Do We Need an Evolutionary Theory of Society?

The need for an evolutionary theory has rarely been focused upon at psychohistorical meetings. I am referring to the theory of the evolution and development of society and the psyche, and—most importantly—what might be the relationship between these two developmental journeys. After a few comments on what psychic and social evolutionary theory holds as first principles, I will state my conclusions and then go on to elaborate on the argument that brought me to them.

The theory postulates that development takes place within stages. There is developmental evolution within a stage, but once the maturity of that stage is reached, only by a more radical advance to the next stage does growth proceed. The energy required to proceed from one stage to another is different—and certainly more intense—than the energy required to advance within a stage. One example that, hopefully, would be acceptable to most readers is the Freudian history of the development of the libido by stages: oral, anal, genital, Oedipal.

Another basic tenet of evolutionary theory is that the sequence of stages is not arbitrary, haphazard, or open to change. There is an iron-bound logic of development from one stage to an-.

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other, In my view, as in Lloyd deMause’s, it is a psycho-logic. I have, for instance, written a book on that stage of society which succeeds to what is called “primitive” or “kinship society,” a stage I designate “complex society.” When a primitive society begins the complicated journey to a new form of social structure, there is no democratic, priestly, aristocratic form that that change can adopt. Every society intent on moving beyond the kinship-primitive becomes an authoritarian, violent, unrestrained monarchy. There is no skipping an evolutionary stage. As impossible, for instance, as going from post-puberty to true adulthood without bothering with adolescence.

To anticipate some usual disagreements, it is important to state three things that evolutionary theory does not say. First, especially in reference to social evolution, the theoretical structure does not indicate that there is an imperative to evolve that all societies must go on to the next level of social development. A society in the primitive-kinship-tribal stage can remain in that stage—especially barring any contact with more advanced societies—forever. Why certain societies in that stage independently undertook that progress to complex society, and why others did not, is a great theoretical question, and no attempt will be made to answer it here.

Second, the theory of evolutionary stages says absolutely nothing, in itself, about moral progress. Evolutionary progress by stages is one thing. Moral progress is clearly a separate thing. The two may be deeply related, but they have to be established by two separate arguments. Both Lloyd deMause and I believe that moral progress is intimately related to—and a result of—evolutionary development. Ironically, there may be complex occasions when an evolutionary advance in one area brings moral regress in other areas. My work on the great developmental advance from primitive to complex society is entitled At the Dawn of Tyranny. One could even have a theory of evolutionary stages which included a greater and greater moral regress. The only one I know of is a mythical one of the ancient Greek poet Hesiod in which society has gone from a golden to a silver to an iron age.

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Third, a theory of societal or psychological evolution through stages should not imply that evolutionary regress is not possible. Or even, in some cases, inevitable. The great historical stage of early Modernity—Renaissance and Reformation, most particularly—evolved into the stage of full Modernity in which we are all living. But that development also brought us, among other things, fascism: one of the worst cases of moral regression in human history. That regression, of course, was a direct result of the evolutionary and moral developments of Modernity. The one thing that every form of fascism announced is the rejection of Modernity; fascists are prepared to kill those who insist we must accept Modernity. I imagine by analogy the same is true of psychic development. The failure to embrace the next stage of psychic development may not end only in a stable compromise, but it also may produce many manifestations of psychological regression.

So then, my conclusion is yes to the “Do we need evolutionary theory?” question. We cannot truly understand the great movement of history without it. However, it is equally important to assert that, as yet, we do not have an adequate developmental/ evolutionary theoretical structure. We have pieces of what I imagine will ultimately become such an adequate theory, and I intend to talk about those pieces, three pieces to be exact. In essence, then, this discussion becomes a prolegomena of a future full theory of psychic and social evolution. I intend, consequently, to discuss what valuable elements of such a theory we do possess and to suggest how they may be put together—actually, must be put together—in order to create such an elaborate theoretical structure.

The first of such elements are the political and sociological theories of social evolution. The ancestor of these is Marxism. Whatever one may conclude about the validity of Marxist views on social and economic history, one must admit that Marxism did do the evolutionist job. It delineated the stages—certainly the most recent ones: Slavery to Feudalism to Capitalism to Socialism. It recognized that there was significant development within each stage: late Capitalism differed from Early Capitalism, although both

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were within the Capitalist realm. The development from one stage to a new one, however, required a qualitatively different kind of energy. Such institutionalization of a new stage was pronounced a “revolution.” The bourgeois revolution replaced Feudalism with Capitalism with Socialism. The Proletarian Revolution would replace Capitalism with Socialism. It was all inevitable and there is no skipping of a stage, no going from Feudalism to Socialism. Unlike Lenin who thought he had the omnipotent power to do just that, Marx was profoundly skeptical. His initial reaction to the Paris Commune was negative; he felt it was premature because the development between stages was ironbound.

Marxist evolutionary theory—so-called Historical Materialism—in the person of Engels also addressed and sought to answer one of the most difficult questions of all within evolutionary theory: What is the energy, or energies, driving the process? What is the “Engine of History?” For Engels the engine was greed. The desire for more and more goods produces technological change, which in turn creates radically new “modes of production,” which in turn engender radically new “relations of production.” These latter refer to class relationships in society, most particularly the question of which class is dominant. The windmill equals Feudalism equals the domination of an aristocratic feudal class. The steam engine equals Capitalism equals the domination of the bourgeoisie. On the surface, yes, a materialist explanation, but even here, below the surface is the assumption of a psychological first principle: that human nature exhibits a profound, overwhelming desire for more and more goods, which desire overrules any other consideration. Here again, one may agree or disagree with Engels’ conclusion, but one must admire the risk of taking on the fundamental question. Later on, when I address the notion of the development of the psyche, it will be necessary to raise again the question of the “Engine of History.”

The association of Marxism with any evolutionary social theory—especially any one that had a dimension of moral progress—proved enormously damaging, in the second half of the 20^th century, to all consideration of any other developmental/evolution-

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ary social thought. As the experience of those societies calling themselves Marxist became humanly catastrophic—Soviet Russia, Mao’s Cultural Revolution, Pol Pot—for theoreticians and intellectuals Marxism became anathema, having no contemporary relevance, to be put on the historical shelf along with Locke and Hobbes. Evolutionary theory suffered from guilt by association, so that when a new, exciting, and viable theoretical structure arose, the number of those who were interested, or could make use of the new hypothesis, turned out to be remarkably small. Its impact was minimal. It did not go into oblivion, however, and this session today is one testimony to its endurance.

That late modern theory of social evolution begins with the work and influence of Talcott Parsons. Parsons had a most complex theoretical career. He began as an expositor—and significant elaborator of—the sociology of Weber and Durkheim, and others related to that oeuvre. A professor and chair of a department at Harvard University, he had a wide influence on a group of very serious graduate students who became professors of sociology in their own right. In the latter part of his life, however, something remarkable happened. He went into serious psychoanalytic analysis several times a week. I can attest to this possibly private account, because we were seeing the same doctor in Cambridge, and several times he had the session just previous to mine. As a result of that experience, Parsons proceeded to write a series of essays on what can only be designated psychoanalytic sociology. No one had quite done what Parsons attempted: integrate the discourse of society and psychoanalysis into one theoretical structure. I have taught those essays and can attest to their remarkable success: such as “The Superego and the Theory of Social Systems,” and “The Father Symbol: An Appraisal in the Light of Psychoanalytic and Sociological Theory.” (In Social Structure and Personality.) The concept of the superego, Parsons says, is the great bridge between psychoanalysis and sociology. One would have thought that insight would open the gates for a wide, productive discussion of what exactly, in social terms, is the superego. It did not happen. The number of peo-

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ple in both the psychoanalytic and sociological communities who even know of these works—leastwise, have read them—is remarkably small. So far, a treasure is lost.

Parsons then went on to do something equally singular. He became interested in and committed to a non-Marxist, sociological theory of social evolution. He invited two gifted former students—Robert Bellah and S. N. Eisenstadt—to join him in giving a seminar on the evolution of societies. The understanding was that each of the three, including Parsons, would then write and publish something on the subject. Parsons went on to publish two books on the evolution of societies. Bellah published a very powerful essay, “Religious Evolution.” Eisenstadt became a leader of sociological theory and teaching in Israel, with a strong interest in social evolution.

What I like to call the Parsons-Bellah theory of social evolution is, primarily, brilliantly descriptive. It sets out to accurately describe the stages in social evolution from the beginning of human existence. It asserts, as a first principle that the development and evolution in human society has proceeded, not just by small increments of change, but has, at certain points, created wholly new stages of social life. Each one of these stages has its own, unique, individual, new system of values and institutions. Each exhibits its own religious system, its own system of values, its own political system, and its own forms of social cohesion—that which holds society together. These systems and forms can change radically from one stage to another. For example, in the Primitive stage, the overwhelming form of social cohesion is kinship. In the Complex and Archaic stages, political domination and loyalty become as important as kinship.

The primary thrust of the Parsons-Bellah theoretical system is to accurately designate these stages and to describe, with as great an insight as possible, what the nature of society was at a particular stage. They postulate five great stages of human social evolution: Primitive, Archaic, Historic, Early Modern, and Modern. Bellah’s essay on religious evolution is a description of the nature and val-

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ues of religion in each social stage. My own view of Bellah’s sequence of stages is that in the earliest stages of society it needs a certain modification: that before the Archaic it is not accurate to postulate only the one stage Primitive. Primitive also can be designated Kinship Society or Tribal Society. I feel it is more accurate to postulate two stages instead of one: firstly, that of hunters and gatherers as the very first stage, and secondly the neolithic stage of the Primitive-Tribal. Between the Primitive and the Archaic, my work titled The Dawn of Tyranny asserts that there was a crucial new stage succeeding the Primitive, which I designate Complex Society: non-literate but politically complex authoritarian monarchical regimes: ancient Hawaii and Tahiti; the great early kingdoms of Africa. One fascinating support of this position is that human sacrifice, except for extremely rare cases, did not exist in Primitive Tribal society. In early Complex societies it begins and grows increasingly important as these societies develop politically to the point where, in the great kingdoms, it is rampageous, becoming a fundamental religious ritual. Then, as society evolves into the Archaic (early Egypt or China) we have a few traces of such sacrifice; and then it almost disappears. Would not such a phenomenon of a radical change in the nature of sacrifice indicate the existence of a separate social stage?

The Parsons-Bellah system represents a powerful insight into human history and should be used by any theory of social evolution, but it is not a complete theory. It is an essential one of what I am calling here the pieces of the future complete theory. It makes no attempt, for instance, to relate social evolution to the development of the psyche. It does not include anything specifically on the evolution of childrearing, which we will look at presently. Although there are certain passing thoughts and hints, it does not address boldly the question of the engine of history. It does, nonetheless, whether modified or not, provide a solid theoretical schema that cannot be ignored by any future evolutionary theory.

We come now to the second piece, or the second pillar, of our future complex theory of social evolution, which involves a dis-

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cussion of the psychological and sociological theories of deMause. Lloyd deMause has advanced four very difficult and important theoretical propositions. First, he has put the history of childrearing at the very center of social change and evolution. After the “Evolution of Childhood,” a most impressive and detailed work, we are obliged to ask of every stage of society not only what was its religion, its politics, its social system, its system of values, but also, what was its predominant mode of raising children—or, we may add in parenthesis—of degrading children.

Second, deMause has theoretically arranged the various modes of childrearing into an evolutionary schema, which of necessity involves the postulation of stages and the inevitable, nonarbitrary movement from stage to stage, assuming that movement occurs. For him, all this evolutionary movement is a morally progressive movement: each stage more humane, healthier psychologically, and more mature than the one it replaces. Lloyd deMause’s way of putting it is that the further one goes back into history—into social evolution—the less humane, the more destructive of psychic health is the predominant mode of childrearing. True history is the history of the gradual development of a humane, healthy psyche.

Third, he has emphasized the parallels, the correspondences between the actual circumstances of childrearing in any particular stage and a specific stage in the development/ evolution of the psyche. The psyche evolves in stages; each new stage is manifest in a new mode of bringing children to adulthood. It becomes, necessarily, not only a theory of the evolution of childrearing, but a theory of the development of the psyche itself.

Fourth, the correspondences are asserted between the combined evolution of psyche and childrearing and the evolutionary stages in society itself. A quick example, at this point, will help illustrate the manner in which the theory is constructed. The stage of society which succeeds the previous one of the Middle Ages is designated “Renaissance.” It, in turn, evolves into the Modern stage. The mode of childrearing in the Renaissance stage was “intrusive,” which corresponds to that stage of psychic develop-

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ment deMause designates as “Depressive”—a progressive development from the preceding stage “Borderline” and leading, ultimately, to the more mature stage “Neurotic.” Thus, we have delineated three separate sequences of evolution development. 1. For the Psyche: Borderline, Intrusive, Neurotic. 2. For Childrearing: Ambivalent, Intrusive, Socializing. 3. For Society: Middle Ages, Renaissance, Modern. These three developmental sequences are ultimately related, one to the others. A new grand theory of psychosocial evolution will depend upon an elaboration of those relationships.

One can, obviously—and more than that, one should—without challenging the fundamental theoretical approach, which is unquestionably valid, in my view—raise certain questions, or even objections, to specific details in this most complex theoretical schema. Before questions, however, one sympathetic observation: the theory is by no means simplistic. Evolutionary thrust does not mean that regression is not possible. In fact, in certain circumstances regression occurs as a result of evolutionary progress. Individuation—an undoubted progressive advance—produces its own new anxieties, which are defended against with regressive behavior. “As people experience growth panic due to individualization,” he writes, “as memories of early traumas threaten to surface, they switch into alters and restage their anger, guilt and punishment in religious rituals” (“The Evolution of Psyche and Society,” The Journal of Psychohistory 29 #3 [Winter 2002], p. 240). When addressing the question of why the witch craze surfaced with such power at the beginning of the modern world, he states: “If the craze is seen as a reaction to growth panic it becomes explainable” (p. 277). Such a complex and ambiguous view finds a very sympathetic response in me, since I have tried to elaborate the same phenomenon in a different context. Observing that nothing moves forward without cost, I have amplified the concept of the great promise and great anxiety of the modern world. Modernity promises—and delivers—a new world. But it is not only good news. The level of individual anxiety rises precipitously, and has to be dealt

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with in a healthy manner—or else. The two great social manifestations of the modern world are a significant number of stable democratic societies, which include women—and fascism.

The very best of social theories do two things. They give us insight into the nature of human history, but they also raise new questions, the answers to which require pushing the theory forward. Having reflected on what de Mause’s theoretical structure offers, one is left with certain fundamental queries. What causes what? Where does the process of moving forward begin? Is the evolution of childrearing the most significant casual energy, pushing the psyche and society to evolve? Or does each of the three areas of evolution—psyche, society, childrearing—have its own independent source of energy? We are back again to the great “engine of history” question, or maybe the “engines of history” question.

One powerful way to begin to solve these problems is to undertake a detailed, deep, imaginative investigation of the actual circumstances of the transition from one social stage to the next. What was going on during that period in the transformation of the psyche, in the characteristic mode of childrearing, in the political-economic-religious institutions within society? For instance, deMause postulates that the Renaissance stage evolved into the Modern. Why, in our three areas of evolution, did that happen? In this circumstance, we have one very significant place to begin our inquiry. It’s called the Reformation. Between the Renaissance and the birth of the Modern comes the Reformation, and for the Reformation we have an enormous amount of data on psyche, society, and childrearing. I realize that in this regard, I am speaking only to young people, who have a lifetime to devote to one era of history. In terms of understanding the world, nonetheless, nothing could be more important. Lloyd deMause and some others have done some of this, unquestionably, but I know of no single work that one can hold up and shout “This is it!”

The one area of deMause’s theoretical structure that I do feel needs careful questioning is the subject of the early stages in society. That is, society before what he designated Antiquity

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(Greece and Rome). Before we get to Greece and Rome, he postulates only one stage of society: Tribal. By Tribal I assume he means these societies which have also been designated Primitive, Kinship Societies: non-literate peoples who were the main subject of anthropologists for 75 years: Zuni, Nuer, Kwakiutl, etc. etc. In my view, to go from Hunters and Gatherers to Ancient Greece in one leap is too much. It cannot represent only one stage of social evolution. The Parsons-Bellah scheme suggests Primitive to Archaic before arriving at the Historic. The modified Parsons-Bellah theory, which I am sympathetic to, postulates a stage before the Tribal/ Primitive: that of Hunters and Gatherers, paleolithic peoples before the invention of agriculture. Also, a stage of Complex Society: non-literate kingdoms, between the Tribal/ Primitive and the Archaic. If one accepts this further differentiation, four stages of society can be observed before we get to ancient Greece: Hunters/ Gatherers, Tribal/ Primitive, Complex Society, Archaic. It can be cogently argued, I believe, that these four represent fundamental stages of development in all areas: social cohesion, politics, economics, religion, forms of social aggression, psychic maturity, and childrearing.

It is not helpful, I feel, to refer to the particular attributes of all four stages as indicative of only a single stage. For instance, deMause has elaborated at length on the catastrophic childrearing in Tribal/ Primitive New Guinea, and postulated that this is the model of all childrearing in the pre-Antiquity stage. On the other hand, Elizabeth Marshall Thomas, who went with her father, mother, and brother to be one of the first people to live with the Bushman in the Kalahari desert, when the latter were still hunters and gatherers, has recently published a book from old data called The Old Way. She would find the New Guinea standard of child-destruction alien to the Bushman world. I am not saying that the Hunter-Gatherer mode of childrearing was more humane or mature than the world of Primitive-Tribal societies. But I do want to suggest that the question is open, and that the further differentiation of the pre-Antiquity stages would assist us in, ultimately, finding the answer.

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Allow me to mention a couple of small quibbles about what data belongs in what category. Lloyd deMause refers to early headhunters and cannibals as if both peoples belonged in the same stage of social development, which contradicts one of the exciting things I discovered in working on my cannibal book. Not always, but in general, I found that those societies engaged in widespread, complicated rituals of headhunting were not cannibals. In general, cannibals were not also headhunters. The theoretical excitement arose from the realization that the explanation of this phenomenon came from a different realm of evolution: that of the psyche. The cannibal eats his victim, who then disappears. The headhunter keeps all his heads as trophies decorating his hut. The more heads, the more man. The heads are like capital—money in the bank. The oral cannibal gets transformed into the anal headhunter. The intense oral aggression can be given up and sublimated only when an adequate anal substitute is institutionalized. Who said we no longer need Freud?

A much greater loss is suffered by not adopting the notion of an Archaic stage directly preceding that of the Historic/ Antiquity. The Archaic includes, among other societies, Sumeria, Babylonia, Egypt, Persia, Early China, and Early India. These societies were not in the same stage as the Greeks and Romans and ancient Israel. They did, however, prepare the ground for the birth of these world-shaking cultures. Parsons designates ancient Greece and Israel as “seed-bed societies.” We cannot understand the whole future history of the world—up to, and including, the late Modern world we live in—without comprehending the role Greece and Israel have played in social evolution. Furthermore, Greece and Israel themselves could not have existed without the Archaic stage that preceded them. Let me give just one example: think of the influence of Sumeria and Babylonia on the Jewish Bible. These Archaic civilizations were exhibiting their own particular, unique mode of politics, social cohesion, moral values, religion, economics, and childrearing—this, for me, is a matter of first principle.

To conclude this particular section on the evolutionary the-

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ory of Lloyd deMause, let me propose that I do not understand it as the end of the journey, but as a great jumping-off place from which to leap forward.

Our third and last piece, or pillar, of a comprehensive evolutionary theory would be a far-reaching, encyclopedic theory of the development of the psyche, from birth to the mature adult in the Late Modern world. Having such, we could then relate those stages of psychic development to the corresponding ones of society and childrearing. We do not, however, have such a theoretical structure. We have important pieces and brilliant insights; we have several places to start. Enormously important work has been done by Freud, Piaget, Melanie Klein, Margaret Mahler, Daniel Stern, and others. We would like to be able to draw the exact correspondences between the stages of psychic and social evolution. Such an activity, I am sure, would help us to more accurately understand the great “engine of history” question.

At one point, I postulated that the development of the psyche is the paradigm for the evolution of society and culture. Three significant parallels led me to that proposition. The first was the development from greater to lesser and lesser magic; also, from omnipotence to non-omnipotent power. The healthy, mature movement of the psyche is one of gradually renouncing magical views of the world, and magical means to one’s ends. The evolution of religion in world history, as delineated so brilliantly by Bellah, is precisely on the same course. The great book to read confirming this is Keith Thomas’ Religion and the Decline of Magic.

Secondly, the psyche develops from an emphasis on shame to an emphasis on guilt. One can, legitimately, discipline a small child with the use of shame. One does so to a child, after a certain age, only by implying it is still an infant. Guilt becomes one important mechanism for the building of a strong conscience: you cannot do that! Here again, the evolution of society is precisely in the same direction. Primitive-Kinship-Tribal societies are shame cultures. Only a certain evolution of religion makes guilt a primary means of moral and social control. E. R. Dodds’ marvelous chap-

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ter, “From Shame Culture to Guilt Culture,” is a revelation. This only happens when society itself evolves to a certain point: for Dodds, ancient Greece; for Parsons-Bellah, a little bit in the Archaic and fully in the Historic; for deMause, that stage he designates “Antiquity.”

The third striking parallel between psychic and social evolution is in the mode of legitimate social aggression. I have already referred to the movement from cannibalism to headhunting: from oral to anal aggression. There is always a particular form of social aggression; the evolution of society, therefore, depends upon the sublimation of aggression from a more primitive to a more healthy psychological form. The path of that sublimation—within society—is dictated by the path of a healthy developing psyche. Joseph Schumpeter underlined it brilliantly. Capitalism, he said, was the first stage of society where a man could prove he was a man without killing somebody. The universal need is for men to prove their manliness. The evolutionary possibilities: to sublimate that need into an increasingly humane, healthy, moral mode of living. We are aware today—especially since the 1960’s—that one can prove one’s manliness not by embracing, but by rejecting all that capitalist competitiveness, domination, and destructiveness. Again, the sublimation of aggression, within both the psyche and society, is one of the great journeys of history. The central problem of our political world today, especially in this great country of ours, is precisely how much we are willing to sublimate and renounce the drives towards domination and destruction.

On the largest question of all—creating a grand, global theory of psychic evolution—I admit to a certain inadequacy on my part; not to create such a thing, which goes without saying, but even to understand much of what has been offered thus far. For instance, I have never quite grasped the Melanie Klein evolutionary stages: Schizoid, Paranoid, Depressive. My imagination fails to enlighten me on what it feels like to be in each of these stages, even though I did publish a book on political and social paranoia and the task of going beyond it.

Lloyd deMause, however, has not been reluctant to under-

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take this task. To each of his seven stages of social evolution he has assigned a one-word description of what he calls “Personality.” Personality, for me, seems to indicate the particular stage of psychic development that corresponds to the parallel stage of social evolution. Thus, we get Schizoid, Narcissist, Masochist, Borderline, Depressive, Neurotic, Individuated. I am incapable of passing judgment—even a superficial one—on this evolutionary schema. What I would love to witness someday is a discussion between someone who has such a capacity and Lloyd deMause. I am sure it would prove enlightening. Meanwhile, we remain hungry for the longed-for great global theory of psychic evolution, with extended examples and arguments, containing our illustrated three pillars—and maybe more.

So, I come to the end of my prolegomena on a future grand theory of the evolution of society. Let us all go to work!

[Editor’s note: This paper was first given as a presentation at the International Association of Psychohistory on June 4, 2008, followed by a comment by David Beisel.]

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