Volume 18 - Number 2 - September 2011
Pages: 123 - 247

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BLIND SPOTS AND TRAUMATIC REENACTMENT
SYMPOSIUM

Summers, F. (2011). Denial or mistake? Clio’s Psyche, 18(2), 177-179.

https://doi.org/10.70763/8e0384779e58ce2af40eb365b318cc32

Denial or Mistake ?

response article

Abstract

In this response to the symposium “The Psychology of Blind Spots and Traumatic Reenactment,” the author, a practicing psychoanalyst, addresses David R. Beisel’s lead essay “Military and Diplomatic Blind Spots and Traumatic Reenactments.” That essay describes a recurring U.S. pattern of provocation, denial of its effects, and shock at a subsequent attack, citing the oil embargo on Japan before Pearl Harbor and the overthrow of Iran’s government before the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The author endorses the analogy between the behavior patterns of individuals and of nations. He distinguishes outcomes with psychological causes from outcomes that are motivated, illustrating the distinction with a clinical example from his practice. He questions whether the U.S. unconsciously wished to be attacked and proposes instead that national hubris may lead leaders to deny the consequences of aggressive conduct, so that the pattern is meaningful but not purposeful. He suggests that Bollas’s concept of violent innocence fits the pattern Beisel describes. He contrasts it with the conduct of McNamara and Westmoreland in sanitizing Vietnam War news for President Johnson, which he argues is explicable only as a refusal to believe the war was being lost. He concludes that historians who decline to look for meaning in such patterns risk a form of denial themselves.

Keywords:

aggression, American foreign policy, blind spots, David Beisel, denial, political blunders, psychoanalysis, psychohistory, repetitive behaviors, traumatic attack, unconscious mechanisms, victimhood

David Beisel’s very thoughtful paper documents a series of violent historical events that appeared to come as a surprise, but the pattern of innocence, traumatic attack, and victimization is so repetitive that Beisel justifiably questions whether there is more here than a disconnected series of political blunders.

Beisel sees a pattern of U.S. provocation, denial of the effects of the provocation, and then shock when the consequences appear in the form of a “surprise” attack. For example, missing from American accounts of Pearl Harbor is our oil embargo on Japan, and absent from U.S. narratives of the Iranian takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran is our deposing the only democratic government Iran ever had and imposing in its stead a ruthless dictator. He then raises the question of whether the U.S. was seeking these attacks. Such a record of victimization, he suggests, may be similar to a patient’s pattern of arranging unconsciously to be victim of others’ aggression.

First, I believe Dr. Beisel is correct to make the analogy between behavioral patterns among individuals and nations. When one can make a list of unanticipated attacks for which warning signals were available but unheeded, there is no reason not to question whether such a pattern has meaning.

I can say as a practicing psychoanalyst that it seems shortsighted to not inquire into the meaning of any pattern of national events. However, I believe it is important to make the distinction between the psychological and the motivated. Results from psychological causes are not necessarily specifically motivated by the psychological factors that underlie them. For example, I once had a patient who could not find a suitable romantic partner, but hated being alone. The analytic work revealed not that she did not want a partner, but that her desperation for attachment was so great that her expectations and demands drove men away, leaving her in the state she most feared. The meaning of her loneliness was that her

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abandonment anxiety and need to control men drove them away. The result was loneliness, at least until the issues were resolved analytically, but the motive was not to be alone, quite the contrary. Much neurosis is this way: the same issues that cause the problem make its resolution difficult.

One may apply the same analysis to the historical events in question. The U.S. keeps being surprised by attacks, but is that because there is an unconscious wish to be attacked or is there another psychological issue in play that results in lack of preparation for invasion? For example, it may be that national hubris leads U.S. leaders to deny there are negative consequences of aggressive U.S. behavior because we do not wish to be limited in our power to control events, even though the behavior is provocative to other countries and results in the U.S. becoming the victim it fears. Many national weaknesses can result in an outcome that is undesirable, and, in such cases the national behavior is meaningful, but not purposeful.

Moreover, the situation is complicated; Dr. Beisel points out that these attacks are often provoked by U.S. behavior, although its provocative nature is not recognized in our country. Indeed, Christopher Bollas’ concept of “violent innocence” would seem to fit well the national behavior described here (Being a Character, 1992). The term refers to individuals who provoke strong responses from others in a presumably passive, indirect manner so that they appear to be oblivious to the impact of their behavior, resulting in a claim of innocence and victimization. Examples include the sexually provocative woman who seems to be shocked when sexual advances are directed her way, or the cutting insult delivered as a “joke” followed by surprise when the target of the attack takes offense. It seems to me that Dr. Beisel is reporting something analogous in his depiction of U.S. provocations, which are then denied when the object of the provocation responds, and the national response is to feel victimized by an act of aggression for which the U.S. is regarded as innocent.

Such motivated inability to confront reality would not be the same psychological process as Defense Secretary McNamara and General Westmoreland sanitizing the Vietnam War news for President Johnson. Presumably, McNamara and Westmoreland feared

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that if Johnson knew the truth, he would want to change policy, possibly even resort to withdrawing troops. While both men were undoubtedly motivated by the desire to pursue a policy on which they had staked their reputations, one wonders what they thought they could ultimately achieve. If the real news was so bad it might have led to troop withdrawal, then how did they expect the war to be won? Their behavior is explainable only on the basis that they did not believe in the reality that was staring them in the face. Confronted with a military defeat that threatened their reputations and judgment, they resorted to magical, omnipotent thinking: if we refuse to believe we are losing, we will not lose. Again, this pathetic denial cost lives—in this case, millions.

Finally, I wish to emphasize that in my view, Dr. Beisel has made a very important contribution. For historians to ignore patterns of historical events and fail to even attempt to discern their meaning is to leave a lacuna where perhaps the greatest benefit of historical analysis could be achieved. Such an abdication of the historian’s role to glean lessons from history is to turn a blind eye to historical events and circumstances that are before them. That is, historians are selectively refusing to explore the results of historical inquiry. If historians refuse to acknowledge that such patterns exist and make no effort to understand them, is that not their own form of denial?

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About the author

Frank Summers

Frank Summers, PhD, ABPP, is president of the Division of Psychoanalysis of the American Psychological Association, and Professor of Clinical Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences at the Feinberg School of Medicine, Northwestern University. He is a Supervising and Training Analyst at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis and the Chicago Center for Psychoanalysis. His most recent book is The Psychoanalytic Vision: The Experiencing Subject, Transcendence, and the Therapeutic Process (2013), and he may be contacted at franksumphd@gmail.com.

How to cite this article

Summers, F. (2011). Denial or mistake? Clio’s Psyche, 18(2), 177-179.

https://doi.org/10.70763/8e0384779e58ce2af40eb365b318cc32

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