There is No “Win” in Bush’s Iraq War

Dear Editor,

This letter is a follow-up to an earlier article I wrote about the war in Iraq. The term “win,” as it concerns Iraq, really has two meanings. The first, as it applies to Iraq, is a military concept and the second is political. Although the weak United States economy, beset by such factors as soaring energy prices, the housing disaster, and a recession (or close to it), has removed Iraq as the most critical issue in the election. Nevertheless, Iraq remains a contentious matter. Indeed, political advertising for John McCain continues to emphasize his military career. The result is that polling favors McCain on the question of

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competency as commander-in-chief. Paradoxically, the polls also show that the electorate would prefer to be out of Iraq.

However, as both presidential candidates dance gingerly about ending the Iraqi conflict, it becomes painfully obvious they are attempting to cope with the military definition of “victory,” which is equivalent to the Gestalt principle of closure (Anita Woolfolk, Educational Psychology, 10^th ed., 2007, p. 272). Any reading of conflict through the centuries (Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages (rev. ed), 1946) will demonstrate that victory could be claimed after a single battle, or a protracted campaign. Vietnam was unique in American history in the sense that the United States could claim a tactical victory or draw in particular battles while suffering a strategic defeat. But somehow, the war could be seen as ended with the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese army’s conquest of South Vietnam. In Iraq, there is no one to whom to offer surrender.

Until fairly recent times, any attempts, particularly by Democrats, to call for a timed withdrawal in Iraq, were greeted by political taunts of “surrender” or “waving the white flag.” At the same time, politicians advocating staying the course were rather murky about what constituted a victory. There were vague allusions to “stability,” some form of “power sharing,” and even occasional references to a “democracy.” The latter is strictly an American fantasy, which denies the inescapable fact that aside from Israel, democratic states simply do not exist in the Middle East.

The problem of determining when at least stability has been achieved is almost unsolvable. Since the United States invaded Iraq, the purposes for going to war have oscillated between destroying WMDs, getting rid of Saddam Hussein, and/or establishing some form of democratic government. But with inadequate forces and no exit strategy, we found ourselves embroiled in a war that is both guerilla and civil.

I learned quickly from some Kuwaiti graduate students that after 1,400 years of enmity between Shiite and Sunni, they simply did not consider the possibilities of coexisting with each other within a government framework based on the principle of mutual trust. In Iraq, Sunnis accepted their brutal repression of the Shiites as a legitimate form of governance. If the current political squabbling is any index, Sunnis believe the Shiites will return the favor once they are in power. You can add to this the Kurds who have their own agenda. The recent return of the Sunni bloc to the government is most likely a matter of participating in any decisions concerning the apportionment of oil revenues. Anything beyond that in terms of a strong centralized government, based on some form of power sharing, is quite problematical.

It is no accident that the “surge,” which was originally intended to provide a “political window” for some form of negotiated agreements, has up to this point not succeeded in this regard. This troop increase was assisted by the Sunni tribes in Anbar province turning on Al-Qaeda, and the government reining in the Shiite militias. The result has been a very significant decrease in casualties, both military and civilian. If there is a downside to peace, the Sunnis are now well armed.

Even in terms of military success, the current relative calm is constantly hedged with all sorts of perils, reflecting a sense of fragility, liberally provided by the American military command. The Iraqi army and police force are improving, but they have a very long way to go to become effective and professional. There are still suicide bombings, and we still have to bail out the Iraqi army on occasion. Ironically, the United States is now faced with a politically resurgent Iraqi government. The Iraqis want no part of any extensive American military presence after two more years. Currently, the Iraqis in their negotiations with the United States are calling for significant troop reductions. At best, the United States would have few, if any, permanent bases, a residual troop presence consisting of special operations forces, training, and logistical units, as well as such resources as air power.

So it appears that after hundreds of billions of dollars, and over 4,100 deaths (not to mention thousands who were maimed), we are being told to exit. The use of the term “horizons” is a polite and vague way to talk about some definitive plans for withdrawal of American combat forces. Undoubtedly, this surge in nationalism is being fueled not only by a return to normalcy in everyday life, but also elections both in the United States and Iraq. Prime Minister Al-Maliki clearly has to show Iraq is not the pawn of some colonial power. Meanwhile, Bush is as unpopular as he has been in the last few years, knows that whatever happens he will be long gone, which fits nicely into his psychological problems. Let me elaborate. In a previous paper (Philip Langer and Robert Pois, “The Psychological Roots of Bush’s Iraq Obstinacy,” Clio’s Psyche 14, nos. 1, 2,

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[2007], pp. 8-11) attribution was made to Festinger’s concept of cognitive dissonance, wherein Bush would restructure the events in Iraq to fit his belief systems. I have since concluded that this represented only part of Bush’s problems. Along with previous observations, I believe now Bush has a very weak, if not shattered, ego. I previously used this concept to describe General George Brinton McClellan, a Union general during the Civil War (Robert Pois and Philip Langer, “Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership,” [2004], Bloomington, IN: The Indiana University Press, chap. 3). Basically, in the process of trying to win, he could not afford to share in any personal blame for failure. In any losing situation, he was not personally at fault. He was the perpetual victim of forces back in Washington. In a similar manner, Bush uses bombast to cover uncertainty. There is a history for this type of behavior.

Early on, we know that Bush’s business successes were greatly assisted by family ties. In addition, he found himself defending the skies of Texas during the Vietnam War. Even in the Texas Air National Guard there is considerable controversy over whether or not he even finished his tour. It is instructive to note how strong individuals such as Cheney and Rumsfeld have dominated him. His free use of “signings” is an attempt to avoid compromise and controversy regarding legislation. The veto successes are based on Republican use of the filibuster in the Senate. They share responsibility with him. More recently he has turned over Iraqi military decisions to the commanders in the field, which is the equivalent of turning von Clausewitz’s dictum regarding politics and war on its head. If General Petraeus had proved wrong, well, he thought the military should have had to make the decision.

By the time he leaves office in January, there will not be anything resembling a military definition of victory in Iraq. But in terms of his needs, Bush has in his mind the best of all worlds. He listened to Petraeus, and Al-Maliki did not. Still, it is true he will also be leaving with a resurgence of fighting in Afghanistan, as the regrouped Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces take the offensive. So, in addition to the lack of any clear-cut victory in Iraq, the threat of terrorism has not been overcome. This represents the second failure of the Iraqi conflict.

Afghanistan is now home to forces intent on doing us no good. As casualties in Afghanistan mount relative to Iraq, Bush can now accede to a military demand for greater troop strength, without acknowledging that in the end Iraq was a distraction. It is interesting to see how the two wars were kept apart as separate conflicts by this administration.

Since I do not believe Bush is completely divorced from any sense of reality, he is well aware that his legacy is a tarnished failure. He also knows the terrorist threat was not lessened. In the months remaining we will not see any political direction, which he can attribute to the need to support McCain’s presidential campaigning. The irony is that McCain has to tie together the failure in Iraq and the resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as Democratic responsibilities. Bush, I presume, will simply accept this as a political necessity. In the end, he exits not with a bang but a whimper.

Sincerely yours,

Philip Langer

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