Denial or Selective Perception?

In my comments on Professor Beisel’s analysis of historical events, the reader must keep in mind that I am writing from the perspectives of both a military psychohistorian (Robert Pois and Philip Langer, Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership, 2004), as well as a professor of psychology. In his article, “Military and Diplomatic Blind Spots and Traumatic Reenactments,” Beisel argues that historians fail to recognize that such processes as denial and unconscious motivation may commonly link unique historical events, resulting in “blind spots.”

The problem is that while his arguments are insightful, the use of defense mechanisms and unconscious motivation does not really provide for much verifiable analytical evidence regarding group decision-making. To categorize decision failure as an example of denial (or “blind spot”) might be an accurate description for an individual’s behavior within a clinical setting, but should not be used to categorize a group process. Denial, per se, reflects an individual’s rejection of reality and the substitution of wish fulfillment (Leland E. Hinsie and Robert J. Campbell, Psychiatric Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1960, p. 197). In a clinical setting, the therapist is in a position to uncover underlying and uniquely individual causes. For historical purposes, though, you would need to establish within the group as to whom or what individual processes contributed to the decision. As for unconscious motivation, while its existence is postulated among clinicians, it is a dead end for purposes of historical analysis.

Given the complexity of group decision-making, about the only construct even remotely resembling a broad clinical character-

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ization is groupthink. This is defined as an overriding group dynamic to seek agreement among its members, at the expense of obtaining accurate, and perhaps negative, evidence. The Bay of Pigs fiasco is often cited as an example of this construct (Saul Kassin, Steven Fein Hazel R. Markus, Social Psychology, 7^th ed., 2008, pp. 274-275). Groupthink is not mentioned in the article, though, and it is doubtful that there is any universal application of this explanation in the instances cited.

In fact, the examples presented are really a mixed bag. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss each in detail, but I would like to react briefly to a few. Beisel’s paper starts off describing a direct confrontation between Hermann Göring and Adolf Galland. Göring knew very well that American planes had penetrated German air space. But a more plausible explanation for his outburst is that he had slipped into the life of a sybarite, as witness his corpulence. Moreover, he had previously contributed to the debacle at Stalingrad, by failing to adequately supply the Sixth Army. He did not need Galland to go to Hitler, who had by this time assumed complete control of German military operations, and voice a complaint about more Luftwaffe failures. Göring’s hysterical reaction more likely reflected an awareness of his increasingly precarious hold on power.

Continuing, it is likely true that Bush did not want to hear more bad news about Iraq. By the very nature of his comments, though, I can only conclude that he was indeed aware of the problems in Iraq, but did not want to be reminded about them. I suspect many of us have been in that same boat.

Stalin, on the other hand, comes closer to providing denial as an explanation. His military was warning him about the massing of German troops and over-flights into Soviet territory. While there was some Soviet reaction to these threats, Stalin was convincing himself in various ways that Hitler was not going to war (Alfred Seaton, The Russo-German War: 1941-45, 1971, pp. 20-22). His retreat from governing, immediately after the outbreak of war, suggests the depth of his shock when reality took over.

On the other hand, the idea of a universal process operating in a variety of events is rather intriguing. I would like to suggest

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the concept of selective perception as more plausible and observable series of events. It certainly can be used as an explanatory construct, especially when a single individual like Stalin or Hitler is controlling the decision-making. Perception is concerned with two parallel processes. One is bottom-up processing, where we choose to consider stimuli from our environment, which is an inductive operation, and top-down processing, a deductive strategy based on prior expectations and experience. Not only do both processes operate simultaneously, but also both operations are influenced by the fact that attention is selective (David Myers, Psychology, 2004, pp. 193, 231). The reader may perceive a resemblance to denial, but these processes can provide evidence amenable to direct observation.

Actually, medical diagnoses provide a good example of selectivity. It is likely true that during the flu season if you visit your doctor, and your symptoms are flu-like, he may very well begin treating you for the flu. On the other hand, if you present symptoms associated with sickle cell anemia, the physician is more likely to initially consider anemia if you are African-American, as to being Caucasian. The recent outbreak of a deadly strain of E.coli illustrates both processes. Researchers immediately identified the disease (top-down), while their search for the sources involved represented bottom-up processing.

On the other hand, using basically a bottom-up strategy, whatever the model of analysis the historian prefers, can focus on individuals involved in the process. Indeed, Gordon Prange, in his book At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, does an excellent job of amassing evidence based on individual behavior. On the other hand, using a top-down approach, while simultaneously relegating bottom-up processing to a minor role, might well create a significant number of “blind spots” in the observer, who starts with denial and unconscious motivation as controlling constructs to categorize the outcomes. The validity of a final categorization is questionable.

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