Nationalism in Japan: A Fertile Ideological Field (article)

In the 1980s and into the 1990s some Japanese came to believe that foreigners, either out of sheer ignorance or an irrational dislike of Japan, had it in for Japan. The “conspirators” were vaguely thought to be anyone not Japanese, though often Americans were singled out. This conspiracy was represented by one term which was invented by a Japan lobbyist: “Japan-bashing,” which became a media buzz word on both sides of the Pacific when criticism was leveled against what were regarded as predatory trade policies and practices which propelled Japan’s economy.

Before the term “Japan-bashing” was ever used, a general sense that Japan had few friends in the world probably existed among some Japanese despite there being no evidence that there was ever an actual conspiracy against Japan. However, in any case, aware of the “fertile ideological field” within Japan that would produce genuine belief in a conspiracy against Japan, some Japanese leaders and bureaucrats cynically employed and deployed charges of “Japan-bashing.” On occasion this was done explicitly, but more often than not, it was carried out surreptitiously by initiating whispering campaigns that were hard to trace. “Japan-bashing” was cleverly used by Japan’s economic elites as a way of deflecting discussion from the substance of any criticism to the motives of the critic. Accusing someone of “Japan-bashing” was a tactic that effectively ended many debates about important international issues. A specific hope was that American trade negotiators would change their policies and argumentation in order to avoid being labeled “Japan-bashers.” Any journalistic coverage, academic research, or casual comment considered unfair toward Japan was open to charges of “Japan-bashing,” implying that anyone critical of Japan did not understand its customs and history, being insensitive to cultural diversity, or, worse, was a racist.

Why did one term, “Japan-bashing,” become so supercharged, giving rise to a conspiracy theory? For those who accepted this conspiracy theory, hearing about “Japan-bashing” was like the missing piece of an intellectual jigsaw puzzle that once put in its proper place, made the picture of the puzzle complete. If the missing piece is the key to a more or less coherent view, the other pieces surrounding it constitute the required context, or a fertile ideological field that might encourage belief in anti-Japan conspiracy theories. This accusation received its charge by resonating with nationalist sentiments of “cultural uniqueness” and “victim consciousness” within Japan.

The use of “Japan-bashing” must be understood within the context of nationalist sentiment in modern Japan. Nationalism is a term that usually evokes images of marching troops, chauvinistic threats, and xenophobic speeches. However, the

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modern national state, depending on the place and historical period, is actually home to a variety of nationalisms, such as linguistic nationalism, racial nationalism, economic nationalism, and cultural nationalism. Some of these nationalisms, lacking the aggressiveness, intolerance, or passion of certain forms of nationalism, have become so much a part of daily life that they may be described as “popular” or “everyday.”

One example of popular and cultural nationalism in Japan is what is called “theories about Japanese,” or nihonjin-ron. The number of works that fall into the nihonjin-ron genre is immense. Though this type of work can be traced back to the end of World War II, it became especially popular when Japan began to obtain economic might in the 1970s and 1980s, and seemed to amount to a national obsession.

Key ideas appearing in nihonjin-ron include: the inherently hierarchical nature of Japanese social structures, a strong proclivity to work in groups, a lack of individuality, and that Japanese belong to a “homogeneous race/ethnic group.” All these notions, however, seem to point to one master idea: the Japanese are unique. The arguments of such works relate the uniqueness of the Japanese to Japan’s special environment and ecology, for example, “only Japan has four seasons”; a rice-growing, agricultural tradition; social structures premised on a Confucian legacy; an inexplicable social psychology; or a mystifying language. Much of nihonjin-ron is ethnocentric and rests upon unsophisticated theorizing.

In an example of how official nationalist concerns have appropriated and employed manifestations of popular nationalism, the state has supported nihonjin-ron. This attempt at cultural policy should not be surprising, since states (some more than others) have regularly attempted to construct sentiments of national solidarity among citizens. The Japanese government has financed the English publication of some nihonjin-ron classics for overseas consumption, and the state-funded Japan Foundation and the International Research Center for Japanese Studies has supported nihonjin-ron-oriented research. Moreover, corporations have seen value in advocating nihonjin-ron, especially those that emphasize cooperation and harmony among workers, loyalty to the company, hard work, and dedication. Nihonjin-ron also has links to economic nationalism: the Japanese authorities have justified trade barriers and attempted to settle economic disputes by resorting to racialist excuses: the Japanese have “different skin” or “longer intestines,” and test results for products conducted on non-Japanese are invalid because “Japanese are different from foreigners.”

If the beliefs mentioned above that give rise to and motivate nihonjin-ron result in cultural exceptionalism, then it is easy to see why a belief might develop that non-Japanese cannot adequately appreciate or understand Japan. Consequently, foreigners might mistreat, even take advantage of, the Japanese people, especially in times of national crisis.

After World War II, many blamed the immoral militarist leaders who took the unsuspecting Japanese people down the wrong path of history. Many of Japan’s citizens deplored Japan’s bloody rampage through Asia and the heavy price they themselves paid for supporting ultra-nationalism. From this developed “victim consciousness.” However, some Japanese give a different spin to a sense of victimhood, emphasizing foreign animosity towards Japan. Some examples are: Japan, forced to defend itself against foreign encirclement and aggression, attacked the United States; the Americans saved the atomic bombings for Japan rather than use them on Germany; the Americans played unfairly with nuclear weapons whose horrific effects went beyond the bounds of conventional warfare. Related to victim consciousness is “peace nationalism” (or more cynically, “one-country pacifism”), which to a large degree is grounded in theories of Japanese exceptionalism, for example, “only Japan has a peace constitution forbidding war” and “only Japan has suffered atomic warfare.”

To account for the spread of conspiracy theories, recognition of the ideological atmosphere, which encourages the growth of strange stories, is vital. Sometimes we search for only one element in the ideological environment that promotes a conspiracy theory. The lesson to be drawn is that to be viable, theories of conspiracies do not require one “big lie,” but rather a fertile ideological field of small untruths in order to grow. The correct ideological atmosphere can turn one phrase into the most emotive charge, loaded with a visceral impact.

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