an expectation of control and independent functioning, the extant reality causes at least apprehension, sometimes suspicion and, in the extreme, paranoia.

Conspiracy theories are fears of non-existent conspiracies (Daniel Pipes, Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From, 1997). Many conspiracy theories contain “a critique of the contemporary social order [and] assume the coming end of a moment cursed by secret power and a … new beginning where secrecy vanishes and power is transparent and utilized by good people for the good of all.” Unfortunately, the theories fail to indicate “how to move from the end of the uncovered plot to the beginning of a political movement” (Mark Fenster, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture, 1999, pp. 225-226).

Conspiracy theories are theories of power, of the ruling individuals’ power that controls “virtually all aspects of social life, politics and economics” (Conspiracy Theories, p. xiv). Postindustrial developments have had different benefits or detriments for different groups of people and, therefore, different influences on their perception of the increase in technical autonomy relative to their personal autonomy and instrumentality. Doubts “about how knowledge is produced and about the authority of those who produce it” add to the sense of being manipulated (Empire, p.10). Conspiracy theories reflect that insecurity resulting from the simultaneously diminishing personal agency and increasing social controls. They are an expression of the anxiety Melley calls “agency panic” (Empire, p. 1).

Melley distinguishes the structural controls vested in governmental organizations and corporate bureaucracies from intentional, “malevolent” control by the media “depth boys” (the motivational researchers who employ psychologically-inspired “subterranean operations,” for example, to induce a “hypnoidal trance” in shoppers). The conjunction of intentional and structural control may significantly diminish individual agency as a result of individuals having become “emasculated” subjects of external agencies. The (unconscious) realization that the individual is a part of a larger system with a life of its own and the “postmodern transference” that sometimes attributes rationality and motives to systems (Empire, p. 40) strengthen the perception of having become victims of outside forces and experiencing exacerbated anxiety. Individuals or groups may defensively develop conspiracy theories. “Multiple, interlocking, heterogeneous systems” that are relatively immutable through outside influences are particularly “subversive of individual agency” and replace the self-relating subject with a self-relating system (Jürgen Habermas quoted by Melley in Empire).

Alienated members of a mass society, who may also be estranged from themselves—from

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their unwanted or unknown (unconscious) parts—may take flight into activism in extreme groups. These “politically disaffected and the culturally suspicious” are likely to subscribe to conspiracy theories. Pipes (Conspiracy, p. xii) supports this observation with a reference to Louis Farrakhan, the representative of disaffected blacks, who maintains that “Jewish ‘blood-suckers’ have successfully blocked black advancement” and who asserts that Jewish participation on behalf of blacks in the civil rights movement was “self-interested.” Pipes laments that though “some conspiracy theorists are among society’s otherwise most idealistic, accomplished, sensible and friendly individuals,” they are, in Walter Lacqueur’s words, “fighters of chimera and phantoms … who nurse inveterate malice … [and] use pernicious wiles and stratagems” (Conspiracy, p. xii).

Members of fringe groups may resort to activism not for reasons of alienation or estrangement, but in response to their fear of the monolithic mass society that appears to usurp their traditional sovereignty at the individual, local, and state levels. Feeling weak and disempowered, they wish to interfere with or topple the established powers. Militia movements in the U.S. are an example of such a dynamic. According to Kenneth Stern (A Force Upon the Plain, 1996, pp. 246ff.), militias are a social movement guided by a belief that the government is ruled by incorrigible, evil, “financial and international” forces which must be “combated with arms.” These conspiracy theorists experience themselves as vulnerable victims in need of a posse with “special rights and privileges” (Force, p. 246) to protect themselves and their rights. (Yet, they may themselves become part of a conspiracy when they “conspire” to create a “citizens army” to fight the rise of the centralized one-world government they fear.)

The entitlement to a posse with special rights and privileges reveals the obverse of the inferiority implied by the victim stance, namely the grandiosity that entitles them to take the law into their own hands, to take up arms—justifiably and with impunity, of course!—and defensively to conspire aggression against the presumed conspiratorial aggressors. Individuals who suspect conspiracies against individualism operating in the society, banding together to form their own conspiratorial organization, blur the lines between conspiracy theorists and conspirators. A case in point is the extreme right-to-life representatives who conspire to kill the evil killers, the physicians who, by performing abortions, digress from the “right” path.

Since conspiracy theory is frequently unrelated to an actual conspiracy, much as a feared fantasy is unrelated to factual reality, it is important to delineate the differences. Pipes suggest some guidelines for distinguishing conspiracy from conspiracy theory (Conspiracy, p. 8). Conspiracy theories are characterized by: complexity instead of simplicity and parsimony; a “taste for the improbable”; a reluctance to divulge information and a reliance on forgeries; inconsistencies and filling in gaps by “piling on” additional conspiracy theories; beginning with conclusions and accepting supporting arguments indiscriminately while dismissing contradictory evidence. Hence, “conspiracies are understood to be hermetically sealed … and virtually undetectable.”

These characteristic ways of constructing and maintaining conspiracy theories are similar to the paranoid process in that both rely more on personal needs than observable events. Richard Hofstadter defines the paranoid style as a “…central preconception [of] the existence of a vast, insidious, preternaturally effective international conspiratorial network designed to perpetrate acts of the most fiendish character” that its exponents believe to be the motive force in historical events (Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays, 1965, pp. 14). And he defines fear of a possible conspiracy planned by activist subgroups in the society as “political paranoia” (quoted in Conspiracy Theories, p. 3). The conspiracy theories of the “New American Right,” represented by Joseph McCarthy and Barry Goldwater, who feared Communist infiltrators, may exemplify political paranoia.

Characteristic of the paranoid style is to project and impute: the tendency to see difficulties and conflicts in terms of external forces, not to acknowledge personal inadequacies, and to displace responsibility from the self to others. These maneuvers preserve self-esteem and assurance of the rightness and truth of one’s beliefs. An additional feature of the paranoid syndrome is the grandiosity that serves to deny and compensate for weakness and to sustain the conviction of rightness (W.W. Meissner, The Paranoid Process, 1978, pp. 36ff.).

Suspicious guardedness and the practice of assimilating reality data to the paranoid belief serve to protect the paranoid construction, its certainty, consistency, and coherence. In both paranoid and conspiracy-theory dynamics, suspicious-

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ness motivates the attempts to “unearth the hidden truth” by interpreting the obvious facts. The danger of interpreting and reinterpreting in order to understand reality is that “reality” more and more resembles a construct. “Fantastic conclusions are argued out along factual lines” supported by the coherence of the paranoid mentality, which is “if not wholly rational, at least intensely rationalistic” (Paranoid Style, pp. 34 and 36). Both paranoia and conspiracy theories are based on conviction and are not open to modification; evidence is used as corroboration; invalidating evidence is dismissed or ignored, labeled irrelevant to the issue. This is in contrast to vigilance, a stance based in possibility, probability, and theory rather than certainty.

The rigidity and paranoid aspects of conspiracy theories, expressed in social terms as bigotry, prejudice, and hate, can easily translate into violence. Having imputed conflicts, difficulties, and weakness to others, passionate dislike of or hostility toward those individuals or groups purported to harbor the unacceptable thoughts or impulses comes easily. It is a small step from there to conspire to disempower, even violently to eliminate them. Political extremists are vulnerable to exhortations to act out their violent tendencies, because unlike working politicians, paranoid leaders do not mediate or compromise; “a paranoid leader is a militant leader” (Paranoid Style, p.31) who focuses on the enemy to mobilize his group’s inner resources and maintain its purposiveness (Paranoid Process, p. 805).

Why are conspiracy theories so preoccupied with Jews, Israel, and Freemasons, as well as Britons and Americans, asks Pipes (Conspiracy, p. 151). He answers that “Ironically, high ideals make a people or state into a special target of conspiracies,” and “paranoid fantasies” can be aroused by idealistic establishments. Thus, “anti-Semitism is a distorted testimony to the achievements of Jews” (p. 153), to whom some conspiracy theorists ascribe the Industrial Revolution and the control of money in capitalism. Similarly, successful Freemasons, and the United States as well as the United Kingdom, have become the targets of those less able to deal with modernity. Success is envied and feared, and unconsciously the idealized figure arouses hate because it is experienced as depriving. In this regard, one can speculate that the forged Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion are the externalization of unconscious, murderous fantasies of vengeful individuals, and persecution the “externalization and enactment of an [internal] catastrophe imposed on others” (Joseph H. Berke, et al, eds., Even Paranoids Have Enemies: New Perspectives on Paranoia and Persecution, 1998, p. 2). In this case, the internal catastrophe may well be a sense of inadequacy and an assault on self-esteem in the face of another’s success. Constructing a conspiracy theory that includes a denigration of the successful figure would both heap the catastrophe on the other and restore the sense of worthiness in the “conspiracist” (Conspiracy, p. 26).

In the end, “paranoia is no protection from persecution, nor is persecution immunization against paranoia” (Even Paranoids, p. 1), because Golda Meir was right: “Even paranoids have enemies.”

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About the author

Charlotte Kahn

Charlotte Kahn, EdD, is a marital and family therapist as well as a psychoanalyst in private practice in New York and New Jersey who did extensive interviews with former East Germans after the collapse of the Communist regime. This article is adapted from her chapter, “Emigration Without Leaving Home,” in the forthcoming book, Immigrant Experiences: Personal Narrative and Psychological Analysis (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1997), edited by Paul H. Elovitz and Charlotte Kahn and sponsored by the Psychohistory Forum.

How to cite this article

Kahn, C. (2000). The paranoid style: Alive and well in the 21st century. Clio’s Psyche, 7(3), 118-120.

https://doi.org/10.70763/af1c25e88a9e818f809f6b5d18ca02e2

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