
Volume 18 - Number 2 - September 2011
Pages: 123 - 247
SYMPOSIUM
Lyman, R. (2011). Psychological influence outweighs blind spots. Clio’s Psyche, 18(2), 164-167.
Psychological Influence Outweighs Blind Spots
Abstract
In this response article in the symposium on the psychology of blind spots and traumatic reenactment, the author replies to David R. Beisel’s lead essay, “Military and Diplomatic Blind Spots and Traumatic Reenactments,” which presents seven American cases, framed by the continuing influence of the Pearl Harbor attack, in which psychological factors are said to have impaired leaders’ judgment. The author grants that Beisel’s cases fit a pattern and that such tendencies often exist. He contends, however, that a longer study would meet contrary examples, and he cautions against simplifying and selecting only favorable cases. He cites Allied deception of Germany and Japan in World War II, including the D-Day landing sites, and Truman’s warning of ruin to Japan after Nagasaki, when no further atomic bombs were available. He presents these as evidence that leaders can learn from earlier errors. He also gives non-American cases: the Japanese high command’s 4–4 vote on continuing the war before the Emperor broke the tie, and the Pakistani leadership’s response to the raid on bin Laden’s hideout, which he suggests may test the thesis. He asks what personal and institutional elements preclude self-deception and raises Churchill’s leadership in 1940 as a possible counterexample. He concludes that Beisel should refine his argument to include countervailing evidence, that psychological influence on decision-making deserves discussion, and that the discussion should continue.
blind spots, David Beisel, decision-making, psychoanalysis, psychohistory, psychological factors, traumatic reenactment, U.S. leaders
David Beisel has written a brief but thought-provoking paper emphasizing a number of instances when top decision-makers seemed self-deluded, obsessed, or blinded to what in retrospect we are inclined to call “reality.” His thesis is that underlying psychological factors often overwhelm a leader’s ability to make judgments with clear sight. The strength of his survey is that he has found many instances of this tendency, each with different details but all fitting into a similar pattern. His seven American cases all seem to prove his point.
In research for a longer essay, however, let alone a book, I suspect that Professor Beisel would find examples that demonstrate a contrary point, even within his chosen framework of exploring the continuing power exerted by the Pearl Harbor attack over American decision-making. Just within the World War II years, one thinks of the numerous deceptions perpetrated by the formerly-gullible Allies on the Germans, and from June 1942 (Midway) onward, on the Japanese as well. These ploys often put our intentions, locations, capabilities, and points of attack under disguise. Surely, some of these deliberate deceptions by the once-deceived Americans and their allies played a strong role in eventual victory in both major theaters of war. Together they may well suggest an ability to learn sometimes from previous and recent errors of judgment, omission, and foresight. In any event, by the end of that war, it was the enemy as much as we who seemed befuddled. Could a marshalling of these examples “prove” that shrewd leaders can sometimes overcome the psychological tendencies that loom so large in this paper? What are the elements (both personal and institutional) that preclude self-deception?
In other words, if we are to look at Beisel’s proposition from both sides, indeed from all sides and not just from a blinded-
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American-leadership point of view, we might still find elements and remnants of powerful psychohistorical tendencies without falling into the dual traps of seeming to simplify excessively and selecting only examples favorable to the thesis at hand. Of course, the tendencies he describes do often exist, but it is not just American policy-makers who are vulnerable. Consider the recent raid on bin Laden’s hideout in Pakistan, an event which seems to have had a “Pearl Harbor impact” upon the Pakistanis. Clearly, collaborative elements in the Pakistani leadership group felt comfortable in shielding the man, apparently confident that we would never have the nerve (or even the capacity?) to carry out with both efficiency and surprise a violation of their territory. It might be an interesting test case of the thesis in this paper to watch South Asian events unfold.
However, if this critique were to be accepted as valid, I am confident Professor Beisel would ask in rebuttal: Then why is there such a disappointing pattern in our own country’s history of self-deception over the decades? Doesn’t the record indeed show that vulnerability to subconscious manipulation by psychological factors is more powerful than any motivation or ability to learn from the past? I would then respond: Perhaps it would be helpful to the strength of the thesis if, in subsequent explorations, the author feels encouraged to refine and develop both argument and exemplification to include countervailing evidence. After all, it seems of almost equivalent significance that there often exists a compensatory drive to learn from prior mistakes. For example, toward the end of World War II, we were regularly misleading the Germans and the Japanese to our advantage, whether through manipulation of codes or the planting of cleverly selected pieces of misinformation (e.g., about the D-Day landing sites, just to name one famous example) or suggesting to a traumatized enemy people a capacity we did not in fact have. Consider, for example, the number of atomic bombs (zero) actually available immediately after Nagasaki when Truman warned about a “rain of ruin” about to fall on Japan should they not immediately surrender. In the actual event, we were reduced to carrying out a conventional (if devastating) air raid three days after Nagasaki, aimed at Tokyo presumably to influence the Emperor to surrender since Tokyo had already been very heavily bombed in
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two severe raids earlier in 1945.
There is no shortage of examples of non-American self-deception in war-making history, including another aspect of the just-mentioned case of Japan’s death struggle after Nagasaki. A mere few hours before we launched that last air raid on Tokyo, unbeknownst to us, the Japanese high command had voted 4-4 on the question of whether or not to continue the war. It was only when the Emperor himself (defying precedent) intervened to break the tie that peace began to become a possibility. When many such examples are assembled from many sources, they could serve to explore in a deeper, broader, and more nuanced way Professor Beisel’s thesis that psychological factors do indeed often play a role in faulty decision-making.
Further, as a part of an expanded discussion, it is tempting to wonder aloud whether or not there are other moments when clear and courageous leadership did tip the scales in yet another way. Even after all his flaws, faults, and weaknesses are laid bare, is there really any doubt that Winston Churchill provided a different kind of leadership in those desperate days of 1940, to the eventual benefit of the world (John Lukacs, Five Days in London May 1940, 1999, and At the End of an Age, 2002)?
Psychological influence on decision-making may have been brushed aside for too long, and Beisel’s paper performs a good service in bringing it out into full daylight for discussion. But as in all things, there are complications, refinements, exceptions, and nuances. I hope the discussion continues.
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How to cite this article
Lyman, R. (2011). Psychological influence outweighs blind spots. Clio’s Psyche, 18(2), 164-167.



