A Nation Awakened? Terrorists Test America’s Resolve

In the shocking aftermath of the assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, many commentators began to draw parallels between these acts of aggression and the attack on Pearl Harbor almost 60 years earlier. Once again, a hostile power conducted a “sudden and unexpected attack” on the United States and appeared to have “awakened a sleeping giant.”

A parallel drawn between the two events was their “surprise” nature. With a little reflection, however, this “obvious” parallel is without basis. The armed forces of Imperial Japan did indeed conduct their first offensive action against the United States in what history records as a surprise attack. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, however, were not the first offensive action of our current adversary. Only the relative complacency of the American people allowed any element of surprise. The al-Qaeda perpetrators had warned us with both words and actions: earlier attacks on the World Trade Center (1993); U.S. servicemen in Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia (1996); U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998); and the USS Cole (2000). The contrast between the surprise nature of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the clearly portended attacks on September 11 is indicative of the differing motivations of each attacker.

The intent of the Japanese attack in Hawaii, directed at the naval forces of the United States, was to weaken the military power of the United States. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were directed at symbols of American financial and military influence. World War II was a contest of military and industrial might. Japan aimed at destroying the capability of the U.S. to deny it access to the resources of the Pacific. The current conflict is a contest of ingenuity and intrigue. Al-Qaeda aims to destroy the resolve of the U.S. to maintain a presence in the Middle East. The psychological basis of the current campaign denies the U.S. an easy target upon which to unleash its mighty arsenal. The current clash will test Americans in a manner to which they are recently quite unaccustomed.

Al-Qaeda appears to understand how to fight a war with a superpower. They have studied the Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In a war of terror, the target is not military but the collective will. History—from the Civil War to World War I to Vietnam—indicates that al-Qaeda has selected a vulnerable target: the American people have usually shown an unwillingness to prosecute a protracted campaign, especially when the apparent objective lies far beyond domestic shores. While the horrific loss of life in New York City may have roused the American people from a metaphoric slumber, it remains to be seen if this national stirring will endure the many arduous tests to come. Will future attacks on American soil steel our resolve to pursue the aggressors throughout the world? Or will mounting personal casualties—innocent family, friends, and school children dying in our urban centers rather than soldiers overseas—weaken Americans’ support for Middle East oil regimes and Israel?

The high costs and minimal benefits of an anti-terrorist campaign offer far less opportunity for psychological reward. There is no quick victory and often no noticeable victory. Success is the absence of a successful attack by the enemy. This allows the “sleeping giant” to fall back into slumber. However, if governments appear incapable of protecting citizens from attack, the collective resolve will quickly dissipate.

Imperial Japan possessed a mighty armada with which to prosecute its war against the United States. The al-Qaeda organization does not possess

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substantial military hardware in the conventional sense. What they do have is equally as dangerous, however. Lacking resources, they appear to possess incredible resourcefulness. Without an organized air arm, the soldiers of al-Qaeda trained at our schools to fly our airplanes and ultimately used our planes as their bombers and as the bombs themselves. In a campaign of terror, their meager assets—skillfully applied—may rival the awesome power of the U.S. military.

What the U.S. has seen of al-Qaeda thus far indicates that it is composed of well-trained, resourceful, and dedicated soldiers. Their dedication and resourcefulness position them well to strike at their target—the determination of the American people. The attacks against America are not isolated incidents—they are part of a jihad. The religious fervor of jihad provides the soldiers of al-Qaeda a devotion unknown to most Americans. Generations of Americans have willingly risked their lives for their country but very few have knowingly given their lives for any cause. This is the nature of the commitment that enables the soldiers of al-Qaeda to enthusiastically engage in suicide attacks.

The al-Qaeda organization, like their mujahideen mentors, appears to be patient. What seems to be likely is that al-Qaeda will wait; the American people will again become complacent, and al-Qaeda will strike again. Americans’ collective resolve is about to be sorely tested.

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