Is There More to Psychohistory Than Trauma?

Dr. Beisel’s paper reiterates a fundamental aspect of psychohistorical analysis: that we can’t understand key historical events without taking into account the operation of irrational processes. His paper focuses on one category of such irrationalities, those in which leaders and policymakers had blind spots, acting as if they were unaware of crucially important information.

Dr. Beisel cites several historical events that fit this description, focusing on seven, starting with the attack on Pearl Harbor, in which the United States was blindsided by a direct or indirect surprise attack that those in leadership roles should have seen coming. He suggests that these seven events can best be understood as traumatic reenactments of the Ur trauma, which lays down the template for subsequent reenactments of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Dr. Beisel, along with a number of other prominent psychohistorians, including Vamik Volkan, Rudy Binion, Dan Dervin, and many others, see trauma and the various reactions to it, including reenactments, and its intergenerational transmission as central to understanding much of what is irrational, and often unconscious, in the motives that determine so many important historical events. Trauma has become the most prevalent topic in recent psychohistorical scholarship. To cite just one of many examples, there is a 1998 book titled, International Handbook of Multigenerational Legacies of Trauma, edited by Yael Danieli, with contributions from 38 authors in sections such as the Nazi Holocaust, World War II, genocide, the Vietnam war, trauma to indigenous peoples, trauma under repressive regimes, and domestic violence and crime.

Beisel mentions four other 20^th century historical events: Göring and Hitler’s denial and disavowal of bad military news as

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the war turned against Germany; a similar refusal to acknowledge negative military developments in Vietnam by Johnson, McNamara, and Westmoreland; the Austro-Hungarian general staff ignoring the probable reaction of Russia to their attack on Serbia, which started World War I; and Stalin’s blindness to the coming German invasion in 1941. Beisel does briefly mention possible psychological motives that may not be trauma related in connection with these examples, as well as the seven events in American history. For example, he says “popular versions of many historical events come to be filled with denials and blind spots, missing pieces put there because they serve several psychological functions,” including “keeping things comfortably simple and allowing normal ethnocentric impulses to flourish by helping the group’s members idealize their group and feel good about themselves.” I would like to suggest that this line of explanation can add a good deal of explanatory power to the trauma reenactment accounting for all the examples.

To expand on Beisel’s comments on ethnocentrism and self-idealization, I would argue that narcissistic motives and wishes can generate a good deal of irrational behavior, such as grandiosity, assertions of superiority over others, over-idealizing one’s own group, demonization of the enemy “other,” and the willingness to use force to enact these wishes that are central to understanding the irrationality that drives so much of nations’ behavior. As Beisel says, all of these maneuvers are in the service of making the group feel good about themselves. I would argue that all of the events described by Beisel can be understood as examples of expressions of narcissistic wishes to feel more powerful, virtuous, and generally superior to others, particularly those we don’t like.

In the case of the United States, these kinds of self-aggrandizing narcissistic wishes are at the core of what has been called “American exceptionalism.” This ideology of entitlement and superiority has been present throughout this country’s history, from the colonists’ treatment of the Native Americans as inferior, uncivilized barbarians; to the Monroe Doctrine claiming the entire Western hemisphere as our sphere of influence; to the belief that this country had a manifest destiny to expand its territory and subjugate all others to our direct rule or dominance; to the World War I crusade to make the world safe for democracy; to our duty to lead

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the battle against godless communism; to being obligated, as the world’s only superpower, to use military means to impose our will on others.

As Beisel points out about the seven unpleasant surprises this country has experienced since Pearl Harbor, we “sometimes played a role in provoking them.” However, one aspect of the American exceptionalist belief system is that we must always, with perhaps a few exceptions, be the good guys. Beisel suggests that it is important that we be in the role of the innocent victim. I believe that the innocent victim stance also facilitates taking revenge on our attackers with a feeling of righteous and justified indignation. Unfortunately, it also aids in suppressing guilt over our acts of violent retribution, as well as helping to avoid any sense of responsibility for our actions that may have provoked the attack.

As described by Heinz Kohut in his paper on narcissistic rage and emphasized by many others, traumatic events can certainly exacerbate the worst kind of narcissistic behavior. However, narcissistic wishes and the actions motivated by them can exist without a prerequisite trauma. For example, without stretching the definition of trauma too broadly, it would be hard to make the argument that the grandiose, entitled, and violent activities of this country from colonial times to the present, most of which occurred before Pearl Harbor, are primarily reactions to or reenactments of a national trauma.

Trauma and its consequences can generate powerful motives which may sometimes be irrational, unconscious, or both, and play a major role in driving much of what happens in the world, particularly when groups or nations engage in violent conflict. Issues related to loss, unresolved mourning, and the desire for revenge and retribution toward those who have harmed them are frequently present in many of the historical events we are trying to understand. My contention here is that too much of an emphasis on traumatic reenactment can lead to downplaying other kinds of motives, which are not necessarily trauma related. In particular, the variety of narcissistic wishes, which can lead to the creation of “blind spots” along with a host of other less puzzling irrationalities.

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